text,y,yhat "Holocaust-Era Insurance Claims: Background and Proposed Legislation. In November 1998, U.S. insurance regulators, six European insurers, international Jewish organizations, and the State of Israel agreed to establish the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC). ICHEIC was tasked with identifying policyholders and administering payment of hundreds of thousands of Holocaust-era insurance policies alleged never to have been honored by European insurance companies. It ended its claims process in March 2007, having facilitated the payment of just over $300 million to 47,353 claimants. An additional $190 million was allocated to a ""humanitarian fund"" for Holocaust survivors and Holocaust education and remembrance. Throughout its existence, ICHEIC was criticized, including by some Members of Congress, for delays in its claims process, for conducting its activities with a lack of transparency, and for allegedly honoring an inadequate number of claims. Although they acknowledge initial delays in the claims process, ICHEIC supporters—among them successive U.S. Administrations and European governments—argue that the process was fair and comprehensive, especially given the unprecedented legal and historical complexities of the task. Members of Congress have shown a long-standing interest in seeking to obtain compensation for Holocaust survivors and their heirs for unpaid insurance policies. Hearings before the House Committee on Government Reform between 2001 and 2003 exposed broad criticism of ICHEIC, and legislation proposed in the 107th-111th Congresses sought to provide survivors alternative legal mechanisms to pursue claims. These proposals were never enacted and were opposed by U.S. Administrations, which considered ICHEIC the exclusive vehicle for resolving Holocaust-era insurance claims. ICHEIC's closure, and growing concern about the well-being of aging survivors—now predominantly over 80 years old—have reignited congressional interest in Holocaust-era insurance and other compensation issues. In March 2011, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Senator Bill Nelson introduced companion legislation in the House and the Senate (H.R. 890 and S. 466) that would affirm Holocaust survivors' and their heirs' right to pursue claims against European insurance companies in U.S. courts and would prohibit executive agreements reached by the federal government from preempting state laws that impose disclosure requirements on European insurers. Critics of the proposed legislation argue that by effectively reversing past commitments made by the U.S. government, the bills could damage future cooperation with European governments on other Holocaust compensation and restitution issues. Furthermore, they contend that the legislation would enable costly, but likely fruitless, litigation. This report aims to inform consideration of H.R. 890 and S. 466 and possible alternatives by providing: background on Holocaust-era compensation and restitution issues, an overview of ICHEIC, including criticism and support of its claims process and Administration policy on ICHEIC, and an overview of litigation on Holocaust-era insurance claims and the proposed legislation.",82,81 "Summit of the Americas II, April 18-19, 1998: Background, Objectives, and Expectations. President William Clinton will attend Summit of the Americas II in Santiago, Chile, on April 18-19 1998, with 34 democratic Presidents and Prime Ministers from Latin American and Caribbean countries expected to attend. This is a follow up to Summit of the Americas I hosted by President Clinton in Miami in December 1994. The 1994 Miami Summit created a Plan of Action with 23 initiatives in four major areas. Under the leadership of various countries and organizations, these initiatives have been advanced, and major agreements have been concluded and are in the process of being implemented. The 1998 Santiago Summit will focus on four major items: (1) promoting education, including programs for children, adults, and disadvantaged groups, (2) strengthening democracy and human rights, including cooperation against illicit drug trafficking, (3) promoting economic integration, including procedures for negotiation of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), and (4) eradicating poverty and discrimination, including programs to protect women and indigenous populations. The United States Congress may be particularly interested in plans to launch FTAA negotiations, proposals to strengthen multilateral drug control efforts, and cooperation initiatives to promote educational and socioeconomic reforms. CRS products related to this topic include: Trade and the Americas, CRS Issue Brief IB95017 by Raymond J. Ahearn.",85,85 "Child Welfare Financing: An Issue Overview. Child welfare programs are designed to protect children from abuse or neglect. Services may be offered to stabilize and strengthen a child's own home. If this is not a safe option for the child however, he or she may be placed in foster care while efforts to improve the home are made. In those instances where reuniting the child with his or her parents is found to be impossible, a child welfare agency must seek a new permanent (often adoptive) home for the child. In FY2003, the most recent year for which complete data are available, the federal government provided states with some $6.9 billion in funding dedicated to child welfare purposes. Most of this funding is authorized under Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. Apart from these dedicated federal child welfare funds, however, states also use non-dedicated federal funds--including the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, Medicaid, and the Social Services Block Grant--to meet child welfare needs. The most recent data available (for state fiscal year 2002) suggests that states spent at least $4.8 billion in non-dedicated funds for child welfare purposes. While non-dedicated funding streams have increased resources to child welfare agencies, current legislative and administrative proposals may jeopardize their continued use for child welfare. The way that the federal government distributes dedicated child welfare money to states has been criticized as inflexible, out of sync with federal child welfare policy goals, and antiquated. Because most dedicated federal child welfare funding (about 65% in FY2003) may be used only for foster care, critics charge that states have inadequate funds to prevent removal of children from their homes or to allow children to be reunited with their parents. In addition, a state's ability to claim most of the dedicated child welfare funds is directly related to the number of foster and adoptive children it assists who meet the income, family structure, and other program rules of the now defunct Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program (as that program existed on July 16, 1996). Attention to federal child welfare financing has focused almost exclusively on dedicated child welfare funding streams and is driven in part by the belief that the current structure hampers the ability of state child welfare agencies to achieve positive outcomes for children. This assumption is not easy to prove. However, it is possible to say that the AFDC link, which ties federal funding in foster care and adoption assistance to increasingly antiquated income standards, over time, will erode the share of program costs for which states may seek federal reimbursement. Recent proposals to alter how dedicated federal child welfare funds are distributed included some that would link eligibility for federally supported foster care and adoption assistance to TANF income rules and others that would remove income restrictions entirely. The latter proposals, which would greatly expand the number of children for whom the federal government would be committed to providing support, have typically sought to cap (or block grant) some or all of what is now open-ended federal funding for foster care and adoption assistance and/or to reduce the share of costs paid for each eligible child by the federal government. This report will not be updated.",95,95 "General Management Laws: A Compendium. This report (hereafter ""compendium"") is a companion to CRS Report RL32388(pdf), General Management Laws: Major Themes and Management Policy Options. In combination, these reports have three main objectives: (1) to identify and describe the major management laws under which the executive branch of the federal government is required to operate, including their rationale, design and scope, (2) to assist Members of Congress and their staff in oversight of executive branch management, and (3) to help Congress when considering potential changes to the management laws themselves, as well as other legislation, including authorization statutes and appropriations. The compendium contains profiles of selected ""general management laws"" -- broad statutes designed to regulate the activities, procedures, and administration of all or most executive branch agencies. The quality of the general management laws, as well as their implementation, are considered crucial to maintaining the accountability of the executive branch to Congress, the President, and the public. Moreover, these laws influence the effectiveness of federal agencies when they implement, evaluate, and help formulate public policies. The compendium includes more than 90 separate entries that describe general management laws for the executive branch of the federal government. The entries in the compendium are organized into the following seven functional categories: (1) Information and Regulatory Management, (2) Strategic Planning, Performance Measurement, and Program Evaluation, (3) Financial Management Budget, and Accounting, (4) Organization, (5) Procurement and Real Property Management, (6) Intergovernmental Relations Management, and (7) Human Resources Management and Ethics. These categories include many laws and topics, including the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA section I.E.), Privacy Act (I.F.), Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA, I.G.), National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, I.L.), Data Quality Act (I.O., increasingly known as the Information Quality Act (IQA)), Inspector General Act (II.A.), Government Performance and Results Act (II.B.), Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (III.D.), Budget Enforcement Act (III.E.), Government Corporation Control Act (IV.A.), Davis-Bacon Act (V.F.), Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA, VI.C.), Hatch Act (VII.A.(5) and VII.A.(29)), Ethics in Government Act (VII.B.), Federal Tort Claims Act (VII.E.), and issues like information security (section I), improper payments (section III), services acquisition and contracting (section V), and federal employees and civil service laws (e.g., the National Security Personnel System at the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security personnel system (section VII.A)). For each entry in the compendium, one or more CRS analysts present a brief history of the general management law, describe the law's major provisions, discuss key developments and issues and provide source readings for readers who want more information. The compendium reflects the status of general management laws at the end of the first session of the 108th Congress, and will be updated along with the companion report to reflect actions taken through the close of the 108th Congress.",55,56 "Electronic Banking: The Check Truncation Issue. The clearing process for checks is more expensive than other methods of payment which are cleared electronically, such as credit cards and Internet banking. The main reason is that check clearing requires banks to physically present and return checks unless they obtain legal agreements to clear electronically. The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-100) eliminates the requirement to physically return the original checks to the paying bank. Before the bill by the same title became law, on April 3, 2003, the Senate held its first hearing on the Fed's Check Truncation Act (CTA) proposal that was sent to banking committees of both Houses in December 2001. On June 5, 2003, the House passed H.R. 1474 and referred it to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. On June 18, 2003, at a markup, the Senate Banking Committee approved its Check Truncation Act of 2003 (S. 1334) and on June 27, 2003 the full Senate passed S. 1334 and incorporated it in H.R. 1474. On October 1, 2003, House and Senate conferees reported H.R. 1474 (Conference Report H.Rept. 108-291). On October 28, 2003, President Bush signed the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (P.L. 108-100) into law, which is now also known as Check 21 Act. Estimates of cost savings from moving to electronic check clearing vary widely because estimates of the cost of using a check and the number of checks written each year remain in dispute. Consequently, estimates of cost savings range from $1.4 billion annually for truncation alone to $68 billion for replacing checks with electronic payments. In testimony at the hearing of Senate and House banking committees in the 108th Congress, the Fed's CTA in the Senate and H.R. 1474 in the House were supported by the Federal Reserve Board, which testified that it would like to remove some of the consumer protection provisions that were in its 2001 proposal because they were unnecessary. The Fed argued that the regulatory costs these provisions would place on banks would outweigh the consumer benefits. Still, the bill is supported by America's Community Bankers, the American Bankers Association, the Consumer Bankers Association, and the Financial Services Roundtable. The opposition to the Check 21 Act came from the Consumers Union, supported in its testimony by the Consumer Federation of America, the U.S. Public Interest Research Group, and the National Consumer Law Center. The Consumers Union argued that the Act would make it impossible for an estimated 45.8 million U.S. households who are currently getting their paper checks back to continue to do so. These consumers would be less protected from fraud under the Act than under the existing check clearing process when there are disputes about check payments. The Consumers Union's suggested changes in the proposed legislation would significantly increase consumer protection. At the same time, these changes would increase financial institutions' costs of voluntarily adopting check truncation. Other witnesses argued that those banks with decades of using truncated checks have not experienced many disputed check payments, and when they did they were quickly resolved. This report will be updated as legislative and financial developments warrant.",5,5 "Hong Kong: Ten Years After the Handover. In the 10 years that have passed since the reversion of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty, much has changed and little has changed. On the political front, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) has selected its first Chief Executive, only to have him step down and be replaced in a process not without some controversy. Meanwhile, belated changes by the British in the makeup of Hong Kong's Legislative Council (Legco) were initially undone, but subsequent changes in the Legco selection process have brought things back nearly full circle to where they stood prior to the Handover. There is also unease about the independence of Hong Kong's judicial system and the protection provided by Hong Kong's Basic Law in light of decisions made by the Chinese government. Similarly, the civil liberties of the people of Hong Kong remain largely intact. In part, this can be attributed to the increased politicization of the people of Hong Kong. The freedom of the press in Hong Kong is still strong, but also faces challenges—both on the legal front and from allegations of self-censorship on the part of the media owners reluctant to antagonize the People's Republic of China. Yet, even with these challenges, many Hong Kong residents do not appear to perceive a decline in their civil liberties since 1997. Economically, Hong Kong is still a major international financial center and a leading gateway into China. However, Hong Kong's economic interaction with the Chinese mainland has grown deeper and broader over the last 10 years than was expected, increasing the city's economic connections with China. This closer tie to the mainland is being bolstered by the signing of a free trade agreement in 2003, called the ""Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement,"" or CEPA, between China and Hong Kong. Current economic and trade dynamics have raised concerns that Hong Kong's relationship with China will shift in the long run from one of synergy to full integration, possibly undermining the HKSAR's ""high degree of autonomy."" Recent social and cultural trends appear to reflect some apprehension about the long-term implications of current economic and political trends. There has been a decline in Hong Kong's expatriate (""ex-pat"") community, including U.S. nationals. Also, there is a perception that Hong Kong's ""middle class"" is disappearing. Underlying many of these social and cultural trends is a redefinition of Hong Kong by its residents, indicating a closer identification with China. At present, few of these long-term trends have had a significant effect on Hong Kong's political or economic situation and its relations with the United States. Under the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-383), the United States treats Hong Kong as a separate entity in a variety of political and economic areas so long as the HKSAR remains ""sufficiently autonomous"" from China. While Hong Kong government continues to fulfill its obligations to the United States under existing bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, there are still some minor issues that might warrant action by Congress. This report will be revised as circumstances warrant.",85,85 "Loan Forgiveness for Public Service Employees Under the William D. Ford Direct Loan Program. The College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (CCRAA, P.L. 110-84) establishes a new loan forgiveness provision for borrowers of loans made under the William D. Ford Direct Loan (DL) program who are employed in public service jobs for 10 years during the repayment of their loans. Borrowers who make 120 monthly payments on or after October 2, 2007, according to specified repayment plan terms, while concurrently employed full-time in certain public service jobs, will have any loan balance of principal and interest remaining due after their 120th payment canceled or forgiven by the Secretary of Education. Since borrowers must make 120 monthly payments on or after October 2, 2007, while concurrently employed in public service jobs, borrowers will become eligible for loan forgiveness no earlier than 2017. This report provides a brief description of the DL program loan forgiveness provision for public service employees and identifies issues that may be addressed as it is implemented. It will be updated as warranted.",34,58 "Coverage of Vision Services under the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). A small but significant proportion of children have visual impairments. When detected early many childhood vision abnormalities are treatable, but the potential for correction and normal visual development diminishes with age. Under SCHIP, states may provide coverage by expanding Medicaid or creating a separate SCHIP program or both. Medicaid and SCHIP provide access to an array of vision-related services, including vision screening services that can help children in low- to moderate-income families overcome these difficulties. Medicaid's mandatory Early, and Periodic, Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) benefit ensures access to vision screening services for children. However, there are several other Medicaid benefit categories where vision screening services may be delivered. Often such services are billed as a part of a well-child visit. Under SCHIP, state-specific benefit packages must provide well-baby and well-child care, which includes a vision screening component. As with Medicaid, the well-child coverage requirement is not the only service category where children could receive vision screening under SCHIP. Children may also receive vision screening services under other SCHIP-covered services such as physician services. A June 2000 CRS benefits survey provides some clues as to access to vision services under SCHIP Medicaid expansion and separate state programs. At that time, nearly all Medicaid and SCHIP programs covered vision services for children, and most also covered eye glasses. The survey data indicates that the breadth of vision-related benefits available under these two programs likely differs within and across states. Coverage policies and benefit limits for the lowest-income children as described in state Medicaid plans are seldom absolute because of EPSDT. For nearly all Medicaid children, states are required to provide all federally allowed treatment to correct identified problems, even if the specific treatment needed is not otherwise covered under a state's Medicaid plan. As a result, when a Medicaid agency reports that a specific benefit is not covered for children, that means the service is available only when delivery of that service meets the EPSDT requirement. Services for higher-income children under SCHIP are sometimes more restrictive. Unlike Medicaid, but consistent with federal statute, separate SCHIP programs are modeled after private sector, commercial insurance products. The requirement to use benchmark plans (or actuarial equivalents of those plans), most of which are state employee health plans or commercial HMO plans, provides the framework for defining benefit limits. Under commercial insurance products benefits are always limited by medical necessity, but other limits may apply and will vary by insurance product, as do procedures to monitor for medical need and appropriateness. Payments to providers participating in these plans may be altered based on the outcome of such service utilization reviews, which can in turn affect access to care. This report will not be updated.",70,35 "Taiwan: The ""Three No's,"" Congressional-Administration Differences, and U.S. Policy Issues. The controversy between the Clinton Administration and congressional critics over President Clinton's public affirmation in Shanghai on June 30, 1998 of the so-called ""three no's"" regarding U.S. policy toward Taiwan is the latest episode in over 20 years of arguments between the Administration and the Congress over appropriate U.S. policy in the U.S.-People's Republic of China (PRC)-Taiwan relationship. The ""three no's"" involve U.S. non-support for: Taiwan independence, one China, one Taiwan, and Taiwan representation in international organizations where statehood is a requirement. Administration supporters argue that the ""three no's"" are consistent with past U.S. statements and do little damage to U.S. interests in Taiwan while discouraging movement in Taiwan toward political independence that might prompt a hostile PRC response. In contrast, many in Congress viewed the President as sacrificing U.S. interests and those of Taiwan for the sake of a smooth summit meeting in China. In response, they criticized the ""three no's"" and proposed resolutions in the Senate and House reaffirming support for Taiwan. The resolutions (S.Con.Res. 107 S.Con.Res. 30, and H.Con.Res. 301) passed in the weeks following the President's China trip. Sometimes acrimonious congressional-executive debate over the appropriate balance in U.S. policy toward Beijing and Taipei dates back at least to the 1970s, before the normalization of U.S. relations with the PRC and the cut off of official U.S. relations with Taiwan. The debate results from the executive branch's tendency to give priority to relations with Beijing over relations with Taiwan and the Congress' tendency to be more receptive to Taiwan concerns regardless of PRC sensitivities from often intense PRC-Taiwan competition for international, especially U.S., support, and from ambiguity in U.S. policy which appears at times to tilt in favor of PRC-backed positions but concurrently also strongly supports Taiwan. As Congress considers whether and how to further adjust U.S. policy in the wake of President Clinton's statement of the ""three no's,"" it can consider sets of questions in key areas of policy concern notably: the impact of the President's ""three no's"" declaration, the consequences of PRC-Taiwan rivalry for U.S. and other international support, prospects for parallel U.S. engagement with both Beijing and Taipei, the PRC-Taiwan military balance, the U.S. role in promoting PRC-Taiwan talks to ease tensions and promote better relations, and the U.S. policy approach toward Taiwan self- determination.",85,85 "Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2018 Budget and Appropriations. Nearly six months after the start of FY2018, the 115th Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 1625, P.L. 115-141, signed March 23, 2018), which provided FY2018 funding for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). Division K of the actState, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) provided a total of $54.18 billion, including Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds and rescissions. This represented a decrease of 6.1% from the FY2017 actual funding level. Of the total, $16.22 billion (not including rescissions) was for the Department of State, international broadcasting, and related agencies, a reduction of 10.7% as compared with FY2017 levels, and $37.99 billion (not including rescissions) was enacted for foreign operations, 4% below the FY2017 funding level. President Donald J. Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request to Congress on May 23, 2017. The request sought $40.25 billion (-30% compared with FY2017 enacted) for SFOPS, including Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds. Of this total, $13.20 billion (-27% compared with FY2017 enacted) would have been for Department of State Operations and related programs. For Foreign Operations, the FY2018 request included $27.05 billion (-31% compared with FY2017 enacted). The total OCO funds in the request amounted to $12.02 billion (-42% below FY2017 enacted, including the FY2017 supplemental, excluding the supplemental, it would have been -21%). The OCO designation has the important feature of not counting against the discretionary spending limits imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). Prominent issues in the SFOPS request included, among others, a reduction in annual appropriations for diplomatic security, contributions to international organizations and international peacekeeping, and educational and cultural exchange programs, a proposal to consolidate several bilateral foreign aid programs into one new account called the Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF), proposed elimination of some foreign operations entities, such as the Trade and Development Agency and the Inter-American Foundation, and a 44% reduction in humanitarian assistance, including a zeroing out of the P.L. 480 (Food for Peace) foreign food aid program. On July 24, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 3362, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018. The bill would have provided $47.5 billion in discretionary and mandatory funding for FY2018, including $12.02 billion for OCO (the same as requested). The text of H.R. 3362 was later incorporated into a consolidated spending bill, H.R. 3354, which passed the House on September 14, 2017. The total House funding level reflected a $7.3 billion (+18%) increase over the Administration request. On September 7, 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 1780 with a total of $51.35 billion in discretionary and mandatory funding for FY2018, including $20.79 billion (the same as the FY2017 enacted level) for OCO. This bill would have provided 42% more OCO funds than either the request or the House bill. The Senate SFOPS total funding level was $11.1 billion (22%) more than the Administration request and $3.8 billion (7%) more than the House bill. On September 7 and 8, 2017, the Senate and House respectively passed the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018, and Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2017 (H.R. 601, P.L. 115-56). As signed by the President on September 8, 2017, the act provided government funding (a continuing resolution, or CR) at the FY2017 rate, reduced by 0.6791%, through December 8, 2017. Subsequent CRs amended that date first to December 22, 2017, then to January 19, 2018, and then February 8, 2018. On February 9, 2018, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA, H.R. 1892, P.L. 115-123), which continued government funding through March 23, 2018, raised discretionary spending limits for FY2018 and FY2019, and extended direct spending reductions through FY2027. The act eased the FY2018 budget process and prevented a breach of the BCA spending limits by raising the overall revised discretionary spending limit from $1.069 trillion for FY2017 to $1.208 trillion for FY2018. It raised the defense cap by $80 billion to $629 billion and the nondefense cap (including SFOPS) by $63 billion to $579 billion for FY2018. (For more detail on defense FY2018 budget issues, see CRS Report R44866, FY2018 Defense Budget Request: The Basics.) This is the final update of this report.",80,80 "Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: Summary of H.R. 2652. H.R. 2652, 105th Congress, 1st Sess., proposes to create a new body of copyright law which would be entitled ""Misappropriation of Collections of Information."" The bill would impose liability on anyone who extracted or used in commerce all or a substantial portion of a collection of information in such a way so as to harm the market for the product or service that contained the information and is offered in commerce. The database collection would be protected for a term of fifteen years. The bill provides for civil and criminal remedies and sets time limitations for bringing actions for misappropriation. The bill was introduced on October 9, 1997 by Representative Coble and reported to the House with amendments by the House Committee on Judiciary on March 24 1998, H.Rept. 105-525.",9,9 "The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): Movie Captioning and Video Description. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a broad civil rights statute prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public accommodations, which are defined to include movie theaters, but the statute does not include specific language on closed captioning or video description. Although the Department of Justice (DOJ) has promulgated regulations under Title III, it has not specifically addressed issues regarding closed captioning or video description. However, DOJ has issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) to establish requirements for closed captioning and video description for movie theaters. The ANPR asks for input in several areas including the implications of a sliding compliance schedule, and the appropriate basis for calculating the number of movies that will be captioned and video described. In addition, the Ninth Circuit, in the first federal court of appeals case to address the issue, held that the ADA requires the provision of closed captioning and descriptive narration in movie theaters unless to do so would be a fundamental alteration or an undue burden.",18,18 "Tobacco Quota Buyout Proposals in the 108th Congress. On October 22, 2004, the tobacco quota buyout was signed into law. Title VI of P.L. 108-357 is known as the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004. This legislation eliminated the tobacco quota program and compensated active producers and absentee quota owners for the lost value. The concept of a quota buyout was not new, but it gained political momentum after being endorsed in the final report of a presidential commission on tobacco, Tobacco at a Crossroads A Call for Action (May 14, 2001), and by the leading U.S. cigarette manufacturer, Philip Morris. Several quota bills were introduced in the 107th Congress without subsequent legislative action. Supporters of a buyout and legislative sponsors again put the proposal on the legislative agenda of the 108th Congress by introducing several differing bills. Eventually, H.R. 4033 (Jenkins, March 25, 2004) and S. 1490 (McConnell, July 30, 2003) were attached to unrelated tax legislation (H.R. 4520 in the House and S. 1637 in the Senate), which was taken up by conferees on October 5, 2004. These bills proposed to eliminate tobacco quotas and the price support loan program. As compensation, quota owners (including absentee owners) and active producers would receive lump sum payments. Active producers were to receive $7 per pound in the House version or $8 per pound in the Senate version for the quota they owned in 2002, plus $3 per pound in the House version or $4 per pound in the Senate version for the quantity of tobacco they were allowed to produce. Most producers grow more than the quota they own because they lease quota from other landlords. The absentee landlords also were be paid for the quota they owned in 2002. The estimated cost of the House and Senate bills was, respectively, $9.6 billion and $12 billion. The source of funding for the two bills differed, coming from the federal treasury in the House bill and from tobacco product manufacturers and importers in the Senate bill. Many public health advocates and Philip Morris strongly supported a tobacco quota buyout accompanied by new legal authority for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate tobacco products. The proposed FDA authority was included in identical bills in the House and Senate (H.R. 4433, Davis-Waxman, and S. 2461, DeWine-Kennedy). The FDA authority also was included in the Senate version of the tax bill, but not in the House version where there was strong opposition. The Chairman's mark for the conference committee on H.R. 4520 included a tobacco title (Title VI) that closely matched the House version, H.R. 4033, with quota buyout payments of $7 per pound and active producer payments of $3 per pound. Under the conference agreement, funding would come from assessments on tobacco product manufacturers and importers (as proposed in S. 1490). FDA regulatory authority over tobacco products however, was not included. This report is intended to serve as a history and evolution of the tobacco buyout. It will not be updated.",4,3 "Foreign Investment in the United States: Major Federal Statutory Restrictions. Foreign investment in the United States is a matter of congressional concern. It is believed by some that the United States has an unusually liberal policy which allows foreigners to invest in virtually all American businesses and real estate and that these foreign investments undermine the American economy by making it vulnerable to foreign influence and domination. These critics argue that there is even foreign domination of some key defense-related industries and that the ability of the country to protect itself in a time of national emergency could greatly suffer. These critics further argue that extensive foreign investment in this country drives up prices which Americans have to pay for investments and, even more importantly, for houses and farmland in areas where there is a significant amount of foreign ownership. However, others argue that the United States should welcome foreign investment because the influx of foreign money contributes to the creation of jobs in this country. Some also believe that the United States should be a kind of sanctuary for foreign money because of the political and economic instability which characterizes much of the rest of the world. It is also argued that, in this age of globalization of the world's economy, United States restrictions on foreign investment will only impair this nation's economy and cause us to appear isolationist. This report takes a look at some of the major federal statutes which presently restrict investment by foreigners. The report first gives a brief history of foreign investment in the United States. It then reviews constitutional justifications and constitutional limitations which exist concerning federal statutory restrictions on foreign ownership of property. After that follows a discussion of some of the major federal statutes which limit foreign investment in the United States. Some of these statutes will be looked at in detail, but a detailed treatment of such other laws as the tax laws, the antitrust laws, and the immigration laws is beyond the scope of this report. The report will be updated as needed.",51,51 "Federal Business Taxation: The Current System, Its Effects, and Options for Reform. A foundation of the broad tax revisions implemented 24 years ago by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was tax ""neutrality""—the idea that economic efficiency and economic welfare are promoted if the distorting impact of taxes on business and other economic decisions is minimized. Based on this principle, the 1986 act broadened the tax base and reduced statutory tax rates set forth by the tax code. In time, however, the underlying thrust of tax policy has changed. Rather than neutrality and efficiency, recent business tax legislation has been guided more by a concern for promoting investment and capital formation, and by attention to the perceived impact of taxes on the ability of U.S. firms to compete with foreign companies. Further, recent interest in fundamental tax reform has been partly stimulated by these same concerns for capital formation and competitiveness. Twenty-four years after the 1986 act, business tax policy is thus potentially at a crossroads, and it is useful to take stock of where the system stands, the economic effects it is known to have, and the principal options for reform. Several data series show a similar pattern in the level of corporate taxes: corporate income taxes have generally declined over the post-World War II period. At the same time, however, significant disparities in the structure of business taxes have remained, suggesting a persistence of distortions caused by the tax system: corporate-sector investment remains heavily taxed compared to non-corporate business and owner-occupied housing, debt is favored over equity, and equipment is favored over structures. The base of business taxation is the return to business investment, business taxes thus influence the economy through their impact on investment. In broad terms, business taxes can, at least in principle, reduce capital formation and thus impair long-term economic growth by making saving and investment less attractive. This effect, however, depends on a robust saving response to taxes, the presence of which is uncertain. Another impact is on the allocation of investment among different sectors and asset types. Here, business taxes likely distort investment decisions, reducing economic efficiency and economic welfare. In the case of equity, economic theory suggests that in the long run, the burden of business taxation is shared among all owners of capital and has a progressive effect on the tax system. Various hypothetical alternatives exist for reforming the business tax system. One possibility is to move in the direction of the 1986 Tax Reform Act by broadening the existing tax base—that is, by eliminating tax benefits and preferences. Another possibility—and one that is favored by many economists—is to adopt some form of tax integration that would eliminate the double taxation of corporate income. A third option is to adopt a form of consumption tax, under which new business investment would be exempt from tax. Either corporate tax integration or a consumption tax could improve economic efficiency, but only if the design were to avoid the types of distortions present in the current system. This report will be updated in the event of major changes in the business tax system.",102,102 "Department of Homeland Security: Consolidation of Border and Transportation Security Agencies. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) transferred several border and transportation security agencies to the newly established Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which became operational March 1, 2003, consolidating some of them in a Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. The Act charges this new directorate with securing the borders, territorial waters terminals, waterways, and air, land and sea transportation systems of the United States, and managing the nation's ports of entry. As in the past, the challenge for policymakers is to provide a level of border and transportation security that is commensurate with a multitude of threats, while facilitating legitimate travel and commerce, as well as protecting civil liberties. The success of the Directorate will depend in large measure on the effective and expedited coordination of transferred agencies and programs, development of a unified strategic vision for departmental and directorate operations, leverage of new and existing technologies to improve threat detection, but facilitate legitimate cross border travel and trade, adequate funding and staffing efficient deployment of resources, and successful implementation of recently enacted border, port and transportation security-related legislation. The agencies transferred to the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security include the U.S. Customs Service, the enforcement programs of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the border and inspection programs of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Protective Service, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and the Office for Domestic Preparedness. The new Department recently announced the realignment of border management and security functions by establishing two bureaus in the directorate, unifying commercial operations, inspections, and land border patrol functions in one, and investigations, alien detention and removal, air/marine drug interdiction operations, and federal protective services in the other. The Coast Guard and the citizenship/services programs of INS have been transferred to the Department of Homeland Security as a stand-alone agency and bureau, outside of the directorate. Nonetheless, their activities will need to be closely coordinated with the new directorate. This report includes conceptual definitions for ""border management"" and ""border security, descriptions of the missions of the principal border management agencies, brief discussion of seaport and transportation security, since both are integral to border security, and a brief exploration of issues raised by transferring the Federal Protective Service, the Office for Domestic Preparedness and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to this new directorate. The report concludes with an analysis of issues concerning the consolidation of various border and transportation security agencies in the new Department of Homeland Security. This report is intended as an analysis of border and transportation security issues attached to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. While some of these issues may persist, this report will not be updated.",22,22 "BSE (""Mad Cow Disease""): A Brief Overview. The appearance of BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or ""mad cow disease"") in North America in 2003 raised meat safety concerns and disrupted trade for cattle and beef producers. A major issue for Congress has been how to rebuild foreign markets for U.S. beef. Other issues include whether additional measures are needed to further protect the public and cattle herd, and concerns over the relative costs and benefits of such measures for consumers, taxpayers and industry. This report summarizes and updates information found in other CRS reports, see ""For More Information."" Sources for facts and citation to reports and studies can be found in those CRS reports. This report will not be updated.",0,0 "Abortion and Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt. In Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, the U.S. Supreme Court (Court) invalidated two Texas requirements that applied to abortion providers and physicians who perform abortions. Under a Texas law enacted in 2013, a physician who performs or induces an abortion was required to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles from the location where the abortion was performed or induced. In general, admitting privileges allow a physician to transfer a patient to a hospital if complications arise in the course of providing treatment. The Texas law also required an abortion facility to satisfy the same standards as an ambulatory surgical center (ASC). These standards address architectural and other structural matters, as well as operational concerns, such as staffing and medical records systems. Supporters of the Texas law maintained that the requirements would guarantee a higher level of care for women seeking abortions. Opponents, however, characterized the requirements as unnecessary and costly, and argued that they would make it more difficult for abortion facilities to operate. In Hellerstedt, the Court concluded that the admitting privileges and ASC requirements placed a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion, and imposed an undue burden on the ability to have an abortion. In applying the undue burden standard that is now used to evaluate abortion regulations, the Court explained that a reviewing court must consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits that are conferred by the law. The Court also indicated that courts should place considerable weight on the evidence and arguments presented in judicial proceedings when they consider the constitutionality of abortion regulations. Hellerstedt has been recognized both for its impact in Texas and for its perceived refinement of the undue burden standard. Because at least 25 states are believed to have either an admitting privileges or ASC requirement, Hellerstedt is expected to have an impact in other jurisdictions. This report examines Hellerstedt and discusses how the decision might affect the application of the undue burden standard in future abortion cases.",16,16 "The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics. The controversial and often impassioned immigration case of Elian Gonzalez ended the afternoon of June 28, 2000, when the six-year old Cuban boy returned home with his father. Elian's departure occurred seven months after the shipwrecked boy was brought to U.S. shores and less than an hour after a temporary injunction preventing his removal lapsed. Litigation over Elian's legal fate did not end until the day of his departure. Then, the Supreme Court declined to consider the rulings of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that allowed Elian's return. Earlier, the Eleventh Circuit had barred Elian's removal until it had had an opportunity to consider his case more fully. Elian was brought ashore alone after his mother and others died in an accident at sea. Because of the exigencies of the case, Elian was paroled into the keeping of relatives in Florida pending a determination of his future residency and care. Subsequently, the Florida relatives sought legal custody of Elian in state court and assisted in his applying for asylum with federal immigration authorities. Elian's father, Juan Miguel Gonzalez, objected to these legal actions, and later he personally came to the U.S. from Cuba to attempt to regain custody. As litigation progressed, Florida state courts ultimately declined to consider the case as a matter of state family law, deferring instead to federal immigration law. Meanwhile, the federal courts eventually decided that the Attorney General could terminate the right of care that had been granted to Elian's relatives and that an asylum claim for Elian could not proceed over his father's objections. This report briefly discusses legal authority that pertained to the Elian Gonzalez case. It will not be updated. For discussion of related issues, see CRS Report RL30570, Elian Gonzalez Chronology and Issues, by Ruth Wasem.",76,76 "The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Coverage of Contagious Diseases. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§12101 et seq., provides broad nondiscrimination protection for individuals with disabilities in employment, public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications. As stated in the act, its purpose is ""to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."" Due to concern about the spread of highly contagious diseases such as pandemic influenza and extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), questions have been raised about the application of the ADA in such situations. Generally, individuals with serious contagious diseases would most likely be considered individuals with disabilities. However, this does not mean that an individual with a serious contagious disease would have to be hired or given access to a place of public accommodation if such an action would place other individuals at a significant risk. Such determinations are highly fact specific and the differences between the contagious diseases may give rise to differing conclusions since each contagious disease has specific patterns of transmission that affect the magnitude and duration of a potential threat to others.",18,18 "Presidential Vetoes of Annual Defense Authorization Bills. This report briefly discusses the historical precedent of Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter's recommendation that President Obama veto the conference report on H.R. 1735, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2016. If Obama were to veto the measure, it would mark the fifth time since 1961 that a president has vetoed that measure.",55,25 "Mandatory Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act. Arbitration is a method of legal dispute resolution in which a neutral, private third party, rather than a judge or jury, renders a decision on a particular matter. Under a growing number of consumer and employment agreements, companies have come to require arbitration to resolve disputes. While arbitration is often viewed as an expeditious and economical alternative to litigation, consumer advocates and others contend that mandatory arbitration agreements create one-sided arrangements that deny consumers and employees advantages afforded by a judicial proceeding. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925 to ensure the validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements in any ""maritime transaction or... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce[.]"" The U.S. Supreme Court (Court) has recognized the FAA as evidencing ""a national policy favoring arbitration."" The application of the FAA, however, particularly in light of various state law requirements and the use of different types of arbitration agreements, has raised numerous legal questions and been the subject of several cases before the Court. The question of whether the FAA preempts a state law or judicial rule is a subject of frequent litigation. In these cases, the Court has routinely held that the FAA supersedes state requirements that restrain the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements. This report examines the FAA and reviews the Court's decisions involving the statute's preemption of state law requirements. The report also explores the Court's decisions involving mandatory arbitration agreements that prohibit a consumer or employee from maintaining a class or collective action. In its October 2017 term, the Court will consider three consolidated cases that challenge such agreements on the grounds that they violate the right to engage in ""other concerted activities"" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Finally, concern over a perceived lack of ""meaningful choice"" to decide whether to submit a claim to arbitration has prompted regulatory activity, as well as legislation that would amend the FAA to render certain types of pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable. The report discusses some recent examples of federal regulatory action that aim to restrict the use of mandatory arbitration in the consumer arena, and reviews bills like the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017 (H.R. 1374/S. 537), which would prohibit the enforcement of an arbitration agreement that requires arbitration for an employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights dispute if the agreement was executed prior to the dispute's occurrence.",92,92 "National Missile Defense and Early Warning Radars: Background and Issues. The Clinton Administration is scheduled to decide by Fall 2000 whether the United States should begin deploying a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. This system could achieve initial operational capability by 2005 and would be designed to protect the United States from a limited attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). As currently envisioned, the NMD system would operate as an integrated system that would rely on a variety of sensors to detect and track incoming missiles. One key program element is to upgrade the existing Early Warning Radars (EWR) so that they can detect and track the incoming missiles sooner. These upgrades include both hardware and software modifications to the existing radars. The earlier detection and tracking allows a ""shoot-look-shoot"" strategy, i.e., sequential launching of multiple interceptors at each incoming missile to increase the probability of intercept. This report provides background information and technical details of these planned upgrades as well as their cost and schedule. NMD remains one of the most controversial national security issues. An in-depth analysis of the NMD program and the debate on it can be found in CRS Issue Brief IB10034. Although the EWR have not yet generated much discussion, their upgrades may also become controversial. Members of Congress could focus on the cost and technical capability of the upgrades, on the legality of these upgrades under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, or on the international implications of the radars that are located outside the United States. This report will address the issues associated with the planned radar upgrades and the related options for Congress. The early warning radars planned for the NMD system include the three PAVE PAWS radars at Cape Cod, Massachusetts, Clear, Alaska, and Beale, California, and the two Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars at Thule, Greenland (Denmark) and Fylingdales, U.K.. The current mission of these five radars is to provide the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) with early warning and assessment of incoming ICBMs and SLBMs. The upgraded radars will be designed to support the new NMD requirements without impacting their current NORAD mission. The Administration argues that upgrading current radars provides effective, low-cost sensors for the NMD mission by reusing about 80% of the equipment at the existing radar sites. Due to the radar operating frequency, the upgraded radars could only provide accurate tracking information for a few warheads accompanied by simple decoys. Thus, the Administration argues that these radar upgrades are for limited defense against limited attacks, not total defense against more advanced ICBM attacks.",32,32 "Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress. This report is intended to provide information that might be of interest to Congress on the current debate surrounding the creation of special U.S. Army units and organizations, which some believe are needed to address current and future security requirements. While the Army has recently changed from a division-based force to a brigade-centric force, it has resisted the creation of special units to deal with counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory operations. In contrast, there have been a number of proposals to create new units and organizations better suited to address the challenges of these mission areas. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's recent challenge to the Army to organize and prepare for asymmetric warfare and advising and training foreign armies could renew and elevate this debate. The Army began reorganizing to a brigade-based, full-spectrum force in 2003 primarily to provide a larger pool of deployable units. Based on lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army have initiated significant changes in doctrine, education, and training, focusing on counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advising foreign militaries. The Army has also begun the conversion from what it describes as ""Cold War force structure"" into a number of other types of units that have been considered high-demand, low-density units that the Army believes will be required in the future. There have also been a number of proposals to create specialized units to meet the operational challenges of counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory operations, but the Army insists that its current force structure is adequate to meet these challenges, and that the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan precludes the effective use of these specialized units. There are potential issues for congressional consideration. For example, should the Army's missions be prioritized to reflect current and possible future security environments instead of holding the Army equally responsible for all of its full-spectrum missions? Another potential issue is the Army's emphasis on new doctrine, education, and training. It can be argued that changes to Army force structure have not matched the significant changes in doctrine, education, and training. There might also be concern that the Army has not conducted a sufficient analysis of the proposals for specialized units and has chosen to continue to rely on full-spectrum units without subjecting this decision to sufficient analytic rigor. Questions also might arise as to whether too much is being asked of soldiers and Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in terms of being able to perform the myriad challenging missions that they are being assigned, particularly given the loss of non-commissioned officers and junior officers. The need for specialized Army units might also be a topic of the congressionally mandated Roles and Missions Review slated to occur sometime in 2008. This report may not be updated.",32,32 "Medicaid and Dental Care for Children. According to guidelines published by the American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry, all youth should see a dentist for routine dental screening and preventive care twice a year. Dental care is a mandatory benefit for most Medicaid eligibles under the age of 21, however, nationwide, the majority of low-income children enrolled in Medicaid do not receive any dental services in a given year. There are many beneficiary and provider-related issues that contribute to inadequate access to and delivery of dental care. To address this problem, some states have undertaken new Medicaid initiatives to attract and retain dental providers that may serve as models for other state Medicaid programs.",70,70 "Germany's Role in Fighting Terrorism: Implications for U.S. Policy. This report examines Germany's response to global Islamic terrorism after the September 11 2001 attacks in the United States. It looks at current German strategy, domestic efforts, and international responses, including possible gaps and weaknesses. It examines the state of U.S.-German cooperation, including problems and prospects for future cooperation. This report may be updated as needed. Although somewhat overshadowed in the public view by the strong and vocal disagreements over Iraq policy, U.S.-German cooperation in the global fight against international terrorism has been extensive. German support is particularly important because several Al Qaeda members and 9/11 plotters lived there and the country is a key hub for the transnational flow of persons and goods. Domestically, Germany faces the challenge of having a sizable population of Muslims, some with extremist views, whom terrorists might seek to recruit. German counterterrorism strategy shares a number of elements with that of the United States although there are clear differences in emphasis. Like the United States, Germany now sees radical Islamic terrorism as its primary national security threat and itself as a potential target of attack. Today, Germany also recognizes that threats to its domestic security lie far beyond its own borders in places such as Afghanistan. Germany has introduced a number of policy, legislative, and organizational reforms since 9/11 to make the country less hospitable to potential terrorists. Despite these reforms, critics point to continuing problems hampering Germany's domestic efforts. German law enforcement and intelligence communities face more bureaucratic hurdles, stricter constraints, and closer oversight than those in many other countries. The German government has sent troops into combat beyond Europe for the first time since World War II. Currently Germany has about 7,800 troops based abroad of which some forty percent are directly engaged in counterterror missions. In Afghanistan, some 2,300 German soldiers participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Germany's role in Afghanistan's stabilization and reconstruction is substantial. German military efforts have been hampered to some extent by delays in implementing military reforms to make German forces more expeditionary. A key question for U.S. German relations is whether differences on issues such as Iraq policy -- shaped by different national interests, practices, and historical experiences -- will harm U.S.-German cooperation against terrorism. Some believe that understanding and accepting these differences (agreeing to disagree) may be the best approach to enhancing future U.S.-German cooperation in the global war on terrorism. Both countries have strong incentives to make the cooperation work.",85,86 "Indiana Emergency Management and Homeland Security Statutory Authorities Summarized. This report is one of a series that profiles the emergency management and homeland security statutory authorities of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and three territories (American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). Each profile identifies the more significant elements of state statutes, generally as codified. This report focuses on the state of Indiana.",11,22 "Entitlements and Appropriated Entitlements in the Federal Budget Process. Entitlements are programs that require payments to persons, state or local governments, or other entities if specific eligibility criteria established in the authorizing law are met. Entitlement payments are legal obligations of the federal government, and eligible beneficiaries may have legal recourse if full payment under the law is not provided. This report provides a brief explanation of spending for entitlements, including so-called appropriated entitlements, and discusses the procedural and statutory constraints on legislation affecting such entitlement spending.",101,101 "The University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases: Racial Diversity in Higher Education. The United States Supreme Court concluded its 2002-03 term with a pair of much anticipated rulings in the University of Michigan affirmative action cases. In Grutter v. Bollinger a 5 to 4 majority of the Justices held that the University Law School had a ""compelling"" interest in the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body,"" which justified its race-based efforts to construct a ""critical mass"" of ""underrepresented"" minority students. But in a companion decision Gratz v. Bollinger, six Justices decided that the University's policy of awarding ""racial bonus points to minority applicants was not ""narrowly tailored"" enough to pass constitutional scrutiny. The Michigan cases revisited constitutional terrain first surveyed by the High Court a quarter century ago in University of California Regents v. Bakke. Unfortunately, the inability of the Bakke Justices to achieve any sort of consensus led in the intervening period to a circuit conflict over the constitutionality of policies to achieve racial and ethnic diversity in higher education. It remained for the Court in Michigan cases to resolve the doctrinal muddle left in Bakke 's wake.",34,34 "Altering House Ethics Committee Sanction Recommendations on the Floor: Past Precedent and Options for Action. The Constitution provides Congress with the power to punish and discipline its Members. Since the House Committee on Ethics was created during the 90th Congress, it has been authorized to investigate allegations of misconduct against Members and staff, and if necessary, recommend sanctions that are then considered by the whole House. This report examines instances when the House Ethics Committee has recommended a sanction, and amendments or alternatives have been considered on the House floor. Since the committee’s creation, the House has attempted to amend sanction recommendations only a handful of times. These instances, however, are instructive of the overall approach to discipline and the relationship between the Ethics Committee and the House floor. When a sanction recommendation—expulsion, censure, or reprimand—is brought to the floor, three options have been used to attempt to offer an alternative to that sanction. These are (1) offering a motion to recommit with amendatory instructions, (2) offering an amendment to the sanctions resolution, or (3) offering a separate resolution. Since the House Ethics Committee was created (as the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct) in 1967, 16 ethics cases have been brought to the House floor to impose a sanction. Of these 16 cases, seven (43%) have included attempts to alter the sanction recommendation, and three (42% of the seven cases and 18% of all cases) have been successful. While not a majority of cases, the offering (and sometimes adoption) of an alternate sanction illustrates that altering a sanction recommendation, although a difficult process, can be done.",61,55 "Unlawfully Present Aliens, Driver's Licenses, and Other State-Issued ID: Select Legal Issues. One aspect of the broader debate over aliens who are present in the United States in violation of federal immigration law has been their eligibility for driver's licenses and other forms of state-issued identification documents (IDs). The issuance of driver's licenses has historically been considered a state matter, and states have taken a variety of approaches. Some have barred the issuance of driver's licenses and other state-issued ID to unlawfully present aliens, others permit their issuance, and yet others instead grant unlawfully present aliens Certificates for Driving (CFDs) or Driving Privilege Cards (DPCs). CFDs or DPCs expressly state, on their face, that they are valid for driving, but not for other purposes. The federal government has generally not intruded on state control over the issuance of driver's licenses, although the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, Div. B) will, when implemented, bar federal agencies from accepting, ""for any official purpose,"" licenses or ID cards issued by states that do not meet specific requirements. Regardless of whether they would deny or grant driver's licenses and other state-issued ID to unlawfully present aliens, such state measures have been challenged on various grounds. While these grounds can vary depending upon the specific statute or practice in question, the grounds most commonly asserted appear to be violations of the Equal Protection and Supremacy Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause bars states from ""deny[ing] to any person within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"" and aliens have been found to be encompassed by the Clause's usage of ""person."" As a result, measures that would treat aliens differently than citizens may be subject to challenge on equal protection grounds. In particular, state measures that distinguish between aliens and citizens are generally subject to some type of heightened scrutiny, although the exact degree of scrutiny can vary depending upon the persons and rights affected. The Supremacy Clause, in turn, establishes that federal law is ""the supreme Law of the Land,"" and may preempt any incompatible provisions of state law. State measures that would deny driver's licenses and other state-issued ID to unlawfully present aliens have historically not been found to violate either the Equal Protection or the Supremacy Clause, as a general matter. The various courts that have reviewed such challenges, to date, have found that these measures do not infringe upon the fundamental right to travel because restrictions upon a single mode of travel (i.e., driving) are not tantamount to restrictions on the right to travel, and aliens' right to travel is more limited than citizens' right. The courts have similarly found that such measures do not impermissibly distinguish between unlawfully present aliens and other persons because unlawfully present aliens are not a ""suspect classification,"" and the measures serve ""legitimate"" government interests. The courts have also found these measures are not, as a general matter, per se preempted on the grounds that they regulate immigration, or preempted by the REAL ID Act. However, state measures that distinguish, without a legitimate interest, between categories of aliens, or that rely upon state definitions or determinations of aliens' status, may be found to be impermissible. Although some commentators have suggested that they are preempted, state measures that grant driver's licenses and state-issued ID to unlawfully present aliens do not appear to have been subject to litigation. The argument that such measures are preempted could, however, be difficult to maintain, because the REAL ID Act arguably contemplates states issuing licenses and other IDs that federal agencies do not recognize for official purposes, and it seems unlikely that granting licenses to unlawfully present aliens would be seen to regulate immigration. Similarly, while federal law generally restricts the circumstances in which states may provide ""public benefits"" to unlawfully present aliens, driver's licenses are unlikely to be seen as public benefits.",76,76 "Clean Air After the CAIR Decision: Multi-Pollutant Approaches to Controlling Powerplant Emissions. On August 2, 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed a new Clean Air Transport Rule to control powerplant emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). When finalized, this rule will replace the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), CAIR, which was promulgated in May 2005, established a regional cap-and-trade program for SO2 and NOx emissions from electric generating units (EGUs) in 28 eastern states and the District of Columbia. On July 11, 2008, in North Carolina v. EPA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated CAIR, saying that it had ""more than several fatal flaws."" The court subsequently modified its decision on December 23, 2008, however, reversing itself by allowing CAIR to remain in effect until a new rule is promulgated by EPA. From a policy standpoint, the court's July 2008 decision seriously undermined EPA's approach to clean air over the previous eight years. CAIR was the lynchpin that held together the Bush Administration's strategy for attainment of the ozone and fine particulate National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), for achieving reductions in mercury emissions from coal-fired powerplants, for addressing regional haze impacts from powerplants, and for responding to state petitions to control upwind sources of ozone and fine particulates under Section 126 of the Clean Air Act. As discussed in this report, the potential impact on communities attempting to achieve NAAQS and the impact on mercury emissions without CAIR or a similar rule would be substantial, this has prompted some to call for congressional action to address the issue. On February 4, 2010, Senator Carper and 11 bipartisan cosponsors introduced S. 2995, a multipollutant bill that would have replaced the CAIR requirements, and required standards for powerplant emissions of mercury. The bill was not acted on. As of May 2011, legislation addressing CAIR replacement has not been introduced in the 112th Congress. The D.C. Circuit's July 2008 decision strongly suggested that there is no simple ""fix"" that will make CAIR acceptable to the court. This left EPA with three clear long-term options: (1) starting anew with a new strategy with respect to mitigating transported air pollution based on the decision, (2) allowing the states to sort out the issue through Section 126 petitions, and (3) seeking new legislation providing EPA with the statutory authority to implement either CAIR in some form, or an alternative. The agency is proceeding with the first of these options with its proposed transport rule, but has indicated that it views congressional efforts to address the issue as ""mutually reinforcing."" For Congress, the court decision raises several issues Should Congress consider providing EPA with the authority to implement CAIR or other cost-based, market-oriented approaches to address NAAQS? Should Congress consider multi-pollutant legislation as a supplement or substitute for the current regulatory regime, at least for electric generating units? Should Congress consider a more comprehensive revision to the Clean Air Act to address the full scope of ozone and PM2.5 NAAQS non-attainment and related issues, as well as mercury emissions from coal-fired powerplants, and emerging environmental issues such as climate change?",42,42 "Suspension of the Rules in the House: Principal Features. “Suspension of the rules” is a procedure that the House of Representatives often uses on the floor to act expeditiously on legislation. This procedure is governed primarily by clause 1 of House Rule XV. When a bill or some other matter is considered “under suspension,” floor debate is limited to 40 minutes, all floor amendments are prohibited, and a two-thirds vote is required for final passage.",55,55 "Campaign Contributions and the Ethics of Elected Officials: Regulation Under Federal Law. Allegations of political corruption often involve questions regarding a public official or candidate's use of campaign funds or the relationship between campaign contributors and the candidate or official. A common concern is that a particular individual, private organization, company, or other entity ""bought""—through large campaign contributions widely distributed—particular official favors, official acts, or official forbearance from officers or employees of the federal government. These issues have been highlighted in several high-profile cases over recent years. In 2016, the Supreme Court clarified the boundaries of federal political corruption statutes in McDonnell v. United States, in which it examined which actions taken by public officials could be considered ""official acts."" In an effort to curb corruption in the political process, Congress has enacted laws that regulate campaign contributions made to federal office candidates. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) regulates contributions in three general ways, by establishing limits, source restrictions, and disclosure requirements. Source restrictions include prohibitions on contributions from government contractors, foreign nationals, and the general treasuries of corporations and labor unions (corporate and labor union political action committee (PAC) contributions are permitted). Further, the law prohibits the converting of campaign funds for personal use, that is, it bans contributions from being used to fulfill any expense that would exist ""irrespective"" of the candidate's campaign or federal officeholder duties. Courts have generally upheld these regulations in order to maintain the integrity of the democratic process by protecting against quid pro quo corruption and its appearance. In addition to civil penalties, it is notable that FECA sets forth a range of criminal penalties. In addition to the direct federal regulation of campaign contributions, a number of federal political corruption provisions prohibit federal officials from receiving personal benefits that are related, in certain ways, to their official acts. Among some of the most common concerns raised in political corruption cases are bribery, illegal gratuities, and extortion. Laws criminalizing these activities bear upon the relationship of official acts to otherwise lawful contributions: The prohibition on bribery precludes officials from accepting contributions in exchange for performance of an official act. The prohibition on illegal gratuities does not require that the contribution be made in exchange for the official act, but instead precludes officials from accepting contributions made because of the official act. The prohibition on extortion precludes officials from using their position to demand contributions in exchange for official action. Additionally, a number of political corruption cases involve charges of so-called ""honest services"" fraud, alleged when public officials engage in schemes that deprive the public of honest services of government officials. This report provides an overview of federal campaign finance and public corruption laws that may be relevant to the political campaigns of elected officials, including discussion of provisions that could be implicated in cases involving the misuse of campaign funds or malintent of campaign contributions.",61,61 "Select Committee on Benghazi: CRS Experts. The following table provides names and contact information for CRS experts on policy concerns relating to the Select Committee on Benghazi (H.Res. 567). In addition to the policy expertise identified below, related CRS products include CRS Insight IN10055, House Select Committee Precedents and Procedures and H. Res. 567, Establishing a Select Committee on the 2012 Benghazi Attack, by Christopher M. Davis, CRS Insight IN10022, Diplomatic Security After Benghazi, by Alex Tiersky, CRS Report R43195, Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Legislative and Executive Branch Initiatives, by Alex Tiersky, CRS Report R42834, Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues, by Alex Tiersky and Susan B. Epstein, and CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.",55,55 "The Congressional Research Service and the American Legislative Process. The Library of Congress, as its name suggests, is a library dedicated to serving the United States Congress and its Members. It serves additionally as an unexcelled national library. The Library was located in the Capitol Building with the House of Representatives and the Senate until 1897, and its collections always have been available for use by Congress. Building upon a concept developed by the New York State Library and then the Wisconsin legislative reference department, Wisconsin’s Senator Robert LaFollette and Representative John M. Nelson led an effort to direct the establishment of a special reference unit within the Library in 1914. Later known as the Legislative Reference Service, it was charged with responding to congressional requests for information. For more than 50 years, this department assisted Congress primarily by providing facts and publications and by transmitting research and analysis done largely by other government agencies, private organizations, and individual scholars. In 1970, Congress enacted a law transforming the Legislative Reference Service into the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and directing CRS to devote more of its efforts and increased resources to performing research and analysis that assists Congress in direct support of the legislative process. Joined today by two other congressional support agencies, the Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service offers research and analysis to Congress on all current and emerging issues of national policy. CRS analysts work exclusively for Congress, providing assistance in the form of reports, memoranda, customized briefings, seminars, digitally recorded presentations, information obtained from governmental and nongovernmental databases, and consultations in person and by telephone. This work is governed by requirements for confidentiality, timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, balance, and nonpartisanship.",55,55 "The Senate’s Executive Calendar. Treaties and nominations constitute the executive business of the Senate and are the subjects of the Senate’s Executive Calendar. When a Senate committee reports a treaty or nomination, it is said to be placed “on the calendar” and is available for floor consideration. In addition, there is a category of nominations that are not immediately referred to committee, but instead placed directly on the Executive Calendar under the heading, “Privileged Nominations.” Most treaties and nominations must be reported from committee and placed on the calendar to be eligible for floor consideration, unless the Senate gives unanimous consent to consider them without committee action. If a treaty or nomination is not on the calendar, either it remains in the possession of the committee to which it was referred, or is “held at the desk” by unanimous consent awaiting a decision either to refer it to committee or to bring it directly to the floor for consideration by unanimous consent. The Senate’s other calendar, the Calendar of Business, identifies the bills, resolutions, and other items of legislative business eligible for consideration (see CRS Report 98-429, The Senate’s Calendar of Business). Both the Calendar of Business and the Executive Calendar are published each day the Senate is in session and distributed to Senators’ personal offices and all committee and subcommittee offices. There are no cumulative issues of the Executive Calendar, each issue documents the status of treaties and nominations as of its publication. The Executive Calendar is available on the Legislative Information System website, http://lis.gov/crtext/lists.html#lcal.",55,55 "Terrorism and the Military's Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for Congress. The United States faces a number of significant national security threats, ranging in scope from intercontinental ballistic missiles to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists. The debate over the seriousness of the various threats intensified recently, even before the events of September 11, 2001. Various studies and commissions recommended far reaching changes in the U.S. approach to domestic preparedness and response to threats to the homeland, many now being implemented. Many experts believe the probable long term effects of a WMD attack by terrorists on the population, environment, and the economy make it imperative that the U.S. be fully prepared to either deter or interdict an attempted terrorist attack. This paper reviews the current legislation and policies that govern the military's role when supporting law enforcement in a domestic terrorism crisis and highlights some of the issues confronting the U.S. government. To fully understand the military's role in domestic crisis response it is necessary to explore existing national-level structures and response options prior to the involvement of military forces. Crisis management is predominately a law enforcement function that manages the resources necessary to prevent or resolve a terrorist incident, including one involving WMD. Current U.S. government terrorism response policy is contained in presidential directives. Among other matters, these directives address National Security Council structure and federal agency crisis response roles when responding to a domestic terrorism incident. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command has not yet changed the basic roles and relationships described herein. Many federal agencies are available to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in dealing with a terrorist threat or in the resolution of an actual terrorist incident. The Department of Defense (DoD), as a supporting agency in domestic law enforcement operations, has developed and maintains plans and capabilities to respond to threats or acts of terrorism, including those involving the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. In a domestic crisis, DoD may be called upon to assist in several different ways ranging from actual interdiction of the terrorists to the loaning of specialized equipment for use by law enforcement agencies. DoD has published specific policy for assistance to civil law enforcement officials in emergencies involving terrorism and WMD. U.S. terrorism policy is an issue of growing policy debate. Most experts believe that a comprehensive national strategy for domestic terrorism is a critical step in defeating the threat. Some say more effectively employing DoD's capabilities during domestic crisis response operations, or new relationships based on the recent creation of the Department of Homeland Security are the best methods to ensure success against domestic terrorism. Lastly, newly proposed congressional oversight roles are seen by many as an important factor in a more effective response to domestic terrorism. This report will be updated should major changes occur to the relationships described.",22,22 "Out-of-Pocket Costs for Medicaid Beneficiaries: In Brief. The federal Medicaid statute and accompanying regulations include provisions that states can apply to certain program beneficiaries with respect to out-of-pocket cost-sharing, including premiums that may be required on a monthly or quarterly basis, enrollment fees that may be applied on an annual or semiannual basis, and point-of-service cost-sharing (e.g., a co-payment to a Medicaid participating provider for a specific covered service received). To implement these options, states must submit Medicaid state plan amendments (SPAs) detailing these provisions to the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for approval. This report provides an overview of these federal authorities and includes some state-specific examples.",70,70 "Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA): Issues and Options for Congress. This report provides background information about the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) system, describes the major issues WMATA currently faces, and discusses possible approaches for addressing these issues.",57,120 "The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): Application to the Internet. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides broad nondiscrimination protection in employment, public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications for individuals with disabilities. As stated in the act, its purpose is ""to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."" However, the ADA, enacted on July 26, 1990, prior to widespread use of the Internet, does not specifically cover the Internet, and the issue of coverage has not been definitively resolved. The Supreme Court has yet to address this issue, and lower court decisions that directly discuss the ADA's application to the Internet vary in their conclusions about coverage. On July 23, 2010, the Department of Justice issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking which would require Internet providers to ensure accessibility for persons with disabilities.",18,18 "India: Chronology of Events, November 2006-February 2007. This report provides a reverse chronology of recent events involving India and India-U.S. relations. Sources include, but are not limited to, major newswires, the U.S. Department of State, and Indian news outlets. For a substantive review, see CRS Report RL33529, India-U.S. Relations. This report will not be updated.",85,85 "Congressional Primary Dates, 1998. This report lists the dates of 1998 primary elections and, where applicable, runoff primary dates for the states and the District of Columbia. The election dates listed herein were provided by the respective election offices in the states and the District of Columbia, they are the dates for congressional primaries and for other state offices for which primaries will be held in 1998.",55,61 "Elementary and Secondary Education Act: An Analytical Review of the Allocation Formulas. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) contains 45 separately authorized programs, plus approximately 20 specified sub-programs. The largest of these programs distribute funds by formulas that prescribe how funds are to be allocated among state educational agencies (SEAs) or local educational agencies (LEAs) nationwide. They take the form of mathematical equations through which the U.S. Department of Education (ED), and in many cases also SEAs, calculate grant amounts for each potential grantee meeting statutory eligibility criteria. They almost always include one or more population factors and may also include state or LEA minimum grant provisions, eligibility thresholds, expenditure factors, fiscal accountability provisions, and reservations of funds for a variety of purposes. The recipients of a majority of the funds under almost all ESEA formula grant programs are LEAs. Under most of these programs, grants are provided to LEAs via SEAs: that is, they are ""state-administered formula grant"" programs. Funds are allocated by ED directly to LEAs only under a limited number of ESEA programs. The most influential ESEA allocation formulas are those under the Title I-A program, both because this is the largest ESEA program and because there are five ESEA programs under which grants are made, in part or in full, in proportion to grants calculated under Title I, Part A. As a result, a majority of ESEA funds are allocated under formulas in which the primary population factor is school-age children in poor families, and state expenditure factors are applied. The share of all public K-12 education revenues that is provided under ESEA programs varies substantially among the states, although ESEA funding constitutes only approximately one-tenth or less of total public K-12 education revenues in all cases except Puerto Rico. The average ESEA program grant per school-age child (poor and non-poor) increases as the state average poverty rate rises, with the third of states having the highest poverty rates receiving 1.4 times as much as low poverty states. At the same time, an opposite trend is found in average ESEA grants per school-age child in a poor family, with low poverty states receiving 1.3 times as much as states with the highest poverty rates. Most ESEA allocation formulas include state or LEA minimum grant provisions. As a result, states with the smallest school-age population receive approximately 1.7 times as much as the remaining states per school-age child, and approximately 2.2 times as much per school-age child from a poor family. This report will be updated if substantial changes are made in one or more ESEA program allocation formulas.",33,33 "Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress. The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region's future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the region, and national security. The five Arctic coastal states—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of which Greenland is a territory)—have made or are in the process of preparing submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding the outer limits of their extended continental shelves. The Russian submission includes the underwater Lomonosov Ridge, a feature that spans a considerable distance across the center of the Arctic Ocean. The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes—the Northern Sea Route close to Russia, and the Northwest Passage—though the rate of increase in the use of these routes might not be as great as sometimes anticipated in press accounts. International guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters have been recently updated. Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies for cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters have yet to be developed. Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is currently meeting with other countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect threatened and endangered species, and could result in migration of fish stocks to new waters. Under the Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate change is also expected to affect the economies, health, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples. Two of the Coast Guard's three polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea—have exceeded their intended 30-year service lives, and Polar Sea is not operational. The Coast Guard has initiated a project to build up to three new heavy polar icebreakers. On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council signed an agreement on cooperation on search and rescue in the Arctic. Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. Some of the Arctic coastal states, particularly Russia, have announced an intention or taken actions to enhance their military presences in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard, have begun to pay more attention to the region in their planning and operations.",122,47 "The Target and Other Financial Data Breaches: Frequently Asked Questions. In November and December of 2013, cybercriminals breached the data security of Target, one of the largest U.S. retail chains, stealing the personal and financial information of millions of customers. On December 19, 2013, Target confirmed that some 40 million credit and debit card account numbers had been stolen. On January 10, 2014, Target announced that personal information, including the names, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses of up to 70 million customers, was also stolen during the data breach. A report by the Senate Committee on Commerce in March 2014 concluded that Target missed opportunities to prevent the data breach. Target. To date, Target has reported data breach costs of $248 million. Independent sources have made back-of-the-envelope estimates ranging from $240 million to $2.2 billion in fraudulent charges alone. This does not include additional potential costs to consumers concerned about their personal information or credit histories, potential fines or penalties to Target, financial institutions, or others, or any costs to Target related to a loss of consumer confidence. The breach was among the largest in U.S. history. Consumer concern over the scale of this data breach has fueled further congressional attention on the Target breach and data security and data breaches more broadly. In the wake of Target's revelations, between February 3 and April 2, 2014, Congress held seven hearings by six different committees related to these topics. In addition to examining the events surrounding the Target breach, hearings have focused on preventing such data breaches, improving data security standards, protecting consumers' personal data, and notifying consumers when their data have been compromised. Other financial data breaches. In addition to Target, there have been data breaches at Home Depot, JPMorgan Chase, Sony, and Adobe. Payment card information was obtained at Adobe and Home Depot. Hackers downloaded a wide range of company confidential information at Sony, and they obtained contact information in the JPMorgan Chase breach. Policy options discussed in these hearings include federal legislation to require notification to consumers when their data have been breached, potentially increase Federal Trade Commission (FTC) powers and authorities over companies' data security, and create a federal standard for the general quality or reasonableness of companies' data security. The hearings also broached the broader question of whether the government should play a role in encouraging or even requiring companies to adopt newer data security technologies. None of the legislation introduced in the 113th Congress that addressed these various issues became law. In 2014 and 2015, the Obama Administration encouraged Congress to pass legislation on data security and data breach notification. Attorney General Eric Holder issued a public statement in the wake of the Target breach on February 24, 2014, that urged Congress to pass a federal data breach notification law, which would hold entities accountable when they fail to keep sensitive information safe. The FTC also called on Congress to pass a federal data security law, including data breach notification and to increase the commission's explicit statutory authority over data security issues. Key questions. This report answers some frequently asked questions about the Target and selected other data breaches, including what is known to have happened in the breach, and what costs may result. It also examines some of the broader issues common to data breaches, including how the payment system works, how cybersecurity costs are shared and allocated within the payment system, who bears the losses in such breaches more generally, what emerging cybersecurity technologies may help prevent them, and what role the government could play in encouraging their adoption. The report addresses policy issues that were discussed in the 113th Congress to deal with these issues. Updating. This report will be updated as warranted by legislative action in the 114th Congress and by further payment system developments.",110,8 "Economic Stimulus: Issues and Policy. This report discusses the passing of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which included tax cut and spending provisions totaling at a cost of $787 billion in an attempt to mitigate the economic fallout of the housing and financial crises on the general economy. The report examines issues surrounding fiscal stimulus such as timeliness, the magnitude of stimulus, long-term effects and previously adopted policies.",99,100 "Project BioShield: Authorities, Appropriations, Acquisitions, and Issues for Congress. In 2004, Congress passed the Project BioShield Act (P.L. 108-276) to encourage the private sector to develop medical countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism agents and to provide a novel mechanism for federal acquisition of those newly developed countermeasures. Although some countermeasures have been acquired through this law, Congress continues to address several Project BioShield-related policy issues. These include whether to continue diverting Project BioShield acquisition funding to other purposes, whether to change the countermeasure development and acquisition process, how to replace stockpiled countermeasures as they expire, and whether to alter federal efforts to encourage the development of broad-spectrum countermeasures. This law provides three main authorities: (1) relaxing regulatory requirements for some CBRN terrorism-related spending, including hiring personnel and awarding research grants, (2) guaranteeing a federal market for new CBRN medical countermeasures, and (3) permitting emergency use of unapproved countermeasures. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has used each of these authorities. The HHS used expedited review authorities to approve contracts and grants related to CBRN countermeasure research and development. The HHS used the authority to guarantee a government market to obligate approximately $2.5 billion to acquire countermeasures against anthrax, botulism, radiation, and smallpox. The HHS has also employed the emergency use authority several times, including during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90) advance-appropriated $5.593 billion for FY2004 to FY2013 for CBRN countermeasures acquisition through Project BioShield. Through FY2011, subsequent Congresses have removed $1.461 billion from this account through rescissions and transfers, more than 25% of the advance appropriation. The transfers from this account supported CBRN medical countermeasure advanced development, pandemic influenza preparedness and response, and basic biomedical research. The President's FY2012 budget requests a transfer of $765 million out of this account to support CBRN countermeasure advanced development and to establish a CBRN countermeasure strategic investment corporation. Since passing the Project BioShield Act, subsequent Congresses have considered additional measures to further encourage countermeasure development. The 109th Congress created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in HHS through the Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417). Among other duties, BARDA oversees all of HHS's Project BioShield procurements. The Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act also modified the Project BioShield procurement process. Some stakeholders question whether these changes have sufficiently improved federal countermeasure development and procurement. The Administration plans to improve the countermeasure research, development, and acquisition process based on the findings of a 2010 HHS review.",22,22 "Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress. Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country's political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Ra√∫l was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In 2013, Ra√∫l began his second and final five-year term, which is scheduled to end in February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Castro has implemented a number of market-oriented economic policy changes over the past several years. An April 2016 Cuban Communist Party congress endorsed the current gradual pace of Cuban economic reform. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system. While the government has released most long-term political prisoners, short-term detentions and harassment have increased significantly over the past several years. U.S. Policy Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. U.S. policy over the years has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, while a second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights and democracy projects. In December 2014, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving away from a sanctions-based policy toward one of engagement and a normalization of relations. The President maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about democracy and human rights in Cuba, but he emphasized that the United States could do more through engagement than isolation. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015), the rescission of Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015), and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. In order to implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations five times (most recently in October 2016) in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. The overall embargo, however, remains in place, and can only be lifted with congressional action or if certain conditions in Cuba are met, including that a democratically elected government is in place. With the goal of advancing the normalization process, President Obama visited Cuba in March 2016, the first visit of a U.S. President to Cuba in almost 90 years. On January 12, 2017, President Obama announced a change in U.S. immigration policy by ending the special treatment for undocumented Cuban migrants entering the United States. Legislative Activity The Obama Administration's shift in Cuba policy has spurred strong interest in Congress. Some Members lauded the initiative as in the best interest of the United States and a better way to support change in Cuba, while others criticized the President for not obtaining more concessions from Cuba to advance human rights and protect U.S. interests. In the 114th Congress, numerous legislative initiatives were introduced on both sides of the policy debate. In 2015, five FY2016 House appropriations bills had Cuba provisions that would have blocked some of the Administration's policy changes and introduced new economic sanctions, and one Senate appropriations bill had provisions that would have eased certain economic sanctions. Ultimately, none of these provisions were included in the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. 114-113. In 2016, three FY2017 House appropriations measures (Commerce, H.R. 5393, Financial Services, H.R. 5485, and Homeland Security, H.R. 5634) had provisions that would have blocked some of the Cuba policy changes, and one FY2017 Senate appropriations measure (Financial Services, S. 3067) had provisions lifting restrictions on travel and financing for agricultural exports. In addition, the Senate version of the FY2017 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, S. 3117, would have funded U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba and additional personnel costs and would have fully funded the $15 million request for democracy programs. In contrast, the House version of the bill, H.R. 5912, would have prohibited assistance for expanding the U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba and provided $30 million for democracy programs. The 114th Congress did not complete action on FY2017 appropriations, but it did approve a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254) in December 2016 funding most programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of almost 0.2% through April 28, 2017. The 115th Congress will face completing action on FY2017 appropriations. With regard to the U.S. Naval Station at Guant√°namo Bay, both the FY2016 and the FY2017 military construction appropriations measures, P.L. 114-113 and P.L. 114-223, have provisions prohibiting funding for the station's closure. Both the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 114-92, and the FY2017 NDAA, P.L. 114-328, also have prohibitions on funding for the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. P.L. 114-328 also restricts FY2017 funding for Cuba's participation in certain joint or multilateral exercises or related security conferences. (See Appendix A.) Several other bills introduced in the 114th Congress would have lifted or eased sanctions: H.R. 274, H.R. 403, and H.R. 735 (overall embargo), H.R. 634, H.R. 664, and S. 299 (travel), H.R. 635 (agricultural and medical exports and travel), S. 491 and S. 1543/H.R. 3238 (some embargo restrictions), S. 1049 (financing of agricultural sales), S. 1389/H.R. 3055 (telecommunications), H.R. 3306 (energy resources and technologies), H.R. 3687 (agricultural exports and investment), and S. 2990 (foreign carriers traveling to or from Cuba). Other bills would have increased restrictions on engagement with Cuba: S. 1388/H.R. 2466 (travel and trade), S. 1489/ H.R. 2937 (Cuban military and intelligence), and H.R. 4772 and H.R. 5728/S. 3289 (U.S. flights). For more on these on other bills and resolutions, see Appendix C.",85,85 "The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations. This report covers current issues in U.S.-Palestinian relations. It also contains an overview of Palestinian society and politics, along with descriptions of key Palestinian individuals and groups —chiefly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian Authority (PA), Fatah, Hamas (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization), and the Palestinian refugee population. The ""Palestinian question"" is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state neighbors, but to many countries and nonstate actors in the region and around the world—including the United States—for a variety of religious, cultural, and political reasons. U.S. policy toward the Palestinians is marked by efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and establish norms of democracy, accountability, and good governance. Since the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993, Congress has committed more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians. Lack of progress on a nearly-25-year-old U.S.-supported peace process with Israel has led the PLO to consider alternative pathways toward a Palestinian state. Such alternatives were initially intended to obtain more widespread international recognition of Palestinian statehood in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. A November 2012 resolution in the U.N. General Assembly identified ""Palestine"" as a ""non-member state."" Palestinians also have encouraged international legal and economic pressure on Israel, perhaps to improve their negotiating position. The Palestinians acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2015, and the ICC could conceivably investigate Israeli, Palestinian, or other individuals for alleged crimes committed in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian leaders have expressed openness to exploring the Trump Administration's proclaimed desire to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. But Palestinian leaders are reportedly concerned about possible U.S. favoritism of Israel and perceived gaps between the Trump Administration's rhetoric and its willingness to help renew Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Administration officials, as part of larger efforts to stop Palestinian incitement to violence, have called upon PA and PLO leaders to cease payments to those who have committed terrorist acts and their family members. Congress has already reduced U.S. economic aid to Palestinians as a result of these payments, and is considering suspending major portions of this aid unless the Palestinians end the payments and meet various related conditions. Among the issues in U.S. policy toward the Palestinians is how to deal with the political leadership of Palestinian society. Hamas retains de facto control over security in the Gaza Strip, despite forswearing formal responsibility. The United States has sought to bolster Fatah head and PA President Mahmoud Abbas—who also chairs the PLO—vis-à-vis Hamas. The Abbas-led PA exercises limited self-rule over specified areas of the West Bank. However, some Members of Congress have manifested concern about Abbas's periodic dealings with Hamas, international diplomatic tactics, and allegations of increasingly authoritarian domestic leadership. Anticipation that Abbas may be approaching the end of his tenure may be fueling political posturing among possible successors and influencing Abbas's own decisions. Gaza also presents a dilemma. Humanitarian and economic problems persist, in the context of a small, population-dense territory that has been the site of three major conflicts involving its militants and Israel over the past decade (2008-2009, 2012, and 2014). Israel and Egypt maintain tight control over access to and commerce with Gaza. They and other international actors seem reluctant to take direct action toward opening Gaza's borders fully because of legal, political, and strategic challenges to dealing with Hamas. Political support and economic assistance from Iran and other state or private benefactors may bolster Hamas's rule and, combined with other factors, exacerbate the Palestinian political divide. In October 2017, Fatah and Hamas reportedly reached an agreement that could allow the Fatah-led PA greater administrative control over Gaza and its border crossings by December. It is unclear to what extent talks in fall 2017 about possibly ending the West Bank-Gaza split might mirror some past situations in which Fatah and Hamas either failed to reach agreement or to implement an agreement. As in those situations, the current case appears to center on Hamas's willingness to cede control of security in Gaza to the PA. Abbas has insisted that he will not accept a situation, like that of Hezbollah in Lebanon, where PA control is undermined by Hamas's militia. One Hamas figure has suggested that possible financial support for Gaza from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may provide incentives for Fatah and Hamas to bridge previously insuperable divides.",85,85 "Long-Term Unemployment and Recessions. The recession that began in the United States in December 2007 and officially ended in June 2009 was one of the deepest and the longest since the Great Depression. One feature that distinguishes the recent recession from its postwar predecessors is the historically high percentage of workers who have been unemployed for more than six months (the long-term unemployed). This report analyzes the trend in long-term unemployment over the postwar period and offers explanations for its unusually high incidence during the most recent postwar recession. It compares the individual, job, and household characteristics of the long-term unemployed during the latest recession (2007-2009) with the long-term unemployed at the end of the two previous recessions (1990-1991 and 2001). Long-term unemployment varies across individuals based on demographic and job characteristics. In each of the last three recessions, older unemployed workers were more likely than younger workers to have been unemployed for over six months. While an equal share of unemployed men and women were unemployed for over half a year during the last two recessions, unemployed women were less likely than men to have been out of work for 27 or more weeks at the end of the 1990-1991 recession. Unlike the two previous recessions, in 2009, unemployed workers with less than a high school education were more likely than unemployed workers with more education to have been out of work for at least six months. Also, in 2009, workers laid off from the financial activities and information industries were the most likely to have been jobless longer than 26 weeks. Workers displaced from management, business, and financial occupations were most at risk of long-term unemployment during recent recessions. Unemployment affects both the individuals who are without work and their families. Households of the long-term unemployed have lower earnings and income than other households (where households include married couples, single parents, and single individuals). In 2009, the most recent year for which data are available, the long-term unemployed were more likely than all unemployed workers to live in households with incomes below the official poverty line. They were more likely than other unemployed workers to receive benefits from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program) or be covered by Medicaid. In 2009, only 1.6% of the long-term unemployed received public assistance. Slightly over half (55%) of the long-term unemployed had some type of health insurance coverage at some time during 2009, compared to a larger majority (83%) of employed workers. Although a small majority (58%) of the long-term unemployed were homeowners in 2009, they were less likely than employed workers (71%) to own their own homes. As the economy recovers and employers increase hiring to meet the growing demand for goods and services, many currently unemployed workers will be able to find new jobs. However, finding work may be more difficult for the long-term unemployed if, for example, employers believe that their skills have deteriorated during their lengthy time away from the workplace. The long-term unemployed displaced from industries in which restructuring has occurred may also have a hard time finding new jobs in other industries, especially if the jobs require skills different from those they possess. Policies to encourage employers to hire the long-term unemployed include wage and training subsidies. Offering wage insurance and reemployment bonuses to unemployed workers may encourage them to accept jobs sooner than they otherwise might have.",103,103 "Need-Tested Benefits: Estimated Eligibility and Benefit Receipt by Families and Individuals. Need-tested benefits have received increased attention from policymakers in recent years, as spending levels for these programs remain elevated well into the economic expansion that followed the 2007-2009 recession. While information is available on the number of people who receive benefits from individual programs, it is more challenging to examine how these programs interact and the cumulative benefits families receive from them. Case studies based on hypothetical families often show how much in benefits a family may potentially receive from multiple programs under federal and state policies. However, these case studies assume families receive all the benefits they are eligible for and receive them all year. This is often not true. This report examines estimated benefit receipt by families from nine major need-tested benefit programs in 2012. The nine programs are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), subsidized housing assistance, the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), the special supplemental nutrition program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash assistance, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), and the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). The estimates are derived from a combination of information from a Census Bureau household survey and a model that estimates program eligibility and participation based on information from that survey. An estimated 135 million persons, 4 in 10 persons in the noninstitutionalized population, were eligible for benefits from at least one of these programs in 2012. However, not all persons eligible for need-tested benefits actually received them. Among the programs examined in this report, an estimated 70% of eligible families actually received SNAP and 65% of eligible families received WIC in 2012. However, the estimated rate of benefit receipt among eligible persons was 28% for TANF cash assistance, 22% for LIHEAP, 18% for subsidized housing, and 17% for CCDF (based on eligible children). An estimated 106 million persons (1 in 3 persons in the population) actually received benefits from one of these programs in 2012. Benefits were concentrated among people in families with children and families with an individual with disabilities with those two groups accounting for an estimated 78% of total benefit dollars from the selected programs. Many families that received need-tested benefits had characteristics not typically associated with economic disadvantage, a substantial portion of families that received aid had pre-welfare incomes above the poverty line in 2012. Among families with children in 2012, an estimated 45% of those who had a worker and 38% with at least one adult working full-time all year received at least one need-tested benefit. The estimated median annual benefit amount from the nine programs in 2012 was $3,300 (i.e., half the families that received benefits received less than $3,300 and half received more). About 40% of families that received need-tested aid did so from only one of the nine selected programs. Some families received relatively large amounts of need-tested aid. In 2012, an estimated 25% of families that received benefits from one or more of the selected programs received a total of $9,027 or more. These families accounted for two-thirds of all spending for these programs in 2012. Families with children who received $9,027 or more had characteristics indicative of a more disadvantaged population: working less than full-time all year, lacking a high school diploma, being in a family headed by a single woman, being of a racial/ethnic minority (other than Asian-American), and being in a large family.",114,117 "Revising the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Lead. The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under a court order to review the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for lead, announced his decision October 16, 2008, reducing the standard by 90%, from 1.5 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) to 0.15 µg/m3. EPA also promulgated new monitoring requirements at that time, requiring monitors downwind of any source emitting one ton or more of lead per year and in urban areas with populations of 500,000 or more. In January 2009, the Natural Resources Defense Council and three other groups petitioned EPA for a reconsideration of the monitoring requirements. EPA granted the petition and, in December 2009, proposed changes in the monitoring requirements, notably lowering the source-oriented emissions threshold from one ton to 0.50 tons per year. NAAQS are standards for outdoor (ambient) air that are intended to protect public health and welfare from harmful concentrations of pollution. In strengthening the lead standard, the Administrator has concluded that protecting public health and welfare requires much lower concentrations of lead pollution in ambient air than the level previously held to be safe. Lead particles can be inhaled or ingested, and, once in the body, can cause lower IQ and effects on learning, memory, and behavior in children. In adults, lead exposure is linked to increased blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, and decreased kidney function. Regulation of airborne lead is often described as one of the key successes of the Clean Air Act and of the Environmental Protection Agency. In 1970, when lead was widely used as a gasoline additive, emissions of lead nationwide totaled 224,100 tons. Lead was also present then in many consumer products, and thus was emitted to the air from industrial processes and waste incinerators. The phasing out of lead from gasoline, paint, and other products, as well as stricter controls on industrial emissions, reduced lead emissions more than 99%, to 1,300 tons in 2007. The reduction in lead emissions and ambient concentrations led some to suggest that there was no longer a need for an ambient air quality standard for lead. Others, including the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC), an independent panel of scientists who advise the EPA Administrator, concluded that the old NAAQS (established in 1978) was far too lenient, that lead in ambient air still poses a threat to public health, and that the NAAQS needed to be significantly strengthened. CASAC recommended that the standard be reduced from 1.5 µg/m3 to no higher than 0.2 µg/m3. In promulgating a more stringent NAAQS, the Administrator agreed with the scientists' recommendation, rejecting the argument that the standard is no longer needed. The Administrator's decision followed a multi-year review of the science. To implement the new standard, EPA and the states will first identify nonattainment areas (expected to occur no later than January 2012), following which there will be a 5-10 year-long implementation process in which states and local governments will identify and implement measures to reduce lead in the air. As noted earlier, EPA also promulgated changes to the monitoring requirements for lead as part of the NAAQS decision. As of 2008, at least 24 of the 50 states, including some with major sources of lead emissions, had no lead monitors at all. Under the 2008 regulations, all 101 metropolitan areas with populations greater than 500,000 would be required to have monitors as would the estimated 135 areas that have sources of lead emissions greater than or equal to one ton per year. In December 2009, EPA proposed further changes, lowering the source-oriented emissions threshold from one ton to 0.50 tons per year, while eliminating the urban area monitoring requirement. In place of the latter, lead monitoring would be added to a national network of 80 sites that will monitor multiple pollutants.",42,42 Legislative History: A Basic Guide For Constituents. This report provides an overview of legislative history of federal legislation. The report briefly outlines the legislative process and then suggests where to find materials that describe or document a piece of legislation's progress through Congress.,55,55 "Hemp as an Agricultural Commodity. Industrial hemp is an agricultural commodity that is cultivated for use in the production of a wide range of products, including foods and beverages, cosmetics and personal care products, nutritional supplements, fabrics and textiles, yarns and spun fibers, paper, construction and insulation materials, and other manufactured goods. Hemp can be grown as a fiber, seed, or other dual-purpose crop. However, hemp is also from the same species of plant, Cannabis sativa, as marijuana. As a result, production in the United States is restricted due to hemp's association with marijuana, and the U.S. market is largely dependent on imports, both as finished hemp-containing products and as ingredients for use in further processing (mostly from Canada and China). Current industry estimates report U.S. hemp sales at nearly $700 million annually. In the early 1990s there was a sustained resurgence of interest to allow for commercial hemp cultivation in the United States. Several states conducted economic or market studies and initiated or enacted legislation to expand state-level resources and production. Congress made significant changes to federal policies regarding hemp in the 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79, §7606). The 2014 farm bill provided that certain research institutions and state departments of agriculture may grow hemp under an agricultural pilot program. The bill further established a statutory definition for industrial hemp as ""the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of such plant, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis."" Delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol is the dominant psychotrophic ingredient in Cannabis sativa. In subsequent omnibus appropriations, Congress has blocked the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and federal law enforcement authorities from interfering with state agencies, hemp growers, and agricultural research. Appropriators have also blocked the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) from prohibiting the transportation, processing, sale, or use of industrial hemp that is grown or cultivated in accordance with the 2014 farm bill provision. Despite these efforts, industrial hemp continues to be subject to U.S. drug laws, and growing industrial hemp is restricted. Under current U.S. drug policy, all cannabis varieties—including industrial hemp—are considered Schedule I controlled substances under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA, 21 U.S.C. §§801 et seq.). Although hemp production is generally allowed following requirements under the 2014 farm bill, some aspects of production remain subject to DEA oversight, including the importation of viable seeds, which still requires DEA registration according to the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. §§951-971). Other guidance from DEA, USDA, and the Food and Drug Administration provides additional clarification regarding federal authorities' position on hemp and its future policies regarding its cultivation and marketing. This guidance supports DEA's contention that the commercial sale or interstate transfer of industrial hemp continues to be restricted. Congress has continued to introduce legislation to further advance industrial hemp and address these types of concerns in the next farm bill. Introduced legislation as part of the Industrial Hemp Farming Act—first introduced in the 109th Congress and greatly expanded over the past few years—seeks to further facilitate hemp production in the United States but would also amend the CSA to specify that the term marijuana does not include industrial hemp. An expanded version of this bill was introduced in the 115th Congress in both the House and Senate (H.R. 5485, S. 2667). Many of the provisions in these bills are included in the Senate-passed 2018 farm bill (H.R. 2) that is now being debated in Congress. Similar provisions are not part of the House version of the 2018 farm bill (H.R. 2). Myriad other bills introduced in both the House and the Senate would further amend the CSA and other federal laws to address industrial hemp.",3,37 "The Proposed Authorities of a National Intelligence Director: Issues for Congress and Side-by-Side Comparison of S. 2845, H.R. 10, and Current Law. The 9/11 Commission, in its recent report on the attacks of September 11, 2001, criticized the U.S. Intelligence Community's (IC) fragmented management structure and questioned whether the U.S. Government, and the IC, in particular, is organized adequately to direct resources and build the intelligence capabilities that the United States will need to counter terrorism, and to address the broader range of national security challenges in the decades ahead. The Commission made a number of recommendations, one of which was to replace the current position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with a National Intelligence Director (NID) who would oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest -- including a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) -- across the U.S. government, manage the national intelligence program, oversee the agencies that contribute to it, and have hiring, firing, and budgetary authority over the IC's 15 agencies. Although the Commission recommended that the director be located in the Executive Office of the President, the Commission Vice Chairman in testimony before Congress on September 7, 2004, withdrew that portion of the recommendation in light of concerns that the NID would be subject to undue influence. The Commission further recommended that a deputy NID be established to oversee the day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Commission's recommendation to strengthen management authority over the IC is the latest contribution to an IC structural reform debate that dates at least to 1955, when arguments for stronger IC authority began to surface. OMB deputy director James Schlesinger in 1971 first broached the NID concept. Congress currently is considering two principal bills, S. 2845, introduced by Senators Collins and Lieberman, and H.R. 10, introduced by Representative Hastert that would establish the NID position. [For a comprehensive comparison of all recent NID legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL32600(pdf) and CRS Report RL32601(pdf) ]. Reactions to the concept of an NID have been mixed since its inception. Supporters argue that the DCI cannot manage the IC, the CIA and serve as the President's chief intelligence advisor, and do justice to any of the jobs. Other than at the CIA, the DCI also lacks hiring, firing and budget authority. They argue that the absence of strong, centralized leadership has resulted in divided management of intelligence capabilities, lack of common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic intelligence divide, structural barriers that undermine the performance of joint intelligence work, and a weak capacity to set priorities and move resources. Opponents counter that an NID would lose day-to-day control over the CIA, a natural power base and, as a result, influence. They also contend that an NID will shift the balance of control away from DOD, risking intelligence support to the warfighter. The congressional role includes deciding whether to establish the position of the NID and its authority. This report will be updated as events warrant.",27,27 "Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. This report provides information on the ongoing crisis in Yemen. Now in its fourth year, the war in Yemen shows no signs of abating. On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition, a multinational grouping of armed forces led primarily by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), launched Operation Golden Victory, with the aim of retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. The coalition also has continued to conduct air strikes inside Yemen. The war has killed thousands of Yemenis, including combatants as well as civilians, and has significantly damaged the country's infrastructure. According to the United Nations (U.N.) High Commissioner for Human Rights, from the start of the conflict in March 2015 through August 9, 2018, the United Nations documented ""a total of 17,062 civilian casualties—6,592 dead and 10,470 injured."" This figure may vastly underestimate the war's death toll. Although both the Obama and Trump Administrations have called for a political solution to the conflict, the war's combatants still appear determined to pursue military victory. The two sides also appear to fundamentally disagree over the framework for a potential political solution. The Saudi-led coalition demands that the Houthi militia disarm, relinquish its heavy weaponry (ballistic missiles and rockets), and return control of the capital, Sanaa, to the internationally recognized government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who is in exile in Saudi Arabia. The coalition cites international consensus for these demands, insisting that the conditions laid out in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2216 (April 2015) should form the basis for a solution to the conflict. The Houthis reject UNSCR 2216 and seem determined to outlast their opponents while consolidating their control over northern Yemen. Since the December 2017 Houthi killing of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, a former Houthi ally, there is no apparent single Yemeni rival to challenge Houthi rule in northern Yemen. The prospects for returning to a unified Yemen remain dim. According to the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, ""The authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen has now eroded to the point that it is doubtful whether it will ever be able to reunite Yemen as a single country."" While the country's unity is a relatively recent historical phenomenon (dating to 1990), the international community had widely supported the reform of Yemen's political system under a unified government just a few years ago. In 2013, Yemenis from across the political spectrum convened a National Dialogue Conference aimed at reaching broad national consensus on a new political order. However, in January 2014 it ended without agreement, and the Houthis launched a war. The situation in Yemen is considered one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), out of a total population of nearly 30 million people, 22.2 million Yemenis are in need of humanitarian assistance. Since March 2015, the United States has been the largest contributor of humanitarian aid to Yemen. For additional information on Yemen, including a summary of relevant legislation, please see CRS Report R45046, The War in Yemen: A Compilation of Legislation in the 115th Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.",85,85 "The International Criminal Court Treaty: Description, Policy Issues, and Congressional Concerns. The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC) concluded five weeks of negotiations on July 17, 1998 in Rome Italy, by adopting an agreement to establish a permanent international criminal court. Of the more than 160 nations that participated in the Rome Conference, 120 nations voted to adopt the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 7 nations voted against it, while 21 nations abstained. The United States rejected the final document primarily because of the broad jurisdictional powers granted to the Court. The Court's powers would include the authority to prosecute people from countries that do not sign and ratify the ICC Treaty. As a result, U.S. military personnel stationed on foreign soil might be subject to investigations and prosecutions by the ICC even if the United States does not become a party to the ICC Treaty. Due to the fact that the global deployment of U.S. military personnel exceeds any other country, U.S. officials are apprehensive over whether American armed forces may be likely candidates for frivolous or politically motivated referrals. Advocates of the ICC Treaty assert that sufficient safeguards exist to limit the Court's jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this assertion, the Clinton Administration is not prepared to sign the ICC Treaty in its current form. Ultimately, the Administration will have to determine what role, if any, the United States should assume concerning its relationship to the ICC Treaty and the Court. Even though the Administration has not submitted the ICC Treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, several members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have expressed their strong opposition to it. Any subsequent consideration of the ICC Treaty is unlikely unless corrective measures are taken to amend the Court's jurisdictional powers. Before the ICC can begin operating, 60 nations must become parties to the treaty through formal ratification or accession procedures - a process that may take years.",83,83 "Agriculture: A Glossary of Terms, Programs, and Laws, 2005 Edition. The complexities of federal farm and food programs have generated a unique vocabulary. Common understanding of these terms (new and old) is important to those involved in policymaking in this area. For this reason, the House Agriculture Committee requested that CRS prepare a glossary of agriculture and related terms (e.g., food programs, conservation, forestry, environmental protection, etc.). Besides defining terms and phrases with specialized meanings for agriculture, the glossary also identifies acronyms, abbreviations, agencies, programs, and laws related to agriculture that are of particular interest to the staff and Members of Congress. CRS is releasing it for general congressional use with the permission of the Committee. The approximately 2,500 entries in this glossary were selected in large part on the basis of Committee instructions and the informed judgment of numerous CRS experts. Time and resource constraints influenced how much and what was included. Many of the glossary explanations have been drawn from other published sources, including previous CRS glossaries, those published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and other federal agencies, and glossaries contained in the publications of various organizations, universities, and authors. In collecting these definitions, the compilers discovered that many terms have diverse specialized meanings in different professional settings. In this glossary, the definitions or explanations have been written to reflect their relevance to agriculture and recent changes in farm and food policies. This glossary is in alphabetical order and contains an explanation for each term. Acronyms and abbreviations are not followed by an explanation. However, except for private organizations and associations, the abbreviations likely are defined under their full name. The definitions and explanations are not legal in nature, but are explanatory. Hence, this document should not be used as a legal or administrative reference. For those purposes, the Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, and the Code of Federal Regulations are the more appropriate resources.",2,2 "Zika Response Funding: Request and Congressional Action. The second session of the 114th Congress has considered whether and how to provide funds to control the spread of the Zika virus throughout the Americas. Zika infection, which is primarily spread by Aedes mosquitoes and sexual contact, has been linked to birth defects and other health concerns. Local transmission of the virus has occurred in Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Florida. On February 22, 2016, the Obama Administration requested more than $1.89 billion in supplemental funding for the Zika response, all of which it asked to be designated as an emergency requirement, which would effectively exempt the funds from discretionary spending limits. The request included $1.509 billion for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), $335 million for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and $41 million for the Department of State. The request sought authority to transfer the requested funds to other federal agencies to allow greater flexibility as circumstances change. It also sought to provide HHS, the Department of State, and USAID with authority for direct hiring and personal services contracting, not limited to positions related to Zika response efforts. On April 6, 2016, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Secretary of HHS announced that they had identified $589 million—$510 million of it from ""existing Ebola resources"" within HHS and Department of State/USAID—that could be redirected and spent on immediate efforts to control the spread of Zika in the Americas. On April 8, 2016, the Administration notified Congress of the transfer of $295 million (included in the $510 million) from FY2015 unobligated USAID Ebola Economic Support Funds (ESF) to be used for Zika response efforts and other purposes. Of that amount, USAID would provide $158 million to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—$78 million for Zika response and $80 million for Ebola response. The remaining $137 million would fund various USAID Zika response activities. In May, both the House and the Senate passed supplemental appropriations measures for Zika response. On May 18, the House passed a stand-alone bill (H.R. 5243) to provide $622.1 million, which would be available until September 30, 2016. It did not designate these funds as an emergency requirement, but instead rescinded an equal amount of budget authority. On May 19, as the Senate was considering a bill to provide regular FY2017 appropriations for Military Construction-Veterans Affairs and Transportation-Housing and Urban Development, it amended that bill so that it also would provide $1.1 billion for Zika response, to be available, depending on the account, either until September 30, 2017, or until expended (S.Amdt. 3900 to H.R. 2577). The Senate bill did not contain any rescissions and instead designated the Zika-related appropriations as emergency requirements. A conference agreement to provide $1.1 billion in Zika response funding (H.Rept. 114-640, to accompany H.R. 2577) was filed on June 22 and agreed to by the House on June 23. Amounts to HHS and Department of State/USAID were generally similar to those in the Senate proposal. However, other aspects of the agreement generated some controversy. These included a provision associated with health care funding that would be provided through the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), and a provision that would rescind a total of $750 million, most of it from unspent funds provided by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) intended to establish health exchanges in the territories. The Senate voted three times (in June, July, and September) not to invoke cloture on the measure. On August 11, 2016, the Administration reprogrammed $81 million within HHS to continue funding for Zika vaccine research efforts. On September 28, 2016, the Senate and House passed H.R. 5325, a legislative vehicle that incorporated appropriations for Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies (Division A), $1.1 billion in FY2016 Zika supplemental funding (Division B), a short-term continuing resolution (CR) for FY2017 that would fund remaining government operations through December 9, 2016 (Division C), and a number of rescissions (Division D). The President signed the legislation on September 29, 2016. This report tracks administrative and congressional action on FY2016 supplemental funding to address the Zika virus. This report incorporates all information from CRS Report R44549, Supplemental Appropriations for Zika Response: The FY2016 Conference Agreement in Brief, with no substantive changes. That CRS report is no longer available.",65,65 "Frequently Asked Questions about IMF Involvement in the Eurozone Debt Crisis. On May 2, 2010, the Eurozone member states and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced an unprecedented €110 billion (about $145 billion) financial assistance package for Greece. The following week, on May 9, 2010, EU leaders announced that they would make an additional €500 billion (about $636 billion) in financial assistance available to vulnerable European countries, and suggested that the IMF could contribute up to an additional €220 billion to €250 billion (about $280 billion to $318 billion). This report answers frequently asked questions about IMF involvement in the Eurozone debt crisis. For more information on the Greek debt crisis, see CRS Report R41167, Greece's Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and Implications, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson.",82,82 "Medicare: Part B Premiums. Medicare is a federal insurance program that pays for covered health care services of most individuals aged 65 and older and certain disabled persons. In calendar year 2018, the program is expected to cover about 60 million persons (51 million aged and 9 million disabled) at a total cost of $745 billion. Most individuals (or their spouses) aged 65 and older who have worked in covered employment and paid Medicare payroll taxes for 40 quarters receive premium-free Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance). Those entitled to Medicare Part A (regardless of whether they are eligible for premium-free Part A) have the option of enrolling in Part B, which covers such things as physician and outpatient services and medical equipment. Beneficiaries have a seven-month initial enrollment period, and those who enroll in Part B after this initial enrollment period and/or reenroll after a termination of coverage may be subject to a late-enrollment penalty. This penalty is equal to a 10% surcharge for each 12 months of delay in enrollment and/or reenrollment. Under certain conditions, some beneficiaries are exempt from the late-enrollment penalty, these exempt beneficiaries include working individuals (and their spouses) with group coverage through their current employment, some international volunteers, and those granted ""equitable relief."" Whereas Part A is financed primarily by payroll taxes paid by current workers, Part B is financed through a combination of beneficiary premiums and federal general revenues. The standard Part B premiums are set to cover 25% of projected average per capita Part B program costs for the aged, with federal general revenues accounting for the remaining amount. In general, if projected Part B costs increase or decrease, the premium rises or falls proportionately. However, some Part B enrollees are protected by a provision in the Social Security Act (the hold-harmless provision) that prevents their Medicare Part B premiums from increasing more than the annual increase in their Social Security benefit payments. This protection does not apply to four main groups of beneficiaries: low-income beneficiaries whose Part B premiums are paid by the Medicaid program, high-income beneficiaries who are subject to income-related Part B premiums, those whose Medicare premiums are not deducted from Social Security benefits, and new Medicare and Social Security enrollees. Most Part B participants must pay monthly premiums, which do not vary with a beneficiary's age, health status, or place of residence. However, since 2007, higher-income enrollees pay higher premiums to cover a higher percentage of Part B costs. Additionally, certain low-income beneficiaries may qualify for Medicare cost-sharing and/or premium assistance from Medicaid through a Medicare Savings Program. The premiums of those receiving benefits through Social Security are deducted from their monthly payments. Each year, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) determines the Medicare Part B premiums for the following year. The standard monthly Part B premium for 2018 is $134.00. However, due to a relatively low (2.0%) Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) in 2018, the hold-harmless provision applies to about 28% of Part B enrollees, and these individuals pay lower premiums. (The premiums of those held harmless vary depending on the dollar amount of the increase in their Social Security benefits.) Higher-income beneficiaries, currently defined as individuals with incomes over $85,000 per year or couples with incomes over $170,000 per year, pay $187.50, $267.90, $348.30, or $428.60 per month, depending on their income levels. Starting in 2018, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA, P.L. 114-10) reduces the income thresholds in the highest two income tiers so that more enrollees will pay higher premiums. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 18, P.L. 115-123) adds an additional income tier beginning in 2019 for individuals with annual incomes of $500,000 or more or couples filing jointly with incomes of $750,000 or more. Current issues related to the Part B premium that may come before Congress include the amount of the premium and its rate of increase (and the potential net impact on Social Security benefits), the impact of the hold-harmless provision on those not held harmless, modifications to the late-enrollment penalty, and possible increases in Medicare premiums as a means to reduce federal spending and deficits.",70,70 "Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance. In the post-2001 era, the United States has viewed Pakistan as a key ally, especially in the context of counterterrorism and Afghan and regional stability. Pakistan has been among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance both historically and in recent years, although assistance levels have fluctuated considerably over the decades of Pakistani independence. In the wake of 9/11, however, aid to Pakistan increased steadily. Since 1948, the United States has pledged more than $30 billion in direct aid, about half for military assistance, and more than two-thirds appropriated in the post-2001 period. Many observers question the gains accrued to date, variously identifying poor planning, lack of both transparency and capacity, corruption, and slow reform by the Pakistani government as major obstacles. Moreover, any goodwill generated by U.S. aid is offset by widespread and intense anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people. Developments in 2011 put immense strains on bilateral relations, making uncertain the future direction of the U.S. aid program. Relations have remained tense since that time, although civilian aid has continued to flow and substantive defense transfers are set to resume later in 2013. Disruptions in 2011 included the killing of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani city and a NATO military raid into Pakistani territory near Afghanistan that inadvertently left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead. The latter development led Islamabad to bar U.S. and NATO access to vital ground lines of communication (GLOCs) linking Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea for a period of more than seven months. More recently, the 113th Congress is focusing on measures to reduce the federal budget deficit. This backdrop appears to be further influencing debate over assistance levels to a top-ranking recipient that many say lacks accountability and even credibility as a U.S. ally. For many lawmakers, the core issue remains balancing Pakistan's strategic importance to the United States—not least its role in Afghan reconciliation efforts—with the pervasive and mutual distrust bedeviling the bilateral relationship. The 111th Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73) authorizing the President to provide $1.5 billion in annual nonmilitary aid to Pakistan for five years (FY2010-FY2014) and requiring annual certification for release of security-related aid. Such conditionality is a contentious issue. Congress also established two new funds in 2009, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF, within Defense Department appropriations) and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF, within State-Foreign Operations Appropriations). The 112th Congress enacted further conditions and limitations on assistance. Among these were certification requirements for nearly all FY2012 assistance (in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012—P.L. 112-74) and for FY2013 Coalition Support Funds (CSF, military reimbursements funded out of the Pentagon) and PCF (in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013—P.L. 112-239). Similar provisions appear in pending FY2014 legislation. In September 2012, the Administration waived FY2012 certification requirements under included national security provisions and, in February 2013, it issued a waiver to allow for the transfer of major defense equipment in FY2013. The Administration has requested nearly $1.2 billion economic and security aid to Pakistan for FY2014. This represents a steep decline from total FY2012 assistance of about $1.9 billion (excluding CSF). Estimated FY2013 allocations are not yet available. This report will be updated as warranted by events. For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. See also CRS Report R42116, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements, by Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt.",79,79 "Confirmation of U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations in Presidential Election Years. In 2012, a presidential election year, an ongoing subject of debate in the Senate has been how many U.S. circuit and district court nominations should be confirmed by year's end, and how late in the year the Senate should continue to confirm them. Senators have disagreed as to what guidance, if any, previous presidential election years provide to the Senate regarding these questions. They have differed specifically on whether slowing down, or stopping, the processing of judicial nominations at a certain point during this session of Congress, or after a certain number of nominees have been confirmed, would be in keeping with the Senate's experience in past presidential election years. This report seeks to help inform the debate, by analyzing the number and timing of circuit court and district court nominations confirmed by the Senate in presidential election years from 1980 to 2008. The report compares the processing of judicial nominations during these years, using various quantitative measures, while relating its findings to the Senate's processing of judicial nominations in 2012, as of June 30. Findings in the report include the following The greatest and smallest numbers of circuit court nominees confirmed during a presidential election year in the 1980 to 2008 period were 11 and 2, compared with 5 confirmed thus far in 2012. Annual percentages of nominees confirmed ranged from 71.4% to 18.2%, compared with 41.7% confirmed in 2012, as of June 30. The greatest and smallest numbers of district court nominees confirmed in the 1980 to 2008 election years were 55 and 18, compared with 24 confirmed in 2012, as of June 30. Annual percentages of nominees confirmed ranged from 77.9% to 46.2%—the latter identical to 46.2% confirmed in 2012, as of June 30. Of 57 circuit court nominees confirmed during presidential election years from 1980 to 2008, most were confirmed in February (14.0%), May (15.8%), June (21.1%), and October (14.0%). Of 280 district court nominees confirmed during presidential election years from 1980 to 2008, most were confirmed in February (11.8%), May (15.7%), June (20.0%), and September (11.4%). In the four most recent presidential election years, 1996 to 2008, Senate confirmation of circuit court nominees almost completely stopped after June 30, with 18 of 19 (94.7%) confirmed in the first six months of the year. In contrast, during presidential election years from 1980 to 1992, approximately 42% of circuit court nominees were confirmed post-June. In contrast, in the four most recent presidential election years,1996 to 2008, a greater percentage of district court nominees were confirmed in the second half of the year (45.7%) than were confirmed after June 30 in the four previous election years of 1980 to 1992 (35.4%). During the presidential election years from 1980 to 1992, the Senate confirmed circuit court nominees as late as October (in three of the years) and December (in the fourth year). By contrast, in the four more recent election years, 1996 to 2008, the Senate did not confirm a circuit nominee after July. In seven of the eight election years, the last district court nominee was confirmed in September or later. During the 1980 to 2008 presidential election years, the Senate annually confirmed an average of five circuit court nominees by the end of June, the same number as confirmed by the Senate in 2012, as of June 30. The Senate confirmed an average of 21 district court nominees by the end of June during the 1980 to 2008 presidential election years, compared with 24 confirmed by the Senate in 2012, as of June 30. Circuit court judgeship vacancy rates declined between January 1 and December 31 in six of eight presidential election years from 1980 to 2008. District judgeship vacancy rates declined in four of the election years. During certain election years, Senate confirmation rates appeared related to the rise or fall in judicial vacancy rates.",54,54 "The Safety of Air Ambulances. The estimated rate of air ambulance accidents has been steadily rising since the early 1990s, and has increased at a rapid rate since 1998 when the industry began to expand more rapidly and shift toward a model of more independent private air ambulance services that cover larger geographic areas. Statistics indicate that the large majority of air ambulance accidents are attributable to operational factors related to pilot situation awareness and decision making when faced with adverse environmental conditions such as darkness, deteriorating weather, rugged terrain, or some combination of these factors. Initiatives to improve air ambulance safety to date have consequently focused on additional pilot training, implementing risk management practices to improve the safety of flight operations and using various technologies to improve pilot situation awareness in restricted visibility conditions. However, implementation of these safety measures has strictly been voluntary. The National Transporation Safety Board (NTSB) and other aviation safety experts are advocating the mandatory use of formal flight dispatch procedures and risk management practices among air ambulance operators as well as mandatory installation of terrain warning systems on air ambulance aircraft. The NTSB also found that many air ambulance accidents occur when patients are not on board, such as en route to an accident scene. Present regulations allow air ambulances to operate under a less stringent set of rules with regards to weather minimums and pilot duty times when not carrying patients. However, the NTSB believes that air ambulance flights should operate under more stringent commercial operating rules at all times that medical personnel are carried on board. Although maintenance issues have been identified in about 20 percent of all air ambulance accidents neither the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) nor the NTSB has placed any specific emphasis on oversight of operators or repair stations that maintain air ambulance aircraft. The present emphasis on air ambulance safety has, instead, been dominated by concerns over flight crew performance and weather-related factors. A variety of options are available to improve safety among air ambulance operators. These options include intensified oversight of air ambulance operators and regulatory changes to bring all phases of air ambulance operations under the same set of operational rules regarding weather minimums and pilot duty times, possible regulatory changes to provide for sharing and analysis of safety-related data and observations with some degree of impunity, possible aircraft design considerations to improve crash survivability, expanded application of system safety and formal risk management principles to mission planning and flight operations, enhanced training for both pilots and support personnel and operational procedures to improve coordination and situation awareness among the entire air ambulance crew and ground support team, and the use of various technologies to improve pilot situation awareness and augment pilot vision in low visibility conditions. This report will not be updated.",119,119 "Carcieri v. Salazar: The Secretary of the Interior May Not Acquire Trust Land for the Narragansett Indian Tribe Under 25 U.S.C. Section 465 Because That Statute Applies to Tribes ""Under Federal Jurisdiction"" in 1934. In Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a 1934 statute provides no authority for the Secretary of the Interior (SOI) to take land into trust for the Narragansett Indian Tribe (Tribe) because the statute applies only to tribes under federal jurisdiction when that law was enacted. The reach of the decision may be broad because it relies on the major statute under which the SOI acquires land in trust for the benefit of Indians. It affects the SOI's authority to take land into trust for any recently recognized tribe unless the trust acquisition has been authorized by legislation other than the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) or the tribe can show that it was ""under Federal jurisdiction"" in 1934. A subsequent decision of the Supreme Court, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012), appears to have opened the way to undo trust acquisitions on the basis of the Administrative Procedure Act. In that case, the Court refuted a long-held assumption that U.S. sovereign immunity under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. §2409(a), barred challenges to any decision of the Secretary to take Indian land into trust once title has passed to the United States. In the case, the Court ruled that a suit directly challenging the Department of the Interior (DOI) and its decision to acquire the land in trust could go forward. The case involved a challenge to a trust acquisition for a tribe that had not been officially recognized in 1934. It was brought under the Administrative Procedure Act and within its six-year statute of limitations. Subsequent cases, including a June 4, 2015, en banc decision, Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 789 F. 3d 947 (9th Cir. 2015), of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, indicate that challenges to the status of Indian trust lands not raised within the six-year statute of limitations will not be entertained by the courts. Carcieri involves a parcel of land which the SOI had agreed to take into trust for the benefit of the Narragansett Tribe, thereby presumably subjecting it to federal and tribal jurisdiction and possibly opening the way for gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The land is outside the Tribe's current reservation, which is subject to the civil and criminal laws of Rhode Island according to the terms of the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1974 (RIICSA). RIICSA does not explicitly address the possibility that lands other than the ""settlement lands"" could be placed in trust, nor does it specify what jurisdictional arrangement should apply should that occur. The issues before the Supreme Court were (1) whether the authority under which the SOI has agreed to acquire the land, 25 U.S.C. §465, a provision of the IRA of 1934, covers trust acquisitions by a tribe that was neither federally recognized nor under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and (2) whether the trust acquisition violated the terms of RIICSA. The Supreme Court's decision is predicated on the Court's finding that the definitions of ""Indians"" and ""Indian tribe"" in the 1934 legislation unambiguously restrict the beneficiaries for whom the SOI may take land into trust to tribes that, in 1934, were ""under Federal jurisdiction."" The Court also held that the Narragansett Indian Tribe was not ""under Federal jurisdiction"" in 1934. It, therefore, ruled that the trust was not authorized by the statute and reversed the lower court. Carcieri prompted the March 12, 2014, DOI issuance of a Solicitor of the Interior Memorandum on ""The Meaning of Under Federal Jurisdiction' for Purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act."" In it, the agency set forth its standards for determining whether a tribe not officially recognized until after 1934 was ""under Federal jurisdiction"" in 1934. These standards have found judicial acceptance in some recent cases. The Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon v. Jewell, No. 14-5326, 2016 WL 40560092 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2016), involved a trust acquisition for a tribe not officially acknowledged as an Indian tribe until 2002. Central New York Fair Business Association v. Jewell, No. 6:08-cv-0660(LEK/DEP), 2015 WL 1400384 (N.D. N.Y. March 26, 2015), involved a decision to take land into trust for the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, a tribe that had conducted an IRA vote in 1934. Acquisition of trust land for that tribe was challenged on the basis of the claim that a 19th century statute terminating the tribe's reservation resulted in placing the tribe under state jurisdiction. Moreover, two September 30, 2015, decisions of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, No Casino in Plymouth and Citizens Equal Rights Alliance v. Jewell, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1166 (E.D. Cal. 2015), and County of Amador v Jewell, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (E.D. Cal. 2015), dismissed challenges to a trust acquisition for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians. Those challenges sought to show that the Ione Band of Indians was not ""under Federal jurisdiction in 1934"" on the basis of various inconsistencies in the DOI's treatment of that tribe. One land-into-trust determination by the SOI has been rejected by a federal court. Littlefield v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 16-10184-WGY (D. Mass. July 28, 2016), invalidated a DOI decision to take land into trust under the 1934 legislation for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe. That tribe had been formally acknowledged in 2007. Its application for a land-into-trust acquisition was approved on the basis of a second definition of ""Indian"" in the IRA. The DOI had found that definition to be ambiguous. The federal district court disagreed. It ruled that, under its plain meaning, that definition applies only to Indians whose tribes were ""under Federal jurisdiction"" in 1934. In the 114th Congress, S. 1879, the Interior Improvement Act, introduced by Senator John Barrasso, chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee and reported by the Senate Indian Affairs Committee on June 6, 2016 (S.Rept. 114-275), joins three other bills, S. 732/H.R. 407, and H.R. 249, which have been introduced to amend the Indian Reorganization Act to permit trust land acquisitions for all federally recognized Indian tribes.",105,105 "Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options. The United States and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty (New START) on April 8, 2010. This Treaty replaces the original START Treaty, which the United States and Soviet Union signed in July 1991. START entered into force in December 1994 and expired on December 5, 2009. The original START Treaty counted each deployed ICBM, SLBM, and bomber as a single delivery vehicle under the Treaty limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and attributes an agreed number of warheads to each deployed delivery vehicle. This attribution rule provides the total number of warheads that count under the 6,000 warhead limit in the Treaty. To verify compliance with START, each side monitors the numbers and locations of ballistic missiles, launchers and heavy bombers deployed by the other country. The parties use a wide variety of means to collect information—or monitor—these forces and activities. Some of these monitoring systems, such as overhead satellites, operate outside the territories of the treaty parties. They have also been required to exchange copious amounts of data on locations, operations, and technical characteristics of the treaty-limited items. This verification regime has allowed the parties to remain confident in each other's compliance with the Treaty. The United States and Russia began to discuss their options for arms control after START in mid-2006. During the Bush Administration, they were unable to agree on a path forward. Neither side wanted to extend START in its current form, as some of the Treaty's provisions have begun to interfere with some military programs on both sides. Russia wants to replace START with a new Treaty that would further reduce deployed forces while using many of the same definitions and counting rules in START. The United States initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty, but, under the Bush Administration, would have been willing to extend, informally, some of START's monitoring provisions. In 2008, the Bush Administration agreed to conclude a new Treaty, with monitoring provisions attached, but this Treaty would resemble the far less formal Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that the two sides signed in 2002. In December 2008, the two sides agreed that they wanted to replace START before it expired, but acknowledged that this task would have to be left to negotiations between Russia and the Obama Administration. President Obama and President Medvedev agreed at their meeting on April 2, 2009, to pursue ""new and verifiable reductions"" in their strategic offensive arms. The two sides have just completed negotiations on new START Treaty. The United States and Russia could have chosen from a number of options for the future of their arms control relationship. They have allowed START to lapse while negotiating a new Treaty, but they could have extended START for five years during this process. They could also have extended START, then amended it to ease some of the outdated provisions. Instead of negotiating a new Treaty, they could have pursued less formal arrangements to manage their nuclear forces. Moreover, if a new treaty includes further reductions in nuclear weapons, it could use some START definitions and counting rules or the less formal Moscow Treaty declarations. This report will no longer be updated. Additional information on the New START Treaty can be found in CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions.",29,29 "The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC): Legislative Issues. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC or EIC) began in 1975 as a temporary program to return a portion of the Social Security taxes paid by lower-income taxpayers, and was made permanent in 1978. In the 1990s, the program was transformed into a major component of federal efforts to reduce poverty, and is now the largest anti-poverty entitlement program. Tax year 2009 data show a total EITC amount of $59.7 billion for 27.2 million tax returns, yielding an average tax credit of $2,195. Most of the EITC (87.1%) was received as a refund (EITC exceeded tax liability) by low-income workers. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA, P.L. 107-116) made several changes to the credit, including simplifying the definition of earned income to reflect only compensation included in gross income, basing the phase-out of the credit on adjusted gross income (AGI) instead of expanded (or modified) gross income, and eliminating the reduction in the EITC for the alternative minimum tax (AMT). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) created the category for families with three or more children, with a credit rate of 45%, for tax years 2009 and 2010 only. The ARRA also increased the phase-in amount for married couples filing joint tax returns so that it is $5,000 higher than for unmarried taxpayers in tax year 2009, and $5,010 in tax year 2010. The changes to the credit made by EGTRRA and ARRA were set to expire on December 31, 2010. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) extended the EGTRRA and ARRA provisions for two years (through 2012). The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA, P.L. 112-240) permanently extended the EGTRAA provisions, but extended the ARRA provisions for only five years. The expiration of the ARRA provisions for the EITC is one of the legislative issues for Congress. This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants.",102,117 "North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. This report briefly reviews North Korea's ballistic missile program. In summer 2007, North Korea tested modern, short-range missiles. In February 2009, South Korea reported the DPRK had deployed a new intermediate-range missile. This report may be updated periodically. Additional information is provided by CRS Report RL33590, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch.",29,29 "Buprenorphine and the Opioid Crisis: A Primer for Congress. Buprenorphine is a medication used to treat adults addicted to opioids (it is also used in the treatment of pain). Buprenorphine's effectiveness, safety, and availability in the treatment of opioid addiction are of considerable interest to policymakers seeking to address the ongoing opioid epidemic in the United States. Congressional actions taken in recent years to address the opioid crisis have included attempts to increase access to buprenorphine. This report addresses questions policymakers may have about the effectiveness of buprenorphine, the demand for buprenorphine, and access to buprenorphine. Effectiveness of Buprenorphine Overall, buprenorphine appears to be an effective medication for treatment of opioid dependence. When compared to other treatments for opioid addiction such as methadone, buprenorphine appeared equally as effective in promoting abstinence from drug use. Buprenorphine does not seem to retain individuals in treatment as well as methadone, however, though the reasons for this remain unclear. The research on buprenorphine suggests that it works better at higher daily doses (16mg or higher). The higher the dose of buprenorphine and the longer people used the drug, the more likely they were to remain in treatment, abstain from opioid use, and successfully complete treatment. Preliminary data suggest that buprenorphine may be safer and more cost effective than methadone, comparison of the safety and costs of buprenorphine with other treatments awaits further research. Demand for Buprenorphine Admissions to substance abuse treatment facilities involving prescription opioids nearly quadrupled between 2002 and 2014, in 2015 18% of individuals in need of treatment for opioid use disorders received it. In 2016, one-fifth (21.1%) of those with any opioid use disorder received specialty treatment, including 37.5% of those with heroin use disorder and 17.5% of those with prescription pain reliever use disorders. Despite marked increases in opioid abuse, deaths attributed to opioids, and related hospital admissions, the majority of individuals in need of treatment do not receive it. Access to Buprenorphine Buprenorphine is regulated differently when used to treat opioid use disorder than when used to treat pain. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) limits who may prescribe (or administer or dispense) buprenorphine to treat opioid use disorders, and the circumstances under which they may do so. These limits have implications for how patients gain access to buprenorphine and how they pay for buprenorphine. Buprenorphine comes in different formulations, and these modes of administration have implications for how patients gain access to buprenorphine and how they pay for buprenorphine. As of May 1, 2018, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration has implemented capacity for health providers to treat with buprenorphine almost 3,000,000 patients. Nonetheless, access to substance abuse treatment such as buprenorphine has not kept pace with the mounting rates of opioid addiction in the United States.",68,68 "Clean Air Interstate Rule: Review and Analysis. On March 10, 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued its final rule to address the effects of interstate transport of air pollutants on nonattainment of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulates (PM2.5) and ozone (specifically, the 8-hour standard). The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) was first proposed as the Interstate Air Quality (IAQ) rule and appeared in the Federal Register January 30, 2004. For PM2.5, CAIR finds that the interstate transport of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) from 23 states and the District of Columbia contributes significantly to downwind nonattainment, for ozone, CAIR finds that interstate transport of NOx from 25 states and the District of Columbia contributes significantly to downwind nonattainment of the 8-hour standard. This result differs some from the proposed rule because of improved modeling. EPA decided in CAIR to create three emissions caps: Two are annual emissions caps that address the interstate contribution of SO2 and NOx to PM2.5 nonattainment, the third cap is a seasonal cap to address interstate contribution of NOx to ozone nonattainment. The three caps are implemented in two phases: Phase 1 begins in 2009 for the NOx caps and 2010 for the SO2 cap. Improved modeling and other considerations resulted in some changes in the final rule from the proposed IAQ. For example, in CAIR, EPA added a fuel-type adjustment factor to the NOx allocation formula that provides significantly more NOx allowances to states that have coal-fired electric generation compared with those with natural gas-fired generation. Although changes to the proposed rule may be important in specific cases, they do not represent a major shift in the thrust and scope of CAIR. That CAIR has not had the visibility of the contemporaneous mercury (Hg) rule should not be interpreted to mean that the underlying issue of PM2.5 and 8-hour ozone compliance has been solved. EPA is currently reviewing the stringency of the PM2.5 NAAQS, a process that may result in a more stringent standard. Given CAIR's lengthy schedule, it seems likely that if the PM2.5 NAAQS is strengthened, efforts to revise CAIR would occur. Likewise, CAIR does not address the most potent environmental issue surrounding fossil-fuel-fired electric generating facilities -- global warming and the possibility of carbon dioxide reductions. Movement on that issue over the next decade could result in a modification of CAIR or a new multi-pollutant control regime. Bills have been introduced in Congress to create such a system. Finally, CAIR raises questions about the future of the Bush Administration's legislative initiative -- Clear Skies. Clear Skies represents a complete rewrite of Title IV of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and would impose a comprehensive cap-and-trade system on utility SO2, NOx, and Hg emissions. In addition, Clear Skies would alter, delete, or hold in abeyance for some time existing sections of the CAA with respect to affected electric facilities and industrial sources that chose to opt into the program. With the promulgation of CAIR that achieves NOx and SO2 emissions reductions from most of the country's electricity generating facilities, and of the final Hg rule, it is unclear what impetus remains for Clear Skies. This report will not be updated.",42,42 "Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 113th Congress. With the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), many observers have made a fresh assessment of where America's homeland security enterprise stands today. DHS is currently the third-largest department in the federal government, although it does not incorporate all of the homeland security functions at the federal level. The definition of homeland security remains unsettled, and questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the department have been raised since it was first proposed. Evolution of America's response to terrorist threats has continued under the leadership of different Administrations, Congresses, and in a shifting environment of public opinion. This report outlines an array of homeland security issues that may come before the 113th Congress. After a brief discussion of the overall homeland security budget, the report divides the specific issues into five broad categories Counterterrorism and Security Management Border Security and Trade Immigration Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, and Departmental Management. Each of those areas contains a survey of topics briefly analyzed by Congressional Research Service experts. The information included only scratches the surface on most of these issues. More detailed information can be obtained by consulting the CRS reports referenced herein, or by contacting the relevant CRS expert.",22,22 "Combating Terrorism: First Emergency Supplemental Appropriations - Distribution of Funds to Departments and Agencies. This report provides background on the 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, P.L. 107-38 (H.R. 2888) as well as the criteria for use of the funds developed by The Office of Management and Budget (OMB). It also outlines information about supplemental fund distributions in three tables.",22,22 "Public Health and Emergency Management: CRS Experts. The following table provides names and contact information for CRS experts on policy concerns relating to public health and emergency management. Policy areas identified include public health and medical system preparedness and response, mental and behavioral health, food safety and food defense, health care financing in disaster response, Stafford Act assistance and the role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Defense (DOD) incident response and civil support, global health and international preparedness, selected legal issues in preparedness and response, medical countermeasures, Project BioShield and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), homeland security research and development, biological and chemical defense research, biomedical research, pandemic influenza, and health effects of biological, chemical, and radiological agents (i.e., radiation health).",65,11 "Endangered Species List Revisions: A Summary of Delisting and Downlisting. The question of whether the Endangered Species Act (ESA) ""works"" is an important part of the debate before Congress concerning both its annual appropriations and reauthorization of the Act itself. Information on the species that have been delisted or downlisted from the Lists of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants is often cited when judging the ESA's success or failure. This report outlines the process and reasons for delisting or downlisting, and summarizes the 27 species delisted due to extinction, recovery, or data revision, and the 22 species that have been downlisted from endangered to threatened status due to stabilized or improving populations.",47,47 Violence Against Women Act: History and Federal Funding. This report provides a brief legislative history of Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) and an overview of the crimes addressed through VAWA. The report concludes with a brief description of the most recent reauthorization of VAWA.,95,95 "U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 2000-2007. This report provides background data on United States arms sales agreements with and deliveries to its major purchasers during calendar years 2000-2007. In a series of data tables, it lists the total dollar values of U.S. government-to-government arms sales agreements with its top five purchasers in five specific regions of the world for three specific periods: 2000-2003, 2004-2007, and 2007 alone, and the total dollar values of U.S. arms deliveries to its top five purchasers in those same regions for the periods 2000-2003, 2004-2007, and for 2007 alone. In addition, the report provides data tables listing the total dollar values of U.S. government-to-government arms agreements with and deliveries to its top 10 purchasers worldwide for the periods 2000-2003, 2004-2007, and for 2007 alone. This report is prepared in conjunction with the annual CRS report for Congress entitled Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007 (CRS Report RL34723, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007, by Richard F. Grimmett). That report details both U.S. and foreign arms transfer activities globally and provides analysis of arms trade trends. The intent here is to complement that elaborate worldwide treatment of the international arms trade by providing only the dollar values of U.S. arms sales agreements with and delivery values to its leading customers, by geographic region, for the calendar years 2000-2003, 2004-2007, and 2007. Unlike CRS Report RL34723, this annual report focuses exclusively on U.S. arms sales and provides the specific names of the major U.S. arms customers, by region, together with the total dollar values of their arms purchases or deliveries. This report will not be updated.",28,28 "Homeland Security: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Border Surveillance. Congress has expressed a great deal of interest in using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to surveil the United States' international land border. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) utilizes advanced technology to augment its USBP agents' ability to patrol the border, including a fleet of six UAVs. This report examines the strengths and limitations of deploying UAVs along the borders and related issues for Congress. UAVs come with several costs and benefits. One potential benefit of UAVs is that they could fill a gap in current border surveillance by improving coverage along remote sections of the U.S. borders. Moreover, the range of UAVs is a significant asset when compared to border agents on patrol or stationary surveillance equipment. Yet, despite potential benefits of using UAVs for homeland security, various problems encountered in the past may hinder UAV implementation on the border. There are concerns regarding the high accident rates of UAVs, which have historically been multiple times higher than that of manned aircraft. Inclement weather conditions can also impinge on a UAV's surveillance capability. Also, according to the CBP Inspector General, the costs of operating a UAV are more than double the costs of operating a manned aircraft. Recent attention has focused on the expanding area of operations for CBP-operated UAVs. On June 23, 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) granted a certificate of authorization requested by CBP, clearing the UAV flights along the Texas border and Gulf region. Other requests have reportedly been delayed due to safety concerns, some of which stem from previous incidents. Despite safety concerns, some policymakers continue to call for the increased domestic use of UAVs. The Supplemental Appropriations Bill of FY2010 (H.R. 4899) would include $32 million for the acquisition of two additional UAVs by CBP. This report will be updated as events warrant.",91,22 "2006 National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for Fine Particulate Matter (PM2.5): Designating Nonattainment Areas. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published revisions to the Clean Air Act (CAA) National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for particulate matter (particulates, or PM) on October 17, 2006. EPA's actions leading up to and following promulgation of the 2006 standard have been the subject of considerable congressional oversight. EPA and states' ongoing implementation of the standard, beginning with the designation of those geographical areas not in compliance, likewise has been an area of concern and debate among some Members of Congress, states, and other stakeholders for some time. EPA's most recent round of periodic review of the particulates NAAQS and final rule revising the PM NAAQS, published January 15, 2013, prompted further scrutiny of the ongoing implementation of the standards. Promulgation of NAAQS sets in motion a process under which the states and EPA identify areas that exceed the national standard (""nonattainment areas"") using multi-year air quality monitoring data and other criteria, requiring states to take steps to reduce pollutant concentrations in order to achieve it. The publication of the final designations for the 2006 NAAQS—and thus the effective date of the final designations—had initially been delayed pending review by the current Administration. On November 13, 2009, EPA published its final designations for the 2006 PM NAAQS that included 120 counties and portions of counties in 18 states as nonattainment areas based on 2006 through 2008 air quality monitoring data. The final designations, which include tribal land of 22 tribes, were effective as of December 14, 2009. States have three years from the effective date to submit nonattainment area State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which identify specific regulations and emission control requirements that would bring a nonattainment area into compliance. The 2006 NAAQS strengthened the pre-existing (1997) standard for ""fine"" particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter (PM2.5) by lowering the allowable daily concentration of PM2.5 in the air. The daily standard averaged over 24-hour periods was reduced from 65 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) to 35 µg/m3. However, the annual PM2.5 standard, which addresses human health effects from chronic exposures to the pollutants, was unchanged from the 1997 standard of 15 µg/m3. The 2006 NAAQS did not substantially modify the daily standard for slightly larger, but still inhalable, particles less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM10), retaining the 24-hour standard but revoking the annual standard for PM10. EPA's final nonattainment designations are only for the revised 2006 24-hour PM2.5 standard. EPA did not require new nonattainment designations for the PM2.5 annual standard and for PM10. The final designations for the 2006 PM2.5 NAAQS included a few areas designated nonattainment for PM2.5 for the first time, but, as expected, the majority of the counties identified overlapped with EPA's final nonattainment designations for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS. EPA's designations for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS included all or part of 204 counties in 20 states and the District of Columbia. Most of them were only exceeding the annual standard, only 12 counties were exceeding both the 24-hour and the annual standards. Thus, the 2006 tightening of the 24-hour standard resulted in an increased number of areas being designated nonattainment based on exceedances of both the 24-hour and the annual standards.",42,42 "FEMA Disaster Housing: The Individuals and Households Program—Implementation and Potential Issues for Congress. Following a major disaster declaration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may provide three principal forms of assistance. These include Public Assistance, which addresses repairs to a community and states' or tribe's infrastructure, Mitigation Assistance which provides funding for projects a state or tribe submits to reduce the threat of future damage, and Individual Assistance (IA) which provides help to individuals and families. IA can include several programs, depending on whether the governor of the affected state or the tribal leader has requested that specific help. These can include Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) for workers made unemployed by a disaster and not covered by the state's standard unemployment program. IA can also include Crisis Counseling that provides assistance to state and local mental health organizations to assist disaster victims traumatized by an event. IA may also include Case Management services that help a state to organize potential forms of assistance for disaster survivors. All of those programs can perform important tasks in the post-disaster environment to aid disaster survivors in reorienting their lives and returning to normal. But the principal IA program to offer such assistance is the Individuals and Households Program (IHP), authorized by Section 408 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The IHP provides temporary housing assistance as well as the Other Needs Assistance (ONA) grants that can provide necessary assistance for the replacement of lost items such as furniture and clothing. Funds to assist any household are currently capped at $33,000. This amount is adjusted annually according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Federal disaster housing assistance has a long history that is not always best understood by concentration on the exceptional circumstances presented by Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. In fact, the Hurricane Sandy experience of the last several years may serve as a better guide to explain the form FEMA housing assistance takes in most disaster recovery operations. While the Katrina experience suggested a general reliance on motel rooms, travel trailers, mobile homes, and even docked cruise ships, the great majority of disaster housing help comes in the form of repairs to a home to make it habitable and financial assistance to cover the cost of temporary rental units, such as available apartments in the disaster area. The use of mobile homes and travel trailers, what FEMA terms ""direct assistance,"" is rare and generally considered a last resort to be employed only when other housing options are not available in the immediate disaster area. But improvements have been made in this form of assistance and are reviewed here. This report explains the traditional approach for temporary housing through the IHP program following a disaster, how it is implemented, and considers if the current policy choices are equitable for disaster victims. As a part of this examination, the report looks at other forms of housing repair assistance such as the Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program for homeowners as well as assistance that is provided, in some instances, through the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Community Development Block Grant (CDBG-DR) program. In recent years FEMA has catalogued its use of various forms of housing and the associated costs of each. This report will review those expenditures and provide information on the relative costs, and applications of, several categories of assistance.",11,11 "Liberia's Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance. This report covers developments in Liberia, a small, poor West African country. Liberia held elections in October 2005, with a presidential runoff in November, a key step in a peace-building process following its second civil war in a decade. That war began in 1999, escalated in 2000, and ended in 2003. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997 after Liberia's first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups. The war also destabilized neighboring states, which accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces and became targets of the Taylor regime. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, an economist, won the presidential runoff vote with 59.4% of votes cast and took office in January 2006, becoming the first elected female president of an African country. Her runoff rival, George Weah, a former star soccer player, conceded Sirleaf's win after initially contesting it. Most observers viewed the vote as orderly, free, and fair. It fulfilled a key goal of an August 2003 peace accord that had ended the second civil war and led to an ongoing, U.S.-aided post-war transition process, which is bolstered by the multifaceted peacekeeping and development-focused U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The next election is scheduled for 2011, and President Sirleaf has announced that she will seek reelection. Liberia's security situation is stable but subject to periodic volatility. Progress in governance under the interim government that preceded that of President Sirleaf was mixed, widespread corruption within it was widely reported. Liberia's economy and state structures remain devastated by war but, along with humanitarian conditions, are improving. Liberia has received extensive U.S. post-war reconstruction and security sector reform assistance. In March 2006, former President Taylor was arrested in Nigeria and transferred to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to face war crimes charges. He was later transferred to The Hague, the Netherlands, where he is on trial by the SCSL. In addition to providing substantial support for Liberia's post-war peace and reconstruction processes, Congress has maintained a continuing interest in the status of Charles Taylor and in ensuring funding for the SCSL. Other legislation proposed in the 109th and 110th Congresses centered on immigration, debt, and tax haven issues, and the commendation of Liberia for successfully holding elections. Liberia-specific legislation introduced or acted upon in the 111th Congress has included H.R. 1105 (Obey), H.R. 3288 (Olver), S. 656 (Reed), H.R. 2258 (Kennedy), H.R. 2410 (Berman), H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen), S. 1434 (Leahy), and H.R. 2346 (Obey).",85,85 "Domestic Content Restrictions: The Buy American Act and Complementary Provisions of Federal Law. Broadly understood, domestic content restrictions are provisions which require that items purchased using specific funds appropriated or otherwise made available by Congress be produced or manufactured in the United States. Federal law contains a number of such restrictions, each of which applies to different entities and supplies, and imposes somewhat different requirements. Some of these restrictions have, however, been waived pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act (TAA). The Buy American Act of 1933 is the earliest and arguably the best known of the major domestic content restrictions. It generally requires federal agencies to purchase ""domestic end products"" and use ""domestic construction materials"" on contracts exceeding the micro-purchase threshold (typically $3,500) performed in the United States. Unmanufactured end products or construction materials qualify as ""domestic"" if they are mined or produced in the United States. Manufactured ones are treated as ""domestic"" if they are manufactured in the United States, and either (1) the cost of components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50% of the cost of all components, or (2) the items are commercially available off-the-shelf items. Agencies may, however, purchase ""foreign"" supplies in exceptional circumstances (purchase of domestic goods or use of domestic construction materials would be ""impracticable""). The TAA permits the President to waive the application of domestic content restrictions that would discriminate against ""eligible"" products or suppliers from countries that have trade agreements with the United States or meet certain other criteria. The Buy American Act is one restriction that has been so waived. This means that certain federal agencies must generally treat end products or construction materials that have been wholly grown, produced, or manufactured in designated countries, or that have been ""substantially transformed"" into new and different articles within designated countries using materials from other countries, the same as domestic ones when acquiring goods or services whose value exceeds certain monetary thresholds. The Berry Amendment, as currently codified in 10 U.S.C. §2533a, requires that food, clothing, tents, certain textile fabrics and fibers, and hand or measuring tools purchased by the Department of Defense (DOD) using appropriated or other funds be entirely grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced within the United States, with certain exceptions (e.g., procurements by vessels in foreign waters). Until 2006, the Berry Amendment also required that any ""specialty metals"" (certain types of steel and metal alloys) contained in aircrafts, missile and space systems, ships, tank and automotive items, weapon systems, ammunition, or any components thereof, purchased by DOD be melted or produced in the United States, with certain exceptions. However, that prohibition has since been codified in 10 U.S.C. §2533b. The Buy America Act is the name commonly given to domestic content restrictions imposed on states, localities, and other nonfederal entities as a condition of receiving specific grant funds administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and certain other federal agencies. The nature of the restrictions can vary depending upon the funds involved. However, by way of example, 23 U.S.C. §313 generally requires recipients of Title 23 funding to use in funded projects steel and iron produced in the United States, as well as manufactured products consisting ""predominantly"" of steel and iron that were produced in the United States, with certain exceptions (e.g., materials needed are not produced in the United States in sufficient and reasonably available quantities of satisfactory quality). There are also a number of other domestic content restrictions that apply in specific contexts and, in many cases, are intended to address perceived ""gaps"" left by the four major domestic content regimes noted above.",99,52 "The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate’s “Byrd Rule”. Reconciliation is a procedure under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by which Congress implements budget resolution policies affecting mainly permanent spending and revenue programs. The principal focus in the reconciliation process has been deficit reduction, but in some years reconciliation has involved revenue reduction generally and spending increases in selected areas. Although reconciliation is an optional procedure, it has been used most years since its first use by the House and Senate in 1980 (20 reconciliation bills have been enacted into law and four have been vetoed). During the first several years’ experience with reconciliation, the legislation contained many provisions that were extraneous to the purpose of implementing budget resolution policies. The reconciliation submissions of committees included such things as provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased spending or reduced revenues when the reconciliation instructions called for reduced spending or increased revenues, or that violated another committee’s jurisdiction. In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule (named after its principal sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd) on a temporary basis as a means of curbing these practices. The Byrd rule was extended and modified several times over the years. In 1990, the Byrd rule was incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as Section 313 and made permanent (2 U.S.C. 644). A Senator opposed to the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation legislation may offer an amendment (or a motion to recommit the measure with instructions) that strikes such provisions from the legislation, or, under the Byrd rule, a Senator may raise a point of order against such matter. In general, a point of order authorized under the Byrd rule may be raised in order to strike extraneous matter already in the bill as reported or discharged (or in the conference report), or to prevent the incorporation of extraneous matter through the adoption of amendments or motions. A motion to waive the Byrd rule, or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of the chair on a point of order raised under the Byrd rule, requires the affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators if no seats are vacant). The Byrd rule provides six definitions of what constitutes extraneous matter for purposes of the rule (and several exceptions thereto), but the term is generally described as covering provisions unrelated to achieving the goals of the reconciliation instructions. The Byrd rule has been in effect during Senate consideration of 19 reconciliation measures from late 1985 through the present. Actions were taken under the Byrd rule in the case of 15 of the 19 measures. In total, 70 points of order and 57 waiver motions were considered and disposed of under the rule, largely in a manner that favored those who opposed the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation legislation (60 points of order were sustained, in whole or in part, and 48 waiver motions were rejected). This report has been updated to include the consideration of the Restoring Americans’ Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015 (H.R. 3762, 114th Congress).",55,101 "Improper Payments Information Act of 2002: Background, Implementation, and Assessment. This report discusses the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA), which was signed into law in 2002 with the intention of increasing financial accountability in the federal government, thereby reducing wasteful spending.",63,63 "Summary Cost Data for Health Plans Available in Georgia's Exchange, 2014: Fact Sheet. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) contains a number of provisions that may affect the individual health insurance market. This fact sheet offers a first look at selected costs and options for individual and family plans in Georgia's exchange, providing information about individual and family premiums for selected ages, as well as two cost-sharing measures: medical deductible and maximum out-of-pocket expenses.",70,70 "American Samoa Emergency Management and Homeland Security Statutory Authorities Summarized. This report is one of a series that profiles the emergency management and homeland security statutory authorities of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and three territories (American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). Each profile identifies the more significant elements of state statutes, generally as codified. This report focuses on American Samoa.",104,22 "Job Loss and Infrastructure Job Creation Spending During the Recession. After the long economic expansion that characterized much of the current decade, the nation entered its 11th postwar recession in December 2007. The size of job losses and the comparison to the Great Depression intensified congressional interest in passing legislation early in 2009 aimed at encouraging job creation and warding off further cuts in employment. To mitigate all but one recession since the 1960s, Congress chose to increase federal spending on public works (i.e., infrastructure). Public works expenditures traditionally have gone to certain types of construction activities (e.g., building highways and bridges, dams and flood control structures), which indirectly increase demand in industries that supply their products to construction firms (e.g., sand and gravel mines, heavy equipment manufacturers). Today, the definition of infrastructure has been expanded to include green economic activities (commonly referred to as green jobs), which include industries that utilize renewable resources (e.g., electricity generated by wind), produce energy-efficient goods and services (e.g., mass transit), and install energy-conserving products (e.g., retrofitting buildings with thermal-pane windows). A question that typically arises during congressional consideration of economic stimulus legislation is which approach produces the most bang for the buck. In the instant case, this means how many jobs might be supported by federal expenditures on traditional and green infrastructure projects. Once stimulus legislation is signed into law, the focus of Congress customarily turns to estimates of the number of jobs that result as federal funds are allocated to specific activities. Therefore, after briefly examining the trend in employment since the recession's onset, the report turns to an in-depth look at estimates of job creation, including the limitations of the methodology often used to derive them and the difficulties associated with developing job estimates for green infrastructure in particular. The report closes with a review of what is known to date about the number of jobs supported by infrastructure spending and other provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). Section 1512 requires entities that receive ARRA appropriations from federal agencies, totaling approximately $271 billion, to include in quarterly reports to the agencies the number of direct jobs created or maintained as a result. Section 1513 requires the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) to report quarterly on the effect of ARRA provisions on employment and other economic indicators. The CEA's reports are the most comprehensive because they contain estimates of not only jobs supported by ARRA appropriations but also of jobs associated with other parts of the act (e.g., unemployment and health insurance benefits, state fiscal relief, and tax provisions). The CEA has estimated that ARRA might have increased aggregate employment above what it otherwise would have been by 1.0-1.1 million jobs in the third quarter of 2009, 1.7-1.9 million jobs in the fourth quarter of 2009, 2.2-2.8 million jobs in the first quarter of 2010, and 2.5-3.6 million jobs in the second quarter of 2010.",89,99 "What Effects Did the 2001 to 2003 Tax Cuts Have on the Economy?. Recession concerns have led policymakers to consider economic stimulus legislation. These proposals have raised questions about the economic effects of past policy changes. Congress enacted major tax cuts in 2001, 2002, and 2003. The acts reduced marginal income tax rates, reduced taxes on married couples, dividends, capital gains, and on estates and gifts, increased the child tax credit, and accelerated depreciation for business investment. The tax cuts resulted in an estimated revenue loss of 0.4% of GDP in 2001, 1.1% in 2002, and 1.6% in 2003. Since government spending rose as taxes were cut, the cuts can be characterized as deficit financed. It is hard to be certain what effects the tax cuts have had on the economy because there is no way to compare actual events to the counterfactual case where the tax cuts were not enacted. The most common method of estimating a tax cut's effect is to feed it into a macroeconomic model of the economy and see what the model predicts. Note that this is typically done before the fact: economic estimates of the tax cut's effect are not based on actual ex post data. These estimates are highly uncertain because there is no one macroeconomic model that adequately captures all of the economy's dynamics, no consensus among macroeconomists as to which one model is most suitable for policy simulations, and no model with a strong track record in accurately projecting economic events. Most estimates predicted that the tax cuts would increase economic growth in the short-term and reduce it in the long run. For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation predicted that the 2003 tax cut would increase GDP by an average of 0.2% to 0.5% in the first five years and decrease it by -0.1% to -0.2% over the next five years. Keynesian models find the largest positive short-term effect of the tax cuts on the economy. But these effects are completely temporary because they focus on how tax cuts boost aggregate spending, in the long run, prices adjust, and production rather than spending determines the level of output. In neo-classical (Solow) growth models, deficit-financed tax cuts reduce national saving, thereby reducing national income because capital investment can only be financed through national saving or foreign borrowing. If the latter occurs, the result will be an increased trade deficit. In intertemporal models, a deficit-financed tax cut is unsustainable: it must be offset in the future by a tax increase or spending cut to prevent the national debt from growing indefinitely. Thus, in these models, tax cuts followed by tax increases lead individuals to shift work and saving into the low-tax period, increasing growth then, and out of the high-tax period, reducing growth then. The period encompassing the tax cuts featured a recession of average duration but below-average depth, an initially sluggish recovery, a deep and unusually long decline in employment, a small decline in hours worked, a sharp and long lasting contraction in investment spending, a significant decline in national saving, and an unusually large trade deficit. Opponents see this as evidence that the tax cuts were ineffective, proponents argue that the economy would have performed worse in their absence. Also consider that some, perhaps most, of the recovery was due to monetary rather than fiscal stimulus.",102,102 "Corporate Criminal Liability: An Abbreviated Overview of Federal Law. A corporation is criminally liable for the federal crimes its employees or agents commit in its interest. Corporate officers, employees, and agents are individually liable for the crimes they commit, for the crimes they conspire to commit, for the foreseeable crimes their coconspirators commit, for the crimes whose commission they aid and abet, and for the crimes whose perpetrators they assist after the fact. The decision whether to prosecute a corporation rests with the Justice Department. Internal guidelines identify the factors that are to be weighed: the strength of the case against the corporation, the extent and history of misconduct, the existence of a compliance program, the corporation's cooperation with the investigation, the collateral consequences, whether the corporation has made restitution or taken other remedial measures, and the alternatives to federal prosecution. As in the case of individual defendants, corporation prosecutions rarely result in a criminal trial. More often, the corporation pleads guilty or enters into a deferred or delayed prosecution agreement. During a criminal investigation and throughout the course of criminal proceedings, corporations enjoy many, but not all, of the constitutional rights implicated in the criminal investigation or prosecution of an individual. Corporations have no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On the other hand, the courts have recognized or have assumed that corporations have a First Amendment right to free speech, a Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, a Fifth Amendment right to due process and protection against double jeopardy, Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, jury trial, speedy trial, and to confront accusers, and to subpoena witnesses, and Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines. Corporations cannot be jailed. Otherwise, corporations and individuals face many of the same consequences following conviction. The federal Sentencing Guidelines influence the sentencing consequences of conviction in many instances. Corporations can be fined. They can be placed on probation. They can be ordered to pay restitution. Their property can be confiscated. They can be barred from engaging in various types of commercial activity. The Guidelines speak to all of these. For example, the corporate fine Guidelines begin with the premise that a totally corrupt corporation should be fined out of existence, if the statutory maximum permits. A corporation operated for criminal purposes or by criminal means should be fined at a level sufficient to strip it of all of its assets. In other cases, the Guidelines recommend fines and sentencing features that reflect the nature and seriousness of the crime of conviction and the level of corporate culpability and remedial efforts. This is an abbreviated version of a longer CRS Report, without the footnotes or citations and attributions to authorities that appear in the longer report. The parent report is entitled CRS Report R43293, Corporate Criminal Liability: An Overview of Federal Law.",98,98 "FY2016 Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriations: In Brief. The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and—in even-numbered fiscal years—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill's development since mandatory amounts generally are set by authorizing laws such as the farm bill. The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), agricultural research, FDA, rural development, foreign food aid and trade, farm assistance programs, food safety inspection, conservation, and animal and plant health programs. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), child nutrition, crop insurance, and the farm commodity and conservation programs paid by the Commodity Credit Corporation. The FY2016 Agriculture Appropriations bill was enacted as part of an omnibus appropriation on December 18, 2015 (H.R. 2029). Agriculture appropriations bills were reported in both chambers, but neither went to the floor (, S. 1800). The enacted appropriation provides $21.750 billion for discretionary amounts in the Agriculture appropriation, an increase of $925 million over FY2015 (+4.4%), and $1.1 billion more than the House bill or $990 million more than the Senate bill. The omnibus was enacted using a higher budget allocation in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74) than the reported bills had during their development. Mandatory spending carried in the Agriculture appropriation is roughly $119 billion, making the FY2016 total about $141 billion. Among the notable policy-related provisions, the FY2016 appropriation repeals certain country-of-origin provisions, continues to prohibit horse slaughter facility inspections and the import of processed poultry from China for certain nutrition programs. It continues providing flexibility from whole grain and sodium requirements in the child nutrition programs, and addresses the formation of future dietary guidelines. It restores the use of commodity certificates for the marketing loan program, including not being subject to payment limits. However, it does not change the conservation compliance requirements, nor does it limit the applicability of certain tobacco regulations for e-cigarettes, unlike the House markup.",2,2 "Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation. Falling agricultural exports and declining commodity prices led farm groups and agribusiness firms to urge the 106th Congress to pass legislation exempting foods and agricultural commodities from U.S. economic sanctions against certain countries. In completing action on the FY2001 agriculture appropriations bill, Congress codified the lifting of unilateral sanctions on commercial sales of food, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical products to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan, and extended this policy to apply to Cuba (Title IX of H.R. 5426, as enacted by P.L. 106-387, Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000). Related provisions place financing and licensing conditions on sales to these countries. Those that apply to Cuba, though, are permanent and more restrictive than for the other countries. Other provisions give Congress the authority in the future to veto a President's proposal to impose a sanction on the sale of agricultural or medical products.",4,4 "Deductibility of Corporate Campaign Expenditures. As the 2012 election cycle heats up, one question often asked is whether businesses may deduct amounts spent on political activities as a business expense. A related question is whether they may deduct dues paid to a 501(c)(6) trade association that then engages in such activities. These questions have greater significance in light of the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC, which struck down long-standing prohibitions in federal campaign finance law on corporations making certain types of campaign-related expenditures. Section 162(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) generally prohibits corporations from deducting as a business expense the types of expenditures that they can now make post-Citizens United. The statute, which long predates the 2010 decision, prohibits taxpayers from deducting campaign-related and lobbying expenditures as a trade or business expense. With respect to dues, the IRC generally permits a 501(c)(6) trade association to decide whether to notify its members of the portion of dues that are allocated to political activities and, therefore, not deductible. If the group provides the notification, then its members may not deduct that portion of the dues. If the group chooses not to provide the notification, or otherwise fails to do so, then it must generally pay a tax (known as a ""proxy tax"") on that amount. The notification and proxy tax requirements do not apply to any amount on which the 501(c)(6) organization is taxed under IRC Section 527(f). That section imposes a tax on 501(c) organizations that make an expenditure for influencing elections, among other activities. Contributions to other types of tax-exempt groups that use the money for campaign activity would appear to be non-deductible under Section 162(e). It seems that donations to a Section 527 political organization engaged in electioneering, such as a political action committee (PAC, including a Super PAC), should not be deducted. The tax treatment of contributions to politically active 501(c) groups (e.g., 501(c)(4) organizations) may be a little more complicated, but it does appear that any amounts for campaign activity or lobbying should be non-deductible under Section 162(e). Nonetheless, some tax experts have recently suggested that businesses might be including some contributions to 501(c) groups in their marketing or advertising budgets and then deducting them as ordinary and necessary business expenses under Section 162. For anyone outside the IRS, determining whether this is actually happening would be very difficult, if not impossible, since the information is typically not publicly available. Some have suggested that Citizens United calls into question the constitutionality of Section 162(e). The arguments appear to be that the tax code cannot disallow a deduction for activities that the Supreme Court has held are protected speech or provide beneficial tax treatment to only some types of speech (e.g., non-political business speech, the expenditures for which may be deductible). It is not clear this is true. Prior to Citizens United, the Supreme Court ruled that a regulatory provision similar to Section 162(e) was constitutional, explaining there is no requirement that the government subsidize a taxpayer's First Amendment rights by permitting a deduction for political expenditures. It is not at all clear that Citizens United changes this analysis. Therefore, until a court speaks to the issue, it seems premature to conclude that Section 162(e) is unconstitutional based on Citizens United.",61,61 Rebuilding the Iraqi Media: Issues for Congress. This report discusses the U.S. efforts to rebuild Iraqi media after the fall of Saddam Hussein's rule.,79,85 "Congress's Power Under the Commerce Clause: The Impact of Recent Court Decisions. This report will first review the current Supreme Court case law with respect to the Commerce Clause. Second, it will examine the analysis used and the results of the three lower court opinions. Finally, two areas of tension that appear to exist within the Court's jurisprudence, and the potential implications that resolution of these conflicts may have on congressional power under the Commerce Clause will be examined.",55,55 "Rwanda: Background and Current Developments. This report discusses the current political conditions of Rwanda, including a brief historical overview. The report also includes information about the poor human rights conditions in Rwanda and U.S. Rwanda relations.",85,85 "The Electoral College: Reform Proposals in the 108th Congress. American voters elect the President and Vice President of the United States under a complex arrangement of constitutional provisions, federal and state laws, and political party practices known as the electoral college system. Despite occasional close elections, this system has delivered uncontested results in 46 of 50 elections since adoption of the 12th Amendment, effective in 1804. Throughout this period, nevertheless, it has been the subject of persistent criticism and many reform proposals. Related measures fall into two basic categories: those that would eliminate the electoral college and substitute direct popular election of the President and Vice President, and those that would retain the existing system in some form and correct perceived defects.",61,61 "Is the U.S. Current Account Deficit Sustainable?. America's current account (CA) deficit (the trade deficit plus net income payments and net unilateral transfers) rose as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) from 1991 to a record high of about 6% of GDP in 2006. It began falling in 2007, and reached 3% of GDP in 2009. The CA deficit is financed by foreign capital inflows. Many observers have questioned whether such large inflows are sustainable. Even at 3% of GDP, the deficit is probably still too large to be permanently sustained, and many economists fear that the decline is temporary and caused by the recession. Further, a large share of the capital inflows have come from foreign central banks in recent years, and some are concerned about the economic and political implications of this reliance. Some fear that a rapid decline in capital inflows would trigger a sharp drop in the value of the dollar and an increase in interest rates that could lower asset values and disrupt economic activity. However, economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that the most plausible scenario is a slow decline in the CA deficit, which would not greatly disrupt economic activity because production in the traded goods sector would be stimulated. The financial crisis that worsened in September 2008 would seem to be a good test case of the type of event that could lead to the feared ""sudden stop"" in foreigners' willingness to finance the CA deficit. While the recession deepened following the crisis, it has not been via a sudden decline in the dollar or a sudden broad spike in U.S. interest rates. On the contrary, the dollar appreciated in value in the months after the crisis and foreign demand for U.S. Treasury bonds has risen since the crisis worsened. On the other hand, there was a large decline in private foreign capital inflows beginning in 2008, had it not been for foreign government purchases of U.S. securities, the CA would have been in surplus in 2009, all else equal. One long-term consequence of large and chronic CA deficits has been the growing foreign ownership of the U.S. capital stock. A large CA deficit is not sustainable in the long run because it increases U.S. net debt owed to foreigners, which cannot rise without limit. A larger debt can be serviced only through more borrowing or higher net exports. For net exports to rise, all else equal, the value of the dollar must fall. This explains why many economists believe that both the dollar and the CA deficit will fall further at some point in the future. To date, debt service has not been burdensome. Because U.S. holdings of foreign assets have earned a higher rate of return than U.S. debt owed to foreigners, U.S. net investment income has remained positive, even though the United States is a net debtor nation. Since 1980, most episodes of a declining CA deficit in industrialized countries have been associated with slow economic growth. Only two episodes were associated with a severe disruption in economic activity. Because most of the episodes involved small countries, these cases may differ in important ways from any corresponding episode in the United States. Historically, a few other countries have had a higher net foreign debt-to-GDP ratio than the United States has at present, however, if CA deficits continue at current levels, the U.S. net foreign debt could eventually be the highest ever recorded. This report also reviews studies on the CA deficit's sustainability. Some of the studies suggest that a large dollar depreciation could eventually be required to restore sustainability. But the inflation-adjusted 25% depreciation of the dollar from 2002-2008 had little effect on the CA deficit, which kept growing until 2007. The CA deficit did not decline rapidly until after the financial crisis of September 2008—a period with little trend movement in the dollar.",101,101 "Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration: Analysis of an Energy Department Task Force Report. Congress annually funds the nuclear weapons complex (the Complex), those sites that develop maintain, manufacture, and dismantle nuclear weapons. In hearings held in 2004, the House Appropriations Committee pressed the Secretary of Energy ""for a systematic review of requirements for the weapons complex over the next twenty-five years."" The committee expressed its concern that the Complex is not well suited to the post-Cold War situation, and should reflect presidential decisions on the stockpile as well as issues of cost, security, and Complex size. In response, the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board prepared a report, released in final form in October 2005. The report indicated that the Complex had redundant facilities, security concerns, high cost excessive competition between the weapons labs, and inadequate equipment for the production plants. To redress these problems, the Task Force proposed restructuring the Complex. It would shift much production and some R&D to a new nuclear production center, probably close one or more plants, contract out some nonnuclear work, shrink the labs, consolidate facilities, and take steps to make governance more effective. It was concerned that current warheads, produced during the Cold War, are inappropriate for the current situation because they have more yield and efficiency than is needed, yet are more vulnerable to terrorist threats than is desirable, are hard to manufacture are designed close to failure points, and will probably become harder to maintain. It recommends restructuring the nuclear arsenal by producing new-design Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRWs) with characteristics deemed more suitable to the current environment. The report links Complex and warheads: in the Task Force's view, RRWs would be easier to produce and maintain, permitting a smaller, more efficient, and less costly Complex. Observers familiar with the current Complex raise several concerns. From their perspective closing Complex sites and facilities might meet fatal political opposition. They maintain that the report seems to downplay the value of investments in Complex facilities over six decades, and projects large cost savings through 2030 based on questionable assumptions. They fear that shifting key tasks that the nuclear weapons labs perform to other sites could disrupt the labs' ability to do their work. The recommendation to proceed immediately with RRW deals with restructuring weapons rather than the Complex and, in this view, may go beyond the Task Force's mandate. A Department of Defense official stated that a Department of Defense-Department of Energy agency did not approve the Task Force's proposed 3-step transition to RRW, despite the report's strong implication to the contrary. While any final decision on deploying RRWs must await completion of studies that might possibly reject RRW, the Task Force assumes RRW will proceed and does not examine how its restructured Complex would support current warheads. Some express concern that Task Force recommendations may be at odds with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. This report will not be updated.",32,32 "USA PATRIOT Act: Background and Comparison of House- and Senate-Approved Reauthorization and Related Legislative Action. The House and Senate have each passed USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Acts, H.R. 3199 and S. 1389. Both make permanent most of the expiring USA PATRIOT Act sections, occasionally in modified form. After amending two of the more controversial expiring sections, 206 (roving Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) wiretaps) and 215 (FISA tangible item access orders (business records-library records)), they postpone their expiration date, S. 1389 until December 31, 2009, H.R. 3199 until December 31, 2015. Both address questions raised as to the constitutionality of various ""national security letter"" (NSL) statutes by providing for review, enforcement and exceptions to the attendant confidentiality requirements in more explicit terms. S. 1389 limits its NSL adjustments to the statute that affords federal foreign intelligence investigators access to communications records, H.R. 3199 amends the communications, and the financial institution and credit bureau NSL statutes. H.R. 3199 contains a substantial number of sections that have no counterpart in S. 1389, although many of them have been passed or reported by committee in one House or the other. Its treatment of seaport security, for example, is similar in many respects to that of S. 378, the Reducing Crime and Terrorism at America's Seaports Act of 2005, as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Its first responder grant program sections are virtually identical to legislation which the House sent to the Senate as H.R. 1544. And its death penalty sections are reminiscent of sections found in H.R. 10 in the 108th Congress as reported the House Judiciary Committee. H.R. 3199 alone permits wiretapping in the investigation of a greater range of federal crimes. It alone expands the use of forfeiture authority against money laundering particularly in terrorism cases. An abbreviated version of this report is available as CRS Report RS22216 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization in Brief.",22,22 "Business Tax Issues in 2009. This report discusses the tax climate for businesses, while economic stimulus proposals dominate the congressional debate. During 2009, it is anticipated that congressional deliberations will once again turn towards the extension of several expiring business tax provisions, energy taxation, tax shelters, and international taxation, while continuing to examine opportunities to stimulate the economy.",102,102 "Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors. In 2002 and continuing into 2003, Congress considered President Bush's requests for FY2002 supplemental and FY2003 assistance for Colombia and six regional neighbors in a continuation of the Andean Regional Initiative launched in 2001. On February 4, 2002, President Bush submitted a FY2003 budget request that would provide $979.8 million for the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), with $731 million in counternarcotics assistance under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). This request included $537 million in ARI funding for Colombia, with $439 million in ACI funding and $98 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to train and equip a Colombian army brigade to protect an oil pipeline in northeastern Colombia. On March 21, 2002, the Administration proposed an Emergency FY2002 Supplemental for counter-terrorism purposes that included a request for $4 million of State Department international narcotics control (INCLE) funding for Colombia police post support, $6 million of FMF funding for Colombia and $3 million for Ecuador for counter-terrorism equipment and training, and $25 million for counter-kidnapping training in Colombia. Also included in the submission were requests to broaden the authorities of the Defense and State Departments to utilize FY2002 and FY2003 assistance and unexpended Plan Colombia assistance to support the Colombian government's unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its national security. In legislative action in 2002, Congress passed the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 4775 / P.L. 107-206), with expanded authorities for activities in Colombia but with various human rights conditions, and it approved the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) extension and expansion as part of an omnibus trade bill (H.R. 3009 / P.L. 107-210). Later, it passed the Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2003 (H.R. 1646 / P.L. 107-228), and the FY2003 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R. 4628 / P.L. 107-306), with provisions relating to Colombia. In early 2003, the FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill was included in an omnibus spending package (H.J.Res. 2 / P.L. 108-7). The measure passed on February 13, 2003 and encompassed 11 of 13 appropriations bills that had not been enacted by the start of the new fiscal year. It provided $835.5 million for the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), of which $700 million was provided for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). It further allowed the transfer of $31 million from the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account to the ACI.",79,79 "NATO and the European Union. Since the end of the Cold War, both NATO and the European Union (EU) have evolved along with Europe's changed strategic landscape. While NATO's collective defense guarantee remains at the core of the alliance, members have also sought to redefine its mission as new security challenges have emerged on Europe's periphery and beyond. At the same time, EU members have taken steps toward political integration with decisions to develop a common foreign policy and a defense arm to improve EU member states' abilities to manage security crises, such as those that engulfed the Balkans in the 1990s. The evolution of NATO and the EU, however, has generated some friction between the United States and several of its allies over the security responsibilities of the two organizations. U.S.-European differences center around threat assessment, defense institutions, and military capabilities. Successive U.S. administrations and the U.S. Congress have called for enhanced European defense capabilities to enable the allies to better share the security burden, and to ensure that NATO's post-Cold War mission embraces combating terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. policymakers, backed by Congress, support EU efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) provided that it remains tied to NATO and does not threaten the transatlantic relationship. Most EU member states support close NATO-EU links, but also view ESDP as a means to give themselves more options for dealing with future crises, especially in cases in which the United States may be reluctant to become involved. A minority of EU countries, spearheaded traditionally by France, continue to favor a more autonomous EU defense identity. This desire has been fueled further recently by disputes with the United States over how or whether to engage international institutions, such as the United Nations, on security matters and over the weight given to political versus military instruments in resolving international crises. This report addresses several questions central to the debate over European security and the future of the broader transatlantic relationship that may be of interest in the second session of the 110th Congress. These include what are the specific security missions of NATO and the European Union, and what is the appropriate relationship between the two organizations? What types of military forces are necessary for NATO's role in collective defense, and for the EU's role in crisis management? Are NATO and EU decision-making structures and procedures appropriate and compatible to ensure that there is an adequate and timely response to emerging threats? What is the proper balance between political and military tools for defending Europe and the United States from terrorism and weapons proliferation? What is the effect of enlargement on security and stability? This report will be updated as events warrant. For more information, see CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Paul Gallis, and CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick.",21,21 "Treatment of ""Battlefield Detainees"" in the War on Terrorism. In June 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v. Bush that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges on behalf of persons detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in connection with the war against terrorism. The Court overturned a ruling that no U.S. court has jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas corpus on behalf of the detainees because they are aliens detained abroad, but left questions involving prisoners' rights and status unanswered. The 9/11 Commission recommended a common coalition approach to such detention. Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), P.L. 109-148, to establish standards for interrogation and to deny detainees access to federal courts to file habeas petitions but allow limited appeals of status determinations and final decisions of military commissions. Congress approved the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), P.L. 109-366, to authorize military commissions for the prosecution of detainees for war crimes. The Bush Administration earlier deemed all of the detainees to be ""unlawful combatants,"" who may, according to Administration officials, be held indefinitely without trial or even if they are acquitted by a military tribunal. Fifteen of the detainees were designated as subject to the President's Military Order of November 13, 2001, making them eligible for trial by military commission. In answer to the Rasul decision, the Pentagon instituted Combatant Status Review Tribunals to provide a forum for detainees to challenge their status as ""enemy combatants."" The Pentagon had earlier announced a plan for annual reviews to determine whether detainees may be released without endangering national security. The President's decision to deny the detainees prisoner-of-war (POW) status remains a point of contention, in particular with respect to members of the Taliban, with some arguing that it is based on an inaccurate interpretation of the Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), which they assert requires that all combatants captured on the battlefield are entitled to be treated as POWs until an independent tribunal has determined otherwise. The publication of executive branch memoranda documenting the internal debate about the status of prisoners evoked additional criticism of the Bush Administration's legal position. Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld determined that persons captured in Afghanistan in connection with the ""Global War on Terrorism"" are entitled at least to the minimum set of protections accorded by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. This report provides an overview of the law of war and the historical treatment of wartime detainees, in particular the U.S. practice, describes how the detainees' status might affect their rights and treatment, and summarizes activity of the 108th and 109th Congresses related to detention in connection with the war against terrorism. The report also summarizes legislative proposals in the 110th Congress, including H.R. 1 and H.R. 267.",24,24 "Gasoline Prices: Causes of Volatility and Congressional Response. The high price of gasoline has been and continues to be a driving factor in consideration of energy policy proposals. Despite passage of the massive Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005, P.L. 109-58), and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (H.R. 6, P.L. 110-140), numerous other proposed initiatives came under active consideration in the Second Session of the 110th Congress. Measures proposed included opening the Outer Continental Shelf for oil and gas drilling, regulation of speculation in energy markets, and policies concerning the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. A large number of factors combined to put pressure on gasoline prices, including increased world demand for crude oil and limited U.S. refinery capacity to supply gasoline. The war and continued violence in Iraq added uncertainty, and threats of supply disruption added pressure, particularly to the commodity futures markets. Concern that speculation added volatility and upward pressure was frequently cited. In recent months, a decline in the value of the dollar compared to other currencies increased the dollar price of oil on futures markets. The gasoline price surge stimulated much legislative activity, but until the last year or so there was not the sense of the extreme urgency of previous energy crises. In part, this may be due to the fact that there was been no physical shortage of gasoline or lines at the pump, as there were after the Arab oil embargo in 1973 and the Iranian revolution in 1979. At that time there was expectation that prices were destined to grow ever higher, and many believed that the world's supply of oil was running out. Such views have been less prevalent during the current run-up. But the continued and unrelenting increase in crude oil prices to record levels, even discounting inflation, led many to suggest that changing world market conditions may cause permanent, or at least chronic, shortages of petroleum production capacity. Others continued to expect that growth in demand would moderate, and production increase to meet demand, as it did following the shortages of the 1970s. The continuing high prices led to a further search for legislative remedies. This report, after analyzing factors that have contributed to high gasoline prices, describes the major legislative initiatives and discusses the issues involved.",40,40 Country Applicability of the U.S. Normal Trade Relations (Most-Favored-Nation) Status. The United States accords permanent normal-trade-relations (NTR) (formerly called most-favored-nation (MFN)) treatment to all its trading partners except six countries to which it is denied by law and 11 countries whose NTR status is temporary and subject to the conditions of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974.,53,53 "Federal/State Relations Under the Clean Air Act: The Supreme Court Takes Two Cases. Recently, the Supreme Court agreed to hear two cases involving federalism issues under the Clean Air Act (CAA). In Alaska Dep't of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, the Court will wrestle with whether EPA can enforce a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provision in the CAA contrary to a prior state determination under its EPA-approved PSD program. In Engine Manufacturers Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., the issue is the preemptive scope of the CAA program regulating mobile sources of air pollution. Why the Court has taken these cases is unclear, given that they present no constitutional issues but only narrow questions of statutory construction. Nor is there a direct split in the circuit courts. Perhaps the current Court's demonstrated interest in federalism issues is part of the reason.",42,42 "North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002-December 2004. This report provides a chronology of events relevant to U.S. relations with North Korea from October 2002 through December 31, 2004. The chronology includes significant meetings, events and statements that shed light on the issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program. An introductory analysis provides background on U.S. policy preceding October 2002 as well as an overview of developments and dynamics among the major players in the North Korea nuclear dispute: South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. Particular attention is paid to the demise of the Agreed Framework, the ongoing six-party talks, China's prominent role in the negotiations, inter-Korean relations, and the Japanese abductee issue. Also discussed is Congress's role in dealing with North Korea, including the passage of the North Korea Human Rights Act (P.L. 108-333). This report will not be updated.",85,85 "Public, Educational, and Governmental (PEG) Access Cable Television Channels: Issues for Congress. This report discusses public, educational, and governmental (PEG) access channels that are set aside for use by the general public, by local schools, colleges, and universities, and by elements of local government.",109,109 "Unauthorized Employment of Aliens: Basics of Employer Sanctions. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) sought to end unauthorized employment by imposing penalties on employers who knowingly hire or continue to employ aliens not authorized to work in the United States (e.g., illegal aliens and foreign tourists). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)amended some of the provisions of IRCA by reducing the number of acceptable documents for completion of the Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9) purposes, providing employers with the possibility of a good-faith defense against technical paperwork violations and providing some protection for employers who are part of multi-employer associations. This report summarizes the employer sanctions. This report will be updated as events warrant.",76,76 "The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA): Policies, Programs, and Funding. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the Department of Commerce, is the executive branch's principal advisory office on domestic and international telecommunications and information policies. Its mandate is to provide greater access for all Americans to telecommunications services, support U.S. attempts to open foreign markets, advise on international telecommunications negotiations, and fund research for new technologies and their applications. NTIA also manages the distribution of funds for several key grant programs. Its role in federal spectrum management includes acting as a facilitator and mediator in negotiations among the various federal agencies regarding usage, priority access, causes of interference, and other radio spectrum questions. The 112th Congress, with the passage of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), in February 2012, has given the NTIA new responsibilities in spectrum management and the support of public safety initiatives.",113,113 "RICO and Abortion Clinic Protests in the Supreme Court: Scheidler v. NOW. The Supreme Court has ruled that the National Organization for Women (NOW) and two abortion clinics may not sue anti-abortion protesters under the federal Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provisions based solely upon allegations that the protesters' efforts to shut down the clinics constituted extortion, Scheidler v. NOW, 123 S.Ct. 1057 (2003). The majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by seven other justices noted that RICO requires the commission of a pattern of racketeering activity. Racketeering activity is defined to include extortion under the Hobbs Act, the Travel Act or state law. Yet extortion requires the acquisition of property from the victim by threat or force. In the eyes of the Court the protesters obtained no property. Consequently no crime of extortion occurred. Without extortion, no RICO violation occurred. Because the Court found there had been no RICO violation, it became unnecessary to decide whether NOW would have been entitled to injunctive relief had there been a RICO violation. Justices Ginsburg, in a concurrence joined by Justice Breyer, pointed out that the principal consequence of the decision is its interpretation of what constitutes extortion for purposes of the Hobbs Act and RICO. After the events that gave rise to the case, Congress outlawed the misconduct at issue in the Free Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) and provided for both criminal penalties and civil remedies. Justice Stevens, in dissent, objected to the difficulties of applying the majority's opinion to cases involving extorted intangible property. Related CRS Reports include CRS Report 96-950(pdf), RICO: A Brief Sketch, and CRS Report RS21214(pdf), RICO: Legislative Activity in the 107th Congress.",98,94 "Poverty in the United States in 2015: In Brief. In 2015, approximately 43.1 million people, or 13.5% of the population, had incomes that fell below the official definition of poverty in the United States. These statistics represented a noticeable drop from the previous year, both in the number of poor, which had been 46.7 million in 2014, and the poverty rate (the percentage that were in poverty), which fell from 14.8%. The drop in the U.S. poverty rate was broad-based, with poverty lessening among many demographic groups. Families with a female householder and no spouse present (female-householder families) historically have had higher poverty rates than married-couple families and families with a male householder and no spouse present (male-householder families). This remained true in 2015, though all three family types experienced poverty rate declines. Poverty rates also fell for all three broad age categories: children under 18, working-age adults 18 to 64, and persons 65 years and older. Declines in poverty among the working-aged were driven by gains in the number working full-time year-round. In 2015, the working-age population grew by 1.0 million, but the number of full-time year-round workers (both poor and nonpoor) had a net gain of 2.3 million. While having a job reduced the likelihood of being in poverty, it did not guarantee that a person or his or her family would avoid poverty. Poverty rates fell among non-Hispanic whites, blacks, Hispanics, the American Indian and Alaska Native population, and Native Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islanders. No discernable change in poverty rates was detected for Asians. Twenty-three states experienced poverty rate declines from 2014 to 2015. Criticisms of the official poverty measure have inspired poverty measurement research and eventually led to the development of the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM). The SPM uses different definitions of needs and resources than the official measure. The measure of need used in the SPM includes food, clothing, shelter, utilities, and a bit extra for miscellaneous expenses, adjusted for geographic variations in costs. Unlike the official measure, the SPM uses after-tax income and includes in-kind benefits which generally help families with children, subtracts out work-related expenses which are often incurred by the working-age population, and subtracts medical out-of-pocket expenses, which are incurred frequently by people age 65 and older, from income. Under the SPM, the profile of the poverty population is slightly different than under the official measure. After rounding, the SPM was about 0.7 percentage points higher in 2015 than the official poverty rate.",117,117 "JOBS and Investor Confidence Act (House-Amended S. 488): Capital Markets Provisions. Capital markets provide financing for businesses to fund their growth that would facilitate innovation and jobs creation, and enhance the society's overall standard of living. They are segments of the financial system in which funding is raised through issuing and trading equity or debt securities, which are forms of financial assets representing ownership or indebtedness of a firm. They are considered the largest source of financing for U.S. nonfinancial companies, significantly larger than bank loans and other forms of financing. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the principal regulator of U.S. capital markets. In recent years, Congress and the SEC began to increasingly direct capital markets regulation away from its traditional ""one size fits all"" approach. Starting in 2012, the bipartisan Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act, P.L. 112-106) has scaled regulation for smaller companies and reduced regulations in general for certain types of capital formation. It established a number of new options to expand capital access, including a new provision for crowdfunding. Starting in 2015, parts of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (P.L. 114-94)—referred to as JOBS Act 2.0—provided additional scaled disclosure and reporting related regulatory relief for smaller companies. Following the JOBS Act and JOBS Act 2.0, capital markets regulation has become even more tailored to suit companies of different sizes and with different needs. However, concerns over capital formation persisted, given that smaller companies continue to face challenges to accessing capital, and the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) remained at far below long-term average levels post-JOBS Act. To address these concerns, Congress has considered numerous legislative proposals to further expand the scaled approach, with some proposals building on existing JOBS Act provisions. The most notable of these proposals is the JOBS and Investor Confidence Act of 2018 (House-amended S. 488), a capital markets package referred to as JOBS Act 3.0. The House replaced the content of the original S. 488 and passed the amended measure by a 406-4 vote on July 17, 2018. The package includes 32 titles, many of which have previously passed the House with bipartisan support as standalone bills. Of the 32 titles, 18 are more capital markets related. They can be grouped under four general categories Expand Investor Access. One approach to expand capital access is to expand the investor pool or enhance investor communications. Some of the provisions propose to expand (1) the type of eligible investors by widening certain eligible investor definitions, as seen in Titles IV and X, (2) the number of eligible investors allowed to participate in certain offerings, as seen in Title XXXII, and (3) the communication to eligible investors by allowing broader outreach, as seen in Title I. Reduce Compliance Costs. Some believe compliance costs could potentially outweigh benefits and are disproportionately burdensome for small and medium-sized businesses. In response to these concerns, certain provisions aim to reduce (Titles V and IX) or better understand (required studies in Titles XXII and XXXI) compliance costs for publicly listed companies. Promote Financial Intermediation. Capital markets consist of numerous players. Between investors and company issuers, who are the end contributors and recipients of funding, there are financial intermediaries that serve to channel funding or execute trades. Titles XXVI (a required study) and XXXII would promote the use of pooled investment vehicles to channel funding from investors to issuers. Title XXIV would require a study on investment research of small issuers, and Title XX would create a designated new marketplace for smaller issuer stock trading. Increase Investor Protection. Multiple S. 488 titles would create investor protection safeguards as part of a provision related to capital formation. Other provisions center on investor protection. For example, Titles XXVII (a required study) and XXIX would provide protection to general investors against corporate insiders, and Title XXX would provide targeted protection to senior investors who are victims of financial exploitation.",12,12 "The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law. The Constitution permits Congress to authorize the use of the militia ""to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions."" And it guarantees the states protection against invasion or usurpation of their ""republican form of government,"" and, upon the request of the state legislature, against ""domestic violence."" These constitutional provisions are reflected in the Insurrection Acts, which have been invoked numerous times both before and after passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1385, in 1878. Congress has also enacted a number of statutes that authorize the use of the land and naval forces to execute their objective. The Posse Comitatus Act outlaws the willful use of any part of the Army or Air Force to execute the law unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. History supplies the grist for an argument that the Constitution prohibits military involvement in civilian affairs subject to only limited alterations by Congress or the President, but the courts do not appear to have ever accepted the argument unless violation of more explicit constitutional command could also be shown. The express statutory exceptions include the legislation that allows the President to use military force to suppress insurrection or to enforce federal authority, 10 U.S.C. Sections 331-335, and laws that permit the Department of Defense to provide federal, state and local police with information, equipment, and personnel, 10 U.S.C. Sections 371-382. Case law indicates that ""execution of the law"" in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act occurs (a) when the Armed Forces perform tasks assigned to an organ of civil government, or (b) when the Armed Forces perform tasks assigned to them solely for purposes of civilian government. Questions concerning the act's application arise most often in the context of assistance to civilian police. At least in this context, the courts have held that, absent a recognized exception, the Posse Comitatus Act is violated when (1) civilian law enforcement officials make ""direct active use"" of military investigators, or (2) the use of the military ""pervades the activities"" of the civilian officials, or (3) the military is used so as to subject ""citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature."" The act is not violated when the Armed Forces conduct activities for a military purpose. The language of the act mentions only the Army and the Air Force, but it is applicable to the Navy and Marines by virtue of administrative action and commands of other laws. The law enforcement functions of the Coast Guard have been expressly authorized by act of Congress and consequently cannot be said to be contrary to the act. The act has been applied to the National Guard when it is in federal service, to civilian employees of the Armed Forces, and to off-duty military personnel. The act probably only applies within the geographical confines of the United States, but supplemental provisions of 10 U.S.C. Sections 371-382 appear to apply worldwide. Finally, the act is a criminal statute under which there has been but a handful of known prosecutions. Although violations will on rare occasions result in the exclusion of evidence, the dismissal of criminal charges, or a civil cause of action, as a practical matter compliance is ordinarily the result of military self-restraint. This report provides an historical analysis of the use of the Armed Forces to execute domestic law and of the Posse Comitatus Act, including their apparent theoretical and constitutional underpinnings. The report then outlines the current application of the act as well as its statutory exceptions, and reviews the consequences of its violation. This report appears in abridged form as CRS Report R42669, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: A Sketch.",91,30 "The Paris Club and International Debt Relief. The Paris Club is a voluntary, informal group of creditor nations who meet approximately 10 times per year to provide debt relief to developing countries. Members of the Paris Club agree to renegotiate and/or reduce official debt owed to them on a case-by-case basis. The United States is a key Paris Club Member and Congress has an active role in both Paris Club operations and U.S. policy regarding debt relief overall. The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 stipulates that Congress must be involved in any official foreign country debt relief and notified of any debt reduction and debt renegotiation.",82,82 "Presidential Appointments to Full-time Positions in Executive Departments During the 109th Congress, 2005-2006. During the 109th Congress, the President submitted to the Senate 283 nominations to executive department full-time positions. Of these 283 nominations, 233 were confirmed, nine were withdrawn, and 41 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, an average of 75 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 57. These statistics do not include the days during which the Senate was adjourned for its summer recesses and between sessions of Congress. President George W. Bush made a total of 13 recess appointments to the departments during this period. All 13 were made during recesses within the first or second session of the 109th Congress (intrasession recess appointments). None were made during the recess between the first and second sessions of the Congress (intersession recess appointments). Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System http://www.congress.gov/¬ønomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the ""Plum Book"" (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions). This report will not be updated.",54,54 "Air Force Bomber Contract Awarded. This report briefly discusses the Department of Defense's recent announcement of its intention to award the contract to build the new Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) to Northrop Grumman Corporation. The program will continue under the LRS-B name, the Air Force has not yet assigned the aircraft a ""B-3""-style type designation.",31,31 "Environment and the World Trade Organization (WTO) at Seattle: Issues and Concerns. As the United States prepared for the ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle, Washington, held November 30 - December 3, 1999, environmental issues were once again a focus of attention. This meeting of the decision making body of the WTO was expected to make decisions that would lead to another round of negotiations on a wide variety of trade rules and related issues. Although the United States continues to assert the necessity of pursuing the twin goals of free trade and environmental protection and to argue that these need not be in conflict controversy remains over how the multilateral trading system should address the specifics of environmental issues. Widespread demonstrations and events in Seattle by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across a wide spectrum of interests involved many environmental NGOs. The environmental interest groups have expressed a variety of concerns, from opposing the WTO altogether, to trying to assure inclusion of specific environmental issues in the Seattle agenda and in subsequent negotiations. Opposition to including environmental issues in WTO negotiations has also been strong, coming from many business groups and developing countries, who argue that these concerns should be addressed outside the WTO. While the demonstrations in Seattle received a great deal of attention, the specifics of the environmental issues did not-either in coverage of the demonstrations, or in the official discussions of the WTO ministerial meetings. These meetings terminated without resolving whether or when a new round of negotiations would ensue. How the WTO will deal with environmental issues in this process in the future remains uncertain.",53,53 "Information Operations, Cyberwarfare, and Cybersecurity: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues. This report describes the emerging areas of information operations, cybersecurity, and cyberwar in the context of U.S. national security. It also notes related policy issues of potential interest to Congress. For military planners, the control of information is critical to military success, and communications networks and computers are of vital operational importance. The use of technology to both control and disrupt the flow of information has been generally referred to by several names: information warfare, electronic warfare, cyberwar, netwar, and Information Operations (IO). Currently, IO activities are grouped by the Department of Defense (DOD) into five core capabilities: (1) Psychological Operations, (2) Military Deception, (3) Operational Security, (4) Computer Network Operations, and (5) Electronic Warfare. Current U.S. military doctrine for IO now places increased emphasis on Psychological Operations, Computer Network Operations, and Electronic Warfare, which includes use of non-kinetic electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, and non-lethal weapons for crowd control. However, as high technology is increasingly incorporated into military functions, the boundaries between all five IO core capabilities are becoming blurred. DOD also acknowledges the existence of a cyber domain, which is similar to air, land, and sea. This new domain is the realm where military functions occur that involve manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum. Control of the spectrum is essential to military success across all other domains. Definitions and examples of the overlapping categories of IO activity are contained in the appendixes. This report will be updated to accommodate significant changes.",22,110 "Creating a Federal Advisory Committee in the Executive Branch. Federal advisory committees provide a formal forum for members of the public to provide advice and recommendations to the federal government on issues ranging from how to support trade goals of small and minority-owned businesses to which drugs best treat arthritis pain. Many of the roughly 1,000 federal advisory committees that operate at any given time are required to operate pursuant to the open meetings, records access, and reporting requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). Advisory committees are established for a number of reasons. These reasons often include acquiring new ideas from non-governmental experts, removing certain controversial topics from politically charged arenas, and reducing the workload of executive branch employees and Members of Congress. Historically, Congress has established the majority of federal advisory committees. Of more than 1,000 federal advisory committees operating pursuant to FACA (FACA committees) in FY2015, for example, 722 (71.6%) were mandated or authorized by Congress—539 (53.4%) of which were required by statute while 183 (18.1%) were authorized, but not required, by statute. Other FACA committees were established by executive branch agencies or the President. In FY2015, 20 new FACA committees that were required to be created by statute began operations. Five of these 20 new FACA committees were required to be established within the Department of the Interior—more than any other federal agency. Legislative provisions seeking to establish 11 additional FACA committees have been introduced but not enacted in the 114th Congress. Should Congress want to authorize a new federal advisory committee, there are several statutory choices that might be considered. These considerations include a committee's mandate, membership requirements, powers, funding, and termination. This report provides a brief overview on how Congress can establish federal advisory committees, and provides some considerations as to why a federal advisory committee may or may not be an appropriate mechanism to assist a particular policy or funding question. The report also explores why FACA may or may not be appropriate for application to particular advisory committees. It presents data on the number of active FACA committees established by Congress with special emphasis on the committees established in FY2015. This report concludes by presenting a list of the federal advisory committees currently proposed for statutory establishment in the 114th Congress.",55,55 "Family Planning Program Under Title X of the Public Health Service Act. The federal government provides grants for family planning services through the Family Planning Program, Title X of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§300 to 300a-6). Title X, enacted in 1970, is the only domestic federal program devoted solely to family planning and related preventive health services. In 2016, Title X-funded clinics served 4 million clients. Title X is administered through the Office of Population Affairs (OPA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Although the authorization of appropriations for Title X ended in FY1985, funding for the program has continued through appropriations bills for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS-Education). Title X grantees can provide family planning services directly or subaward Title X monies to other public or nonprofit entities to provide services. In December 2016, OPA released a final rule to limit the criteria Title X grantees could use to restrict subawards: ""No recipient making subawards for the provision of services as part of its Title X project may prohibit an entity from participating for reasons other than its ability to provide Title X services."" On April 13, 2017, the President signed P.L. 115-23, which nullified the rule under the Congressional Review Act. On March 23, 2018, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), which provides $286.5 million for Title X, the same as the FY2017 level. The FY2018 act continues previous years' requirements that Title X funds not be spent on abortions, that all pregnancy counseling be nondirective, and that funds not be spent on promoting or opposing any legislative proposal or candidate for public office. Grantees continue to be required to certify that they encourage ""family participation"" when minors seek family planning services and to certify that they counsel minors on how to resist attempted coercion into sexual activity. The appropriations law also clarifies that family planning providers are not exempt from state notification and reporting laws on child abuse, child molestation, sexual abuse, rape, or incest. The President's FY2019 budget request, submitted February 12, 2018, proposes $286.5 million for Title X, the same as the FY2018 enacted level. Under the Title X Family Planning Services FY2017 funding opportunity announcement (FOA), final award selections were made by the applicable Public Health Service Region's regional health administrator, in consultation with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs (DASPA) and the Assistant Secretary for Health or their designees. In contrast, under the FY2018 FOA, final award selections will be made by the DASPAa political appointee or the DASPA's designee. This is a change from program practices in place since the 1980s. Federal law (42 U.S.C. §300a-6) prohibits the use of Title X funds in programs in which abortion is a method of family planning. According to OPA, family planning projects that receive Title X funds are closely monitored to ensure that federal funds are used appropriately and that funds are not used for prohibited activities. The abortion prohibition does not apply to all Title X grantees' activities, but applies only to Title X projects' activities. A grantee's abortion activities must be ""separate and distinct"" from the Title X project activities.",95,95 "Crude Oil Exports and Related Provisions in P.L. 114-113: In Brief. On December 18, 2015, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2029), which was signed by the President and became P.L. 114-113. Included in P.L. 114-113 is a provision that repeals Section 103 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA, P.L. 94-163), which directs the President to promulgate a rule prohibiting crude oil exports. For nearly four decades, repeal of EPCA was generally not a policy issue since oil production was declining and imports were rising. However, increasing U.S. light oil production starting in the 2010/2011 timeframe, projected production increases, and domestic-to-international oil price differentials that were as large as $30 per barrel, motivated many companies and trade organizations to advocate removing the EPCA crude oil export prohibition. P.L. 114-113 also includes a ""savings clause"" and a list of exceptions that maintain and provide the President with authority to restrict exports under certain circumstances. Enactment of P.L. 114-113 allows U.S. crude oil to be marketed and sold to international buyers and concludes a nearly two-year debate about the varied and multi-dimensional considerations associated with allowing the export of crude oil produced in the United States. Some oil producers may benefit from this policy change, when market conditions warrant, by potentially selling crude oil for a higher price to global buyers. Perhaps more important for all U.S. oil producers is that allowing crude oil exports may limit the domestic/international price differential in the future. Studies published during the debate estimated that crude oil exports might range between 0 and 2 million barrels per day, reflecting the uncertainty of future market conditions that might motivate exports. Exactly how much crude oil will be exported will depend on oil price differentials, which had narrowed to less than $1 per barrel in January 2016. In addition to repealing EPCA Section 103, P.L. 114-113 also includes provisions that address two considerations discussed during the crude oil export debate. First, owners of U.S. flag ships advocated that crude oil exporters be required to use such ships for overseas transport. While this requirement was not included in P.L. 114-113, the law does include a provision that authorizes increasing the annual subsidy paid to U.S. flag cargo ships participating in the Maritime Security Program (MSP), which provides an operating subsidy in exchange for participating ships being subject to Department of Defense acquisition during times of war. The operating subsidy for each participating ship was increased from $3.1 million to around $5 million per year thru 2021. Second, independent U.S. refiners were generally opposed to allowing unrestricted crude oil exports as many of them were benefiting from price discounts that might either be eliminated or limited as a result of removing export restrictions. Some refiners expressed concern that the cost of waterborne crude shipments from the Gulf coast may result in a competitive disadvantage and that the value of investments made in crude-by-rail infrastructure may be adversely affected should crude oil export restrictions be removed. P.L. 114-113 modified the Section 199 tax deduction for independent refiners by changing how independent refiners account for transportation costs when calculating the deduction, potentially allowing higher oil transportation costs to be associated with greater tax relief. Overall, the enhanced deduction for independent refiners may have fairly modest effects. For most independent refiners that are able to claim the enhanced deduction, the change has the potential to reduce tax liability by up to 1.575% of oil-related transportation costs.",40,40 "Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry. Border enforcement is a core element of the Department of Homeland Security's effort to control unauthorized migration, with the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) within the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as the lead agency along most of the border. Border enforcement has been an ongoing subject of congressional interest since the 1970s, when unauthorized immigration to the United States first registered as a serious national problem, and border security has received additional attention in the years since the terrorist attacks of 2001. Since the 1990s, migration control at the border has been guided by a strategy of ""prevention through deterrence""—the idea that the concentration of personnel, infrastructure, and surveillance technology along heavily trafficked regions of the border will discourage unauthorized migrants from attempting to enter the United States. Since 2005, CBP has attempted to discourage repeat unauthorized migrant entries and disrupt migrant smuggling networks by imposing tougher penalties against certain unauthorized migrants, a set of policies eventually described as ""enforcement with consequences."" Most people apprehended at the Southwest border are now subject to ""high consequence"" enforcement outcomes. Across a variety of indicators, the United States has substantially expanded border enforcement resources over the last three decades. Particularly since 2001, such increases include border security appropriations, personnel, fencing and infrastructure, and surveillance technology. In addition to increased resources, the USBP has implemented several strategies over the past several decades in an attempt to thwart unauthorized migration. In 2014, the Obama Administration announced executive actions to ""fix"" the immigration system. These actions address several issues, including a revised security plan at the southern border. The Border Patrol collects data on several different border enforcement outcomes, this report describes trends in border apprehensions, recidivism, and estimated ""got aways"" and ""turn backs."" Yet none of these existing data are designed to measure unauthorized border flows or the degree to which the border is secured. Thus, the report also describes methods for estimating border security at the strategic and operational levels. Drawing on multiple data sources, the report reviews the state of border security. Robust investments at the border were not associated with reduced unauthorized inflows during the 1980s and 1990s, but a range of evidence suggests a substantial drop in unauthorized inflows from 2007 to 2011, followed by a rise from 2012 to 2014 and a decrease in 2015. Enforcement, along with the 2007 economic downturn in the United States, likely contributed to the drop in unauthorized migration, though the precise share of the decline attributable to enforcement is unknown. Enhanced border enforcement also may have contributed to a number of secondary costs and benefits. To the extent that border enforcement successfully deters unauthorized entries, such enforcement may reduce border-area violence and migrant deaths, protect fragile border ecosystems, and improve the quality of life in border communities. But to the extent that migrants are not deterred, the concentration of enforcement resources on the border may increase border area violence and migrant deaths, encourage unauthorized migrants to find new ways to enter and to remain in the United States for longer periods of time, damage border ecosystems, harm border-area businesses and the quality of life in border communities, and strain U.S. relations with Mexico and Canada.",91,91 "The Role of Departments and Agencies in Budget Development. Federal departments and agencies play an integral role in the development of the President’s budget. The President is required to prepare and submit a comprehensive federal budget to Congress each year. Due to the size and complexity of the federal budget, however, the President relies on departments and agencies to bear the primary responsibility for formulating their budget requests. For more information on the budget process, see the CRS Guides to Congressional Processes at http://www.crs.gov/products/guides/guidehome.shtml.",55,101 "Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America. In October 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year proposal for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America aimed at combating drug trafficking, gangs, and organized crime. On May 14, 2008, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved a bill, H.R. 6028 (Berman), which would authorize $1.6 billion for the Initiative from FY2008 through FY2010. The Bush Administration requested $500 million for Mexico and $50 million for Central American countries in its FY2008 supplemental appropriations request. In late June 2008, Congress appropriated $465 million in FY2008 and FY2009 supplemental assistance for Mexico and Central America in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 (P.L. 110-252). In the act, Mexico receives $352 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental assistance, while Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic receive $65 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance. The Administration has requested an additional $450 million for Mexico and $100 million for the Central American countries under the Mérida Initiative in its FY2009 budget request. This report will be updated. See also CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel, and CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.",79,85 "New Zealand: Political/Economic Developments and Relations with the United States. Since 1984, New Zealand has restructured its economy, long agrarian and highly dependent on guaranteed access to the British market, into a more industrialized and balanced market economy. The reforms have been comprehensive, New Zealand now is rated as one of the most open and unregulated economies in the world. The reforms, however, also have entailed painful adjustment costs as expected increases in production have taken about a decade to materialize. In the process popular dissatisfaction with both major political parties has emerged contributing to a more complex domestic political situation. U.S. relations with New Zealand are quite strong, despite differences over nuclear weapons and lamb imports, and ties will be reconfirmed during President Clinton's visit when New Zealand hosts the APEC economic summit in September 1999. This report will be updated periodically.",85,85 "Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs): Issues and Proposed Expansion. Current law provides many incentives to promote saving. The goal of these provisions is to increase saving for special purposes such as education or retirement, and to increase national saving. Increased national saving can lead to faster wealth and capital accumulation, which can boost future national income. An increasingly important retirement saving vehicle is the individual retirement account (IRA). IRA savings is encouraged by two mechanisms—a carrot approach and a stick approach. First, tax provisions allow individuals to defer taxes on IRA contributions and investment earnings or to accumulate investment earnings tax free. Second, withdrawals before the age of 59¬Ω are generally subject to a 10% penalty tax in addition to regular taxes. There are two types of IRAs: the traditional IRA and the Roth IRA. The traditional IRA allows for the tax-deferred accumulation of investment earnings, and some individuals are eligible to make tax-deductible contributions to their traditional IRAs while other individuals are not. Some or all distributions from traditional IRAs are taxed at retirement. In contrast, contributions to Roth IRAs are not tax deductible, but distributions from Roth IRAs are not taxed on withdrawal in retirement. Expanded contribution limits were adopted in 2001, but were scheduled to expire after 2010, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 made those increases permanent. In November 2005, President Bush's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform proposed changes to IRAs. The panel's plan would have created Save for Retirement Accounts (SRAs) to replace traditional and Roth IRAs. Additionally, President Bush proposed consolidating IRAs into a Roth-style retirement savings account. The Obama Administration appears to be taking a different tack by proposing additional incentives to increase saving by low- and moderate-income workers in existing retirement saving accounts that have proven effective in evaluations. Neither conventional economic theory nor the empirical evidence on savings effects tends to support the argument that increased IRA contributions are primarily new savings—often increased retirement saving comes at the expense of reduced nonretirement saving. Roth-style accounts are less likely to induce new private savings than are traditional ones. Furthermore, these proposals would predominantly benefit higher-income individuals and families, who are the ones most likely to save without the added incentive. Proposals that increase retirement saving among low- and moderate-income workers could be effective in increasing new saving because these workers typically have little or no nonretirement saving to reduce.",88,88 "Federal and Non-Federal Support of University Based Research. The most recent data of the National Science Foundation shows total national R&D expenditures for university based research reached $36.333 billion in 2002. Between 1971 and 2002 university self financing of research increased at an average annual rate of 5.9%, compared to an average annual rate of 3.6% for the federal government. The academic community and some Members of Congress are concerned that rising federal deficits will constrain the growth of future academic research expenditures. According to the Chronicle of Higher Education, in FY2003 congressionally directed (earmarked) funds to colleges and universities reached $2 billion, or 9.2% of total federal support a 9.5% increase over the FY2002. This report will not be updated.",34,34 "U.S. Renewable Electricity Generation: Resources and Challenges. The United States faces important decisions about future energy supply and use. A key question is how renewable energy resources might be used to meet U.S. energy needs in general, and to meet U.S. electricity needs specifically. Renewable energy sources are typically used for three general types of applications: electricity generation, biofuels/bioproducts, and heating/cooling. Each application uses different technologies to convert renewable energy sources into usable products. The literature on renewable energy resources, conversion technologies for different applications, and economics is massive. This report focuses on electricity generation from renewable energy sources. In 2010, renewable sources of energy were used to produce almost 11% (7% from hydropower and 4% from other renewables) of the 4 million gigawatthours of electricity generated in the United States. This report provides a summary of U.S. electricity generation potential from wind, solar, geothermal, hydroelectric, ocean-hydrokinetic, and biomass sources of renewable energy. The focus of this report is twofold: (1) provide an assessment of U.S. renewable electricity generation potential and how renewables might satisfy electric power sector demand, and (2) discuss challenges, issues, and barriers that might limit renewable electricity generation deployment. Data sources from 15 different organizations were reviewed to derive estimates of electricity generation potential. One key finding is that there exists no uniform national assessment of renewable electricity generation potential. No standard methods or set of assumptions are used to estimate renewable electricity generation potential. So even existing assessments for individual energy sources are difficult to compare objectively. In order to compare various estimates on an equivalent basis, CRS engaged experts in each renewable energy resource area to help normalize electricity generation potential estimates into a common metric: gigawatthours per year. After surveying, researching, and normalizing all of the third-party electricity generation estimates, results indicate that renewable energy sources may, in principle, have the potential to satisfy a large portion of U.S. electricity demand. However, a number of potential barriers to large-scale deployment exist, including cost, power system integration, intermittency and variability, land requirements, transmission access, possible limits to the availability of key materials and resources, certain environmental impacts, specialized infrastructure requirements, and policy issues. Ultimately, the amount of renewable electricity generation in the U.S. may be dependent on the ability to address these deployment barriers. The Energy Information Administration projects that U.S. renewable electricity generation will increase from 11% today to between 14% and 15% in 2035. As Congress considers policy options associated with increasing renewable electricity generation, policy makers may assess potential benefits such as emissions reduction, job creation, and global competitiveness, along with possible risks and consequences such as electricity cost and price increases, electricity delivery reliability, and environmental impacts associated with large-scale deployment of renewable electricity generation technologies.",37,37 "Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence. There has been an elevated level of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. This violence has generated concern among U.S. policy makers that the violence in Mexico might spill over into the United States. U.S. federal officials have denied that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a spillover into the United States, but they acknowledge that the prospect is a serious concern. The most recent threat assessment indicates that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations pose the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States, and this threat is driven partly by U.S. demand for drugs. Mexican drug trafficking organizations are the major suppliers and key producers of most illegal drugs smuggled into the United States across the Southwest border (SWB). The nature of the conflict between the Mexican drug trafficking organizations in Mexico has manifested itself, in part, as a struggle for control of these smuggling routes into the United States. Further, in an illegal marketplace—such as that of illicit drugs—where prices and profits are elevated due to the risks of operating outside the law, violence or the threat of violence becomes the primary means for settling disputes. When assessing the potential implications of the increased violence in Mexico, one of the central concerns for Congress is the potential for what has been termed ""spillover"" violence—an increase in drug trafficking-related violence in United States. While the interagency community has defined spillover violence as violence targeted primarily at civilians and government entities—excluding trafficker-on-trafficker violence—other experts and scholars have recognized trafficker-on-trafficker violence as central to spillover. When defining and analyzing changes in drug trafficking-related violence within the United States to determine whether there has been (or may be in the future) any spillover violence, critical elements include who may be implicated in the violence (both perpetrators and victims), what type of violence may arise, when violence may appear, and where violence may occur (both along the SWB and in the nation's interior). Currently, no comprehensive, publicly available data exist that can definitively answer the question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government officials maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover. In an examination of data that could provide insight into whether there has been a significant spillover in drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico into the United States, CRS analyzed violent crime data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Report program. The data, however, do not allow analysts to determine what proportion of the violent crime rate is related to drug trafficking or, even more specifically, what proportion of drug trafficking-related violent crimes can be attributed to spillover violence. In conclusion, because the trends in the overall violent crime rate may not be indicative of trends in drug trafficking-related violent crimes, CRS is unable to develop fact-based conclusions about trends in drug trafficking-related violence spilling over from Mexico into the United States.",91,85 "Class Size Reduction Program: Background and Status. This report provides an overview of the structure and status of the CSR program, the issues raised about the program, early reports on its implementation, and relevant legislative action by the U.S. Congress",33,33 "Farm Safety Net Provisions in a 2013 Farm Bill: S. 954 and H.R. 2642. The farm commodity provisions of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, as amended (P.L. 110-246, the 2008 farm bill) expire with the 2013 crop year. Consequently, the 113th Congress has been considering an omnibus farm bill that would establish the direction of agricultural policy for the next five years. On June 10, 2013, the Senate approved its version of the farm bill, S. 954, the Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2013. The House approved a farm bill (H.R. 2642) without a nutrition title on July 11, 2013, and a nutrition title (H.R. 3102) on September 19, 2013. The House adopted a resolution (H.Res. 361) on September 28 that combined the texts of H.R. 2642 and H.R. 3102 into one bill (H.R. 2642) for purposes of resolving differences with the Senate. Conference on the two measures is pending. Among the many provisions, both bills would reshape the structure of farm commodity support, retroactively reauthorize several disaster programs, and expand coverage under the federal crop insurance program. These three areas of federal support for farmers are often collectively called the ""farm safety net."" Commodity programs under the original 2008 farm bill cover only crops harvested in 2008 through 2012, and were extended for an additional crop year in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240, the fiscal cliff bill). Unlike farm commodity programs, the federal crop insurance program, which provides subsidized insurance policies for producers, is permanently authorized under the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. Five disaster assistance programs under the 2008 farm bill expired on September 30, 2011, and under the farm bill extension, Congress provided authority to appropriate funds (but no actual funding) for three livestock programs and a tree assistance program. Under both S. 954 and H.R. 2642, farm support for traditional program crops is restructured by eliminating direct payments. Direct payments—made to producers and landowners based on historical production and fixed payment rates for corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, rice, peanuts, and other ""covered"" crops—have accounted for most farm program spending in recent years. As under current law, both bills authorize farm programs (with new program names) that would make payments when crop prices (or revenue) fall below a reference price (or historical average revenue). Authority is continued for marketing assistance loans, which provide additional low-price protection at ""loan rates"" specified in current law (with an adjustment made to cotton). The Senate bill covers only crop years 2014-2018, and it suspends permanent price support authority under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1949 until program authority in S. 954 expires in 2018. In contrast, the House bill covers crop year 2014 and each succeeding crop year (i.e., no program expiration date) and repeals permanent law. In both bills, approximately three-fourths of the 10-year, $46 billion-$47 billion in savings (as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office) associated with the proposed elimination of current farm programs would be used to offset the cost of revising farm programs (Title I), enhancing crop insurance (Title XI), and retroactively reauthorizing four disaster programs (beginning FY2012). The two bills provide programs for covered crops, except cotton, which would have its own program (a crop insurance product called Stacked Income Protection Plan or STAX). Proponents of farm programs and federal crop insurance are attempting to address the issue of ""shallow losses""—crop losses not covered currently by crop insurance—as well as provide disaster assistance for livestock producers. Critics contend that the proposals contain overly generous farm and crop insurance subsidies and shift additional commodity market risk to the federal government.",3,2 "EB-5 Immigrant Investor Visa. The immigrant investor visa was created in 1990 to benefit the U.S. economy through employment creation and an influx of foreign capital into the United States. The visa is also referred to as the EB-5 visa because it is the fifth employment preference immigrant visa category. The EB-5 visa provides lawful permanent residence (i.e., LPR status) to foreign nationals who invest a specified amount of capital in a new commercial enterprise in the United States and create at least 10 jobs. The foreign nationals must invest $1,000,000, or $500,000 if they invest in a rural area or an area with high unemployment (referred to as targeted employment areas or TEAs). There are approximately 10,000 visas available annually for foreign national investors and their family members (7.1% of the worldwide employment-based visas are allotted to immigrant investors and their derivatives). In FY2015, there were 9,764 EB-5 visas used, with 93% going to investors from Asia. More specifically, 84% were granted to investors from China and 3% were granted to those from Vietnam. In general, an individual receiving an EB-5 visa is granted conditional residence status. After approximately two years the foreign national must apply to remove the conditionality (i.e., convert to full-LPR status). If the foreign national has met the visa requirements (i.e., invested and sustained the required money and created the required jobs), the foreign national receives full LPR status. If the foreign national investor has not met the requirements or does not apply to have the conditional status removed, his or her conditional LPR status is terminated, and, generally, the foreign national is required to leave the United States, or will be placed in removal proceedings. In 1992, Congress established the Regional Center (Pilot) Program, which created an additional pathway to LPR status through the EB-5 visa category. Regional centers are ""any economic unit, public or private, which [are] involved with the promotion of economic growth, including increased export sales, improved regional productivity, job creation, and increased domestic capital investment."" The program allows foreign national investors to pool their investment in a regional center to fund a broad range of projects within a specific geographic area. The investment requirement for regional center investors is the same as for standard EB-5 investors. As the use of EB-5 visas has grown, so has the use of the Regional Center Program. In FY2014, 97% of all EB-5 visas were issued based on investments in regional centers. Unlike the standard EB-5 visa category, which does not expire, the Regional Center Program is set to expire on September 30, 2016. Different policy issues surrounding the EB-5 visa have been debated. Proponents of the EB-5 visa contend that providing visas to foreign investors benefits the U.S. economy, in light of the potential economic growth and job creation it can create. Others argue that the EB-5 visa allows wealthy individuals to buy their way into the United States. In addition, some EB-5 stakeholders have voiced concerns over the delays in processing EB-5 applications and possible effects on investors and time sensitive projects. Furthermore, some have questioned whether U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) has the expertise to administer the EB-5 program, given its embedded business components. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector General (DHS OIG) has recommended that USCIS work with other federal agencies that do have such expertise, while USCIS has reported that it has taken steps internally to address this issue. USCIS has also struggled to measure the efficacy of the EB-5 category (e.g., its economic impact). USCIS methodology for reporting investments and jobs created has been called into question by both the DHS OIG and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Furthermore, some have highlighted possible fraud and threats to national security that the visa category presents. In comparison to other immigrant visas, the EB-5 visa faces additional risks of fraud that stem from its investment components. Such risks are associated with the difficulty in verifying that investors' funds are obtained lawfully and the visa's potential for large monetary gains, which could motivate individuals to take advantage of investors and can make the visa susceptible to the appearance of favoritism. USCIS has reported improvements in its fraud detection but also feels certain statutory limitations have restricted what it can do. Additionally, GAO believes that improved data collection by USCIS could assist in detecting fraud and keeping visa holders and regional centers accountable. Lastly, the authority of states to designate TEAs has raised concerns. Some have pointed to the inconsistency in TEA designation practices across states and how it could allow for possible gerrymandering (i.e., all development occurs in an area that by itself would not be considered a TEA). Others contend that the current regulations allow states to determine what area fits their economic needs and allow for the accommodation of commuting patterns. In addition to the issues discussed above, Congress may consider whether the Regional Center Program should be allowed to expire, be reauthorized, or made permanent, given its expiration on September 30, 2016. In addition, Congress may consider whether any modifications should be made to the EB-5 visa category or the Regional Center Program. Legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress that would, among other provisions, amend the program to try to address concerns about fraud, and change the manner in which TEAs are determined. Other bills would create an EB-5-like visa category for foreign national entrepreneurs who do not have their own capital but have received capital from qualified sources, such as venture capitalists.",76,76 "Emergency Communications Legislation: Implications for the 110th Congress. Since September 11, 2001, several bills introduced in the U.S. Congress have included provisions to assist emergency communications. Key provisions from a number of these bills have become law. Legislation addressing communications among first responders focused first on interoperability—the capability of different systems to connect—with provisions in the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296). The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) provided more comprehensive language that included requirements for developing a national approach to achieving interoperability. Some of the legislative requirements were based on recommendations made by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission). Also in response to a 9/11 Commission recommendation regarding the availability of spectrum for radio operations, Congress set a date to release needed radio frequency spectrum by early 2009, as part of the Deficit Reduction Act (P.L. 109-171). The act also provided funding for public safety and for the improvement of 911 systems through a Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund. In a section of the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295, Title VI, Subtitle D), Congress revisited the needs of an effective communications capacity for first responders and other emergency personnel and expanded the provisions of P.L. 108-458. The 109th Congress also passed provisions to improve emergency alerts, incorporated in the Port Security Improvement Act (P.L. 109-347). In the 110th Congress, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) was passed in the 1st Session. Sections in the act modified and expanded provisions for emergency communications passed in P.L. 109-171 and P.L. 109-295. Among introduced bills that would fund public safety are: S. 74 (Senator Schumer), to ensure adequate funding for high-threat areas, S. 345 (Senator Biden), that would provide funding and includes a requirement for the immediate release of spectrum for public safety use, now scheduled for 2009, S. 3465 (Senator Wicker), to create a First Responders Interoperable Device Availability Trust Fund that would provide grants to purchase interoperable radios for the new public safety network proposed for some of the spectrum made available by the transition to digital TV, H.R. 3116 (Representative Stupak), creating a Public Safety Communications Trust Fund to receive, among other sources of funding, the uncommitted balance remaining in the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund, and H.R. 130, a funding bill for first responders (Representative Frelinghuysen), with a provision that would require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a study evaluating the need to assign additional spectrum for use by public safety. The bills that carry provisions regarding spectrum are referring, for the most part, to licenses at 700 MHz that were auctioned in January-March 2008, some of the licenses have been assigned to public safety. The proceeds from the auction are to be deposited in the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund, from which mandated disbursements will be made by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The auction grossed approximately $19.6 billion.",97,11 "Introducing a Senate Bill or Resolution. This report discusses the beginning steps in the Senate's legislative procedure. Ideas and recommendations for legislation may come from private sources, like ordinary citizens or interest groups executive branch agencies and the White House, states and localities, and, of course, from individual Senators, committees and other Senate work groups, and party and chamber leaders. Any or all of these entities may also participate in drafting legislation (resolutions as well as bills).",55,55 "Homeland Security: Intelligence Support. Legislation establishing a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (P.L. 107-296) included provisions for an information analysis element within the new department. It did not transfer to DHS existing government intelligence and law enforcement agencies but envisioned an analytical office utilizing the products of other agencies -- both unevaluated information and finished reports -- to provide warning of terrorist attacks, assessments of vulnerability, and recommendations for remedial actions at federal, state, and local levels, and by the private sector. In January 2003, the Administration announced its intention to establish a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) to undertake many of the tasks envisioned for the DHS informational analysis element, known as Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), but some Members of Congress argue that TTIC cannot be a substitute for a DHS analytical effort. This report examines different approaches to improving the information analysis function and the sharing of information among federal agencies. It will be updated as circumstances warrant.",27,22 "National Security and Emergency Preparedness Communications: A Summary of Executive Order 13618. In the event of a national security crisis or disaster, federal, state, local, and territorial government and private sector communications are important. National security and emergency preparedness communication systems include landline, wireless, broadcast and cable television, radio, public safety systems, satellite communications, and the Internet. For instance, federal national security and emergency preparedness communications programs include the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service, Wireless Priority Service, and classified messaging related to the Continuity of Government Condition. Reliable and secure telecommunications systems are necessary to effectively manage national security incidents and emergencies. On July 6, 2012, President Barrack Obama issued Executive Order (EO) 13618 which addresses the federal government's need and responsibility to communicate during national security and emergency situations and crises by assigning federal national security and emergency preparedness communications functions. EO 13618 is a continuation of older executive orders issued by other presidents and is related to the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. §606). This executive order, however, changes federal national security and emergency preparedness communications functions by dissolving the National Communications System, establishing an executive committee to oversee federal national security and emergency preparedness communications functions, establishing a programs office within the Department of Homeland Security to assist the executive committee, and assigning specific responsibilities to federal government entities. This report provides a summary of EO 13618 provisions, and a brief discussion of its salient points.",11,22 "Military Construction, Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs: FY2007 Appropriations. The structure of the Committees on Appropriations were changed at the beginning of the 109th Congress, altering jurisdictions over the appropriations covered in this report, including military construction, military housing allowances, military installation maintenance and operation, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and other veteran-related agencies, rested in the House Committee on Appropriations with the new Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs. In the Senate Committee on Appropriations, jurisdiction for military construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and other veteran-related agencies were vested in the Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, while military housing allowances and military installation maintenance and operation are the responsibility of the Subcommittee on Defense. At the opening of the 110th Congress, the House subcommittee structure was again adjusted, returning some non-construction defense activities to the Subcommittee on Defense. Authorization jurisdictions lie with the two Committees on the Armed Services and Committees on Veterans Affairs. Key issues in congressional action to date include Military Construction: The changing structure of the Army, the redeployment of troops from overseas garrisons to domestic bases, and implementation of the current BRAC round have drawn committee attention during the appropriation process. To fund the activities included in the military construction and family housing portion of this bill, the President requested $16.7 billion, the House appropriated $15.9 billion, and the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $16.3 billion. Veteran Benefits: Entitlement spending is rising as the number of beneficiaries is increasing, education benefits are being augmented, and annual cost of living adjustments are being granted. Benefits such as disability compensation, pensions, and education are mandatory payments and constitute more than half ($37.2 and $41.4 billion, respectively) of the VA appropriation of approximately $71 billion for FY2006 and almost $78 billion proposed for FY2007. Veteran Medical Care: The Administration has again requested legislative changes to increase certain co-payments and other cost sharing fees for veterans in lower priority categories. The House passed version of H.R. 5385 provides $32.7 billion for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) for FY2007, about the same amount as the President's request. On July 20, 2006, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out of committee its version of H.R. 5385. H.R. 5385, as amended, provides $32.7 billion for VHA for FY2007, almost equivalent to the House-passed amount and the President's request. The House-passed bill and the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported bill do not include any provisions that would give VA the authority to implement fee increases.",25,25 "Statutory Limits on Total Spending as a Method of Budget Control. Often when there is dissatisfaction with budgetary levels, budget process reforms are proposed to mandate a specific budgetary policy or fiscal objective. This report focuses specifically on one such budget process reform—the concept of creating a statutory limit on total spending. As discussed in this report, a total spending limit consists of statutory long-term or permanent limits on federal spending coupled with a statutory enforcement mechanism that would make automatic reductions in spending in the event that compliance with the limits is not achieved through legislative action. Such spending limits would comprise any new spending as well as spending that results from previously enacted law. By encompassing all types of spending, and by including a statutory enforcement mechanism, a total spending limit attempts to remedy a perceived limitation of the congressional budget resolution, under which Congress establishes limits on spending in various categories that can be enforced or waived by Congress at its own discretion. The recent growth in spending, both in dollar terms and relative to the economy, has generated support for total limits on spending. Several groups and organizations have recommended a total spending cap, and on July 19, 2011, the House passed H.R. 2560, the Cut, Cap and Balance Act of 2011, which includes total spending limits for FY2013 through FY2021. In addition, the House-passed budget resolution for FY2012, H.Con.Res. 34, includes a policy statement calling for Congress to enact total spending limits. Other legislative proposals introduced in the 112th Congress include total spending limits, such as S. 245, H.R. 1605, H.R. 1848, and H.R. 2041. The potential effectiveness of a statutory limit on total spending is complicated by projection uncertainty, unforeseen events, and especially the complex nature of direct spending. Statutory limits have been subject to criticism for ceding Congress's ""power of the purse,"" targeting spending rather than the deficit or debt, attempting to address a budgetary problem through procedure instead of policy changes that would themselves reduce spending, and for other reasons. This report provides information on the concept of a statutory limit on total spending, including objectives, complications, and criticisms. The report also includes information on the many features of spending limit proposals, which can vary considerably. Lastly, the report provides observations on budgetary controls, similar to statutory spending limits, from an historical perspective.",101,101 "Defining ""Specialty Crops"": A Fact Sheet. ""Specialty crops"" refer to ""fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits, horticulture, and nursery crops (including floriculture)"" as defined in statute by the Specialty Crops Competitiveness Act of 2004, as amended (P.L. 108-465, 7 U.S.C. 1621 note). The statutory definition of specialty crops ties to program eligibility and funding allocations for a number of U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs providing marketing and research assistance to eligible producer groups. USDA's list of eligible and ineligible products under the statutory definition is not intended to be all inclusive, but rather to provide examples of the most common specialty crops.",3,2 "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011. This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions. Similar data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 2004-2011, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 68.6% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 79.2% of all such agreements globally from 2008 to 2011, and 83.9% of these agreements in 2011. The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2011 was over $71.5 billion. This was a substantial increase from $32.7 billion in 2010. In 2011, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was $28 billion, the highest total in these deliveries values since 2004. Recently, from 2008 to 2011, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for each of these four years in the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2008 to 2011, the United States made nearly $113 billion in such agreements, 54.5% of all these agreements (expressed in current dollars). Russia made $31.1 billion, 15% of these agreements. During this same period, collectively, the United States and Russia made 69.5% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations ($207.3 billion in current dollars) during this four-year period. In 2011, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations with over $56.3 billion or 78.7% of these agreements, an extraordinary increase in market share from 2010, when the United States held a 43.6% market share. In second place was Russia with $4.1 billion or 5.7% of such agreements. In 2011, the United States ranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at $10.5 billion, or 37.6% of all such deliveries. Russia ranked second in these deliveries at $7.5 billion or 26.8%. In worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2011—to both developed and developing nations—the United States dominated, ranking first with $66.3 billion in such agreements or 77.7% of all such agreements. This is the highest single year agreements total in the history of the U.S. arms export program. Russia ranked second in worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2011 with $4.8 billion in such global agreements or 5.6%. The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide in 2011 was $85.3 billion, a substantial increase over the 2010 total of $44.5 billion, and the highest worldwide arms agreements total since 2004. In 2011, Saudi Arabia ranked first in the value of arms transfer agreements among all developing nations weapons purchasers, concluding $33.7 billion in such agreements. The Saudis concluded $33.4 billion of these agreements with the United States (99%). India ranked second with $6.9 billion in such agreements. The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E) ranked third with $4.5 billion.",28,28 "China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ""One China"" Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Despite broadly consistent statements, the U.S. ""one China"" policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, analyzes the ""one China"" policy since U.S. Presidents began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan calls itself the Republic of China (ROC) and does not recognize the PRC. There are three sets of issues: sovereignty over Taiwan, PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan, and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained non-diplomatic engagement with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The State Department claims an ""unofficial"" relationship with Taiwan. The United States did not explicitly state Taiwan's status in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States ""acknowledged"" the ""one China"" position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have articulated a ""one China"" policy in understandings with the PRC. Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing's ""one China"" principle—on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC's claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled. With added conditions, U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a ""peaceful resolution"" with the assent of Taiwan's people and without unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. The TRA stipulates the expectation that the future of Taiwan ""will be determined"" by peaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan's future ""a threat"" to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of ""grave concern"" to the United States, ""to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character,"" and ""to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion"" jeopardizing the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan's people. The TRA provides a congressional role in determining security assistance ""necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."" President Reagan also offered ""Six Assurances"" to Taipei in 1982, partly to continue arms sales. Policy makers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the political and strategic context of the policy has changed dramatically since the 1970s. Since the early 1990s, U.S. interests in the military balance as well as Taiwan's security and democracy have been challenged by the PRC's military buildup (particularly in missiles) and potential coercion, moves perceived by Beijing for Taiwan's de jure independence under the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP's) president (2000-2008), and resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to investing in self-defense. After the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou became President in May 2008, Taipei and Beijing reduced tension and resumed talks—beyond seeking detente. With President Obama since 2009, a rhetorical convergence emerged about ""peaceful development"" of cross-strait ties. However, disagreements remain about the PRC's goal of political talks for unification, Taiwan's status, Taiwan's self-defense, and U.S. arms sales and other cooperation with Taiwan. On September 23, 2014, 29 Members of the House sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, calling for a new Taiwan Policy Review (after 20 years) to examine expanded engagement with Taiwan.",85,85 "The WTO Brazil-U.S. Cotton Case. On October 1, 2014, Brazil and the United States reached an agreement to resolve the long-running cotton dispute in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The two countries signed a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) that spelled out the terms of the agreement: Brazil relinquishes its rights to countermeasures against U.S. trade or any further proceedings in the dispute, the United States agreed to new rules governing fees and tenor for the GSM-102 export credit guarantee program, Brazil agreed to a temporary Peace Clause with respect to any new WTO actions against U.S. cotton support programs while the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) is in force or against any agricultural export credit guarantees under the GSM-102 program as long as the program is operated consistent with the agreed terms, the United States would make a one-time final payment of $300 million to the Brazil Cotton Institute (BCI) with explicit use-of-fund conditions, and both counties agreed to routine semi-annual reporting under the MOU. The cotton dispute settlement case (DS267) was initiated by Brazil—a major cotton export competitor—in 2002 against specific provisions of the U.S. cotton program. In September 2004, a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled that (1) certain U.S. agricultural support payments for cotton distorted international agricultural markets and should be either withdrawn or modified to end the market distortions, and (2) U.S. Step-2 payments and agricultural export credit guarantees for cotton and other unscheduled commodities were prohibited subsidies under WTO rules and should be withdrawn. In 2005, the United States made several changes to both its cotton and export credit guarantee programs in an attempt to bring them into compliance with WTO recommendations, however, Brazil argued that the U.S. response was inadequate. A WTO compliance panel ruled in Brazil's favor and was upheld on appeal. The United States made additional changes to its export credit program in the 2008 farm bill, but Brazil found the overall level of changes to fall short of the WTO ruling. The threat of retaliation led Brazil and the United States to negotiate a temporary agreement, referred to as the Framework Agreement (June 17, 2010), to avoid trade retaliation with the understanding that the WTO cotton dispute would be resolved definitively within the context of the next U.S. farm bill. In this regard, the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) included several substantive changes to both U.S. cotton support programs and the export credit guarantee program. These changes have resulted in cotton being singled out and treated differently from all other U.S. program crops. Cotton no longer has access to the price and income support programs offered for other program crops, but instead will rely on a within-year, market-based insurance guarantee—referred to as the Stacked Income Protection Program or STAX—as its primary support measure. Under this new cotton program, producers would have to pay into the program in order to participate, a loss (albeit at the county level) would have to occur before an indemnity payment would be made, and the sum of program indemnity payments under STAX and any other crop insurance policy would be prohibited from exceeding the value of the insured crop to minimize any production incentive. In addition, U.S. export credit guarantee programs have been substantially reformed, including a shortened tenor (i.e., contract length) of only 24 months—down from 36 months—and increased user fees to ensure that the program's operating costs are fully covered by fees so as to avoid any implicit subsidy. New farm legislative language also included expanded flexibility for USDA to negotiate with Brazil concerning the compliance of export credit guarantee implementation.",53,53 "Comparison of Selected Senate Earmark Reform Proposals. In response to reports of, and concern over, alleged irregularities in certain lobbying and representational activities, the Senate is considering various lobby and ethics reform proposals. Some have argued that the Senate should consider changes to the process by which the Senate earmarks spending priorities as a part of the larger focus on lobby and ethics reform. Proposals to modify the earmark processes have been included in some Senate bills. On February 28, 2006, for example, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration ordered reported S. 2349, Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006, which includes, in part, such proposed changes. In addition, provisions in both S. 2261 and S. 2265, sponsored by Senator Barack Obama and Senator John McCain, respectively would also make changes in the earmark process. This report provides a comparison of these three measures: S. 2349, S. 2261, and S. 2265 with the current Senate rules and practices. This report will be updated to reflect any congressional action.",61,55 "Credit Scores: Credit-Based Insurance Scores. An insurance score, a type of credit score, is a number produced by a computer scoring model that analyzes a person's credit information (i.e., payment history, collections, balances, and bankruptcies) obtained principally from that person's credit reports. Increasingly, insurers have been using insurance scores as an underwriting factor to evaluate insurance applications, especially for automobile and homeowners insurance, in predicting possible future insurance claims an applicant might generate. Insurers maintain that there is a clear statistical connection between a person's insurance score and the likelihood of that person filing claims, as well as how expensive such claims might be. By using insurance scores, insurers say that they are able to charge lower premiums to most customers who are better risks. On the other hand, some consumer advocates dispute the insurers' position and argue that the use of insurance scores has a disparate effect on minorities, and is merely a new method by which insurers can increase premium rates. Even though credit scores have been widely used for some time by credit-related businesses such as home mortgage lenders and credit card issuers, the use of insurance scores by insurers is relatively new. The growing discontent regarding the use of credit-based scoring has been reflected in proposed legislation amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act to require additional consumer protections, and in increased litigation. Insurance scores, like other credit scores based on credit reports, are regulated to some degree at the federal level. Unlike other credit scores, however insurance scores used in the underwriting process are also subject to state insurance laws and regulations. Most of the states have been active in recently reviewing their laws and regulations in this area. Federal legislation in the 108th Congress that would have affected insurance scoring included H.R. 1473, H.R. 2796, H.R. 2622, and S. 1753. The latter two were the House and Senate versions of what would become P.L. 108-159, which mandated a study on the impact of insurance scoring. This report will be updated in the event of significant legislative or regulatory developments.",7,5 "Medicare Durable Medical Equipment: The Competitive Bidding Program. The Medicare Supplementary Medical Insurance Program (Part B) currently covers a wide variety of durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and other medical supplies (DMEPOS) if they are medically necessary and are prescribed by a physician. Durable medical equipment (DME) is equipment that (1) can withstand repeated use, (2) has an expected life of at least three years (effective for items classified as DME after January 1, 2012), (3) is used to serve a medical purpose, (4) generally is not useful in the absence of an illness or injury, and (5) is appropriate for use in the home. Examples include hospital beds, blood glucose monitors, and wheelchairs. Prosthetic and orthotic devices (PO) are items that replace all or part of an internal body organ, such as colostomy bags, as well as such items as leg braces and artificial legs, arms, and eyes. Medicare also covers some items or supplies (S), such as disposable surgical dressings that do not meet the definition of DME or PO. Medicare generally pays for most DMEPOS on the basis of fee schedules. Medicare pays 80% of the fee schedule amount, while the beneficiary is responsible for the remaining 20%, plus any unmet deductible. Unless otherwise specified by Congress, fee schedule amounts are updated yearly by a measure of inflation and economy-wide productivity. However, studies by federal agencies have shown that Medicare pays above-market prices for certain items of DME. Such overpayments may be due partly to the fee schedule mechanism of payment, which does not reflect market changes, such as new and less-expensive technologies, changes in production or supplier costs, or geographic price variations. Congress enacted legislation to establish a Medicare competitive acquisition program (competitive bidding) under which prices for selected DMEPOS sold in specified areas are determined by suppliers' bids rather than fee schedules. The first round of the program began on July 1, 2008, but was suspended due to implementation concerns. Suppliers submitted new bids for the first round ""rebid,"" and payments based on winning suppliers' bids went into place in the first nine areas on January 1, 2011. Round 2 is set to begin in 91 additional areas on July 1, 2013. The process for re-competing the contracts for Round 1 has started, and payments based on winning bids are expected to be in place on January 1, 2014. Starting in 2016, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) is required to either expand competitive bidding to additional areas, or apply information gained from the program to adjust fee schedule amounts in remaining areas. Competitive bidding has been shown to decrease Medicare payments for DMEPOS, leading to savings for Medicare and lower beneficiary cost sharing. Evidence from the competitive bidding demonstration and the Round 1 Rebid also suggests, based on evaluations of the program thus far, that competition did not deteriorate beneficiary access to DMEPOS, or the quality and product selection available to them. In general, the technical implementation concerns that halted the 2008 competition appear to have been addressed, however, concerns over the auction methodology have been raised, drawing into question whether the competitively bid payments are an accurate reflection of the market for DMEPOS. Finally, the competitive bidding program will result in fewer suppliers being allowed to sell competitively bid items to Medicare beneficiaries, though all suppliers may continue to sell non-competitively bid items to beneficiaries and may repair competitively bid and non-competitively bid DMEPOS.",67,70 "Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade. This report provides background on intellectual property rights (IPR) and discusses the role of U.S. international trade policy in enhancing IPR protection and enforcement abroad. IPR are legal rights granted by governments to encourage innovation and creative output by ensuring that creators reap the benefits of their inventions or works. They may take forms such as patents, trade secrets, copyrights, trademarks, or geographical indications. Congress has constitutional responsibility for legislating and overseeing IPR and international trade policy. Responsibility for developing IPR policy, engaging in IPR-related international negotiations, and enforcing IPR laws cuts across multiple U.S. government agencies. The protection and enforcement of IPR is an important and longstanding component of U.S. international trade policy and U.S. trade negotiating objectives. U.S. trade policy also seeks to address new and evolving issues in the IPR landscape related to the growing role of emerging markets in the global market place and the increased level of digital trade. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) at the, trade policy has been used to advance IPR rules internationally. The TRIPS Agreement set minimum standards for IPR protection and enforcement. The United States engages in efforts with other trading partners to build on the TRIPS Agreement, particularly through the negotiation of regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). To date, the United States has entered into 14 FTAs with 20 countries, which generally include IPR commitments exceeding obligations under the TRIPS Agreement (""TRIPS-plus""). IPR issues are prominent in the ongoing U.S. FTA negotiations of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). On June 29, 2015, President Obama signed the Bipartisan Trade Promotion and Accountability Act (P.L. 114-26), known as Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), setting forth negotiating objectives on IPR. Many of these objectives are to seek to negotiate TRIPS-plus provisions in U.S. FTAs. Other trade policy tools also are available to advance U.S. international IPR objectives. Pursuant to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended (P.L. 93-618), the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) identifies countries providing inadequate IPR protection in its annual ""Special 301"" report. Section 337 of the amended Tariff Act of 1930 authorizes the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to prohibit U.S. imports that infringe on U.S. IPR. Additionally, under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the United States may consider a developing country's IPR policies and practices as a basis for offering or suspending preferential duty-free entry to certain products from the country. IPR issues related to international trade policy may figure prominently in the 114th congressional agenda. Congress may examine the role of IPR in U.S. trade policy, including the implications of IPR trade negotiating objectives in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) conduct oversight of implementation of the IPR commitments in existing trade agreements, as well as in the current U.S. trade negotiations on TPP and T-TIP conduct oversight of the role of IPR in U.S. economic growth and innovation, and how the protection and enforcement of IPR relates to other public policy goals, such as access to medicines in poor or developing countries and the free flow of data consider the possibility of additional policy options to address IPR concerns in emerging economies that are not a part of existing U.S. FTAs or included in current U.S. FTA negotiations, as well as new and evolving IPR issues, such as with respect to indigenous innovation, ""forced"" localization barriers to trade, and trade secret theft through cybercrime, and examine the effectiveness of the current U.S. coordinating structure and the adequacy of current federal resources for promoting international IPR support.",9,9 "Lebanon. Since having its boundaries drawn by France after the First World War, Lebanon has struggled to define its national identity. Unlike other countries in the region, its population included Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shia Muslim communities of roughly comparable size, and with competing visions for the country. Seeking to avoid sectarian conflict, Lebanese leaders created a confessional system that allocated power among the country's religious sects according to their percentage of the population. The system was based on Lebanon's last official census, which was conducted in 1932. As Lebanon's demographics shifted over the years, Muslim communities pushed for the political status quo, favoring Maronite Christians, to be revisited, while the latter worked to maintain their privileges. This tension at times manifested itself in violence, such as during the country's 15-year civil war, but also in political disputes such as disagreements over revisions to Lebanon's electoral law. To date, domestic political conflicts continue to be shaped in part by the influence of external actors, including Syria and Iran. The United States has sought to bolster forces that could serve as a counterweight to Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon. The United States has provided more than $1.7 billion in military assistance to Lebanon with the aim of creating a national force strong enough to counter nonstate actors and secure the country's borders. Hezbollah's armed militia is sometimes described as more effective than the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and has also undertaken operations along the border to counter the infiltration of armed groups from neighboring Syria. U.S. policy in Lebanon has been undermined by Iran and Syria, both of which exercise significant influence in the country, including through support for Hezbollah. The question of how best to marginalize Hezbollah and other anti-U.S. Lebanese actors without provoking civil conflict among divided Lebanese sectarian political forces has remained a key challenge for U.S. policymakers. In addition, Lebanon currently faces a large-scale refugee crisis driven by the ongoing war in neighboring Syria. There are over 1 million Syrian refugees registered with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, in addition to a significant existing community of Palestinian refugees. This has given Lebanon (a country of roughly 4.3 million citizens in 2010) the highest per capita refugee population in the world. Lebanon's infrastructure has been unable to absorb the refugee population, which some government officials describe as a threat to the country's security. Since 2015, the government has taken steps to close the border to those fleeing Syria, and has implemented measures that have made it more difficult for existing refugees to remain in Lebanon legally. At the same time, Hezbollah has played an active role in the ongoing fighting in Syria. The experience gained by Hezbollah in the Syria conflict has raised questions about how the eventual return of these fighters to Lebanon could impact the country's domestic stability or affect the prospects for renewed conflict with Israel. This report provides an overview of Lebanon and current issues of U.S. interest. It provides background information, analyzes recent developments and key policy debates, and tracks legislation, U.S. assistance, and recent congressional action.",85,85 "State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2012 Budget and Appropriations. Some in the 112th Congress view the foreign affairs budget as a place to cut funds in order to reduce the budget deficit. Foreign affairs expenditures typically amount to about 1% of the annual budget. Others, including Members of Congress of both political parties, view a robust foreign affairs budget as essential for America's national security and foreign policy interests. The State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies appropriations bills, in addition to funding U.S. diplomatic and foreign aid activities, have been the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. international affairs budget and influences executive branch foreign policy making in recent years. (Congress has not amended foreign policy issues through a complete authorization process for State Department diplomatic activities since 2003 and for foreign aid programs since 1985.) After a period of general decline in the late 1980s and 1990s, funding for State Department operations, international broadcasting, and foreign aid rose steadily from FY2002 to FY2010, largely because of ongoing assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan, new global health programs, and increasing assistance to Pakistan. It declined again in FY2011 when Congress passed a continuing resolution (P.L. 112-10) significantly reducing U.S. government-wide expenditures, including foreign affairs. On February 14, 2011, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2012 budget proposal before enactment of the final FY2011 appropriations and the current congressional emphasis on budget reductions. The FY2012 request sought $61.5 billion for the international affairs budget, including a core State-Foreign Operations budget of $59.65 billion plus $8.70 billion for extraordinary Overseas Contingency Operations in frontline states. The total request represented an increase of 21.8% over the enacted FY2011 funding level for State Department and Foreign Operations accounts and sought significant increases for State Department's administration of foreign affairs accounts, security assistance, and various multilateral environmental accounts. Funding for international affairs programs was expected by many to decline in FY2012 as the 112th Congress focuses on budget reduction measures to meet objectives in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). The House subcommittee mark of the FY2012 State-Foreign Operations appropriation recommended $47.58 billion in total funding, and the Senate committee-passed bill (S. 1601) recommended $53.97 billion. The enacted total funding level of $53.88 billion is nearly 10% less than the Administration's request, but is 10% more than the enacted total for FY2011. However, $11.20 billion of the FY2012 enacted total is designated for Overseas Contingency Operations (more than the $8.70 billion requested by the Administration) and does not count toward enacted discretionary spending caps. This report analyzes the FY2012 request and congressional action related to FY2012 State-Foreign Operations legislation. The Summary, ""Introduction"" and ""Recent Developments"" sections, and appendix tables in this version of the report have been updated to reflect enactment of P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2012.",80,80 "The FY2011 Federal Budget. This report provides an historical overview of the budget trends through the most recently completed fiscal year (2009). It discusses major budgetary challenges over the past several fiscal years given the current economic conditions and provides an in-depth discussion of the FY2011 budget process. Finally, it provides context for the issues facing the country's federal budget over the long term. This report will be updated as events warrant.",101,101 "Summary and Analysis of S. 1733 and Comparison with H.R. 2454: Electric Power and Natural Gas. This report provides a summary and analysis of selected provisions of the chairman's mark of S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act. The topics covered include electric power and incentives for the development of natural gas technologies. The report also compares those provisions with H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act. In S. 1733, Subtitle H of Division A has two sections dealing with the use of low carbon emitting energy technologies. Section 181, Clean Energy and Accelerated Emission Reduction Program, directs the EPA administrator to ""establish a program to promote dispatchable power generation projects that can accelerate the reduction of power sector carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions"" (emphasis added). The term ""dispatchable"" is not defined in the bill, but would normally refer to power generating units that can be run at-will by system operators, such as natural gas, nuclear, or coal units. Several features of Section 181 are unspecified or unclear, including the total dollar amount and form of the incentives, whether the emission reduction target for a specific project would change over time, and the deadline for making incentive awards. Section 182 of Subtitle H, Advanced Natural Gas Technologies, would establish two grant programs for accelerating the development of advanced natural gas technologies in the power generation, commercial, and residential sectors. No parts of H.R. 2454 are directly comparable to sections 181 and 182 of S. 1733. Closest in intent is Section 175 of Subtitle H of H.R. 2454, which provides for a government program to help develop and demonstrate high efficiency natural gas burning combustion turbines, for use in combined cycle power plants. H.R. 2454 has several provisions relating to electric power transmission that have no counterparts in S. 1733. These provisions of H.R. 2454 involve transmission planning and permitting, development and deployment of smart grid technologies, requirements for electric utilities to reduce peak demand, net metering for federal agencies, and incentives for transmission technology development. These elements of H.R. 2454 are summarized in this report and discussed in more detail in CRS Report R40643, Greenhouse Gas Legislation: Summary and Analysis of H.R. 2454 as Passed by the House of Representatives, coordinated by Mark Holt and Gene Whitney.",39,37 "Government Spending on Health Care Benefits and Programs: A Data Brief. In a country where health spending accounts for more than 16% of gross domestic product (GDP), health care costs and spending are often described as a problem for consumers and their families, for employers that provide (or seek to provide) health benefits, and for government, which finances a mix of health care services, health research and training, and health safety programs. To describe government spending on health care benefits and programs, this report presents data from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).",70,70 "The History and Effect of Abortion Conscience Clause Laws. Conscience clause laws allow medical providers to refuse to provide services to which they have religious or moral objections. In some cases, these laws are designed to excuse such providers from performing abortions. While substantive conscience clause legislation, such as the Abortion Non-Discrimination Act, has not been approved, appropriations bills that include conscience clause provisions have been passed. This report describes the history of conscience clauses as they relate to abortion law and provides a legal analysis of the effects of such laws. The report also discusses the issuance of a new rule to implement some of the existing conscience clause laws, and recent efforts to rescind that rule. Finally, the report reviews the conscience protection provisions of the House- and Senate-passed health reform measures, H.R. 3962 and H.R. 3590.",16,16 "Senegal: Background and U.S. Relations. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Senegal as a democratic leader in Africa, an anchor of regional stability, and a partner in addressing development challenges and combating transnational security threats. Senegalese President Macky Sall met with President Barack Obama at the White House in March 2013, and President Obama is expected to visit Senegal in late June. A small, arid nation on West Africa's Atlantic coast, Senegal has struggled with widespread poverty and a long-running, low-level separatist insurgency in its southern Casamance region. Still, the country's democratic continuity and military professionalism have stood in stark contrast to near-state collapse in neighboring Mali (previously also considered a democracy), and to unrest and instability elsewhere in the region. This regional turbulence presents security, political, and economic challenges to Senegal's leadership and population. President Sall was voted into office in early 2012 in an election widely seen as free and fair, defeating incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade, who had been in office since 2000. Wade's decision to run for what would have been a third term in office was extremely controversial within Senegal, provoking protests and sparking concerns over potential instability. Such concerns prompted officials in the Obama Administration and some Members of Congress to appeal to Wade to withdraw his candidacy. Wade pursued his campaign nonetheless, and criticized what he described as Western interference. In the end, Sall's electoral victory, and Wade's peaceful concession, renewed many Senegalese and international observers' faith in the strength of Senegal's democratic institutions. Since his election, President Sall has focused on reforming Senegal's bloated civilian administration, pursuing investigations into corrupt practices under his predecessor, and making a renewed push for peace in Casamance. While these initiatives appear to be popular, Sall faces stark challenges, including public expectations that he will deliver rapid economic dividends to Senegal's largely impoverished population. It is also unclear how far Sall can pursue allegations of corruption under his predecessor without implicating himself or close allies, as he and others served in senior positions under former President Wade. Congress plays a role in shaping U.S. policy toward Senegal through its authorization and appropriation of foreign assistance, and through its oversight of executive branch policies and programs. In addition to bilateral aid totaling $109.6 million in FY2012, Senegal is the beneficiary of a five-year, $540 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact signed in 2009. Some Members of Congress objected to the decision to award Senegal an MCC compact in light of concerns, at the time, over corruption and political trends under then-President Wade. In the conference report accompanying P.L. 112-74, the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act, appropriators directed the Administration to allocate at least $50 million in development aid to Senegal, while also expressing concern over Senegal's failure to bring to justice former Chadian president Hissène Habré, who lives in Senegal and has been accused of crimes against humanity. Some progress has since been made toward a possible trial for Habré.",85,85 "House Rules Affecting Committees. The rules of the House of Representatives, especially Rules X-XIII, govern the authority and operations of its committees and subcommittees. In many respects, the House allows each of its committees to decide for itself how to conduct its business. However, the House does impose various requirements and prohibitions on its committees, and because the committees are the agents of the House, they are obligated to comply with all House directives that apply to them. This report identifies and summarizes the provisions of the House's standing rules and certain other directives that affect committee powers, authority, activities, and operations. It is organized under seven headings: (1) general, (2) establishment and assignments, (3) hearings, markups, and other meetings, (4) reporting, (5) oversight and investigations, (6) funding, staff, and travel, and (7) other duties.",55,55 "Supreme Court Appointment Process: Roles of the President, Judiciary Committee, and Senate. This report discusses the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, including the President's selection of a nominee and process to reach confirmation in the Senate. The appointment of a Supreme Court Justice is an event of major significance in American politics. Each appointment is of consequence because of the enormous judicial power the Supreme Court exercises as the highest appellate court in the federal judiciary. Appointments are usually infrequent, as a vacancy on the nine-member Court may occur only once or twice, or never at all, during a particular President's years in office. Under the Constitution, Justices on the Supreme Court receive lifetime appointments. Such job security in the government has been conferred solely on judges and, by constitutional design, helps insure the Court's independence from the President and Congress.",54,92 "Sponsorship and Cosponsorship of House Bills. This report discusses the sponsorship and co-sponsorship of House bills. A Representative who introduces a bill or other measure in the House is called its sponsor. Under House Rule XII, clause 7, several Members together may submit a bill, but the first-named Representative is considered the chief or primary sponsor, the others are considered cosponsors.",55,55 "The Elder Justice Act: Background and Issues for Congress. Elder abuse is a complex issue that often requires a multifaceted policy response that combines public health interventions, social services programs, and criminal law enforcement for abusive behavior. To address this complexity, the Elder Justice Act was enacted on March 23, 2010 as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended). The act attempts to provide a coordinated federal response by emphasizing various public health and social service approaches to the prevention, detection, and treatment of elder abuse. The Elder Justice Act also represents Congress's first attempt at comprehensive legislation to address abuse, neglect, and exploitation of the elderly at the federal level. To date, most activities and programs authorized under the Elder Justice Act have not received federal funding through the annual appropriations process. For the first time, Congress appropriated $4 million for a new Elder Justice Initiative in FY2015 and $8 million in FY2016. However, the authorizations of appropriations for most provisions under the act expired on September 30, 2014. Despite the lack of discretionary appropriations prior to FY2015, some elder justice activities have received funding from mandatory funding appropriated through the ACA Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF). As a result of this limited federal funding, the federal government has not substantially developed and expanded its role in addressing the prevention, detection, and treatment of elder abuse. For FY2012, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) transferred $6.0 million to the Administration for Community Living (ACL) from the PPHF for new grants to states and tribes to test elder abuse prevention strategies. Funded projects included using forensic accountants to prevent elder financial exploitation, increasing medication adherence to prevent elder self-neglect, and developing screening tools to identify elder abuse. For FY2013, $2.0 million was transferred to ACL from the PPHF for elder justice activities, which funded development of the National Adult Protective Services Data Reporting System Project. No PPHF funds were transferred to ACL for elder justice activities for FY2014 or subsequent fiscal years. For FY2017, the President's budget request included $10.0 million in discretionary funding for Elder Justice/Adult Protective Services (APS) that would be used to fund APS, research, and evaluation activities. The 2017 budget request did not specify an intended transfer of funding from the PPHF for elder justice activities. For FY2017, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $10.0 million for the Elder Justice Initiative in its FY2017 Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. The House Appropriations Committee recommended $8.0 million in its FY2017 LHHS appropriations bill. Neither House nor Senate floor consideration of the bill occurred in the 114th Congress. Since the start of the fiscal year (October 1, 2016), funding for LHHS programs and activities has been provided by two continuing resolutions (CR, P.L. 114-223 and P.L. 114-254). The second FY2017 CR provides continuing appropriations for LHHS appropriations through April 28, 2017, or until full-year appropriations are enacted. This report provides a brief legislative history of the Elder Justice Act, summarizes elder justice provisions enacted as part of ACA, and administrative efforts related to implementation and funding. The report then describes several issues for Congress with respect to the act's reauthorization.",95,95 "The European Union's Response to the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis. This report examines the EU responses to the financial crisis through changes to the financial regulatory structure at the EU level as well as the member country level. The countries examined are Germany and the United Kingdom, which have single financial regulators, the Netherlands, which has a twin peaks regulatory structure, and Spain, which has a functional structure.",87,87 "Preexisting Condition Exclusion Provisions for Children and Dependent Coverage under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, ACA, as amended), a number of provisions directly affect access to health insurance coverage. This report provides a description of two of the provisions in ACA that are targeted toward younger individuals, for plan years beginning on or after six months from the date of enactment (i.e., the plan year beginning on or after September 23, 2010). ACA prohibits coverage exclusions for children with preexisting health conditions who are under age 19, and the law also requires plans to continue to make dependent coverage available to children under age 26.",70,70 "Ebola: Basics About the Disease. Will be suppressed. In March 2014, global health officials recognized an outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Guinea, West Africa. In retrospect, officials determined that the outbreak began in December 2013, and spread to the adjacent countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone. In September 2014, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed the first EVD case diagnosed in the United States, heightening concerns among some who fear the disease could spread in American communities. This report discusses EVD in general, including symptoms, modes of transmission, incubation period, and treatments, presents projections of the future course of the outbreak, and lists additional CRS products, including products focused on the situation in West Africa. Unless otherwise cited, information in this report is drawn from Ebola information pages of CDC and the World Health Organization (WHO). In humans EVD has an incubation period—the time between exposure and onset of symptoms—from 2 to 21 days, with an average of 8 to10 days. Isolation is used to separate ill persons who have a contagious disease from others. It is often carried out in a healthcare setting. Quarantine is used to separate and restrict the movement of well persons who may have been exposed to a contagious disease to see if they become ill. It is often carried out at home. The case fatality rate (CFR), the percentage of infected individuals who do not survive, generally exceeds 50%, an extraordinarily high rate among infectious diseases. The true CFR is an inherent property of the infectious agent (in this case, the Ebola Zaire virus). Prevention of human-to-human transmission of Ebola virus requires avoiding contact with body fluids of those who are sick. EVD is not likely to be easily transmitted in community settings in the United States. However, caregivers, including family members and healthcare workers, face considerable risk of transmission. Barrier protections (called personal protective equipment or PPE), liberal disinfection of premises and facilities housing EVD patients, and careful handling of human remains and contaminated objects are essential. No specific therapy or vaccine against EVD is approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use in the United States, or is available elsewhere in the world. However, for more than a decade the U.S. government has funded research and development of specific therapies (such as antiviral drugs) and vaccines against EVD for military force protection and domestic biodefense purposes. CDC authors published outbreak projections for Liberia and Sierra Leone. The model found that without further interventions to slow the outbreak (a worst case scenario), the case count in the two countries could reach 1.4 million by January 20, 2015. Conversely, if 70% of EVD patients were effectively isolated going forward, the outbreak in both countries would be almost controlled by that same date.",65,65 "Federal Trust Funds and the Budget. The federal budget consists of four basic fund groups—the general fund, special funds, revolving funds, and trust funds. The first three are often referred to as the federal funds group. Trust funds are an accounting mechanism that records revenues, offsetting receipts, or collections earmarked for the purpose of the specific fund. Trust funds generally share three common features: (1) they are established for programs serving long-term purposes, (2) monies are used for a single purpose, and (3) users are charged to finance the trust fund. About 40% of all federal outlays were through trust funds and about 37% of all federal receipts came to trust funds in fiscal year (FY) 2012. A federal trust fund often represents a long-term commitment to use specific funds for a certain purpose. It has been argued that the creation of a trust fund is one way for Congress to ""commit"" future Congresses to fund a specific program or ""to make long-term promises stick."" Dedicated revenues are used to fund the program and the revenues usually come from the beneficiaries of the program. The Office of Management and Budget tracks approximately 120 trust funds and trust fund aggregates. The 13 largest trust funds account for nearly all (over 99%) of the income to, outgo from, and balances of all trust funds. Trust fund receipts come from a variety of sources. Almost all trust funds receive monies from current or future beneficiaries. Most trust funds receive general revenues in terms of direct payments or interest payments. In addition, some trust funds receive payments from other trust funds. Most trust fund programs have permanent budget authority and all monies in the trust fund are available for obligation. The outgo of a trust fund is comprised of payments made to the public or to another trust fund. Cumulatively, trust fund surpluses (i.e., revenues in excess of outgo) in FY2012 amounted to $89.9 billion. This surplus is mostly invested in government obligations and transferred to the general fund to pay for other spending. By law, all trust funds except the Railroad Retirement fund must invest balances in government obligations. The Railroad Retirement fund is allowed to invest its balance in equities. The government securities held by trust funds are part of federal debt that is subject to the statutory federal debt limit. At the end of FY2012, the trust funds held $4,388.5 billion in government securities. The federal funds deficit for FY2012 was $1,176.8 billion, but because of the trust fund surplus, the unified federal budget deficit (what is widely reported in the press) was $1,087.0 billion. Some observers have argued that trust fund programs increase the federal deficit and reduce national saving. There is evidence, however, to support the claim that trust fund surpluses reduce the federal government deficit and increase public saving. This becomes important when a trust fund's revenues are less than its outgo and the Treasury securities held by the trust fund need to be redeemed to cover outgo. The Treasury securities in the trust fund are claims on the government and the government will need to find real resources (by raising revenue, decreasing spending, or issuing more debt) to cover these claims when the obligations are redeemed.",101,101 "The No Child Left Behind Act: An Overview of Reauthorization Issues for the 111th Congress. Most programs of federal aid to K-12 education are authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The ESEA was most recently amended and reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). The authorization for ESEA programs expired at the end of FY2008, although ESEA programs continue to operate as long as appropriations are provided, and the 111th Congress is expected to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA. Debates over reauthorization of the ESEA have thus far focused on the following overarching issues: (1) What has been the impact of the substantial expansion of standards-based assessments of pupil achievement required under the ESEA, and should these requirements be expanded further to include additional subjects or grade levels? (2) Are adequate yearly progress (AYP) requirements appropriately focused on improving education for disadvantaged pupil groups and identifying low-performing schools? (3) Have the program improvement, corrective actions, and restructuring required under the ESEA for schools and local educational agencies (LEAs) that fail to meet AYP standards for two consecutive years or more been effectively implemented, and have they significantly improved achievement levels among pupils in the affected schools? (4) What has been the impact of the requirements that all public school teachers (and many paraprofessionals) be highly qualified and that well-qualified teachers be equitably distributed across schools and LEAs? (5) Should ESEA programs be funded at levels closer to the maximum authorized amounts, and at what levels, if any, should authorizations be set for years beyond FY2008? (6) Should the ESEA place greater emphasis on enhancing the nation's international competitiveness in science, mathematics, and foreign language achievement? (7) The NCLB, with its numerous new or substantially expanded requirements for participating states and LEAs, initiated a major increase in federal involvement in basic aspects of public K-12 education. Should the active federal role in K-12 education embodied in the NCLB be maintained? This report will be updated regularly.",33,33 "File-Sharing Software and Copyright Infringement: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision considered allegations of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement by companies which distribute peer-to-peer file-sharing software. The software facilitates direct copyright infringement by its users. It was the first decision to reject infringement claims against and find in favor of companies distributing the software. Other digital media file-sharing software decisions found in favor of the copyright holders, most notably A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. and In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation. But in Grokster, the court granted summary judgment for the software companies. The court thus became the first to accept the ""substantial, noninfringing uses"" defense to copyright infringement liability, a defense developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in connection with use of VCRs in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. In a unanimous 9-0 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, finding that it had misapplied Sony. It articulated a new standard for the imposition of secondary liability for copyright infringement, namely ""inducement."" The Court held that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."" Although firmly rooted in the common law, the Court imported the ""inducement"" theory to copyright law much as it had adopted the safe harbor from infringement liability in Sony from patent law. The Court was careful to preserve the safe harbor for dual use technology established by Sony. Sony bars secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used for infringement. Inducement of copyright infringement may be demonstrated when an actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence independent of design and distribution of the product. This report examines the background and holding in Grokster and the doctrinal relationship between Sony and Grokster. It will not be updated.",9,9 "The Uninsured by State and Congressional District. The total U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population in 2009 was estimated to be slightly more than 301 million of whom 15.1%, or 45.5 million, were estimated by the American Community Survey to be without health insurance or uninsured. The uninsured are far more likely than those with health insurance to report problems getting needed medical care, less likely to follow recommended treatments because of costs, have less access to care, receive less preventive care, and are more likely to be hospitalized for avoidable health problems. Moreover, it is widely believed that the uninsured, when they need care, are less able to pay for their care since they do not have health insurance and therefore it is further assumed that other payers take on the financial burden of their care through higher prices. Many Americans obtain their health insurance through employers. Local factors such as local labor market conditions, the mix of firms and firm sizes, and demographic factors such as age, play a role in the proportion of uninsured among those of working age. The Medicare program has effectively provided health insurance to almost all elderly Americans while the Medicaid program and the State Children's Health Insurance Program have expanded health insurance coverage to both the poor and to children. State policies to expand coverage, including implementing Medicaid waivers to expand coverage, account for some of the differences across states in the proportion of uninsureds. Similarly, state policies to expand coverage such as employer or personal mandates to purchase insurance in Hawaii and Massachusetts further explain some of the differences in the number of uninsureds across states. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended), through an expansion of Medicaid and the creation of state health insurance exchanges, is projected by the Congressional Budget Office to reduce the share of legal non-elderly residents without health insurance to 6% of the population by 2019. This report, using the U.S. Census Bureau's 2009 American Community Survey, details differences in the number and proportion of uninsured across states, within states, and across demographic groups.",70,70 "H.R. 1 (Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007) and S. 4 (Improving America's Security Act of 2007): A Comparative Analysis. This comparative analysis of H.R. 1 (Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007) and S. 4 (Improving America's Security Act of 2007) is an assessment of major similarities and differences between the two bills as passed by the House (January 9, 2007) and Senate (March 13, 2007) and under conference consideration. References to the two bills are to engrossed versions. The presentation is organized to follow the basic construct of the House bill because its coverage remained more stable through the legislative process and as the analyses began. Titles unique to S. 4 follow the Titles of H.R. 1. CRS experts are available to follow up on any additional needs, including clarification of content or of legislative references. Each section of this analysis includes contact information for the analyst or attorney who prepared it. CRS also provides online access to research products that directly address a number of issues that are the focus of or are raised by H.R. 1 and S. 4. These products are available under the CRS home page Current Legislative Issues heading ""Terrorism and Homeland Security"" (see http://www.crs.gov).",22,22 "Judge Merrick Garland: His Jurisprudence and Potential Impact on the Supreme Court. On March 16, 2016, President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court created by the unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February. Judge Garland was appointed to the D.C. Circuit by President Clinton in 1997, and is currently its chief judge, an administrative position that rotates among the active judges on the circuit. Prior to his appointment to the bench, Judge Garland served in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, where he notably oversaw the prosecution of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing case, as well as other cases. It remains to be seen whether or how the Senate might proceed in considering Judge Garland's nomination, however, the nomination generally remains effective until it is withdrawn or this term of Congress ends, whichever occurs first. This report provides an overview of Judge Garland's jurisprudence and discusses what the impact on the Court might be if he, or a judge of a similar judicial approach, were to be confirmed to succeed Justice Scalia. In particular, the report focuses upon those areas of law where Justice Scalia can be seen to have influenced the High Court's approach to certain issues, or served as a fifth and deciding vote on the Court, with a view toward how Judge Garland might approach those same issues if he were to be confirmed. The report begins with his views on two overarching issues—the role of the judiciary and statutory interpretation. It then addresses 14 separate areas of law, which are arranged in alphabetical order from ""administrative law"" to ""takings."" The report includes one table which notes the cases where the Supreme Court has reviewed majority opinions written or joined by Judge Garland. Another table, in the appendix to the report, identifies Judge Garland's colleagues on the D.C. Circuit and lists notable cases involving Judge Garland and that colleague. A separate report, CRS Report R44484, Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions Authored by Judge Merrick Garland, coordinated by R. Chuck Mason, lists all opinions authored by Judge Garland during his tenure on the D.C. Circuit. Other CRS products discuss various issues related to the vacancy on the Supreme Court. For an overview of available products, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1526, Vacancy on the Supreme Court: CRS Products, by Kate M. Manuel and Andrew Nolan.",92,92 "Encryption Technology: the Debate in the 105th and 106th Congresses. The controversy over encryption throughout the 1990s concerned what access the government should have to encrypted stored computer data or electronic communications (voice and data, wired and wireless) for law enforcement and national security purposes. Encryption and decryption are methods of using cryptography to protect the confidentiality of data and communications. When encrypted, a message can only be understood by someone with the key to decrypt it. Businesses and consumers want strong encryption products to protect their information, while the Clinton Administration wanted to ensure the law enforcement community's ability to monitor undesirable activity in the digital age. Until 1998, the Clinton Administration promoted the use of strong encryption (greater than 56 bits) here and abroad, only if it had ""key recovery"" features where a ""key recovery agent"" holds a spare key"" to decrypt the information. The Administration wanted key recovery agents to make the decryption key available to authorized federal and state government entities. Privacy advocates argued that law enforcement entities would have too much access to private information. Under this policy, the Administration attempted to use the export control process to influence companies to develop key recovery encryption products by making it easy to export products with key recovery and difficult for those products without. There were no limits on domestic use or import of any type of encryption, so the Administration tried to influence what was available for domestic use through export controls since most companies do not want to incur the costs of creating two versions of the same product--one for U.S. use and another for export. U.S. companies argued that U.S. export policies hurt their market share while helping foreign companies not subject to export restrictions. While many businesses and consumer groups agreed that key recovery is desirable when keys are lost stolen, or corrupted, they wanted market forces to drive the development of key recovery encryption products. They also objected to government having any role in determining who can hold the keys. Although a general consensus emerged that encryption is essential to the growth of electronic commerce and use of the Internet, opposition to the Clinton Administration's policy grew as industry and privacy rights groups lobbied Congress to loosen export controls. In the 106th Congress legislation was introduced intended to foster widespread use of the strongest encryption (H.R. 850, S. 798). While the Administration continued to oppose that legislation, H.R. 850 was marked up by five Committees, resulting in widely varying and, in places, contradictory, provisions. In September 1999, the Clinton Administration announced plans to relax its encryption export policy by allowing unlimited key length (with some exceptions) without key recovery, and reducing reporting requirements. The rules for implementing that policy were issued by the Department of Commerce in January 2000. While the new policy appears to have satisfied industry interests, privacy rights groups continue to express concerns about government surveillance.",110,110 "China-U.S. Trade Agreements: Compliance Issues. On November 15, 1999, the United States and China completed a bilateral agreement on China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). China agreed to substantially liberalize its markets for U.S. agriculture, manufactured goods, and services. In addition China has completed bilateral trade agreements with 35 other WTO members (an agreement with Mexico is still pending) and is close to completing negotiations with the WTO Working Party handling its WTO application. Once China completes all of its bilateral and multilateral agreements, it will likely join the WTO soon after, and the terms of those agreements will apply equally to all WTO members. China's accession to the WTO would subject China's trade regime to multilateral trade rules, such as most- favored-nation (MFN), or nondiscriminatory, trade status, national treatment for foreign firms transparency of trade rules, and the use of tariffs, rather than non-tariff barriers, to protect domestic firms (when necessary). The terms of China's WTO membership would be subject to monitoring and review by WTO members, who, in case of Chinese non-compliance with WTO obligations would be able to bring a complaint before a WTO trade dispute resolution panel for settlement. Congressional concerns over China's full compliance with its WTO commitments became a factor in the congressional debate over H.R. 4444, a bill that would permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) treatment to China upon its accession to the WTO. Some congressional opponents of PNTR legislation charged that China could not be trusted to implement the WTO agreements, based on the contention that China had failed to fully comply with the terms of past trade agreements made with the United States. Other analysts contended that, while China's compliance with trade agreements had been less than perfect, it did make important strides in fulfilling its trade obligations with the United States. They further contended that the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism would provide a more effective means for the United States to deal with trade disputes than relying on unilateral measures. In order to ensure China's full compliance with its WTO commitments, many Members of Congress called for the establishment of special mechanisms that would closely monitor China's compliance with its WTO commitments. Such measures were included in the final version of H.R. 4444, which passed both Houses and became law on October 10, 2000. This report addresses five major trade issues and related trade agreements between the United States and China: (1) the 1979 trade agreement providing mutual most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, (2) the 1992 memorandum of understanding (MOU) on market access, (3) the 1992 and 1995 MOUs on intellectual property rights (IPR), (4) the 1997 MOU on textile quotas and market access, and (5) the 1992 MOU on prison labor exports. It provides an overview of the agreements and summarizes various government and private sector assessments of China's compliance with the agreements. It also discusses issues arising from concerns over how to ensure China's compliance with its trade commitments relating to its accession to the WTO (if and when it enters the WTO) including legislative proposals.",53,53 "Overview of Continuing Appropriations for FY2018 (P.L. 115-56). This report provides an analysis of the continuing appropriations provisions for FY2018 in Division D of H.R. 601. The measure also included separate divisions that establish a program to provide foreign assistance concerning basic education (Division A—Reinforcing Education Accountability in Development Act), supplemental appropriations for disaster relief requirements for FY2017 (Division B), and a temporary suspension of the public debt limit (Division C). On September 8, 2017, the President signed H.R. 601 into law (P.L. 115-56). Division D of H.R. 601 was termed a ""continuing resolution"" (CR) because it provided temporary authority for federal agencies and programs to continue spending in FY2018 in the same manner as a separately enacted CR. It provides temporary funding for the programs and activities covered by all 12 of the regular appropriations bills, since none of them had been enacted previously. These provisions provide continuing budget authority for projects and activities funded in FY2017 by that fiscal year's regular appropriations acts, with some exceptions. It includes both budget authority that is subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits on defense and nondefense spending and also budget authority that is effectively exempt from those limits, such as that designated as for ""Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism."" Funding under the terms of the CR is effective October 1, 2017, through December 8, 2017—roughly the first 10 weeks of the fiscal year. The CR generally provides budget authority for FY2018 for projects and activities at the rate at which they were funded during FY2017. Most projects and activities funded in the CR, however, are also subject to an across-the-board decrease of 0.6791% (pursuant to Section 101(b) of Division D). According to the cost estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the annualized discretionary budget authority provided in the FY2018 CR, as enacted, and subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits is approximately $1,070 billion. When spending that is effectively not subject to those limits (Overseas Contingency Operations, disaster relief, emergency requirements, and program integrity adjustments) is also included, the CBO estimate is $1,183 billion. CRs usually include provisions that are specific to certain agencies, accounts, or programs. These include provisions that designate exceptions to the formula and purpose for which any referenced funding is extended (referred to as ""anomalies"") as well as provisions that have the effect of creating new law or changing existing law (often used to renew expiring provisions of law). The CR includes a number of such provisions, each of which is briefly summarized in this report. CRS appropriations process experts for each of these provisions are listed in Table 1. For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2016, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices, by James V. Saturno and Jessica Tollestrup.",101,101 "Critical Infrastructure Resilience: The Evolution of Policy and Programs and Issues for Congress. In 2006, the Critical Infrastructure Task Force of the Homeland Security Advisory Council initiated a public policy debate arguing that the government's critical infrastructure policies were focused too much on protecting assets from terrorist attacks and not focused enough on improving the resilience of assets against a variety of threats. According to the Task Force, such a defensive posture was ""brittle."" Not all possible targets could be protected and adversaries could find ways to defeat defenses, still leaving the nation having to deal with the consequences. The Task Force advocated that greater encouragement for resilience would broaden the range of risk reduction options and should be the overarching policy framework for reducing risks associated with all threats to critical infrastructure. Others in the homeland security community agreed. Critical infrastructure are those assets the loss of which would result in great harm to the nation's security, economy, health and safety, and morale. They include assets necessary to generate and distribute such basic goods and services such as electricity, drinking water, telecommunications, banking and finance, etc. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to a change in environment or conditions. The Task Force argued that government policies encouraged employing greater defenses such as surveillance equipment, guards, etc., around these assets but did less to encourage efforts that would allow assets to continue operating at some level, or quickly return to full operation, if attacked. Such efforts might include increasing redundancies (such as having multiple backup power generation capability) or designing more robust systems for the future (such as using more hardened concrete for stronger fixed facilities). In 2008, as part of its oversight function, the House Committee on Homeland Security held a series of hearings addressing resilience. At those hearings, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) argued that government policies and actions did encourage resilience as well as protection. Even so, subsequent policy documents made greater reference to resilience. At first those references were relatively superficial, but later they became more substantive. Policy has evolved to the point that resilience and protection of critical infrastructure assets are recognized as distinct options to be equally considered when seeking to reduce the risks associated with potential attacks on critical infrastructures. As policy has evolved, programs have also evolved somewhat, to support efforts at improving critical infrastructure resiliency. The Office of Infrastructure Protection within the DHS conducts risk assessments at the asset and regional level that now include a resilience index along with a protection index. The program allows asset owners/operators to compare their level of resilience to other similar assets and allows them to analyze how certain improvements might contribute to better resilience. Also, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate supports some resilience-oriented research and development projects. In addition to projects developing better technologies to aid in response and recovery, the Directorate also supports projects that are developing technologies for structures to withstand blasts or large physical displacements or systems which can self-heal after being damaged. The Federal Emergency Management Agency within DHS provides grants, primarily to state and local governments or public authorities, that largely support resilience by improving the ability to respond to and recover from incidents. Mitigation grants, which allow communities to reduce the potential consequences of an incident before it happens, offer limited support for improving the resilience of critical infrastructures. There is relatively little direct government support or incentives for private sector owners/operators to implement resilience-oriented (or protective-oriented) measures. It is not clear if market incentives are sufficient to drive such investments. Congress may choose to consider the adequacy of private investments in resilience, whether the private market provides sufficient incentives, and options for government action if markets do not.",22,22 "Senate Committee Reports: Required Contents. When a Senate committee reports a measure to the Senate, it usually prepares a written report that describes the purposes and provisions of the measure. Senate rules and statutes specify items that must be included in committee reports. Senate committees also may include additional items in their reports. For more information on legislative process, see http://www.crs.gov/¬øproducts/¬øguides/¬øguidehome.shtml.",55,55 "Missiles for Standoff Attack: Air-Launched Air- to-Surface Munitions Programs. Increasing the standoff range of air-delivered munitions and improving their accuracy and lethality have become matters of major emphasis in U.S. defense plans since the 1991 Gulf War. The 1999 conflict in Kosovo especially highlighted the value of air-to-surface munitions that could be launched from safe standoff ranges and guided to their targets with precision. Since cancellation in late 1994 of the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) program various alternatives have been proposed, including development of a new missile or a derivative of currently operational missiles. This report focuses six air-to-surface munition programs: the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) the Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), the Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW), the Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM), and the AGM-142 and AGM-130 missiles. All of these weapons are launched from aircraft, in contrast ships and ground-based missile launchers. The Defense Department's FY2001 budget included requests of $122.3 million for JASSM and $27.9 million for SLAM-ER as well as requests for other standoff munition programs such as JSOW ($284.7 million) and AGM-130 (about $100 thousand). Appropriations conferees recommended funding SLAM-ER as requested, reduced the JASSM request by $4 million and increased the JSOW request by $6.4 million. These standoff munitions programs were funded in FY1999 and FY2000 essentially as requested, with minimal differences between the House and Senate in regard to these programs, however, there are continuing differences between the Air Force and the Navy as to funding priorities and military requirements for JASSM, SLAM-ER, and JSOW. Issues before Congress include the relative cost and performance of these missile systems tradeoffs between performance and cost that may be acceptable, perceptions of inventory requirements, emphasis on development of standoff munitions at the expense of other defense programs, and whether derivatives of current munitions should be procured pending development and production of more advanced standoff missiles that may be needed in post-2010 threat scenarios. The quest for capable and affordable standoff air-to-surface missiles poses a number of interrelated issues for Congress in evaluating the proposed alternatives: (1) the advantages of an entirely new design versus a derivative of currently operational munitions or designs in full-scale development, (2) acceptable tradeoffs between perceived performance requirements in regard to range, payload, accuracy, and stealth, (3) projected inventory requirements for future combat scenarios, (4) the development and production costs and the delivery schedules of proposed alternatives, and (5) reliance on interim standoff munitions pending development of new systems.",31,32 "Legal Issues Related to Funding for Religious Schools in P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) provides funding for various educational programs, including a State Fiscal Stabilization Fund. The State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF) provides federal funding to states to support elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education. Although federal money provided by the SFSF is available only to public elementary and secondary schools, public and private institutions of higher education are eligible to receive federal money from the SFSF. Because the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment limits the extent to which the government may provide funds to religious organizations, the SFSF also includes a provision that prohibits funds from being used for facilities with religious uses or purposes. This report will provide a brief overview of the prohibition on the use of funds by institutions of higher education, including proposals considered by the House and Senate before ARRA was enacted. It will also analyze the constitutionality of the distribution of federal money to religious schools in the context of common questions raised by these provisions.",15,15 "Congress's Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas: A Sketch. Congress's contempt power is the means by which Congress responds to certain acts that in its view obstruct the legislative process. Contempt may be used either to coerce compliance, punish the contemnor, and/or to remove the obstruction. Although arguably any action that directly obstructs the effort of Congress to exercise its constitutional powers may constitute a contempt, in recent times the contempt power has most often been employed in response to noncompliance with a duly issued congressional subpoena—whether in the form of a refusal to appear before a committee for purposes of providing testimony or a refusal to produce requested documents. Congress has three formal methods by which it can combat noncompliance with a duly issued subpoena. Each of these methods invokes the authority of a separate branch of government. First, the long dormant inherent contempt power permits Congress to rely on its own constitutional authority to detain and imprison a contemnor until the individual complies with congressional demands. Second, the criminal contempt statute permits Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal prosecution of the contemnor. Finally, Congress may rely on the judicial branch to enforce a congressional subpoena. Under this procedure, Congress may seek a civil judgment from a federal court declaring that the individual in question is legally obligated to comply with the congressional subpoena. A number of obstacles face Congress in any attempt to enforce a subpoena issued against an executive branch official. Although the courts have reaffirmed Congress's constitutional authority to issue and enforce subpoenas, efforts to punish an executive branch official for noncompliance with a subpoena through criminal contempt will likely prove unavailing in many, if not most, circumstances. Where the official refuses to disclose information pursuant to the President's decision that such information is protected under executive privilege, past practice suggests that the Department of Justice (DOJ) will not pursue a prosecution for criminal contempt. In addition, although it appears that Congress may be able to enforce its subpoenas through a declaratory civil action, relying on this mechanism to enforce a subpoena directed at an executive official may prove an inadequate means of protecting congressional prerogatives due to the time required to achieve a final, enforceable ruling in the case. Although subject to practical limitations, Congress retains the ability to exercise its own constitutionally based authorities to enforce a subpoena through inherent contempt. This report examines the source of Congress's contempt power, analyzes the procedures associated with inherent contempt, criminal contempt, and the civil enforcement of subpoenas, and discusses the obstacles that face Congress in enforcing a contempt action against an executive branch official. A more fully developed and detailed version of this report, complete with sources and references, can be found at CRS Report RL34097, Congress's Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure, by Todd Garvey and Alissa M. Dolan.",55,55 "Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory Framework. The financial regulatory system has been described as fragmented, with multiple overlapping regulators and a dual state-federal regulatory system. The system evolved piecemeal, punctuated by major changes in response to various historical financial crises. The most recent financial crisis also resulted in changes to the regulatory system through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act, P.L. 111-203) and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA, P.L. 110-289). To address the fragmented nature of the system, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a council of regulators and experts chaired by the Treasury Secretary. At the federal level, regulators can be clustered in the following areas Depository regulators—Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Reserve for banks, and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) for credit unions Securities markets regulators—Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) regulators—Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), created by HERA, and Farm Credit Administration (FCA), and Consumer protection regulator—Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), created by the Dodd-Frank Act. These regulators regulate financial institutions, markets, and products using licensing, registration, rulemaking, supervisory, enforcement, and resolution powers. Other entities that play a role in financial regulation are interagency bodies, state regulators, and international regulatory fora. Notably, federal regulators generally play a secondary role in insurance markets. Financial regulation aims to achieve diverse goals, which vary from regulator to regulator market efficiency and integrity consumer and investor protections capital formation or access to credit taxpayer protection illicit activity prevention, and financial stability. Policy debate revolves around the tradeoffs between these various goals. Different types of regulation—prudential (safety and soundness), disclosure, standard setting, competition, and price and rate regulations—are used to achieve these goals. Many observers believe that the structure of the regulatory system influences regulatory outcomes. For that reason, there is ongoing congressional debate about the best way to structure the regulatory system. As background for that debate, this report provides an overview of the U.S. financial regulatory framework. It briefly describes each of the federal financial regulators and the types of institutions they supervise. It also discusses the other entities that play a role in financial regulation.",5,8 "Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Requirements in the Rulemaking Process. Regulatory analytical requirements (e.g., cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis) have been established incrementally during the last 40 to 50 years through a series of presidential and congressional initiatives. The current set of requirements includes Executive Order 12866 and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-4, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). These requirements vary in terms of the agencies and rules they cover, and the types of analyses that are required. For example, a regulatory analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act is not required if the agency head certifies that the rule will not have a ""significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities."" The most extensive and broadly applicable of the requirements are in Executive Order 12866 and OMB Circular A-4, but they do not apply to independent regulatory agencies. The statutes that provide rulemaking authority to independent regulatory agencies often require them to ""consider"" regulatory costs and benefits, and they often have less explicit requirements for cost-benefit analysis, if any. An OMB report indicated that independent regulatory agencies provided some information and costs and benefits in 76 of the 118 major rules they issued from FY2003 to FY2012. Cabinet departments and other agencies estimated monetary costs and benefits for some, but not all, of their rules. Several bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress that would codify and/or expand the current requirements for cost-benefit analysis. Congress could decide to keep the existing analytical framework in place, or could enact one or more of these reform proposals. Another more comprehensive approach could be to consolidate all of the analytical requirements in one place, and perhaps expand those requirements to include more agencies or rules, or to require different types of analysis. To do so, or to simply cover independent regulatory agencies by the executive order, the President could arguably amend Executive Order 12866 and OMB Circular A-4, or Congress could enact legislation. Any such changes must be cognizant of the state of existing law and practice in this area, and the resources and data required for agencies to carry out the analyses.",55,56 "The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (S. 2590): Overview and Comparison with H.R. 5060. In an attempt to expand oversight of federal spending, including earmarks, S. 2590 would provide the public with access to an online database containing information about entities that are awarded federal grants, loans, and contracts. This report summarizes S. 2590, compares it to H.R. 5060, and outlines the arguments in favor of the bill and those critical of it. The final section discusses the implications of using the Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS) and the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) to populate the bill's proposed database.",56,56 "U.S.-EU Trade and Economic Relations: Key Policy Issues for the 112th Congress. The 112th Congress, in both its legislative and oversight roles, confronts numerous issues that affect the trade and economic relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU). As U.S.-EU commercial interactions drive significant job creation on both sides of the Atlantic, Congress is monitoring ongoing efforts to deepen transatlantic ties that are already large, dynamic, and mutually beneficial. U.S. and European private stakeholders, concerned about slow growth, job creation, and increased competition from emerging economies, have urged Brussels and Washington to strengthen transatlantic trade and economic ties by reducing or eliminating remaining trade barriers and by cooperating more closely in addressing global economic challenges. A number of studies produced over the past several years have called for new bilateral trade, investment, and other economic arrangements to maximize economic opportunities available to stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic. At the November 28, 2011, EU-U.S. Summit meeting, leaders from both sides directed the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) to establish a High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth. The Working Group, which will be led by U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk and EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht, was tasked with assessing options for strengthening the U.S.-EU trade and investment relationship, especially those that have the highest potential to support jobs and growth. The findings and recommendations of the group are due by the end of 2012. The working group will provide an interim update to leaders in June 2012. There are many options the Working Group could explore for greater liberalization of the transatlantic economic relationship. They range from a comprehensive and traditional free trade agreement to parallel but separate negotiations in areas such as elimination of tariffs on trade in goods, liberalization of services trade and foreign investment restrictions, and reduction of regulatory barriers. A select group of these issues, including enhanced bilateral cooperation on global issues, is discussed in this report. Despite generally low tariff levels on both sides, some in the U.S. and EU business communities support negotiating the elimination of all remaining tariffs imposed on U.S.-EU trade through a bilateral negotiation. Support for a zero-tariff agreement is based on a combination of factors, including the agreement's ability to generate economic benefits for both sides and the leverage such an agreement could create for pressuring emerging economies to make more concessions in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Consideration of enhanced regulatory cooperation and one or more bilateral agreements addressing investment and services trade issues are also being touted by the business community. Greater collaboration and alignment of U.S. and EU approaches towards addressing global economic challenges, such as completing the Doha Round, dealing with China's trade barriers, and reducing global imbalances, remains a work in progress. Given shared interests in opening emerging markets further to industrial goods and services, business interests have urged U.S. and EU negotiators to work more closely together to press other countries for more concessions. EU negotiators in the past have remained reluctant to move in this direction perhaps out of concern that greater ambition would require further EU concessions on agriculture.",87,53 "Safe Harbor for Online Service Providers Under Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998 in an effort to adapt copyright law to emerging digital technologies that potentially could be used to exponentially increase infringing activities online. Title II of the DMCA, titled the ""Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act,"" added a new Section 512 to the Copyright Act (Title 17 of the U.S. Code) in order to limit the liability of providers of Internet access and online services that may arise due to their users posting or sharing materials that infringe copyrights. Congress was concerned that without insulating Internet intermediaries from crippling financial liability for copyright infringement, investment in the growth of the Internet could be stifled and innovation could be harmed. The § 512 ""safe harbor"" immunity is available only to a party that qualifies as a ""service provider"" as defined by the DMCA, and only after the provider complies with certain eligibility requirements. The DMCA's safe harbors greatly limit service providers' liability based on the specific functions they could perform: (1) transitory digital network communications, (2) system caching, (3) storage of information on systems or networks at direction of users, and (4) information location tools. In exchange for the shelter from most forms of liability, the DMCA requires service providers to cooperate with copyright owners to address infringing activities conducted by the providers' customers. The safe harbor thus reflects a ""grand bargain"" between creative content-producing industries and Internet companies that seeks to both promote investment in the Internet and protect copyright holders' intellectual property rights. The DMCA expressly states that a service provider is not required to actively monitor its service for infringing activity. However, § 512 requires a service provider, upon proper notification by the copyright owner of online material being displayed or transmitted without authorization, to ""expeditiously"" remove or disable access to the allegedly infringing material. In addition, a service provider must remove or disable access to material upon acquiring actual knowledge that materials or activities on its system or network are infringing (for example, actual knowledge can be obtained by the copyright holder's notification) or when the service provider becomes aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent (so-called ""red flag"" knowledge). Service providers that meet the eligibility conditions of the § 512 safe harbor are thus shielded from liability for unknowingly hosting content that infringes copyrights, whereas § 512 provides copyright holders a simple and cost-effective procedural mechanism for remedying online infringement of their intellectual property rights. Courts have found that the burden of actively monitoring online copyright infringement lies on copyright holders. This report focuses primarily on the third safe harbor functional category, ""storage of information on systems or networks at direction of users,"" which includes any website that stores digital content that users have uploaded for public consumption or for sharing purposes, such as popular social media and online services YouTube, Facebook, Dropbox, Flickr, Google Drive, and Blogger. The report will describe and analyze the statutory language establishing the safe harbor as well as discuss federal court cases that have considered the scope and application of the DMCA safe harbors and the extent to which online service providers can be held indirectly liable for copyright infringement committed by their users.",9,9 "Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies: FY2013 and FY2014 Appropriations. The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for most of the Department of the Interior (DOI) and for agencies within other departmentsincluding the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also provides funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), arts and cultural agencies, and numerous other entities. For FY2014, $30.12 billion was appropriated for the approximately 30 agencies and entities typically funded in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations law. This total included appropriations in P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, and additional funding for Wildland Fire Management in P.L. 113-46, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014. For the 10 major DOI agencies in Title I of the bill, the appropriation was $10.47 billion, or 34.8% of the total enacted. For EPA, funded by Title II of the bill, the appropriation was $8.20 billion, or 27.2% of the total. For about 20 agencies and other entities typically funded in Title III of the bill, the appropriation was $11.44 billion, or 38.0% of the total. The FY2014 total appropriation was an increase of $431.5 million (1.5%) over the total FY2013 appropriation of $29.69 billion. This FY2013 level included full-year and supplemental appropriations, and reflected reductions from sequestration and an across-the-board rescission. Excluding supplemental appropriations for FY2013 for disaster relief (in P.L. 113-2), the FY2014 appropriation was an increase of $1.80 billion (6.4%) over the $28.32 billion FY2013 appropriation. In addition, relative to FY2012 appropriations of $29.23 billion, the FY2014 appropriation was an increase of $891.4 million (3.0%). Neither the House nor Senate Appropriations Committee reported a regular appropriations bill for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2014. However, the FY2014 appropriation was $5.78 billion (23.7%) more than the $24.34 billion in a House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee draft, but $717.0 million (2.3%) less than the $30.84 billion in a draft of the leaders of the Senate Interior Appropriations Subcommittee. Further, as compared with the Presidents request of $29.91 billion, the FY2014 appropriation was $206.3 million (0.7%) higher. Because a FY2014 appropriations bill for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies had not been enacted at the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013, agencies funded by the bill initially received FY2014 appropriations under a short-term continuing resolution (P.L. 113-46, extended by P.L. 113-73). The continuing resolution generally extended appropriations for continuing projects and activities at the FY2013 post-sequestration, post-rescission levels. The law provided exceptions for Wildland Fire Management. The enactment of P.L. 113-46 ended the funding gap and partial government shutdown that began on October 1, 2013.",59,59 "Asset Distribution of Taxable Estates: An Analysis. This report provides data on the distribution of assets in estates as reported on estate tax returns filed in 2009 and 2010. The data for 2010 are unique, as the estate tax was repealed for those who died in calendar year 2010. Thus, the 2010 data are presented as an appendix to this report. Based on the 2009 data, this report finds that farm and business assets represent a small share of the total value of taxable estates that filed tax returns in 2009 (3.25% and 13.86%, respectively). That share is concentrated in estates valued over $10 million. For an overview of the estate tax, see CRS Report RL30600, Estate and Gift Taxes: Economic Issues, by Donald J. Marples and Jane G. Gravelle. This report will be updated as new data become available.",7,102 "Rules and Practices Governing Consideration of Revenue Legislation in the House and Senate. The term revenue is defined as funds collected from the public that arise from the government's exercise of its sovereign or governmental powers. Federal revenues come from a variety of sources, including individual and corporate income taxes, excise taxes, customs duties, estate and gift taxes, fees and fines, payroll taxes for social insurance programs, and miscellaneous receipts (such as earnings of the Federal Reserve System, donations, and bequests). The executive branch often uses the term receipts or governmental receipts in place of the term revenues. The collection of revenue is a fundamental component of the federal budget process that provides the government with the money necessary to fund agencies and programs. Further, the collection of revenue directly affects individual citizens and businesses and, in some cases, can achieve specific policy outcomes. The Constitution grants Congress this considerable power to ""lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises."" Most revenue is collected by the federal government as a result of previously enacted law that continues in effect without any need for congressional action. However, Congress routinely considers revenue legislation that repeals existing provisions, extends expiring provisions, or creates new provisions. Congress may consider such legislation either in a measure dedicated solely to revenues or as a provision in another type of measure. As with all legislation considered by Congress, revenue measures are subject to general House and Senate rules. In addition, revenue measures are subject to further House and Senate rules, as well as constitutional and statutory requirements (e.g., the Origination Clause, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974). The purposes of such revenue-specific rules are generally to centralize and coordinate the development and consideration of revenue legislation, to provide Members of Congress with the information necessary to judge the merits of revenue legislation, and to control the budgetary impact of revenue measures. This report provides an overview and analysis of the most consequential revenue-specific rules that apply during the process of developing and considering revenue legislation. It highlights certain rules and precedents that apply specifically to revenue measures and distinguishes them into four categories: (1) rules that apply to the origination and referral of revenue measures, (2) rules that require supplemental materials or information to be included with revenue measures, (3) rules that apply to the budgetary impact of revenue measures, and (4) rules related to the consideration of revenue measures under the budget reconciliation process, which carries with it additional unique procedures.",55,55 "A Patent/Innovation Box as a Tax Incentive for Domestic Research and Development. A patent box provides a lower tax rate on income from patents, and in some cases, from other intellectual property. A number of countries, including the U.K., France, the Netherlands, and China, have adopted a patent box. Rates generally range from 5% to 15%. Patent boxes are in some cases referred to as innovation boxes because they cover income from non-patented as well as patented intellectual property. Patent boxes can have narrow coverage (providing a lower tax rate on royalties and licenses from patents) or broadly cover income attributable to intellectual property, including that used directly by the firm in production. The purpose of a patent box is to encourage research and development, and, in some cases, to encourage the location of profits from intellectual property in the country. Proposals for a patent box in the United States include a draft proposal by Representatives Boustany and Neal, the Innovation Promotion Act of 2015, proposed legislation in the 112th Congress by Senator Feinstein, and a bill introduced by Representative Schwartz in the 113th Congress (H.R. 2605). The Feinstein proposal provided a 15% tax rate on income from patents developed and used for manufacture in the United States, whereas the Boustany-Neal proposal and H.R. 2605 allowed a 71% deduction of income, which produces an effective 10% rate for corporations. The Boustany-Neal draft proposal would allocate profit between the ordinary tax rate (35% for corporations) and the patent box rate, based on the share of (research and development) R&D spending in total spending. Current tax law contains incentives for investment in research and development. One is the option to expense certain R&D costs (deduct immediately) rather than deduct them over the life of the investment. Expensing is the equivalent of a zero effective tax rate on the return to investment. The tax code also contains a research tax credit. R&D subsidies are justified because the average company is likely to invest less in R&D than the amount warranted by the social returns from the investment. There may be disagreement over whether tax subsidies are the best method. The expected effectiveness of a patent box on R&D depends on its design, and particularly whether it applies to net profit, where the tax rate on the up-front deductible cost is the new, lower patent box rate, or to gross investment, where the deductible cost is still valued at the higher regular statutory rate. The Boustany-Neal draft proposal applies to net profit, which means that lower statutory rate has no effect on the incentive to invest in R&D. The effective rate is still zero under expensing regardless of the statutory tax rate, and the credit is not driven by the tax rate. Moreover, if part of the revenue cost for the lower patent box rate is offset by slower recovery of costs, the effective tax rate rises. Similarly, the R&D credit, which was recently made permanent, is more valuable in reducing effective tax rates than a lower rate applied to net profit. It is possible to design a patent box where the lower rate applies to gross rather than net profit. This approach would produce large subsidies for R&D that could lead to negative pre-tax returns, which might be justified depending on the size of R&D spillover effects. A global economy also raises a number of policy issues. To the extent that a patent box has been adopted to discourage profit shifting to low-tax foreign jurisdictions, the Boustany-Neal patent box proposal may not be very effective. For an additional dollar of profit, the rate is a weighted average of the regular 35% rate and the 10% patent box rate, estimates suggest that the rate would still be relatively high. The effect of a patent box when part of profits are already shifted to a low-rate country is an increase in effective rate domestic R&D, for a patent box that applies the rate to net income rather than gross income.",9,9 "Terrorism Abroad: A Quick Look at Applicable Federal and State Laws. Terrorists' attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania have stimulated demands that the terrorists responsible and those like them be brought to justice. American criminal law already proscribes many of these acts of terrorism and there have been proposals to expand that coverage. Ordinarily, crime is proscribed by the law of the place where it occurs, but more than a few American criminal laws apply to terrorism committed outside the United States. The power to enact such laws flows from the Constitution and is usually limited by little more than due process notice. Practicality and reluctance to offend other nations have traditionally limited American exercise of such authority to instances where there is a discernible nexus to the United States. Yet where there is a clear connection to the United States, American criminal law, primarily federal law generally permits prosecution of terrorism committed overseas. This report and a companion, CRS Report RS21033(pdf), Terrorism At Home: A Quick Look at Applicable Federal and State Criminal Law, are abbreviated from portions of CRS Report 95-1050(pdf) Terrorism At Home and Abroad: Applicable Federal and State Criminal Laws, stripped of its footnotes and appendices.",86,22 "Days Reserved for Special Business in the House. As presented in the following table and described below, several provisions in the rules of the House provide for certain types of business to be privileged for consideration on specified days, some under special procedures. For more information on legislative process, see http://www.crs.gov/products/guides/guidehome.shtml.",55,55 "Broadband Loan and Grant Programs in the USDA's Rural Utilities Service. Given the large potential impact broadband access may have on the economic development of rural America, concern has been raised over a ""digital divide"" between rural and urban or suburban areas with respect to broadband deployment. While there are many examples of rural communities with state-of-the-art telecommunications facilities, recent surveys and studies have indicated that, in general, rural areas tend to lag behind urban and suburban areas in broadband deployment. According to the FCC's 2018 Broadband Deployment Report, 30.7% of Americans in rural areas and 35.4% of Americans in tribal lands lack access to fixed terrestrial 25 Mbps/3 Mbps broadband, as compared to 2.1% of Americans in urban areas. The comparatively lower population density of rural areas is likely a major reason why broadband is less deployed than in more highly populated suburban and urban areas. Particularly for wireline broadband technologies—such as cable modem and fiber—the greater the geographical distances among customers, the larger the cost to serve those customers. The Rural Utilities Service (RUS) at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) houses two ongoing assistance programs exclusively created and dedicated to financing broadband deployment: the Rural Broadband Access Loan and Loan Guarantee Program and the Community Connect Grant Program. Additionally, the Telecommunications Infrastructure Loan and Loan Guarantee Program (previously the Telephone Loan Program) funds broadband deployment in rural areas. Distance Learning and Telemedicine (DLT) grants—while not principally supporting connectivity—fund equipment and software that operate via telecommunications to rural end-users of telemedicine and distance learning applications. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) provided $5 million to subsidize a broadband loan level of $29.851 million, $30 million to Community Connect broadband grants, $49 million for DLT grants, and $0.863 million in loan subsidies for a total loan level of $690 million for the Telecommunications Infrastructure Loan and Loan Guarantee Program. P.L. 115-141 also appropriated $600 million to RUS to ""conduct a new broadband loan and grant pilot program."" With the 2014 farm bill expiring on September 30, 2018, the 115th Congress is considering reauthorization of the RUS broadband loan program and other broadband-related provisions in the 2018 farm bill. H.R. 2, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018, which was passed by the House on June 21, 2018, seeks to address rural broadband programs at USDA through Title VI, Subtitle B, ""Connecting Rural Americans to High Speed Broadband."" On June 28, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 2, the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, which would reauthorize and modify the broadband loan program, and codify the existing Community Connect Grant Program.",109,109 "Renewable Energy—A Pathway to Green Jobs?. In the United States, growing awareness of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the possible implications for global climate change have combined with recent high energy prices and economic uncertainty to rekindle interest in renewable energy. Renewable energy technologies generate electricity from resources such as the sun, wind, or biomass, with essentially no net GHG emissions. President Obama has declared a goal for the United States to become the world's leading exporter of renewable energy technologies, setting out policy objectives for the development of related ""green jobs"". Green jobs have often been defined to include (at a minimum) jobs that result directly from renewables for generating electricity and powering vehicles as well as jobs that result directly from achieving greater energy efficiency. Studies of green job creation in the renewable energy industry vary greatly as a result of differences in definitions, assumptions, and methodologies, with the resulting analyses producing wide-ranging estimates of the number of green jobs. Complicating the estimation of the number of green jobs is the absence of an authoritative data source. The North American Industry Classification System disaggregates firms into the categories of hydro, fossil fuel, nuclear and ""other"" sources. Renewables are part of the ""other"" category. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has requested funding for FY2010 to develop data on the number of green jobs and their characteristics (e.g., wages, training requirements) by industry and occupation. Most of the future growth in green jobs is generally envisioned as coming from the growth in deployment of renewable energy technologies. Renewable energy deployment programs from state governments have had a great influence on the existing deployment levels of renewable energy technologies and resultant jobs. Historically, the federal investment in renewable energy technologies in the United States has not been about creating jobs, but was focused on developing the technologies to a point where they are ready for commercialization. The timeframe under consideration is thus important in any discussion of the potential for renewable energy technologies to create jobs, for the technologies are at different stages in their development cycles. It is also important to recognize that as a specific renewable energy technology becomes more efficient, the number of jobs per Megawatt of output is likely to decrease. A key to maximizing green jobs growth in the United States from renewable energy is the domestic design and manufacture of equipment and components. Given the growing international competition for renewable energy markets and green jobs, policy mechanisms and incentives may be necessary to encourage manufacturers to locate production in the United States. Companies must be capable of competing in the domestic market for renewable energy first and foremost, as the potential growth of U.S. renewable markets already has attracted significant international participation. A renewable energy industry capable of serving the export market may create many more jobs than an industry which only serves domestic needs. Few doubt the potential of renewable energy to help address climate change concerns, the question is whether the desired benefits merit the investment. But developing the next generation of renewable energy technologies and building an internationally competitive industry may require a significant and sustained national investment. Without it, the majority of the solar panels, wind turbines, and components providing the clean energy of tomorrow may continue to be designed and built by workers overseas.",37,37 "Turkey: Government Update. Capping three years of political instability, a fourth government since the December 1995 election has been formed in Turkey to lead the country to new elections on April 18, 1999. The maneuvering of politicians and the interference of the powerful Turkish military in politics have produced the governmental turnovers. The military continues to be wary of a possible strong showing by Islamists in the coming vote. New Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, an ardent secularist and nationalist reportedly has little hope of accomplishing much during his very brief tenure. Pending foreign policy issues of concern to Turkey that also concern the United States include Iraq, Cyprus, Greece and Europe. For additional background and related information, see CRS Reports 97-840F Turkey Situation Update, September 12, 1997, 97-462F, Turkey's Unfolding Political Crisis, April 11, 1997 97-799F, Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues Background and Recent Developments and CRS Issue Brief 89140, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations, all by Carol Migdalovitz. This report will not be updated.",85,85 General Overview of U.S. Copyright Law. This report provides a general overview of copyright law and briefly summarizes the major provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act.,9,9 "The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Possible Effects on Gasoline Prices of Selected Fill Policies. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), authorized by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (P.L. 94-163), was originally intended to provide a domestic stock of crude oil to be used in emergency situations when the supply of crude oil to the United States is disrupted. In November 2001 President Bush ordered that the SPR be filled to its current capacity with royalty-in-kind (RIK) oil the government's share of oil produced from federal leases. In the face of high prices for crude oil and gasoline, the policy has been challenged as a contributing cause of higher prices. Some policymakers have been urging suspension of RIK deliveries to the reserve, arguing that it would help to lower the cost of gasoline. RIK deliveries are currently scheduled through April 2005 notwithstanding loans of some crude to refiners adversely affected by Hurricane Ivan in September 2004. This report examines the factors that are currently influencing crude oil and gasoline prices, and reviews the extent to which prices might be correlated with SPR fill policy. If RIK oil were released to the market, gasoline prices might be affected. Since crude oil is a raw material in the production of gasoline, a reduction in the price of oil might pass through to the price of gasoline. To the extent that the capacity to refine additional barrels of crude directed to the market exists, and the diverted RIK oil is not offset by reduced crude oil imports, consumers might benefit. However, the amount of RIK oil, relative to the total market when it is operating normally, is small, and when coupled with other market dynamics, the effect of changes in SPR fill policy on crude and product prices could be only minimal. In instances where there is an actual interruption in deliveries -- as experienced by some refineries in the Gulf Coast in the wake of Hurricane Ivan -- the effect of SPR use may be different. Conditions in the gasoline market, including strong demand, high refinery capacity utilization rates, fragmented regional gasoline specifications, and scarce, high-cost imports, as well as the need to build inventories, point to the continuation of high gasoline prices even if oil prices decline somewhat. Although the price of oil influences, and is a component of, the price of gasoline, a complex interaction of many factors determines price. A drawdown of the SPR -- in addition to a deferral of RIK fill -- is a further policy option, but is not analyzed in depth here. Benefits might vary, depending upon the ability of refineries to absorb additional crude, and the amount of additional crude made available. However, if one considers that refining capacity is already strained and unlikely to benefit from extra crude supply, any softening in oil prices from a drawdown would be unlikely to be passed along in full to consumers. This report will be updated as events warrant.",40,40 "Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA): Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications for Sentence Enhancements. With recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the role of judges and juries in making factual determinations upon which sentences are made, there has been increased congressional interest in federal sentencing. One aspect of federal sentencing includes recidivism statutes that provide longer sentences for repeat offenders. One such statute, the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), requires imposition of a 15-year prison sentence for an individual with prior serious drug or violent felony convictions. Under the ACCA, non-jury juvenile adjudications qualify as prior convictions. The use of these non-jury juvenile adjudications raises several constitutional due process questions and continues to spark debate among courts at the federal and state levels. Opinions vary, in part, because of conflicting interpretations of the U.S. Supreme Court's jury trial jurisprudence stressing the constitutional requirement of juries, rather than judges, making factual determinations upon which sentences are based. This report summarizes the competing views on the constitutionality of the use of non-jury juvenile adjudications in subsequent criminal proceedings.",94,94 "Campaign Finance: Brief Overview of District Court Opinion in McConnell v. FEC. On March 27, 2002, the President signed into law the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), P.L. 107-155 (H.R. 2356, 107th Cong.), which was also known as the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform legislation prior to enactment. Most provisions of the new law became effective on November 6, 2002. Shortly after President Bush signed BCRA into law, Senator Mitch McConnell filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Ultimately, eleven suits challenging the campaign finance reform law were brought by more than 80 plaintiffs and were consolidated into one lead case, McConnell v. FEC. In summary, the McConnell complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief argued that portions of BCRA violate the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. On May 2, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued its decision in McConnell v. FEC, striking down many key provisions of the law. (See the text of the per curiam opinion at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/02cv582a.pdf.) This report provides a brief overview of the court’s decision and will be updated. The three-judge panel which was split 2 to 1 on many issues, ordered that its ruling take effect immediately. Since the court has issued its opinion, several appeals have been filed. Under the BCRA expedited review provision the court’s decision will be reviewed directly by the U.S. Supreme Court. On May 19 the U.S. district court issued a stay to its ruling, which leaves BCRA, as enacted, in effect until the Supreme Court issues a decision. For more information see, Campaign Finance Reform Oversight http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isele2.html, and CRS Report RL30669, Campaign Finance Regulation Under the First Amendment.",61,61 "Iraq: Compensation and Assets Issues. A U.N. process to compensate the victims of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait is proceeding aided by revenues generated by the U.N. ""oil-for-food"" program in Iraq. However, the amount of money available relative to outstanding claims suggests that the compensation process will not be completed in the foreseeable future. On a related issue, progress to decide the disposition of frozen Iraq assets held by U.S. banks has been hampered by differences over which claimants should have priority. (1) A bill that gives priority to members or veterans of the U.S. armed forces was incorporated into the House version of the FY2000 State Department authorization bill (H.R. 2415) passed by the House July 21, 1999. This report will be updated to reflect legislative developments on this issue. For further information on Iraq, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq Compliance with Ceasefire Agreements. 1. This report mentions some specific compensation claims within and separate from the U.N. compensation process, for illustrative purposes only. CRS has no way to independently assess the validity or value of any specific compensation claim.",83,24 "Synthetic Drugs: Overview and Issues for Congress. Synthetic drugs, as opposed to natural drugs, are chemically produced in a laboratory. Their chemical structure can be either identical to or different from naturally occurring drugs, and their effects are designed to mimic or even enhance those of natural drugs. When produced clandestinely, they are not typically controlled pharmaceutical substances intended for legitimate medical use. Designer drugs are a form of synthetic drugs. They contain slightly modified molecular structures of illegal or controlled substances, and they are modified in order to circumvent existing drug laws. While the issue of synthetic drugs and their abuse is not new, Congress has demonstrated a renewed concern with the issue. From 2009 to 2011, synthetic drug abuse was reported to have dramatically increased. During this time period, calls to poison control centers for incidents relating to harmful effects of synthetic cannabinoids (such as ""K2"" and ""Spice"") and stimulants (such as ""bath salts"") increased at what some considered to be an alarming rate. The number of hospital emergency department visits involving synthetic cannabinoids more than doubled from 2010 to 2011. In 2012 and 2013, however, the number of calls to poison control centers for incidents relating to harmful effects of synthetic cannabinoids and synthetic stimulants decreased. Calls regarding bath salts have declined each year since 2011, while calls regarding synthetic cannabinoids have increased since the drops in 2012 and 2013. The Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey results from 2015 indicate that annual prevalence rates for use of synthetic cannabinoids are down over the last two years while bath salt use remained low. Government and media reports indicate that fentanyl, a synthetic opioid 50-100 times stronger than morphine, is rising in popularity as well as various synthetic cannabinoids. The reported harmful effects of synthetic substances range from nausea to drug-induced psychosis. Due to the unpredictable nature of synthetic drugs and of human consumption of these drugs, the true effects of many of these drugs are unknown. Many states have responded to synthetic drug abuse by passing laws banning certain synthetic cannabinoids and stimulants. In 2011, the Attorney General—through the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—used his temporary scheduling authority to place five synthetic cannabinoids and three synthetic stimulants on Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Concern over the reported increase in use of certain synthetic cannabinoids and stimulants resulted in legislative action to schedule specific substances. The Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012—Subtitle D of Title XI of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (P.L. 112-144)—added five structural classes of substances in synthetic cannabinoids (and their analogues) as well as 11 synthetic stimulants and hallucinogens to Schedule I of the CSA. In addition, the act extended the DEA's authority to temporarily schedule substances. In April 2013, then-Attorney General Holder—through the DEA and in consultation with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—took administrative action to permanently place methylone on Schedule I of the CSA. A number of administrative scheduling actions have since taken place. In considering permanent placement of synthetic substances on Schedule I of the CSA, there are several issues on which Congress may deliberate. Policymakers may consider the implications on the federal criminal justice system of scheduling certain synthetic substances. Another issue is whether Congress should schedule certain synthetic substances or whether these substances merit Attorney General (in consultation with the Secretary of HHS) scheduling based on qualifications specified in the CSA. Congress may also consider whether placing additional synthetic drugs on Schedule I may hinder future medical research. In addition, policymakers may consider whether it is more efficient to place these drugs on Schedule I of the CSA or to treat them as analogue controlled substances under the Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement Act. In considering enforcement challenges identified by the DEA, Congress may consider whether to amend the CSA to better facilitate enforcement action against the illicit synthetic drug market.",96,67 "Updated Standards for SNAP-Authorized Retailers. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the largest of the U.S Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) domestic food assistance programs, provides benefits to eligible participants, these benefits are redeemable for SNAP-eligible foods at SNAP-authorized retailers. SNAP-authorized retailers are stores and other food sellers that are allowed to accept SNAP benefits. In FY2015, the vast majority of benefits were redeemed at ""super stores"" and supermarkets. On December 15, 2016, USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) published in the Federal Register a final rule, ""Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)."" The final rule implements provisions of the Agriculture Act of 2014 (""2014 farm bill,"" P.L. 113-79) that increase inventory requirements for SNAP-authorized retailers. In addition, the rule addresses other USDA-FNS policy objectives. Like the proposed rule, the final rule makes changes to 7 C.F.R. Part 271 and Part 278 in five areas of retailer authorization policy: (1) sales of hot, prepared foods, (2) definition of staple foods, (3) inventory and depth of stock, (4) access-related exceptions to the rules, and (5) disclosures of retailer information. The effective date for the final rule is January 17, 2017, but most aspects of the rule take effect on subsequent dates. The final rule responds to many of the comments and concerns raised about the proposed rule. The proposed rule had been controversial, particularly due to the provisions not explicitly required by the farm bill and due to the potential impact of changed inventory requirements on smaller retailers. This report focuses on the final rule as published December 15, 2016. However, a number of the changes in the rule will not go into effect due to provisions in the FY2017 appropriations law (P.L. 115-31, enacted May 5, 2017), which directed USDA to change substantially its implementation of the final rule, particularly retailer inventory requirements. This report currently reflects USDA-FNS plans to implement the final rule as of August 4, 2017. However, the report may not reflect policy developments that have occurred since then. For the most current information on the implementation of retailer standards, see USDA-FNS's website, ""Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),"" https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/enhancing-retailer-standards-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap.",114,114 "Registered Apprenticeship: Federal Role and Recent Federal Efforts. Apprenticeship is a workforce development strategy that trains a worker for a specific occupation using a structured combination of paid on-the-job training and related instruction. Increased costs for higher education and possible mismatches between worker skills and employer needs have led to interest in alternative workforce development strategies such as apprenticeship. The primary federal role in supporting apprenticeships is the administration of the registered apprenticeship system. In this system, the federal Department of Labor (DOL) or a DOL-recognized state apprenticeship agency (SAA) is responsible for evaluating apprenticeship programs to determine if they are in compliance with federal regulations related to program design, worker protections, and other criteria. Programs that are in compliance are ""registered."" While registration does not trigger any specific federal financial incentives, registered programs may receive preferential consideration in various federal systems and apprentices who complete a registered program receive a nationally recognized credential. In the federal context, ""apprenticeship"" has typically been synonymous with registered apprenticeship programs. Programs that may have a strategy or format similar to apprenticeship but are not registered are not typically considered apprenticeships by the federal government, though they may be considered on-the-job training under other federal workforce programs. To register an apprenticeship, a sponsor (an employer, union, industry group, or other eligible entity) submits an application to the applicable registration agency (either DOL or the appropriate SAA). The application must include a work process schedule that describes the competencies that the apprentice will learn and how on-the-job training and related instruction will teach those competencies. The application must also include a schedule of wage increases for the apprentice, a description of safety measures, and various assurances related to program administration and recordkeeping. If the registration agency finds that the program is in conformity with the requirements, the program receives provisional registration. Once a program receives permanent registration, the registration agency is responsible for reviewing the program for conformity not less than once every five years. In recent years, the federal government has supplemented its typical registration activities with competitive grants to support the expansion of registered apprenticeship. These grants have gone predominantly to states and other intermediaries to support apprenticeship expansion through partnerships with apprenticeship sponsors. While registered apprenticeship sponsors do not necessarily qualify for federal funding, several education and workforce programs have identified apprenticeship as an eligible use of funds. For example, some veterans may qualify to receive GI Bill benefits while participating in a registered apprenticeship and registered apprenticeships are eligible for federal workforce development funds through the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA).",89,89 "The Civil Defense Acquisition Workforce: Enhancing Recruitment Through Hiring Flexibilities. Policymakers and defense acquisition experts have asserted that improved recruitment for the defense acquisition workforce is a necessary component for comprehensive acquisition reform. To help rebuild the workforce and enhance recruitment, DOD has used several hiring flexibilities authorized by Congress, the President, and OPM in recent years. Hiring flexibilities are a suite of tools that are intended to simplify, and sometimes accelerate, the hiring process. The impact of hiring flexibilities on recruitment and workforce quality, however, remains unclear. Congress may consider three high-level questions regarding hiring flexibilities for the workforce Are flexibilities effectively improving the workforce? Are the current number and type of flexibilities appropriate? What factors may impact effective use of flexibilities to improve the workforce? Congress could consider several oversight options to help gauge and improve the effectiveness of flexibilities in improving the civilian defense acquisition workforce. Such options might help Congress determine whether flexibilities should be expanded or newly created, consolidated or removed, or otherwise restructured. Congress could direct DOD to provide data on the use of all available flexibilities to fill the full range of civilian defense acquisition positions, including any barriers to producing such data establish proxy measures for effectiveness related to employee quality (such as employee timeliness in earning required certifications and retention and career progression rates) and recruitment (such as time to hire from the perspective of the candidate and job acceptance rates) conduct a study that evaluates the effectiveness of flexibilities, and improve the quality, clarity, and use of implementing guidance for flexibilities. At least 38 hiring flexibilities are currently available for the civilian defense acquisition workforce. According to DOD, the following six flexibilities were used most frequently to fill external civilian acquisition positions between FY2008 and FY2014 Direct-hire authority (DHA) Expedited hiring authority (EHA) for certain civilian acquisition positions Pathways Recent Graduates program Pathways Internship program Federal Career Intern Program Delegated examining authority The six flexibilities accounted for roughly 66% of total external civilian acquisition hires between FY2008 and FY2014 (i.e., hires from outside the government). Some of the flexibilities were available throughout the six-year period, while others were discontinued or established during that period. Potential factors affecting the use of flexibilities include their structure, clarity of implementing guidance, establishment of new flexibilities, staff knowledge of appropriate use, budgetary constraints, and efforts to balance hiring speed with equity.",30,31 "U.S.-Vietnam Economic and Trade Relations: Issues for the 111th Congress. After more than two decades of virtually no economic contact, the United States and Vietnam reestablished trade relations during the 1990s. Since then, Vietnam has rapidly risen to become a significant trading partner for the United States. Bilateral trade has risen from about $220 million in 1994 to $15.4 billion in 2009. Vietnam is the second-largest source of U.S. clothing imports, and a major source for footwear, furniture, and electrical machinery. Much of this rapid growth in bilateral trade can be attributed to U.S. extension of normal trade relations (NTR) status to Vietnam. Another major contributing factor is over 20 years of rapid economic growth in Vietnam, ushered in by a 1986 shift to a more market-oriented economic system. Bilateral trade may increase if both nations become members of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). The United States and Vietnam are among the eight countries negotiating the terms of expansion of the trade association. The Obama Administration envisions an expanded TPP as a ""21st Century free trade agreement"" that will become the cornerstone for a trans-Pacific regional trade association. Vietnam is also a party to negotiations to form a larger pan-Asian regional trade association based on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that could exclude the United States and could prove to be an alternative to the TPP and the U.S. vision for regional economic integration in Asia. The growth in bilateral trade has not been without its accompanying issues and problems. Vietnam has applied for acceptance into the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program and is participating in negotiations of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States. Both the Bush and the Obama Administrations have shown some hesitance in accepting Vietnam as a GSP beneficiary country and in concluding a BIT with Vietnam. Vietnam would like to have the United States officially recognize it as a market economy. There have also been problems with U.S. imports of specific products from Vietnam. In 2003, the United States began collecting antidumping duties on certain fish imports from Vietnam. From 2007 to 2009, the United States implemented a controversial monitoring program for selected clothing imports from Vietnam. In 2008, the 110th Congress passed legislation that transferred the regulation of catfish from the Food and Drug Administration to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Vietnamese government strongly protested these actions as largely protectionist measures. An examination of recent trends in bilateral trade reveals that other product categories—such as footwear, furniture, and electrical machinery—could generate future tension between the United States and Vietnam. Observers of Vietnam's economic development have also been critical of Vietnam's protection of workers' rights, its enforcement of intellectual property rights laws and regulations, and the country's exchange rate policies. The 111th Congress may play an important role in one or more of these issues, as have past Congresses. The GSP program is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2010, and if Congress should take up GSP renewal, it may also consider Vietnam's pending application. The 111th Congress may also weigh in on clothing and fish imports from Vietnam, or its designation as a market or non-market economy. Finally, if current growth trends continue, Congress may be asked to act on the rising amount of footwear, furniture, and/or electrical machinery being imported from Vietnam. This report will be updated as circumstances require.",53,53 "Votes on Measures to Adjust the Statutory Debt Limit, 1978 to Present. Almost all borrowing by the federal government is conducted by the Treasury Department, within the restrictions established by a single, statutory limit (ceiling) on the total amount of debt that may be outstanding at any time. By law, the Treasury cannot exceed federal debt limits, so the Treasury periodically has had to ask Congress to enact new debt limits so it can fulfill its financial commitments. Since 1978, 58 measures adjusting or suspending the statutory debt limit either as stand-alone legislation or as part of legislation dealing with other matters have been enacted into law. This report provides roll call vote data identified by the Congressional Research Service for measures to adjust the statutory debt limit. This report will be updated as events warrant.",101,101 "The Advanced Technology Program. The Advanced Technology Program (ATP) was created by P.L. 100-418, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, to encourage public-private cooperation in the development of pre-competitive technologies with broad application across industries. This activity has been targeted for elimination as a means to cut federal spending. Since FY2000, the original House-passed appropriation bills have not included funding for ATP. Many of the Administration's budget requests have proposed termination of the program. However, ATP continues to be supported, although at levels below that achieved in FY1995 when the activity was expanded significantly. This report discusses funding (or lack thereof) appropriated for the ATP for FY2006.",48,111 "The Market Structure of the Health Insurance Industry. In March 2010, Congress passed a pair of measures designed to reform the U.S. health care system and address the twin challenges of constraining rapid growth of health care costs and expanding access to high-quality health care. On March 21, the House passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590), which the Senate had approved on Christmas Eve, as well as the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (H.R. 4872). President Obama signed the first measure (P.L. 111-148) on March 23 and the second on March 30 (P.L. 111-152). On November 2, 2009, the House Judiciary Committee reported out the Health Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act (H.R. 3596), which would limit antitrust exemptions provided by the McCarran-Ferguson Act (P.L. 79-15). The House passed the Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act (H.R. 4626) on February 24, 2010. This report discusses how the current health insurance market structure affects the two policy goals of expanding health insurance coverage and containing health care costs. Concerns about concentration in health insurance markets are linked to wider concerns about the cost, quality, and availability of health care. The market structure of the health insurance and hospital industries may have contributed to rising health care costs and deteriorating access to affordable health insurance and health care. Many features of the health insurance market and the ways it links to other parts of the health care system can hinder competition, lead to concentrated markets, and produce inefficient outcomes. Health insurers are intermediaries in the transaction of the provision of health care between patients and providers: reimbursing providers on behalf of patients, exercising some control over the number and types of services covered, and negotiating contracts with providers on the payments for health services. Consequently, policies affecting health insurers will likely affect the other parts of the health care sector. The market structure of the U.S. health insurance industry not only reflects the nature of health care, but also its origins in the 1930s and its evolution in succeeding decades. Before World War II, many commercial insurers doubted that hospital or medical costs were an insurable risk. But after the rapid spread of Blue Cross plans in the mid-1930s, several commercial insurers began to offer health coverage. By the 1950s, commercial health insurers had become potent competitors and began to cut into Blue Cross's market share in many regions, changing the competitive environment of the health insurance market. Evidence suggests that health insurance markets are highly concentrated in many local areas. Many large firms that offer health insurance benefits to their employees have self-insured, which may put some competitive pressure on insurers, although this is unlikely to improve market conditions for other consumers. The exercise of market power by firms in concentrated markets generally leads to higher prices and reduced output—high premiums and limited access to health insurance—combined with high profits. Many other characteristics of the health insurance markets, however, also contribute to rising costs and limited access to affordable health insurance. Rising health care costs, in particular, play a key role in rising health insurance costs. Complex interactions among health insurance, health care providers, employers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, tax policy, and the medical technology industry have helped increase health costs over time. Reducing the growth trajectory of health care costs may require policies that affect these interactions. Policies focused only on health insurance sector reform may yield some results, but are unlikely to solve larger cost growth and limited access problems. This report will be updated as events warrant.",70,70 "Hedge Funds: Should They Be Regulated?. In an echo of the Robber Baron Era, the late 20th century saw the rise of a new elite class, who made their fortunes not in steel, oil, or railroads, but in financial speculation. These gilded few are the managers of a group of private, unregulated investment partnerships, called hedge funds. Deploying their own capital and that of well-to-do investors, successful hedge fund managers frequently (but not consistently) outperform public mutual funds. Hedge funds use many different investment strategies, but the largest and best-known funds engage in high-risk speculation in markets around the world. Wherever there is financial volatility, the hedge funds will probably be there. Hedge funds can also lose money very quickly. In 1998, one fund—Long-Term Capital Management—saw its capital shrink from about $4 billion to a few hundred million in a matter of weeks. To prevent default, the Federal Reserve engineered a rescue by 13 large commercial and investment banks. Intervention was thought necessary because the fund's failure might have caused widespread disruption in financial markets—the feared scenario then closely resembled what actually occurred in 2008 (except that large, regulated financial institutions took the place of hedge funds). Despite the risks, investors poured money into hedge funds in recent years, until stock market losses in 2008 prompted a wave of redemption requests. In view of the growing impact of hedge funds on a variety of financial markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in October 2004 adopted a regulation that required hedge funds to register as investment advisers, disclose basic information about their operations, and open their books for inspection. The regulation took effect in February 2006, but on June 23, 2006, a court challenge was upheld and the rule was vacated. In December 2006, the SEC proposed raising the ""accredited investor"" standard—to be permitted to invest in hedge funds, an investor would need $2.5 million in assets, instead of $1 million. In the face of opposition from individuals who did not want to be protected from high-risk, unregulated investment opportunities, the SEC did not adopt a final rule. Hedge funds are not seen as a principal cause of the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. They are, however, widely viewed as part of the ""shadow"" financial system that includes over-the-counter derivatives, non-bank lending, and other lightly regulated or non-regulated financial sectors. As part of sweeping regulatory reform legislation before the House and Senate in the 111th Congress, certain hedge funds would be required to register with the SEC and to provide information about their positions and trading strategies to be shared with the systemic risk authorities. Under H.R. 4173, passed by the House on December 11, 2009, managers of funds with more than $150 million under management would be required to register as investment advisers with the SEC. They would be required to report (on a confidential basis) certain portfolio information of interest to the Federal Reserve or other systemic risk authorities. The bill provides exemptions for advisers to venture capital funds and small business investment corporations. The Restoring American Financial Stability Act, as ordered reported by the Senate Banking Committee on March 22, 2010, includes similar provisions regarding registration and reporting of systemic risk data. The Senate version exempts venture capital funds and private equity funds. It sets the SEC registration threshold for all investment advisers at $100 million in assets under management. Advisers below that figure would be regulated by the states.",12,12 "Morocco: Royal Succession and Other Developments. King Hassan II of Morocco succumbed to a heart attack on July 24, 1999, and was succeeded by his 36-year old elder son, who became King Mohammed VI. The new King's progressive agenda highlights efforts to fight poverty, advance economic development, support the opposition-led government, and redress human rights abuses. In foreign policy, his priorities include improving relations with Europe and Algeria, and he has reached out to the Moroccan Jews of Israel. The long-standing U.S. friendship with Morocco continues. For background, see CRS Report 98-663(pdf) Morocco: Political and Economic Changes and U.S. Policy. This report will be updated if developments warrant.",85,85 "Reconciling McCarran-Ferguson (Insurance) Case Law and ERISA Preemption: Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller. In Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, (1) the Supreme Court ruled that Kentucky's ""any willing provider"" statutes, which mandate that health plans and health insurers may not exclude from their networks any health-care providers that agree to the plans' participation terms, are not preempted by ERISA, as statutes that regulate and are specifically directed toward the insurance industry they are exempted from such preemption by the ""savings"" clause in ERISA, which precludes preemption for state laws that ""regulate... insurance, banking, or securities."" Rejecting plaintiffs' arguments -- grounded in case law interpreting the McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust exemption for the ""business of insurance"" -- that the Kentucky laws, because they also reach health-care providers, are not 'specifically directed toward' insurers, and do not regulate insurance practices, the Court reconsidered and rejected prior judicial reliance upon McCarran-Ferguson case law as a guide to interpreting ERISA's applicability to and preemption of state laws purporting to deal with insurance. The Court emphasizes the distinction between the conduct of private parties that is the focus of McCarran-Ferguson interpretation and the state laws that are the subject of the current litigation to conclude that ""our use of the McCarran-Ferguson case law in the ERISA context has misdirected attention, failed to provide clear guidance to the lower federal courts, and... added little to the relevant analysis."" (2) 1. 538 U.S. 329 (2003) 2. Id. at 339-340.",70,70 "Is Global Growth Slowing?. This report discusses concerns about a slowdown in the global economy, particularly in China and other emerging markets. Some projections indicate that global economic growth in 2016 could be slightly weaker for emerging markets, primarily Latin America, and developed economies, except the United States and the United Kingdom.",82,99 Update on Controlling Greenhouse Gases from International Aviation. EU ETS international aviation greenhouse gases GHG carbon dioxide CO2 S. 1956 emissions trading International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO UNFCCC European Union climate change global warming international flights Airlines for America A4A China cap-and-trade market-based incentives market-based mechanisms emissions control,42,42 "Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress. This report discusses the Japan - U.S. relations. The alliance, with its access to bases in Japan, where about 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed, facilitates the forward deployment of U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific, thereby undergirding U.S. national security strategy.",85,21 "The Army's Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress. The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the Army's proposed replacement for the Vietnam-era M-113 personnel carriers, which are still in service in a variety of support capacities in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). While M-113s no longer serve as infantry fighting vehicles, five variants of the M-113 are used as command and control vehicles, general purpose vehicles, mortar carriers, and medical treatment and evacuation vehicles. The AMPV is intended to be a nondevelopmental program (candidate vehicles will be either existing vehicles or modified existing vehicles—not vehicles that are specially designed and not currently in service). Some suggest a nondevelopmental vehicle might make it easier for the Army to eventually field this system to the force, as most of the Army's past developmental programs, such as the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), the Future Combat System (FCS), the Crusader self-propelled artillery system, and the Comanche helicopter, were cancelled before they could be fully developed and fielded. On November 26, 2013, the Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the AMPV. This RFP stipulated the Army planned to award a five-year Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract in May 2014 worth $458 million to a single contractor for 29 prototypes. While the March 2013 RFP established an Average Unit Manufacturing Cost Ceiling for each AMPV at $1.8 million, this was rescinded to permit vendors greater flexibility. The EMD phase was scheduled to run between FY2015 and FY2019, followed by three years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) starting in 2020. As of 2018, the Army plans to procure 2,936 AMPVs to replace M-113s in ABCTs. The Army also has plans to replace 1,922 M-113s at Echelons Above Brigade (EAB), and the Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that if the M-113s are replaced by AMPVs at EAB, total program costs could be increased by an additional $6.5 billion. While the Army would like a pure fleet of AMPVs, budgetary constraints could preclude this. On December 23, 2014, the Army announced it had selected BAE Systems Land and Armaments L.P. as the winner of the EMD contract. The initial award was for 52 months, valued at about $382 million. In addition, the award provides for an optional low-rate initial production (LRIP) phase. If this phase is awarded, BAE would produce an additional 289 vehicles for a total contract value of $1.2 billion. This EMD contract does not include EAB AMPV variants. The AMPV reportedly successfully completed its Critical Design Review (CDR) on June 23, 2016. On December 15, 2016, BAE delivered the first general purpose AMPV to the Army for testing. In September 2017, the Army began AMPV reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) testing. Also in 2017, based on budgetary constraints, the Army decided that it would upgrade a number of EAB M-113s instead of replacing them with AMPVs. In May 2018, the Army decided to put the EAB M-113 upgrade effort on hold. Other program issues include DOD Inspector General (IG) concerns regarding performance and design concerns, as well as inaccurate procurement quantities, which could result in inaccurate program costs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2018 expressed concerns regarding cost growth, difficulties meeting a variety of developmental requirements, and dependencies on other programs that are experiencing developmental challenges. Potential issues for Congress include a ""way ahead"" for upgraded M-113s at EAB and DOD Inspector General (IG) and GAO concerns.",32,32 "Multilateral Development Banks: General Capital Increases. For the first time in the history of the institutions, each of the major Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are simultaneously seeking increases in their capital bases to fund the continued expansion of their development lending programs. The requests come after several years of increased lending by the banks. If the increases are fully funded, the resources of the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Asian Development Bank (AsDB), and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) would increase by between 31% and 200%. Collectively, the requested capital increases are worth around $348 billion. U.S. authorization to participate in the GCIs was provided in the FY2011 and FY2012 budget measures. Key issues regarding U.S. participation in the GCIs include Comparative effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral aid. Compared to other advanced economies, the United States provides a smaller proportion of development assistance through multilateral organizations, such as the MDBs, than other countries. Is multilateral assistance more effective, and if so, should greater amounts of U.S. foreign aid be channeled through the MDBs by supporting the capital increases? Scope of MDB activity. The MDBs have expanded the range of activities that they engage in to include issues such as climate change and food security. Members may wish to evaluate whether the benefits of MDB engagement on these issues outweigh potential costs. Some argue that a consequence of working through the MDBs is duplication of efforts across a range of multilateral institutions, which can be costly and inefficient. Others argue that this approach leverages resources and provides common approaches. Role of emerging economic powers. Many rapidly growing economies, including Brazil, China, and India, among others, borrow from the MDBs despite having access to international capital markets and substantial holdings of foreign exchange reserves. Supporting capital increases at the MDBs would allow higher rates of lending to these quickly growing economies. Members may assess whether the development-impact of increased MDB lending to credit-worthy countries outweighs any potential crowding-out effect. At the same time, these countries are increasing their shares and leadership roles in the institutions, with important implications for the United States. U.S. bidding for MDB-funded projects. Firms located in large emerging economies are winning a larger share of MDB procurement projects. Are U.S. firms competing effectively for MDB projects? If not, since the general capital increases (GCIs) would increase the amount of MDB projects, are policy options available to better position U.S. firms to capture a larger share of MDB projects, creating additional jobs for U.S. workers? Anti-corruption policies. The MDBs have different approaches to anti-corruption measures. In procurement, for example, these range from international best practices to country-based approaches, which, some analysts argue, may increase the risk of monies being diverted for corrupt purposes. Congressional legislation on capital increases may be seen as a potential opportunity for seeking further reform.",82,82 "Transportation Spending and ""Buy America"" Requirements. The Buy America Act is the popular name for a group of domestic content restrictions that have been attached to funds administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT). These funds are used to make grants to states, localities, and other non-federal government entities for various transportation projects. Specific sources of funding administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) are covered under various Buy America provisions. Generally, these statutes require applicable agency grant programs and spending to be used to fund projects that only include steel, iron, and/or manufactured products produced in the United States. Each provision includes a series of circumstances under which the agency may issue a nationwide or project-specific waiver to these domestic content requirements. Such exemptions may be based upon a finding that application of the domestic content requirement is not in the public interest, the needed materials are not produced in sufficient quantity and/or quality in the United States, or the cost of using domestic materials is unreasonable, among others. The Buy American Act, another statute requiring domestic content preferences in federal government procurement, does not apply to DOT-administered grant funds because, while the source of the money is federal, purchases are not made directly by the federal government. For more information on the Buy American Act and other domestic preference requirements, see CRS Report R43354, Domestic Content Restrictions: The Buy American Act and Complementary Provisions of Federal Law, by Kate M. Manuel et al.",48,120 "Military Base Closures: Cleanup of Contaminated Properties for Civilian Reuse. In 2005, the 109th Congress approved a new Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. As the Department of Defense (DOD) implements the new round, issues for Congress include the pace and costs of closing and realigning the selected installations and the impacts on surrounding communities. The disposal of surplus property has stimulated interest among affected communities in how the land can be redeveloped to replace jobs lost as a result of the planned closures. Environmental contamination can limit the potential for economic redevelopment if the availability of funding or technological capabilities constrains the degree of cleanup needed to make the land suitable for its intended use. Although most of the properties on installations closed under the four earlier rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 have been cleaned up and made available for redevelopment, the most extensively contaminated properties remain in various stages of cleanup to make them suitable for their desired use. Cleanup began many years ago at 2005 round installations when they were still operational. As a result, cleanup generally should be at a more advanced stage upon closure, compared to installations closed under earlier rounds when cleanup efforts were less mature. Still, installations closed under the 2005 round could face delays in redevelopment if a community's desired land use would require a lengthy and costly cleanup.",23,23 "FY2015 Funding to Counter Ebola and the Islamic State (IS). In 2014, two major global threats—the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East—caused serious concern within the Obama Administration and among Members of Congress. In November 2014, the President requested a total of $11.7 billion for responding to the Ebola crisis and combatting the Islamic State. On November 5, 2014, the President requested $6.18 billion in FY2015 emergency appropriations for Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of State and international assistance programs, and DOD to address the Ebola crisis domestically and overseas. The funding would enhance domestic preparedness and support overseas operations to end the current epidemic and prevent the spread of Ebola and other infectious diseases. The request included $2.43 billion for Health and Human Services, $2.10 billion for the Department of State and International Programs, and $112 million for the Department of Defense to advance research and technologies to control Ebola and other infectious diseases. Appropriations requested for a new Contingency Fund (not Overseas Contingency Operations—OCO) totaling $1.54 billion under HHS and Department of State accounts were accompanied by a request for the authority to transfer these funds to any federal agency to help meet Ebola or other infectious disease-related critical needs that may suddenly arise, both domestically and overseas. In addition to the new Contingency Fund, the request also sought transfer authority for the emergency appropriations to any other federal accounts to meet the purposes specified in the request. The Administration asserted that these authorities are necessary for flexibility and a whole-of-government approach to this crisis. On November 10, 2014, the President submitted to Congress an amended FY2015 OCO request for an additional $5.5 billion to combat IS—nearly $5 billion for DOD and $520 million for the Department of State. This brought the FY2015 OCO request to a total of $71.4 billion. DOD's amended OCO funding request of $4.94 billion for FY2015 was for incremental U.S. military personnel expenses, fuel, supplies, and repair costs for ground, air, and sea-based operations, as well as other support, command, control, and intelligence activities, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and classified activities, replacement of expended munitions, building the capacity of Iraqi security forces and Kurdish and tribal forces, providing support to coalition members, and other small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities. In addition, DOD's earlier OCO request included an allocation of $500 million to train Syrian opposition forces to combat ISIS. The Department of State's amended OCO request of $520 million was for expanding the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications' messaging in key languages, helping the moderate Syrian opposition develop capacity and credibility, supporting Jordan and Lebanon's territory and borders, humanitarian support related to IS attacks in Syria and Iraq, and expanding U.S. international broadcasting to provide a platform for moderate Muslims to voice opposition to extremism. Both the Ebola and IS requests designated budget authority as either an emergency requirement or Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT). Funds designated in this manner would effectively not be subject to the discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act, 2011, as amended (P.L. 112-25), and could, therefore, increase the deficit. The conference version of the Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), approved the DOD Ebola request and the $5.4 billion requested to combat the Islamic State plus an unspecified increase in Department of State OCO funds that is available to counter IS. The DOD total included $1.6 billion requested for a new Iraq train-and-equip account and $500 million to train vetted Syrian opposition forces, the more controversial elements. The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291/H.R. 3797), signed into law on December 19, 2014, reduced the amount and limited the authorities in a new Counterterrorism Response Partnership Fund (CTPF) that could include funds to train Syrian opposition forces, as well as other partnerships.",79,65 "Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization: An Overview of Selected Provisions in Proposed Legislation Considered by the 110th Congress. Funding authorization for aviation programs set forth in Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176) and authorization for taxes and fees that provide revenue for the aviation trust fund expired at the end of FY2007. While Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization legislation was considered during the 110th Congress, the only related legislation enacted consisted of several short term extensions for aviation trust fund revenue collections and aviation program authority. The Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act, Part II (P.L. 110-330) extends these authorizations until March 31, 2009, thus carrying the issue of FAA reauthorization over to the 111th Congress. Consideration of FAA reauthorization during the 110th Congress began with the introduction of the FAA's reauthorization proposal, entitled the Next Generation Air Transportation System Financing Reform Act of 2007 (H.R. 1356/S. 1076, introduced by request), which recommends a new system for financing aviation system costs through direct user fees and increased fuel taxes. The FAA proposal would also allow airports to increase passenger facility charges (PFC), and includes initiatives to simplify the apportionment of airport grants. The proposal also seeks to better integrate development of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS) into ongoing planning and acquisition activities, and would allow airport and private investment in certain aviation facilities and services. The FAA proposal would authorize funding for research on aviation noise, air emissions, and water quality impacts, and seeks to modify the Essential Air Service Program (EAS). The Aviation Investment and Modernization Act of 2007 (S. 1300, S.Rept. 110-144) proposes a four-year authorization with modest overall budget increases and larger increases specifically for facilities and equipment (F&E) modernization. S. 1300 proposes a $25 surcharge for certain flights and retention of existing taxes and fees. S. 1300 would establish a modernization oversight board and would set up offices at each federal agency supporting NGATS for defining agency resources and budgetary commitments to air traffic modernization. S. 2345, introduced by the Senate Finance Committee, may be considered as the revenue title of the overall bill, and modifies certain aviation taxes and fees as a possible alternative to the $25 surcharge proposal. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 2881) seeks higher spending authorizations for F&E compared to S. 1300. While the bill does not propose any direct user-fee mechanisms, it proposes modest increases to existing aviation fuel taxes. The overall legislation also seeks to increase accountability and coordination of NGATS planning and implementation. An amendment agreed to would create a binding arbitration process to resolve labor negotiations impasses, and would apply this process to settle the current impasse between the FAA and air traffic controllers. This report will not be updated.",119,119 "EPA's Boiler MACT: Controlling Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants. On December 20, 2012, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson signed final revisions to EPA's 2011 Maximum Achievable Control Technology standards for boilers (the ""Boiler MACT""). The Boiler MACT has been among the most controversial EPA regulations over the last three years, because of its wide reach and potential economic impact. Boilers are widely used for heat and power throughout industry, and by large commercial establishments and institutions, as well. EPA found it difficult to adequately characterize and develop emissions data for the many types of boilers, leading many in the regulated community to complain that the originally proposed standards would not be economically achievable. Although EPA and others disputed the industry cost estimates, the revised rule modifies all of the originally proposed standards, lowering the projected cost, and grants owners and operators additional time to comply. Whether these changes will quell the long controversy or raise new issues remains to be seen. EPA developed the regulations because it has found, based on emissions data, that boilers (especially coal-, biomass-, and liquid-fired boilers) are major sources of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). The Clean Air Act defines a major source as any facility that emits 10 tons or more of a single listed HAP or 25 tons of any combination of HAPs annually. The HAPs themselves (187 substances) were listed by Congress in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Congress also set specific requirements for the stringency of MACT standards, limiting EPA's ability to promulgate less stringent requirements. The revised MACT will affect about 14,000 existing boilers and process heaters, with capital costs of $4.6 billion, according to the agency. Annualized costs, which spread the costs of capital over the expected life of the equipment and include operating and maintenance expenses, are estimated by EPA at $1.2 billion per year. In response to comments on an earlier proposal and on the promulgated 2011 rule, the modified rule reduces the number of units expected to require controls, and makes the emissions standards much less stringent, cutting the agency's estimate of annualized control costs by more than half. Most of the costs of the final rule would be borne by boilers that burn coal, biomass, or liquid fuels, only 12% of the 14,000 units covered by the rule will need to install equipment to meet it. Most of the rest are fueled by natural gas or refinery gases. These boilers would not have to install pollution control equipment and most would experience cost savings under the rule's provisions, according to EPA. For the rule as a whole, EPA estimated that benefits—including the avoidance of 3,100 to 7,900 premature deaths annually—would outweigh costs by at least $23 billion per year. Affected industries and many in Congress raised objections to the rule as proposed in 2010 and as promulgated in 2011, and bills were introduced in both the House and Senate in the 112th Congress to alter the rule's requirements and delay its implementation. H.R. 2250 passed the House 275-142 on October 13, 2011. Provisions similar to H.R. 2250 were offered as an amendment (S.Amdt. 1660) to the Senate version of the surface transportation bill (S. 1813) on March 8, 2012, but were not adopted. Numerous stakeholders have also challenged the rules in court. These challenges are expected to proceed now that EPA has finalized the rule. In addition to the Boiler MACT, this report discusses three related rules that EPA developed at the same time, dealing with smaller ""area source"" boilers and with commercial and industrial boilers that burn solid waste (the ""CISWI"" and solid waste rules). The latter two rules have also been controversial. Revised versions of the three related rules were also finalized December 20.",42,42 "EPA's Vessel General Permits: Background and Issues. In November 2011 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed two Clean Water Act (CWA) permits to regulate certain types of vessel discharges into U.S. waters. The proposed permits would replace a single Vessel General Permit (VGP) issued in 2008 that was due to expire in December 2013. As proposed, the permits would apply to approximately 71,000 large domestic and foreign vessels and perhaps as many as 138,000 small vessels. This universe of regulated entities is diverse as well as large, consisting of tankers, freighters, barges, cruise ships and other passenger vessels, and commercial fishing vessels. Their discharges are similarly diverse, including among other pollutants aquatic nuisance species (ANS), nutrients, pathogens, oil and grease, metals, and toxic chemical compounds that can have a broad array of effects on aquatic species and human health, many of which can be harmful. EPA proposed two permits, one for large vessels to replace the 2008 VGP, and one for smaller vessels covered by a congressionally enacted temporary moratorium. Both were proposed well in advance of the VGP's expiration to provide ample time for the regulated community to prepare for new requirements. On March 28, 2013, EPA issued a final version of the VGP for large vessels. It took effect December 19, 2013. The permit for smaller vessels, the sVGP, was issued on September 10, 2014, and was scheduled to take effect on December 19, 2014. However, in December 2014, Congress passed legislation (S. 2444/P.L. 113-281) extending until December 18, 2017, the date when small vessels will need a CWA permit. The CWA requires that all regulated discharges must meet effluent limitations representing applicable levels of technology-based control. The 2013 VGP largely retains the current permit's approach of relying on best management practices to control most discharges, because EPA concluded that it is infeasible to develop numeric effluent limits for most controlled discharges. However, the new VGP includes for the first time numeric ballast water discharge limits, which are consistent with standards in a 2012 Coast Guard rule and an international convention. The 2013 VGP raises two key issues. One concerns inclusion of specific numeric ballast water discharge limits in the permit. At issue had been whether EPA would propose more stringent numeric limits, as some environmental groups have favored and a few states have already adopted. A second issue concerns the role of states in regulating vessel discharges. Environmental groups and Canadian shippers challenged the 2013 permit in federal court. In October 2015, the court supported the environmentalists' challenge, ruling that the permit violated the CWA because it did not require the use of best available technology to control discharges of invasive species from ships' ballast water. The court remanded the permit to EPA, but did not vacate it, the permit remains in effect until EPA issues a new permit. Congressional interest in this topic has been evident for some time. In 2008 Congress enacted two bills to exempt certain vessels from a CWA permit requirement, thus restricting the population of vessels subject to the VGP. One was a permanent permit moratorium for recreational vessels of all sizes. The other act was a temporary permit moratorium for small commercial vessels and commercial fishing vessels, which was extended twice by Congress and would have expired December 18, 2014, had Congress not enacted an additional three-year extension in P.L. 113-281. In the 114th Congress, bills addressing the temporary permit moratorium for small vessels and regulation of ballast water discharges have been introduced (S. 373/H.R. 980 and S. 371). The Senate Commerce Committee approved S. 373 in February 2015, the committee also included provisions of this bill in S. 2829, which the Senate passed in June 2016, and S. 1611. Further, the House has passed H.R. 4909, which includes the text of H.R. 980 as one title of that bill.",41,41 "Has the U.S. Government Ever ""Defaulted""?. During recent debt limit episodes, federal officials have contended that if the debt limit were to constrain the government's ability to meet its obligations, that would be an unprecedented blemish on the nation's credit. For example, the U.S. Treasury has asserted that ""(f)ailing to increase the debt limit would have catastrophic economic consequences. It would cause the government to default on its legal obligations"" or that it ""would represent an irresponsible retreat from a core American value: we are a nation that honors all of its commitments. It would cause the government to default on its legal obligations."" Failure to pay obligations on time is regarded as a central indicator of default, although default may be triggered by a wide range of contractual provisions. More generally, the concept of default stems from contract law, and thus may be ambiguous because contract terms may be private or contracts may be incomplete, in that the consequences of some contingencies are left unspecified. For instance, the terms under which Treasury securities are offered lack any mention of payment delays or nonpayment. The ambiguity of the term ""default"" leads many third parties to develop their own definitions to monitor compliance with promises to pay. The U.S. Treasury in some historical instances was unable to pay all its obligations on time or made payments on terms that disappointed creditors. Those instances resulted from extraordinary stresses on public finances. Over time, the United States has managed its finances so that its credit history compares favorably to nearly all other advanced countries. This report examines three episodes in the federal government's fiscal history when some have questioned the public credit of the U.S. government. During the War of 1812, the federal government eventually became unable to meet its obligations. Shortly before that war, Congress had declined to renew the charter of the first Bank of the United States, leaving the government without a fiscal agent. In addition, President Jefferson and Treasury Secretary Gallatin had dismantled the administrative machinery needed to collect internal revenues, leaving Treasury revenues heavily dependent on customs income. In 1814, military expenses and lagging revenue left the U.S. Treasury unable to meet all of its obligations, including some interest payments on federal debt. The end of that war, the establishment of the second Bank of the United States, and the rebound of tariff revenues put federal finances on a sounder foundation. In March 1933, newly inaugurated President Franklin Roosevelt soon took steps to suspend the gold standard, as one measure to address severe disinflation, a collapse of the banking system, and other consequences of the Great Depression. While the Supreme Court upheld actions that suspended the gold standard, others contended that the cancellation of gold clauses in federal bond contracts amounted to a restructuring of debt. Although the cancellation of gold clauses in 1933-1934 had no discernable effect on the U.S. Treasury's ability to borrow, holders of Treasury securities lost money relative to what they had expected to receive. More recently, when the U.S. Treasury failed to make timely payments to some small investors in the spring of 1979, some dubbed the incident a ""mini-default."" While the payment delays inconvenienced many investors, the stability of the wider market in Treasury securities was never at risk. Shifts in monetary policy, as constraining inflation became a policy priority, provide a stronger explanation for changes in yields in federal securities. Moreover, payment delays were not uncommon at that time, when automatic data processing was at a relatively primitive stage. Other countries that defaulted in the 1930s or in the 19th century apparently suffered no lasting damage to their ability to borrow. Nonetheless, the prominent role of U.S. Treasury securities in global and domestic financial arrangements implies that systematic delays in Treasury payments now could have serious consequences.",101,101 "Bank Systemic Risk Regulation: The $50 Billion Threshold in the Dodd-Frank Act. The 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the problem of ""too big to fail"" financial institutions—the concept that the failure of a large financial firm could trigger financial instability, which in several cases prompted extraordinary federal assistance to prevent their failure. This report focuses on one pillar of the Dodd-Frank Act's (P.L. 111-203) response to addressing financial stability and ending too big to fail: a new enhanced prudential regulatory regime that applies to all banks with more than $50 billion in assets and to certain other financial institutions. Under this regime, the Federal Reserve is required to apply a number of safety and soundness requirements to large banks that are more stringent than those applied to smaller banks. These requirements are intended to mitigate systemic risk posed by large banks Stress tests and capital planning ensure banks hold enough capital to survive a crisis. Living wills provide a plan to safely wind down a failing bank. Liquidity requirements ensure that banks are sufficiently liquid if they lose access to funding markets. Counterparty limits restrict the bank's exposure to counterparty default. Risk management requires publicly traded companies to have risk committees on their boards and banks to have chief risk officers. Financial stability, regulatory interventions that can be taken only if a bank poses a threat to the financial stability. Most of these requirements apply to about 30 U.S. bank holding companies or the U.S. operations of foreign banks. The requirements do not apply to other types of financial institutions with more than $50 billion in assets (unless individually designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council), including a few large securities and insurance firms that are chartered as thrift holding companies. In addition, a number of provisions, such as higher capital requirements, that stem from the international ""Basel III"" agreement apply only to a handful of the largest banks. This is an example of how the current system is tailored, with the largest banks facing more stringent regulatory requirements than medium-sized and smaller banks. Congress is debating whether to modify the $50 billion threshold because some Members believe that it applies to too many banks that do not pose systemic risk. Bills to amend which banks are subject to enhanced regulation include H.R. 3312/S. 1893, H.R. 10, and S. 2155. Many economists believe that the economic problem of too big to fail is really a problem of firms that are too complex or too interdependent to fail. Size correlates with complexity and interdependence, but not perfectly. Size is a much simpler and more transparent metric than complexity or interdependence, however. As a practical matter, if size is well correlated with systemic importance, a dollar threshold could serve as a good proxy that is inexpensive and easy to administer. Designating banks on a case-by-case basis could raise similar issues that have occurred in the designation of nonbanks, such as legal challenges to overturn their designation. This report also examines the question of which banks are systemically important. However, examining the banks above and slightly below the threshold does not reveal any natural cut off points that divide bank organizations into two groups that clearly present substantively different risks to systemic stability. This is because the size differences between each bank and those nearest to it are incremental and because banks vary across numerous characteristics. For these reasons, making an objective and definitive size-based determination of the point that a bank becomes systemically important is difficult. Regulators do employ an empirical methodology to identify globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) based on a score that is calculated using 12 indicators that measure the size, interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity, and cross-jurisdictional activity of a bank. However, the results of this exercise do not produce a clear and uncontestable score threshold at which institutions clearly become systemically important.",5,5 "Cash and Noncash Benefits for Persons With Limited Income: Eligibility Rules, Recipient and Expenditure Data, FY1996-FY1998. Eighty benefit programs provide aid -- in cash and noncash form -- that is directed primarily to persons with limited income. Such programs constitute the public ""welfare"" system, if welfare is defined as income-tested or need-based benefits. This definition excludes social insurance programs (e.g., Social Security and Medicare). Income-tested benefit programs in FY1998 cost $391.7 billion: $277.3 billion in federal funds and $114.4 billion in state-local funds. Total welfare spending rose by 3.1% from its FY1997 level. Higher medical spending accounted for $10.3 billion of the year's net increase of $11.8 billion and for the first time, medical benefits accounted for half of all income-tested spending. Expressed in constant FY1998 dollars, welfare spending increased by $5.8 billion (1.5%). Real spending increases: medical benefits, 3.9%, services, 5.4%, education benefits, 1.8%, and housing aid, 0.6%. In real terms, cash benefit outlays held steady, but spending for food aid, jobs and training, and energy assistance declined. Welfare consumed the same share of the federal budget (16.8%) as in FY1997, but accounted for a slightly smaller share of gross domestic product (4.6% compared to 4.7% in 1997). In FY1998, medical services represented 50.1% of total welfare spending, cash benefits, 24.1% food and housing benefits, 16.6%. Services, energy aid, education, and jobs/training accounted for the remainder. The composition of welfare spending differed by level of government. Medical aid consumed 72% of state-local welfare funds, but only 41% of federal welfare dollars. Most income-tested programs provide benefits, in the form of cash, goods, or services, to persons who make no payment and render no service in return. However, in the case of the job and training programs and some educational benefits, recipients must work or study. Further, the block grant program of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) requires adults to start work after a period of enrollment, the food stamp program imposes work and training requirements, and public housing requires residents to engage in ""self'sufficiency"" activities or perform community service. Finally, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is available only to workers. An unduplicated count of welfare beneficiaries is not available. Enrollment in Medicaid AFDC, and food stamps has declined from 1994/1995 peak levels, but the number of recipients of EITC and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) continues to grow. Average 1998 monthly numbers Food stamps, 21 million, TANF, 8.8 million, and SSI, 7.2 million. In 1998, EITC payments went to an estimated 58.2 million persons, and in 1997, 40.4 million persons received Medicaid services. The Census Bureau classified 34.5 million persons as poor on the basis of pre-tax money income in 1998 and found that 69.2% of them were in households that received some income-tested aid other than the EITC. Among male-present families with children who were poor before transfers, the EITC was the main form of aid.",117,117 "U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the counterterrorism fight against Al Qaeda. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit cooperation and how to address PRC concerns about the U.S.-led war (Operation Enduring Freedom). Longer-term issues have concerned whether counterterrorism has strategically transformed bilateral ties and whether China's support was valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests. The extent of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been limited, but the tone and context of counterterrorism helped to stabilize—even if it did not transform—the closer bilateral relationship pursued by President George Bush in late 2001. China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), has not fought in the U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition. The Bush Administration designated the PRC-targeted ""East Turkistan Islamic Movement"" (ETIM) as a terrorist organization in August 2002, reportedly allowed PRC interrogators access to Uighur detainees at Guantanamo in September 2002, and held a summit in Texas in October 2002. Since 2005, however, U.S. concerns about China's extent of cooperation in counterterrorism have increased. In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick acknowledged that ""China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism"" after ""a good start,"" in his policy speech that called on China to be a ""responsible stakeholder"" in the world. The summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005 and 2006 raised U.S. concerns. Since the summer of 2007, U.S. officials have expressed more concern about China-origin arms that have been found in the conflict involving U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as part of the broader threat posed by Iran and its arms transfers. Congress has oversight over the closer ties with China and a number of policy options. U.S. policy has addressed law-enforcement and intelligence ties, oppressed Uighur (Uyghur) people in western Xinjiang whom China claims to be linked to ""terrorists"", detained Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay prison, Olympic security in August 2008, sanctions that ban exports of arms and security equipment, weapons nonproliferation, port security, military-to-military contacts, China's influence and support in Central Asia through the SCO, and China's arms transfers to Iran. Also, Congress has concerns about suspected PRC harassment of Uighurs and others in the United States, the President's efforts to transfer the Uighurs detained at Guantanamo, and efforts to seek China's counterterrorism cooperation (with U.S. assessments of mixed implications). The United States detained 22 Uighurs and rejected China's demand to take them while seeking a third country to accept them. In 2006, Albania accepted five of them. In June 2009, Bermuda accepted four. In November 2009, Palau accepted six. In February 2010, Switzerland accepted two Uighurs. The five Uighurs remaining in detention had been taken into custody in Pakistan. On February 26, 2010, the House passed H.R. 2701 (Reyes), with Section 351 which would require an unclassified summary of intelligence on any threats posed by the Uighurs who were detained at Guantanamo. Other relevant bills in the 111th Congress include: H.R. 2346 (P.L. 111-32), H.Res. 417 (Baldwin), H.Res. 624 (Delahunt), H.Res. 774 (Hastings), H.Res. 953 (McGovern), H.R. 2294 (Boehner), S.Res. 155 (Brown), and S. 1054 (Inouye). The Obama Administration has proposed that China increase contributions and coordination in investments and assistance to help stabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan. With concerns about military operations in Central Asia, the United States also has concerns about dealing with China in its northwestern region of Xinjiang. On July 8, 2010, Norway arrested three men reportedly connected with the Turkistan Islamic Party (another name for ETIM) and Al Qaeda.",86,86 "Hedge Funds: Goldstein v. Securities and Exchange Commission. In 2004 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a rule which resulted in requiring many hedge fund advisers to register as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act. Because hedge fund advisers had for the most part before the rule been exempt from registration so long as they had fewer than 15 clients, hedge fund advisers, referred to collectively as Goldstein, brought suit to challenge the rule. The District of Columbia Circuit, after examining an amendment to the Investment Advisers Act, previous statements by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Supreme Court case Lowe v. Securities and Exchange Commission, in a three-judge panel unanimously held that the SEC's hedge fund rule was arbitrary and vacated and remanded the rule. On August 7, 2006, Chairman Cox stated that the SEC would not seek en banc review of the Court of Appeals decision and would not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In response to the Goldstein decision, the SEC on December 13, 2006, voted unanimously to issue a proposal for a new antifraud rule under section 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act that would prohibit an investment adviser from defrauding investors in a hedge fund or certain other pooled instruments. On July 11, 2007, the SEC voted unanimously to approve new Rule 206(4)-8 to state the commission's authority to pursue fraudulent misconduct by hedge fund advisers. The rule was adopted in the wake of Goldstein in order to clarify the commission's authority in this area. There is also congressional interest in regulating hedge funds. This report will be updated as necessary.",12,12 "Statutory Modifications of the Application of NEPA. From time to time, Congress has considered the operation of the National Environmental Policy Act. While Congress has amended the statute itself only twice since its enactment, Congress has often enacted provisions that modify the application of the Act or specify the extent of the documents that need be prepared in particular instances or contexts. This report collects and lists examples of such provisions and will be updated as legislative action warrants.",45,45 "Crusader XM2001 Self-Propelled Howitzer: Background and Issues for Congress. The Army has been seeking to enhance its self-propelled 155mm artillery capabilities since the late 1970's. In addition to several programs to modify the M109 artillery system, culminating in the current M109A6 Paladin, since 1987 these efforts have focused on what is now called the XM2001 Crusader. Initially begun in order to match the mobility and firepower of Soviet artillery, the Crusader program is now the center of a controversy over whether it is an appropriate investment given the Army's on-going transformation to a lighter, more mobile force. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has announced his intent to terminate the program, however the Crusader's supporters in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees are seeking legislative provisions to maintain the program until at least May 2003 while an assessment of alternatives is conducted. This report will be updated as further events occur.",31,32 "Compensated Work Sharing Arrangements (Short-Time Compensation) as an Alternative to Layoffs. Short-time compensation (STC) is a program within the federal-state unemployment insurance system. In states that have STC programs, workers whose hours are reduced under a formal work sharing plan may be compensated with STC, which is a regular unemployment benefit that has been pro-rated for the partial work reduction. Although the terms work sharing and short-time compensation are sometimes used interchangeably, work sharing refers to any arrangement under which workers' hours are reduced in lieu of a layoff. Under a work sharing arrangement, a firm faced with the need to downsize temporarily chooses to reduce work hours across the board for all workers instead of laying off a smaller number of workers. For example, an employer might reduce the work hours of the entire workforce by 20%, from five to four days a week, in lieu of laying off 20% of the workforce. Employers have used STC combined with work sharing arrangements to reduce labor costs, sustain morale compared to layoffs, and retain highly skilled workers. Work sharing can also reduce employers' recruitment and training costs by eliminating the need to recruit new employees when business improves. On the employee's side, work sharing spreads more moderate earnings reductions across more employees—especially if work sharing is combined with STC—as opposed to imposing significant hardship on a few. Many states also require that employers who participate in STC programs continue to provide health insurance and retirement benefits to work sharing employees as if they were working a full schedule. Work sharing and STC cannot, however, avert layoffs or plant closings if a company's financial situation is dire. In addition, some employers may choose not to adopt work sharing because laying off workers may be a less expensive alternative. This may be the case for firms whose production technologies make it expensive or impossible to shorten the work week. For other firms, it may be cheaper to lay off workers than to continue paying health and pension benefits on a full-time equivalent basis. Work sharing arrangements in general also redistribute the burden of unemployment from younger to older employees, and for this reason the arrangements may be opposed by workers with seniority who are less likely to be laid off. From the perspective of state governments, concerns about the STC program have included the program's high administrative costs. Massachusetts has made significant strides in automating STC systems and reducing costs, but many other states still manage much of the STC program on paper. Currently, approximately half of the states and the District of Columbia have enacted STC programs to support work sharing arrangements. However, few UC beneficiaries are STC participants. At the peak of its use in 2010, the STC beneficiaries totaled nearly 3% of regular unemployment compensation first payments. The reasons for low take-up of the STC program are not completely clear, but key causes include lack of awareness of the program, administrative complexity for employers, and employer costs. P.L. 112-96, passed in February 2012, offered grants to states to help bring attention to the states' STC laws. In addition, P.L. 112-96 provided temporary federal funding to states that have existing STC programs or to create a new one. Despite these changes, the proportion of UC claimants receiving funds from STC remains low relative to overall UC claims.",88,88 "Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP). The Federal Employee Dental and Vision Benefits Enhancement Act of 2004 was enacted on December 23, 2004 (P.L. 108-496), directing the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to establish a supplemental dental and vision benefits program. OPM created the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP), with coverage first available on December 31, 2006. Enrollees are responsible for 100% of premiums and may choose a self-only, self + 1, or family plan. Coverage for dental and/or vision services provided through Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) plans is the primary source of coverage, and the supplemental dental and vision plan is secondary. Employees may still contribute to a Flexible Spending Account (FSA) to cover any qualified unmet medical expenses.",58,58 "Department of Homeland Security Assistance to States and Localities: A Summary and Issues for the 111th Congress. In light of lessons learned from the September 2001 terrorist attacks and other catastrophes such as Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav, the second session of the 111th Congress is expected to consider questions and issues associated with federal homeland security assistance. Federal homeland security assistance, for the purpose of this report, is defined as U.S. Department of Homeland Security programs that provide funding, training, or technical assistance to states, localities, tribes, and other entities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from man-made and natural disasters. Since the nation is still threatened by terrorist attacks and natural disasters, the 111th Congress may wish to consider questions and challenges about whether, or how, federal homeland security assistance policy should be revisited. Policy solutions could affect, and be constrained by, existing law and regulations, and constitutional considerations. Since FY2002, Congress has appropriated over $34 billion for homeland security assistance to states, specified urban areas and critical infrastructures (such as ports and rail systems), the District of Columbia, and U.S. insular areas. Originally, in FY2002, there were eight programs, in FY2010 there are 15 programs. This expansion and scope of homeland security assistance programs are the result of congressional and executive branch actions. The Grant Programs Directorate, within the Federal Emergency Management Agency, administers these programs for the Department of Homeland Security. Each assistance program has either an all-hazards purpose or a terrorism preparedness purpose. However, in FY2010, 60% of funding has been appropriated for terrorism preparedness programs, a decision that has been criticized by some grant recipients, Members of Congress, and others. Congress appropriated $757 million less for state and local programs than was appropriated in FY2009, however, some programs received increased funding in FY2010, such as the Urban Area Security Initiative. This reduction is primarily the result of Congress not funding the Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance Program, and the Trucking Security Grant program. According to news reports, a Department of Homeland Security official announced that the overall FY2011 budget request for the department will decline from previous years' levels, and in the FY2011 budget request, the Administration requested approximately $4 billion. The impact of a reduction on grants assistance may be an issue. This report summarizes these programs, and identifies and analyzes potential issues for the 111th Congress. These issues include (1) the purpose and number of assistance programs, (2) the evaluation of the use of grant funding, (3) the determination of eligible grant recipients, (4) the programs' funding amounts, and (5) the programs' funding distribution methodologies. Some of these issues have been debated and legislation passed since FY2002. This report will be updated when congressional or executive branch actions warrant.",22,22 "Agriculture Conservation Programs: A Scorecard. This report provides basic information on several agriculture conservation programs, primarily drawn from agency budget presentations and websites, about each program using a consistent format. This information should help respond to basic questions and resolve many common sources of confusion about the purposes of the program, program participation and policy topics.",43,2 "Department of Labor's 2015 Proposed Fiduciary Rule: Background and Issues. On April 20, 2015, the Department of Labor (DOL) proposed redefining the term investment advice within pension and retirement plans. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA, P.L. 93-406), a person who provides investment advice has a fiduciary obligation, which means that the person must provide the advice in the sole interest of plan participants. Thus, redefining the term investment advice could affect who is subject to this fiduciary standard. Regulations issued in 1975 define investment advice using a five-part test. To be held to ERISA's fiduciary standard with respect to his or her advice, an individual must (1) make recommendations on investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property, or give advice as to the value (2) on a regular basis (3) pursuant to a mutual understanding that the advice (4) will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions, and (5) will be individualized to the particular needs of the plan. DOL proposed broadening the term's definition to capture activities that currently occur within pension and retirement plans, but do not meet the existing definition of investment advice. The proposed rule would replace the current five-part test with a more inclusive definition. Table 1 in this report compares the current and proposed definitions. For example, under the current regulation, an individual must provide advice on a regular basis to be a fiduciary, which generally would not include recommendations on whether or not to roll over a 401(k) account balance to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). The expanded definition would remove the requirement that advice be given on a regular basis. Securities brokers and dealers who provide services to retirement plans and who are not fiduciaries under current regulations are not required to act in the sole interests of plan participants. Rather, their recommendations must meet a suitability standard which requires that recommendations be suitable for the plan participant, given factors such as an individual's income, risk tolerance, and investment objectives. The suitability standard is a lower standard than a fiduciary standard. Under DOL's proposed regulation, brokers and dealers could be considered fiduciaries when they provide recommendations to participants in retirement plans. In addition to broadening the definition of investment advice, the rule would provide carve-outs for situations that would not be considered investment advice. For example, providing generalized investment or retirement education would not be considered investment advice under the proposed rule. The proposed rule is accompanied by proposed prohibited transaction exemptions (PTEs) and proposed amendments to existing PTEs. These proposals would allow fiduciaries to continue to engage in certain practices that would otherwise be prohibited (such as charging commissions for products that they recommend or having revenue-sharing agreements with third parties). DOL first proposed broadening the definition of investment advice in October 2010. The proposed regulation generated much controversy and was withdrawn in September 2011. The revised proposals issued in April 2015 also have generated considerable controversy. Following the release of the proposals, DOL received public comments and held three and a half days of public hearings on the proposals. DOL has not indicated when it expects to issue the final rule. In the 114th Congress, bills have been introduced that would, among other provisions, delay or prohibit the implementation of a final rule or establish a best interest standard for advice in retirement plans. H.R. 1090, the Retail Investor Protection Act, would prohibit DOL from issuing a final rule on the definition of investment advice until at least 30 days after the SEC were to issue a rule for the standards of conduct for brokers and dealers. On October 27, 2015, H.R. 1090 passed the House of Representatives. H.R. 3020 and S. 1695, the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016, would prohibit DOL from using any funds to finalize, implement, administer, or enforce the proposed fiduciary regulation. H.R. 3922, the Retirement Choice Protection Act of 2015, would (1) transfer authority for issuing regulations on IRAs from DOL to the Department of the Treasury and (2) establish a best interest standard for fiduciaries who provide investment advice. H.R. 4293, the Affordable Retirement Advice Protection Act, and H.R. 4294, the Strengthening Access to Valuable Education and Retirement Support Act of 2015 (or the SAVERS Act of 2015), would, among other provisions, add a statutory definition of investment advice and a best interest prohibited transaction exemption. In addition, the bills would require Congress to approve of investment advice regulations that have been issued after January 1, 2015. Companion legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate. S. 2502, the Affordable Retirement Advice Protection Act, was introduced by Senator Johnny Isakson on February 4, 2016, and S. 2505, the SAVERS Act of 2016, was introduced by Senator Mark Kirk on February 4, 2016.",88,88 "Biologics and Biosimilars: Background and Key Issues. A biological product, or biologic, is a preparation, such as a drug or a vaccine, that is made from living organisms. Compared with conventional chemical drugs, biologics are relatively large and complex molecules. They may be composed of proteins (and/or their constituent amino acids), carbohydrates (such as sugars), nucleic acids (such as DNA), or combinations of these substances. Biologics may also be cells or tissues used in transplantation. A biosimilar, sometimes referred to as a follow-on biologic, is a therapeutic drug that is similar but not structurally identical to the brand-name biologic made by a pharmaceutical or biotechnology company. In contrast, a generic chemical drug is an exact copy of a brand-name chemical drug. Because biologics are more complex than chemical drugs, both in composition and method of manufacture, biosimilars will not be exact replicas of the brand-name product, but may instead be shown to be highly similar. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates both biologics and chemical drugs. Biologics and biosimilars frequently require special handling (such as refrigeration) and processing to avoid contamination by microbes or other unwanted substances. Also, they are usually administered to patients via injection or infused directly into the bloodstream. For these reasons, biologics often are referred to as specialty drugs. The cost of specialty drugs, including biologics, can be extremely high. In April 2006, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) authorized for marketing in Europe the first biosimilar product, Omnitrope, a human growth hormone. The EMA lists a total of 40 biosimilars on its website, 2 products were refused authorization and 3 were withdrawn, leaving a total of 35 biosimilars authorized for the European market. The introduction of biosimilars in Europe has reduced prices for biologics overall, in some cases by 33% compared with the original price of the brand-name product. For one drug in Portugal, the price reduction was 61%. In contrast, the pathway to marketing biosimilars in the United States has had several barriers. FDA approved Omnitrope in June 2006, following an April 2006 court ruling requiring the FDA to move forward with consideration of the application. At the time Omnitrope was approved, FDA indicated that this action ""does not establish a pathway"" for approval of other follow-on biologic drugs and stated that Congress must change the law before the agency can approve copies of nearly all other such products. Four years later, in March 2010, Congress established a new regulatory authority for FDA by creating an abbreviated licensure pathway for biological products demonstrated to be ""highly similar"" (biosimilar) to or ""interchangeable"" with an FDA-licensed biological product. The new authority was accomplished via the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) of 2009, enacted as Title VII of the Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148). Congress authorized FDA to collect associated fees via the Biosimilar User Fee Act of 2012 (BsUFA, P.L. 112-144). The five-year biosimilars user fee authority was set to expire on September 30, 2017. Congress reauthorized the biosimilar user fee program via the Food and Drug Administration Reauthorization Act of 2017 (FDARA, P.L. 115-52). As more biosimilars enter the U.S. market, analysts expect to see U.S. price reductions similar to those that have occurred in Europe. However, of the seven biosimilars approved by FDA, sales of five biosimilars have been delayed, or (allegedly) adversely impacted, by actions of the brand-name manufacturers. Three biosimilars (Erelzi, Amjevita, and Cyltezo) have had their marketing launch delayed by patent infringement lawsuits filed by brand-name manufacturers. In addition, Pfizer has sued Johnson & Johnson (J&J) alleging that J&J has entered into anticompetitive contracts with insurers that prevent coverage of Pfizer's biosimilar (Inflectra), a less expensive substitute for J&J's best-selling biologic (Remicade). The alleged anticompetitive practices would be expected to have a negative impact on another recently approved biosimilar (Renflexis). The high costs of pharmaceuticals in general—and biologics in particular—has led to an increased interest in understanding the federal government's role in the development of costly new therapeutics. In the case of six of the seven biosimilars approved by FDA, the associated brand-name drug was originally discovered by scientists at public-sector research institutions. Several of these brand-name biologics (Remicade, Enbrel, Humira, Avastin) are among the top-selling drugs in the United States and worldwide.",67,111 "How Measures Are Brought to the Senate Floor: A Brief Introduction. Two basic methods are used by the Senate to bring legislation to the floor for consideration: (1) The Senate, at the majority leader’s request, grants unanimous consent to take up a matter, or (2) it agrees to his motion to proceed to consider it. Because the motion to proceed is subject to debate in most circumstances, it is less frequently used. Both methods are derived from the basic premise that the Senate as a body may decide what matters it considers. The Senate may also use the same two methods to bring up executive business (nominations and treaties). This report will be updated to reflect changes in Senate practice.",55,55 "American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5): Summary and Legislative History. President Barack Obama signed H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, into law on February 17, 2009, as P.L. 111-5 (123 Stat. 115-521). The act is seen as one of the most significant legislative responses made thus far to the current economic turmoil. This report provides a summary and legislative history of ARRA and identifies other resources that provide additional information regarding its content and implementation. ARRA is a relatively lengthy and complex act, amounting to just over 400 pages (in slip law form) and melding together hundreds of billions of dollars in discretionary spending, mandatory spending, and revenue provisions encompassing the jurisdiction of several House and Senate committees. The act consists of two major divisions. Division A (Appropriations Provisions) includes supplemental appropriations for FY2009 (and later fiscal years) covering by separate titles all 12 of the regular appropriations acts, as well as four additional titles dealing with health information technology, a state fiscal stabilization fund, accountability and transparency, and general provisions. Division B (Tax, Unemployment, Health, State Fiscal Relief, and Other Provisions) consists of seven separate titles. Division A includes the discretionary spending provisions, but some significant substantive provisions as well, Division B includes the mandatory spending and revenue provisions, with some exceptions. ARRA provides almost $800 billion through extensive discretionary spending, mandatory spending, and revenue provisions that the Administration estimates will save or create some 3.5 million jobs. Funding is provided for existing and some new programs in the 15 Cabinet-level departments and 11 independent agencies. Some of the funds are distributed to states, localities, other entities, and individuals through a combination of formula and competitive grants and direct assistance. In addition to new spending and tax provisions, new policies are created regarding unemployment compensation, health insurance, health information technology, broadband communications, and energy, among others. Numerous oversight, accountability, and transparency provisions are contained in the act. They include various reporting requirements and funding for offices of inspector general, the Government Accountability Office, and a newly established Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board. With regard to its specific impact on the budget, the act is estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to increase the deficit by $787.2 billion over the 11-year period covering FY2009-FY2019. The estimated deficit impact reflects spending increases of $575.3 billion (in outlays) and revenue reductions of $211.8 billion. The total spending increases consist of $311.2 billion in discretionary new budget authority (yielding $308.3 billion in outlays) and $269.5 billion in mandatory new budget authority (yielding $267.0 billion in outlays). About 21% of total outlays ($120.1 billion) under ARRA are estimated to occur by the end of FY2009. By the end of FY2010, 59% of total outlays ($339.4 billion) are expected to occur, and by the end of FY2011, 81% of total outlays ($465.6 billion) are expected to occur. Revenue reductions occur more quickly, with reductions of $64.8 billion in FY2009 and $180.1 billion in FY2010, offset somewhat in later years by modest revenue increases. This report will not be updated.",99,99 "Zivotofsky v. Kerry: The Jerusalem Passport Case and Its Potential Implications for Congress's Foreign Affairs Powers. The Supreme Court in its last term by a vote of 6-3 invalidated a statute passed by Congress touching on the status of Jerusalem, affirming the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decision in Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State that the President's power to recognize foreign sovereigns is exclusive and trumps Congress's authority to regulate passports. The Court's decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II) represents the first time the Court has struck down a congressionally enacted law on the basis of a separation-of-powers infringement involving a matter of foreign affairs. At the same time, the Court rejected the executive branch assertion that it has exclusive authority to conduct international diplomacy, while endorsing Congress's ample authority to influence the nation's foreign affairs. The implications the decision will have on Congress's foreign affairs authority will likely depend on its interpretation by lower courts, as well as the two political branches. Successive U.S. Administrations have maintained that the status of Jerusalem is a matter to be resolved between Israel and the Palestinians. Congress has consistently urged the President to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. In 2002 Congress passed a measure that directed the State Department to give U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem the option of having Israel recorded as their place of birth on their passports, P.L. 107-228 §214(d). The State Department policy has been to list only ""Jerusalem"" on passports in such cases, omitting any reference to country. On signing the act into law, President George W. Bush wrote in an accompanying signing statement that this and other provisions on Jerusalem would, ""if construed as mandatory... impermissibly interfere with the President's constitutional authority to conduct the nation's foreign affairs."" When Menachem Zivotofsky's parents sought to invoke the measure to have their son's birthplace recorded as ""Jerusalem, Israel,"" the State Department refused. The Zivotofskys took their request to court, seeking an order to have the passport reissued with the place of birth listed as Israel in conformance with the statute. The case was first rejected on the basis of standing and then on the basis of the political question doctrine, but the Supreme Court reinstated the case in 2012, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, finding there to be no political question and directing the appellate court to examine the ""textual, structural, and historic evidence"" to determine the nature of the President's recognition power and Congress's passport power. This report briefly describes legislative efforts to modify U.S. policy with respect to Jerusalem, in particular multiple enactments of the passport provision. The report next summarizes the appellate court's opinion finding the passport measure at issue unconstitutional. Turning to the Supreme Court decision, it presents brief synopses of the petitioner's argument, the Secretary of State's brief in response, and briefs of amici curiae submitted by the Senate and by some Members of the House of Representatives. The report then summarizes the Supreme Court decision, including concurrences and dissents. Finally, the report concludes by suggesting possible implications of the decision with respect to Congress's authority to influence foreign affairs. While the decision recognizes Congress's ample authority to legislate in matters touching on foreign affairs so long as its actions do not infringe the narrowly defined executive power to recognize foreign states, it does not provide a clear blueprint for distinguishing legislation that impermissibly forces the executive branch to contradict an earlier recognition decision from laws that permissibly interfere with sovereign privileges accorded to a foreign state once it is recognized, nor does it provide a thorough explanation for why this distinction is of constitutional significance. Moreover, the Court's analysis in determining that Congress has no share in the recognition power could arguably provide an advantage to the executive branch in future separation-of-powers disputes involving foreign affairs, should one arise.",78,78 "Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): Its Role in Response to the Effects of Hurricane Katrina. The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides grants to states to help them fund a wide variety of benefits and services to low-income families with children. TANF is best known for funding cash welfare benefits for families with children, but the block grant may also fund other benefits and services such as emergency payments, child care, transportation assistance, and other social services. Welfare programs are not usually associated with responses to natural disasters. However, the scope of Hurricane Katrina's displacement of families, the strain placed on responding human service agencies, plus the flexibility allowed states to design programs under TANF, made the block grant a potential source of help to the victims of this disaster. P.L. 109-68 provided some additional TANF funds and waived certain program requirements for states affected by Katrina. Under that act, all states were provided capped funding to aid evacuees from hurricane-damaged states. This report will be not be updated.",117,117 What Is the Current State of the Economic Recovery?. This report discusses the U.S. economy's recovery from the 2007-2009 recession.,99,99 "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Proposed Amendment on Uniform Disciplinary Policies. An amendment to the disciplinary procedures under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was proposed and withdrawn by Senators Gorton and Faircloth to H.R. 2646. This amendment would have allowed state and local educational agencies to establish and implement uniform policies with respect to discipline for all children within their jurisdiction, including children with disabilities, and was identical to one offered and defeated during debate on IDEA reauthorization last year. The amendment would have essentially returned the authority to the schools regarding discipline and the cessation of educational services that existed prior to the enactment of P.L. 94-142, the predecessor to IDEA. Although the proposed amendment was withdrawn, Senator Gorton indicated that it would be added to another education bill. This report discusses the arguments for and against the amendment's adoption and analyzes the legal implications of the proposed amendment. For a more detailed discussion of the existing disciplinary provisions in IDEA see Jones, ""Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Discipline Provisions in P.L. 105-17,"" CRS Report 98-42 (January 12, 1998).",35,35 "FY2004 Budget Documents: Internet Access and GPO Availability. Every year the President submits to Congress a series of budget volumes which provides the text of the President's proposed budget for the coming fiscal year. Neither CRS nor the Library of Congress can provide giveaway copies of these documents. This report provides brief descriptions of these budget volumes and related documents together with Internet addresses, Government Printing Office (GPO) stock numbers, and prices to obtain these publications.",101,101 "Military Recruitment on High School and College Campuses: A Policy and Legal Analysis. In recent years, many academic institutions have enacted rules that protect individuals who are gay from discrimination on campus. As a result, some high schools and institutions of higher education have sought to bar military recruiters from their campuses and/or to eliminate Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs on campus in response to the military's ""Don't Ask, Don't Tell"" (DADT) policy, which prohibits homosexual conduct by members of the armed services. These efforts, however, have largely been thwarted due to several laws that bar giving federal funds to campuses that block access for military recruiters. These laws include the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001, which amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) by requiring high schools that receive federal funds to provide certain student contact information to military recruiters upon request and to allow recruiters to have the same access to students as employers and colleges. This provision is different from similar Department of Defense (DOD) provisions that allow DOD to compile directory information on high school students for military recruitment purposes and that require colleges and universities that receive federal funds to give military recruiters the same access to students and campuses that is provided to other employers. Known as the Solomon Amendment, the latter provision was upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in the 2006 case Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR). This report describes the various laws regarding military recruitment on high school and college campuses, as well as discusses the policy and legal issues that they may raise.",30,34 "Tax-Preferred College Savings Plans: An Introduction to 529 Plans. Among the options families may choose to save for education (elementary and secondary as well as higher education), they may consider using tax-advantaged qualified tuition programs (QTPs), also known as 529 plans. 529 plans, named for the section of the tax code which dictates their tax treatment, are tax-advantaged investment trusts used to pay for education expenses. The specific tax advantage of a 529 plan is that distributions (i.e., withdrawals) from this savings plan are tax-free if they are used to pay for qualified higher-education expenses. In addition, up to $10,000 per beneficiary per year can be withdrawn and used for qualifying K-12 education expenses. If some or all of the distribution is used to pay for nonqualified expenses, then a portion of the distribution is taxable, and may also be subject to a 10% penalty tax. There are two types of 529 plans: ""prepaid"" plans and ""savings"" plans. A 529 prepaid plan allows a contributor (i.e., a parent, grandparent, or nonrelative) to make lump-sum or periodic payments that entitle the beneficiary to a specified number of academic periods, course units, or a percentage of tuition costs at current prices. A 529 savings plan allows contributors to invest in a portfolio of mutual funds or other underlying investments. While prepaid 529 plans were the first type of 529 plan established, savings plans have grown in popularity and are now the most common type of 529 plan. There are currently 18 prepaid 529 plans offered in contrast to 90 savings plans. In addition, according to the most recent data, of the $275.1 billion worth of assets in 529 plans at the end of 2016, 91.8% ($252.6 billion) were held in savings plans, while 8.2% ($22.5 billion) were held in prepaid plans. This report provides an overview of the mechanics of 529 plans and examines the specific tax advantages of these plans. Specifically, this report is structured to first compare ""savings"" and ""prepaid"" 529 plans and, second, to examine the income and gift tax treatment of 529 plans, using a stylized example to illustrate key concepts. The report also examines the tax treatment of rollovers and the interaction of 529 plans with other education tax benefits and looks at how 529 plans are treated in the federal needs analysis for financial aid. Finally, the report summarizes recent permanent legislative changes made by the 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97) that allows up to $10,000 to be withdrawn from 529 savings accounts tax-free if used for qualifying K-12 expenses. (The 2017 tax revision was titled the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) before the name was removed prior to final passage of the legislation in the Senate.)",34,34 "Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future Prospects. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has helped 3.69 million Afghan refugees return to Afghanistan since March 2002, marking the largest assisted return operation in its history. In addition, more than 1.11 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan without availing themselves of UNHCR's assistance, bringing the total number of returnees to at least 4.8 million. Despite the massive returns, possibly 3.5 million registered and unregistered Afghans still remain in these two countries of asylum—up to 2.46 million in Pakistan and more than 900,000 in Iran—making Afghans the second-largest refugee population in the world. These numbers are far greater than the initial working assumption in 2002 of 3.5 million refugees, in fact, the total is believed to be more than 8 million. The United States spent approximately $332.37 million between FY 2002 and FY 2005 on humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees and returnees through the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). It continues to provide support to refugees and returnees. The 110th Congress faces several relevant challenges. The safe and voluntary return of refugees to Afghanistan is not only a major part of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, but also an important indicator of its success. To the extent that refugees continue to return, it can be seen that Afghans are taking part in the future of their country. It is becoming more difficult, however, to encourage refugees to return. Those who were most capable of returning did so in the early years, those who remain have progressively less to return to—houses, livelihoods, family—in Afghanistan. Furthermore, maintaining the high pace of returns will require greater levels of reintegration assistance to anchor returnees in their homes and help them reestablish their lives in Afghanistan. Security will also be a major factor in population displacement within and across borders. The status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran has also been somewhat controversial in recent years as these governments want all Afghan refugees to return to Afghanistan. Officials in Pakistan have become concerned that the concentrations of Afghans in the country pose a security and crime risk, as individuals and goods are smuggled across the border. At the same time, however, many observers argue that Afghan labor migration may be beneficial to both Iran and Pakistan—which take advantage of cheap and effective immigrant labor—as well as Afghanistan, whose citizens benefit heavily from remittances sent in from abroad. To cut off this source of income for many poor Afghans could have disastrous consequences—not only humanitarian, but in the security sphere as well, as more than a million Afghans along the Afghan-Pakistan border are deprived of livelihoods and resort to other means to feed their families. Reportedly, many Afghans cross the border regularly, without documentation, and Islamabad does not appear to have the resources to control this flow. A future challenge will thus be to balance reasonable concerns about security with the importance of Afghanistan's labor plans in the regional economies and the forces that drive its migration patterns. It remains to be seen what effect the Pakistani government's recently announced plans for controlling and securing the Afghan border, through the construction of fences and planting of landmines, will have on refugee movements. This report will be updated.",76,81 "Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities. Iran is home to approximately 70.5 million people who are ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse. This report discusses these minorities, their treatment under the Islamic regime, and the reactions of international rights groups.",85,85 "A Primer on the Higher Education Act (HEA). The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) as amended, authorizes the federal government's major federal student aid programs (Title IV), as well as other programs which provide institutional aid and support (Titles II, III and V). In addition, the HEA authorizes services and support to less-advantaged students (select Title IV programs), and to students pursuing international education and certain graduate and professional degrees (Titles VI and VII). The programs authorized by the HEA are administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), and made available an estimated 70% ($94 billion) of all federal, state, and institutional aid awarded to postsecondary students in 2005-2006 (excluding tax benefits). The principal objective of the HEA is to expand postsecondary education opportunity, particularly for low-income individuals, and to increase affordability for moderate income families as well. The heart of the legislation is its student aid programs authorized under Title IV, which provide student aid in the form of grants, loans, and work-study assistance. There are seven titles of the HEA that authorize numerous programs and provisions designed to provide assistance to postsecondary students and institutions. This report provides a brief overview of major provisions of the HEA. It is organized by title and part of the act. This report will be updated following reauthorization of the HEA.",34,34 "The OECD Shipbuilding Agreement and Legislation in the 105th Congress. In December 1994, the United States, the European Union, Japan, Korea, and Norway signed an agreement on shipbuilding that was negotiated under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The agreement prohibits most subsidies for shipbuilding, limits financing assistance, allows actions against injurious pricing, and establishes a dispute resolution process. Although the United States was the lead proponent of the agreement, it is the only signatory that has not ratified the agreement. U.S. maritime industries are split. The largest shipyards oppose the agreement without modifications such as a longer phase-out of the U.S. vessel financing guarantee program. Mid-level shipyards and vessel operators support the agreement, primarily for its provision to end most shipbuilding subsidies. Legislation to approve the agreement and make necessary statutory changes has been introduced in the 105th Congress.",122,64 "Cuba: An Economic Primer. This report provides an overview of the Cuban economy. Recent congressional interest in Cuba has centered on the partial lifting of trade sanctions on agricultural products and medicine. The 107th Congress may consider further easing of sanctions or other alterations to the trade embargo in effect since 1962. The paper first presents a brief historical overview of the Cuban economy. This history is characterized by dependence on major powers: first Spain, then the United States, and then the Soviet Union. The report then charts the different, and often conflicting, economic policy courses that Fidel Castro has pursued since his rise to power in 1959.",85,85 "Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues -- Background and Recent Developments. For many years, NATO allies Greece and Turkey have been adversaries in bilateral disputes which have produced crises and even brought them to the brink of war. One series of disputes involves Aegean Sea borders. The two disagree over the border in the air, continental shelf, and territorial sea, over the status of islands in the Sea, and over the ownership of Aegean islets. In the aftermath of a January 1996 crisis over the sovereignty of the Imia/Kardak islet, various dispute resolution initiatives were undertaken. NATO proposed military-related confidence-building measures, some of which are being implemented. The President of the European Union Council of Ministers proposed a committee of wise men, which was accepted in the form of Greek and Turkish committees of experts who are exchanging views via the President. In March 1996, Turkey suggested ways to address Aegean issues. A year later, Greece made a decisive overture that accelerated bilateral diplomacy. Finally, in July 1997, the United States instigated a joint Greek- Turkish declaration of principles that is said to equal a non-aggression pact. The principles have yet to be applied to specific Aegean disputes. Whether or not Greece and Turkey want to change the nature of their relations and resolve the Aegean disputes is uncertain. Strong motivations to resolve exist. Greece wants to meet the criteria for joining the European Monetary Union and must control defense spending to do so. It can only cut defense spending if the ""Turkish threat"" recedes. Greece also wants to cultivate a more positive image in European circles and its relations with Turkey are an impediment. Turkish secularists want to be part of Europe and to stop Greek use of the veto in the European Union as a weapon in bilateral disputes. The influential Turkish military may favor a rapprochement with Athens. In both countries, however, there may be domestic political constraints on policy change. In Greece, the legacy of former Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who asserted that Turkey is the greatest threat to Greece, affects the current government's maneuverability. In Turkey, nationalist former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit is now Deputy Prime Minister and the government's primary foreign policy spokesman, and there is no new thinking in Ankara to match that of Athens. The United States wants stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and, after the Imia/Kardak crisis sought to become more active in dispute resolution. U.S. neutrality in the crisis, however, was perceived in Greece as favoritism toward Turkey and prevented the United States from engaging immediately. The U.S. desire to be a force for positive change persevered and reached fruition with the Madrid declaration in July 1997. The United States is determined to stay on course and work with the parties to apply the Madrid principles to specific disputes. The prospects for Aegean resolutions are better now than they have been in years, but domestic political developments in both Greece and Turkey could affect the outlook detrimentally.",85,85 "Mandatory Minimum Sentencing for Federal Sex Offenses: An Overview. Sex offenses are usually state crimes. Federal law, however, outlaws sex offenses when they occur on federal lands or in federal prisons, when they involve interstate or foreign travel, or when they involve child pornography whose production or distribution is associated in some way with interstate or foreign commerce. Mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment attend conviction for any of several of these federal sex crimes. The most severe mandatory minimum sentences have been reserved for aggravated sexual assaults committed in federal enclaves or federal prisons, for sex offenses resulting in death, and for sex crimes committed against children by repeat offenders. Two-thirds of the federal trial judges responding to a U.S. Sentencing Commission survey questioned the severity of the mandatory minimum penalties required for receipt of child pornography (5 years, 15 years for repeat offenders). The Commission's report suggested that the perception may lead to inconsistent sentencing in child pornography cases. It explained that more study would be required before it could make any specific recommendations concerning mandatory minimum sentencing in sex offenses. The constitutional authority to enact federal sex offense punishable by mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment is not unlimited. The ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component, the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, the separation of powers and the reservation of powers principles—all establish boundaries that must be honored. Nevertheless, few defendants have successfully challenged the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment imposed following their conviction for a federal sex offense. This report is available in an abridged version as CRS Report R42387, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing for Federal Sex Offenses: An Abridged Overview, without the footnotes or citations to authority found here.",94,94 "FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program: Background and Considerations for Congress. The Public Assistance Grant Program (PA Program) is administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and combines the authorities of multiple sections of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended, the Stafford Act). The PA Program is only available for states and communities that have received a major or emergency disaster declaration through the Stafford Act (and in a more limited fashion, Fire Management Assistance Grants). The PA Program provides grant assistance for eligible purposes, including Emergency work, as authorized by Sections 403, 407, and 502 of the Stafford Act, which provide for the removal of debris and emergency protective measures, such as the establishment of temporary shelters and emergency power generation. Permanent work, as authorized by Section 406, which provides for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain private nonprofit organizations (PNPs). PNPs are generally eligible for permanent work assistance if they provide a governmental type of service, though PNPs not providing a ""critical"" service must first apply to the Small Business Administration for loan assistance for facility projects. At its discretion, FEMA may provide assistance for hazard mitigation measures that are not required by applicable codes and standards. As a condition of PA assistance, applicants must obtain and maintain insurance on their facilities for similar future disasters. Management costs, as authorized by Section 324, which reimburses some of the applicant's administrative expenses incurred managing the totality of the PA Program's projects and grants. FEMA will either award PA grants based on the estimated federal share of the total eligible cost of the project or award grants on the federal share of actual eligible costs evidenced through documentation from the applicant/grantee. The federal government provides a minimum of 75% of the cost of eligible assistance, and this cost-share can rise if certain criteria are met. The PA Program is appropriated for in the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). Between FY2000 and FY2013, PA accounted for approximately 47% of all federal spending from the DRF. During this period, the PA Program provided approximately $21.2 billion in federal grants for emergency work assistance, $30.2 billion in permanent work assistance, and $1.2 billion in management assistance. Approximately $6.6 billion of these grant amounts was provided to PNPs for both emergency and permanent work. The PA Program authorities were most recently significantly amended by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (Division B of P.L. 113-2, SRIA). SRIA established ""alternative procedures"" for PA Program assistance, which has allowed FEMA to implement a Public Assistance Alternative Procedures (PAAP) Pilot Program. These procedures revise a number of elements of the PA Program, such as allowing grants for large, permanent work projects (facility restoration projects over $120,000) to be based on fixed estimates, as opposed to actual cost basis, and increasing the federal share of eligible costs when debris is removed more quickly by applicants. Given the importance of PA Program assistance to communities recovering from disasters, and the amount of federal dollars spent on the assistance, Congress may consider several policy issues related to the PA Program. For example, Congress may consider Reviewing current FEMA policies implementing the authorizing statute and, when desired, codifying or overriding the policies through further clarification in law Evaluating major forthcoming changes to the PA Program authorized by SRIA and an earlier law, the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-390) Weighing options for decreasing the improper use of PA assistance by applicants, perhaps by revising the conditions of management cost assistance or improving the collection of data in the PA Program Expanding or restricting the eligibility of the PA Program, possibly to exclude certain PNPs from assistance or to grant assistance to privately owned facilities Deciding if and how the PA Program should provide hazard mitigation assistance on facility restoration projects, and Defining the role of PA Program as it potentially overlaps with the disaster assistance authorities of other federal agencies.",11,11 "Energy and Water Development: FY2015 Appropriations. The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), for the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), and the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and several other independent agencies. President Obama's FY2015 budget request for Energy and Water Development was released in March 2014. Including adjustments, the request totaled $34.26 billion, compared with a total of $34.13 billion appropriated for FY2014. The House approved the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill for FY2015 by a vote of 253-170 on July 10, 2014 (H.R. 4923, H.Rept. 113-486), with a funding total of $34.20 billion. The House adopted several amendments that did not change the total funding level from the bill as reported by the Appropriations Committee. The Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on Energy and Water Development approved its version of the bill on June 17, 2014, with a total of $34.21 billion, but the full committee did not take it up. Final FY2015 Energy and Water Development funding was included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83). Energy and Water funding totaled $34.78 billion, $519 million above the request and $653 million above FY2014, including rescissions. The consolidated appropriations measure passed the House December 11, 2014, and the Senate December 13, 2014, and was signed by the President on December 16, 2014 (P.L. 113-235). Major issues in the debate over the Energy and Water Development bill included the distribution of appropriations for Corps (Title I) and Reclamation (Title II) projects that have historically received congressional appropriations above Administration requests alternatives to the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, which the Administration has abandoned (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal) proposed FY2015 spending levels for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs (Title III) that were more than 20% higher in the Administration's request than the amount appropriated for FY2014 DOE funding for a joint effort with the Departments of the Navy and Agriculture for commercial-scale biorefineries that produce military-specification fuels cost, schedule, and management concerns for the international ITER project, which seeks to design and build an experimental fusion reactor (Title III, Science) long-standing controversy over facilities for processing uranium and plutonium components for nuclear weapons (Title III, Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship), and the Administration's proposal, rejected in the enacted version, to suspend construction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which is intended to convert surplus nuclear weapons plutonium into civilian nuclear reactor fuel.",59,59 "The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress. This report discusses the global nuclear detection architecture: a multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack.",22,29 "The No Child Left Behind Act and ""Unfunded Mandates"": A Legal Analysis of School District of the City of Pontiac v. Secretary of the United States Department of Education. In 2008, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a decision in School District of the City of Pontiac v. Secretary of the United States Department of Education. In its decision, the court held that the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act failed to provide the required ""clear notice"" to states and school districts regarding the requirements they must fulfill as a condition of receiving federal funding. The case was subsequently reheard, but the en banc Sixth Circuit divided evenly, meaning that the judgment of the district court to dismiss the case was affirmed. This report discusses some of the practical and legal implications of the Sixth Circuit decisions.",33,33 "Election Projections: First Amendment Issues. Media projections may be based both on exit polls and on information acquired as to actual ballot counts. The First Amendment would generally preclude Congress from prohibiting the media from interviewing voters after they exit the polls. It apparently would also preclude Congress from prohibiting the media from reporting the results of those polls. Congress, could, however, ban voter solicitation within a certain distance from a polling place, and might be able to include exit polling within such a ban. It also might be able to deny media access to ballot counts, either when the polls have not closed in the jurisdiction whose votes are being counted, or when the polls have not closed across the nation.",15,61 "Endangered Species: Difficult Choices. This report discusses issues debated in the 108th Congress while is considering various proposals to amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). Major issues in recent years have included changing the role of science in decision-making, changing the role of critical habitat, reducing conflicts with Department of Defense activities, incorporating further protection for property owners, and increasing protection of listed species, among others. In addition, many have advocated including significant changes to ESA regulations made during the Clinton Administration in the law itself.",47,47 "The Education of Students with Disabilities: Alignment Between the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The largest sources of federal funding for elementary and secondary education are the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB, P.L. 107-110), and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, P.L. 108-446). The ESEA provides funding and services for a broad population of students, including disadvantaged students, migrant students, neglected and delinquent students, and students with limited English proficiency. Approximately 6 million students with disabilities ages 6 through 21 attend elementary and secondary schools, however, they are not afforded special services under the ESEA due to their disability status. The IDEA provides funding and services specifically for those students with disabilities. Both the ESEA and IDEA aim to improve the educational outcomes for students with disabilities. The ways in which they do this sometimes differ, and when the laws are not fully or clearly aligned it can be difficult for educators to plan and execute an appropriate education for students with disabilities. In the 113th Congress, legislators have actively considered reauthorization of the ESEA. This report focuses on four broad policy issues within both the ESEA and IDEA, which potentially create differing expectations or requirements for schools and teachers educating students with disabilities Standards. Under the ESEA, students with disabilities are taught to state academic content standards that apply to all children in the state. Under the IDEA, academic goals are established for each child in an individualized education program (IEP). Assessments. Under the ESEA, students with disabilities participate in annual assessments that determine adequate yearly progress toward meeting expectations associated with state academic content and achievement standards. Under the IDEA, students with disabilities are assessed for identification purposes and for monitoring progress toward meeting goals articulated in their IEPs. Accountability. The ESEA accountability system primarily measures whether schools and local education agencies are making adequate yearly progress in reading and mathematics achievement. The ""students with disabilities"" subgroup is expected to make adequate yearly progress. The IDEA monitoring system measures whether states are meeting certain compliance and performance indicators to determine whether the law is being implemented as intended. Teachers. Both the ESEA and IDEA have requirements regarding ""highly qualified"" teachers. The ESEA includes a definition of ""highly qualified"" teacher as the term relates to teachers of elementary and secondary education. The IDEA also includes a definition of ""highly qualified"" teacher as the term relates to special education teachers of elementary and secondary education. Because students with disabilities spend the majority of time in the general education classroom, they are affected by both definitions. This report highlights issues pertaining to alignment and misalignment among ESEA and IDEA provisions within these areas, describes how statutory and regulatory language has sought to clarify these issues, and discusses specific issues that Congress may consider during deliberations on the reauthorization of ESEA.",35,35 "Avian Flu Pandemic: Potential Impact of Trade Disruptions. Concerns about potential disruptions in U.S. trade flows due to a global health or security crisis are not new. The possibility of an avian flu pandemic with consequences for global trade is a concern that has received attention recently, although some experts believe there is little cause for alarm. Experts disagree on the likelihood of an avian flu pandemic developing at all. This report considers possible trade disruptions, including possible impacts on trade between the United States and countries and regions that have reported avian influenza infections. These trade disruptions could include countries banning imported goods from infected regions at the onset of a pandemic, de facto bans due to protective health measures, or supply-side constraints caused by health crises in exporting countries.",65,4 "Emergency Communications: Policy Options at a Crossroads. Wireless communications capacity and capability provide essential support to emergency workers. First responders, state, local, tribal and federal emergency officials, utility workers, ambulance drivers, hospital personnel, forest fire fighters, federal law enforcement agents, the National Guard, and members of all branches of the military are among those who might respond to an emergency and need to be equipped to communicate among themselves and with each other. The management of spectrum that carries wireless communications for public safety and homeland security has emerged as a time-critical policy issue for the 110th Congress due largely to several recent actions by Congress and the Administration, some with near-term deadlines. Congress has mandated that an important band of spectrum be released for public safety use not later than February 18, 2009 (Deficit Reduction Act, P.L. 109-171, Sec. 3002). Congress has also mandated that a billion-dollar fund for public safety communications, created by the Deficit Reduction Act, be fully distributed by the end of FY2007 (S. 2653). As part of the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Congress put in place a number of requirements for an Office of Emergency Communications that, among other objectives, is to work with community, state and regional representatives to develop a national emergency communications capability (P.L. 109-295, Title VI, Subtitle D). Funding for part of this effort would be authorized as part of H.R. 1 (Representative Thompson). The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is moving forward with the Presidential Spectrum Policy Initiative planning process which includes evaluating spectrum use for public safety and homeland security. The Spectrum Advisory Committee created for this effort has announced that it will study several advanced systems operated by public safety agencies that might serve as a model for designing a national system. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in December 2006, announced a proposed rulemaking for a plan to provide a national emergency communications network using the spectrum band assigned by Congress to public safety, noted above. At the core of the FCC proposal is the appointment of a not-for-profit entity to administer access to the designated spectrum and to design a network that would be shared by public safety and commercial users. These various initiatives appear to be moving in different directions. Congress may opt to establish policies for spectrum management that could require other approaches or objectives by the various agencies and departments involved. This report will be updated.",97,97 "Independent Counsels, Special Prosecutors, Special Counsels, and the Role of Congress. This report provides information on the procedure for the appointment of an ""independent counsel,"" a ""special prosecutor,"" or a ""special counsel"" to investigate and prosecute potential or possible violations of federal criminal law by officials in the executive branch of the federal government and in federal agencies. Specifically examined is the role or authority of Congress in requiring an independent or special counsel investigation of executive branch officials. Under the Constitution and its separation of powers principles and structure, Congress has no direct role in federal law enforcement, nor in triggering or initiating the appointment of any prosecutor for any particular matter (other than the advice and consent role of the Senate regarding certain nominations made by the President). Congress, however, has recognized inherent authority to conduct oversight hearings and legislative investigations by its committees into misconduct, mismanagement, or any other malfeasance relating to the officers and agencies of the executive branch of government to assure the government's proper functioning, to assure the proper expenditure of funds that Congress appropriates, and to explore the need for remedial legislation. Revelations from such investigations and oversight, in addition to providing information for remedial legislation, may contribute to the public pressure on the Administration or Department of Justice to appoint an ""independent"" counsel or prosecutor to investigate uncovered evidence or allegations of wrongdoing by persons in the Administration. Congress may also have a legislative role in designing a statutory mechanism for the appointment of ""independent counsels"" or ""special prosecutors,"" as it did in title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. Under the provisions of that law relating to the appointment of ""independent counsels"" (called ""special prosecutors"" until 1983), the Attorney General was directed to petition a special three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals to name an independent counsel upon the receipt of credible allegations of criminal misconduct by certain high-level personnel in the executive branch of the federal government whose prosecution by the Administration might give rise to an appearance of a conflict of interest. In 1999, Congress allowed the ""independent counsel"" provisions of law to expire. Upon the expiration of the law in June of 1999, no new ""independent counsels"" or ""special prosecutors"" may be appointed by a three-judge panel upon the application of the Attorney General. The Attorney General retains the general authority to designate or name individuals as ""special counsels"" to conduct investigations or prosecutions of particular matters or individuals on behalf of the United States. Under regulations issued by the Attorney General in 1999, the Attorney General may appoint a ""special counsel"" from outside of the Department of Justice who acts as a special employee of the Department of Justice under the direction of the Attorney General. The Attorney General, however, may also appoint an individual as a special counsel, and may invest that individual with a greater degree of independence and autonomy to conduct investigations and prosecutions, regardless of any ""special counsel"" regulations, as Attorneys General did in 1973, 1994, and 2003. In 1973, Attorney General Elliot Richardson named Archibald Cox to be the ""special prosecutor"" for the ""Watergate"" investigation, in 1994, during an earlier expiration of the independent counsel provisions of law, Attorney General Janet Reno named a ""regulatory"" independent counsel Robert Fisk to investigate allegations concerning the matter known as ""Whitewater"", and in 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft recused himself from the investigation of the leak of the identity of a CIA agent, and Deputy Attorney General Comey named U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald to be special counsel ""with all the authority of the Attorney General"" to pursue that matter.",61,54 "Private Immigration Legislation. Private immigration bills warrant careful consideration with regard to precedent since they are a special form of relief allowing the circumvention of the public laws concerning immigration and nationality in uniquely meritorious cases. This report will give an overview of the congressional subcommittee procedure and precedents concerning private immigration bills. This report will not cover parliamentary procedural issues for private bills, which are covered by CRS Report 98-628, Private Bills: Procedure in the House, by Richard S. Beth.",76,76 "Climate Change: Comparison and Analysis of S. 1766 and S. 2191 (S. 3036). Several proposals designed to address greenhouse gases have been introduced in the 110th Congress. Two proposals, S. 1766, introduced by Senators Bingaman and Specter, and S. 2191, introduced by Senators Lieberman and Warner and reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works on May 20, 2008, are receiving increased scrutiny in preparation for Senate debate on S. 2191. On May 20, 2008, Senator Boxer introduced S. 3036, which is identical to the reported version of S. 2191 except that it contains a proposed budget amendment to make the bill deficit neutral. On June 2, 2008, the Senate invoked cloture on a motion to proceed on S. 3036, allowing discussion of the bill, but not allowing amendments to be introduced. As of June 4, 2008, it is unclear whether the Senate will agree on the motion to proceed, leading to further discussion and allowing amendments to be introduced. The two proposals—S. 1766 and S. 2191—would establish market-based systems to limit emissions of greenhouse gases. However, the proposals differ in how those systems would work. S. 2191 would establish an absolute cap on emissions from covered entities and would allow entities to trade emissions under that cap. S. 1766 would establish emissions targets on covered entities and allow those entities to either meet emission reduction targets through a trading program or make a safety valve payment in lieu of reducing emissions. Under both proposals, short-term U.S. emissions would likely be below a business-as-usual scenario, although reductions under S. 2191 are guaranteed by the cap and are projected to be larger, particularly over the long-term. In contrast, costs under S. 1766 are likely to be lower and more predictable than under S. 2191. A major policy question is whether one is more concerned about the possible economic cost of the program and therefore willing to accept some uncertainty about the amount of reduction received (i.e., favoring a ""safety valve"" like S. 1766), or one is more concerned about achieving a specific emission reduction level with costs handled efficiently, but not capped (i.e., pure tradeable permits as in S. 2191). S. 2191 leans toward the quantity (total emissions) side of the equation, S. 1766 leans toward the price side of the equation.",42,42 "The ""FTO List"" and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The purpose of this report is to provide Congress with an overview of the nature and status of the designated foreign terrorist organizations list, as a potential tool in overseeing the implementation and effects of U.S. legislation designed to sanction terrorists. It centers on the list of terrorist groups that are formally designated by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132). These groups are often collectively referred to as the ""FTO list. FTO list designations, which last for two years and must be renewed, occur after an interagency process involving the departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury. Since the designations can be challenged in court, they require a detailed administrative record often based on classified information. An organization that is placed on the FTO list is subject to financial and immigration sanctions, potentially including the blocking of assets, the prosecution of supporters who provide funds, refusal of visas, and deportations of members. There have been a number of designations and changes since the list was established, but it currently includes thirty-six organizations. (See Appendix A.) The FTO list is often confused with some of the other ""terrorist lists"" that are maintained by the U.S. government. These include the ""state-sponsors of terrorism"" list, which is pursuant to Section 6(j) of the 1979 Export Administration Act (P.L. 96-72, 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(6)(j)), the Specially Designated Terrorists"" (SDTs) list, which is pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and was initiated in 1995 under Presidential Executive Order 12947, the ""Specially Designated Global Terrorists"" (SDGT) list initiated in 2001 under Presidential Executive Order 13224, and, finally, the ""Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons"" (SDN) list, a master list that contains the other lists. All of these are summarized and maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department. Lastly, the ""Terrorist Exclusion List"" or ""TEL,"" which relates to immigration and is pursuant to Section 411 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (8 U.S.C. 1182) is maintained by the State Department. Like the FTO list, the TEL includes the names of terrorist organizations, but it has a broader standard for inclusion, is subject to less stringent administrative requirements, and is not challengeable in court. There is a complicated interplay among all of these lists, and it is important to distinguish them from the better-known FTO list. The FTO list has been of considerable interest to Congress, and there are arguments in favor and against it. It publicly stigmatizes groups and provides a clear focal point for interagency cooperation on terrorist sanctions, however, some argue that it is inflexible and misleading, since groups that are not on the list are still often subject to U.S. sanctions. The report concludes with a discussion of potential policy options for Congress, including some of the recently proposed amendments to the legislation that establishes it. It will be updated as events warrant.",86,86 "Burma's 2015 Parliamentary Elections: Issues for Congress. The landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) in Burma's November 2015 parliamentary elections may prove to be a major step in the nation's potential transition to a more democratic government. Having won nearly 80% of the contested seats in the election, the NLD has a majority in both chambers of the Union Parliament, which gave it the ability to select the President-elect, as well as control of most of the nation's Regional and State Parliaments. Burma's 2008 constitution, however, grants the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, widespread powers in the governance of the nation, and nearly complete autonomy from civilian control. One quarter of the seats in each chamber of the Union Parliament are reserved for military officers appointed by the Tatmadaw's Commander-in-Chief, giving them the ability to block any constitutional amendments. Military officers constitute a majority of the National Defence and Security Council, an 11-member body with some oversight authority over the President. The constitution also grants the Tatmadaw ""the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed services,"" and designates the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services as ""the Supreme Commander' of all armed forces,"" which could have serious implications for efforts to end the nation's six-decade-long, low-grade civil war. For Congress and the Obama Administration, the election results and a transition period that will last several months raise a number of questions for U.S. policy toward Burma. To what extent does the election and formation of an NLD-led government constitute the partial achievement of the U.S. goal to see a civilian democratically elected government in Burma? Under what conditions and when should the Obama Administration and/or Congress consider relaxing or revoking existing restrictions on relations with Burma? Should the Obama Administration or Congress undertake any new programs or activities in Burma, and if so, at what stage in the transition process? Congress gave one indication of its answers to these questions in December 2015 when it passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), which continued some restrictions on U.S. relations with Burma, while requiring new forms of engagement. A new NLD-led government may not be fully in place before summer 2016. The new Union Parliament took office in early February, and on March 15 selected Htin Kyaw as the nation's next President. The President-elect is to be sworn into office on March 30, 2016, and will have to appoint new Ministers for his government, as well as Chief Ministers for the nation's 14 Regions and States. The NLD government will face great expectations from the Burmese people to address the country's more serious problems. These include a six-decade-long, low-grade civil war, serious ethnic and religious tensions (especially in Rakhine State), poor conditions for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, and an inefficient and distorted economy. The new government faces the issue of cooperation with the Tatmadaw to address some of these problems, it is unclear if the Burmese military will be willing to cooperate. What measures the Obama Administration or Congress choose to take, if any, to alter current U.S. policy toward Burma will likely depend on several factors. The first factor is how the transition process proceeds and what the new NLD-led government looks like in terms of parliamentary and ministerial leadership. Another factor is timing, a clearer picture of Burma's political situation is likely to emerge just as the United States enters into the height of its election season.",85,85 "Federal Aid to Roads and Highways Since the 18th Century: A Legislative History. The federal government has provided aid for roads and highways since the establishment of the United States in 1789. This report comprises a brief history of such aid, detailing some precedent setters and more recent funding through the Highway Trust Fund, which was created in 1956.",121,121 "Climate Change and International Deforestation: Legislative Analysis. Deforestation accounts for nearly 20% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in the world. Deforestation results in carbon emissions when trees and underlying vegetation are burning or decomposing. Deforested areas that are later cultivated also release carbon to the atmosphere when soil carbon is oxidized. Further, deforested areas converted to other land uses (e.g., pastures) might sequester less carbon than forests, enabling greater levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. Providing incentives to prevent deforestation in foreign countries has been proposed in climate change legislation. An objective of this legislation is to provide funding from carbon markets to assist foreign countries in reducing deforestation and increasing forest restoration and afforestation. Challenges to this approach include implementing deforestation reduction activities in developing countries that may lack the capacity to monitor and enforce measures, avoiding harm to indigenous communities who rely on forest resources, and matching policies with the various drivers of deforestation in different regions around the world. Legislative policies on deforestation and climate change are analyzed in this report, and challenges for restoring forests in the tropics are discussed.",42,42 "Floor Consideration of Conference Reports in the Senate. When a conference committee approves its report, the next step in the legislative process is for the report, along with a joint explanatory statement of the managers, to be presented to the House and Senate for consideration. A conference report must be considered in one chamber at a time when a chamber is in possession of the official conference papers. The papers consist of the conference report as well as the bill and the amendment(s) sent to conference.",55,55 "An Overview of the Employment-Population Ratio. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the employment-population ratio as the ratio of total civilian employment to the civilian noninstitutional population. Simply put, it is the portion of the population that is employed. The ratio is used primarily as a measure of job holders and to track the pace of job creation, relative to the adult population, over time. The employment-population ratio has several properties that make it an attractive indicator for labor market analysis. It is easy to interpret and can be used to make meaningful comparisons across time and groups with dissimilar population size. Because it takes into account both the impacts of labor force participation and unemployment, it is a useful summary measure when those forces place countervailing pressures on employment. Like all labor market indicators, it has limits. For example, it does not distinguish between part-time and full-time employment, and it is silent on wages, benefits, and job conditions. Trends in the employment-population ratio also do not provide information about job flows (i.e., whether a drop in employment represents more people exiting employment or fewer new entrants). Recent estimates show that employment as a percentage of the civilian population has not returned to pre-recessionary levels. In November 2007, the employment-population ratio was 62.9%, indicating that 62.9% of the adult population had a job in that month. This rate fell steadily during the recession and several months beyond, before stabilizing around 58.5% in October 2009. Between October 2009 and March 2014, the ratio fluctuated within 0.3 percentage points of 58.5%. Since then, the employment-population ratio has climbed slowly to 59.3%, its value in April 2015. These patterns should be taken in the context of shifting demographics and other recent developments in the United States. Notably, the large baby boomer cohort has started to retire, and younger individuals are spending more time in school or otherwise delaying labor market entry. A comparison of recent employment-population ratio trends for the ""prime-age"" population (persons in the 25- to 54-year-age group) with those for the full adult population (persons 16 years and older) suggests that recent labor force participation patterns of young and older workers have placed downward pressure on the employment-population ratio, but age factors do not fully explain its slow recovery.",103,103 "The ""Superwaiver"" Proposal and Service Integration: A History of Federal Initiatives. As part of the continuing debate over welfare reform reauthorization, the Bush Administration has supported a proposal that would enable states to obtain waivers from certain federal rules of various welfare-related programs in order to integrate activities across a wide spectrum of social services. This proposal, often referred to as the ""superwaiver,"" would provide broad waiver authority to executive branch agencies that administer covered programs. The Administration has argued that giving state and local authorities more flexibility to coordinate workforce and family support programs can help to promote self-sufficiency among low-income families. Waiver initiatives like the ""superwaiver"" are one type of approach to service integration -- a broad and more enduring policy issue that has been raised in response to criticism that social service programs are fragmented, costly to administer, and complicated for low-income families to maneuver. Over the past 30 years, there have been numerous federal-level service integration initiatives. In addition to waivers, approaches to service integration have included grant management reform administrative simplification, demonstration or pilot projects, and block grants. Past federal efforts reveal that issues related to potential costs and savings, programs to be covered, administering authority, evaluations, and accountability are important components that can influence the success of service integration initiatives. Ironically, the biggest lesson has been that reform itself can be fragmented, and requires a great deal of effort and strong leadership to coordinate and implement in its own right. Lessons from past initiatives have shown that service integration requires resources to execute in the short-run and it is not clear whether integration is cost-effective in the long-run, taking these costs into account. Federal programs included in integration efforts generally are those that provide services to meet ""basic needs"" of low-income individuals and families, but the debate over which programs and types of requirements to include can be highly political and lead to wide variation in the types of projects undertaken. Designation of an organizational body with authority to implement an initiative can facilitate federal participation, expedite approval of projects, provide technical assistance, and act as an oversight entity. Pilot and demonstration projects require substantive evaluations in order to compare the effectiveness of varying types of inter-agency linkages and approaches to integration to inform future efforts. Developing strong performance measures is critical to enhancing accountability of service integration projects. This report reviews the history, trends, and outcomes of past federal service integration initiatives that might be seen as comparable to the current ""superwaiver"" proposal. These past attempts are wide ranging, but related in the sense that they have sought to cut across multiple federal program boundaries in order to give state and local agencies more flexibility to integrate and coordinate programs that serve the same or overlapping low-income populations.",117,95 "House of Representatives v. Burwell and Congressional Standing to Sue. On November 21, 2014, the House of Representatives filed a lawsuit against the Departments of Health and Human Services and the Treasury, pursuant to H.Res. 676. House of Representatives v. Burwell included two claims regarding the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). In September 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion addressing the preliminary jurisdictional and justiciability questions at issue in the case. In May 2016, the district court issued its decision on the merits, in which the House prevailed as to one of its claims. The agencies filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in July 2016. This report discusses one preliminary justiciability question: whether or not an authorized house of Congress has standing to sue the executive branch regarding the manner in which it executes the law. Generally, to participate as party litigants, all plaintiffs, including congressional plaintiffs, must demonstrate that they meet the requirements of the standing doctrine, derived from Article III of the Constitution. The failure to satisfy the standing requirements is fatal to the litigation and will result in its dismissal without a decision by the court on the merits of the presented claims. As applied to congressional plaintiffs, the doctrine of standing has generally been invoked in cases challenging executive branch actions or acts of Congress. This case law can be broken down into two categories: (1) cases where individual Members file suit and (2) cases where congressional institutions (committees or houses of Congress) file suit. The case law regarding individual Member suits has been fairly settled following the Supreme Court's 1997 Raines v. Byrd decision. In contrast, suits by congressional plaintiffs have been rare. While the courts have grappled with several cases regarding access to information, Burwell is the first case to analyze the House's standing to assert an institutional injury unrelated to information access. This report begins by examining areas in which the courts have provided relatively definitive analysis regarding congressional standing. First, it examines Raines and its progeny, to explain how a court analyzes assertions of institutional injuries when the plaintiff is an individual Member. Next, the report discusses cases brought by institutional plaintiffs based on institutional injuries regarding information access, namely suits seeking to enforce a congressional subpoena. By looking at these cases, one can identify whether the courts have established criteria that are necessary, but not sufficient, for institutional plaintiffs to establish standing. The report then describes and analyzes the district court's ruling on standing in Burwell, in which the court determined that the House had suffered an injury sufficient to establish standing on one of its two claims. Finally, it addresses unresolved questions raised by the reasoning developed in Burwell and how it may be applied in future cases.",92,55 "Congressional Commissions: Costs and Cost-Saving Strategies. This report discusses the congressional commissions, which are temporary advisory bodies, usually established by statute, that provide independent advice to Congress, make recommendations for changes in public policy, study or investigate a particular problem or event, or perform a specific duty.",55,55 "Global Climate Change: Carbon Emissions and End-Use Energy Demand. This report presents an analysis of the potential impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. energy demand. The analysis focuses on 27 common end-uses — light duty vehicles, residential space heating, industrial direct process heat, etc. — that describe the way energy is used in the United States",42,42 "The Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the 111th Congress: Conflicting Values and Difficult Choices. The Endangered Species Act (ESA, P.L. 93-205, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543) has been one of the more contentious environmental laws. This may stem from its strict substantive provisions, which can affect the use of both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. Under ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) can be listed as endangered or threatened according to assessments of their risk of extinction. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to aid its recovery and protect its habitat. ESA may also be controversial because dwindling species are usually harbingers of broader ecosystem decline. The most common cause of species listing is habitat loss. ESA is considered a primary driver of large-scale ecosystem restoration issues. The 111th Congress has considered whether to revoke ESA regulations promulgated in the waning days of the Bush Administration that would alter when federal agency consultation is required. In addition, legislation related to global climate change includes provisions that would allocate funds to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's endangered species program and/or to related funds to assist species adaptation to climate change. Other major issues concerning ESA in recent years have included the role of science in decision-making, critical habitat (CH) designation, protection by and incentives for property owners, and appropriate protection of listed species, among others. The authorization for spending under ESA expired on October 1, 1992. The prohibitions and requirements of ESA remain in force, even in the absence of an authorization, and funds have been appropriated to implement the administrative provisions of ESA in each subsequent fiscal year. Proposals to reauthorize and extensively amend ESA were last considered in the 109th Congress, but none was enacted. No legislative proposals were introduced in the 110th or 111th Congresses to reauthorize the ESA. Several measures related to ESA were enacted in the 111th Congress, including P.L. 111-8, containing language authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw or reissue (1) revisions to the ESA Section 7 consultation regulations promulgated by the Bush Administration and (2) a December 2008 special rule that outlined protections afforded polar bears, P.L. 111-11, including provisions (1) authorizing the implementation of the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement, providing for the reintroduction of Chinook salmon, and (2) amending P.L. 106-392 to extend the authorizations for the Upper Colorado and San Juan River Basin endangered fish recovery programs through FY2023, P.L. 111-88, appropriating about $281 million for U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service endangered species and related programs for FY2010 (under the authority of a continuing resolution (P.L. 111-322), ESA funding at FY2010 levels was extended through March 4, 2011), and P.L. 111-241, authorizing the issuance of a Multinational Species Conservation Fund semipostal stamp. This report discusses oversight issues and legislation introduced in the 111th Congress to address ESA implementation and management of endangered and threatened species.",47,47 "Federal Funding Gaps: A Brief Overview. The Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341-1342, 1511-1519) generally bars the obligation of funds in the absence of appropriations. Exceptions are made under the act, including for activities involving ""the safety of human life or the protection of property."" The interval during the fiscal year when appropriations for a particular project or activity are not enacted into law, either in the form of a regular appropriations act or a continuing resolution (CR), is referred to as a funding gap. Although funding gaps may occur at the start of the fiscal year, they may also occur any time a CR expires and another CR (or the regular appropriations bill) is not enacted immediately thereafter. Multiple funding gaps may occur within a fiscal year. When a funding gap occurs, federal agencies are generally required to begin a shutdown of the affected projects and activities, which includes the prompt furlough of non-excepted personnel. The general practice of the federal government after the shutdown has ended has been to retroactively pay furloughed employees for the time they missed, as well as employees who were required to come to work. Although a shutdown may be the result of a funding gap, the two events should be distinguished. This is because a funding gap may result in a total shutdown of all affected projects or activities in some instances but not others. For example, when funding gaps are of a short duration, agencies may not have enough time to complete a shutdown of affected projects and activities before funding is restored. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget has previously indicated that a shutdown of agency operations within the first day of the funding gap may be postponed if a resolution appears to be imminent. Since FY1977, 19 funding gaps occurred, ranging in duration from 1 day to 21 full days. These funding gaps are listed in Table 1. About half of these funding gaps were brief (i.e., three days or less in duration). Notably, many of the funding gaps that occurred during this period do not appear to have resulted in a ""shutdown."" Prior to the issuance of the opinions in 1980 and early 1981 by then-Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, while agencies tended to curtail some operations in response to a funding gap, they often ""continued to operate during periods of expired funding."" In addition, some of the funding gaps after the Civiletti opinions did not result in a completion of shutdown operations due to both the funding gap's short duration and an expectation that appropriations would soon be enacted. Some of the funding gaps during this period, however, did have a broader impact on affected government operations, even if only for a matter of hours. Two of the most recent funding gaps occurred in FY1996, amounting to 5 days and 21 days. The chronology of regular and continuing appropriations enacted during FY1996 is illustrated in Figure 1. At the beginning of FY2014 (October 1, 2013), none of the regular appropriations bills had been enacted, so a government-wide funding gap occurred. It concluded on October 17, 2013, after lasting 16 days. The most recent funding gap occurred during FY2018, when a CR covering all of the regular appropriations bills expired on January 19, 2018. It concluded on January 22, 2018, after lasting two days. For a general discussion of federal government shutdowns, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass.",101,59 "Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress. The Bush Administration identified transformation as a major goal for the Department of Defense (DOD) soon after taking office, and initially justified many of its proposals for DOD on the grounds that they were needed for defense transformation. Although defense transformation is still discussed in administration defense-policy documents and budget-justification materials, the concept is now less prominent in discussions of U.S. defense policy and programs than it was during the earlier years of the Bush Administration. The Administration's vision for defense transformation calls for placing increased emphasis in U.S. defense planning on the following: irregular warfare, including terrorism, insurgencies, and civil war, potential catastrophic security threats, such as the possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and rogue states, and potential disruptive events, such as the emergence of new technologies that could undermine current U.S. military advantages. The Administration's vision for defense transformation calls for shifting U.S. military forces toward a greater reliance on joint operations, network-centric warfare, effects-based operations, speed and agility, and precision application of firepower. Transformation could affect the defense industrial base by transferring funding from ""legacy"" systems to transformational systems, and from traditional DOD contractors to firms that previously have not done much defense work. Potential oversight issues for Congress regarding defense transformation include the potential for DOD transformation plans to change as a result of Robert Gates succeeding Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, the merits of certain elements of DOD's transformation plan, overall leadership and management of transformation, experiments and exercises conducted in support of transformation, measures for creating a culture of innovation viewed as necessary to support transformation, the adequacy of information provided to Congress regarding transformation-related initiatives, and whether the Administration has invoked the term transformation as an all-purpose rhetorical tool for justifying its various proposals for DOD. This report will be updated as events warrant.",25,32 "Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Proposals Before the 105th Congress. This report examines current consumer bankruptcy practice and the proposals set forth in the reform bills. Also considered are the legislative history of the current consumer bankruptcy scheme, and topics likely to be debated as Congress proceeds to consider consumer bankruptcy reform.",6,6 "Transitional Medical Assistance (TMA) Under Medicaid. This report provides an overview of transitional medical assistance (TMA). While Section 1925 of the Social Security Act outlines the provisions requiring states to provide TMA for up to 12 months, states have considerable flexibility in designing and implementing their TMA programs.",71,70 "AIDS Funding for Federal Government Programs: FY1981-FY2009. Federal government spending on HIV (the human immunodeficiency virus) and AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) is estimated at $23.3 billion in FY2008. Of the total, 63% is for treatment programs, research programs receive 13%, prevention programs receive 14%, and income support programs receive 10%. The Administration's government-wide request level for all HIV/AIDS programs in FY2009 is $24.1 billion. AIDS programs within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) account for 66% of the total amount spent on HIV/AIDS by the federal government in FY2008, a total of $15.2 billion for both discretionary and entitlement programs. Within the HHS discretionary budget, funding for HIV/AIDS research, prevention, and treatment programs has increased from $200,000 in FY1981 to an estimated $6.586 billion in FY2008, the Administration's request for FY2009 is $6.592 billion. This report provides an overview of HHS spending on HIV/AIDS as well as budget numbers for other federal government programs targeting HIV/AIDS. This report is updated once per year to reflect the new budget figures.",65,65 "Romania After the 2000 Elections: Background and Issues for Congress. In parliamentary and presidential elections on November 26, 2000, the Romanian electorate restored to power the reformed communist party that it had voted out of office four years earlier, in addition Ion Iliescu, president from 1990-1996, received a plurality of the presidential votes. During a run-off election on December 10, Iliescu defeated Vadim Tudor, an extremist nationalist candidate. Romania is one of Europe's poorest countries, successive governments have been slow to make necessary reforms to jumpstart the economy and attract needed foreign investment. There have been indications that, despite pressure from international institutions, the new government may attempt only a gradual approach to reform. With a minority mandate, Iliescu and his Party of Social Democracy in Romania will need the cooperation of other parties to privatize and restructure the economy. Romania's foreign policy, which for the past decade has emphasized integration into the EU and NATO, is not expected to change. On January 1, 2001, Romania assumed the revolving chairmanship of the OSCE.",85,85 "Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Enforcement: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 allows U.S. companies to protect themselves from imports that infringe intellectual property rights. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) adjudicates complaints filed by U.S. companies alleging Section 337 violations. Primary remedies under Section 337 include exclusion orders and cease and desist orders. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of Section 337 proceedings or actions. Members of Congress have expressed concern about the length of time for completion of Section 337 investigations and the effectiveness of enforcement of exclusion orders.",9,9 "Administrative Subpoenas and National Security Letters in Criminal and Intelligence Investigations: A Sketch. Administrative subpoena authority, including closely related national security letter authority, is the power vested in various administrative agencies to compel testimony or the production of documents or both in aid of the agencies' performance of their duties. Both the President and Members of Congress have called for statutory adjustments relating to the use of administrative subpoenas and national security letters in criminal and foreign intelligence investigations. One lower federal court has found the sweeping gag orders and lack of judicial review that mark one of the national security letter practices constitutionally defective. Proponents of expanded use emphasize the effectiveness of administrative subpoenas as an investigative tool and question the logic of its availability in drug and health care fraud cases but not in terrorism cases. Critics suggest that it is little more than a constitutionally suspect ""trophy"" power, easily abused and of little legitimate use. This is an abridged version — without footnotes, appendices, quotation marks and most citations to authority — of Administrative Subpoenas and National Security Letters in Criminal and Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Background and Proposed Adjustments, CRS Report RL32880.",27,27 "Social Security: Raising the Retirement Age Background and Issues. The Social Security ""full retirement age"" will gradually rise from 65 to 67 beginning with people who attain age 62 in 2000 (i.e., those born in 1938). Early retirement benefits will still be available beginning at age 62, but at lower levels. To help solve Social Security's long-range financing problems, it has been proposed that these ages be raised further.",88,116 "Health Savings Accounts: Overview of Rules for 2012. Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) are one way people can pay for unreimbursed medical expenses (deductibles, copayments, and services not covered by insurance) on a tax-advantaged basis. HSAs can be established and funded by eligible individuals when they have a qualifying high-deductible health plan and no other health plan, with some exceptions. For 2012, the deductible for self-only coverage must be at least $1,200 (with an annual out-of-pocket limit not exceeding $6,050), the deductible for family coverage must be at least $2,400 (with an annual out-of-pocket limit not exceeding $12,100). The annual HSA contribution limit in 2012 for individuals with self-only coverage is $3,100, for family coverage, it is $6,250. Individuals who are at least 55 years of age but not yet enrolled in Medicare may contribute an additional $1,000. The tax advantages of HSAs can be significant for some people: contributions are deductible (or excluded from income that is taxable if made by employers), withdrawals are not taxed if used for medical expenses, and account earnings are tax-exempt. Unused balances may accumulate without limit. HSAs and the accompanying high-deductible health plans are one form of what some call ""consumer-driven health plans."" One objective of these plans is to encourage individuals and families to set money aside for their health care expenses. Another is to give them a financial incentive for spending health care dollars prudently. Still another goal is to give them the means to pay for health care services of their own choosing, without constraint by insurers or employers. Since HSAs are still relatively new (they have been authorized for less than six years), the extent to which they will further these objectives is not yet known with any assurance, notwithstanding some early data. This report is limited to a summary of the principal rules governing HSAs, covering such matters as eligibility, qualifying health insurance, contributions, and withdrawals. The major changes to HSAs in 2011 were a result of provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). These include changes to the definition of qualified expenses and increases to the penalty for distributions for non-qualified expenses. These are discussed in greater detail in this report. This report will be updated as the rules change, either by legislation or regulatory action.",70,70 "Consumption Taxes: An Overview. Commentary abounds suggesting the current U.S. income tax code is overly complicated, unfair, a drag on the economy, and in need of reform. One option for tax reform would fundamentally change how taxes are collected in the United States, and tax consumption instead of income. Multiple proposals have been introduced in the 114th Congress to shift revenue collection away from income and toward consumption. H.R. 25 and its companion legislation in the Senate, S. 155, would replace the income tax with a national retail sales tax, often referred to as a ""fair tax."" H.R. 1040 would offer taxpayers the ability to opt into a consumed-income tax. Within the current income tax structure, an individual's tax liability is determined as a function of total income. Under a consumption tax, however, an individual's tax liability would be determined as a function of total expenditures on goods and services. Consumption taxes can take many different forms—which differ in when the tax is collected, how the tax is calculated, and who is responsible for remitting the tax—but they all share the common tax base of consumption. Common consumption tax designs include a value added tax (VAT), a national sales tax (NST), and a consumed-income tax. Taxes are necessary for the government to raise revenue to provide necessary and desired goods and services. However, taxes also tend to introduce distortions into a market economy and can hinder economic efficiency. Proponents of consumption taxes argue that a broad-based consumption tax could replace the federal income tax, raising requisite revenue while improving economic efficiency, and increasing economic output. Broadly, taxes tend to distort individual decisions by altering price signals within the economy. Taxes can affect individual behavior in a number of ways, including labor participation decisions, and saving and investment decisions. As discussed in the report, the effects on labor supply from switching to a consumption tax are expected to be small, if any. However, there is evidence that transitioning to a consumption tax may increase individual saving. Increased individual savings could contribute to increased economic output. Effects on the distribution of the tax burden are also often considered in tax policy debates. When comparing a hypothetical pure consumption tax to a hypothetical pure income tax, consumption taxes place a greater tax burden on lower income individuals. Additionally, in this stylized comparison, consumption taxes place a greater tax burden on younger and older individuals, especially retired individuals drawing down their savings.",102,102 "Federal Employees: Human Resources Management Flexibilities in Emergency Situations. Federal executive branch departments and agencies have available to them various human resources management flexibilities which can be utilized in emergency situations, such as those which resulted from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and which could occur during a pandemic influenza outbreak. The Office of Personnel Management has issued guidance on these flexibilities, which supplements the basic policies governing staffing, compensation, leave sharing, and telework in Title 5 of the United States Code. Legislation (S. 1000, H.R. 4106, and proposed amendments to S. 3268) to enhance telework in the federal government is pending in the 110th Congress.",58,58 "The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. In June 2005, G8 finance ministers proposed the new Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). The MDRI proposes to cancel debts of some of the world's poorest countries owed to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and African Development Bank. This report discusses MDRI's implementation and raises some issues regarding debt relief's effectiveness as a form of foreign assistance for possible congressional consideration.",82,82 "Dominican Republic: Background and U.S. Relations. The Dominican Republic, a country of roughly 10.3 million people that shares the Caribbean island of Hispaniola with Haiti, is a close U.S. trade partner and political ally in Latin America. The United States is the Dominican Republic's main trading partner, with two-way trade totaling more than $12.5 billion in 2014. In addition to trade, U.S. interest in the Dominican Republic has recently focused on anti-drug cooperation and governance/human rights issues, particularly as they relate to Haiti. U.S.-Dominican cooperation on bilateral and regional issues intensified during Leonel Fern√°ndez's most recent terms in office (2004-2008 and 2008-2012) and has continued during the Danilo Medina Administration. Led by former President Fern√°ndez and current President Medina, the center-left Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) has solidified its dominance over Dominican politics. In May 2010, the PLD captured two-thirds of the seats in the Dominican Congress, the party will remain in control of the legislature through May 2016. With President Medina constitutionally barred from seeking consecutive reelection, the PLD may again select Leonel Fern√°ndez as its standard bearer. Regardless, most observers are expecting the party to remain dominant in the 2016 election cycle. The main opposition party—the populist Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD)—has remained divided for several years between supporters of its leader, Miguel Vargas Maldonado (who is widely expected to seek its nomination in 2016), and those of former President Hipólito Mejía (2000-2004). Mejía seeks to run in 2016 as the candidate of a new political movement. Inaugurated on August 16, 2012, President Medina, a former member of the Dominican Congress and minister of the presidency, has built upon his predecessors' legacy while seeking to resolve lingering challenges related to the country's fiscal situation, energy sector, and education system. Medina has implemented ambitious economic and social policies that have helped him maintain extremely high approval ratings (83% in January 2015). The Medina government has struggled, however, to implement a September 2013 Dominican Constitutional Tribunal ruling that many argue may place hundreds of thousands of Dominican-born persons, most of who are of Haitian descent, at risk of statelessness. The ruling has been widely condemned by the international community and strained Dominican-Haitian relations. In recent years, congressional interest in the Dominican Republic has focused on security, trade, and human rights issues. The United States is one of the largest bilateral donors to the Dominican Republic, in FY2014, assistance totaled some $25.3 million. FY2015 estimated assistance provided in P.L. 113-235 is not yet available. The Dominican Republic has also received at least $32.5 million through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), a regional initiative for which Congress appropriated $327.0 million from FY2010-FY2014. For FY2016, the Obama Administration requested at least $24.4 million for the Dominican Republic and $53.5 million for the CBSI program. Bilateral trade and investment flows have expanded since the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) entered into force for the Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007. Human rights issues, particularly the treatment of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, have also been of significant interest to Congress. This report provides background information on political and economic conditions in the Dominican Republic, as well as an overview of some of the key issues in U.S.-Dominican relations.",85,85 "Body Armor for Law Enforcement Officers: In Brief. Firearms are one of the leading causes of deaths for law enforcement officers feloniously killed in the line of duty. Since FY1999, Congress has provided funding to state and local law enforcement agencies to help them purchase armor vests for their officers. The Matching Grant Program for Law Enforcement Armor Vests (hereinafter, ""BPV program"") provides grants to state, local, and tribal governments to purchase armor vests for use by law enforcement officers and court officers. The BPV program was first authorized by the Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-181). It has been subsequently reauthorized four times. The most recent reauthorization expired in FY2012. Between FY1999 and FY2012, annual appropriations for the program generally ranged between $25 million and $30 million. However, over the past four fiscal years, annual appropriations for the program were less than $23 million. Armor vests can only save lives when they are actually worn. Data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that an increasing percentage of police departments have instituted ""mandatory wear"" policies. Several factors can affect whether a law enforcement officer will wear an armor vest. Safety concerns are the most significant, followed by whether the officer's department has a mandatory wear policy. Comfort and fit are also a factor. While armor vests can only save lives when they are worn, there is also a limit on how long they can be worn and still be effective. No definitive data exist on how long an armor vest will last before it needs to be replaced. Many manufacturers offer a five-year warranty on their vests, but this is not necessarily indicative of their useful lifespan. The age of an armor vest alone does not cause its ballistic resistance to deteriorate. Vest care and maintenance have been shown to have a greater impact than age. Similarly, no definitive data exist on the number of law enforcement officers whose lives have been saved by vests paid for, in part, with funds from the BPV program. A frequently cited statistic is that armor vests have saved the lives of more than 3,000 law enforcement officers over the past 30 years, but it is not known how many of those vests were purchased in part with funds from the BPV program. While there is no such thing as a totally bulletproof vest, research has shown that armor vests do save lives. The risk of dying from a gunshot wound to the torso is 3.4 times higher for law enforcement officers who do not wear armor vests. Should Congress consider legislation to reauthorize the BPV program, policymakers may consider several issues, including (1) what role the federal government should play, if any, in providing armor vests for state and local law enforcement, (2) whether Congress should invest in developing new technology for armor vests, and (3) whether Congress should require law enforcement agencies to provide training on the care and maintenance of body armor as a condition of receiving funding under the BPV program.",97,97 "Everglades Restoration: Federal Funding and Implementation Progress. The Everglades is a unique network of subtropical wetlands in South Florida that is approximately half of its historical size, due in part to degradation from federal water projects built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps). In 2000, Congress authorized a plan, termed the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), as a comprehensive framework for the restoration of the Everglades ecosystem in southern Florida. When originally authorized, it was estimated that CERP would cost a total of $8.2 billion and take approximately 30 years to complete. More recent estimates indicate that the plan will cost $16.4 billion and will take approximately 50 years to implement. At issue for Congress is oversight and implementation of this commitment. Under CERP, the federal government (through the Corps and various bureaus within the Department of the Interior) is required to fund half of the costs for restoration, with an array of state, tribal, and local agencies paying the other half. In addition to activities under CERP, a number of ongoing federal and state efforts that predate CERP (known collectively as ""non-CERP"" or ""Foundation"" activities) also factor into Everglades restoration. Although non-CERP efforts technically are not part of CERP, the two sets of activities are widely viewed as complementary. Since passage of CERP in 2000, the federal investment in Everglades restoration has increased. As of the end of FY2016, the federal government had provided in excess of $1.2 billion in funding for CERP, with the state providing matching funds for CERP projects, as well as advanced funding for land acquisition and construction for expected future CERP projects. Federal funding for non-CERP activities has also continued over this period. Together with CERP, all federal Everglades restoration efforts are estimated to have totaled in excess of $5 billion from FY1993 to FY2016. While estimates of nonfederal funding contributions to CERP vary depending on what methodology and assumptions are used, observers agree that to date, the state of Florida has spent more on Everglades restoration than has the federal government. Although overall progress has fallen short of initial timelines, progress has been made on a number of Everglades restoration projects. The majority of the land necessary for restoration projects under CERP has been acquired, and significant progress has been made on non-CERP activities (including improved water deliveries to Everglades National Park). Of the nine CERP projects that had been authorized by the end of 2016 (not including pilot projects), construction was ongoing or complete at eight projects and studies were completed or under way for a number of other projects. Despite this progress, some projects have seen setbacks in the form of schedule delays and cost escalations. Assuming that the plan does not change significantly and most of the 50 projects included in the original CERP plan are eventually required to complete the effort, many new authorizations and significant additional funding would be necessary. Reviewers of the restoration program have pointed out that at current rates of project authorization and funding, additional delays would be likely. Reductions to state funding and the enactment of new CERP project authorizations in 2014 and 2016 legislation have brought renewed attention to Everglades restoration. Restoration of the Everglades is one of the largest and most mature efforts of its kind, thus, debate and resolution of Everglades restoration issues has implications not only for South Florida but also for large-scale restoration initiatives elsewhere. This report provides an overview of the federal role in Everglades restoration. It discusses background, funding history, and major accomplishments and challenges to date in federal efforts to restore the Everglades.",41,47 "Federal Financial Reporting: An Overview. Federal financial reporting—defined here as the process of recording retrospective executive department-level financial and performance information—can provide both a snapshot of the government's financial health at a given moment in time, as well as an accounting of its financial performance over a particular time frame. Federal financial reports may help the federal government demonstrate accountability, provide information for policy formulation and planning, and be used to evaluate governmental performance. Multiple reports are required by law, and all are intended to permit users—Congress, the President, agency heads, program managers, and citizens—to see how the government raises, handles, and expends public money. Congress, in particular, may find the information in federal financial reports useful for oversight. The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 was the first statute to require executive agencies to provide reports and information on their financial condition to the Secretary of the Treasury. The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) mandates the preparation of audited annual financial statements for certain funds and accounts from a number of executive branch agencies, with 10 agencies selected to provide audited annual financial statements for all agency accounts. The latter provision was expanded to every agency covered under the CFO Act (commonly referred to as CFO agencies) in the Government Management Reform Act of 1994 (GMRA) and to every executive agency in the Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 (ATDA). In addition, the CFO Act requires the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to furnish an annual financial management status report and a government-wide five-year financial management plan, and GMRA requires the Secretary of the Treasury to provide government-wide annual consolidated financial statements to be audited by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). GAO has documented improvements to federal financial reporting since the enactment of the CFO Act. Demonstrable progress has been in evidence across numerous financial management indicators, including timeliness, consistency, and auditability. In FY2012, 21 of 24 CFO agencies received unqualified (clean) audit opinions on their annual financial statements, which means that their statements were free of material misstatements and accord with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Challenges have persisted, though, both within agencies and government-wide. Unqualified overall audit opinions can obscure material weaknesses that underlie systematic financial management issues. In addition, two agencies—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD)—have never received unqualified audit opinions, which signifies the persistence of financial problems at these agencies. Government-wide, the U.S. consolidated financial statements have received a disclaimer of opinion every year since they were first required under GMRA. GAO was unable to express an opinion on the FY2012 U.S. consolidated financial statements due to material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting and other limitations on the scope of its work. Finally, federal financial statements may not provide readily understandable information to their multiple stakeholders. Congress has recently considered legislation relating to audits of federal financial statements. In the 113th Congress, Representative Lee has introduced legislation (H.R. 559) that would require a 5% reduction in a federal agency's discretionary budgetary authority for failure to produce an annual financial statement or failure to receive either an unqualified or qualified audit opinion on its annual financial statement. H.R. 559 was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Committee on Armed Services. The 112th Congress considered similar legislation, as well as legislation on audited annual financial statements at DOD and DHS, specifically. In the 112th Congress, Senator Coburn introduced the Audit the Pentagon Act, which would have mandated auditable financial statements by DOD for its FY2017 statements. The legislation also would have required DOD to provide a complete and validated statement of budgetary resources by FY2014. Congress also considered legislation to address problems at the Department of Homeland Security in the 112th Congress. The DHS Audit Requirement Target Act of 2012 (DART, 126 Stat. 1591) was signed into law on December 20, 2012. The DART Act directs DHS to obtain an unqualified audit opinion beginning with its FY2013 annual financial statements. This report will be updated to reflect significant developments.",59,56 """Price Gouging,"" the Antitrust Laws, and Vertical Integration in the Petroleum Industry: How They Are Related. The antitrust laws and statutes to prohibit ""price gouging"" each aim to serve the same end—realization of lower or reasonable prices for consumers, but they do so from different perspectives. Antitrust law operates on the premise that vigorous and unfettered marketplace competition will yield the most advantageous result for consumers. Statutes concerning ""price gouging,"" by contrast, are direct consumer-protection measures, generally making no reference to competition. Statutes to limit the extent of vertical integration in the petroleum industry (common ownership of different stages of production, marketing, or retailing) have been proposed at the federal level, and exist at the state level, but contrary to the expectations of proponents, the price of gasoline in those states that prohibit refiners from operating retail gasoline stations is generally higher than in states without similar prohibitions. Although the potential for anticompetitive actions by vertically integrated entities has been noted by, among others, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), it also states in a 2005 report, that ""the vast majority of the FTC's investigations [into the petroleum industry] have revealed market factors to be the primary drivers of both price increases and price spikes."" The Energy Policy Act of 2005 required an FTC investigation ""to determine if the price of gasoline is being artificially manipulated by reducing refinery capacity or by any other form of market manipulation or price-gouging practices"", the 110th Congress enacted the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 with a provision authorizing the FTC to promulgate a rule concerning market manipulation. Also in the 110th Congress, the House has passed H.R. 1252, which would define ""price gouging"" as ""excessively unconscionable"" or ""unreasonably"" increased prices during Presidentially declared ""energy emergencies,"" incorporates the FTC Act, directs FTC enforcement, and provides for civil and criminal penalties (several, similar measures are pending in the Senate Commerce Committee), and H.R. 6074 to make ""oil-producing and exporting cartels illegal"" under U.S. antitrust laws. This report, which may be updated to further reflect congressional action, attempts to provide the antitrust context for the prohibited practices, notes prior congressional action concerning vertical divestiture in the petroleum industry, and provides information on the state ""divorcement"" statutes.",10,10 "The Medical Device Excise Tax: A Legal Overview. On December 7, 2012, the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service issued final regulations explaining the scope of the medical device excise tax created by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), which modified the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. The new regulations were issued less than a month before the 2.3% excise tax took effect on January 1, 2013. This report provides a brief overview of the recently enacted Treasury regulations, analyzes the legal implications of the regulations, and answers frequently asked questions about the medical device tax. The Treasury regulations on the medical device excise tax explain both who is subject to the excise tax and the scope of the statutory exemptions provided for the tax. Specifically, the regulations incorporate by reference the general definitions for a ""manufacturer, producer, or importer"" outlined in the Internal Revenue Code, meaning that the excise tax will be directly paid by manufacturers, as opposed to consumers or others that use a given medical device. Furthermore, the regulations attempt to clarify the limits to the medical device excise tax. Beyond the statutory exemptions created for eyeglasses, contact lenses, and hearing aids, the law created a ""retail exemption"" to the excise tax, excluding from the tax medical devices that are ""generally purchased by the general public at retail for individual use."" The Treasury regulations attempt to simultaneously provide certainty to potential taxpayers as to which devices are subject to the retail exemption, while allowing the government the flexibility to properly apply the retail exemption to the variety of devices that could be exposed to the excise tax. The regulations provide a flexible two-prong test to determine whether a device should fall within the retail exemption, applying the exemption when the device is (1) regularly available for purchase by non-professional consumers and (2) not primarily intended for use by medical professionals. The regulations provide several factors to consider when applying the two-prong test. To provide some certainty to the scope of the retail exemption, the regulations also included several ""safe harbor"" provisions, explicitly acknowledging that certain devices, such as ""over-the-counter"" devices, fall within the retail exemption. The new Treasury regulations on the medical device excise tax, while providing some certainty with respect to what devices will be exempt from the tax, generally favor a more flexible approach to defining the scope of the central exemption to the tax. As a consequence, uncertainty remains as to which medical devices will be subject to the tax. Indeed, Treasury, in releasing the medical device excise tax regulations, notes that further clarification on various issues implicated by the tax is still needed. As such, the regulations constitute only the first step in defining the limits of the medical device excise tax.",67,110 "The 2009 Influenza Pandemic: U.S. Responses to Global Human Cases. In April 2009, a novel influenza virus began to spread around the world. The World Health Organization (WHO) refers to the virus as Influenza A(H1N1). The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other Administration officials refer to it as 2009 H1N1 flu. Throughout this report, the virus is referred to as H1N1. The virus does not appear to be as lethal as H5N1 avian influenza—which reemerged in 2005—but is slightly more lethal than seasonal flu. Although the virus has been characterized as a pandemic, researchers can not predict how virulent the virus will be ultimately. As of June 22, 2009, WHO confirmed that more than 50,000 human cases of H1N1 had occurred in more than 80 countries and territories, including 231 deaths. With the exception of Britain and Australia, all human deaths have occurred in the Americas. About 87% of all deaths have occurred in Mexico (49%) and the United States (38%). The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and WHO agree that there is no risk of contracting the virus from consuming well-cooked pork or pork products. WHO asserts that limiting travel and imposing travel restrictions would minimally affect the spread of the virus, but would be highly disruptive to the global community. The strain of H1N1 circulating the globe is treatable with two antiviral drugs, oseltamivir (brand name Tamiflu®) and zanamivir (brand name Relenza®), though there is no available vaccine. WHO has been maintaining a global stockpile of approximately 5 million adult treatment courses of oseltamivir that were donated by manufacturers and donor countries. This stockpile was initiated after the onset of H5N1 bird flu outbreaks. WHO has already distributed some of the treatments through the WHO Regional Offices and is distributing 3 million treatment courses from the stockpile to developing countries in need. As of May 18, 2009, the United States had provided more than $16 million to assist countries respond to H1N1 outbreaks. Global responses by U.S. agencies to H1N1 are conducted primarily by CDC and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), though DOD does provide some support to global aid. CDC has sent experts to Latin America and the Caribbean to help the countries strengthen laboratory capacity and train health experts. HHS has already sent 400,000 treatment courses to Mexico, accounting for less than 1% of the total American stockpile. In total, the Administration aims to provide 2 million courses to Mexico. USAID announced on April 28, 2009, that it would provide an additional $5 million to WHO and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) for interventions against H1N1 in Mexico and Central America. To date, USAID has provided $6.2 million for international H1N1 assistance. The assistance includes support to FAO for animal surveillance efforts in Mexico and other parts of Central America, and the provision of personal protection equipment (PPE) kits from its avian and pandemic influenza stockpile to prevent first responders from contracting or spreading the disease. In May 2009, it distributed more than 100,000 PPE kits in Mexico City and announced that it had already pre-positioned 400,000 PPE kits in 82 countries in preparation of a possible influenza pandemic. Investments that the United States and other stakeholders have made to prepare for a possible influenza pandemic, and to monitor the spread of other infectious diseases, have been applied to the most recent global response to H1N1. While health experts have made considerable gains against the disease, questions remain. Some health experts are concerned that poorer countries may not yet have the capacity to sufficiently monitor and respond to H1N1. Others warn that H1N1 transmission might accelerate in winter months. Questions still remain about whether the disease can change or reassort, particularly in countries simultaneously contending with H5N1 bird flu cases occur (such as Egypt, Vietnam, and Indonesia).",65,65 "A Historical Perspective on ""Hollow Forces"". Senior Department of Defense (DOD) leaders have invoked the specter of a ""hollow force"" to describe what could happen to the U.S. Armed Forces if significant cuts to the defense budget are enacted. While some Members and staff might be familiar with the hollow force and its causes, newer Members and staff might not have a similar understanding of the conditions that led to the hollow force and what actions were taken to improve the condition of the U.S. Armed Forces. After several years of rapid growth in defense budgets, measures to reduce federal budget deficits have led to projections of a substantial decline in military spending over the next decade. As a result of limits on discretionary spending in the Budget Control Act of 2011, DOD is considering how to absorb a reduction of $450 billion to $500 billion in planned programs through FY2021. Senior defense officials have said that such reductions can be managed, but they also warn that that trade-offs among defense programs will require a reassessment of priorities, and that deeper cuts would weaken critical capabilities. A common theme is that, unless reductions are managed prudently, budget cuts of the magnitude required, let alone larger cuts, would risk creating a hollow force The term hollow force refers to military forces that appear mission-ready but, upon examination, suffer from shortages of personnel and equipment and from deficiencies in training. Historically, there were two periods—post-Vietnam and again in the 1990s—when the term hollow force was used to describe the U.S. Armed Forces. In the case of post-Vietnam, a variety of socioeconomic factors as well as funding decisions played a large role in the overall decline in readiness, particularly the decision to develop new weapon systems rather than funding other requirements. The 1990s hollow force, however, did not suffer from the socioeconomic problems that characterized the post-Vietnam force. Instead, the military of the early and mid-1990s was being deployed on a frequent basis for a variety of contingency operations and was viewed by some as being ""overcommitted"" relative to its size and resources. This overcommitment was further exacerbated by recruiting and retention concerns and a lack of funds to finance new weapon systems due to DOD decisions to emphasize readiness-related funding. A number of current defense officials have warned about the return to a hollow force if the DOD budget is cut significantly. Other senior officers instead suggest that in the aftermath of two wars, a reduction in the defense budget and the force is not unprecedented and the services will be able to make the necessary adjustments to ensure readiness. Therefore, the question arises if it is fair to suggest that the military could become a hollow force if DOD funding was drastically reduced and if force structure and weapon systems programs were cut. Some believe this is a mischaracterization, as it is considered unlikely the quality of the force will decline, that pay and benefits will be cut to the point that service in the military becomes unattractive, and public support for the military will erode—all factors that lead to General Meyer's description of the post-Vietnam Army as a hollow force It is also noted that DOD has a great deal of discretion on how its funds are spent and how units are organized, manned, equipped, and trained, which is also a factor that contributes to readiness of the force. As Congress will play a major role in shaping the Armed Forces in terms of size, capabilities, and how it is equipped and trained, a nuanced understanding of how the military once became ""hollow"" could provide a useful context for current and anticipated legislative action.",30,32 "Duty to Disclose to Shareholders: Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano. On January 10, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano. The question presented was whether a plaintiff can state a claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 based upon a pharmaceutical company's nondisclosure of adverse event reports, despite the lack of an allegation that the reports are statistically significant. On March 22, 2011, the Court unanimously held that the plaintiffs in this case had stated a claim under Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The case was first brought in U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The district court found that there were not statistically significant data as to the accuracy of reports that the company's cold medication caused cases of the loss of smell and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The shareholders appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court, analyzing issues of required materiality and scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), held that the shareholders had sufficiently complied with the requirements and reversed the district court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and affirmed its decision.",12,12 "Hurricane-Damaged Drinking Water and Wastewater Facilities: Impacts, Needs, and Response. Throughout the Gulf Coast region, high winds and water from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 damaged a wide range of public service facilities, including drinking water supply and treatment and sewage treatment plants. Restoring those facilities is part of the overall cleanup and restoration process. This report describes impacts of the storms on drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities and efforts to assess damages and needs to repair and reconstruct damaged systems. Full facility restorations in some locations may take many months, and costs of needed repairs are largely unknown. To meet those long-term recovery needs, affected communities are likely to rely heavily on federal assistance in emergency appropriations acts, as well as traditional water infrastructure programs, principally those administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In September 2005, the Senate passed a bill intended to streamline delivery of funds through existing EPA programs to repair storm-damaged sewage treatment and drinking water plants (S. 1709). Also, legislation was introduced to provide hurricane assistance to Louisiana, including $5 billion for water infrastructure projects (S. 1765/S. 1766, H.R. 3958). No further action occurred on any of these proposals during the 109th Congress.",44,11 "FY2015 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies' Appropriations: Fact Sheet. The annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations act provides funding for the Departments of Commerce and Justice, the science agencies, and several related agencies. Appropriations for the Department of Commerce include funding for agencies such as the Census Bureau, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Appropriations for the Department of Justice provide funding for agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, along with funding for a variety of grant programs for state, local, and tribal governments. Funding for the science agencies goes to the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National Science Foundation. The annual appropriation for the related agencies includes funding for agencies such as the Legal Services Corporation and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This fact sheet provides information on the amounts the Administration and Congress provides for FY2015 for CJS. It also provides information on the enacted FY2014 appropriations for CJS.",59,59 "Considering Measures in the House Under the One-Hour Rule. The fundamental rule of the House of Representatives governing debate is the one-hour rule. Clause 2 of Rule XVII states in part that no one shall “occupy more than one hour in debate on a question in the House.” When the House debates a bill on the floor under this rule, the bill is said to be considered “in the House.” The House considers bills on the floor under the one-hour rule unless it resorts to one of the alternative packages of floor procedures provided under other House rules, especially the Committee of the Whole and motions to suspend the rules. In some cases, a primary advantage for choosing one of these alternative procedures is that they avoid some of the difficulties that can arise when the House debates a bill under the one-hour rule.",55,55 "Mobile Telephones and Motor Vehicle Operation. In the United States, as well as worldwide, there has been substantial growth in the use of mobile wireless telecommunication services (""mobile telephones""). The use of mobile telephones by the drivers of motor vehicles has been the subject of certain state and local restrictions. S. 179 (108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003)) has been introduced in the 108th Congress to provide some federal oversight of mobile telephone use by drivers of motor vehicles, by requiring the individual states to enact legislation to restrict mobile telephone use by drivers of motor vehicles. Noncomplying states would be subject to the loss of federal highway funds. At the present time, eighteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation concerning the use of mobile telephones by drivers of motor vehicles. The existing state laws vary greatly and are summarized in the report. Some state laws expressly preempt local regulation of mobile telephones. As of the date of this report, fifty-three pieces of legislation have been introduced in 2004 in twenty-six states and the District of Columbia concerning the use of mobile telephones by drivers of motor vehicles. The current status of state legislation is summarized state-by-state in the report. Over the years, Congress has repeatedly conditioned the use of federal highway funds to encourage states to enact desired transportation-related legislation. For example, Congress has used this legislative device in dealing with drunk driving. The pending federal legislation making federal highway funding contingent on state restriction on the use of mobile telephones by drivers of motor vehicles would appear to follow the driving while intoxicated legislative models. This report examines the pending federal legislation, pending and enacted state legislation, and the possible effect that the federal legislation, if enacted, might have on the existing state and local regulations.",118,113 "Domestic Drones and Privacy: A Primer. It has been three years since Congress enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA), calling for the integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or ""drones,"" into the national airspace by September 2015. During that time, the substantive legal privacy framework relating to UAS on the federal level has remained relatively static: Congress has enacted no law explicitly regulating the potential privacy impacts of drone flights, the courts have had no occasion to rule on the constitutionality of drone surveillance, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) did not include privacy provisions in its proposed rule on small UAS. This issue, however, has not left the national radar. Congress has held hearings and introduced legislation concerning the potential privacy implications of domestic drone use, President Obama recently issued a directive to all federal agencies to assess the privacy impact of their drone operations, and almost half the states have enacted some form of drone legislation. There are two overarching privacy issues implicated by domestic drone use. The first is defining what ""privacy"" means in the context of aerial surveillance. Privacy is an ambiguous term that can mean different things in different contexts. This becomes readily apparent when attempting to apply traditional privacy concepts such as personal control and secrecy to drone surveillance. Other, more nuanced privacy theories such as personal autonomy and anonymity must be explored to get a fuller understanding of the privacy risks posed by drone surveillance. Moreover, with ever-increasing advances in data storage and manipulation, the subsequent aggregation, use, and retention of drone-obtained data may warrant an additional privacy impact analysis. The second predominant issue is which entity should be responsible for regulating drones and privacy. As the final arbiter of the Constitution, the courts are naturally looked upon to provide at least the floor of privacy protection from UAS surveillance, but as will be discussed in this report, under current law, this protection may be minimal. In addition to the courts, the executive branch likely has a role to play in regulating privacy and drones. While the FAA has taken on a relatively passive role in such regulation, the President's new privacy directive for government drone use and multi-stakeholder process for private use could create an initial framework for privacy regulations. With its power over interstate commerce, Congress has the broadest authority to set national standards for UAS privacy regulation. Several measures were introduced in the 113th Congress that would have restricted both public- and private-actor domestic UAS operations, and reintroduction of these bills is likely in the 114th Congress. Lastly, some have argued that under our system of federalism, the states should be left to experiment with various privacy schemes. It is reported that by the end of 2014, 20 states have enacted some form of drone regulation. This report will provide a primer on privacy issues related to various UAS operations, both public and private, including an overview of current UAS uses, the privacy interests implicated by these operations, and various potential approaches to UAS privacy regulation.",19,19 "The Endangered Species Act and ""Sound Science"". The adequacy of the science supporting implementation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has received considerable congressional attention over the years. While many scientific decisions pass unremarked, some critics accuse agencies responsible for implementing the ESA of using ""junk science,"" and others counter that decisions that should rest on science are instead being dictated by political concerns. Under the ESA, certain species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) are listed as either endangered or threatened according to assessments of the risk of their extinction. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to protect the species and its habitat. Efforts to list, protect, and recover threatened or endangered species under the ESA can be controversial. Some of this controversy stems from the substantive provisions of this law, which can affect the use of both federal and nonfederal lands. The scientific underpinnings of decisions under the ESA are especially important, given their importance for species and their possible impacts on land use and development. The Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior and the National Marine Fisheries Service in the Department of Commerce administer the ESA, and each agency has policies and requirements to ensure the integrity and objectivity of the science that underlies ESA decisions. The Information Quality Act (P.L. 106-554, IQA or Data Quality Act) also imposes general requirements and has resulted in agency changes to carry out the goals of that act to maximize the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by the agencies. In several situations, economic and social disputes have resulted from actions taken to list, protect, and recover species under the ESA. Critics in some of these disputes assert that the science supporting ESA actions is insufficiently rigorous. Others assert that in some instances decisions were political rather than scientific. Controversy has arisen over what might be the essential elements of ""sound science"" in the ESA process and whether the ESA might benefit from clarification of how science is to be used in its implementation. The courts have had occasion to review the use of science by the agencies, which generally must show their decisions were not arbitrary and that they rest on credible science. For some purposes, if that science is the best available, even if it is considered imperfect or incomplete, it still may be used. Several bills affecting science as used in the ESA were introduced in recent Congresses, but to date none have been enacted. Legislative activity in the 112th Congress is summarized in CRS Report R41608, The Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the 112th Congress: Conflicting Values and Difficult Choices, by Eugene H. Buck et al. No bills concerning ESA and science have yet been introduced in the 113th Congress. This report provides a context for evaluating legislative proposals through examples of how science has been used in selected cases, a discussion of the nature and role of science in general, and its role in the ESA process in particular, together with general and agency information quality requirements and policies, and a review of how the courts have viewed agency use of science.",47,47 "Mandatory Minimum Sentencing of Federal Drug Offenses in Short. As a general rule, federal judges must impose a minimum term of imprisonment upon defendants convicted of various controlled substance (drug) offenses and drug-related offenses. The severity of those sentences depends primarily upon the nature and amount of the drugs involved, the defendant's prior criminal record, any resulting injuries or death, and in the case of the related firearms offenses, the manner in which the firearm was used. The drug offenses reside principally in the Controlled Substances Act or the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. The drug-related firearms offenses involve the possession and use of firearms in connection with serious drug offenses and instances in which prior drug convictions trigger mandatory sentences for unlawful firearms possession. The minimum sentences range from imprisonment for a year to imprisonment for life. Although the sentences are usually referred to as mandatory minimum sentences, a defendant may avoid them under several circumstances. Prosecutors may elect not to prosecute. The President may choose to pardon the defendant or commute his sentence. The defendant may qualify for sentencing for providing authorities with substantial assistance or under the so-called ""safety valve"" provision available to low-level, nonviolent, first-time offenders. Over time, defendants, sentenced to mandatory terms of imprisonment for drug- related offenses, have challenged Congress's legislative authority to authorize them and the government's constitutional authority to enforcement. The challenges have met with scant success. Generally, courts have concluded that the provisions fall within congressional authority under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, Treaty, and Territorial Clauses of the Constitution. By and large, courts have also found no impediment to mandatory minimum sentences under the Due Process, Equal Protection, or Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses, or the separation-of- powers doctrine. Proposals to amend drug-related mandatory minimum sentence provisions surfaced during the 114th Congress. In the 115th Congress, Senator Grassley introduced the successor to those proposals for himself and a bi-partisan list of co-sponsors as S. 1917, the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2017. Many of the same issues are addressed in H.R. 4261 introduced by Representative Scott of Virginia. This is an overview of the law from which those proposals spring. This report is an abridged version of a longer report, CRS Report R45074, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing of Federal Drug Offenses, without the citations to authority and origin of quotations found in the parent report.",94,94 "FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues. Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, along with the operational role of the Reserve Components, further heighten interest in a wide range of military personnel policies and issues. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has selected a number of the military personnel issues considered in deliberations on the initial House-passed version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and on the bill that was enacted and became law (P.L. 113-66). This report provides a brief synopsis of sections that pertain to personnel policy. These include end strengths, pay raises, health care, and sexual assault, as well as less prominent issues that nonetheless generate significant public interest. This report focuses exclusively on the annual defense authorization process. It does not include language concerning appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices, or any discussion of separately introduced legislation, topics which are addressed in other CRS products. Some issues were addressed in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report R42651, FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues, coordinated by Catherine A. Theohary. Those issues that were considered previously are designated with a ""*"" in the relevant section titles of this report.",30,30 "Screening and Securing Air Cargo: Background and Issues for Congress. The October 2010 discovery of two explosive devices being prepared for loading on U.S.-bound all-cargo aircraft overseas has heightened concerns over the potential use of air cargo shipments to bomb passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The incidents have renewed policy debate over air cargo security measures and have prompted some policymakers to call for comprehensive screening of all air cargo, including shipments that travel on all-cargo aircraft. U.S. policies and strategies for protecting air cargo have focused on two main perceived threats: the bombing of a passenger airliner carrying cargo and the hijacking of a large all-cargo aircraft for use as a weapon to attack a ground target such as a major population center, critical infrastructure, or a critical national security asset. With respect to protecting passenger airliners from explosives placed in cargo, policy debate has focused on whether risk-based targeting strategies and methods should be used to identify those shipments requiring additional scrutiny or whether all or most shipments should be subject to more intensive physical screening. While the air cargo industry and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have argued for the implementation of risk-based approaches, Congress mandated 100% screening of all cargo placed on passenger aircraft using approved methods by August 2010 (see P.L. 110-53). While 100% of domestic air cargo now undergoes physical screening in compliance with this mandate, not all inbound international cargo shipments carried on passenger airplanes are scrutinized in this manner. TSA is working with international air cargo operators to increase the share of cargo placed on passenger flights that is screened, but 100% screening may not be achieved until August 2013. In the interim, TSA, along with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and international partners, is relying on risk-based targeting to increase screening of air cargo, particularly shipments deemed to be high risk. Amid renewed congressional interest on air cargo security, a number of policy issues may arise regarding the desirability of risk-based strategies as alternatives to 100% cargo screening and inspection the adequacy of off-airport screening under the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) in conjunction with various supply chain and air cargo facility security measures the costs and benefits of requiring blast resistant cargo containers to protect aircraft from in-flight explosions in cargo holds the desirability of having air cargo screened by employees of private firms rather than TSA and CBP employees, and cooperative efforts with international partners and stakeholders to improve the security of international air cargo operations.",119,122 "Western Hemisphere Trade Developments. The countries of the Western Hemisphere constitute the largest regional market for U.S. exports and the second largest regional market for U.S. foreign direct investments. The growing importance of this region to U.S. economic interests has been complemented by the growth of sub-regional integration initiatives such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur, the Andean Community, the Central American Common Market, and Caribbean Community. These groupings have not only established free trade areas and in some cases customs unions among partner countries, but are also expanding trade and investment ties with other countries and regions in the hemisphere, as well as more tentatively with the European Union. Concurrent with the deepening and expansion of these sub-regional groupings have been efforts to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). While FTAA negotiations formally commenced in September 1998 the deadline for completion is not until 2005. If the FTAA negotiations were to lose momentum hemispheric integration could come to be dominated by the proliferation of sub-regional groupings. This development, in turn, could have varying impacts on U.S. interests.",50,53 "Committee Funding Resolutions and Processes, 106th Congress. This report describes the procedures under which committee funding resolutions are considered in the two chambers, and 106th Congress action to review and approve committee operating budgets. Also noted are changes in the Senate's committee funding processes to move from a session-based biennial funding process to one more closely matched to a fiscal year cycle. Tables at the end of the report show funds approved for the 105th Congress, and the funds requested, recommended, and approved for the 106th Congress for each House and Senate committee.",55,55 "Judge Samuel Alito's Opinions in Freedom of Speech Cases. Judge Samuel Alito, who has been nominated by President Bush to take retiring Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's seat as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, has been a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit since 1990. This report examines his major judicial opinions, both for the majority and in dissent, in freedom of speech cases. It also briefly discusses some cases in which he joined the opinion for the court but did not write it. This report examines Judge Alito's free speech opinions by subject area.",15,92 "China and U.S. Missile Defense Proposals: Reactions and Implications. The Chinese government has strongly criticized U.S. announcements that it will develop or assist in deploying missile defense systems involving cooperation with U.S. allies in East Asia, and reports of such possible U.S. cooperation with Taiwan. For those in the United States, the U.S. plans have many perceived disadvantages and advantages, (1) the latter include notably providing degrees of protection for the United States and its allies against ballistic missile attack. Many in China believe that proposed U.S. development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses at home and in East Asia pose potentially serious complications for China's ability to use its nuclear weapons to deter possible U.S. pressure and aggression, and to use Chinese ballistic missile capability to exert leverage over Japan, Taiwan, and others in East Asia. Beijing's options include using political means to curb U.S. efforts or to seek reassurances from the United States, military options include increasing the number of Chinese missiles and warheads, and using force to intimidate Taiwan from developing a viable missile defense system. Though the U.S. government may attempt to reassure China that it is not the target of the new systems, initial Chinese reactions suggest that the United States may face serious difficulties with China if on balance it sees U.S. interests well served by current plans and goes ahead with them, and especially if it supports ballistic missile defense efforts in Taiwan. This report will be updated periodically. 1. In March 1999, legislation favoring a national missile defense for the United States (S. 257 and H.R. 4) received close congressional attention. For a review of the arguments about these systems, see National Missile Defense, by Steven Hildreth, CRS Report 96-441, and Theater Air and Missile Defense, by Robert Shuey, CRS Issue Brief IB98028. See also Ballistic Missile Defenses, CRS Info Pack IP496.",29,29 "NATO Enlargement and the Former European Neutrals. With the NATO enlargement process now underway, Europe's former neutral states Austria Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland are re-evaluating the role they should play in the changing European security setting. In Austria, there is a major political debate dividing partners in the governing coalition over whether or not to seek NATO membership. The key role of NATO in European security has created both opportunities and dilemmas for the former neutrals. On the one hand, their governments recognize that the new global environment has removed the Cold War rationale for a posture as a ""neutral"" in the international system. On the other hand, many people in these countries still value to a degree their country's nonalignment. Political elites are divided concerning how to advance their country's interests in the new setting. All of the former neutrals except Switzerland are members of the European Union (EU), bringing them part-way into the transatlantic security community, even though they are not NATO members. All except Ireland have joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, involving them directly in many NATO activities. The position of the former neutrals outside the Alliance could appear increasingly anomalous as Central and East European states begin joining NATO over the next few years. Members of Congress might wish to consider how the enlargement process might affect decisions by the former neutrals about their relationship to, and potential membership in, the Alliance.",21,21 "Natural Gas Prices and Market Fundamentals. Intermittently high, volatile natural gas prices since 2000 have raised concern among all types of consumers. Residential customers have seen gas bills increase dramatically during the heating season. Industrial consumers have seen costs increase, which reduces their competitiveness. Because the price of natural gas at the consumer level is a mixture of market forces and regulation explaining the behavior of price can be difficult. Debate in the 108th Congress concerning the energy bill (H.R. 6), considered provisions which are intended to improve long term natural gas supplies in the United States. Other issues are likely to be brought before the 109th Congress for consideration. This paper analyzes the short term forces which influence the natural gas market. The Energy Information Administration has developed a metric called the effective capacity utilization rate as a framework for analyzing the economics of the natural gas market. This measure has been shown to be correlated with the price of natural gas. When as the effective capacity utilization rate attains high levels (90% and above) it becomes increasingly likely that tight market conditions will yield high prices. As a result of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-621) and subsequent legislation in 1989 and 1992 (P.L. 101-60 and P.L. 102-486) the wellhead price of natural gas is market determined. Pipeline rates are federally monitored and distribution charges are regulated at the state level. Price variability centers on the wellhead price as well as the price determined in futures markets. Price spikes have occurred in two of the past three heating seasons. Whether severe weather causes price increases depends on the tightness of the market as measured by the effective capacity utilization rate. The same level of demand could lead to very different price results if the effective capacity utilization rate is high or low. A variety of factors can affect the effective capacity utilization rate. Since short run supply adjusts to meet demand, the weather will be an important determinant. The relationship between natural gas prices and investment in exploration, development and production is an important factor in determining productive capacity. The availability of stored gas and imported gas become vital to price stability as the effective productive capacity exceeds 90%. In the very short term there appears to be little that can be done from a policy perspective to alter the fundamental economics of the natural gas market. In the longer term, policies that slow demand growth and/or encourage the growth of supply, either from domestic or foreign sources could be effective. This report will be updated as events warrant.",40,40 "Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Issues for Congress. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a hazardous fuel shipped in large tankers from overseas to U.S. ports. Because LNG infrastructure is highly visible and easily identified, it can be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. LNG industry and federal agencies have put new measures in place to respond to the possibility of terrorism. Nonetheless, public concerns about LNG risks continue to raise questions about LNG security. Faced with a perceived national need for greater LNG imports, and persistent public concerns about LNG risks, some in Congress are examining the adequacy of security provisions in federal LNG regulation. LNG infrastructure consists primarily of tankers, import terminals, and inland storage plants. There are nine active U.S. terminals and proposals for many others. Although potentially catastrophic events could arise from a serious accident or attack on such facilities, LNG has a record of relative safety for the last 40 years, and no LNG tanker or land-based facility has been attacked by terrorists. The likelihood and possible impacts from LNG attacks continue to be debated among experts. Several federal agencies oversee LNG infrastructure security. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility for LNG shipping and marine terminal security under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295) and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347). The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) both have security authority for LNG storage plants within gas utilities, as well as some security authority for LNG marine terminals. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approves the siting, with some security oversight, of on-shore LNG marine terminals and certain utility LNG plants. The Coast Guard, OPS and FERC cooperate in the siting approval of new LNG facilities, inspection and operational review of existing facilities, informal communication, and dispute resolution. Federal initiatives to secure LNG are still evolving, but a variety of industry and agency representatives suggest they are reducing the vulnerability of LNG to terrorism. S. 1594 would strengthen federal protection of vessels and infrastructure handling LNG and other especially hazardous cargoes through new international standards, new training requirements, vessel security cost-sharing, incident response and recovery plans, and other provisions. H.R. 2830, which passed in the House of Representatives on April 24, 2008, but which President Bush has threatened to veto, would require the Coast Guard to secure LNG tankers, and would limit the agency's reliance on state and local resources in doing so, among other provisions. As Congress continues its oversight of LNG, it may consider whether future LNG security requirements will be appropriately funded, whether these requirements will be balanced against evolving risks, and whether the LNG industry is carrying its fair share of the security burden. Congress may also act to improve its understanding of LNG security risks. Finally, Congress may initiate action to better understand the security and trade implications of efforts to promote U.S.-flagged LNG tankers and U.S. crews.",40,40 "The Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens: The Chevron Doctrine. One of Justice John Paul Stevens's most lasting jurisprudential legacies is his opinion in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The 1984 case, a landmark decision in both administrative law and separation of powers, established the legal framework that has largely governed the degree of deference a court will accord a federal agency in interpreting and implementing statutes. What began as an unexceptional case focusing on the meaning of the phrase ""stationary source"" in the Clean Air Act has developed into one of the most frequently cited cases ever. Although often relied on as an authority, the case has also engendered significant confusion. Questions of when, and how, to apply the two-step Chevron analysis laid out by Justice Stevens, which is simple in theory yet remarkably varied in its application, have consistently challenged federal judges. Moreover, although Justice Stevens has spent the last quarter century working to clarify the Chevron doctrine, as he departs the Court he may find himself outside the majority position on at least one key aspect of the test's application. Stevens's Chevron analysis established what many commentators have considered to be a highly deferential judicial role when faced with a challenge to an agency's interpretation of its own authorizing statute or a statute it administers. At step one of the analysis, a reviewing court must determine whether Congress has spoken clearly on the issue at hand and give effect to any intent it finds Congress expressed unambiguously. An agency interpretation that is contrary to the clear intent of Congress must be rejected. If, however, Congress's intent is unclear as to the immediate question, including where Congress is silent, at step two the court's role is to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of the pertinent statutory language. This analysis is commonly referred to as the Chevron ""two-step."" As much as Justice Stevens's opinion has been cited, major questions remain about when and how to properly apply the Chevron test. The threshold question of what types of agency interpretations qualify for Chevron deference, for example, has narrowed. A second ongoing dispute, and one in which Justice Stevens has played a leading role, relates to what tools of statutory construction are properly employed at step one of the test as a court determines Congress's ""intent."" Specifically, should the court be considering legislative intent and legislative purpose or restrict itself to the statutory language alone?",92,92 "Military Base Closures and Affected Defense Department Civil Service Employees. As a step in the 2005 round of the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (commonly referred to as the BRAC Commission) recommended on September 8, 2005, that a number of domestic U.S. military installations be closed or realigned. Overall, the BRAC Commission estimated that the recommended closures or realignments would result in a net decrease of 15,874 federal civilian jobs at the Department of Defense (DOD). On September 15, 2005, the President approved the commission's recommendations and transmitted them to Congress. Congress rejected H.J.Res. 65 (a resolution of disapproval of the BRAC Commission recommendations) on October 27, 2005. The BRAC Commission recommendations took effect on November 9, 2005, and are required to be implemented by 2011. As BRAC-related closures and realignments are implemented, there will likely be several implications and options for affected DOD civil service employees relating to reductions in force (RIFs) and several types of transition assistance. In addition, DOD's National Security Personnel System (NSPS) and labor-management relations could have implications in some respects for how DOD employees are affected by the BRAC process. This report will be updated if major changes occur in the BRAC process regarding DOD civil service employees. Implementation of NSPS is discussed in CRS Report RL31954, DOD's National Security Personnel System: Statute, Regulations, and Implementation Plans, by Barbara L. Schwemle et al.",23,23 "Social Networking and Constituent Communication: Member Use of Twitter During a Two-Week Period in the 111th Congress. During the past 15 years, the development of new electronic technologies has altered the traditional patterns of communication between Members of Congress and constituents. Many Members now use e-mail, official websites, blogs, Youtube channels, and Facebook pages to communicate with their constituents—technologies that were either non-existent or not widely available 15 years ago. These technologies have arguably served to potentially enhance the ability of Members of Congress to fulfill their representational duties by providing greater opportunities for communication between the Member and individual constituents, supporting the fundamental democratic role of spreading information about public policy and government operations. In addition, electronic technology has reduced the marginal cost of constituent communications, unlike postal letters, Members can reach large numbers of constituents for a fixed cost. Despite these advantages, electronic communications have raised some concerns. Existing law and chamber regulations on the use of communication media such as the franking privilege have proven difficult to adapt to the new electronic technologies. This report examines Member use of one specific new electronic communication medium: Twitter. After providing an overview and background of Twitter, the report analyzes patterns of Member use of Twitter during two one-week periods in July and August 2009. This report is inherently a snapshot in time of a dynamic process. As with any new technology, the number of Members using Twitter and the patterns of use may change rapidly in short periods of time. Thus, the conclusions drawn from this data can not be easily generalized nor can these results be used to predict future behavior. The data show that 158 Representatives and Senators are registered with Twitter (as of August 2009) and issued a total of approximately 1,187 ""tweets"" during the data collection periods in July and August 2009. With approximately 29% of House Members and 31% of Senators registered with Twitter, Members sent an average of 85 tweets per day collectively. House Republicans sent the most tweets (54%), followed by House Democrats (27%), Senate Republicans (10%), and Senate Democrats (9%). The data also suggest that more tweets were sent on Thursday than any other day of the week. Members' use of Twitter can be divided into six categories: position taking, press or web links, district or state activities, official congressional action, personal, and replies. The data suggest that the most frequent type of tweets were press and web link tweets, which comprised 43% of in-session and 46% of recess tweets. This is followed by official congressional action tweets during session (33%) and position-taking tweets during recess (14%).",55,55 "The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIG TARP). This report discusses the Special Inspector General provisions in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, which was enacted as P.L. 110-343 on October 3, 2008. This Act created a Special Inspector General (SIG) for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). This report will compare the duties and authorities of the SIG TARP to those of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), as well as statutory IGs under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act).",56,11 "Appropriations Bills: What Are ""General Provisions""?. An annual appropriations act generally consists of two parts—paragraphs providing funding and general provisions focusing on non-funding as well as funding issues. Generally, each paragraph corresponds to a unique budget account and provides a lump-sum amount for a group of activities such as agency salaries and expenses, and may include restrictions or conditions that apply to that funding. Some general provisions establish restrictions and conditions that apply to a single account, multiple accounts, the entire bill, or a department or agency funded in the bill. General provisions may be of a policy or operational character.",59,55 "Animal Drug User Fee Programs. The Animal Drug User Fee Act of 2003 (ADUFA I, P.L. 108-130) gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) initial authority to collect user fees from sponsors for the review of animal drug applications. ADUFA mirrors fee programs for human drugs and medical devices. Program authority sunsets October 1, 2008, and FDA would have to lay off staff in its review program if the program were not reauthorized by then. ADUFA supporters—including companies that make brand-name animal drugs, and livestock producer groups—considered ADUFA reauthorization to be ""must pass"" legislation in the 110th Congress. A coalition of consumer groups opposed the program and its reauthorization, citing, in particular, concerns about the safety of animal drugs used in livestock production. After negotiations with brand-name animal drug companies, FDA made several proposals for the reauthorization of ADUFA (ADUFA II), including a near-doubling of the total amount of fees to be collected in the future. The proposed increase would support continued enhancements of FDA's review program, further improvements in the timeliness of reviews, and the elimination of a backlog of pre-approval inspections of foreign manufacturing facilities. FDA presented draft reauthorizing legislation to Congress in April 2008. H.R. 6432, the Animal Drug User Fee Amendments of 2008, a bill to reauthorize the program, was introduced on July 8, 2008. Subsequently, the bill was forwarded without amendment to the full committee by the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health, and was marked up by the full committee on July 16, 2008. ADUFA does not cover generic animal drugs. FDA has not been able to maintain the statutory requirement for timeliness of generic animal drug reviews since ADUFA was enacted. FDA presented a draft Animal Generic Drug User Fee Act (AGDUFA) to Congress in April 2008, separate from the ADUFA II draft bill. H.R. 6433, the Animal Generic Drug User Fee Act of 2008, was introduced on July 8, 2008. Subsequently, the bill was forwarded without amendment to the full committee by the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health, and was marked up by the full committee on July 16, 2008. On July 30, 2008, the House passed H.R. 6432, as amended, under suspension. The engrossed (House-passed) bill incorporated an amended version of H.R. 6432 (ADUFA reauthorization), as reported, and H.R. 6433 (AGDUFA), as reported, without amendment. On August 1, 2008, the Senate took up the House-passed measure and passed it by unanimous consent. The measure has been sent to the President, who is expected to sign it. This report discusses aspects of ADUFA I, including funding and program performance, FDA's ADUFA II and AGDUFA proposals, congressional activity, and relevant issues. Appendix A provides a summary of ADUFA I. Appendix B describes the FDA process for approval of animal drugs. This report will be updated to incorporate legislative actions and other events as they unfold.",67,0 "Head Start: Designation Renewal System. Head Start is a federal program that has provided comprehensive early childhood development services (e.g., education, health, nutrition, and social services) to low-income children and their families since 1965. These services are intended to promote the school readiness of children by enhancing their cognitive, social, and emotional development. At the federal level, Head Start is administered by the Office of Head Start within the Administration for Children and Families at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Federal Head Start funds are provided directly to local public and private nonprofit and for-profit agencies (called ""grantees""), rather than through states. At this time, programs are administered by roughly 1,600 grantees. Since the program's inception, Head Start grantees have generally been given grant awards for indefinite periods (i.e., awards with no end date). However, the 2007 Head Start reauthorization law (P.L. 110-134) changed this by instituting a five-year designation period for Head Start grantees. Under this law, at the end of its five-year designation period, a grantee must demonstrate that it is delivering high-quality and comprehensive services, or else the grant is to be opened for re-competition. The law refers to the process of identifying grantees for re-competition as the Designation Renewal System (DRS). The law tasked HHS with establishing the DRS in consultation with a panel of experts and based on parameters specified in the law. In January 2008, HHS convened an Advisory Committee on Re-designation of Head Start Grantees. Twelve months later, the advisory committee released a report with formal recommendations for implementing the DRS. In September 2010, HHS published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on the DRS based, in part, on the advisory committee's recommendations. HHS received approximately 16,000 comments on the proposed rule from Head Start grantees, parents, teachers, state associations, national organizations, academic institutions, and legal entities. HHS took all comments into consideration before publishing a final rule on the DRS in November 2011. The DRS final rule established seven indicators for identifying Head Start grantees that are not providing ""high-quality and comprehensive services."" The indicators address various aspects of program quality, licensing and operations, and fiscal and internal controls. Any grantee that fails to meet the minimum quality standards set by one or more of the seven indicators will automatically be required to compete for continued funding. Under the terms of the final rule, the DRS became effective on December 9, 2011. That month, HHS announced the first cohort of grantees required to re-compete. A second cohort of grantees designated for re-competition was announced in January 2013. DRS competitions began in 2012. As of July 2013, HHS had awarded roughly 153 grants through DRS competitions.",36,36 "Privacy: Key Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Several of the recommendations made to protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks in the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) focus on the protection of civil liberties. This report examines these recommendations, and those of other recent commissions. It will not be updated.",19,19 "The Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens: Selected Federalism Issues. Structurally, the Constitution establishes a federal government with discrete, limited powers, reserving authority not given to the federal government under the Constitution to the states and the people. The uncertain contours of this dual system have often resulted in Supreme Court decisions on the reach of the federal government's limited powers and the core autonomy of the states. Congress, for example, has invoked the Commerce Clause to regulate local, and sometimes non-economic, activities that historically have been subject to regulation under state police powers. Also, Congress has invoked its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate state activity that might otherwise be beyond its reach. States, on the other hand, have cited the Tenth Amendment to resist what they perceive as congressional overreaching into essential state functions. During Justice John Paul Stevens's tenure on the Supreme Court, the Court has continued to develop its jurisprudence on these constitutional provisions in resolving tension between federal versus state authority. Justice Stevens himself has written notable opinions on a range of federalism issues. These opinions generally indicate a viewpoint that it is difficult to clearly distinguish between federal and state spheres of power, and a tendency to recognize a limited federal role in issues that affect state prerogatives and local activities.",60,92 "The NCAA and Due Process: Legal Issues. Recent events surrounding sports scandals at several of the nation's major universities have sparked interest in the National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) procedures for investigating claims of rules violations, and the procedural protection afforded to the accused in such an investigation. This report examines the NCAA's current investigatory process and outlines two important court cases that have shielded the NCAA from attempts to require the NCAA to adhere to due process principles.",14,14 "U.S. Agent Orange/Dioxin Assistance to Vietnam. U.S. assistance to Vietnam for the environmental and health damage attributed to a dioxin contained in Agent Orange and other herbicides sprayed over much of the southern portion of the country during the Vietnam War remains a major bilateral issue. Between fiscal years (FY) 2007 and 2018, Congress appropriated over $222 million to address these two issues. In addition, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232) authorized the transfer of up to $15 million to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the dioxin cleanup of the Bien Hoa Airbase. Most of the appropriated funds have been used by USAID for the environmental cleanup of Danang airport, one of the major airbases used for storing and spraying the herbicides between 1961 and 1971. A lesser amount of the appropriated funds have been used by USAID for assistance to Vietnam's persons with disabilities, generally, but not always in the vicinity of Danang or other dioxin-contaminated areas. Congressional interest in Agent Orange/dioxin in Vietnam has largely been focused on two issues. The first issue is determining the appropriate amount and type of assistance to provide to address the environmental damage and the health effects of dioxin contamination in Vietnam. The second issue is oversight of how such assistance has been utilized by the State Department and USAID. In November 2017, the United States and Vietnam completed the environmental remediation of approximately 90,000 cubic meters (118,000 cubic yards) of contaminated soil and 60,000 cubic meters (78,000 cubic yards) of lower risk materials at Danang airport by a process known as in-pile thermal desorption (IPTD). Restoration and project closure operations continue at the airport. The project took five years to complete at an estimated overall cost of $116 million. Field studies have identified a number of other areas in Vietnam contaminated with the dioxin associated with Agent Orange, including the airports near Bien Hoa and Phu Cat, as well as sections of the A Luoi Valley. In January 2018, U.S. and Vietnamese governments signed a memorandum of intent (MOI) to begin the cleanup of the Bien Hoa airport. According to a USAID study, the environmental cleanup of Bien Hoa airport could cost an estimated $137 million to $794 million, depending on what form of remediation is used. The provision of health-related assistance to areas contaminated with Agent Orange/dioxin has raised questions about how USAID has utilized appropriated funds. By May 2017, USAID had obligated less than two-thirds of the appropriated funds for FY2011-FY2017. The funds have generally been used for disability assistance programs regardless of the cause of the disability, rather than for both health and disability programs targeting populations residing near Agent Orange/dioxin ""hot spots."" While the obligations for environmental remediation activities generally have not been a matter of congressional concern, how USAID has obligated appropriations for health and disability activities has drawn some attention. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) appropriated ""not less than $20 million"" for environmental remediation and ""not less than $10 million... for health and disability programs in areas sprayed with Agent Orange and otherwise contaminated with dioxin."" The Victims of Agent Orange Relief Act of 2017 (H.R. 334) would require the Secretary of State to provide assistance to individuals in Vietnam with health issues related to exposure to Agent Orange, as well as ""to institutions in Vietnam that provide health care for covered individuals."" The act would also require the Secretary of State to provide assistance ""to remediate those geographic areas of Vietnam that the Secretary determines contain high levels of Agent Orange.""",79,65 "Table Egg Production and Hen Welfare: Agreement and Legislative Proposals. The United Egg Producers (UEP), the largest group representing egg producers, and the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), the largest animal protection group, have been adversaries for many years over the use of conventional cages in table egg production. In July 2011, the animal agriculture community was stunned when the UEP and HSUS announced that they had agreed to work together to push for federal legislation to regulate how U.S. table eggs are produced. The agreement between UEP and HSUS called for federal legislation that would set cage sizes, establish labeling requirements, and regulate other production practices. As part of the agreement, HSUS agreed to immediately suspend state-level ballot initiative efforts in Oregon and Washington. On April 25, 2013, the Egg Products Inspection Act Amendments of 2013 (S. 820 and H.R. 1731) were introduced in the 113th Congress. The bills are nearly identical to the legislation that was introduced during the 112th Congress (S. 3239 and H.R. 3798). The provisions in S. 820 and H.R. 1731 reflect the 2011 agreement between UEP and HSUS to establish uniform, national cage size requirements for table egg-laying hens. The bills would codify national standards for laying-hen housing over a 15- to 16-year phase-in period, including labeling requirements to disclose how eggs are produced, and set air quality, molting, and euthanasia standards for laying hens. Compared with the bills from the 112th Congress, S. 820 and H.R. 1731 add provisions specific to California that establish deadlines based on whether or not cages are new or existing, and add a four-step phase-in period for California producers. The legislation also requires that any eggs bought or sold in California meet the California requirements in the legislation, no matter where the eggs are produced. The agreement and legislation were a marked shift in direction for both UEP and HSUS. UEP views the legislation as being in the long-term survival interest of American egg farmers. It says that egg producers would benefit from national egg standards that halt costly state-by-state battles over caged eggs that result in a variety of laws across the country. For HSUS, which has actively campaigned for cage-free egg production, accepting enriched cages was a compromise, but one that could result in significant federal farm animal welfare legislation. Egg legislation has been endorsed by a wide range of agricultural, veterinary, consumer, and animal protection groups. Farm group opponents have criticized egg legislation for several reasons. First, they are concerned that the bills federally mandate management practices for farm animals, something that has not been done in the past. These groups argue that the bills could set a precedent, paving the way for future legislation on animal welfare for other livestock and poultry industries. Opponents hold the view that the cage requirements are not science-based, and undermine long-standing views that animal husbandry practices should be based on the best available science. They also argue that codifying cage standards today ignores innovations that could appear in the future. Additionally, opponents are concerned that the capital cost of transitioning to enriched cages would be high, and could be prohibitive for small producers. UEP and HSUS and other supporters favor moving egg legislation forward through the farm bill process, but other livestock groups strongly oppose this legislative route. Reportedly, S. 820 was considered for inclusion in the Senate Agriculture Committee 2013 farm bill draft, but it was not included. Senator Feinstein's submitted egg bill amendment (S.Amdt. 1057) was not considered during the Senate farm bill (S. 954) floor debate. The House-passed farm bill (H.R. 2642) included Section 12312, known as the King amendment, which would have prohibited states from imposing standards on agricultural products produced in other states. The final Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79) did not include the amendment.",0,0 "The Supreme Court Decision in Microsoft v. i4i: Implications for Innovation Policy. The June 9, 2011, decision of the United States Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership et al. rained current legal standards by holding that patents must be proved invalid by ""clear and convincing evidence."" The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the ""preponderance of the evidence"" standard, which would have made patents more vulnerable to challenge, applied in this situation. The decision arguably holds a number of potential implications for U.S. innovation policy, including incentives to innovate, invest, and assert patents, and leaves the question of the appropriate presumption of validity for patents squarely before Congress.",9,9 "South Africa: Politics, Economy, and U.S. Relations. South Africa is a multi-racial, majority black southern African country of nearly 52 million. It held its first universal suffrage elections in 1994, after a transition from white minority rule under apartheid, a system of state-enforced racial segregation and socioeconomic discrimination. South Africa entered a period of mourning in late 2013, upon the death of its first post-apartheid president, Nelson Mandela. He is viewed as the founding father of the countrys nonracial democratic system, the 20th anniversary of which was recently celebrated prior to national elections on May 7. South Africa is influential regionally, due to its political, trade, and investment ties across Africa and its active role within the African Union. It is viewed as a U.S. strategic partner in Africa, despite periodic foreign policy differences. In mid-2013, President Obama traveled to South Africa, among other African countries. Key issues addressed in South Africa included bilateral political and trade and investment ties, development cooperation, and shared U.S.-South African aims regarding similar issues across Africa, as well as democracy, youth leadership development, and peace and security. Congress has long been engaged with South Africa, notably during the anti-apartheid struggle, and with regard to post-apartheid socioeconomic development efforts, a key focus of bilateral ties. Since 1992, South Africa has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid, mostly devoted to addressing HIV/AIDS and other health challenges. Aid oversight has drawn the bulk of South Africa-related congressional attention in recent years. U.S. policy makers are also increasingly focused on efforts to strengthen already growing U.S.-South African trade and investment ties. Other key areas of bilateral engagement include security cooperation and an ongoing U.S.-South African Strategic Dialogue. Established in 2010, the Dialogue centers on health, education, food security, law enforcement, trade, investment, and energy, among other issues. South Africa has the largest, most diversified, and highly industrialized economy in Africa. It has enjoyed moderate economic growth in most recent years. Average per capita incomes and access to education have grown across racial groups, notably for blacks. Despite post-apartheid national socioeconomic gains, South Africa remains a highly unequal society with respect to wealth and income distribution and access to jobs, social services, utilities, and land. Most blacks are poor, and average black incomes are far smaller than those of the historically privileged white minority. Blacks also suffer very high unemployment rates (36% in 2011), and have far less access to education. Shortages of quality housing, utilities, and social services in townshipsthe vast, high-density housing settlements where many of the poor livespur ongoing social and political tensions. Other key problems include public corruption and widespread violent crime. Vigilante justice and mob violence is not uncommon, and heavy-handed police tactics sometimes result in human rights abuses. South Africa also suffers high rates of HIV/AIDS. In late 2012, the governing African National Congress (ANC) party, despite some reported internal divisions, reelected as its president Jacob Zuma, ahead of the May 2014 national elections. The parliament elected Zuma to his first term as president of South Africa in 2009. The ANC government faces the substantial challenges noted above, along with others, including labor unrest, rising dissatisfaction within key labor constituencies, and dissatisfaction among youths. Youth populations face particularly high jobless rates and may lack older generations continuing allegiance and gratitude to the ANC for helping to end apartheid. To address these diverse challenges, all of which are electoral issues, the government is investing billions of dollars to upgrade infrastructure and improve public service delivery, but is likely to face continuing challenges in meeting popular expectations.",85,85 "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: U.S. Economic Assistance. U.S. economic assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) seeks to foster democratic institutions and economic reform. Congress approved $100 million for Serbia for FY2001 and the Administration has requested $145 million for the FRY for FY2002. Congressional debate may center on constraints on that aid, the role of other donors, and Serbia's relationship with Montenegro and Kosovo in that context.",79,79 "Lean Finely Textured Beef: The ""Pink Slime"" Controversy. Since early March 2012, the use of lean finely textured beef (LFTB) in the U.S. ground beef supply has come under a barrage of media criticism and consumer backlash. The depiction of LFTB in the media as ""pink slime"" raised the product's ""yuck"" factor and implied that there were food safety issues with LFTB, mainly because ammonium gas is used as an antimicrobial intervention in the production of LFTB. Also, the fact that ground beef purchased for the school lunch program could contain LFTB triggered consumer calls for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to immediately end the practice. The meat industry saw media sensationalism as a campaign of misinformation to undermine a product used for more than ten years to supplement lean beef supplies used in ground beef. Ground beef is the most popularly consumed beef item among American consumers, and consumers have increasingly demanded lean ground beef. USDA approved the process that Beef Products, Inc. (BPI), the primary producer of LFTB, uses to produce LFTB, and USDA continues to affirm that LFTB is a safe, nutritious beef product. Although LFTB received negative press in previous years, the uproar starting in March 2012 has had greater impacts. USDA changed its policy on school lunches to allow schools to have a choice of whether to buy ground beef with LFTB or not. Major grocery chains announced that they were discontinuing the use of LFTB in retail ground beef. The result has been an immediate, sharp decline in 50% beef trimming prices, and expectations of higher ground beef prices. Some companies decided to voluntarily use LFTB labels on ground beef containing the product. Some food safety advocates who believe BPI was a food safety innovator have expressed concern that the barrage of negative publicity could stifle further innovation by meat companies. The LFTB controversy demonstrates that consumers' perceptions and understanding of modern food production can quickly affect markets and/or a company's business. It raises policy issues about how consumers should be informed by either industry or government. Some Members of Congress have expressed strong interest in the LFTB controversy through statements and letters to USDA. Some Members have called for the immediate end of LFTB in the school lunch program, and others have asked that ground beef include labels informing consumers that LFTB is used in a beef product. Legislation also has been introduced that would require LFTB labels.",1,1 "New York Times Co. v. Tasini: The U.S. Supreme Court Affirms ""Authorial"" Rights in Copyright. This report examines the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in New York Times Co. v. Tasini. This case considers whether, under the U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 201(c), publishers are ""privileged"" to include the copyrighted articles of freelance authors in an electronic database.",9,9 "Vaccine Policy Issues. This report's focus is on vaccination, one of the most cost-effective methods available to prevent infectious diseases. Whether a vaccine's target is naturally occurring or present because of hostile intent, the issues policy makers must deal with include vaccine development, production availability, safety, effectiveness, and access. Vaccines are biologics: their basic components begin as living material. They introduce bacteria or dead or weakened viruses into a person or animal to stimulate an immune reaction that the body will remember if assaulted by the same pathogen in the future. There is no central federal authority for vaccine policy. In the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the National Vaccine Program Office (NVPO) coordinates vaccine-related activities, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for the regulation of vaccines and other biologics. Also involved in vaccine activities are other components of HHS (e.g., the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Health Resources and Services Administration), the Departments of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Concerned about bioterrorist attacks in the United States, the 107th Congress passed several vaccine-related measures and the 108th Congress continued with legislative and oversight activities regarding the development and purchase of vaccines against possible bioterrorist attacks and dealing with the sudden shortage of influenza vaccine at the outset of the 2004-2005 flu season. Obstacles to vaccine availability -- such as production costs, concern for liability expenses weak markets, and difficulties in predicting need -- often have economic roots. As mechanisms to enhance availability, Congress may consider financial incentives, public-private partnerships improved coordination, and alternatives to safety and effectiveness documentation. A pillar of U.S. policy on drugs and vaccines is the protection of the individuals who use them. FDA does not license a product for sale in the United States until it is satisfied that the vaccine is safe and effective. Scientists, clinicians, Members of Congress, and the public must make decisions of vaccine safety despite uncertainties and varying perceptions of risk. To ameliorate the difficulties Congress could address post-licensure adverse-event surveillance, education and risk communication, studies in pharmacoepidemiology and pharmacoeconomics, and improving available mechanisms to compensate individuals injured by vaccinations. Successful development and production of safe and effective vaccines does not ensure that everyone who needs a vaccine gets it. Congress may take up the coordination of government childhood immunization programs and financing levels and strategies for vaccine-related care. Noting concern for health needs of developing countries, some Members seek to increase access to existing vaccines and to spur development of affordable vaccines for global health threats. This report will be updated as warranted.",65,65 "The Advocacy of Terrorism on the Internet: Freedom of Speech Issues and the Material Support Statutes. The development of the Internet has revolutionized communications. It has never been easier to speak to wide audiences or to communicate with people that may be located more than half a world away from the speaker. However, like any neutral platform, the Internet can be used to many different ends, including illegal, offensive, or dangerous purposes. Terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State (IS, also referred to as ISIS or ISIL), Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Al Shabaab, use the Internet to disseminate their ideology, to recruit new members, and to take credit for attacks around the world. In addition, some people who are not members of these groups may view this content and could begin to sympathize with or to adhere to the violent philosophies these groups advocate. They might even act on these beliefs. Several U.S. policymakers, including some Members of Congress, have expressed concern about the influence that terrorist advocacy may have upon those who view or read it. The ease with which such speech may be disseminated over the Internet, using popular social media services, has been highlighted by some observers as potentially increasing the ease by which persons who might otherwise have not been exposed to the ideology or recruitment efforts of terrorist entities may become radicalized. These concerns raise the question of whether it would be permissible for the federal government to restrict or prohibit the publication and distribution of speech that advocates the commission of terrorist acts when that speech appears on the Internet. Significant First Amendment freedom of speech issues are raised by the prospect of government restrictions on the publication and distribution of speech, even speech that advocates terrorism. This report discusses relevant precedent concerning the extent to which advocacy of terrorism may be restricted in a manner consistent with the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech Clause. The report also discusses the potential application of the federal ban on the provision of material support to foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) to the advocacy of terrorism, including as it relates to the dissemination of such advocacy via online services like Twitter or Facebook.",110,86 "Appropriations for FY2004: Energy and Water Development. The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies. The Bush Administration requested $26.95 billion for these programs for FY2004 compared with $26.20 billion appropriated for FY2003. On July 18 the House passed a bill, H.R. 2754 containing appropriations of $27.08 billion. On September 16 the Senate passed its version of H.R. 2754, funding energy and water development programs at $27.38 billion. The conference committee on the bill approved $27.33 billion on November 5, 2003. Both the House and the Senate agreed to the conference report on November 18, and the President signed the bill December 1 (P.L. 108-137). Key issues involving Energy and Water Development appropriations programs include funding and progress of Corps projects not considered priorities by the Administration funding for major water/ecosystem restoration initiatives such as Florida Everglades and California “Bay-Delta†funding for the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada funding for developing a new nuclear warhead, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, and DOE’s “Nuclear Power 2010†initiative, to “identify the technical, institutional and regulatory barriers to the deployment of new nuclear power plants by 2010.†This report will be updated as events warrant.",59,59 "The Child Tax Credit and the President's Tax Cut Plan. The child tax credit was enacted as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The current credit is $500 per qualifying child. President Bush has proposed increasing the child tax credit to $1,000 per qualifying child. The President has also proposed making permanent the temporary rule in current law that allows the child tax credit to offset a taxpayer's alternative minimum tax.",117,102 "Criminal Restitution Proposals in the 110th Congress. Congress enacted two restitution provisions in the 110th Congress, one as part of the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 (Title II of P.L. 110-326)(H.R. 5938), and the other as part of the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-403)(S. 3325). It devoted considerable time and attention to other restitution proposals as well. Restitution legislation in the 110th Congress fell into three categories. Some proposals, such as two provisions enacted, create or would have created new federal crimes or amend specific existing federal offenses and in doing so include restitution provisions particular to those offenses, e.g., P.L. 110-326 (intellectual property), P.L. 110-403 (identity theft), H.R. 880, H.R. 1582, H.R. 1692, S. 456, and S. 990 (gang bills), H.R. 6491 (organized retail offenses), H.R. 3148 (Mann Act), H.R. 3990 (sexual military offenses), and H.R. 871 (spousal support offenses). Other proposals would have addressed a particular aspect of the law such as abatement which limits restitution collection after the defendant's death (S. 149/H.R. 4111). Two bills – H.R. 845, the Criminal Restitution Improvement Act, and S. 973/H.R. 4110, the Restitution for Victims of Crime Act – sought to make substantial changes in federal restitution law. They anticipated three kinds of adjustments: (1) an expansion of offenses for which restitution may be ordered without recourse to the laws relating to probation and supervised release, (2) an overhaul of the procedures governing the issuance and enforcement of restitution orders to afford prosecutors greater enforcement flexibility without having to seek the approval of the sentencing court, and (3) authority for preindictment and presentencing restraining orders and other protective measures to prevent dissipation of assets by those who may subsequently owe restitution. Although similar in many respects, S. 973/H.R. 4110 more closely resembles the proposals transmitted by the Justice Department. The provisions of H.R. 845 also appeared as Title V of the Violent Crime Control Act of 2007 (H.R. 3156/S. 1860), most of the language in S. 973/H.R. 4110 also appeared in Title VII of a subsequently tabled version of the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations bill (H.R. 3903). This report is available in an abridged form – without footnotes, citations to most authorities and appendices – as CRS Report RS22709, Criminal Restitution in the 110th Congress: A Sketch. Related reports include CRS Report RL34138, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases, available in abridged form as CRS Report RS22708, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases: A Sketch, all by Charles Doyle.",93,94 "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11. With enactment of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act on January 1, 2014 (H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-73), Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total $1.6 trillion for military operations, base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and Iraq security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans' health care for the war operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks. Of this $1.6 trillion total, CRS estimates that the total is distributed as follows $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and other counterterror operations received $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn (OND) $27 billion (2%) for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases, and $81 billion (5%) for war-designated funding not considered directly related to the Afghanistan or Iraq wars. About 92% of the funds are for Department of Defense (DOD), 6% for State Department foreign aid programs and diplomatic operations, 1% for Department of Veterans Administration's medical care for veterans. In addition, 5% of the funds (across agencies) are for programs and activities tangentially-related to war operations. The FY2015 war request for DOD, State/USAID, and Veterans Administration Medical totals $73.5 billion including $58.1 billion for Afghanistan, $5.0 billion for Iraq, $ 100 million for enhanced security, and $10.4 billion for other war-designated funding. These totals do not reflect the new FY2015 request submitted in November 2014 to cover expenses for Operations Inherent Resolve (OIR) that began with airstrikes launched in late August 2014, to aid Syrian insurgents and the Iraq government to counter the takeover of territory by the Islamic State (IS). The Administration submitted a $5.5 billion FY2015 budget amendment for this operation that Congress is considering. Including the new request, the FY2015 war funding now totals $79.0 billion. In late May 2014, the President announced that troop levels in Afghanistan would fall from 33,000 to 9,800 by January 1, 2015 with the U.S. role focusing on advising Afghan security forces and conducting counter-terror operations. A year later, by January 1, 2016, the President stated that the number of troops in Afghanistan would halve to about 4,900 and then by the beginning of 2017, settle at an embassy presence of about 1,000. Overall U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq began to decline with the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq by December 2011. The troop decline continued with President Obama's announcement in February 2013 that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would halve from 67,000 to 34,000 by February 2014. Annual war costs also decreased from a peak of $195 billion in FY2008 to $95 billion enacted in FY2014. After the reversal of the 2009 Afghanistan surge, the President promised in the 2013 State of the Union address that ""our troops will continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead [and] our mission will change from combat to support."" He also stated that by ""2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security."" The FY2015 Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-164) sets war funding at the FY2014 enacted level of $95.5 billion, which exceeds the FY2015 amended request (with OIR) by about $16.5 billion. The CR expires on December 11, 2014, and Congress is expected to enact another CR or an Omnibus appropriations act for the rest of the fiscal year. Congress may face several budgetary issues about how to respond to the FY2015 war request and longer-term war cost issues including assessing the amount, purposes, and level of funding to support U.S. troops during the post-2014 drawdown evaluating the Administration proposal for a new flexible funding account that would provide $5 billion for a Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTFP) to respond to unspecified ""evolving threats from South Asia to the Sahel"" by ""building partnership capacity"" through Train && Equip programs defining what is an appropriate war-related cost as opposed to what is in the base, non-war budget, a choice made more difficult in part by the potential squeeze on agencies' base budgets that are subject to Budget Control Act spending limits (P.L. 112-25) estimating the potential long-term cost of the war, including repairing and replacing war-worn equipment and maintaining an ""enduring presence"" that could entail a substantial footprint in the region, and responding to the November 2014 request for $5.5 billion for Operation Inherent Resolve, the new operation to counter the Islamic State. There are some indications that the FY2015 DOD war funding request may be more than is needed in light of FY2014 experience when expenses for returning troops and equipment have proven to be lower and the pace faster than anticipated. If expenses are lower and withdrawal is faster than anticipated, the FY2015 request may also include excess funds that could be used to pay for part or all of the new $5.5 billion request to counter the Islamic State. Savings in FY2015 could be partly offset by the recent announcement by Secretary Hagel that up to 1,000 U.S. troops could be kept in Afghanistan until the spring of 2015 to substitute for a delay in NATO troops being available to provide needed support. Members have raised various concerns about the broad authorities requested for the new CTPF, which exceed current authorities for other Train & Equip programs. The conference version of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 3797, reduces the funding and rejects most of the new authorities requested. Other concerns include the lack of evidence of success in previous similar programs, particularly in situations like the complex political-military environment in Syria and Iraq. Congress may wish to consider ways to restrict war-funding to exclude activities marginally related to war operations and support, and to limit the use of ground troops in Operation Inherent Resolve.",22,24 "Progress in Combating Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs): U.S. and Global Efforts from FY2006 to FY2015. The term ""neglected tropical diseases"" (NTDs) was coined by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2003 to describe a set of diseases that are ancient, worsen poverty, and typically impair health and productivity while carrying low death rates. While the use of the term ""NTDs"" has helped to raise awareness about these long-standing health challenges, its use risks simplifying a complicated health challenge. Some of the diseases are treatable with drugs that can be administered by lay health workers irrespective of disease status, while others require diagnosis and can be treated only by trained health professionals who have access to appropriate equipment, electrical power, and refrigeration (to store the temperature-sensitive therapies). Neglected tropical diseases primarily plague the poorest people in developing countries. Changes in the environment and population flows, however, make industrialized countries, including the United States, increasingly vulnerable to some NTDs, particularly dengue haemorrhagic fever, which can cause death and has no cure. Health interventions to address the array of NTDs vary, but a common factor to an enduring solution to these illnesses is economic development. Industrialized countries, including the United States, have controlled these diseases in their territories by combining drug treatment with the construction and use of improved sanitation, modernization of agricultural practices, and utilization of improved water systems. The international community has made substantial progress in combating select NTDs, though some have been tackled more effectively than others. Guinea worm disease, for example, is on the cusp of eradication. More generally, expanding access to mass drug administration is contributing to decreases in prevalence of several NTDs, particularly across Latin America. Despite these advances, WHO cautions that these diseases cannot be banished without improving global access to clean water and sanitation, strengthening local health capacity (veterinary as well as human), and intensifying case detection and management. Making improvements in these areas will require long-term investments that are complex and may entail facing thorny issues such as addressing corruption, transferring ownership of health programs from donors to recipient countries, and evaluating the impact of political and economic policies on health programs (e.g., international lending requirements). The United States has played an important role in combating NTDs. Congressional interest in NTDs has been growing. Appropriations for NTD programs have steadily increased from $15 million in FY2006 to $100 million in FY2014. In May 2014, President Barack Obama announced that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had supported the delivery of the one billionth NTD treatment and had reached nearly half a billion people. The Administration requested $86.5 million to support NTD programs in FY2015. Between FY2006 and FY2012, U.S. funding has supported the delivery of nearly 585 NTD treatments, reaching 258 million people. This report discusses the prevalence of NTDs, U.S. and global actions to address them, and options the 113th Congress might consider. For additional background on NTDs, including photographs and discussions about transmission of NTDs, descriptions of activities to combat NTDs by other agencies, and additional policy issues, see CRS Report R41607, Neglected Tropical Diseases: Background, Responses, and Issues for Congress.",79,65 "The Effect of the President's Dividend Relief Proposal on Corporate Tax Subsidies. The first section of this report explains how these excludable dividend amounts (EDAs) work and how they affect the value of corporate tax preferences. The second section of the report details alternative approaches and their effects on corporate tax subsidies. The next section of the report explores the rationale for EDAs. The final section concludes with a review of general policy issues, including a discussion of the general types of corporate tax preferences currently allowed and a discussion of possible alternative approaches.",102,102 "Debarment and Suspension Provisions Applicable to Federal Grant Programs. Federal agencies have general authority to debar or suspend persons from participating in federal grant programs and other nonprocurement transactions. Grounds for debarment of a federal grantee include criminal or civil convictions for various crimes including fraud, embezzlement, theft, bribery, tax evasion, and making up false claims, among others, as well as other causes indicating a person is not ""presently responsible"" as a federal grantee. Debarment and suspension in the context of federal grant programs is described in each agency's regulations, and such provisions may vary for individual programs depending upon the grant program's authorizing statute. Executive Order 12549, issued by President Ronald Reagan, directed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to issue government-wide criteria for debarment and suspension in federal grants and further directed executive departments and agencies to issue regulations consistent with OMB's guidelines. OMB's government-wide guidelines may be found at 2 C.F.R. Part 180. The issue of debarment and suspension for federal grant recipients is particularly timely given Congress's interest in the activities of the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (""ACORN"") and its affiliates. Title VI of H.R. 3221, which was passed by the House in September of 2009, barred certain organizations (including ACORN) from receiving federal grants and contracts under certain circumstances, such as an indictment for a violation of various campaign finance or election laws. This legislation, along with similar legislative vehicles, prompted interest in the current status of debarment and suspension in the context of federal grant programs. This report discusses the background of debarment and suspension for federal grant programs, the specific rules established by OMB, and related legislation and activities in the 111th Congress.",60,60 "The Federal Assets Sale and Transfer Act of 2016: Background and Key Provisions. Real property disposal is the process by which federal agencies identify and then transfer, donate, or sell real property they no longer need. Disposition is an important asset management function because the costs of maintaining unneeded properties can be substantial. Moreover, properties the government no longer needs may be used by state or local governments, nonprofits, or businesses to provide benefits to the public. Finally, the government loses potential revenue when it holds onto certain unneeded properties that might be sold for a profit. Despite these drawbacks, federal agencies hold thousands of unneeded and underutilized properties. Agencies have argued that they are unable to dispose of these properties for several reasons. First, there are statutorily prescribed steps in the disposal process that can take months to complete. Second, properties may not be appealing to potential buyers or lessees if they require major repairs or environmental remediation—steps for which agencies lack funding to complete before bringing a property to market. Third, key stakeholders in the disposal process—including local governments, nonprofit organizations, and businesses—are often at odds over how to dispose of properties. In addition, Congress may be limited in its capacity to conduct oversight of the disposal process because it currently lacks access to reliable, comprehensive real property data. The General Services Administration (GSA) maintains a database with information on most federal buildings, but those data are provided to Congress on a limited basis. Moreover, the quality of the information in the database has been questioned, in part because of inconsistent reporting of key data elements, such as how much space within a given building is unneeded. The lack of data may also hinder congressional oversight on the extent to which agencies enter into leases rather than purchase space. Leasing space is typically more expensive than owning, and the government's ""overreliance on costly leased space"" is one of the primary reasons federal real property is designated as a ""high risk"" issue by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The Federal Assets Sale and Transfer Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-287) established a new, centralized process for disposing of unneeded space. Under FASTA, agencies are required to develop a list of disposal recommendations, which could include the sale, transfer, conveyance, consolidation, or outlease of any unneeded space, among other options. These recommendations are then to be submitted to the GSA Administrator and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and revision. The revised list of recommendations is then vetted by a newly established Public Buildings Reform Board, and returned to the OMB Director for final approval or disapproval. FASTA may address some of the obstacles agencies face when disposing of unneeded space. Properties on the recommendation list are exempt from certain statutory requirements, such as screening for public benefit, and FASTA provides funding for agencies to implement the board's recommendations. The use of a board to make disposal decisions may also reduce the impact of stakeholder conflict. In addition, FASTA requires GSA to create a public database with information that may enhance congressional oversight. There may be drawbacks to FASTA. The law does not provide Congress with an opportunity to vote for or against the list of recommendations, nor is Congress directly involved in the creation of the list. It is possible that philosophical differences between the board and the OMB Director could lead to an impasse that would effectively shut down the FASTA disposal process. The required database may not include some information that could be useful to Congress, such as the repair needs and condition of each building.",64,64 "U.S.-Dominican Republic Free-Trade Agreement. On March 15, 2004, the United States and the Dominican Republic concluded a draft free-trade agreement to integrate the Dominican Republic into the earlier signed Central American Free-Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The final agreement (DR-CAFTA) was signed by all parties on August 5 2004. The Dominican Republic would have its own market access provisions, but would accept the rest of the CAFTA framework. Legislation to implement DR-CAFTA might be considered in the 109th Congress. This report will be updated as developments occur.",53,53 "Summary Cost Data for Health Plans Available in Ohio's Exchange, 2014: Fact Sheet. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) contains a number of provisions that may affect the individual health insurance market. This fact sheet offers a first look at selected costs and options for individual and family plans in Ohio's exchange, providing information about individual and family premiums for selected ages, as well as two cost-sharing measures: medical deductible and maximum out-of-pocket expenses.",70,70 "Food and Drug Administration: Selected Funding and Policy Issues. This report discusses funding and policy issues regarding the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsible for ensuring the safety of foods, drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and other products.",2,2 "Ocean Acidification. With increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, the extent of effects on the ocean and marine resources is an increasing concern. One aspect of this issue is the ongoing process (known as ocean acidification) whereby seawater becomes less alkaline as more CO2 dissolves in it, causing hydrogen ion concentration in seawater to increase. Scientists are concerned that increasing hydrogen ion concentration could reduce growth or even cause death of shell-forming animals (e.g., corals, mollusks, and certain planktonic organisms) as well as disrupt marine food webs and the reproductive physiology of certain species. While not yet fully understood, the ecological and economic consequences of ocean acidification could be substantial. Congress is beginning to focus attention on better understanding ocean acidification and determining how this concern might be addressed. In the 111th Congress, the Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act of 2009 (FOARAM, Title XII, Subtitle D, of P.L. 111-11) directed the Secretary of Commerce to establish an ocean acidification program within National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), established an interagency committee to develop an ocean acidification research and monitoring plan, and authorized appropriations through FY2012 for NOAA and the National Science Foundation. To date, the only bill related to ocean acidification that has been introduced during the 113th Congress is the Coral Reef Conservation Act Amendments of 2013 (S. 839). S. 839 would include ocean acidification in the criteria used to evaluate project proposals for studying threats to coral reefs and developing responses to coral reef losses. On July 30, 2013, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation ordered S. 839 to be reported.",41,41 "The Israeli Economy: Overview and Developments Through 1997. The Israeli economy belies simple categorization. Based on a per capita income level of $16,783 a large services sector, and hundreds of dynamic high-tech companies, it is modern and advanced. Based on the large role the government still plays in the economy, it is interventionist and regulated. And based on the country's high defense requirements, chronic trade deficits, and political economy it can be described as distinctive or unique. Since 1948, the economy has experienced three different stages of development. The first (1948-1972) and third stages (1989-1995) were classic boom periods fueled primarily by rapid increases in the stock of labor. The second stage (1973-1988) was characterized by considerable economic instability and turmoil. The Israeli economy currently may be entering a fourth stage where concerns once again are being raised about stability and performance. The increase and size of the current account deficit (4.8% of GDP in 1996), combined with an overvalued exchange rate, are matters of particular concern because they can be precursors to a financial crisis. This is a situation of special concern to Israel because it already imports a large amount of capital to finance its deficit, and there is no certainty that sources of funding at reasonable cost will continue indefinitely. These economic problems have been fueled by an expansionary fiscal policy and a relatively restrictive monetary policy. In order to promote economic stability, most economists agree that Israel needs to pursue a less expansionary fiscal policy mainly by cutting non-productive government expenditures. This, in turn, would allow central bank authorities leeway to run a less restrictive monetary policy without jeopardizing other macroeconomic objectives. A reduction of the high degree of government intervention in economic activity also could help Israel promote economic growth and macroeconomic stability through a more efficient use of the country's resources. Given the likelihood of a slower growing labor force, productivity increases brought about by structural reforms may become even more critical in the future. However, progress has been gradual in reducing the government's role in owning and running enterprises, as well as reforming capital and labor markets. Progress has been more rapid in liberalizing foreign trade and currency barriers and in increasing competition in certain sectors. Although there appears to be a consensus within Israel on the policy actions that should be taken to avoid serious economic problems, implementation of a coherent economic strategy continues to be politically difficult. A perennial problem is that as Israel's political system produces coalition governments, the majority party in the government is often hampered in implementing its preferred economic policy by competing claims from small coalition partners. A larger unknown is the commitment of the two major political parties, Likud and Labor, to deficit reduction and structural reforms.",85,85 "Welfare Reform: Diversion as an Alternative to TANF Benefits. One strategy that states are using to reduce the need for ongoing welfare is referred to as ""diversion."" Diversion is typically considered to be a payment, program, or activity that is intended to divert applicants for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits from completing the application process and thereby becoming potentially eligible for monthly TANF assistance. Welfare diversion comes in a variety of forms, such as lump sum payments, vendor payments, supportive services, and resource referral. In addition, applicant job search is used by some states as a diversion activity. Sometimes it is not easy to identify what diversion is and what it is not. A procedure like eligibility screening may be a form of diversion when it is carried out in a certain manner, while at other times it may merely be part of an eligibility review. Diversion payments generally are equal to several months' benefits. They usually are offered as a one-time payment in lieu of extended cash benefits. Acceptance of a diversion payment ordinarily makes a family ineligible for TANF assistance for a certain period of time. According to the latest available reported data, 28 states and the District of Columbia provided lump sum diversion payments to TANF applicants, 16 states and the District of Columbia required TANF applicants to engage in active job searches before their application for TANF was approved, and 15 states were using a fairly aggressive form of resource referral. Under the final TANF regulations, non-recurrent, short-term benefits (e.g., diversion) for crisis situations (provided for no more than four months) do not count as TANF assistance. Since diversion is not considered TANF assistance, families receiving diversion aid are not subject to TANF work requirements, time limits, child support assignment, or data reporting requirements. This report discusses welfare diversion and state use of diversion strategies. It will be updated periodically as new data and information become available.",117,117 "Oregon Emergency Management and Homeland Security Statutory Authorities Summarized. This report is one of a series that profiles the emergency management and homeland security statutory authorities of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and three territories (American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). Each profile identifies the more significant elements of state statutes, generally as codified. This report focuses on the state of Oregon.",22,22 "Oversight and Legal Enforcement of the National Mortgage Settlement. In Autumn 2010, all 50 state attorneys general, the attorney general for the District of Columbia, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department) initiated an investigation into foreclosure-related state and federal law violations by the nation's top five mortgage servicers: Ally Financial, Inc. (formerly GMAC, Inc.), Bank of America, Corp., Citigroup, Inc., JP Morgan Chase && Co. and Wells Fargo & Co. On February 8, 2012, these state and federal officials, with the exception of Oklahoma's attorney general, announced a ""National Mortgage Settlement"" of certain legal claims with these five institutions. The settlement is to result in the servicers providing about $25 billion of relief, primarily to homeowners and individuals who recently lost their homes through foreclosure. In financial terms, it constitutes the second largest legal settlement ever reached by the attorneys general, behind only the 1998 settlement with tobacco companies. The agreements stipulate that, in exchange for a release of liability for legal claims that otherwise could have been raised against the servicers by the participating regulators, these five mortgage companies will provide five distinct forms of relief. Under the agreements, the mortgage companies shall comply with specified servicing standards going forward provide various forms of mortgage-related consumer relief to current borrowers whose mortgages are owned and serviced by the five servicers (""Consumer Relief"" component) provide relief to servicemembers who may have been harmed by violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) and to improve the servicing of soldiers' mortgages to prevent future SCRA violations (""SCRA"" component) provide compensation to certain individuals whose homes were previously foreclosed by the five servicers (""Borrower Payment"" component), and make direct payments to federal and state governments to cover the resolution of legal claims (""Direct Settlement Payment"" component). With the exception of the Direct Settlement Payment component, the agreements also provide explicit mechanisms by which compliance of each distinct relief component will be overseen and enforced. The agreements establish an independent monitor with the primary authority to conduct oversight of the servicers' compliance with Consumer Relief and Servicing Standards of the settlement, while the enforcement powers primarily are provided to a Monitoring Committee that is composed of representatives of the state and federal regulators that are parties to the agreements. Primary oversight and enforcement of the SCRA terms reside with the DOJ. A Special Administrator is charged with identifying individuals who qualify for monetary relief under the Borrower Payment terms and with distributing those funds, while the state members of the Monitoring Committee have the authority to oversee the Special Administrator's operations. Individual homeowners are not parties to the agreements, and the terms of the agreements do not provide individual borrowers a private right of action to enforce the agreements. Similarly, the settlement agreements do not, in any way, limit any enforcement power held by state or federal regulators that are not parties to the agreements, including the authorities of the federal banking regulators.",7,7 "Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers. The Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers (TAAF) program provides technical assistance and cash benefits to producers of farm commodities and fishermen who experience adverse economic effects from increased imports. Congress first authorized this program in 2002, and made significant changes to it in the 2009 economic stimulus package (P.L. 111-5). The 2009 revisions were aimed at making it easier for farmers and fishermen to qualify for program benefits, and provided over $200 million in funding through December 2010. Subsequently, P.L. 112-40 (enacted in October 2011) authorized $202.5 million through December 2013, but no new program activity has occurred since December 2010 for lack of appropriated funds. In June 2015, Congress passed H.R. 1295, the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, authorizing TAAF through FY2021, and the President signed the bill into law on June 29, 2015, as P.L. 114-27. Any program activity would still be contingent on the appropriation of funds. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is required to follow a two-step process in administering TAAF. First, a group of producers must be certified eligible to apply. Second, a producer in a certified group must meet specified requirements to be approved for benefits. To be certified, a group must show that imports were a significant cause for at least a 15% decline in one of three factors: the price of the commodity, the quantity of the commodity produced, or the production value of the commodity. Once a producer group is certified, an individual producer within that group must meet three requirements to be approved for program benefits. These include technical assistance with a training component, and financial assistance. A producer must show that (1) the commodity was produced in the current year and also in one of the previous three years, (2) the quantity of the commodity produced decreased compared to that in a previous year, or the price received for the commodity decreased compared to a preceding three-year average price, and (3) no benefits were received under any other trade adjustment assistance program. The training component is intended to help the producer become more competitive in producing the same or another commodity. Financial assistance is to be used to develop and implement a business adjustment plan designed to address the impact of import competition. From 2009 to 2011, USDA certified 10 of 30 petitions filed by producers of 5 commodity groups—shrimp, catfish, asparagus, lobster, and wild blueberries. USDA approved TAAF benefits for about 4,500 individual producers in FY2010, and for about 5,700 producers in FY2011. In a 2012 audit of TAAF, the Government Accountability Office recommended that USDA require spouses who apply for assistance to submit documentation on how they contribute to producing a commodity, take steps to ensure that the program's financial assistance component is used for intended purposes, and adopt a longer-term approach to evaluate its effectiveness. A 2013 audit by USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) identified several shortcomings in administering the program, including determining eligibility and providing effective oversight. The 2015 reauthorization of TAAF programs follows directly in the wake of the enactment of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation (P.L. 114-26) that President Obama had requested of Congress to facilitate the conclusion of regional free trade agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 other Pacific-facing nations. Under P.L. 114-27, TAAF is authorized to receive $90 million annually for FY2015 through FY2021, subject to annual appropriations. No new funding has been appropriated since the program's reauthorization.",3,3 "Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) FY2012 Appropriations. Enacted December 23, 2011, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74, H.R. 2055), finalized appropriations for FY2012 for those agencies typically funded under nine of the 12 regular appropriations bills. Not including a 0.16% across-the-board rescission, Title II of Division E under P.L. 112-74 provided $8.46 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for FY2012. The total was an increase above the $7.15 billion proposed by the House Appropriations Committee (H.R. 2584 as reported), but less than the $8.62 billion proposed in a draft released by the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee and the $8.97 billion included in the President's FY2012 budget request. The EPA FY2012 appropriations were $219.1 million (2.6%) less than the FY2011 enacted appropriations of $8.68 billion. Prior to the enactment of P.L. 112-74, EPA and agencies included in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill had been funded sequentially under a series of FY2012 continuing resolutions. In addition to FY2012 appropriations for the various EPA programs and activities, P.L. 112-74 included directive provisions regarding certain EPA authorities and program activities, including some that restricted the use of appropriated funds for implementing or proceeding with several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions. Division E, Title IV ""General Provisions"" P.L. 112-74, included provisions specifying requirements and restrictions for the use of appropriations for certain air Clean Air Act regulatory actions and greenhouse gas emission reporting requirements (see sections 425, 426, 427 and 432), and certain Clean Water Act permitting requirements associated with silvicultural activities (section 429). Additionally, the Conference Report H.Rept. 112-331 included extensive language with regard to specific actions by EPA. For example, under the Science and Technology account in H.Rept. 112-331 (p. 1072), the Conferees required specific refinements and modifications to EPA's policies and practices for conducting assessments under the agency's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS). EPA regulatory actions received considerable attention during House and Senate oversight committee hearings, appropriations committee hearings, and House floor debate on the FY2012 appropriations during the first session of the 112th Congress. Several of the provisions included in P.L. 112-74 were the same or similar to a subset of more than 25 provisions included in H.R. 2584, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.Rept. 112-151), as reported on July 19, 2011, and additional proposed provisions regarding EPA among roughly 150 amendments considered or submitted during floor debate of H.R. 2584, which was suspended on July 28, 2011. These proposed directives cut across many of the various environmental pollution control statutes' programs and initiatives. An October 14, 2011, draft released by the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies did not include comparable general provisions that would restrict or preclude the use of appropriations for certain EPA actions. This report summarizes funding levels for EPA accounts and certain sub-account program activities as enacted in P.L. 112-74, and as proposed in H.R. 2584 as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, in the Senate subcommittee draft, and in the President's FY2012 request, compared to the FY2011 enacted appropriations. Selected provisions regarding EPA program activities extracted from P.L. 112-74, the conference report, and the House committee-reported bill are also presented. Only those provisions affecting EPA that are clearly identifiable by specific language or references contained in the bill are included. Amendments that were considered or pending during initial House floor debate at the end of July 2011 are not included.",45,45 "Long-Term Measures of Fiscal Imbalance. Short-term budget estimates, while critical for program administration and congressional spending decisions, provide a partial and potentially misleading impression of the federal government's fiscal situation. On the other hand, long-term measures have their own limitations. On the positive side, they indicate the magnitude of long-term budget imbalances resulting from the gap between future federal tax revenues and the costs of providing retirement and health care for the baby-boom generation. However, long-term projections are subject to substantial uncertainties for two reasons. First, statistical theory implies that expected forecasting error is larger for more-distant events because errors accumulate over each period into the future. Second, the structure of the economy changes over time, so that assumptions based on the past behavior of the economy may not hold in the future. Thus short-term measures, which are relatively certain but which ignore future imbalances, must be used in conjunction with long-term measures, which indicate the size of future imbalances, but with more variability, in order to gain an accurate picture of the fiscal challenges facing the federal government. Long-run fiscal projections depend on determinants of economic growth—such as productivity, and increases in capital stock and labor force—and the growth of health care costs. This report describes and analyzes several measures of the long-term fiscal condition of the federal government. The strengths and limitations of long-term, short-term, and medium-term fiscal measures are discussed. The report then provides an overview of the federal government's long-term fiscal situation. Most independent analysts believe the federal government's fiscal position is more accurately summarized by projections that modify the Congressional Budget Office baseline by assuming the reach of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) will be capped at present levels, that tax cuts slated to expire in 2010 will in fact be extended, and that discretionary spending will keep pace with overall economic growth. Seventy-five-year projections employing these alternative assumptions put the long-term fiscal gap between revenues and spending at 7%-8% of gross domestic product (GDP). Fiscal gap is defined as the size of the immediate and permanent increase in tax revenues or decrease in non-interest expenditures needed to ensure that the public debt to GDP ratio at the end of the budget window is the same as the initial public debt to GDP ratio. These modified-baseline projections indicate that putting federal fiscal policy on a sustainable path for the next 75 years requires substantial increases in taxes, decreases in spending, or both. Changes needed to maintain a permanently sustainable fiscal stance would be even greater. This report will be updated as events warrant.",101,101 "Pay-for-Performance: Linking Employee Pay to Performance Appraisal. In many occupations today, pay is intended to reflect employee performance—or how effectively, efficiently, or thoroughly one performs his or her job. The federal government is no different from the private sector in this regard. Nearly 300,000 federal employees are currently in pay systems that attempt to make pay increases contingent upon job performance—such a system is often referred to as either a merit-based pay system or a performance-based pay system. A basic challenge with such an arrangement is arriving at credible and objective performance measures. In addition, while the private sector is ultimately concerned that employee performance be of such effectiveness that it contributes to the profits of a business, the federal government has other objectives to which employee performance is expected to contribute—such as the efficient, economical, and effective provision of services to those who qualify for, and are otherwise entitled to, them. This report discusses issues related to measuring performance across the federal government and analyzes a variety of methods utilized by the government to measure employee performance and its linkage to pay. As developments warrant, this report will be updated.",58,58 "FY2017 Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriations: In Brief. The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and—in even-numbered fiscal years—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). (For CFTC, the Agriculture appropriations subcommittee has jurisdiction in the House but not in the Senate.) Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill's development, since mandatory amounts are generally set by authorizing laws such as the farm bill. The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), agricultural research, FDA, rural development, foreign food aid and trade, farm assistance programs, food safety inspection, conservation, and animal and plant health programs. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), child nutrition, crop insurance, and the farm commodity and conservation programs paid by the Commodity Credit Corporation. The FY2017 appropriation for Agriculture and Related Agencies was enacted on May 5, 2017, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-31, Division A). The fiscal year started on October 1, 2016, under continuing resolutions (CRs) that continued FY2016 funding with a few exceptions. The House and the Senate Appropriations Committees reported their FY2017 Agriculture appropriations bills (H.R. 5054, S. 2956) in April and May 2016. The discretionary total of the enacted appropriation is $20.877 billion, which is $623 million less than enacted in FY2016 (-2.9%). It achieves this primarily by increasing budgetary offsets over the FY2016 level through greater rescissions of prior appropriations and greater scorekeeping adjustments. However, the budget authority for FY2017 provided to agencies in the major titles of the bill actually increases by $462 million compared to FY2016. Increases primarily include $163 million more for discretionary conservation programs than in FY2016, $119 million more for rural development, $65 million more for discretionary domestic nutrition programs, $52 million more for animal and plant health programs, $51 million more for agricultural research programs, $42 million more for the Food and Drug Administration, $29 million more for the Farm Service Agency, $20 million more for USDA administrative facilities, and $17 million more for food safety inspections. Reductions primarily come from a rescission of unused domestic nutrition assistance funding ($850 million rescission), supplemental funding for international food aid ($116 million less than in FY2016), agricultural research facilities ($112 million less), greater use of a disaster designation that does not count against budget caps ($76 million extra offset), and disaster assistance ($38 million less). The appropriation also carries mandatory spending that totaled about $132.5 billion. The overall total of the FY2017 Agricultural appropriation therefore exceeded $153 billion.",2,2 "Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors. In April and May 2001, the Bush Administration proposed $882.29 million in FY2002 economic and counter-narcotics assistance, as well as extension of trade preferences and other measures, for Colombia and regional neighbors in an initiative called the ""Andean Regional Initiative"" (ARI). Critics of the Andean Regional Initiative argue that it is a continuation of what they regard as the misguided approach of Plan Colombia assistance approved in 2000, with an overemphasis on military and counter-drug assistance, and with inadequate support for human rights and the peace process in Colombia. Supporters argue that it continues needed assistance to Colombia, while providing more support for regional neighbors and social and economic programs. In action on the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 2506), the House passed the bill on July 24, 2001, with $826 million for the ARI, of which $675 million is for the counter-narcotics ""Andean Counterdrug Initiative"" (ACI) portion, a reduction of $56 million from the President's ACI request. The Senate passed the bill on October 24, 2001, with $698 million for the ARI, of which $547 million is for the ACI, a reduction of $184 million from the President's ACI request. The conference version of H.R. 2506, as approved by the House on December 19, and the Senate on December 20, includes $625 million for the ACI, $106 million less than the President's ACI request, with $215 million earmarked for AID programs and a variety of conditions, including an alteration of the cap on military and civilian contractors serving in Colombia. In February 2002 budget submissions, the Bush Administration allocated $645 million to the ACI account for FY2002, including $20 million transferred from the general International Narcotics Control account. In action on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, the House passed H.R. 1646 on May 16, 2001, with four reporting requirements on activities in Colombia and a prohibition on the issuance of visas to illegal armed groups in Colombia. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out S. 1401 on September 4, 2001, with a requirement for a report that outlines a comprehensive strategy to eradicate all opium cultivation at its source in Colombia. No further action occurred on either of these bills in the first session of the 107th Congress. In action on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002, the House passed H.R. 2586 on September 25, 2001, with a cap of 500 on the number of U.S. military personnel in Colombia, with some exceptions. This provision was not retained in the conference version of S. 1438 which was passed by both chambers on December 13, 2001. In action on the Andean Trade Preference Act, on November 16, 2001, the House passed H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, which would extend and expand the ATPA through December 31, 2006. The Senate Finance Committee reported a more limited version, S. 525, on November 29, 2001, in the context of other legislation.",79,79 "Emerging Trends in the Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral and Multilateral Ties Among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. Some analysts have questioned whether U.S. security interests in the Asia Pacific region are best served by its existing framework of bilateral alliances. The region is now facing an array of changes: deepening trade links, the formation of new regional institutions, and increased attention to the threat of Islamic terrorism. Against this backdrop, China's rise represents the key driver in the evolving security landscape in Asia. China is now attracting regional states with its economic power and is offering competing vision to the U.S.-centric ""hub and spoke"" system of alliances. In essence, China's increasing economic, diplomatic, and military strength is compelling countries to rethink existing security arrangements and take initial steps that may lead to the formation of regional groupings of nations with common interests and values. At the same time, the Bush Administration has pursued stronger defense relations with Australia, Japan, and India. Bilateral defense ties have also developed between Canberra, Tokyo, and New Delhi, with varying degrees of engagement. Fledgling initiatives for trilateral efforts among the nations have emerged, some defense planners see these efforts as building on existing security cooperation to further U.S. goals in the region by combining forces among partners and allies. As trilateral initiatives have taken shape, some officials have begun promoting a quadrilateral grouping, which would tie together the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. Although no formal quadrilateral groupings exist, the Malabar 07 military exercises among the four countries in September 2007 provided an opportunity to test naval cooperation. Some observers caution that moving forward too fast with such a grouping could trigger a negative response from China. Pursuit of multilateral security arrangements holds a number of potential challenges and opportunities for the United States. Of the four leaders who championed the trilateral and quadrilateral groupings, two left office in 2007 and two face significant political challenges. Japan's constitutional restraints on military involvement may limit the scope of its cooperation, and both Australia and India have some degree of reluctance to fully engage in any forum that might alienate Beijing. Increasing capabilities among like-minded nations could enhance stability and provide a platform for responding to natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies in the region, or to potential aggression by other countries, but it also risks threatening China, potentially spurring dangerous countermeasures. Finally, there is the risk that other Asian allies, such as South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, could feel excluded from multilateral initiatives among the United States, Japan, Australia, and/or India. This report may not be updated.",21,21 "Colorado Emergency Management and Homeland Security Statutory Authorities Summarized. This report is one of a series that profiles the emergency management and homeland security statutory authorities of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and three territories (American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). Each profile identifies the more significant elements of state statutes, generally as codified. This report focuses on the state of Colorado.",11,11 "Intelligence Identities Protection Act. Concern that government documents obtained by WikiLeaks and disclosed to several newspapers could reveal the identities of United States intelligence agents or informants focused attention on whether the disclosure or publication of such information could give rise to criminal liability. This report summarizes the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA, P.L. 97-200), enacted by Congress in 1982 to address the unauthorized disclosure of information that exposes covert U.S. intelligence agents. The act, as amended, is codified at 50 U.S.C. Sections 421-426, and provides criminal penalties in certain circumstances for intentional, unauthorized disclosure of information identifying a covert agent, where those making such a disclosure know that the information disclosed identifies the covert agent as such and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent's foreign intelligence relationship to the United States. The act prescribes punishments for disclosing the identities of covert agents with increasing severity according to the level of access to classified information the offender exploited. Offenders without authorized access to classified information are subject to punishment only if they participated in a pattern of activity designed to discover and reveal the identities of covert agents and have reason to believe that such disclosure will harm U.S. intelligence operations. The act also provides exceptions and defenses to prosecution, makes provision for extraterritorial application for offenders who are U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, includes reporting requirements to Congress, and sets forth definitions of the terms used in the act. Prosecutions are rare, despite some high-profile incidents involving the exposure of U.S. intelligence agents. Although some officials have expressed concern that the WikiLeaks disclosures could endanger the lives of persons who provided information to assist U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan or to embassy officials, no prosecutions appear to have occurred related to those disclosures. There was, however, one prosecution brought related to the revelation of the identities of CIA interrogators. The 111th Congress increased the penalties for violations by persons with access to classified information (P.L. 111-259).",27,27 "Kosovo: Review and Analysis of Policy Objectives, 1998-June 1999. Since the outbreak of violent conflict in the Serbian province of Kosovo in early 1998, the United States and European countries have been actively involved in various initiatives to end the conflict and restore peace. At first, international objectives, as expressed by the six-nation Contact Group and the U.N. Security Council, were limited to seeking a cease-fire in the province, ending the repression of the Kosovo civilian population by Serb forces and improving the humanitarian situation, and facilitating a political dialogue between the parties. As fighting continued, the United States pressed for NATO to threaten punitive air strikes in order to achieve compliance with U.N. Demands. The Contact Group became more involved with the possible terms of a political settlement. In early 1999, the Contact Group sought Serb and Kosovar Albanian acceptance of a detailed interim peace plan that would restore substantial autonomy to the Kosovo population while upholding Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic's rejection of the draft peace plan and his escalating use of force in Kosovo prompted NATO to launch a sustained air campaign, Operation Allied Force against Serb targets throughout Yugoslavia beginning in March 1999. NATO leaders sought to deter Belgrade from a bloodier offensive in Kosovo and to damage Belgrade's military capacity. In response, however, Milosevic stepped up efforts to drive out the ethnic Albanian population from Kosovo, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians across borders. NATO established five key conditions for Milosevic to meet before air strikes would end: an end to all military action in Kosovo, the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, agreement to the stationing of a NATO-led military presence in Kosovo, agreement to the return of all refugees, and, willingness to negotiate a political framework agreement for Kosovo. In June, Milosevic accepted a peace framework incorporating these demands, eventually leading to an end to the bombing campaign. U.S. and allied officials proclaimed victory for the operation and moved quickly toward a peacekeeping and peace implementation phase in Kosovo. U.S. and European objectives in Kosovo remained largely consistent, although some evolved in response to changing circumstances and met with varying degrees of success. In late 1998, the threat of air strikes achieved the objective of averting a humanitarian disaster, at least for a while. In 1999, however, NATO did not succeed in deterring the largest Serbian offensives to date during the course of the air campaign. The humanitarian situation in Kosovo is likely to improve substantially in the absence of violent conflict. The NATO operation achieved Belgrade's agreement to withdraw all of its forces from Kosovo, and the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army's commitment to de-militarize under NATO supervision. A NATO-led peacekeeping force, KFOR, has been deployed to Kosovo under unified command and control arrangements, with Russian participation. Contrary to some expectations, NATO countries generally remained unified behind the air operation, though were divided on other military options. The objective of attaining a durable political settlement in Kosovo remains elusive, but has been superceded to some extent by the establishment of a virtual U.N. protectorate for Kosovo.",85,85 "Transnational Organized Crime: Principal Threats and U.S. Responses. This report examines the growing threat of transnational organized crime to U.S. national security and global stability. The end of the Cold War -- along with increasing globalization beginning in the 1990s -- has helped criminal organizations expand their activities and gain global reach. Criminal networks are believed to have benefitted from the weakening of certain government institutions, more open borders, and the resurgence of ethnic and regional conflicts across the former Soviet Union and many other regions. Transnational criminal organizations have also exploited expanding financial markets and rapid technological developments. In addition, terrorist networks are believed to be increasingly supporting themselves through traditional crime, and have been linked to criminal organizations. Alliances between the two groups could amplify threats to American security. Transnational criminals engage in a spectrum of illicit activities, including narcotics and arms smuggling, trafficking in persons, counterfeiting, and money laundering and other financial crimes. The report also outlines the U.S. response to international crime. While U.S. policy is framed within the 1998 International Crime Control Strategy, it is also shaped by other more recent federal and agency plans. Agencies heading government efforts include the Departments of State, Defense Justice, Treasury, and Homeland Security. Key federal programs and initiatives and their interagency coordination are discussed. International cooperation and agreements are vital to U.S. strategy, also, many programs seek to assist and train foreign law enforcement. Finally, this report examines likely Congressional concerns related to U.S. efforts to combat transnational crime. The report will not be updated.",98,98 "Lobbying Regulations on Non-Profit Organizations. Public charities, religious groups, social welfare organizations, and other nonprofit organizations which are exempt from federal income taxation are not generally prohibited from engaging in all lobbying or public policy advocacy activities merely because of their tax-exempt status. There may, however, be some lobbying limitations on certain organizations, depending. This report discusses this issue at length, including related legislation, relevant passages in the Internal Revenue Code, and other regulatory information.",61,61 "ACA: A Brief Overview of the Law, Implementation, and Legal Challenges. In March 2010, the 111th Congress passed health reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA, P.L. 111-152) and other laws. ACA increases access to health insurance coverage, expands federal private health insurance market requirements, and requires the creation of health insurance exchanges to provide individuals and small employers with access to insurance. It also expands Medicaid coverage. The costs to the federal government of expanding health insurance and Medicaid coverage are projected to be offset by increased taxes and revenues and reduced spending on Medicare and other federal health programs. Implementation of ACA, which began upon the law's enactment and is scheduled to unfold over the next few years, involves all the major health care stakeholders, including the federal and state governments, as well as employers, insurers, and health care providers. Following the enactment of ACA, individuals, states, and other entities challenged various provisions of ACA on constitutional grounds. Many of these suits addressed ACA's requirement for individuals to have health insurance (i.e., the individual mandate), and claimed that it is beyond the scope of Congress's enumerated powers. The expansion of the Medicaid program was also challenged, as state plaintiffs contended that the expansion impermissibly infringes upon states' rights, coercing them into accepting onerous conditions in exchange for federal funds. On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, finding that the individual mandate is a constitutional exercise of Congress's authority to levy taxes. However, the Court held that it was not a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. With regard to the Medicaid expansion provision, the Court further held that the federal government cannot terminate current Medicaid program federal matching funds if a state refuses to expand its Medicaid program. If a state accepts the new ACA Medicaid expansion funds, it must abide by the new expansion coverage rules, but, based on the Court's opinion, it appears that a state can refuse to participate in the expansion without losing any of its current federal Medicaid matching funds. All other provisions of ACA, as amended by HCERA, remain intact. This report provides a brief summary of major ACA provisions, implementation and oversight activities, and current legal challenges. For more detailed information on ACA's provisions, CRS has produced a series of more comprehensive reports, which are available at http://www.crs.gov. The information provided in these reports ranges from broad overviews of ACA provisions, such as the law's Medicare provisions, to more narrowly focused topics, such as dependent coverage for children under age 26.",69,69 "Russian Oil and Gas Companies and Central and Eastern Europe. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, and of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, heralded a major reduction in Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. Russia's armed forces and the Russian economy went into steep decline. In recent years, one key sector of the Russian economy, the Russian oil and gas sector, has shown signs of revival. The Russian energy sector occupies a central place in Russia's economy and political system. In 2000, the energy sector accounted for 16% of Russia's GDP, 29% of the gross value of industrial output, 45%-48% of Federal budget revenues, and 54% of foreign exchange earnings. Its vast financial resources also translate into great political power, although this power is mitigated by infighting among Russian elite groups. In the past few years, flush with cash from rising energy prices, Russian firms have tried to buy up energy companies in Central Europe, with mixed success. Officials and experts in Central Europe have expressed worries about the political motives of these investments. They have expressed concern that such Russian investment could have a negative impact on the sovereignty of these countries, particularly given the non-transparent way in which these companies have operated and their close links with the Russian government. Some claim that Russian leaders are pushing to control as much as possible while they still have substantial leverage, as opposed to 2004, when NATO and, especially, EU membership will change the political equation. They claim if Russian firms controlled key resources, they could form stronger political client networks within their countries, thereby compromising their sovereignty. However, some analysts point out that in some cases, the actions of Russian firms appear to be affected by conflicts within the Russian elite. Moreover, there are limits to Russian firms' ability to gain influence in the region. They often face strong resistance from local governments fearing Russian dominance and wanting to protect local companies. Public opinion in these countries strongly favors maintaining independence from Russia, including economic independence. One way that the United States can help counter the possible negative consequences of the activities of Russian energy firms is to raise the issue with Moscow and encourage the European Union, which is the main player on the issue, to do likewise. The United States and its allies could also encourage the participation of Western companies in the privatization of key firms in the region which would foster transparency. The United States can help these countries by encouraging diversification of their energy supplies. U.S. investment in Russian energy firms could also be helpful. Investment could both give the United States a greater interest in the success of Russian energy firms and positively influence the behavior of those firms in Central and Eastern Europe. However, Administration officials have also expressed frustration with Russia's slowness to create conditions for foreign investment. This report will be updated as events warrant.",85,85 "Proprietary Rights in Pharmaceutical Innovation: Issues at the Intersection of Patents and Marketing Exclusivities. In combination, patents and marketing exclusivities provide the fundamental framework of intellectual property incentives for pharmaceutical innovation in the United States. Patents, which are administered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), provide their owner with the ability to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention for a limited time. In contrast, marketing exclusivities are administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Alternatively known as ""data exclusivity"" or ""data protection,"" a marketing exclusivity prevents generic competitors from referencing the preclinical and clinical test data that manufacturers of brand-name pharmaceuticals generated in order to demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of their products. The FDA currently awards qualifying innovators with marketing exclusivities for the development of new chemical entities or orphan drugs, as well as for the performance of new clinical studies and pediatric studies. Although patents and marketing exclusivities are separate entitlements that are administered by different federal administrative agencies and that depend upon distinct criteria, they both create proprietary rights in pharmaceutical innovation. These rights in turn allow innovators to receive a return on the expenditure of resources leading to the discovery. Once these rights expire, the marketplace for that drug is open to generic competition. Several innovation policy issues have arisen concerning the relationship of patents and marketing exclusivities. Some observers believe that marketing exclusivities are unnecessary because patents are generally available for pharmaceutical innovation. On the other hand, some observers believe that the terms of the marketing exclusivities established by U.S. law are too short. In particular, they note that comparable European standards are often considerably longer than their U.S. counterparts. International agreements require each World Trade Organization (WTO) member state to treat all patented inventions in the same manner. As a result, marketing exclusivities provide Congress with a more flexible option for stimulating specific sorts of desirable private activity than do patents. Indeed, the 109th Congress is currently considering expanding upon existing marketing exclusivities in order to encourage the development of bioterrorism countermeasures. WTO Agreements, as well as recent Free Trade Agreements to which the United States is a signatory, also oblige nations to provide some manner of protection to pharmaceutical test data. Although general patent reform legislation has been the subject of significant discussion during the 109th Congress, current legislative proposals do not appear particularly to impact the relationship between patents and marketing exclusivities. Some maintain that continued attention to the impact of broadly oriented patent reforms upon the pharmaceutical industry is appropriate.",9,67 "Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt. This report presents current data on estimated ownership of U.S. Treasury securities and major holders of federal debt by country. Federal debt represents the accumulated balance of borrowing by the federal government. To finance federal borrowing, U.S. Treasury securities are sold to investors. Treasury securities may be purchased directly from the Treasury or on the secondary market by individual private investors, financial institutions in the United States or overseas, and foreign, state, or local governments. Foreign investors have held slightly less than half of the publicly held federal debt in recent years, prompting questions on the location of the foreign holders and how much debt they hold. This report will be updated annually or as events warrant.",101,100 "Agriculture in Afghanistan and Neighboring Asian Countries. Agriculture (as measured by share of gross domestic product and employment) is a significant economic sector in seven Central and South Asian countries: Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. All of these countries are net food importers. Some have experienced successive years of drought, which has contributed to noticeable declines in agricultural output and the need to increase commodity imports. The United Nations' World Food Program reports that both Afghanistan and Tajikistan are currently in need of emergency food assistance to cover sizable food deficits. The food outlook in Afghanistan is made uncertain by ongoing military conflict.",85,3 "Amtrak: Overview and Options. This report discusses Amtrak, an intercity railway transit system that being operatios in 1971. Amtrak receives considerable criticism for its inability to make a profit. The central policy issue, which this report addresses, is the following: Given that a national system of passenger rail service appears to be inherently unprofitable, as is the case for other public services, do we as a Nation wish to preserve our system or to liquidate it?",123,123 "The United Nations and ""Gun Control"". Since the mid-1990s, some sources have stated that the United Nations is trying to disarm the world by taking control of all guns, including in particular, guns held by private citizens in the United States. U.N. member states have discussed problems associated with increasing numbers of firearms throughout the world in various U.N. organs and subsidiary bodies. These discussions have been directed towards illegal manufacture and trafficking in firearms. This report summarizes the results of these considerations in two central U.N. venues -- the criminal arena and the arms control and disarmament arena. U.S. representatives have participated in these discussions, usually pointing out this country's interest in protecting the Second Amendment rights of U.S. citizens to own guns. U.S. representatives have also expressed concern that the increasing quantities of illegally manufactured and trafficked firearms that are contributing to rising levels of crime, violence, and conflict are also accessible to terrorists. This report will be updated as events warrant.",83,83 "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress. The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a ""dual-track"" decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles. The U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that ""the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles."" In the 2016 report, it noted that ""the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty."" The 2017 and 2018 compliance reports describe the types of information the United States has provided to Russia in pressing its claim of noncompliance, including, in 2018, the Russian designator for the missile—9M729. Press reports also indicate that Russia has now begun to deploy the new cruise missile. The Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. These meetings made little progress because Russia continued to deny that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia's nuclear forces. The Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia's violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017—the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed—the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia's cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches. This report will be updated as needed.",29,29 "The Boy Scouts Amendment to P.L. 107-110, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: Legal Background. On January 8, 2002, President Bush signed into law the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 making major reforms to educational programs authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. A controversy that had shadowed the measure all year, and triggered divergent legislative responses from both houses, concerned the Boy Scouts of America (BSA), and the right of that organization to equal access with other community groups to use of federally funded public school facilities. In reaction to a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, and BSA's highly publicized policy of excluding homosexuals from membership, several school districts across the nation sought to deny local scouting organizations free use of their facilities. By an agreement reached near the end of last session, conferees on H.R. 1 resolved differences between competing House and Senate amendments by adopting a basic prohibition against excluding the Boy Scouts from the use of public school facilities due to the organization's refusal to admit homosexuals, if other outside youth groups are permitted to use school property. School districts are not compelled to ""sponsor or otherwise support scouting organizations, however, as arguably might have been required by a broader reading of the House measure. The U.S. Department of Education is responsible for enforcing mandated equal access rights, through procedures authorized by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, including termination of federal assistance to any ""school"" or ""agency"" that fails to comply.",33,33 "Food Safety Issues for the 114th Congress. Congress passed comprehensive food safety legislation in December 2010 (FDA Food Safety Modernization Act [FSMA], P.L. 111-353), representing the largest expansion and overhaul of U.S. food safety authorities since the 1930s. FSMA greatly expanded food safety oversight authority at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), but did not alter oversight authorities within other federal agencies responsible for food safety, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Given challenges facing FDA in implementing this law and also a continued prevalence of food safety incidents, Congress continues to actively address concerns of the U.S. food safety system. Numerous agencies share responsibility for regulating food safety, however, FSMA focused on FDA-regulated foods and amended FDA's existing structure and authorities, in particular the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§301 et seq.). Among its many provisions, FSMA expanded FDA's authority to conduct a mandatory recall of contaminated food products, enhanced surveillance systems for foodborne illness outbreaks, established preventive controls at some food processing facilities and farms, enhanced FDA's traceability capacity within the nation's food distribution channels, increased the number of FDA inspections at domestic and foreign food facilities, and expanded FDA's authority and oversight of foreign companies that supply food imports to the United States. Since the law was signed in January 2011, FDA has been actively engaged in developing regulations to implement FSMA. Congress will likely continue to monitor FDA's implementation of the law and provide oversight over how some provisions are carried out and enforced, as well as FDA's coordination with other federal agencies, such as those in USDA and the Department of Homeland Security. Under FSMA, FDA is responsible for more than 50 regulations, guidelines, and studies, however, some FDA rules under FSMA have been substantially delayed, and it is uncertain whether full implementation of some provisions in the law will meet their expected deadlines. Regulations were to have been proposed or, in some cases, finalized within one to two years of enactment (roughly January 2012 and January 2013). Given delays in the rulemaking process, the Center for Food Safety filed suit in federal court against FDA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), citing the government's failure to implement several food safety regulations required by FSMA. By early 2014, FDA had proposed a majority of the regulations that constitute the food safety framework under FSMA, but there are continued delays in some rules, industry guidance, and reports as required under the law. FDA also re-proposed some aspects of four major proposed rules in September 2014. FDA has agreed to a new court-ordered schedule for issuing final FSMA regulations for many of the major rules between 2015 and 2016. Congress may also continue to consider changes to other food safety laws and policies that continue to be actively debated. Among these are food safety initiatives covering meat, poultry, and seafood products, legislation intended to curtail the non-medical use of antibiotics in animal feeds and to ban the use of certain plastic components commonly used in food containers, food labeling, stricter food safety enforcement mechanisms, and the use of plant and animal biotechnology. Several of these issues were actively debated leading up to the passage of FSMA. Several bills debated in previous Congresses were reintroduced in the 112th and 113th Congress. Some in Congress also might continue to advocate for additional policy reforms to existing FDA or USDA food safety laws to address other perceived concerns about the safety of the U.S. food supply. These include concerns about the adequacy of resources and regulatory tools to combat foodborne illness, and concerns about coordination and organization among federal agencies.",1,1 "The Cigarette Tax Increase to Finance SCHIP. On January 15, the House passed H.R. 2, a bill which included increased tobacco taxes to finance State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). This legislation was similar to that passed in the 110th Congress (H.R. 976 and H.R. 3162) although the initial House proposal had smaller tax increases.. H.R. 2 increases cigarette taxes, the primary source of tobacco tax revenues from 39 cents to $1.00. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the cigarette tax will raise $6.4 billion in federal revenues in FY2010 with all federal tobacco taxes increases raising $7.1 billion. A similar tax increase was contained in the Senate bill, and in the final proposal, P.L. 111-3 (although in both case the tax was increased by an additional two thirds of a cent, to $1.0066.) The analysis suggests that state and local governments will lose about $1 billion in cigarette tax revenues and up to $0.5 billion in lost revenues from the tobacco settlement payments. The legislation is now being considered in the Senate. A justification is to discourage teenage smoking, but this effect is probably small, a reservation is that the burden falls heavily on low-income individuals. Taxes on other tobacco products are also increased, although cigarette taxes account for most tobacco revenues. In the 110th Congress, the President vetoed the 110th Congress SCHIP proposal on October 3, 2008, the House failed to override the veto and a new bill, H.R. 3963 passed the House and Senate, with no changes in the cigarette tax, but changes in spending rules, and the President vetoed that version on December 12, 2008.",68,69 "Pandemic Flu and Medical Biodefense Countermeasure Liability Limitation. Division C of P.L. 109-148 (2005), 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e, also known as the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act), limits liability with respect to pandemic flu and other public health countermeasures. Specifically, upon a declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services of a public health emergency or the credible risk of such emergency, Division C would, with respect to a ""covered countermeasure,"" eliminate liability, with one exception, for the United States, and for manufacturers, distributors, program planners, persons who prescribe, administer or dispense the countermeasure, and employees of any of the above. The exception to immunity from liability is that a defendant who engaged in willful misconduct would be subject to liability under a new federal cause of action, though not under state tort law, if death or serious injury results. Division C's limitation on liability is a more extensive restriction on victims' ability to recover than exists in most federal tort reform statutes. However, victims could, in lieu of suing, accept payment under a new ""Covered Countermeasure Process Fund,"" if Congress appropriates money for this fund. The first PREP Act declaration was issued on January 26, 2007, to limit liability for the administration of the H5N1 influenza vaccine. Since then, declarations have been issued covering countermeasures against other strains of influenza (including H1N1), anthrax, botulism, small pox, and acute radiation syndrome.",65,65 "SBA Small Business Investment Company Program. The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program is designed to enhance small business access to venture capital by stimulating and supplementing ""the flow of private equity capital and long-term loan funds which small-business concerns need for the sound financing of their business operations and for their growth, expansion, and modernization, and which are not available in adequate supply."" Facilitating the flow of capital to small businesses to stimulate the national economy was, and remains, the SBIC program's primary objective. As of March 31, 2018, there were 308 privately owned and managed SBA-licensed SBICs providing small businesses private capital the SBIC has raised (called regulatory capital) and funds the SBIC borrows at favorable rates (called leverage) because the SBA guarantees the debenture (loan obligation). SBICs pursue investments in a broad range of industries, geographic areas, and stages of investment. Some SBICs specialize in a particular field or industry, and others invest more generally. Most SBICs concentrate on a particular stage of investment (i.e., startup, expansion, or turnaround) and geographic area. The SBIC program currently has invested or committed about $29.5 billion in small businesses, with the SBA's share of capital at risk about $14.2 billion. In FY2017, the SBA committed to guarantee $1.96 billion in SBIC small business investments. SBICs invested another $3.77 billion from private capital for a total of $5.73 billion in financing for 1,077 small businesses. In recent years, some Members of Congress have argued that the program should be expanded as a means to stimulate economic activity and create jobs. For example, P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, increased the annual amount of leverage the SBA is authorized to provide to SBICs to $4 billion from $3 billion. P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, increased the amount of outstanding leverage allowed for two or more SBIC licenses under common control (the multiple licenses/family of funds limit) to $350 million from $225 million. P.L. 115-187, the Small Business Investment Opportunity Act of 2017, increased the amount of outstanding leverage allowed for individual SBICs to $175 million from $150 million. Others worry that an expanded SBIC program could result in losses and increase the federal deficit. In their view, the best means to assist small business, promote economic growth, and create jobs is to reduce business taxes and exercise federal fiscal restraint. Some Members have also proposed that the program target additional assistance to startup and early stage small businesses, which are generally viewed as relatively risky investments but also as having a relatively high potential for job creation. During the Obama Administration, the SBA established a five-year, early stage SBIC initiative. Early stage SBICs are required to invest at least 50% of their investments in early stage small businesses, defined as small businesses that have never achieved positive cash flow from operations in any fiscal year. The SBA stopped accepting new applicants for the early stage SBIC initiative in 2017. This report describes the SBIC program's structure and operations, focusing on SBIC eligibility requirements, investment activity, and program statistics. It also includes information concerning the SBIC program's debenture SBIC program, participating securities SBIC program, impact investment SBIC program (targeting underserved markets and communities facing barriers to access to credit and capital), and early stage SBIC initiative.",13,13 "Support Offices in the House of Representatives: Roles and Authorities. Article I of the Constitution, in Sections 2 and 3, authorizes the House of Representatives and Senate to choose their own officers. The number of such congressional support personnel, as well as their specific responsibilities, is left to the discretion of the chambers. Over time, both chambers have authorized a number of offices that assist them, collectively or individually, in their work. In the House, these offices include the Clerk of the House, Chief Administrative Officer, Sergeant at Arms, Office of the Legislative Counsel, Office of the Parliamentarian, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, Office of Interparliamentary Affairs, House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards, Office of the Inspector General, Office of General Counsel, House Chaplain, and the Historian of the House. These offices perform legislative, administrative, financial, and ceremonial functions. They also ensure the protection of Congress and preserve its institutional memory. The roles of House support offices have been established by House Rules, statute, and custom. They are also shaped by the congressional authorities with policy, oversight, and funding responsibilities for the offices. These include the House Administration Committee, the House Appropriations Committee, the House Office Building Commission, and the Office of the Speaker. This report is an overview of the different roles performed and the organizational authorities that govern the ""daily operations"" offices in the House of Representatives. Certain entities that assist both the House and Senate, like the Architect of the Capitol, Office of Congressional Accessibility Services, Office of Compliance, the Office of the Attending Physician, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS), are included in this report, although the focus here is on their services to the House. The report is organized by function, with sections on offices supporting legislative duties, administrative, operational, and financial offices, legal and regulatory offices, ceremonial and historical offices, and security offices. Offices with responsibilities in more than one area are addressed in successive sections. More detailed information on select offices is also available in additional CRS products identified throughout.",55,55 "The Economics of Corporate Executive Pay. In the past ten years, the pay of chief executive officers (CEOs) has more than doubled, and the ratio of median CEO to worker pay has risen to 179 to 1. High and rising executive pay could be an issue of public concern on two different grounds. First, it is contributing to widening income inequality that may be of concern from an equity perspective. Second, it could be the result of economically inefficient labor markets. It is difficult to determine whether executive pay is excessive across the board since executives' marginal product cannot be directly observed. An upward trend in pay over time is not sufficient proof that the market is not efficient since factors determining supply and demand, such as the skills required of the position, can change over time. To show that pay is excessive from an economic perspective, one must first demonstrate that there is a market failure that is preventing the market from functioning efficiently. The market failure could originate in the division in large modern firms between management and ownership, which is typically dispersed among millions of shareholders. Shareholders' interests are represented by a board of directors. Critics of executive pay have argued that boards have all too often been ""captured"" by the executive and are no longer negotiating pay packages that are in the shareholders' best interests. They point to a number of common practices that they call ""stealth compensation"" which are inconsistent with arm's length contracting. These include ""golden parachutes,"" generous severance packages, company-provided perks, and bonuses that are unrelated to firm performance. Stock options have been the fastest growing portion of executive pay since the 1990s, and critics believe this pattern can also be explained through the prism of stealth compensation. Rewarding executives with employee stock options was often justified in terms of the ""pay for performance"" mantra, but options are usually designed to reward absolute, not relative, performance. This means that in the bull market of the 1990s, when virtually all stock prices were rising, a company could fall behind its competitors and its executives could still receive handsome options payouts. Indeed, a sizeable portion of the increase in executive pay in the 1990s was likely due to options that turned out to be much more valuable than expected because of the unprecedented price increases of the bull market. Many of the recent corporate scandals appear consistent with stealth compensation as well. Stock options backdating, earnings manipulation, and accounting fraud might have been motivated by attempts to covertly increase executive pay. If short-term fluctuations in the stock price are not good proxies of firm performance, then tying compensation to the stock price can create incentives for executives to engage in activities that are detrimental to shareholders. Policy proposals mostly focus on improving transparency, increasing board independence, and strengthening shareholder control rather than attempting to curb pay directly. S. 1181 (Obama) and H.R. 1257 (Frank), which the House approved on April 19, 2007, would give shareholders a non-binding vote on executive pay. Another proposal would modify the limit on deductibility of executive pay from corporate taxation. More broadly, income inequality could be reduced by increasing the progressivity of the tax system. For current developments and legislation, see CRS Report RS22604, Excessive CEO Pay: Background and Policy Approaches.",10,10 "The Federal Minimum Wage and American Samoa. In 1938, when the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was adopted, Congress appears to have given little consideration as to how its provisions might affect the various possessions and territories of the United States. The first off-shore jurisdiction to request exception from the FLSA was Puerto Rico, which, in 1940, along with the Virgin Islands, was given an exception under the act. Special industry committees were appointed to visit the Caribbean islands and to recommend minimum wage rates consistent with the insular economies. In the wake of World War II, new attention was focused upon the Pacific islands. American Samoa, basically, had no industry other than harvesting of copra, the dried meat of the coconut, and an economy very different from the mainland. In the early 1950s, the Department of the Interior contracted with the Van Camp Sea Food Company to move onto the island and develop a fish processing plant. However, the FLSA minimum wage was regarded as too high to be competitive and, in 1956, Van Camp appealed to Congress to extend the Puerto Rican special industry committee (SIC) model to American Samoa. Thereafter, the Secretary of Labor would review economic conditions and establish minimum rates. The SICs were admonished to reach ""as rapidly as is economically feasible without substantially curtailing employment"" the American standard under the FLSA. While the rates established by the committees were lower than those prevailing on the mainland, the device was regarded as temporary. During the 1980s and 1990s, special treatment of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands was phased out, and those islands came fully under the FLSA. Of the three jurisdictions, only American Samoa remained under the SIC structure. Fish processing has become Samoa's primary private-sector industry. In early 2007, the minimum wage for the industry was $3.26 per hour: the federal minimum wage was $5.15 per hour. However, in late May 2007, Congress adopted H.R. 2206 (P.L. 110-28) which, through a series of step increases over several years, would raise the federal minimum wage to $7.25 per hour. At the same time, the SIC for American Samoa was abolished and the insular minimum wage was raised (through a more prolonged series of step increases) until the federal minimum level, whatever that may ultimately become, might be reached. At least since the 1950s, the companies involved in fish processing have suggested that, were the minimum wage to be raised to the national rate, they might consider leaving the island and operating out of a country where wage rates were more favorable. Now, with the new wage rate for American Samoa in effect, what will be the reaction of the tuna canning companies? Will they improve technology to raise labor productivity, change the type of production done in Samoa, absorb the new rates—or migrate? And, if they were to migrate, what alternative employment might be available for the people of American Samoa? This report will be updated as warranted.",104,90 "Legislative Actions in the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses to Repeal, Defund, or Delay the Affordable Care Act. Congress is deeply divided over implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the health reform law enacted in March 2010 during the 111th Congress. Since the ACA's enactment, lawmakers opposed to specific provisions in the ACA or the entire law have repeatedly debated its implementation and considered bills to repeal, defund, delay, or otherwise amend the law. During the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses, the Republican-led House passed numerous ACA-related bills, including legislation that would repeal the entire law. There was much less debate in the Senate, which remained under Democratic control during the 112th and 113th Congresses. Most of the House-passed ACA legislation was not considered in the Senate during that period. With Republicans in control of both chambers in the 114th Congress, opponents of the ACA sought new opportunities to pass legislation that would change the law. The House-passed legislation included stand-alone bills as well as provisions in broader, often unrelated measures that would have (1) repealed the ACA in its entirety and, in some cases, replaced it with new law, (2) repealed, or by amendment restricted or otherwise limited, specific provisions in the ACA, (3) eliminated appropriations provided by the ACA and rescinded all unobligated funds, (4) replaced the ACA's mandatory appropriations with authorizations of (discretionary) appropriations, and rescinded all unobligated funds, or (5) blocked or otherwise delayed implementation of specific ACA provisions. Republican leaders used a special legislative process known as budget reconciliation in an effort to repeal parts of the ACA. On October 23, 2015, the House passed a reconciliation bill that would have repealed several provisions of the ACA. The House-passed bill (H.R. 3762) was taken up by the Senate, which substituted its own more extensive set of ACA repeal provisions. The Senate approved H.R. 3762, as amended, on December 3, 2015. The House subsequently approved the Senate-passed bill. President Obama vetoed H.R. 3762 on January 8, 2016. The House failed to override the veto. A few bills to amend specific elements of the ACA that attracted sufficiently broad and bipartisan support were approved by both the House and the Senate and signed into law. During the 111th Congress, a number of clarifications and technical adjustments to the ACA were enacted. During the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses, several more substantive ACA amendments became law. For example, Congress repealed Title VIII of the ACA—the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act—which would have established a voluntary, long-term care insurance program to pay for community-based services and supports for individuals with functional limitations. Lawmakers also repealed a tax-filing provision (IRS Form 1099) that had been included in the ACA, and, in two separate legislative actions, reduced the annual appropriations to the ACA's Prevention and Public Health Fund over the period FY2013-FY2024 by a total of $9.75 billion. In addition to considering ACA repeal or amendment in authorizing legislation, lawmakers used the annual appropriations process in an effort to eliminate funding for the ACA's implementation and address other concerns they have with the law. A companion report, CRS Report R44100, Use of the Annual Appropriations Process to Block Implementation of the Affordable Care Act (FY2011-FY2017), summarizes the ACA-related language added to annual appropriations legislation by congressional appropriators since the ACA was signed into law.",69,69 "REINS Act: Number and Types of ""Major Rules"" in Recent Years. Under the Congressional Review Act (CRA, 5 U.S.C. §§801-808), a covered agency regulation takes effect as provided by law unless Congress disapproves the rule with a joint resolution of disapproval. In contrast, the Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act (H.R. 10 and S. 299, 112th Congress) would (if enacted) generally require the enactment of a joint resolution of approval before any ""major rule"" could take effect (e.g., rules that are expected to have a $100 million annual impact on the economy). The REINS Act was reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary on November 10, 2011, and by the Committee on Rules on November 18, 2011. This report provides information on the types of ""major rules"" that may be covered by the REINS Act, if enacted. Specifically, it identifies how many major rules have been issued in recent years, and which agencies have issued them. It also attempts to identify why certain rules published during calendar year 2010 were considered to be major rules under the CRA. According to a database maintained by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in 9 of the 14 full calendar years since the CRA was enacted, federal agencies published between 50 and 70 major rules. The agencies published 76 major rules in 1998, and 77 major rules in 2000. The number of major rules issued in a single calendar year first exceeded 80 in 2008 (the last full year of the George W. Bush Administration), when 95 major rules were published. In calendar year 2009, the first year of the Barack Obama Administration, federal agencies published 84 major final rules. However, 11 of those 84 rules were actually issued in early January 2009, during the final days of the Bush Administration. During calendar year 2010, federal agencies published 100 major final rules. The entities that issued the largest number of major rules from 2004 through 2010 were the Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency. CRS examined the 100 major rules published in 2010 and concluded that they appeared to be ""major"" for a variety of reasons. Thirty-seven of the rules appeared to be major because they involved transfers of funds from one party to another party, most commonly the transfer of federal funds to the recipients of those funds (e.g., grants, food stamps, Medicare or Medicaid funds, special pay for members of the military, and crop payments). Ten other rules appeared to be major because they were expected to prompt consumer spending, or because they were establishing fees for the reimbursement of particular federal functions (e.g., issuance of passports and oversight of the nuclear power industry). Thirty-nine rules appeared to be major because they were expected to result in at least $100 million in annual compliance costs, regulatory benefits, or both. In 20 of those 39 rules, estimated costs and benefits were both expected to exceed $100 million. In 14 of these rules, the agencies' lowest estimates of regulatory benefits were larger than the highest estimated compliance costs. In only one rule were the lowest costs greater than the highest benefits, and the agency indicated that this result was caused by the lack of discretion provided in the underlying statute. These variations in the type of major rules do not bring into question the appropriateness of congressional oversight. However, Congress may need different types of expertise to oversee different types of major rules. H.R. 214 (112th Congress), which would create a Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis, may provide access to that expertise. This report will be updated as events warrant.",55,56 "Using Army Corps of Engineers Reservoirs for Municipal and Industrial Water Supply: Current Issues. Congress has limited the use of Army Corps of Engineers dams and reservoirs for municipal and industrial (M&I) water supply. Growing M&I demands have raised interest in—and concern about—changing current law and reservoir operations to give Corps facilities a greater role in M&I water storage. A reallocation of storage to M&I use from a currently authorized purpose (e.g., hydropower or navigation) changes the types of benefits produced by a facility and the stakeholders served. While Congress has specifically authorized 91 Corps multi-purpose facilities for M&I supply, it also has delegated to the Secretary of the Army constrained authority to reallocate storage to M&I water supply. In the Water Supply Act of 1958 (1958 WSA, P.L. 85-500), Congress provided that storage at Corps facilities could be allocated to M&I water supply without congressional approval if this reallocation did not seriously harm authorized project purposes or involve major structural or operational changes. Whether the Corps has regularly exceeded its discretion to reallocate is a concern raised in response to a July 2009 federal court order that found the Corps exceeded its discretion at Lake Lanier (GA). In order to guide its implementation of the discretionary authority to reallocate, the agency developed guidance on what may constitute a major change or serious harm to an authorized purpose. Since 1977 that guidance has included quantitative limits on reallocations conducted without congressional authorization. Issues for Congress include whether the Corps' interpretation of its discretionary authority is consistent with congressional intent and whether current law and policy are appropriate for current demands and constraints on water resources. CRS analysis of available data indicates that the Corps generally has not exceeded agency-established quantitative limits, with two exceptions in addition to Lake Lanier. One of the exceptions, Cowanesque Lake (PA), was made with the consent of Congress but conducted under the 1958 WSA authority. The other exception was a 1985 reallocation from hydropower to M&I use at Lake Texoma (TX/OK). The Corps found that a reallocation at Lake Texoma would neither require significant modification of the project, nor seriously harm authorized purposes (as the result of compensation being provided for lost hydropower). The Corps concluded that it could make the reallocation without congressional approval using its discretionary authority, in spite of the reallocation exceeding the agency-established quantitative limit. Whether this or other Corps reallocations and operational changes performed without congressional authorization (including those that have fallen within agency-established quantitative guidelines) have seriously harmed other project purposes or constituted a major operational change cannot be independently determined by available data, and is beyond the scope of the analysis herein.",108,108 "The United States and Europe: Responding to Change in the Middle East and North Africa. U.S. and European Responses to Changes in the Middle East and North Africa Over the last two years, many U.S. policymakers, Members of Congress, and their European counterparts have struggled with how best to respond to the wide range of challenges posed by the popular uprisings and political upheaval in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Almost immediately after the onset of the so-called ""Arab Spring"" in early 2011, U.S. and European leaders alike declared their intention to put greater emphasis than in the past on democratic reform and economic development in formulating their respective policies toward countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco. In Libya, the United States and many European allies participated in the NATO-led military intervention in support of rebel forces that ultimately toppled the Qadhafi regime. And as demonstrations in Syria escalated into a bloody civil war, the United States and the European Union (EU) have imposed sanctions, called for an end to the ruling Asad regime, and are considering greater material and financial support to the Syrian political and armed opposition. Possibilities for U.S.-European Cooperation and Potential Obstacles In light of the immense changes and what many have long viewed as common U.S. and European interests in the Middle East and North Africa, numerous analysts have advocated for significant U.S.-European cooperation to promote a more peaceful and prosperous MENA region. Such collaboration, they argued, would help prevent a wasteful duplication of Western diplomatic and economic resources amid competing domestic political priorities and financial constraints on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite notable cultural, historical, and geopolitical differences, some commentators early on drew analogies with the way the United States and its West European allies worked together to support the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War, and hopes were high for a similar robust transatlantic effort in the MENA region. As events in the MENA region have unfolded, U.S. and European policymakers have been in frequent contact with each other. Analysts suggest that U.S. and European policies have been closely aligned on most issues regarding the changes underway. There have been some U.S.-European efforts to promote a more coherent international response through institutions such as the G8, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund (especially with respect to reaching a financial assistance agreement for Egypt). Nevertheless, many observers contend that so far, tangible joint or coordinated U.S.-European initiatives to encourage political transitions and economic opportunities in the MENA countries have been modest at best. Debate thus continues about the prospects for greater U.S.-European collaboration and the possible benefits of it for U.S. interests. Skeptics point out that both the United States and Europe are limited in what they can do to influence events in the region, and they worry that the political and economic difficulties facing many MENA countries in transition, combined with deeply problematic issues involving Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Syria, could lead to a progressively worse regional situation in the years ahead. Others are also concerned that more intensive Western involvement could be counterproductive if viewed in the region as an attempt to protect U.S.-European interests, or if used by some MENA leaders to deflect blame for domestic and regional problems. Issues for Congress Many Members of Congress have closely followed events in the MENA region. Congress has been and will be considering the appropriation of U.S. aid to the MENA countries. As such, some Members may be interested in ways to coordinate U.S. and European foreign assistance, debt relief, and trade and investment policies in order to maximize their effectiveness as well as to conserve U.S. political capital and economic assets in the years ahead. Members may also be interested in European responses to the transitions in the MENA region, and the degree of U.S.-European cooperation, as a test of whether Europe can be an effective partner for the United States in protecting shared global interests and addressing common challenges. At the same time, many Members of Congress are concerned about the eventual political orientation of emerging regimes in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, and about the implications of regional change for Israel's security and U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Some Members may be apprehensive about working too closely with European governments or the EU if policy differences begin to emerge between the two sides, or if doing so might constrain future U.S. policy choices toward the MENA countries. Congress may also want to consider whether more robust U.S.-European cooperation in the MENA region could have implications for U.S. options in addressing challenges elsewhere in the greater Middle East (such as those related to Iran or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).",85,85 "FY2014 Appropriations Lapse and the Department of Homeland Security: Impact and Legislation. Absent legislation providing appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2014, the Department implemented a shutdown furlough on October 1, 2013. Operations of different components were affected to varying degrees by the shutdown. While an estimated 31,295 employees were furloughed, roughly 85% of the department's workforce continued with their duties that day, due to exceptions identified in current interpretations of law. Some DHS employees were recalled to work after the furloughs began on the basis of unanticipated needs (such as disaster preparedness activities) or the enactment of appropriations legislation that temporarily covered personnel costs. While the DHS shutdown contingency plan's data on staffing and exemptions from furloughs is not a perfect metric for the broad impacts of the lapse in annual appropriations, some of the data provided by DHS lend a perspective on some of the effects on the department's staffing and operations during the funding gap until fuller post-shutdown reviews are completed. Even though most of DHS continued to work through the shutdown, most of the department's civilian employees were not being paid until the lapse was resolved. A handful of activities were paid for through multi-year appropriations or other revenues, however, and employees working in those programs continued to be paid on schedule. During the funding lapse, several pieces of legislation were introduced that would have impacted the funding status of the department, allowing it to either pay employees or restore operations to varying degrees. Two of these were enacted. The Pay Our Military Act (P.L. 113-39) returned almost 5,800 furloughed Coast Guard civilian employees to work and restored pay for active military personnel and the civilian federal employees and the contractors that support them. On October 17, 2013, the President signed into law a Senate-amended version of H.R. 2775 which carried a short term continuing resolution (CR) which funds government operations at a rate generally equivalent to FY2013 post-sequestration levels through January 15, 2014. This act resolves the lapse in funding, returns federal employees to work, and retroactively authorizes pay for both furloughed and exempt (or ""excepted"") employees for the duration of the funding lapse. This report examines the DHS contingency plan for the funding lapse that began October 1, 2013, and the potential impacts of a lapse in annual appropriations on DHS operations, focusing primarily on the emergency furlough of personnel, and then discusses the legislative vehicles that had the potential to mitigate those same impacts. CRS is continuing to gather information on the actual impact of the shutdown on DHS operations now that the October 1, 2013, lapse has been resolved, and will update this report as warranted.",22,22 "National Mortgage Servicing Standards: Legislation in the 112th Congress. This report analyzes the potential misaligned incentives in the servicer-mortgage holder relationship and the servicing standards that attempt to address each concern, the servicer-borrower relationship and the relevant servicing provisions, as well as the possible implications of reforming the servicing industry.",7,7 "Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top-Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 3,600 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing the regulatory requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection. The DHS has had challenges meeting its own projections and congressional expectations regarding program performance, raising questions about its ability to achieve steady-state regulatory implementation. As of April 2014, DHS had made final risk assignments to 3,316 of the approximately 4,200 facilities then regulated. The DHS reported in December 2014 that it now regulates approximately 3,600 facilities, approximately 2,700 of which have final risk assignments. The DHS authorizes a site security plan when the submitted plan satisfies CFATS requirements. Following a successful authorization inspection, DHS approves the site security plan. As of February 2014, DHS had authorized 2,646 site security plans, conducted 1,969 authorization inspections, and approved 1,526 site security plans. Between February 2014 and February 2015, DHS authorized an average of 132 and approved an average of 85 site security plans per month. The DHS has generally increased its average authorization and approval rate over time, between August 2014 and February 2015, DHS authorized an average of 135 and approved an average of 93 site security plans per month. Between January 2015 and February 2015, DHS authorized 120 and approved 80 site security plans. This report analyzes data from a variety of DHS presentations, testimony, and other sources to present a historical overview of program performance to date. It identifies an ongoing gap between the number of facilities that have received final risk tier assignments and the total number of regulated facilities. This makes it appear likely that DHS will not have inspected or approved site security plans for some portion of the regulated facility universe for at least several years. In addition, the current rates of authorization of site security plans, authorization inspection, and approval of site security plans make it appear likely that DHS will not have completed implementation for the initial facilities before the date when it will potentially need to begin reinspecting already approved facilities. With the onset of compliance inspections, congressional policymakers may have further questions about the ability of the CFATS program to meet congressional expectations regarding timeliness.",22,22 "Military Forces: What Is the Appropriate Size for the United States?. For several years, some Members of Congress and many military analysts have argued that the U.S. Armed Forces are too small to adequately meet all the requirements arising after the Cold War, particularly with the advent of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In January 2004, the Department of Defense acknowledged a problem by temporarily adding 30,000 troops to the authorized active duty end strength of the Army. Congress addressed the issue by raising ground force statutory end strengths in the FY2005 defense authorization bill (P.L. 108-375), the FY2006 bill (P.L. 109-163), and again in FY2007 (P.L. 109-364). In FY2007, the Administration requested a permanent end strength increase—65,000 for the Army and 27,000 for the Marine Corps—and P.L. 110-181) the FY2008 defense authorization bill approved the increase. This report describes the background of these actions, current Administration planning, and assesses potential issues for the 110th Congress. This report will be updated.",30,25 "Three Strike Mandatory Sentencing (18 U.S.C. 3559(c)): An Overview. The federal three strikes provision calls for a mandatory term of life imprisonment for defendants convicted of a serious violent felony who have two or more federal or state serious violent felony convictions or one or more of such felony conviction plus one or more federal or state serious drug conviction, 18 U.S.C. 3559(c). The qualifying violent felonies are those specifically enumerated within the section—murder, rape, violent robberies, extortion, among others—as well as unenumerated felonies, that is, any state and federal 10-year felony that involves the fact or risk of physical violence. The qualifying serious drug offenses are those punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or more under state or federal law. The section creates an exemption where defendants can prove that an otherwise qualifying conviction involved neither the fact nor risk of injury. Defendants have regularly challenged the constitutionality of the section and whether their felony convictions constitute convictions for qualified offenses. The question of when a felony should be considered an unenumerated serious violent felony has proven perplexing, but recent Supreme Court construction of the term in another context may be illuminating. The Court has said in Johnson, Chambers, and Begay that for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) a violent felony is one that involves the purposeful, aggressive use of force, capable of inflicting physical pain or injury upon another. Constitutional challenges have been to no avail, at least thus far. Defendants have argued without success (1) that requiring the defendant to prove to a judge by clear and convincing evidence, the inapplicability of an injury free conviction offends the due process and jury trial principles identified in Apprendi and its progeny, (2) that the section results in the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, (3) that the mandatory sentencing provision impermissibly intrudes upon the constitutional prerogatives of the federal courts in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, (4) that application of the section results in punishment for prior convictions in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, and in some instances of the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws, and (5) that, under some circumstances, application of the section constitutes a violation of the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The text of section 3559(c) is appended.",94,94 "Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes: An Overview of Legislation in the 106th Congress. Federal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes (mandatory minimums) demand that execution or incarceration follow criminal conviction. They cover drug dealing, murdering federal officials, and using a gun to commit a federal crime. They circumscribe judicial sentencing discretion. They have been criticized as unthinkingly harsh and incompatible with a rational sentencing guideline system yet they have also been embraced as hallmarks of truth in sentence and a certain means of incapacitating the criminally dangerous. Among the bills introduced in the 106th Congress, some would have created new mandatory minimums, several would have enlarged existing mandatory minimums, others would have eliminated existing mandatory minimums, and some would have adjusted existing mandatory minimums in other ways. The only proposed mandatory minimum enacted came in the form of a piggyback statute which extended, to overseas misconduct by military dependents and contractors, the pre-existing mandatory minimums applicable in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 18 U.S.C. 3261.",94,94 "Elementary and Secondary Education Act: Estimated Burden Hours and Cost of Information Collections. Congress has been actively engaged in efforts to reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), most recently amended by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB, P.L. 107-110). It is anticipated that the 113th Congress may continue to work on ESEA reauthorization issues. As part of the reauthorization debate, Congress has focused on the federal role in education, particularly in the area of educational accountability, where federal efforts to hold states, local educational agencies (LEAs), and schools accountable for student achievement and teacher performance are being discussed. In these discussions, issues related to the burden that complying with the statutory and regulatory reporting requirements associated with the ESEA have put on state educational agencies (SEAs), LEAs, and schools have been considered. While the burden hours and annualized costs (also referred to as cost burden) associated with ESEA reporting requirements have clearly increased since the enactment of NCLB, it is important to highlight that the data collected and reported play an important role in supporting core components of the federal education policies enacted through NCLB. SEAs, LEAs, and schools use such data to gauge student performance and determine the progress schools are making in enhancing student academic achievement. Parents use these data to inform choices about their child's education, and the U.S. Department of Education (ED) uses these data to inform technical assistance efforts and monitor SEA work in a number of areas in which educational accountability is expected under the provisions of NCLB. This report was undertaken in response to concerns about state and local reporting burdens having increased in recent years since the enactment of NCLB. It examines the time and cost burden associated with complying with the ESEA statutory and regulatory reporting requirements associated with 16 information collection packages. For each information collection package, information is included on the purpose of the collection and data are provided on burden hours and cost burden as defined in the Paperwork Reduction Act. There is also a discussion of the current annualized cost to the federal government for each of the information collection packages. Finally, a more detailed analysis is provided for the information collection package that accounts for the largest number of the burden hours and largest cost burden of all the information collection packages examined. Currently, for respondents at the state and local levels, the overall annualized estimate of burden hours per information collection package ranges from 200 hours to 4.7 million hours and the estimated annualized cost associated with the information collection packages ranges from $6,000 to $118.1 million per information collection package. Respondents to the 16 information collection packages include SEAs, LEAs, schools, parents, and other entities. The average number of estimated annualized burden hours and estimated annualized cost burden is generally spread across numerous respondents, and the burden placed on an individual respondent for a given information collection package varies. Within information collections there can be substantial variation in the number of underlying reporting requirements or activities that are applicable to a given type of respondent. For a given type of respondent within a single information collection package, the respondent may not have to address every item on a given information collection package, and the cost of responding to the information collection package may vary by item (e.g., the hourly cost of responding to one item may be different than the cost of responding to another item). For example, for the ""State Educational Agency, Local Educational Agency, and School Data Collection and Reporting Under ESEA Title I, Part A"" (accountability issues) information collection package, there are three types of activities or information that schools may need to address. On average, the annualized burden for each of these requirements ranges from 4.8 to 960 burden hours and from $120 to $24,000 per school. While some schools will not need to address any of the requirements, others may need to address one or two requirements. Of the information collection packages examined in this report, the ""State Educational Agency, Local Education Agency, and School Data Collection and Reporting Under ESEA, Title I, Part A"" information collection package, which focuses on Title I-A accountability requirements that are a core component of the federal education policy incorporated in NCLB, has the largest number of estimated annualized burden hours (4.7 million) and greatest estimated annualized costs ($118.1 million). The burden associated with this information collection package has increased substantially since the enactment of NCLB. For example, the overall number of estimated annualized burden hours for the information collection package prior to the enactment of NCLB was about 564,000 hours. Following the enactment of NCLB, the number of estimated annualized burden hours increased by over 350% to about 2.6 million hours. The number of estimated annualized burden hours associated with this package peaked at 7.9 million burden hours. The most recent version of the information collection package, however, includes an expected decline of about 3.2 million (40%) burden hours from the peak level. The changes over time in the estimated annualized cost associated with this package mirror those for the changes in burden hours, peaking at an estimated $169.4 million. The most recent version of the information collection package expects the estimated annualized cost to decrease $51.4 million (30.3%) from the peak level. ED indicated that the decline in burden hours and cost burden is directly related to 43 SEAs having requested or indicated that they will request the ESEA flexibility package being offered to states by the Administration, which provides waivers of several of the Title I-A accountability requirements included in current law. It is unknown whether the reductions in burden hours and cost burden attributed to the ESEA flexibility package will be realized. As of August 21, 2013, ED had approved ESEA flexibility packages for 41 states and the District of Columbia, as well as for a consortium of eight LEAs in California.",33,33 "Concurrent Enrollment Programs. Initiated in part as a proposal to reform U.S. high schools, concurrent enrollment programs enable high school aged students to take college level course work and receive college credit while enrolled in high school. Concurrent enrollment programs can be best described as a secondary/postsecondary school hybrid. This report provides a brief history of these programs and a description of the different types of programs, including participation data.",33,33 "Columbia River Treaty Review. The Columbia River Treaty (CRT, or Treaty) is an international agreement between the United States and Canada for the cooperative development and operation of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin to provide for flood control and power. The Treaty was the result of more than 20 years of negotiations between the two countries and was ratified in 1961. Implementation began in 1964. The Treaty provided for the construction and operation of three dams in Canada and one dam in the United States whose reservoir extends into Canada. Together, these dams more than doubled the amount of reservoir storage available in the basin and provided significant flood protection benefits. In exchange for these benefits, the United States agreed to provide Canada with lump-sum cash payments and a portion of downstream hydropower benefits that are attributable to Canadian operations under the CRT, known as the ""Canadian Entitlement."" Some have estimated the Canadian Entitlement to be worth as much as $335 million annually. The CRT has no specific end date, and most of its provisions would continue indefinitely without action by the United States or Canada. Beginning in September 2024, either nation can terminate most provisions of the Treaty with at least 10 years' written notice (i.e., starting as early as 2014). To date, neither country has given notice of termination, but both countries have indicated a preliminary interest in modification of the treaty. If the CRT is not terminated or modified, most of its provisions would continue, with the exception of its flood control provisions (which are scheduled to transition automatically to ""called-upon"" operations at that time, meaning the United States would request and compensate Canada for flood control operations as necessary). Perspectives on the CRT and its review vary. Some believe the Treaty should include stronger provisions related to tribal resources and flows for fisheries that are not in the Treaty, others disagree and focus on the perceived need to adjust the Canadian Entitlement to reflect actual hydropower benefits. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bonneville Power Administration, in their joint role as the U.S. Entity overseeing the Treaty, undertook a review of the CRT from 2009 to 2013. Based on studies and stakeholder input, they provided a Regional Recommendation to the State Department in December 2013. They recommended continuing the Treaty with certain modifications, including rebalancing the CRT's hydropower provisions, further delineating called-upon flood control operations after 2024, and incorporating into the Treaty flows to benefit Columbia River fisheries. For its part, the Canadian Entity (the Province of British Columbia) released in March 2013 a recommendation to continue the CRT with modifications ""within the Treaty framework."" It disputed several assumptions in the U.S. Entity's review process. Following a two-year federal interagency review of the U.S. Regional Recommendation, the State Department finalized its negotiating parameters and authorized talks with Canada in October 2016. The State Department recently announced the start of negotiations on May 29-30, 2018, with the next round of talks scheduled for August 2018. If the executive branch comes to an agreement regarding modification of the CRT, the Senate may be asked to weigh in on future versions of the Treaty pursuant to its advice and consent role. In addition, both houses of Congress may weigh in on CRT review and negotiation activities through their oversight roles.",84,84 "Terrorism at Home: A Quick Look at Applicable Federal and State Criminal Laws. Terrorists' attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania have stimulated demands that the terrorists responsible and those like them be brought to justice. American criminal law already proscribes many of these acts of terrorism and there have been proposals to expand that coverage. The conduct we most often associate with terrorism -- bombings, assassinations, armed assaults kidnapping, threats -- are generally outlawed by both federal and state law. The federal approach builds upon individual national interests: the protection of federal officers, ensuring the safety of foreign diplomatic officials, guaranteeing the safety and integrity of the mails and the channels of interstate and foreign commerce, and honoring our international obligations. Crime within the United States, however, has traditionally been the domain of state law. It is therefore not surprising that the reach of state criminal law, concerning terrorism as well as other matters, is more comprehensive than that of the federal laws which supplement it. Where federal law condemns presidential assassination, state law prohibits murdering anyone. This report and a companion, CRS Report RS21034(pdf), Terrorism Abroad: A Quick Look at Applicable Federal and State Criminal Law, are abbreviated from portions of CRS Report 95-1050(pdf) Terrorism At Home and Abroad: Applicable Federal and State Criminal Laws, stripped of its footnotes and appendices.",22,22 "Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and Commissions, 107th Congress. During the 107th Congress, 125 nominations to full-time positions on 33 regulatory and other boards and commissions were submitted to the Senate by the President. President Clinton submitted 12 of these nominations before he left office on January 20, 2001, and these 12 were withdrawn by President Bush on March 19, 2001. President Bush submitted 113 nominations, of which 72 were confirmed, 6 were withdrawn, and 35 were returned to him (13 at the August 2001 recess and 22 at the end of the Congress). President Clinton made 12 recess appointments during the intersession between the 106th and 107th Congresses, all of which expired at the end of the first session of the 107th Congress. President Bush made 5 intrasession and 7 intersession recess appointments to boards and commissions. Seven of President Bush's recess appointments expired at the end of the 107th Congress and five will expire at the end of the first session of 108th Congress. At the end of the 107th Congress, there were 19 vacancies among 147 positions. In addition, 14 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, and telephone discussions with agency officials. Related information may be found in CRS Report RL31346(pdf), Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions in Executive Departments During the 107th Congress, 2001-2002, by Henry B. Hogue, and CRS Report RL31435(pdf), Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions in Independent and Other Agencies During the 107th Congress, by Henry B. Hogue. This report will not be updated.",54,54 "A Brief Overview of Business Types and Their Tax Treatment. In the United States, how a business is taxed at the federal level is partly dependent on how it is organized. The income of subchapter C corporations, also known as ""regular"" corporations, is taxed once at the corporate level according to the corporate tax system, and then a second time at the individual-shareholder level according to the individual tax rates when corporate dividend payments are made or capital gains are recognized. This leads to the so-called ""double taxation"" of corporate income. Businesses that choose any other form of organization are, in general, not subject to the corporate income tax. Instead, the income of these businesses passes through to their owners and is taxed according to individual income tax rates. Examples of these alternative ""pass-through"" forms of organization include sole proprietorships, partnerships, subchapter S corporations, and limited liability companies. This report summarizes the general tax treatment of corporate and pass-through businesses. The intent is to introduce those who are unfamiliar with the current U.S. business tax environment to the basics of corporate and pass-through taxation. Understanding how various businesses are taxed provides a starting point from which one can evaluate current and future proposals to change the taxation of corporations and pass-throughs. Additionally, since pass-through income is typically taxed only at individual income tax rates, this report is also a useful starting point for understanding the effects on pass-through businesses from a change to individual income tax rates. A list of related CRS products on business taxation may be found at the end of the report.",102,102 "Derivatives: Introduction and Legislation in the 114th Congress. Derivatives are financial instruments that come in several different forms, including futures, options, and swaps. A derivative is a contract that derives its value from some underlying asset at a designated point in time. The derivative may be tied to a physical commodity, a stock index, an interest rate, or some other asset. Derivatives played a role in the 2008 financial crisis in a variety of ways. The unmonitored buildup of derivatives positions in the largely unregulated ""over-the-counter"" (OTC) market led many major financial institutions into large financial losses. Possibly the best-known example of such losses was the insurance giant American International Group (AIG), whose massive losses from selling credit-default swaps ultimately contributed to the need for government assistance. OTC derivatives, prior to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act, P.L. 111-203), were traded bilaterally rather than cleared through a clearinghouse, and no reporting trail existed, which created uncertainty during the crisis over the web of exposures to large derivatives losses. The Dodd-Frank Act aimed to address these policy concerns by bringing the swaps market into a regulatory framework based on that of the futures markets, which had long been regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Security-based swaps tied to equities or narrow-based credit indexes were placed under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within a similar framework. Broadly, Dodd-Frank included five major reforms. It required the clearing of certain swaps through a clearinghouse, entailing the posting of margin, or cash, to cover accumulating losses trading of certain swaps on an exchange or swap execution facility (an electronic trading platform), with the aim of increasing price transparency reporting of all swaps transactions to a swaps data repository (SDR) to create an audit trail and more market data for regulators registration of swap dealers and major swap participants, subjecting them to regulatory oversight, and establishment of margin and capital requirements by regulators for swaps that remain uncleared. Parallel provisions were enacted for security-based swaps under the SEC. In the 114th Congress, several bills have been introduced, and two have been enacted as part of other legislation, impacting various aspects of swaps regulation largely stemming from Dodd-Frank. One of the provisions, originally in H.R. 1847 but enacted in P.L. 114-94/H.R. 22, removed a requirement added in Dodd-Frank that foreign regulators indemnify a U.S.-based SDR and the CFTC for any expenses arising from litigation related to a request for market data (with a parallel SEC provision). The other provision, originally in H.R. 1317 but enacted in P.L. 114-113/H.R. 2029, created an exception for certain corporate affiliates of nonfinancial companies, dubbed ""centralized treasury units,"" to the clearing and exchange-trading requirements. The House has passed legislation, H.R. 2289, that would reauthorize appropriations to carry out the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA, 7 U.S.C. §§1 et seq.)—a process that historically has recurred every five years. The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry marked up and ordered to be reported S. 2917 which would also reauthorize such appropriations, as well as making other changes to the CEA. S. 2917 and H.R. 2289 would each modify the definition of who is a financial entity—relevant for determining who must clear their swaps—but the bills do so in different ways. H.R. 2289 and S. 2917 would—in substantially identical ways—broaden the definition of bona fide hedging to allow anticipated, as well as current, risks to be hedged, likely increasing the number of swaps qualifying as hedges for position limits, registration requirements, and other purposes. H.R. 2289, S. 2917 and S. 1560 also contain provisions to codify the deadline for brokers to deposit residual interest (capital from a futures broker that temporarily makes up the difference for insufficient margin in a customer's account) as no earlier than 6:00 p.m. on the following business day. H.R. 2289 (but not S. 2917) includes measures that would increase required cost-benefit analysis by the CFTC in rulemakings. H.R. 2289 (but not S. 2917) would mandate that, starting 18 months from enactment, the swaps regulatory requirements of the eight largest foreign swaps markets must be considered comparable to those of the United States—unless the CFTC were to issue a rule finding that any of those foreign jurisdictions' requirements were not comparable to U.S. requirements.",12,12 "Department of Defense Fuel Costs in Iraq. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the average price of fuels purchased for military operations in Iraq has steadily increased. The disparity between the higher price of fuel supplied to the United States Central Command compared to Iraq's civilian population has been a point of contention. Several factors contribute to the disparity, including the different types of fuel used by the military compared to Iraqi civilians, the Iraqi government's price subsidies, and the level pricing that the DOD's Defense Logistics Agency charges for military customers around the world. The Iraqi government has been pressured to reduce its fuel subsidy and black market fuel prices remain higher than the official subsidized price.",32,31 "The FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues. Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of the Global War on Terror, along with the emerging operational role of the Reserve Components, further heightened interest and support for a wide range of military personnel policies and issues. CRS selected a number of issues considered by Congress as it acted on the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act. In each case, a brief synopsis is provided that includes background information, a comparison of the House and Senate provisions, if any, and a brief discussion of the issue. Where appropriate, other CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided. This report focuses exclusively on the annual authorization process. It does not include appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices or any discussion of separately introduced legislation. The Conference Report on H.R. 5122 (H.Rept. 109-702) was adopted by the House on September 29, 2006, and by the Senate on September 30, 2006. The legislation was signed by the President on October 17, 2006, becoming P.L. 109-364. It is not anticipated that this report will be updated.",30,30 Nominations to the Supreme Court During Years of Divided and Unified Party Government. This report provides data and analysis related to nominations made to the Supreme Court during years of unified and divided party government.,54,55 "Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations. This report outlines U.S. military operations in Bosnia and discusses issues such as U.S. and Allied Participation in Bosnia Peacekeeping (IFOR/SFOR), duration, cost, arms control and military assistance. This report also includes most recent development, background analysis, and legislation.",21,21 Tax Credit Bonds: A Brief Explanation. This report provides a brief explanation on tax credit bonds (TCBs). The first section of this report examines the mechanics of TCBs in more detail. The second section of this report analyzes the market for TCBs relative to municipal and corporate bonds.,102,102 "Chinese Tire Imports: Section 421 Safeguards and the World Trade Organization (WTO). On April 20, 2009, the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union filed a petition with the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) requesting an investigation under Section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §2451, a trade remedy statute addressing import surges from China, to examine whether Chinese passenger vehicle and light truck tires were causing market disruption to U.S. tire producers. Market disruption will be found to occur under Section 421 whenever imports of a Chinese product that is ""like or directly competitive with"" a domestic product ""are increasing rapidly... so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or threat of material injury, to the domestic industry."" The ITC initiated the investigation (TA-421-7) on April 24, 2009. As a result of its investigation, the ITC in June 2009 voted 4-2 that Chinese tire imports were causing domestic market disruption and recommended that the President impose an added duty on these items for three years at an annually declining rate. The ITC also recommended expedited consideration of trade adjustment assistance (TAA) applications filed by affected firms or workers. On September 11, 2009, President Obama proclaimed increased tariffs on Chinese tires for three years effective September 26, 2009, albeit at lower rates than recommended by the ITC. The proclaimed increase was 35% ad valorem in the first year, 30% in the second, and 25% in the third year. The President also directed the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce to expedite TAA applications and to provide other assistance to affected workers, firms, and communities. While the President was authorized to review the tariffs after six months and to modify, reduce, or terminate them, he did not take any of these actions. No formal requests have been made to extend the tire tariffs, which are scheduled to expire on September 25, 2012. Six petitions had been previously filed under Section 421, with the ITC finding market disruption in four out of six of its investigations. President Bush decided not to provide import relief in these earlier cases. Section 421 was enacted as part of an October 2000 statute that also permitted the President to grant most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment to Chinese products upon China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Section 421 authorizes the President to impose safeguards—that is, temporary measures such as import surcharges or quotas—on Chinese goods if domestic market disruption is found. The statute implements a China-specific safeguard mechanism in China's WTO Accession Protocol that may be utilized by WTO members through December 2013. The provision is separate from Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, which allow WTO members to respond to injurious import surges but on a stricter basis than under the Protocol. A major difference is that the Protocol allows a safeguard to be applied only to Chinese products while the Safeguards Agreement requires that any safeguard be applied to a product regardless of its source. China filed a WTO complaint against the United States in September 2009, claiming that the Section 421 tariffs violate U.S. GATT obligations to accord Chinese tires MFN tariff treatment and not to exceed negotiated tariff rates, that the United States imposed tariffs under the safeguard mechanism in China's Accession Protocol without first attempting to justify them under GATT and WTO safeguard provisions, and that Section 421 and its application in this case violate U.S. obligations under the Protocol. In a December 2010 report, the WTO panel rejected all of China's claims. China later appealed panel findings related to the Accession Protocol. The WTO Appellate Body upheld the panel, and thus U.S. actions under the Protocol, in a September 2011 report. The panel and Appellate Body reports were adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on October 5, 2011, ending the WTO dispute.",48,53 "Sexual Harassment, Constructive Discharge, and Employers' Affirmative Defenses: The U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders. On June 14, 2004 the Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the federal circuits concerning the defenses, if any, that may be available to an employer against an employee's claim that she was forced to resign because of ""intolerable"" sexual harassment at the hands of a supervisor. An employer may generally assert an affirmative defense to supervisory harassment under the Court's 1998 rulings in Farager v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth. The defense is not available, however, if the harassment includes a ""tangible employment action,"" such as discharge or demotion. In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, the plaintiff claimed the tangible adverse action was supervisory harassment so severe that it drove the employee to quit, a constructive discharge in effect. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, with only Justice Thomas dissenting, accepted the theory of a constructive discharge as a tangible employment action but it also set conditions under which the employer could assert an affirmative defense and avoid strict liability. The issue is of key importance for determining the scope of employers' vicarious liability in ""supervisory"" sexual harassment cases alleging a hostile work environment.",16,16 "Upcoming Rules Pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Fall 2011 Unified Agenda. Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agencies for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, as amended) is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified more than 40 provisions in ACA that explicitly require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation. One way for Congress to identify upcoming ACA rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, which is published twice each year (spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration, for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The Unified Agenda lists upcoming activities, by agency, in three separate categories ""active"" actions, including rules in the prerule stage (e.g., advance notices of proposed rulemaking that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months), proposed rule stage (i.e., notices of proposed rulemaking that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months, or for which the closing date of the comment period is the next step), and final rule stage (i.e., final rules or other final actions that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months) ""completed"" actions (i.e., final rules or rules that have been withdrawn since the last edition of the Unified Agenda), and ""long-term"" actions (i.e., items under development that agencies do not expect to take action on in the next 12 months). All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of the action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date for the next regulatory action. Each entry also indicates the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered ""economically significant"" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a ""major"" rule under the Congressional Review Act). This report examines the most recent edition of the Unified Agenda (Fall 2011), published on January 20, 2012, the third edition since the enactment of ACA. The report identifies upcoming proposed rules that agencies identify as pursuant to ACA, such as an upcoming Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) proposed rule on ""Medicaid Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act."" Additionally, this report identifies upcoming final rules listed that are expected to be issued pursuant to ACA, such as a pair of upcoming Food and Drug Administration (FDA) final rules on ""Nutrition Labeling for Food Sold in Vending Machines"" and ""Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and Similar Retail Food Establishments."" The Appendix lists these upcoming proposed and final rules in a table. This report also briefly identifies some long-term actions listed in the Unified Agenda, such as the upcoming Health and Human Services/Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (HHS/CMS) final rule on ""Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act."" Finally, this report briefly discusses some options for congressional oversight over the ACA rules, including the procedures contained within the Congressional Review Act.",69,69 "France and U.S.-French Relations: In Brief. French President Emmanuel Macron took office in May 2017 promising to shake up a political system he characterized as out of touch, revive the stagnant French economy, and revitalize French leadership of the 28-member European Union (EU). Since that time, he has sought to advance a centrist, reform-oriented domestic agenda while pursuing a ""traditional"" French foreign and defense policy that emphasizes European integration and a strong French presence in global affairs. Although Macron has the support of a solid majority in the French parliament, he faces challenges in advancing his ambitious policy agenda, both at home and abroad. Domestically, France has suffered a number of deadly terrorist attacks since January 2015, and some powerful labor unions oppose key elements of Macron's proposed economic reforms. At the European level, the EU is facing some of the most significant challenges of its 60-year history, including the planned withdrawal of the United Kingdom (also referred to as Brexit), tensions related to an upsurge in migrants and refugees to Europe, heightened terrorist threats, and Russian aggression. Globally, Macron has sought to boost his country's profile on the world stage. He has advocated a stronger EU and international response to combat terrorism, especially in the Middle East and Africa, where more than 5,000 French troops are carrying out counterterrorism operations. Macron has maintained France's traditionally strong commitment to the global multilateral security and economic architecture established after the World War II, and he is a particularly strong proponent of both free trade and the 2015 U.N. Paris Agreement on climate change. Despite expressing unease at times about the direction of U.S. foreign policy under President Trump, Macron has made a concerted effort—perhaps more so than any other European leader—to forge a close working relationship with the U.S. President. Accordingly, President Trump is scheduled to host Macron in Washington, DC, on April 23-25, 2018, for the Trump Presidency's first official state visit by a foreign leader. In previous meetings and conversations, President Macron and President Trump have stressed their governments' strong bilateral cooperation in confronting terrorist and other security threats in the Middle East and Africa. This cooperation is likely to remain a key driver of bilateral relations for the near future. However, given President Trump's widespread unpopularity in France and Europe and a perception that Macron has yet to secure Trump's support for key French priorities, Macron could face heightened domestic pressure to take a stronger stand against the Trump Administration's foreign and trade policies.",87,85 "Class Actions and Proposed Reform in the 106th Congress: Class Action Fairness Act of 2000. S. 353 reflects a preference for class actions to be adjudicated in federal courts and would give U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over class actions with claims aggregating $2,000,000 or more. It is intended to protect class members and to make the procedure easier for them to understand but, conversely, it is also said to be anti-plaintiff and pro-business. The Senate Judiciary Committee reported out an amended version of the bill, but the 106th Congress adjourned without taking further action. This report summarizes the action the 106th Congress took on this legislation and will not be updated.",92,94 "The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues. Natural disasters, such as Hurricane Sandy, raise questions concerning the President's legal authority to send active duty military forces into a disaster area and the permissible functions the military can perform to protect life and property and maintain order. The Stafford Act authorizes the use of the military for disaster relief operations at the request of the state governor, but it does not authorize the use of the military to perform law enforcement functions, which is ordinarily prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act. However, the President may invoke other authorities to use federal troops to aid in the execution of the law, including the Insurrection Act. This report summarizes the possible constitutional and statutory authorities and constraints relevant to the use of armed forces, including National Guard units in federal service, to provide assistance to states when a natural disaster impedes the operation of state and local police.",11,11 "Patent-Eligibility of Process Claims Under Section 101 of the Patent Act: Bilski v. Kappos. The source of federal patent law originates with the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress: ""To promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective... Discoveries."" Section 101 of the Patent Act describes the subject matter that is eligible for patent protection, which may be divided into four categories: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued two decisions in the 1990s, In re Alappat and State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, that had expanded the scope of patent-eligible subject matter to include any process that produces a ""useful, concrete and tangible result."" In October 2008, the Federal Circuit issued an en banc opinion, In re Bilski, that expressly overruled those earlier decisions. The Federal Circuit's Bilski opinion articulated a new legal standard governing the eligibility of process claims for patent protection under § 101 of the Patent Act: if the process is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or if it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing. Some observers and patent practitioners criticized this ""machine-or-transformation"" standard as being too rigid and not in compliance with Supreme Court precedent concerning patentable subject matter eligibility. They raised concerns that the test potentially restricts patent protection for new innovations in business methods and software, and that it called into question the validity of already-issued patents that claim information-based and computer-managed processes. On June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bilski v. Kappos, representing the first time that the Court has ruled on the scope of patentable subject matter since its last decision on this topic, the 1981 decision Diamond v. Diehr. At the outset of the opinion, the Court emphasized that its precedents already provide limits to patent eligibility under § 101—laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas may not be patented. Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected Bilski's patent application (regarding a commodities trading risk-hedging method) without using any ""test"" that may have been developed by the Federal Circuit, rather, the Court relied on its precedents in declaring that the processes that were claimed in Bilski's patent application are unpatentable abstract ideas. The Court ruled that the Federal Circuit was incorrect in holding that the ""machine-or-transformation"" standard is the sole test for showing patent eligibility of process claims, however, the Court acknowledged that the test is a ""useful and important clue, an investigative tool,"" for determining whether a particular process is patentable. Thus, the Court did not invalidate the test, but rather rejected the Federal Circuit's conclusion that the test is the exclusive one that governs the analysis for process patent eligibility under § 101 of the Patent Act. However, the Court did not articulate a different test or adopt new categorical rules for process patent eligibility, nor did it provide much guidance to the lower courts on this matter. Instead, the Court invited the Federal Circuit to develop additional tests and other limiting criteria regarding what constitutes a patentable process. The Bilski Court also ruled that some business methods may be patentable, because (1) the Patent Act's definition of ""process"" does not categorically exclude business methods, and (2) § 273 of the Patent Act contemplates the possibility that some business methods, at least in some circumstances, may be eligible for patenting.",9,9 "U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations During President Obama's First Six Years (2009-2014): Comparative Analysis with Recent Presidents. The selection and confirmation process for U.S. circuit and district court judges is of continuing interest to Congress. Recent Senate debates over judicial nominations have focused on issues such as the relative degree of success of President Barack Obama's nominees in gaining Senate confirmation compared with other recent Presidents, as well as the time from nomination to confirmation for nominees, and the relative prevalence of vacant judgeships compared to years past. This report addresses these issues, and others, by providing a statistical analysis of nominations to U.S. circuit and district court judgeships during the first six years of President Obama's time in office and that of his three most recent two-term predecessors, Presidents Reagan, Clinton and G.W. Bush. Some of the report's findings include the following During his first six years in office, President Obama nominated 61 persons to U.S. circuit court judgeships. Of the 61, 53 were also confirmed during this same six-year period. The 53 confirmed Obama circuit court nominees represented the second-highest number of nominees confirmed during recent Presidents' first six years. President Clinton had the lowest number at 50. The percentage of circuit court nominees confirmed during President Obama's first six years, 86.9%, was also the second-highest, while the percentage confirmed during President G.W. Bush's, 75.0%, was the lowest. Of the four Presidents, President Reagan had both the greatest number (66) and percentage (97.1%) of circuit court nominees confirmed within the first six years of his presidency. Of the 270 persons nominated by President Obama to U.S. district court judgeships during his first six years, 250 (92.6%) were confirmed. Of the four recent two-term Presidents analyzed here, this was the greatest number and second-greatest percentage of district court nominees confirmed. Of the comparison group, President Reagan had the greatest percentage of district court nominees confirmed (97.4%), while President G.W. Bush had the lowest percentage confirmed (86.8%). President Clinton had, during his first six years, 90.2% of his district court nominees confirmed. The average number of days elapsed from nomination to confirmation for circuit court nominees confirmed during a President's first six years ranged from a low of 55.8 days during the Reagan presidency to a high of 366.7 days during the G.W. Bush presidency. The median number of days from nomination to confirmation for circuit court nominees confirmed during a President's first six years ranged from a low of 37.0 days (Reagan) to a high of 228.0 (Obama). The average number of days elapsed from nomination to confirmation for district court nominees confirmed during a President's first six years ranged from a low of 50.2 days during the Reagan presidency to a high of 219.4 days during the Obama presidency. The median number of days from nomination to confirmation for district court nominees confirmed during a President's first six years ranged from a low of 35.0 days (Reagan) to a high of 214.5 (Obama). The percentage of circuit court judgeships vacant on January 1 of President Obama's seventh year in office was less than the percentage of such judgeships vacant on January 1 of his sixth year in office (3.9% and 9.5%, respectively). The percentage of circuit court judgeships vacant at the beginning of President Obama's seventh year in office was less than the percentage vacant at the beginning of the seventh year of the Reagan, Clinton, and G.W. Bush presidencies. The percentage of district court judgeships vacant on January 1 of President Obama's seventh year in office was less than the percentage of such judgeships vacant on January 1 of his sixth year in office (4.9% and 11.1%, respectively). The percentage of district court judgeships vacant at the beginning of President Obama's seventh year in office was less than the percentage vacant at the beginning of the seventh year of the Reagan, Clinton, and G.W. Bush presidencies.",54,54 "Military Construction: FY2017 Appropriations. Military construction for active and reserve components of the Armed Forces, military family housing construction and operations, the U.S. contribution to the NATO Security Investment Program, military base closures and realignment actions, and the military housing privatization initiative will be funded through Title I and Title IV of the FY2017 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The act is associated with three separate bill numbers: H.R. 4974, S. 2806, and H.R. 2577. For FY2017, the President requested $7.44 billion in new budget authority for regular (base budget) military construction and family housing activities and an additional $172.5 million for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) construction for a total of $7.62 billion in new budget authority. The bill's conference committee recommended $7.73 billion in the base budget and $172.0 million in OCO funding for a total of $7.90 billion in new budget authority. With additional funds available through the rescission of prior-year appropriations, Congress could make available up to $8.03 billion in base funding and $172.0 million in OCO appropriations for a total military construction appropriation of $8.21 billion for FY2017. The FY2017 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act originated in the House as H.R. 4974, introduced on April 15, 2016. A similar bill, S. 2806, was introduced in the Senate on April 18, 2016. On May 19, 2016, the Senate combined the versions of the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development (T-HUD), Military Construction and Veterans Affairs (MILCON/VA), and Zika Response and Preparedness appropriations bills into H.R. 2577 (a T-HUD appropriations bill for FY2016 that the House had passed in June, 2015), passed the amended bill, and sent it to the House. The House substituted its own amendment in three divisions (Division A: MILCON/VA, Division B: Zika Response Appropriations, and Division C: Zika Vector Control), removing the T-HUD portion for H.R. 2577, passed the bill, and requested a conference. The conference met on June 15, 2016, and filed its report (H.Rept. 114-640) the next day. The conference bill contained four divisions: (1) Division A: MILCON/VA, (2) Division B: Zika Response and Preparedness Appropriations, (3) Division C: Zika Vector Control, and (4) Division D: Rescission of Funds. The House agreed to the report on June 23, 2016.The Senate incorporated portions of the amended H.R. 2577 into another bill, H.R. 5325, organized as (1) Division A: Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, (2) Division B: Zika Response and Preparedness, (3) Division C: Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017, and (4) Division D: Rescissions of Funds, and passed the bill. The House agreed to the amended H.R. 5325 the same day. The President signed H.R. 5325 into law (P.L. 114-223) on September 29, 2016.",26,25 "Economic and Fiscal Conditions in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Fiscal and economic challenges facing the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) government raise several issues for Congress. Congress may choose to maintain oversight of federal policies that could affect the USVI's long-term fiscal stability. Congress also may consider further legislation that would extend or restructure long-range disaster assistance programs to mitigate those challenges and promote greater resiliency of infrastructure and public programs. Federal responses to the USVI's fiscal distress could conceivably affect municipal debt markets more broadly. The USVI, like many other Caribbean islands acquired by European powers, were used to produce sugar and other tropical agricultural products and to further strategic interests such as shipping and the extension of naval forces. Once the United States acquired the U.S. Virgin Islands shortly before World War I, they effectively ceased to have major strategic importance. Moreover, at that time the Virgin Islands' sugar-based economy had been in decline for decades. While efforts of mainland and local policymakers eventually created a robust manufacturing sector after World War II, manufacturing in the Virgin Islands has struggled in the 21st century. In particular, the 2012 closing of the HOVENSA refinery operated by Hess Oil resulted in the loss of some 2,000 jobs and left the local economy highly dependent on tourism and related services. The territorial government, facing persistent economic challenges, covered some budget deficits with borrowed funds, which has raised concerns over levels of public debt and unfunded pension liabilities. Local policymakers have proposed tax increases and austerity measures to bolster public finances, which currently operate with restricted liquidity. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) expressed doubts that those fiscal measures would restore access to capital markets or address shortfalls in the funding of public pensions. Governor Kenneth Mapp, in his FY2019 budget proposals, set forth measures that would delay expected public pension insolvency from 2024 to 2025 and promised to outline other measures that would further delay insolvency until 2028. Damage caused by two powerful hurricanes—Irma and Maria—that hit the USVI in September 2017 created additional economic and social challenges. Public revenues, according to estimates based on USVI fiscal data, were halved after the two hurricanes. The USVI economy has relied heavily on tourism and related business activity, which made it more vulnerable to the effects of hurricanes than jurisdictions with more diverse economies. The severity of damage from Irma and Maria, and the subsequent disruption of the USVI tourism industry, suggest that a full economic recovery could take years. Federal disaster assistance has included aid to public institutions, such as long-term loans to the USVI government and two hospitals, loans and grants to individuals and small businesses, as well as direct operations of the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Coast Guard, among other federal agencies. Funding for disaster relief has been augmented by supplemental appropriations. The extent of federal disaster assistance received by the USVI will depend, in part, on how funds provided in response to needs resulting from hurricanes and fires in 2017 are allocated among affected areas. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123, §20301), enacted on February 9, 2018, included additional Medicaid funding for the USVI and Puerto Rico through September 30, 2019.",104,104 Regulation of Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions: State and Federal Standards. This report discusses the federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards (including tighter standards enacted under P.L. 110-140) and compares them with the GHG standards under California's law. It also identifies some factors that would have a bearing on the relative stringency of CAFE and the California program.,42,42 "Crude Oil Properties Relevant to Rail Transport Safety: In Brief. The dramatic increase in U.S. crude oil production, coupled with the increase in crude oil transport by rail, has raised questions about whether properties (e.g., flammability) of these crude types—particularly Bakken crude oil from North Dakota—differ sufficiently from other crude oils to warrant any additional handling considerations. The U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a Safety Alert to notify emergency responders, shippers, carriers, and the public that recent derailments and resulting fires indicate that the type of crude oil transported from the Bakken region of North Dakota may be more flammable than traditional heavy crude oil. The alert reminds emergency responders that light sweet crude oil, such as that coming from the Bakken region, pose significant fire risk if released from the package (tank car) in an accident. PHMSA has expanded the scope of lab testing to include other factors that affect proper characterization and classification of crude oil such as volatility, corrosivity, hydrogen sulfide content and composition/concentration of the entrained gases in the material. All crude oils are flammable, to a varying degree. Further, crude oils exhibit other potentially hazardous characteristics as well. The growing perception is that light volatile crude oil, like Bakken crude, is a root cause for catastrophic incidents and thus may be too hazardous to ship by rail. However, equally hazardous and flammable liquids from other sources are routinely transported by rail, tanker truck, barge, and pipeline, though not without accident. A key question for Congress is whether the characteristics of Bakken crude oil make it particularly hazardous to ship by rail, or are there other causes of transport incidents, such as poor maintenance practices, inadequate safety standards, or human error.",40,123 "Terrorism and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases: Recent Developments in Brief. Most crime is territorial. It is proscribed, investigated, tried, and punished under the law of the place where it occurs. As a general rule, no nation's laws apply within the territory of another. Yet in a surprising number of instances, federal criminal law does apply overseas to U.S. citizens and foreign nationals. As long as there is some nexus to the United States, federal law authorizes prosecution -- practical, diplomatic, and procedural impediments notwithstanding. In the 107th Congress, the USA PATRIOT Act and the legislation implementing the international conventions on terrorist bombings and on financing terrorism have extended the substantive authority for federal prosecution of crimes occurring elsewhere. This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL31557(pdf), Terrorism and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases Recent Developments, stripped of its footnotes and most citations.",22,22 "Majority Cloture for Nominations: Implications and the ""Nuclear"" Proceedings. On November 21, 2013, by overturning a ruling of the chair on appeal, the Senate set a precedent that lowered the vote threshold required by Senate Standing Rule XXII for invoking cloture on most presidential nominations. The precedent did not change the text of Rule XXII of the Standing Rules, rather, the Senate established a precedent reinterpreting the provisions of Rule XXII to require only a simple majority of those voting, rather than three-fifths of the full Senate, to invoke cloture on all presidential nominations except those to the U.S. Supreme Court. The precedent does not eliminate the potential need for a cloture process for the Senate to reach a vote on a contested nomination. The time required to invoke cloture on a pending nomination remains as it was before the precedent. Specifically, nominations are still subject to Rule XXII's requirement that (1) a cloture motion filed on a pending nomination lie over for two days of Senate session prior to the cloture vote, and (2) the nomination be subject to an additional 30 hours of post-cloture consideration prior to a vote on confirmation. For the 113th Congress only (pursuant to S.Res. 15), this post-cloture time limit is eight hours for most nominations and two hours for U.S. District Court judges, the limit is still 30 hours for high level executive nominations and the top judicial positions (see Table 1). The only direct effect of the new precedent is to change the vote threshold by which the Senate can invoke cloture (and thereby eventually reach a vote) on these nominations from three-fifths of the Senate to a numerical majority of Senators voting (with a quorum present). However, to the extent that the change may effectively limit the floor leverage of Senators opposing a nomination, there may be implications for the pre-floor stages during which nominations are vetted. In addition, the parliamentary circumstances under which the November 21 precedent was set will likely be examined for their implications for future attempts to change Senate procedures. A key element of the feasibility of such action is whether a Senate majority in favor of change can reach a vote to establish new procedures in the face of opposition. Reaching a vote to reinterpret existing rules, in a contested situation, might rely on steps that are novel or potentially are in contravention of existing rules and precedents, in addition, the effects of such actions could also undermine the existing procedural prerogatives available to Senators. Such proceedings have sometimes been called the ""nuclear option."" In this context, an important feature of the proceedings of November 21 was the inability of opponents to extend debate on the appeal of the chair's ruling. This report explains the procedural context within which the precedent was set and addresses the precedent's effects on floor consideration of nominations (as well as noting other potential effects on the nominations process). In addition, since the parliamentary circumstances under which the precedent was set fall within proceedings often called the ""nuclear option,"" the report concludes by briefly noting the precedent's relevance for future proposals to alter or reinterpret Senate rules through the establishment of new precedent. An Appendix details the key procedural steps by which the precedent was set. This report will be updated if events warrant, or to add citations to additional CRS reports that address related issues.",55,55 "Data Brokers: Background and Industry Overview. Disclosures of breaches of the customer databases of LexisNexis and ChoicePoint have raised interest in the business and regulation of data brokers, companies that collect personal information from public and private records and sell this information to public and private sector entities. The growth of this industry has generally tracked the increase in government and private sector use of personal information. The vast amount of personal information that data brokers collect and the improper access to such data, however, have spurred concern as to the dangers of identity theft. Identity theft is reportedly the fastest growing crime in America. This report provides an overview of the data brokerage industry and more specific background on LexisNexis and ChoicePoint.",8,8 "Who Are the ""Middle Class""?. There is no consensus definition of ""middle class,"" neither is there an official government definition. What constitutes the middle class is relative, subjective, and not easily defined. The mid-point in the distribution is the median, and in 2007 the median household income was $50,233. How far above and below that amount the middle stretches remains an open question. This report explores the various definitions of the middle class and what salary ranges those definitions encompass, as well as related statistics and surveys that support this information.",99,99 "Unauthorized Employment in the United States: Issues, Options, and Legislation. As immigration reform and the illegal alien population have gained congressional and public attention in the past several years, the issue of unauthorized employment has come to the fore. It is widely accepted that most unauthorized aliens enter and remain in the United States in order to work. Thus, eliminating employment opportunities for these aliens has been seen as key to curtailing unauthorized immigration. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to add provisions, sometimes referred to as employer sanctions, that made it unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to work. These provisions also established a paper-based employment eligibility verification system, known as the I-9 system, which requires that employers examine documents presented by new hires to verify identity and work eligibility, and complete and retain I-9 verification forms. There is general agreement that the I-9 process has been undermined by fraud. Employers violating INA prohibitions on unauthorized employment may be subject to civil or criminal penalties. The Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS/ICE) is responsible for enforcing the INA prohibitions on unauthorized employment. Building on the employment verification system established by IRCA, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) directed the Attorney General to conduct three pilot programs for employment eligibility confirmation. Under the Basic Pilot program (known now as E-Verify), the only one of the three pilots still in operation, participating employers verify new hires' employment eligibility by submitting information about these workers that is checked against Social Security Administration (SSA) and, if applicable, DHS databases. E-Verify is scheduled to terminate on March 6, 2009, in accordance with Division A of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. A variety of options has been put forth to curtail unauthorized employment and related practices, a selection of which is discussed in this report. Some of these options would build on the current employment eligibility verification system, these include making electronic verification mandatory, increasing existing penalties, or increasing resources for worksite enforcement. Others represent new approaches to address unauthorized employment, such as shifting responsibility for employment eligibility verification from employers to the federal government. Multiple bills related to unauthorized employment have been introduced in the 111th Congress. Among them, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (H.R. 1105), as introduced and as passed by the House, includes a provision to extend E-Verify through September 30, 2009. Several other provisions on the E-Verify program, including provisions to extend the program until November 2013 and to require that none of the funds made available under the act be used to enter into a contract with an entity that does not participate in E-Verify, were included in the House-passed version of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (H.R. 1). These provisions, however, were not included in the Senate-passed version of H.R. 1 or in the final enacted version of the bill. This report will be updated as developments warrant.",76,76 "Financial Institution Customer Identification Programs Mandated by the USA PATRIOT Act. Under the USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56, section 326, 31 U.S.C. Section 5318(l), the Secretary of the Treasury has prescribed minimum standards for banks, savings associations, credit unions, and securities firms to establish Customer Identification Programs (CIPs). To open a new account, U.S. individuals must provide a social security number and non-U.S. persons, a government issued identification with a photograph. The required information must be verified either by documents such as driver's licenses, or by non-documentary means, such as inquiring with a credit reporting agency. The institutions are to cross-check names of new account holders against lists of terrorists and suspected terrorists that the federal government will provide. The regulations permit financial institutions to rely on photograph-bearing-foreign-government-issued documents, such as the matricula consular, issued by the Mexican government, to identify new account-holders. Acceptance of the matricula consular, issued by the Mexican government, would be authorized under H.R. 773 and precluded by H.R. 3674. The 9/11 Commission Report included some information about the use of bank accounts by terrorists and raised questions about further sharing of information among government agencies, and the use of biometric identifiers for foreign travelers, that may eventually have an impact on the CIP program. This report will be updated as legislative developments warrant. Related CRS reports include CRS Report RL32094, Consular Identification Cards: Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications, the Mexican Case, and Related Legislation, CRS Report RS21627(pdf), Implication of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Upon the Regulation of Consular Identification Cards, CRS Report RL31377 The USA PATRIOT ACT: A Legal Analysis, CRS Report RL31208, The International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, Title III of P.L. 107-56 (USA PATRIOT Act), and CRS Report RS21032(pdf), Money Laundering: Current Law and Proposals.",5,5 "Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE): Authorizations of Appropriations Proposed by the Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2015 (S. 2012). Search terms: S. 2012, H.R. 8, energy efficiency, renewable energy, Department of Energy, EISA, P.L. 110-140 (Hide summary)",37,37 "Justice Antonin Scalia: His Jurisprudence and His Impact on the Court. On February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia passed away unexpectedly at the age of 79, vacating a seat on the Supreme Court which he had held for nearly 30 years. Justice Scalia's lengthy tenure on the Court, coupled with his strongly held views on how constitutional and statutory texts are to be interpreted, led him to have significant influence on the development of the jurisprudence of various areas of law. He was also an active speaker and author outside the Court, having, among other things, recently coauthored a book which sought to articulate interpretative canons that would, in its authors' view, ""curb—even reverse—the tendency of judges to imbue authoritative texts with their own policy preferences"" and ""provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predictability and greater respect for the rule of law."" Like his approaches to many legal issues in his opinions on the Court, Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation in this book has prompted debate both over its desirability, as a normative matter, and over the consistency with which Justice Scalia applied that approach. This report discusses Justice Scalia's jurisprudence on key areas of law, as well as how that jurisprudence could be seen to have influenced the Court's approach to these subject matters. It begins with his views on two cross-cutting issues—the role of the judiciary and statutory interpretation—which highlight his well-known views about originalism, textualism, the importance of bright-line rules for judges to apply, and the proper role of the courts within the system of government established by the U.S. Constitution. It then addresses Justice Scalia's jurisprudence on fourteen separate areas of law, which are arranged in alphabetical order from ""administrative law"" to ""takings,"" and were specifically selected as key areas of law where Justice Scalia's absence from the Court could result in a change in its jurisprudence. The report concludes with an Appendix that lists the Supreme Court cases from the October 2010 term through the October 2015 term in which Justice Scalia was part of a bare five-member majority, indicating the legal issues where Justice Scalia's absence from the Court could result in a shift in the Court's jurisprudence. A separate report is being prepared to address the opinions of Merrick Garland, currently the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the President's nominee to fill the seat vacated by Justice Scalia. The two reports, taken together, may assist Members of Congress and their staff in assessing the impact that replacement of Justice Scalia might have upon the High Court's rulings. Other CRS reports address the procedural issues that the vacating of Justice Scalia's seat poses for the Court, as well as the processes for nominating and confirming Supreme Court Justices. See CRS Report R44400, The Death of Justice Scalia: Procedural Issues Arising on an Eight-Member Supreme Court, by Andrew Nolan, CRS Report R44235, Supreme Court Appointment Process: President's Selection of a Nominee, by Barry J. McMillion, CRS Report R44236, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee, by Barry J. McMillion, and CRS Report R44234, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Senate Debate and Confirmation Vote, by Barry J. McMillion.",92,92 "Constitutional Limits on Hate Crime Legislation. Federal and state legislators recognize the special concerns and effects of hate crimes. Although there is some federal legislation in place, many states have enacted some form of ethnic intimidation law or bias-motivated sentence-enhancement factors in attempts to curtail hate crimes. Several United States Supreme Court cases provide the framework in which states must legislate to ensure the constitutionality of hate crime legislation. After these landmark cases, the real questions for states involve identifying permissible ways to curtail hate crimes without infringing on any constitutionally protected rights. On the federal level, in light of U.S. Supreme Court cases, the question remains as to what extent Congress can broaden the classes of individuals subject to hate crime legislation. This report discusses constitutional considerations facing both individual states and Congress in enacting hate crime legislation. It will be updated as events warrant.",94,94 "Wildfire Fuels and Fuel Reduction. Severe wildfires have been burning more acres and more structures in recent years. Some assert that climate change is at least partly to blame, others claim that the increasing number of homes in and near the forest (the wildland-urban interface) is a major cause. However, most observers agree that wildfire suppression and historic land management practices have led to unnaturally high accumulations of biomass in many forests, particularly in the intermountain West. While high-intensity conflagrations (wildfires that burn the forest canopy) occur naturally in some ecosystems (called crown-fire or stand-replacement fire ecosystems), abnormally high biomass levels can lead to conflagrations in ecosystems when such crown fires were rare (called frequent-surface-fire ecosystems). Thus, many propose activities to reduce forest biomass fuels. The characteristics of forest biomass fuels affect the nature, spread, and intensity of the fire. Fuel moisture content is critical, but is generally a function of weather patterns over hours, days, and weeks. Fuel size is also important—fine and small fuels (e.g., needles, grasses, leaves, small twigs) are key to fire spread, while larger fuels (e.g., twigs larger than pencil-diameter, branches, and logs) contribute primarily to fire intensity, both are important to minimizing fire damages. Fuel distribution can also affect damages. Relatively continuous fuels improve burning, and vertically continuous fuels—fuel ladders—can lead a surface fire into the canopy, causing a conflagration. Total fuel accumulations (fuel loads) also contribute to fire intensity and damage. Thus, activities that alter biomass fuels—reducing total loads, reducing small fuels, reducing large fuels, and eliminating fuel ladders—can help reduce wildfire severity and damages. Several tools can be used to reduce forest biomass fuels. Prescribed burning is the deliberate use of fire in specific areas under specified conditions. It is the only tool that can eliminate fine fuels, but is risky because it burns any fuel available. Wildland fire use is the term used for allowing a wildfire to be used like a prescribed burn (i.e., within specified areas and conditions). Thinning is a broader forestry tool useful for eliminating fuel ladders and total fuels in the crown, but it does not eliminate fine fuels, and it concentrates fuels in a more continuous array on the surface. The combination of thinning with prescribed burning is often proposed to combine the benefits, but it also combines the cost of both. Logging does little to reduce fuel loads. The federal land management agencies undertake all of these activities under general authorities for wildfire protection and land and resource management. Fuel reduction, primarily via prescribed burning, is funded with direct annual appropriations for wildfire management. Other activities, particularly thinning, are funded through other annual appropriations accounts, such as vegetation management. Also, several mandatory spending accounts provide funds for related activities, such as treating logging and thinning debris. In addition, wildfire assistance funding allows the Forest Service to provide technical and financial aid for reducing forest biomass fuel loads on nonfederal lands, among other things. The issues for Congress include the appropriate level of funding for prescribed burning and thinning for fuel reduction and the appropriate reporting of accomplishments. Current reporting does not identify ecosystems being treated and the effectiveness of the treatments. Similarly, current appropriations and reporting do not distinguish thinning for fuel reduction from thinning for other purposes, such as enhancing timber productivity. More complete reporting could allow Congress to better target its appropriations for fuel reduction to enhance wildfire protection.",107,107 "Air Quality and Electricity: Enforcing New Source Review. On November 3, 1999, the Justice Department filed seven lawsuits against electric utilities in the Midwest and South charging them with violations of the New Source Review (NSR) requirements of the Clean Air Act (CAA). In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an administrative order against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), alleging similar violations. Through a ""preconstruction"" permitting process, NSR is designed to ensure that newly constructed facilities, or substantially modified existing facilities, do not result in violation of applicable air quality standards. The suits represent a continuing effort by EPA to reduce pollution from existing sources, particularly coal-fired electric generating facilities. The primary pollutants of concern have been nitrogen oxides (NOx), and sulfur dioxide (SO2). The question the EPA lawsuits raise is whether the specified facilities have engaged in rehabilitation actions that represent ""major modifications"" of the plants, in which case the CAA would require the installation of best available pollution control equipment. The crucial definition of ""major modification"" derives from an EPA ruling that a life extension project by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO) triggered NSR requirements. Since 1992, after considerable litigation and congressional debate, the ""test"" to determine the applicability of NSR compares whether a facility's projected actual emissions after the modification are more than its actual emissions before the modification. Utilities argue that the ""modifications"" that EPA cites in the suits were just routine maintenance, which do not trigger NSR. NSR is an attractive enforcement tool because EPA can ask the court to impose substantial monetary penalties, and to require a violating source to install best available control technology. Thus EPA states that these facilities could be required to reduce their emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides by 85 to 95%. Because the CAA is a complex piece of legislation built up over time, however, the reductions that might result from successful prosecution of the NSR suits may not be completely realized. In the case of SO2, any reduction achieved under NSR would interact with a cap on emissions set under title IV of the CAA, because of the system of tradable allowances established under title IV, reductions from NSR compliance might be shifted to unaffected facilities. The situation with respect to NOx is also confused, largely because of inconsistencies in EPA's new and existing source NOx regulations as a result of a partial remand of regulations by a court. By seeking to enforce NSR requirements, EPA exploits an existing authority that holds the potential for reducing emissions. EPA clearly believes that some sources have been evading NSR requirements. However, the action appears to raise the classic enforcement issue: will the outcome be reduced emissions, or just costly litigation? The suits expose the complex interactions of NSR with other provisions of the CAA – complexities that might compromise air pollution reductions sought through the NSR suits. Knowledge gained through 30 years of CAA implementation suggests options for updating the Act's approach to regulating the utility industry's emissions, however, many of these require Congressional action to amend the Act.",42,42 "The Trump Administration's March 2017 Defense Budget Proposals: Frequently Asked Questions. On March 16, 2017, the Trump Administration released two defense budget proposals—a proposal for national defense (budget function 050) discretionary spending for fiscal year (FY) 2018 as part of the Administration's Budget Blueprint for federal spending, and a detailed request for additional FY0217 funding for Department of Defense (DOD) military activities. For FY2017, the Administration is seeking $30 billion for DOD military activities (budget subfunction 051) in addition to the amounts requested by the Obama Administration. Of this amount, $24.9 billion is slated for base budget activities and $5.1 billion is associated with OCO. The Budget Blueprint includes a $603 billion request for national defense (budget function 050) discretionary budget authority for FY2018 base budget requirements and $65 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). This report addresses several frequently asked questions regarding these proposals.",25,25 "The 10-20-30 Plan and Persistent Poverty Counties. Anti-poverty interventions that provide resources to local communities, based on the characteristics of those communities, have been of interest to Congress. One such policy, dubbed the ""10-20-30 plan,"" was implemented in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). Title I, Section 105 of ARRA required the Secretary of Agriculture to allocate at least 10% of funds from three rural development program accounts to persistent poverty counties, that is, to counties that have had poverty rates of 20% or more for the past 30 years, as measured by the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. One notable characteristic of this plan is that it did not increase spending for the rural development programs addressed in ARRA, but rather targeted existing funds differently. Research has suggested that areas for which the poverty rate (the percentage of the population that is below poverty) reaches 20% experience systemic problems that are more acute than in lower-poverty areas. Therefore, policy interventions at the community level (such as applying the 10-20-30 plan, to other programs besides those cited in ARRA), and not only at the individual or family level, could continue to be of interest to Congress. Poverty rates are computed using data from household surveys. Currently, the only data sources that provide poverty estimates for all U.S. counties are the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates program (SAIPE), before the mid-1990s, the decennial census was the only source of county poverty estimates. Therefore, to determine whether an area is ""persistently"" poor in a time span that ends after the year 2000, it must first be decided whether ACS or SAIPE poverty estimates will be used for the later part of that time span. Lists of persistent poverty counties may differ by roughly 80 to 100 counties in a particular year, depending on the data source selected to compile the list and the rounding method used for the poverty rate estimates. When determining the method to be used to compile a list of persistent poverty counties, the following may be relevant to consider Characteristics of interest: SAIPE is suited for poverty or median income alone, ACS for other topics in addition to poverty and income. Geographic areas of interest: SAIPE is recommended for counties and school districts only, ACS produces estimates for other small geographic areas as well. Reference period of estimate: SAIPE for one year, ACS for a five-year span. Rounding method for poverty rates: rounding to 20.0% (one decimal place) yields a shorter list than rounding to 20% (whole number). Poverty status is not defined for all persons: foster children (unrelated individuals under age 15), institutionalized persons, and residents of college dormitories are excluded, the homeless are not targeted by household surveys, and areas with large numbers of students living off-campus may have high poverty rates.",117,117 "The Islamic State in Syria and Iraq: A Possible Threat to Jordan?. This report briefly examines the extent to which the Islamic State (IS, formerly referred to as ISIS or ISIL) may pose a threat to Jordan, an ""important U.S. partner."" The report discusses Jordanian actions to address threats, and U.S. policy implications.",86,86 "The Federal Workforce: Characteristics and Trends. This report describes the characteristics and trends of the United States federal government workforce, which many consider to reflect the gender, racial, and ethnic diversity of the country as a whole.",58,58 "The Discharge Rule in the House: Recent Use in Historical Context. The discharge rule of the House of Representatives affords a way for Members to bring to the floor a measure not reported from committee. Before a motion to discharge may be made, 218 Members must sign a petition for that purpose. This report provides summary data on discharge petitions filed since adoption of the present form of discharge rule in 1931. It also identifies the 32 occasions since 1967 on which a committee report or floor action occurred on a measure against which a petition was filed (or an alternative measure on the same subject).",55,55 "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Current Issues and U.S. Policy. In recent years, many analysts have expressed concern that the international community's efforts over the past 17 years to stabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina are failing. Milorad Dodik, president of the Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two semi-autonomous ""entities"" within Bosnia, has obstructed efforts to make Bosnia's central government more effective. He has repeatedly asserted the RS's right to secede from Bosnia, although he has so far refrained from trying to make this threat a reality. Some ethnic Croat leaders in Bosnia have called for more autonomy for Croats within Bosnia, perhaps threatening a further fragmentation of the country. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), chosen by leading countries and international institutions, oversees implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. It has the power to fire Bosnian officials and impose laws, if need be, to enforce the Dayton Accords. However, the international community has proved unwilling in recent years to back the High Representative in using these powers boldly, fearing a backlash among Bosnian Serb leaders. As a result, OHR has become increasingly ineffective, according to many observers. The international community has vowed to close OHR after Bosnia meets a series of five objectives and two conditions. The EU's main inducement to enlist the cooperation of Bosnian leaders—the prospect of eventual EU membership—has so far proved insufficient. The prospect of NATO membership has also had little effect. In April 2010, NATO foreign ministers agreed to permit Bosnia to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) program, a key stepping-stone to membership for NATO. However, the ministers stressed that NATO will not accept Bosnia's Annual National Plan under the program until the entities agree to the registration of defense installations as the property of the central government. Dodik has rejected doing so for installations on RS territory. The U.S. political role in the country appears to have declined in recent years as the EU role has increased. The Obama Administration has stressed the importance of maintaining a close partnership with the EU in dealing with Bosnia. Like the EU, the United States has urged Bosnian politicians to agree among themselves to constitutional and other reforms to make Bosnia's government institutions more effective and better coordinated, so that the country can become a better candidate for eventual NATO and EU membership. The United States provided just over $2 billion in aid to Bosnia from the country's independence through FY2012. Aid to Bosnia has declined in recent years. For FY2013, the Administration requested $28.556 million in aid for political and economic reforms in Bosnia from the Economic Support Fund, $6.735 million in the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account (INCLE), $4.5 million in FMF, $1 million in IMET aid, and $4.75 million in NADR funding.",85,85 "Renegotiating NAFTA and U.S. Textile Manufacturing. When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was negotiated more than two decades ago, textiles and apparel were among the industrial sectors most sensitive to the agreement's terms. NAFTA, which was implemented on January 1, 1994, has encouraged the integration of textile and apparel production in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. For example, under NAFTA's ""yarn-forward"" rule of origin, textiles and apparel benefit from tariff-free treatment in all three countries if the production of yarn, fabric, and apparel, with some exceptions, is done within North America. The United States maintains a bilateral trade surplus in yarns and fabrics with its NAFTA partners. In 2016, the United States had a $4.1 billion surplus in yarns and fabrics and a positive balance of around $720 million in made-up textile products (such as home textiles and furnishings) with Canada and Mexico. U.S. exports of yarns and fabrics shipped to Mexico and Canada were valued at close to $6 billion last year. In apparel, the United States had a trade surplus with Canada of $1.4 billion and a trade deficit with Mexico of $2.7 billion in 2016. On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration notified Congress of its intent to renegotiate the agreement. In July 2017, the Administration announced specific goals for textiles and apparel among its renegotiating objectives, which include improving competitive opportunities for U.S. textile and apparel products, but also taking into account U.S. import sensitivities. Also germane to textiles and apparel are several other renegotiating objectives, such as enhancing customs enforcement to prevent unlawful transshipment of these goods from outside the region and ensuring that requirements for use of domestic textiles and apparel in U.S. government purchases primarily benefit producers located in the United States. NAFTA renegotiation started in August 2017. There is widespread support for continuation of the agreement among U.S. textile and apparel producers, although there are significant differences of opinion with respect to certain provisions. In particular, U.S. textile manufacturers generally favor eliminating all exceptions to NAFTA's yarn-forward rule, whereas U.S. retailers and apparel groups oppose tightening the rule. If the United States were to exit NAFTA, imports of textiles from Mexico and Canada would face U.S. tariffs as high as 20%, and imports of apparel would have tariff rates of up to 32%. U.S. exports of textiles and apparel could face higher tariff rates entering Canada and Mexico. One possibility is that U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA could lead U.S. retailers and apparel brands to source more of their goods from Asia, which could reduce demand for U.S.-made yarns and fabrics within the NAFTA region.",53,53 "Proposals to Change Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) Premium Structure: Issues for Congress. This report provides background and analysis of the premiums charged by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which is a government-owned corporation that was created in 1974 to protect the retirement income of participants in private-sector, defined benefit (DB) pension plans. When a company terminates a DB pension plan that does not have enough assets to pay 100% of the promised benefits, PBGC pays, in accordance with statute and up to a maximum yearly dollar amount, the benefits to participants in the terminated plan. In FY2013, 901,000 individuals received $5.4 billion in benefit payments from PBGC. An additional 617,000 workers will receive benefits when they retire. PBGC consists of two insurance programs: (1) a multiemployer pension program, which protects the benefits of 10.4 million participants in collectively bargained DB pensions in which several employers make contributions, and (2) a larger single-employer pension program, which protects the benefits of 31.9 million participants in DB pensions operated by one employer for its eligible employees. Since FY2002, PBGC has ended each fiscal year with a deficit. The total deficit for the PBGC at the end of FY2013 was $35.6 billion. Most of this deficit is attributable to the single-employer program, which ended FY2013 with a deficit of $27.4 billion. At the end of FY2013, PBGC's single-employer program reported assets of $83.0 billion and liabilities of $110.6 billion. Most of PBGC's liabilities are future benefit obligations. Although PBGC receives no congressional appropriations, its financial condition may be of interest to Congress. If PBGC's deficit persists, then cuts to benefits or U.S. government financial assistance could be necessary. PBGC is funded by a combination of insurance premiums paid by employers who sponsor DB pension plans, the assets of DB pension plans that are trusteed by PBGC, and income earned on the investment of the trusteed plan assets. Some policymakers who are concerned by PBGC's financial position have renewed the calls for changes to the structure of the premiums that PBGC collects from employers. The suggested changes include increasing current premium levels or adding a premium that would better reflect a pension plan's potential liability to PBGC. PBGC collects three premiums from DB plan sponsors: (1) an annual flat-rate premium of $49 per participant, (2) an annual variable-rate premium of $14 per $1,000 of underfunding, or (3) a termination premium of $1,250 per plan participant per year for three years for pension plans that terminate under certain conditions. Changes to PBGC's premium structure were included in the Department of Labor's FY2012 and FY2013 proposed budgets. In the 112th Congress, H.Con.Res. 34, the Concurrent Resolution of the Budget for Fiscal Year 2012, and H.Con.Res. 112, the Concurrent Resolution of the Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, recognized a need to reform PBGC but did not adopt the President's budget recommendations. In the 112th Congress, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21, P.L. 112-141) increased the premiums levels but did not change the structure of the premiums that DB plan sponsors pay. In the 113th Congress, H.J.Res. 59 (P.L. 113-67), the vehicle for the December 2013 bipartisan budget agreement, increased PBGC premiums that the sponsors of single-employer DB pension plans pay. Proponents of changes to PBGC's premium structure argue that the current premium structure does not adequately reflect the risk to PBGC of some underfunded pension plans. Some have proposed that PBGC charge premiums based on the financial health of a DB plan sponsor. Although risk-based premiums would better allocate the risk of termination among DB plan sponsors, their implementation would raise additional concerns.",88,88 "Diversity Immigrant Visa Lottery Issues. The purpose of the diversity immigrant visa lottery is, as the name suggests, to encourage legal immigration from countries other than the major sending countries of current immigrants to the United States. Current law weights the allocation of immigrant visas heavily toward aliens with close family in the United States and, to a lesser extent, toward aliens who meet particular employment needs. The diversity immigrant category was added to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by the Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649) to stimulate ""new seed"" immigration (i.e., to foster new, more varied migration from other parts of the world). To be eligible for a diversity visa, the INA requires that the foreign national must have a high school education or the equivalent, or two years experience in an occupation that requires at least two years of training or experience. The foreign national or the foreign national's spouse must be a native of one of the countries listed as a foreign state qualified for the diversity visa lottery. Diversity lottery winners, like all other aliens wishing to come to the United States, must undergo reviews performed by Department of State consular officers abroad and Department of Homeland Security immigration officers upon entry to the United States. These reviews are intended to ensure that the aliens are not ineligible for visas or admission under the grounds for inadmissibility spelled out in the INA. The diversity lottery currently makes 50,000 visas available annually to natives of countries from which immigrant admissions were lower than a total of 50,000 over the preceding five years. The formula for allocating visas is based upon the statutory specifications, visas are divided among six global geographic regions according to the relative populations of the regions, with their allocation weighted in favor of countries in regions that were under-represented among immigrant admissions to the United States during the past five years. The INA limits each country to 7%, or 3,850, of the total and provides that Northern Ireland be treated as a separate foreign state. The regional distribution of the source countries for diversity immigrants has shifted over time in the four years selected for comparison (FY1994, FY1999, FY2004, and FY2009). Foreign nationals from Europe garnered the overwhelming share of the diversity visas in FY1994 and maintained a plurality share in FY1999. By FY2004, foreign nationals from Africa received a share comparable to those from Europe. In FY2009, foreign nationals from Africa gained the plurality share. Some argue that the diversity lottery should be eliminated and its visas used for backlog reduction in other visa categories. Supporters of the diversity visa, however, argue that the diversity visa provides ""new seed"" immigrants for an immigration system weighted disproportionately to family-based immigrants from a handful of countries. Critics of the diversity lottery warn that it is vulnerable to fraud and misuse and is potentially an avenue for terrorists, citing the difficulties of performing background checks in many of the countries eligible for the diversity lottery. Supporters respond that background checks for criminal and national security matters are performed on all prospective immigrants seeking to come to the United States, including those winning diversity visas.",76,76 "Oil Sands and the Keystone XL Pipeline: Background and Selected Environmental Issues. If constructed, the Keystone XL pipeline would transport crude oil derived from oil sands sites in Alberta, Canada, to U.S. refineries and other destinations. Because the pipeline would cross an international border, it requires a Presidential Permit. Although some groups have opposed previous oil pipelines, opposition to the Keystone XL proposal has generated substantially more interest. Stakeholder concerns vary from local impacts, such as oil spills or extraction impacts in Canada, to potential climate change consequences. Arguments supporting the pipelines construction cover an analogous range. Proponents of the Keystone XL Pipeline, including high-level Canadian officials and U.S. and Canadian petroleum industry stakeholders, base their arguments supporting the pipeline primarily on increasing the security and diversity of the U.S. petroleum supply and economic benefits, especially jobs. A number of studies have looked into the various environmental impacts of oil sands crude. This report focuses on selected environmental concerns raised in conjunction with the proposed pipeline and the oil sands crude it will transport. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Key studies indicate that the average greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions intensitymetric tons of GHG emissions per units of production (e.g., barrels)of oil sands crude is higher than many other crude oils. However, industry stakeholders point to analyses indicating that GHG emissions from oil sands crude oil are comparable to other heavy crudes, some of which are produced and/or consumed currently in the United States. Due to oil sands increased emissions intensity, many stakeholders have voiced concern about potential climate change consequences associated with oil sands development. In June 2013, President Obama stated that an evaluation of the net effects of the pipelines impact on our climate would factor into the Department of States (DOSs) national interest determination in order to determine if the project would significantly exacerbate the problem of carbon pollution. Thus, DOSs 2014 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) has received considerable attention. Among other conclusions, the FEIS estimated that the incremental (i.e., net) life-cycle GHG emissions associated with the pipeline would be 1.3 million to 27.4 million metric tons of carbon dioxide per year (0.02%-0.4% of U.S. annual GHG emissions). In addition, the FEIS stated that the approval or denial of any one crude oil transport project, including the proposed project, is unlikely to significantly impact the rate of extraction in the oil sands or the continued demand for heavy crude oil at refineries in the United States based on expected oil prices, oil-sands supply costs, transport costs, and supply-demand scenarios. Some stakeholders have questioned these conclusions, arguing (1) that the project may have greater climate change impacts than projected by DOS, and (2) that there is nothing presumed or inevitable about the rate of expansion for the Canadian oil sands. Other stakeholders support the FEIS analysis, arguing that as long as there is strong global demand for petroleum products, resources such as the Canadian oil sands will be produced and shipped to markets using whatever route necessary. Oil Spills and Other Local Impacts Some groups have argued that both the pipelines operating parameters and the material being transported through it impose an increased spill risk. The National Academy of Sciences National Research Council examined this issue in a 2013 report, stating that it did not find any causes of pipeline failure unique to the transportation of diluted bitumen [oil sands crude]. However, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), spills of oil sands crude may result in different impacts than spills of other crude oils. Other environmental concerns pertain to the region in which the oil sands resources are extracted. Potential impacts include, among others, wildlife and ecosystem disturbance and water resource issues. In general, these local/regional impacts from Canadian oil sands development are unlikely to directly affect public health or the environment in the United States. Within the context of a Presidential Permit, the mechanism to consider local Canadian impacts is unclear.",40,40 "Biopower: Background and Federal Support. Biopower—a form of renewable energy—is the generation of electric power from biomass feedstocks. In 2014, Biopower comprised about 1.6% of total U.S. electricity generation and accounted for close to 12% of U.S. renewable electricity generation. Its advantages include a potential for baseload power production, greenhouse gas emission reduction, and use of renewable biomass feedstock, among other things. Its disadvantages include uncertain sustainable feedstock supply and infrastructure concerns, among other things. Recent developments have prompted renewed interest in biopower. For instance, some stakeholders are concerned about the treatment of biopower by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the Clean Power Plan (CPP). The CPP—which was granted a stay by the Supreme Court on February 9, 2016—establishes regulations that would reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric power plants.. States are required to reach a state-specific emission reduction goal by 2030 using various options—including biopower—based on guidance provided by EPA. EPA has struggled with accounting for greenhouse gas emissions from bioenergy for various reasons, and it is not clear if this struggle will continue throughout the implementation of the CPP. Further, international demand for wood pellets—primarily to satisfy European Union renewable energy mandates—has increased significantly. This development has prompted environmental organizations and others to express concern about the harvest of increasing amounts of biomass and about possible increases in greenhouse gas emissions from the combustion of wood pellets to produce energy. By contrast, some in the forestry industry and the wood pellet industry argue that the international demand presents another market opportunity, that measures are in place to ensure a sustainable biomass feedstock supply, and that biopower can result in lower greenhouse gas emissions. The future contribution of biopower to the U.S. electricity portfolio is uncertain. Challenges to biopower production include regulatory uncertainty (e.g., EPA's CPP), market fluctuation (e.g., natural gas prices), conversion technology development, and tax uncertainty (e.g., extension or termination of renewable energy tax credits), among other issues. Some argue that a comprehensive energy policy focused on renewables could boost biopower production efforts, especially if the policy includes a renewable portfolio standard—a mandate that requires increased production of energy from renewable sources. There is no federal renewable portfolio standard, and the last Congress to robustly debate the issue was the 111th Congress. However, 29 states have established renewable portfolio standards, which vary dramatically from state to state. Current federal support for biopower exists in the form of loans, tax incentives, grant programs, and more.",37,37 "Filling the Senate ""Amendment Tree"". This report discusses the filing process of ""Amendment trees"": diagrams that have developed over decades of Senate practice as a way of visualizing certain principles of precedence that govern the offering of, and voting on, amendments in the chamber.",55,55 "A Presidential Item Veto. During a news conference on November 4, 2004, President George W. Bush stated that he ""would like to see the President have a line-item veto again, one that passed constitutional muster. I think it would help the executive branch work with the legislative branch to make sure that we're able to maintain budget discipline."" The Supreme Court struck down an earlier version of item-veto authority (the Line Item Veto Act of 1996) in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), but several statutory alternatives are available. Options to the Line Item Veto Act have been proposed over the years, including an amendment to the Constitution to grant the President item-veto authority. The line-item veto is listed among several budget reform proposals included in the FY2005 budget, but a more specific recommendation is expected to be developed by the Administration and submitted to Congress at the start of the 109th Congress. This report analyzes the statutory and constitutional alternatives that are likely to be considered and will be updated as necessary.",55,55 "Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress. The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) since FY1998. The two Virginia-class boats that the Navy has requested for procurement in FY2019 would be the 29th and 30th boats in the class, and the first two to be covered under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for at least 10 Virginia-class submarines to be procured in FY2019-FY2023. The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2019 at $6,502.3 million (i.e., about $6.5 billion). The second of these two boats is to be the first Virginia-class boat built with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-long, midbody section equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads. The Navy plans to build all Virginia-class boats procured in FY2020 and subsequent years with the VPM, and the Navy's FY2019 budget submission shows that VPM-equipped Virginia-class boats in FY2020 and beyond have an estimated recurring unit procurement cost of about $3.2 billion in today's dollars. The two boats requested for procurement in FY2019 have received an estimated total of $2,128.9 million in prior-year ""regular"" advance procurement (AP) funding. (This figure is an estimate, because Congress has not yet completed action on the FY2018 Department of Defense appropriations act.) Based on this estimate, the Navy's proposed FY2019 budget requests the remaining $4,373.4 million in procurement funding needed to complete the boats' estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget also requests $1,810.9 million in ""regular"" AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal years, and $985.5 million in additional Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) AP funding for components of Virginia-class boats to be procured under the FY2019-FY2023 Virginia-class MYP contract, bringing the total amount of procurement, ""regular"" AP, and EOQ AP funding requested for the program in FY2019 to $7,169.8 million (i.e., about $7.2 billion), excluding outfitting and postdelivery costs. The Navy's force-level goal, released in December 2016, is to achieve and maintain a 355-ship fleet, including 66 SSNs. To increase the size of the SSN force toward the 66-boat goal, the FY2019 30-year shipbuilding plan includes 16 more SSNs than the Navy's previous (FY2017) 30-year shipbuilding plan. The first of the 16 additional SSNs is a second Virginia-class boat in FY2021. Under the Navy's FY2019 30-year shipbuilding plan, a 66-boat SSN force would be achieved in FY2048. CRS and CBO estimated in 2017 that adding even more SSNs to the earlier years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan could accelerate the attainment of a 66-boat force to as early as 2037. The Navy's FY2019 30-year shipbuilding plan shows options for adding another 12 SSNs to the 30-year plan, but only 3 of the 12 occur in the earlier years of the plan. From the mid-2020s through the early 2030s, the number of SSNs is projected to experience a valley or trough, reaching a minimum of 42 boats (i.e., 24 boats, or about 36%, less than the 66-boat force-level goal) in FY2028. This projected valley is a consequence of having procured a relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early years of the post-Cold War era. Some observers are concerned that this projected valley could lead to a period of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened conventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China. The projected SSN valley was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS reports and testimony every year since then. As one measure for mitigating this valley, the Navy's FY2019 budget submission proposes to refuel and extend the service life of one older Los Angeles (SSN-688) class submarine. The Navy states that this could become the first of as many as five Los Angeles-class SSNs to be refueled and have their service lives extended.",31,31 "Federal Workforce Flexibilities: A Side-by-Side Comparison of S. 129 (108th Congress) with Current Law. A bill related to the management of the federal workforce is being considered by the 108th Congress. S. 129, the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003, passed the Senate with an amendment by unanimous consent on April 8, 2004. In the House, the Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization forwarded S. 129 to the House Committee on Government Reform on May 18, 2004, after amending it by voice vote. On June 24, 2004, the House committee ordered the bill to be reported to the House of Representatives, after amending it by voice vote. The bill was introduced by Senator George Voinovich on January 9, 2003. A similar bill, H.R. 1601, the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003, was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Jo Ann Davis on April 3, 2003. S. 129, as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported to the House, would amend current law provisions on critical pay, civil service retirement system computation for part-time service, agency training, and annual leave. The bill also would amend current law provisions on recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention allowances (which would be renamed bonuses). As ordered to be reported to the House, S. 129 would amend the current 5 U.S.C. Sections 5753 and 5754 language on such bonuses and allowances. As passed by the Senate it would add new sections 5754a and 5754b on recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses to Title 5 United States Code. Therefore, if S. 129, as passed by the Senate, were enacted agencies would be able to use the current law provisions on recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention allowances at 5 U.S.C. Sections 5753 and 5754 and the enhanced authority for recruitment relocation, and retention bonuses proposed at 5 U.S.C. Sections 5754a and 5754b. S. 129, as ordered to be reported to the House, would amend current law provisions on pay administration. These amendments were included in S. 129, as introduced, but they were dropped during Senate committee markup and are not included in the Senate-passed version of the bill. Provisions that would amend current law on retirement service credit for cadet or midshipman service and compensatory time off for travel were added to S. 129 during Senate committee markup and are included in the legislation as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported to the House. Added during Senate Committee markup as well were provisions on Senior Executive Service authority for the White House Office of Administration that are in the Senate-passed bill, but are not in the legislation as ordered to be reported to the House. Other provisions that would have amended current law provisions relating to contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan, annuity commencement dates, and retirement for air traffic controllers were included in S. 129, as forwarded by the House Civil Service and Agency Organization Subcommittee to the House Government Reform Committee, but were removed during the full committee markup. This report compares each of the provisions in S. 129, as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported to the House, with current law.",58,58 Senate Leadership: Whip Organization. The whip system performs two primary functions: to take responsibility for the mobilization of party Members for key votes and to serve as a conduit for information between party leaders and party Members.,55,55 "Spain and Its Relations with the United States: In Brief. The United States and Spain have extensive cultural ties and a mutually beneficial economic relationship, and the two countries cooperate closely on numerous diplomatic and security issues. Spain has been a member of NATO since 1982 and a member of the European Union (EU) since 1986. Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, developments in Spain and its relations with the United States are of continuing interest to the U.S. Congress. Domestic Political and Economic Issues The government of Spain is led by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy of the center-right Popular Party (PP). Rajoy began his second term as prime minister in 2016 at the head of a minority government, after a 10-month political deadlock caused by two inconclusive general elections. He initially became prime minister after the PP won an absolute parliamentary majority in 2011. Economic conditions, austerity policies, and corruption scandals have fueled public backlash against Spain's political establishment in recent years. This dynamic fractured Spain's two-party system, dominated for more than 30 years by the PP and the center-left Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), with the emergence of two new parties, Ciudadanos and Podemos. Over the past several years, Spain's economy has experienced a relatively strong recovery, with growth averaging more than 3% annually, a decreasing government budget deficit, and stabilized financial conditions. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 plunged Spain into a prolonged recession and has had a lasting impact on the country. Unemployment has decreased to 15% after peaking at 26% in 2013. Catalonia Crisis A crisis over Catalan independence efforts has been the predominant issue in Spain since late 2017. Spain's central government invoked Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution to dissolve the regional assembly and executive and take direct control of the region after the Catalan parliament held a vote for independence in October 2017. The issue remains deadlocked after separatist parties retained a majority of seats in the regional parliament following a new regional election in December 2017. Spain has charged 13 separatist leaders with rebellion and misuse of public funds, offenses which could carry a lengthy prison sentence. Catalonia accounts for about 15% of Spain's population and one-fifth of its economy. Counterterrorism The United States and Spain cooperate closely on counterterrorism issues. Spanish authorities have dismantled numerous recruiting networks over the past several years, many of them based in Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish enclaves on the north coast of Africa. In 2015, the Spanish Parliament adopted new legislation to strengthen counterterrorism laws and police powers in response to the foreign fighter threat. U.S.-Spain Defense Relations Spain plays an important role in U.S. defense strategy for Europe and Africa. Four U.S. destroyers equipped with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system are based at Rota naval base, and Morón air base is the headquarters for a rapid reaction force of U.S. Marines that protects U.S. interests and personnel in North Africa. Spanish armed forces participate in numerous international peacekeeping and security operations, including the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, the international coalition countering the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence mission in Latvia, EU and NATO maritime security missions, and EU operations in the Sahel region. Spain's defense spending was cut during the economic crisis but has been increasing since 2015. With the acquisition of new Eurofighter combat aircraft nearly complete, additional spending is focused largely on planned naval acquisitions. U.S.-Spain Economic Relations Investment flows between the United States and Spain totaled more than $105 billion in 2016, and Spanish foreign direct investment in the United States has increased every year since 2002. Annual U.S.-Spain trade in goods and services totals nearly $40 billion. Approximately 1,100 U.S. firms operate subsidiaries and branches in Spain. Affiliates of Spanish companies account for approximately 83,000 jobs in the United States.",87,85 "Federal Lifeline Program: Frequently Asked Questions. The Federal Lifeline Program, established by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1985, is one of four programs supported under the Universal Service Fund. The Program was originally designed to assist eligible low-income households to subsidize the monthly service charges incurred for voice telephone usage and was limited to one fixed line per household. In 2005 the Program was modified to cover the choice between either a fixed line or a mobile/wireless option. Concern over the division between those who use and have access to broadband versus those who do not, known as the digital divide, prompted the FCC to once again modify the Lifeline program to cover access to broadband. On March 31, 2016, the FCC adopted an Order to expand the Lifeline Program to support mobile and fixed broadband Internet access services on a stand-alone basis, or with a bundled voice service. Households must meet a needs-based criteria for eligibility. The program provides assistance to only one line per household in the form of a monthly subsidy of, in most cases, $9.25. This subsidy solely covers costs associated with network access (minutes of use), not the costs associated with devices, and is given not to the subscriber, but to the household-selected service provider. This subsidy is then in turn passed on to the subscriber. The Lifeline program is available to eligible low-income consumers in every state, territory, commonwealth, and on tribal lands.",117,109 "Fact Sheet: Selected Highlights of H.R. 3979, the Carl Levin and Howard ""Buck"" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for FY2015. Following are selected highlights of S. 1847, the version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2015, agreed to on December 2, 2014, by negotiators for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. On May 22, 2014, by a vote of 325-98, the House passed H.R. 4435, a version of the FY2015 NDAA that had been reported by the House Armed Services Committee. On the same day, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported S. 2410, its version of the FY2015 NDAA. To expedite final action on the bill (since the Senate did not take up S. 2410), negotiators from the House and Senate drafted a compromise version of the FY2015 NDAA. For procedural reasons, this compromise version has been incorporated into the conference report on H.R. 3979, an unrelated bill. This CRS Fact Sheet, based on the draft explanatory statement of House and Senate negotiators, is intended as a time-urgent expedient to offer Members the best available information about the bill pending update of CRS Report R43788, Defense: FY2015 Authorization and Appropriations, by Pat Towell.",25,25 "Export-Import Bank: Reauthorization. This report discusses the ongoing debate regarding the Export-Import Bank of the United States, a federal government corporation which is the the official export credit agency (ECA) of the U.S. Government.",49,49 "Net Operating Losses: Proposed Extension of Carryback Period. This report explains the current law regarding the tax treatment of net operating losses (NOLs). In addition, this report highlights a number of policy considerations relating to the extension of the NOL carryback period.",102,102 "U.S. Postal Service Workforce Size and Employment Categories, FY1995-FY2014. This report provides data from the past 20 years on the size and composition of the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS's) workforce. Reforms to the size and composition of the workforce have been an integral part of USPS's strategy to reduce costs and regain financial solvency, particularly between FY2007 and FY2014. Since 2007, USPS has experienced significant revenue losses that have affected its ability to manage its expenses. Personnel costs are one of the primary drivers of USPS's operating expenses. As such, USPS has employed strategies to reform the size and composition of its workforce in an effort to cut personnel costs, primarily through attrition and separation incentives and increased use of lower-cost employees. These strategies reduced personnel expenses between FY2013 and FY2014. The sustainability of these reduced expenses and their overall impact on USPS's ability to regain financial solvency, however, is unclear. The size of the USPS workforce has declined in the past 20 years. The number of employees has dropped by 257,095 (29.4%) in the past 20 years, from 874,972 in FY1995 to 617,877 in FY2014. USPS, however, had 163 more employees at the end of FY2014 than it did at the end of FY2013. Declines in workforce size between FY2010 and FY2014 were driven, in part, by USPS's efforts to reduce its workforce size through attrition and separation incentives. Between FY2010 and FY2014, 55,473 career employees accepted a separation incentive to retire or resign early. On January 9, 2015, USPS instituted a reduction in force for 249 postmasters who did not accept a separation incentive offered in 2014. The composition of USPS's workforce has also changed over the past two decades. USPS categorizes its workforce into two types of employees: career and non-career. Career employees serve in permanent positions on a full-time or part-time basis and typically receive full federal benefits. Non-career employees serve in time-limited or otherwise temporary positions and can often perform the full range of duties of career counterparts at lower wage rates, which might lower personnel costs. USPS has increased the number of non-career employees in an effort to reduce personnel costs, particularly since FY2011. Between FY2011 and FY2014, the number of non-career employees increased by 46.1%, from 88,699 to 129,577 employees. The influx in non-career employees since FY2011 is primarily attributable to the establishment of three new non-career positions: postal support employees, city carrier assistants, and mail handler assistants. Labor union contracts governing these positions, which went into effect in 2011 and 2013, effectively raised the total number of non-career employees that can comprise the USPS workforce. Career employees, however, continued to comprise the majority of the total workforce in FY2014 (79%). This report will be updated as events warrant.",62,62 "Federal Research and Development: Budgeting and Priority-Setting Issues, 109th Congress. This report summarizes current research and development (R&D) priority-setting issues—in terms of expenditures, agency, topical, or field-specific priorities, and organizational arrangements to determine priorities. Federal R&D funding priorities reflect presidential policies and national needs. Defense R&D predominated in the 1980s, decreasing to about 50% of federal R&D in the 1990s. In non-defense R&D, space R&D was important in the 1960s as the nation sought to compete with the Soviet Union, energy R&D was a priority during the energy-short 1970s, and, since the 1980s, health R&D has predominated in non-defense science. This Administration's R&D priorities include weapons development, homeland security, space launch vehicles, and, beginning in 2006, more support for physical sciences and engineering. For FY2007, R&D was requested at almost $137 billion of budget authority, about 1.8% more than enacted in FY2006. The request would have increased funding for physical sciences and engineering programs in the National Science Foundation, the Department of Energy's Office of Science, and National Institute of Standards and Technology laboratories as part of the President's American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI) to enhance innovation. Funding for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's R&D would have increased by about 8% largely to develop human space vehicles. For FY2007, two appropriations bills were signed, the rest of the government is operating on a continuing resolution through February 2007, but likely to continue throughout FY2007, funding domestic agencies at FY2006 levels. Appropriations action increased support for defense development and decreases homeland security R&D funding. The latest estimated expenditure for national (public and private) R&D is $312.1 billion for FY2004. Federal R&D expenditures, at $93.4 billion, have grown, but have declined to 30% of total national R&D spending. During the 109th Congress, some proposals to increase incentives for industrial R&D included H.R. 1454, H.R. 1736, S. 14, S. 627, S. 2199, and S. 2720. H.R. 6111, passed in both Houses, extended the R&D tax credit for two years and widened eligibility for the credit. The FY2007 budget would have emphasized three interagency R&D initiatives: networking and information technology, climate change science, and nanotechnology. Proposals to coordinate R&D include a continuing priority-setting mechanism, a cabinet-level S&&T body functional R&&D budgeting and reestablishment of a technology assessment function. The Administration opposes R&D earmarking, estimated at $2.4 billion in budget authority for FY2006. Although the Administration is using the Government Performance and Results Act and the Program Assessment Rating Tool for R&D budgeting, some critics say better data and concepts are needed before performance budgeting can be used to identify R&D priorities.",111,111 "U.S. Family-Based Immigration Policy. Family reunification has historically been a key principle underlying U.S. immigration policy. It is embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which specifies numerical limits for five family-based immigration categories, as well as a per-country limit on total family-based immigration. The five categories include immediate relatives (spouses, minor unmarried children, and parents) of U.S. citizens and four other family-based categories that vary according to individual characteristics such as the legal status of the petitioning U.S.-based relative, and the age, family relationship, and marital status of the prospective immigrant. Of the 1,183,505 foreign nationals admitted to the United States in FY2016 as lawful permanent residents (LPRs), 804,793, or 68%, were admitted on the basis of family ties. Of the family-based immigrants admitted in FY2016, 70% were admitted as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Many of the 1,183,505 immigrants were initially admitted on a nonimmigrant (temporary) visa and became immigrants by converting or ""adjusting"" their status to a lawful permanent resident. The proportion of family-based immigrants who adjusted their immigration status while residing in the United States (34%) was substantially less than that of family-based immigrants who had their immigration petitions processed while living abroad (66%), although such percentages varied considerably among the five family-based immigration categories. Since FY2000, increasing numbers of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens have accounted for the growth in family-based immigration. In FY2016, related (derivative) immigrants who accompanied or later followed principal (qualifying) immigrants accounted for 9% of all family-based immigration. In recent years, Mexico, the Philippines, China, India, and the Dominican Republic have sent the most family-based immigrants to the United States. Each year, the number of foreign nationals petitioning for LPR status through family-sponsored preference categories exceeds the numerical limits of legal immigrant visas. As a result, a visa queue has accumulated of foreign nationals who qualify as immigrants under the INA but who must wait for a visa to immigrate to the United States. The visa queue is not a processing backlog but, rather, the number of persons approved for visas not yet available due to INA-specified numerical limits. As of November 1, 2017, the visa queue numbered 3.95 million persons. Every month, the Department of State (DOS) issues its Visa Bulletin, which lists ""cut-off dates"" for each numerically limited family-based immigration category. Cut-off dates indicate when petitions that are currently being processed for a numerically limited visa were initially approved. For most countries, cut-off dates range between 23 months and 13.5 years ago. For countries that send the most immigrants, the range expands to between 2 and 23 years ago. Long-standing debates over the level of annual permanent immigration regularly place scrutiny on family-based immigration and revive debates over whether its current proportion of total lawful permanent immigration is appropriate. Proposals to overhaul family-based immigration were made by two congressionally mandated commissions in 1980 and 1995-1997. More recent legislative proposals to revise family-based immigration include S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act in the 113th Congress and S. 1720, the Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy (RAISE) Act in the 115th Congress. Those who favor expanding family-based immigration by increasing the annual numeric limits point to the visa queue of approved prospective immigrants who must wait years separated from their U.S.-based family members until they receive a visa. Others question whether the United States has an obligation to reconstitute families of immigrants beyond their nuclear families and favor reducing permanent immigration by eliminating certain family-based preference categories. Arguments favoring restricting certain categories of family-based immigration reiterate earlier recommendations made by congressionally mandated immigration reform commissions.",76,76 "The Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008: An Overview. In December of 2008, Congress unanimously enacted the Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008 (WRERA) (P.L. 110-458), which makes several technical corrections to the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-280) and contains provisions designed to help pension plans and plan participants weather the current economic downturn. This report highlights the provisions of WRERA relating to the economic crisis, such as the temporary waiver of required minimum distributions and provisions that temporarily relax certain pension plan funding requirements. This report also discusses certain technical corrections to the Pension Protection Act made by WRERA, and certain other notable provisions of the Act affecting retirement plans and benefits.",88,88 "Department of Education Final Rules for Postsecondary Education Programs That Prepare Students for Gainful Employment in a Recognized Occupation. Some types of postsecondary education programs at institutions of higher education that are eligible for participation in the federal student aid programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA), face additional conditions for Title IV aid eligibility. These programs, which are offered by public and private not-for-profit institutions of higher education and postsecondary vocational institutions, and by for-profit proprietary institutions of higher education, must prepare students for gainful employment in recognized occupations. For many years, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) had not promulgated regulations that explicitly defined what it means for a program to be preparing students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation. To address concerns about the quality of programs that prepare students for gainful employment and concerns about the level of student loan debt assumed by students who attend these programs, ED issued new rules on gainful employment in late 2010 and early 2011. The final rules established a series of reporting and disclosure requirements for institutions of higher education that offer gainful employment programs and additional requirements for institutions that add new gainful employment programs. The rules also established a series of three performance metrics designed to measure how effectively completers of gainful employment programs repay the student loans they borrow to attend these programs, and the relationship between their student loan debt and their earnings. One metric, a loan repayment rate, was designed to measure how effectively students who are borrowers of federal student loans and who attended a gainful employment program repay the loans they borrowed to attend the program. Two additional metrics—an earnings rate and a discretionary income rate—are debt-to-earnings measures and were designed to measure the proportion of students who complete a gainful employment program whose combined federal and non-federal student loan debt exceeds certain percentage thresholds of their earnings. A program failing to pass at least one of the three performance metrics for any three out of the most recently completed four fiscal years would lose eligibility to participate in HEA, Title IV programs. The Department of Education's efforts to establish new rules on gainful employment were very contentious. When ED published proposed rules in the summer of 2010, it received an unprecedented volume of comments. Overall, ED received more than 90,000 comments, with approximately three-quarters opposed to the rules and one-quarter in support. Many were concerned that the new rules would increase regulatory burden and potential adverse effects from programs losing eligibility to participate in HEA, Title IV federal student aid programs. Others supported the regulation of gainful employment programs, particularly with regard to the student loan debt of students who attend them. Prior to the effective date of the gainful employment regulations, they were challenged in court by the Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities. On June 30, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a decision that vacated most aspects of the regulations and remanded them to ED for further action. At present, only the disclosure requirements remain in effect.",34,34 "Judge Sonia Sotomayor: Analysis of Selected Opinions. In May 2009, Supreme Court Justice David Souter announced his intention to retire from the Supreme Court. Several weeks later, President Obama nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor, who served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to fill his seat. To fulfill its constitutional ""advice and consent"" function, the Senate considered Judge Sotomayor's extensive record—compiled from years as a lawyer, prosecutor, district court judge, and appellate court judge—to better understand her legal approaches and judicial philosophy. On August 6, the Senate confirmed Justice Sotomayor by a vote of 68-31, and she was sworn in on August 8. This report provides an analysis of selected opinions authored by Judge Sotomayor during her tenure as a judge on the Second Circuit. Discussions of the selected opinions are grouped according to various topics of legal significance. As a group, the opinions belie easy categorization along any ideological spectrum. However, it is possible to draw some conclusions regarding Judge Sotomayor's judicial approach, both within some specific issue areas and in general. Perhaps the most consistent characteristic of Judge Sotomayor's approach as an appellate judge has been an adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis (i.e., the upholding of past judicial precedents). Other characteristics appear to include what many would describe as a careful application of particular facts at issue in a case and a dislike for situations in which the court might be seen as overstepping its judicial role. It is difficult to determine the extent to which Judge Sotomayor's style as a judge on the Second Circuit will predict her style as a Supreme Court justice. However, as has been the case historically with other nominees, some of her approaches may be enduring characteristics.",92,92 "Economic Development Administration: Reauthorization and Funding Issues in the 112th Congress. The primary focus of the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration (EDA) is to help regions experiencing long-term economic distress or sudden economic dislocation attract private-sector capital and create higher-skill, higher-wage jobs through investments in public infrastructure, the provision of technical assistance and research, and the development and implementation of Comprehensive Economic Development Strategies (CEDS). EDA was created with the passage of the Public Works and Economic Development Act (PWEDA) of 1965, P.L. 89-136 (79 Stat. 552, 42 U.S.C. §3121). The 112th Congress may consider legislation to reauthorize and amend PWEDA, whose statutory authority expired on September 30, 2008. As part of those deliberations, Congress may consider a number of changes in the structure of EDA assistance programs. At least one bill, S. 782, the Economic Development Revitalization Act, has been reported by a congressional committee. The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works reported the bill on May 2, 2011. The bill includes several provisions intended to encourage regional and interagency cooperation, expand the role of regional Economic Development Districts, and modify the factors used to determine the federal share of EDA-funded projects and activities. The bill also includes proposals that would address a number of programmatic concerns raised by grant recipients, including provisions that would grant eligible entities, including EDDs, administering revolving loan funds (RLF) greater flexibility in the management and conversion of RLF assets for other EDA-eligible activities, and change the current requirements governing the transfer of federal interest in EDA-financed construction projects in an effort to encourage local flexibility in the use of EDA funds. The Senate began consideration of S. 782 on June 8, 2011. For six days—over a two-week period that ended on June 21, 2011—the Senate debated the bill. In an effort to end debate and bring the bill to a floor vote, a cloture motion was filed on June 16, 2011. Successful adoption of the cloture motion would have limited time for debate on the bill, prohibited consideration of non-germane amendments, and allowed the Senate to vote on passage of S. 782. On June 21, 2011, the chamber rejected the cloture motion, 49-51. Currently, the bill has been set aside and may be considered at a future date in the 112th Congress. The reauthorization of EDA and its programs will take place within the context of more prominent policy debates regarding efforts to reduce federal spending to address growing budget deficits and the national debt, concerns about the duplication, fragmentation, and effectiveness of federal economic development assistance, and efforts to support economic recovery and job creation following the worst economic recession since the Great Depression. On November 18, 2011, the President signed into law P.L. 112-55, which appropriated $457.5 million in EDA assistance and salaries and expenses, including $200 million in supplemental disaster assistance for states and communities in presidentially declared disaster areas. For FY2013, excluding supplemental disaster assistance, the President has proposed to reduce program funds by $38 million to $220 million, including $182 million for program activities and $38 million for salaries and expenses. A bill, S. 2323, reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee recommends $200 million for EDA activities while a bill reported by the House would appropriate $182 million for EDA programs for FY2013. This report will be updated as events warrant.",99,99 """Sensitive But Unclassified"" Information and Other Controls: Policy and Options for Scientific and Technical Information. Providing access to scientific and technical information (S&T) for legitimate uses while protecting it from potential terrorists poses difficult policy choices. Federally funded, extramural academic research is to be ""classified"" if it poses a security threat, otherwise, it is to be ""unrestricted."" Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, controls increasingly have been placed on some unclassified research and S&T information, including that used to inform decision making and citizen oversight. These controls include ""sensitive but unclassified"" (SBU) labels, restrictive contract clauses, visa controls, controlled laboratories, and wider legal restrictions on access to some federal biological, transportation, critical infrastructure, geospatial, environmental impact, and nuclear information. Some professional groups have supported voluntary controls on the conduct or publication of sensitive research. Federal agencies do not have uniform definitions of SBU or consistent policies to safeguard or release it, raising questions about how to identify SBU information, especially S&&T information how to keep it from terrorists, while allowing access for those who need to use it, and how to develop uniform nondisclosure policies and penalties. On December 16, 2005, President Bush instructed federal agencies to standardize procedures to designate, mark, and handle SBU information, and to forward recommendations for government-wide standards to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, sent to Congress in November 2006, reports that final action will occur during the lst quarter of CY2006. Following the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration issued guidance that reversed the Clinton Administration's ""presumption of disclosure"" approach to releasing information under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and cautioned agencies to consider withholding SBU information if there was a ""sound legal basis"" to do so. Some agencies contend that SBU information is exempt from disclosure under FOIA, even though such information per se is not exempt under FOIA. The 2002 enactment of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) rendered moot the definition of SBU that some agencies had used since the passage of the Computer Security Act of 1987, which identified sensitive information by content. FISMA requires agencies to categorize the criticality and sensitivity of all information according to the security control objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability across a range of risk levels and to use safeguards based on risk of release. Many federal agencies have not yet fully implemented these new procedures. During the 109th Congress, P.L. 109-90 and P.L. 109-295 focused on management, oversight, and appropriate use of the sensitive security information (SSI) category. Legislative proposals focused on standardizing concepts of ""sensitive"" information, modifying penalties for disclosure, and clarifying FOIA. During the 110th Congress, additional topics likely to be controversial include limiting the number of persons who can designate SBU, widening the use of risk-based approaches to control, centralizing review, handling, and appeals, and evaluating the impact of federal policies on nongovernmental professional groups' prepublication review and self-policing of sensitive research. This report will be updated as necessary.",19,27 "Trafficking in Persons and U.S. Foreign Policy Responses in the 114th Congress. Trafficking in persons, or human trafficking, refers to the subjection of men, women, and children to exploitative conditions that may be tantamount to slavery. Reports suggest that human trafficking is a global phenomenon, victimizing millions of people each year and contributing to a multi-billion dollar criminal industry. Common forms of human trafficking include trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation, forced labor, and debt bondage. Other forms of human trafficking include trafficking for domestic servitude and the use of children in armed conflict (e.g., child soldiers). Human trafficking is a centuries-old problem that, despite international and U.S. efforts to eliminate it, continues to occur in virtually every country in the world. The modern manifestation of the human trafficking problem is driven by gaps in the enforcement of anti-trafficking laws and regulations and the willingness of some labor and service providers to violate such laws in order to fulfill international demand. Such demand is particularly concentrated among industries and economic sectors that are low-skill and labor-intensive. Human trafficking is an international and cross-cutting policy problem that affects a range of major national security, human rights, criminal justice, social, economic, migration, gender, public health, and labor issues. The U.S. government and successive Congresses have long played a leading role in international efforts to combat human trafficking. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA, Division A of P.L. 106-386, as amended) and its reauthorizations are the cornerstone legislative vehicles for current U.S. policy to combat international human trafficking. Since enactment of the TVPA in 2000, Congress has remained active on international human trafficking issues, particularly with appropriations identified for anti-trafficking assistance purposes, proposed legislation related to the TVPA, and other anti-trafficking initiatives. Periodic oversight hearings have focused in particular on the State Department's annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, a detailed country-by-country ranking and analysis of government efforts to achieve congressionally established minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking. Although there is widespread support among policy makers for U.S. anti-trafficking goals, ongoing reports of continued trafficking worldwide raise questions regarding whether sufficient progress has been made to deter and ultimately eliminate the problem. This report provides an overview of recent global trends and U.S. foreign policy responses to address human trafficking. The report focuses in particular on efforts conducted by the State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP) and the President's Interagency Task Force (PITF) on human trafficking, as well as discussion of the 2016 TIP Report. An Appendix includes the status of legislation introduced in the 114th Congress on international dimensions of human trafficking. Drawing on CRS Report R42497, Trafficking in Persons: International Dimensions and Foreign Policy Issues for Congress, this report reflects policy activity in the 114th Congress and will be updated to reflect international trafficking developments through the end of the second session..",93,93 "War in Afghanistan: Campaign Progress, Political Strategy, and Issues for Congress. This is a critical time for U.S. efforts in the war in Afghanistan. U.S. military engagement beyond December 2014, when the current NATO mission ends, depends on the achievement of a U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), specifying the status of U.S. forces. Afghan President Hamid Karzai threw the BSA process into confusion by introducing new terms and conditions after a deal had been reached by negotiators. Even if a BSA is reached, U.S. decisions are still pending regarding the scope, scale, and timeline for any post-2014 U.S. force presence in Afghanistan. President Obama has indicated U.S. readiness, in principle, to maintain a small force focused on counter-terrorism and supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). While troop levels tend to steal the headlines, more fundamentally at stake is what it would take to ensure the long-term protection of U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the region. Arguably, the United States may have a number of different interests at stake in the region: countering al Qaeda and other violent extremists, preventing nuclear proliferation, preventing nuclear confrontation between nuclear-armed states, standing up for American values, including basic human rights and the protection of women, and preserving the United States' ability to exercise leadership on the world stage. At issue is the relative priority of these interests, what it would take in practice to ensure that they are protected, and their relative importance compared to other compelling security concerns around the globe. U.S. efforts in Afghanistan include an array of activities: prosecuting the fight on the ground, in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), to counter the insurgency, supporting Afghanistan's political process, including the presidential elections scheduled to be held in April 2014, providing assistance to help Afghans craft and grow a viable economy, and facilitating Afghan-led efforts to achieve a high-level political settlement with the Taliban. At issue is whether these are the activities best suited to achieve a lasting outcome that protects U.S. interests, as well as how these activities might most constructively inform each other. In 2013, most Afghan and ISAF commanders suggested that the campaign on the ground was gaining traction, reflected in the successful security transition to Afghan lead responsibility for security and in improvements in the ANSF, in the diminished strength of the insurgency, and in the successful adaptation by coalition forces to new roles and missions. Yet most observers agree that the long-term sustainability of campaign gains—and the protection of U.S. interests—would require major changes in the broader strategic landscape. Critical requirements would include sufficiently responsive Afghan governance, a viable economy that offers Afghans sufficient opportunities, a regional context that supports rather than undermines Afghan stability, and a conclusion to the war broadly acceptable to the Afghan people. For Congress, next steps in the war in Afghanistan, including near-term policy decisions by the U.S. and Afghan governments, raise several basic oversight issues: the costs associated with a continued U.S. force presence in Afghanistan, the challenges of ""re-setting"" the force and restoring its readiness as it comes home from Afghanistan, accountability for sound strategy that protects U.S. interests, integration of effort across U.S. government agencies in support of broad U.S. political strategy for Afghanistan, and appropriate prioritization of this effort compared to competing national security exigencies.",24,24 "Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities are not fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic continues to be of congressional interest, particularly as the 110th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations via H.R. 1 and S. 4.",22,119 "Bolivia: Political and Economic Developments and Relations with the United States. Bolivia has experienced a period of political volatility, with the country having had six presidents since 2001. Evo Morales, an indigenous leader and head of Bolivia's coca growers' union, and his party, the leftist Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), won a convincing victory in the December 18, 2005, presidential election with 54% of the votes. Early in his term, President Morales moved to decriminalize coca cultivation and nationalized the country's natural gas industry. His efforts to reform the Bolivian constitution have, until recently, been stymied by a strong opposition movement led by the leaders (prefects) of Bolivia's wealthy eastern provinces who are seeking greater regional autonomy. In December 2007, the Constituent Assembly elected in mid-2006 passed a draft constitution without the presence of opposition delegates. In late August 2008, President Morales, buoyed by the strong support he received in a national recall referendum held on August 10, 2008, proposed to convoke a referendum on the draft constitution in December 2008. He later agreed to seek congressional approval for that referendum. Several opposition prefects were angered by Morales' proposal, and launched protests and blockades, which turned violent in mid-September. On October 20, 2008, after multiparty negotiations on the draft constitution's text, the Bolivian Congress approved legislation convoking a constitutional referendum on January 25, 2009. The new constitution was approved by a 61% to 39% vote following a peaceful election. Four eastern provinces, however, all voted against the constitution suggesting a strong possibility of continued opposition and discord. U.S.-Bolivian relations have been strained by the Morales government's drug policy and its increasing ties with Venezuela. Bilateral relations hit their lowest point in recent memory on September 10, 2008, when President Morales accused the U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia of supporting opposition forces and expelled him from the country. The U.S. government responded by expelling Bolivia's U.S. Ambassador. On September 16, 2008, President Bush designated Bolivia as a country that had failed to live up to its obligations under international narcotics agreements. That decision was closely followed by a Bush Administration proposal to suspend Bolivia's trade preferences under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA). On November 1, 2008, Bolivian President Morales announced an indefinite suspension of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operations in Bolivia after accusing some DEA agents of espionage. Concerns regarding Bolivia in the 110th Congress focused largely on counternarcotics and trade issues. Bolivia received an estimated $99.5 million in U.S. foreign aid in FY2008, including roughly $47 million in counternarcotics assistance, significantly lower than in previous years. An enacted continuing resolution H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 will provide funding for U.S. programs in Bolivia at FY2008 levels through March 6, 2009. In October 2008, Congress enacted legislation to extend ATPA trade preferences for Bolivia until June 30, 2009 (P.L. 110-436). However, on November 25, 2008, President Bush announced his decision to suspend Bolivia's ATPA trade preferences effective December 15, citing Bolivia's failure to cooperate with the United States on counternarcotics efforts. The 111th Congress is likely to continue to focus on trade and drug issues as these concerns remain central to U.S. relations with Bolivia.",85,85 "House Committee Jurisdiction and Referral: Rules and Practice. Committee jurisdiction is determined by a variety of factors. Paramount is House Rule X, which designates the subject matter within the purview of each standing committee. House Rule X, however, is both largely broad and the product of an era in which governmental activity was not so extensive and relations among policies not so intertwined as now. Most of Rule X was drawn from 19th and 20th century precedents and codified in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Although the rule underwent modest revisions in 1974 and 1980, as well as more extensive changes in the 104th and 109th Congresses, topic omissions and a lack of clarity, as well as overlaps among committees in areas of jurisdiction, still exist. Accordingly, the formal provisions of the rule are supplemented by an intricate series of precedents and informal agreements governing the referral of legislation.",55,55 "What Happens to SCHIP After March 31, 2009?. A report about the effects of the end of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).",70,70 Protecting Civil Aviation from Cyberattacks. This report briefly discusses cyber-security issues in civil aviation. unclear. A recent probe into alleged hacking incidents unfolded just weeks after the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) alerted airlines to be on the lookout for passengers trying to tap into aircraft electronics and for evidence of tampering or network intrusions.,119,119 "H-2A and H-2B Temporary Worker Visas: Policy and Related Issues. Under current law, certain foreign workers, sometimes referred to as guest workers, may be admitted to the United States to perform temporary service or labor under two temporary worker visas: the H-2A visa for agricultural workers and the H-2B visa for nonagricultural workers. Both programs are administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Labor (DOL). The H-2A and H-2B programs—and guest worker programs broadly—strive both to be responsive to legitimate employer needs for temporary labor and to provide adequate protections for U.S. and foreign temporary workers. There is much debate, however, about how to strike the appropriate balance between these goals. Bringing workers into the United States under either the H-2A or H-2B program is a multiagency process involving DOL, DHS, and the Department of State (DOS). As an initial step in the process, a prospective H-2A or H-2B employer must apply for DOL labor certification to ensure that U.S. workers are not available for the jobs in question and that the hiring of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. After receiving labor certification, the employer can submit an application, known as a petition, to DHS to bring in foreign workers. If the application is approved, a foreign worker who is abroad can then go to a U.S. embassy or consulate to apply for an H-2A or H-2B nonimmigrant visa from DOS. If the visa application is approved, the worker is issued a visa that he or she can use to apply for admission to the United States at a port of entry. Major guest worker reform legislation was last considered in the 113th Congress. Since then, guest worker bills typically have proposed to change particular aspects of the existing H-2A and H-2B visas. Legislative action in recent years has focused on the H-2B visa, specifically the statutory numerical limitation on the visa and H-2B regulatory provisions. Regarding the H-2B numerical limitation, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) provided that a returning H-2B worker who had been counted against the statutory cap in FY2013, FY2014, or FY2015 would not be counted again in FY2016. This provision expired at the end of FY2016. For FY2017, related language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) provides for the issuance of H-2B visas beyond the statutory limit under certain conditions. Guest worker proposals may contain provisions on a range of component policy issues. Key policy considerations for Congress include the labor market test to determine whether U.S. workers are available for the positions, required wages, and enforcement. The issue of unauthorized workers also arises in connection with guest worker programs.",76,76 "NATO's Wales Summit: Outcomes and Key Challenges. On September 4-5, the leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) 28 member states met in Wales for the alliance's 2014 summit. This was their first meeting since Russia began providing large-scale military support to separatist forces fighting in Ukraine, and their last before the planned completion by the end of 2014 of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, the longest and most ambitious operation in NATO history. As such, some analysts portrayed the summit as an opportunity to consider a possible strategic shift for NATO, away from the broad, ""out of area"" focus embodied by the Afghanistan mission, toward a more narrow focus on territorial defense and deterrence, largely in response to a resurgent Russia. Although the allies did not make such decisive declarations, summit deliberations did center largely on responding to Russian aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere in the region. Summit outcomes centered on three main areas: (1) enhancing allied readiness and collective defense in response to Russian aggression, (2) increasing defense spending and boosting military capabilities, and (3) boosting NATO support for partner countries outside the alliance, including through a new ""Defense Capacity Building Initiative."" The allies also marked the planned withdrawal at the end of 2014 of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and discussed a non-combat security sector training mission in the country expected to begin in 2015. The cornerstone of NATO's new collective defense initiative is a ""Readiness Action Plan"" intended to enable a continuous NATO military presence on the alliance's periphery, including in its easternmost member states. This includes enhanced troop rotations and military exercises in Central and Eastern Europe and establishment of a high readiness force able to deploy within a few days. Although NATO leaders have characterized the envisioned rotational troop deployments in Central and Eastern Europe as continuous, they say the deployments will not amount to a permanent NATO military presence. Some allied governments in the region, including Poland and the Baltic states, have called for larger, permanent NATO deployments. These are opposed by member states concerned about the possible negative consequences of longer-lasting militarization in the region. In Wales, the allies also sought to address widespread concerns regarding a long and ongoing decline in European defense spending—in 2013, only four allies met the alliance's target to spend 2% of GDP on defense. NATO leaders committed to halting any further decline in defense spending and pledged to aim to reach the 2% target within a decade. These declarations fell short of the shorter-term, binding commitments reportedly sought by the United States and the NATO Secretary General. A top U.S. Administration priority for the summit was to secure allied commitments to increase defense spending, enhance military capabilities, and boost contributions to NATO defense initiatives in Europe. In addition, President Obama sought to reassure European allies, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, that the United States remains prepared, capable, and willing to honor its collective defense commitments in Europe. The Administration also used the summit to gain commitments from other governments to join ongoing efforts to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Although a group of allies agreed to join these efforts, all ruled out deploying ground forces, and NATO as a whole did not commit to any new, substantive engagement in the region. Congress can continue to play an important role in guiding the U.S. and NATO response to Russian aggression in Ukraine and in addressing broader concerns regarding NATO's future. This includes consideration of the Administration's request for $925 million to fund a proposed European Reassurance Initiative. Many Members of Congress have consistently called on NATO's European allies to enhance their contributions to NATO collective defense efforts. They have also advocated a more proactive NATO enlargement policy, which they argue would send an important signal to aspiring members that NATO's ""open door"" policy will not be scaled back in the face of Russian opposition. The proposed Forging Peace through Strength in Ukraine and the Transatlantic Alliance Act (H.R. 4433), for example, calls for additional NATO and U.S. military assistance to Ukraine and calls for immediate NATO membership for Montenegro and the granting of a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia. This report provides an overview of the summit's main agenda items and outcomes, highlighting key challenges, U.S. policy priorities, and potential issues for Congress. For more on the situation in Ukraine and NATO's response, see CRS Report R43478, NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe, coordinated by Paul Belkin, and CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel.",21,21 "The Congressional Arts Caucus and the Congressional Art Competition: History and Current Practice. Sponsored by the Congressional Arts Caucus, and known in recent years as ""An Artistic Discovery,"" the Congressional Art Competition is open to high school students nationwide. Begun in 1982, the competition, based in congressional districts, provides the opportunity for Members of Congress to encourage and recognize the artistic talents of their young constituents. Since its inception, more than 650,000 high school students nationwide have been involved in the program. Each year, the art of one student per participating congressional district is selected to represent the district. The culmination of the competition is the yearlong display of winning artwork in the Cannon House Office Building tunnel as well as on the House of Representatives' website. This report provides a brief history of the Congressional Arts Caucus and the Congressional Art Competition. It also provides a history of sponsorship and support for the caucus and the annual competition. The report includes copies of the original correspondence establishing the competition, a sample competition announcement, sample guidelines and required forms for the competition, and a chronological list of congressional co-chairs.",55,55 "What Effects Would the Expiration of the 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts Have on the Economy?. In 2001 and 2003, Congress enacted major tax cuts (popularly referred to as the ""Bush tax cuts""), the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. Congress is currently debating whether to extend some or all of these tax cuts that are scheduled to expire at the end of 2010. This report discusses the two main economic arguments against allowing the tax cuts to expire as scheduled, using historical evidence and by examining the current economic environment.",102,102 "The Congressional Review Act: Determining Which ""Rules"" Must Be Submitted to Congress. The Congressional Review Act (CRA) allows Congress to review certain types of federal agency actions that fall under the statutory category of ""rules."" The CRA requires that agencies report their rules to Congress and provides special procedures under which Congress can consider legislation to overturn those rules. A joint resolution of disapproval will become effective once both houses of Congress pass a joint resolution and it is signed by the President, or if Congress overrides the President's veto. The CRA generally adopts a broad definition of the word ""rule"" from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), defining a rule as ""the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency."" The CRA, however, provides three exceptions to this broad definition any rule of particular applicability, including a rule that approves or prescribes for the future rates, wages, prices, services, or allowances therefor, corporate or financial structures, reorganizations, mergers, or acquisitions thereof, or accounting practices or disclosures bearing on any of the foregoing any rule relating to agency management or personnel, or any rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice that does not substantially affect the rights or obligations of non-agency parties. The class of rules the CRA covers is broader than the category of rules that are subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements. As such, some agency actions, such as guidance documents, that are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures may still be considered rules under the CRA and thus could be overturned using the CRA's procedures. The effect of Congress disapproving a rule that is not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking may be subject to debate, given that such rules are generally viewed to lack any legal effect in the first place. Nonetheless, the CRA does encompass some such rules, as highlighted by the recent enactment of a CRA resolution overturning a bulletin from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that was not subject to the notice-and-comment procedures. Even if an agency action falls under the CRA's definition of ""rule,"" however, the expedited procedures for considering legislation to overturn the rule only become available when the agency submits the rule to Congress. In many cases in which agencies take actions that fall under the scope of a ""rule"" but have not gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, agencies fail to submit those rules. Thus, questions have arisen as to how Members can avail themselves of the CRA's special fast-track procedures if the agency has not submitted the action to Congress. To protect its prerogative to review agency rules under the CRA, Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have developed an ad hoc process in which Members can request that GAO provide a formal legal opinion on whether a particular agency action qualifies as a rule under the CRA. If GAO concludes that the action in question can be considered a rule under the CRA, Congress has treated the publication of the GAO opinion in the Congressional Record as constructive submission of the rule. In other words, an affirmative opinion from GAO can allow Congress to use the CRA procedures to consider legislation overturning an agency action despite the agency not submitting that action to Congress.",55,55 "National Security Space Launch at a Crossroads. The United States is in the midst of making significant changes in how best to pursue an acquisition strategy that would ensure continued access to space for national security missions. The current strategy for the EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) program dates from the 1990s and has since been revised a few times. The program has been dogged by perennial concerns over cost and competition. Those same concerns are a major impetus for change today. The EELV program stands at a crossroads today. Factors that prompted the initial EELV effort in 1994 are once again manifest—significant increases in launch costs, procurement concerns, and concerns about competition. In addition, a long-standing undercurrent of concern over U.S. reliance on a Russian rocket engine (RD-180) for critical national security space launches on one of the primary EELV rockets was exacerbated by the Russian backlash over U.S. sanctions against Russian actions in Ukraine. Moreover, significant overall EELV program cost increases and unresolved questions over individual launch costs, along with legal challenges to the Air Force EELV program by SpaceX, have contributed to Congress recently taking legislative action that has significantly affected the EELV program. Efforts by the Obama Administration and the Air Force to work with Congress on changing the EELV strategy have been deemed insufficient by those in Congress eager to proceed more quickly and definitively. The Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) have argued for a slower, more measured transition to replace the RD-180. Although some in Congress have pressed for a more flexible transition to replace the RD-180 and possibly allow for development of a new launch vehicle, others in Congress have sought legislation that would move the transition process forward more quickly with a focus on developing an alternative U.S. rocket engine. This debate over how best to proceed with NSS launch has been a leading legislative priority in the defense bills over the past few years and is likely to continue to be so throughout the coming year. Transitioning away from the RD-180 to a domestic U.S. alternative would likely involve technical, program, and schedule risk. A combination of factors over the next several years, as a worst-case scenario, could leave the United States in a situation where some of its national security space payloads would not have a certified launcher available. Even with a smooth, on-schedule transition away from the RD-180 to an alternative engine or launch vehicle, the performance and reliability record achieved with the RD-180 to date would not likely be replicated until well beyond 2030 because the RD-180 has had 68 consecutive successful civil, commercial, and NSS launches since 2000.",112,112 "Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and Reconstruction. U.S. policymakers have made securing and maintaining foreign contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq a major priority since the preparation period for the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. This report highlights and discusses important changes in financial and personnel contributions from foreign governments to Iraq since 2003. To date, foreign donors have pledged an estimated $16.4 billion in grants and loans for Iraq reconstruction, with most major pledges originating at a major donors' conference in Madrid, Spain, in October 2003. However, only a small part of the pledges have been committed or disbursed to the World Bank and United Nations Development Group Trust Funds for Iraq. The largest non-U.S. pledges of grants have come from Japan, the European Commission, the United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, Japan, and Saudi Arabia have pledged the most loans and export credits. Currently, 33 countries including the United States have some level of troops on the ground in Iraq or supporting Iraq operations from nearby locations. Those forces are working under the rubric of one of several organizations—the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), or the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). Currently, the largest troop contributors, in addition to the United States, are the United Kingdom, Georgia, Australia, South Korea, and Poland. Some of these key contributors have announced their intention to reduce or withdraw their forces from Iraq during 2008. The total number of non-U.S. coalition troop contributions has declined since the early stabilization efforts, as other countries have withdrawn their contingents or substantially reduced their size. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003, a number of coalition, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other countries have contributed personnel, equipment, and/or facilities to the training of Iraqi security forces. Supporting the establishment of effective Iraqi security forces is a core element of the Administration's current strategy for Iraq, ""the New Way Forward,"" and several of the congressionally mandated benchmarks for Iraq refer to these efforts. Planned U.S.-Iraqi negotiation aimed at achieving a ""strategic framework agreement"" to replace the current United Nations mandate for U.S. military operations in Iraq may have implications for the future participation of coalition members in stabilization and training efforts. This report will be updated to reflect important developments. For a broader review of foreign support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.",85,79 "Victims' Rights Amendment: Proposals to Amend the United States Constitution in the 106th Congress. Thirty-three states have added a victims rights amendment to their state constitutions. Both House and Senate Judiciary Committees have held hearings on similar proposals to amend the United States Constitution, in the Senate on S.J.Res. 3 introduced by Senator Kyl for himself and Senator Feinstein and in the House on H.J.Res. 64 introduced by Representative Chabot. The Senate Committee has reported out S.J.Res. 3, S.Rept. 106-254, and the Senate debated the measure for two days in April. The proposed amendment defines the participation of crime victims in state and federal official proceedings generated by the crimes committed against them. It gives them qualified notification attendance, articulation, and consideration rights. Victims' safety must be considered in bail proceedings, victim restitution must be a consequence of conviction, and victims' interests must be weighed when the time tables for official proceedings are set or reset. Victims must be allowed to speak on questions of bail, plea agreements, sentencing, and pardons. They must be informed of and not excluded from, crime-related public proceedings. They must be notified of escapes and releases and advised of their rights under the amendment. Arguments put forward in support of an amendment include: (1) the criminal justice system is badly tilted in favor of criminal defendants and against victims' interests and a more appropriate balance should be restored, (2) the shabby treatment afforded victims has chilled their participation in the criminal justice system to the detriment of all, (3) society has an obligation to compensate victims, (4) existing statutory and state constitutional provisions are wildly disparate in their coverage, resulting in uneven treatment and harmful confusion throughout the criminal justice system, and (5) existing state and federal law is inadequate and likely to remain inadequate. Critics argue to the contrary that: (1) the criminal justice system is not out of balance misguided interjection of victim participation threatens to render the process inaccurate, and unfair (2) if the mischief possible through a victims' rights amendment is avoided, the proposal becomes purely hortatory, the Constitution is no place for commemorative decorations, (3) the proposals are inconsistent with the basic notions of federalism, (4) the Senate proposal, limited to violent crimes is too narrow, or conversely, the House proposal, applied to all felonies, is too broad, and (5) the proposals do not clearly preserve the constitutional rights of the accused.",93,93 "National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Legal Background. Five federal statutes authorize intelligence officials to request certain business record information in connection with national security investigations. The authority to issue these national security letters (NSL) is comparable to the authority to issue administrative subpoenas. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) expanded the authority under the original four NSL statutes and created a fifth. Thereafter, the authority was reported to have been widely used. Then, a report by the Department of Justice's Inspector General (IG) found that in its use of expanded USA PATRIOT Act authority the FBI had ""used NSLs in violation of applicable NSL statutes, Attorney General Guidelines, and internal FBI policies,"" although it concluded that no criminal laws had been broken. A year later, a second IG report confirmed the findings of the first, and noted the corrective measures taken in response. A third IG report, critical of the FBI's use of exigent letters and informal NSL alternatives, noted that the practice had been stopped and related problems addressed. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act (P.L. 109-177, and its companion, P.L. 109-178) amended the five NSL statutes to expressly provide for judicial review of both the NSLs and the confidentiality requirements that attend them. The sections were made explicitly subject to judicial enforcement and to sanctions for failure to comply with an NSL request or to breach NSL confidentiality requirements. Prospects of its continued use dimmed, however, after two lower federal courts held that the absolute confidentiality requirements and the limitations on judicial review rendered one of the NSL statutes constitutionally suspect. The President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies recommended several NSL statutory adjustments designed to eliminate differences between NSLs and court orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (""§215 orders""), including requiring pre-issuance judicial approval of NSLs. Instead in the USA FREEDOM Act, P.L. 114-23 (H.R. 2048), Congress opted to adjust the NSL judicial review provisions governing the nondisclosure requirements which may accompany NSLs. It also precludes the use of NSL authority for bulk collection of communications or financial records. Finally, it adjusts existing reporting requirements to permit recipients to publicly disclose the extent to which they have been compelled to comply with NSLs. The text of the five NSL statutory provisions has been appended. This report is available abridged—without footnotes, appendices, and most of the citations to authority—as CRS Report RS22406, National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: A Glimpse at the Legal Background, by Charles Doyle.",27,27 Disadvantaged Businesses: A Review of Federal Assistance. It is the policy of the federal government to encourage the development of small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs) owned by minorities and women. SDBs are statutorily defined as small businesses that are owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias and who have limited capital and credit opportunities. This report presents an overview of the major federal programs now in existence and indicates where interested persons can obtain further information about specific programs.,13,13 "Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: The Fate of the Oil. The April 20, 2010, explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig led to the largest oil spill in U.S. waters. Federal government officials estimated that the deepwater well ultimately released (over 84 days) over 200 million gallons (or 4.9 million barrels) of crude oil. Although decreasing amounts of oil were observed on the ocean surface following the well's containment on July 15, 2010, oil spill response officials and researchers have found oil in other places. A pressing question that has been raised by many stakeholders is where did the oil go? On August 4, 2010, the federal government released an estimate of the oil spill budget for the Deepwater Horizon incident. On November 23, 2010, the federal government released a peer-reviewed ""Technical Document"" that further explained how the estimates were derived, and in some cases, modified the initial estimates. The oil budget estimates divide the released oil into seven categories, accounting for the following percentages of the total oil released. These categories generally fall into three groups Human intervention: direct recovery from the well (17%), in situ burning (5%), skimmed (3%), chemically dispersed (16%). Natural Processes: naturally dispersed (13%), evaporated or dissolved (24%). Other (22%): refers to the oil remaining after subtracting the above estimates from the total estimated release, possible fates include remaining in the water column, settling to the sea floor, mixing with sediment, ingested by microbes, or collected during shore cleanup activities. Direct observation and measurement of the fate of the vast majority of the estimated 200 million gallons of oil presents a considerable challenge. In some cases, the estimates used to calculate these percentages contain considerable uncertainty. Even assuming that approximately half of the oil has been removed from the Gulf ecosystem through direct recovery, burning, skimming, or evaporation, the fate of the remaining (""other"") oil is unknown. It is debatable whether the fate of the remaining oil will ever be established conclusively, because multiple challenges hinder this objective: the complexity of the Gulf system, resources required to collect data, and varied interpretations over the results and observations. Moreover, as time progresses, determining the fate of the oil will likely become more difficult. Regardless, the question of oil fate will likely be answered through an incremental process. Researchers are continuing to study various components of the Gulf, specifically damages to natural resources. Some of these efforts may provide clues to the oil's fate. Because evaluating the actual fate of the oil may take time and may prove difficult, perceptions of the oil's fate may influence congressional interest and action, with consequences for the affected stakeholders. The perception of the spill's fate may be influenced by multiple factors, including oil spill assessments, the group that prepared the assessment, and the manner in which the assessment is presented. If policymakers have the perception that the oil has degraded with minimal impacts to the environment, attention to the oil spill's consequences and associated impacts may wane. On the other hand, a perception that a substantial volume of oil remains and poses a threat to the environment could result in continuing pressure on Gulf industries and livelihoods.",41,41 "S. 1961 and H.R. 4024: Legislative Responses to a Chemical Storage Facility Spill. In January 2014, an estimated 10,000 gallons of 4-methylcyclohexanemethanol (MCHM) and other chemicals leaked from a bulk aboveground storage tank at a chemical storage facility located upstream from the intake pipes of the water treatment plant serving Charleston, WV, and nearby counties. In the wake of the resulting contamination of this large public water supply, Congress has undertaken oversight and is considering legislative options. The chemical storage tank at the center of the West Virginia incident appears to not have been subject to regulation under various federal or state laws aimed at protecting water resources from chemical releases. Oversight hearings by House and Senate committees began within a month to review the event, and to identify policy issues regarding the federal and state roles in regulating chemical facilities and whether legislation might be warranted. In further response to the spill, S. 1961, the Chemical Safety and Preparedness Act, was introduced on January 27, 2014, and H.R. 4024, the Ensuring Access to Clean Water Act of 2014, was introduced on February 10, 2014. This report describes and analyzes H.R. 4024 and S. 1961, as reported. The bills share a number of broadly similar provisions—both would direct states or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish programs to prevent and respond to releases from chemical storage facilities (H.R. 4024) or tanks (S. 1961) located near drinking water sources—but they take different approaches to doing so: S. 1961 would make programmatic changes by amending the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), while H.R. 4024 would amend the Clean Water Act (CWA). The bills would require states with primary enforcement responsibility for public water systems (S. 1961), or states with primary authority to issue CWA discharge permits (H.R. 4024), to establish a regulatory program for chemical storage tanks or facilities, and would have EPA establish programs in other states. Only S. 1961 would require EPA to establish and administer the program in primacy states that refrain from doing so. H.R. 4024 would require EPA or states to carry out a ""chemical storage facility source water protection program"" within one year of enactment, while S. 1961 would give EPA or states two years to establish a ""chemical storage tank surface water protection program."" Both bills include similar program requirements: (1) a state inventory of chemical storage facilities (H.R. 4024) or tanks (S. 1961), (2) regular inspections, and (3) requirements for facilities or tanks (including construction standards, leak detection, emergency response and communication plans, employee training, etc.). Both bills would authorize EPA or a state to issue corrective action orders to enforce the requirements of the legislation, and to recover response costs from facility or tank owners or operators. The bills would require pre-transfer inspections of facilities or tanks, and require information about stored chemicals and response plans to be shared with local water systems. The bills define ""chemical"" and ""storage tank"" differently, but would give states or EPA broad discretion in determining the scope of covered facilities or tanks. Both bills contemplate creating state programs to provide for oversight and inspection of covered chemical storage facilities or tanks, but neither would provide financial resources to assist states in establishing or administering the programs. The pending bills broadly present one approach among an array of possible approaches that have received some discussion. Some Members of Congress and stakeholders have suggested that a federal legislative response to the West Virginia spill is premature, saying that they favor allowing states to take the lead in determining the need for and details of programs to address chemical storage tanks and facilities within their borders.",46,46 "Veterans' Medical Care: FY2008 Appropriations. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility rules. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health-care system. On February 5, 2007, the President submitted his FY2008 budget proposal to Congress. The total amount requested by the Administration for the VHA for FY2008 was $34.6 billion, a 1.93% increase in funding compared with the FY2007 enacted amount. For FY2008, the Administration was requesting $27.2 billion for medical services, $3.4 billion for medical administration, $3.6 billion for medical facilities, and $411 million for medical and prosthetic research. On June 15, 2007, the House passed its version of the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations bill (MILCON-VA appropriations bill) for FY2008 (H.R. 2642, H.Rept. 110-186). H.R. 2642 provided $37.1 billion for the VHA for FY2008. This amount included $29.0 billion for medical services, a $1.9 billion (6.9%) increase above the President's request. H.R. 2642 also included $3.5 billion for medical administration, $69 million above the Administration's request of $3.4 billion, $4.1 billion for medical facilities, a 14% increase over the President's request, and $480 million for medical and prosthetic research, a 17% increase over the President's request of $411 million. H.R. 2642 did not include any bill language authorizing fee increases as requested by the Administration's budget proposal for the VHA for FY2008. On September 6, 2007, the Senate passed MILCON-VA appropriations bill for FY2008 (H.R. 2642, S.Rept. 110-85) with an amendment. H.R. 2642, as passed by the Senate, provided a total of $37.2 billion for the VHA. This amount included $29.1 billion for medical services—a $3.2 billion (12.3%) increase over the FY2007 enacted amount and $1.9 billion over the FY2008 budget request—and $3.5 billion for medical administration, $75 million above the FY2008 Administration's request. Furthermore, H.R. 2642, as passed by the Senate, provided $4.1 billion for medical facilities, and $500 million for medical and prosthetic research. The Senate-passed bill also did not include any bill language authorizing fee increases as requested by the President. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 2764) was signed into law (P.L. 110-161) on December 26, 2007, and included the MILCON-VA Appropriations Act for FY2008. Under P.L. 110-161, the total amount of funding for the VHA is $37.2 billion. This report will not be updated.",70,70 "The Child and Dependent Care Credit: Impact of Selected Policy Options. Some policymakers have shown interest in having the federal government offset some of the costs families incur for child care. The child and dependent care tax credit (CDCTC or ""child care credit"") reimburses some taxpayers for a portion of their out-of-pocket child care expenses. The CDCTC is a nonrefundable tax credit, meaning taxpayers with little or no income tax liability—including many low-income taxpayers—receive little if any credit. Using the TRIM3 model, this report provides estimates of key characteristics of the CDCTC under current law and estimates the distributional effect of selected policy options that would change the credit. Estimates presented in this report are derived using 2014 calendar year data. Hence, estimates reflect 2014 credit amounts as well as the impact of policy options if implemented in 2014. Analysis of the credit under current law indicates A significant amount of the benefit goes to higher-income taxpayers. An estimated 35% of the tax units claiming the credit were in the highest-income quintile (top 20%) in 2014. In contrast, 1% of all CDCTC recipient families were in the lowest-income quintile in the same year. Over 7 out of 10 CDCTC families were married couple families where both parents worked, with the remaining being single parents who worked. The typical (median) amount and range of spending on child care increased with income among credit recipients. This report estimates the distributional impact of four policy options to modify the CDCTC. Making the credit refundable. Refundability would primarily benefit families in the bottom two income quintiles. Convert the credit into a deduction. Converting the credit to an above-the-line deduction would primarily benefit the top 20% of taxpayers. Some taxpayers in the second-lowest income quintile would receive a smaller benefit in terms of tax savings with a deduction than with a credit. Increasing the credit rate. Increasing the credit rate to a uniform 50% would primarily benefit the top 40% of taxpayers. Increase the maximum amount of expenses. Doubling the amount of allowable expenses that could be applied toward the credit would primarily benefit the top 40% of taxpayers. One major factor driving these estimates is the underlying distribution of out-of-pocket child care expenses. Lower-income families with children tend to have significantly lower out-of-pocket child care expenses than do higher-income taxpayers. Lower out-of-pocket child care expenses do not necessarily mean that lower-income people do not have child care needs, rather, it may indicate that these needs are met informally. In contrast, policy options that increase the amount of allowable expenses, increase the credit rate, or are based on the amount of expenses (like a deduction) will tend to provide the largest benefit to the higher-income taxpayers who have higher child care expenditures to begin with.",95,115 "Student Loan Issues and the Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. The federal government operates two major student loan programs: the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program, authorized by Part B of Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA), and the William D. Ford Direct Loan (DL) program, authorized by Part D of Title IV of the HEA. These programs provide loans to undergraduate and graduate students and the parents of undergraduate students to help them meet the costs of postsecondary education. Together, these programs provide more direct aid to support students' postsecondary educational pursuits than any other source. In FY2003, they provided $45.8 billion in new loans to students and their parents. The HEA is being considered for reauthorization. This report discusses issues concerning the FFEL and DL student loan programs that are likely to be considered during reauthorization. Issues that are expected to receive attention include borrower interest rates, loan fees, refinance opportunities, and annual and aggregate loan limits. Additionally, it is likely that considerable attention will be devoted to promoting greater comparability between the loan terms and conditions made available to borrowers in the FFEL and DL programs. In general, helping students by enhancing their benefits is a goal upon which many can agree but finding offsetting revenues is often a challenge. It is therefore likely that some effort will be made to identify savings in the loan programs' mandatory spending that could be used to offset costs associated with enhancements in borrower benefits, or that could be used to finance other student aid expenditures. This report will be updated as events warrant.",34,34 "International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Response Mechanisms. The majority of humanitarian emergencies worldwide stem from natural disasters or from conflicts. Congress has consistently supported humanitarian efforts as a means of saving lives, promoting stability, and furthering U.S. foreign policy objectives. Intervention results in varying amounts of relief and recovery assistance and can have an important impact not only on the relief operation itself but on broader foreign policy issues. In the 114th Congress, international humanitarian and refugee assistance is expected to continue to have a strong measure of bipartisan interest, with key policy issues focused on budget priorities, levels and types of funding, the sources of other support available worldwide, and the ways in which operational assistance is delivered. Factors that may impact decision-making include the type of humanitarian assistance required, the impact of conflict and refugee flows on stability in the region in question, and the role of neighboring countries in contributing to the relief effort. Examples of issues likely to remain of congressional interest include competing aid and budget priorities, reimbursing U.S. government agencies for their expenditures (to replenish the emergency accounts or other accounts that have been used to provide assistance), and civilian and military coordination, including the evolving role of the Department of Defense in humanitarian assistance. Other priorities may include an examination of the disparity between numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees worldwide and the available funding for these groups, physical access to and protection of refugees and other vulnerable populations in addition to the protection of human rights, programs to address gender based violence, and the creation of durable solutions for displaced populations. The President can provide emergency humanitarian assistance through several sources whose funding is authorized and appropriated by Congress. These are funds currently appropriated to the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID's) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) through the International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDA) account, U.S. Department of Agriculture food aid programs under Title II of the Food for Peace Act, the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) through the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and the U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA) accounts, and funds appropriated to the Department of Defense, Overseas Humanitarian and Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account. In addition, the President has the authority to draw down defense equipment and direct military personnel to respond to disasters and provide space-available transportation on military aircraft and ships to private donors who wish to transport humanitarian goods and equipment in response to a disaster. Finally, the President can request other government agencies to assist within their capabilities. In FY2015, estimated funding for global humanitarian accounts is $6.4 billion. The Administration's FY2016 budget request for global humanitarian accounts is $5.6 billion, but the decrease assumes carryover balances from FY2015 will be available to meet projected needs for humanitarian responses. This report examines U.S. humanitarian assistance in international crises and disaster situations. It considers the sources and types of U.S. government aid, the response mechanisms of key U.S. agencies and departments, and possible issues for Congress—including competing aid and budget priorities, burdensharing and donor-fatigue, the transparency and efficacy of U.S. humanitarian assistance, consequences of such assistance, and potential links to broader U.S. foreign policy goals. This report will be updated as events warrant.",83,79 "Legislative Procedures for Adjusting the Public Debt Limit: A Brief Overview. Nearly all of the outstanding debt of the federal government is subject to a statutory limit, which is set forth as a dollar limitation in 31 U.S.C. 3101(b). From time to time, Congress considers and passes legislation to adjust or suspend this limit. The annual budget resolution is required to include appropriate levels of the public debt for each fiscal year covered by the resolution. The budget resolution, however, does not become law. Therefore, the enactment of subsequent legislation is necessary in order to implement budget resolution policies, including changes to the statutory limit on the public debt. In addition, Congress may consider adjustments to the public debt limit outside the context of the budget resolution, such as when the House and Senate are unable to agree on a budget resolution or when the current debt limit is not sufficient to meet existing financial obligations. Under current legislative procedures, the House and Senate may originate and consider legislation adjusting the debt limit in several different ways. They may consider such legislation under regular legislative procedures, either as freestanding legislation or as a part of a measure dealing with other topics. Alternatively, they may change the debt limit as part of the budget reconciliation process provided for under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The House also has originated debt limit legislation under its former House Rule XXVIII (the so-called “Gephardt rule”), the House repealed the rule at the beginning of the 112th Congress (2011-2012). In addition, Congress has twice established special procedures for congressional disapproval of adjustments to the debt limit authorized by certain statutes. During the period from 1940 to the present, Congress and the President have enacted a total of 96 measures adjusting the public debt limit—77 under regular legislative procedures in both chambers, 15 under the Gephardt rule, and 4 under reconciliation procedures. This report will be updated as developments warrant.",101,101 International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side. This report discusses various cooperative international efforts to address the issue of global climate change. The two major international agreements discussed in a side-by-side comparison are the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2010 Copenhagen Accord. The report discusses how many observers are hoping that initiatives carried out under the Copenhagen Accord may help bridge divides between the various tracks and economic groupings established under the Kyoto Protocol.,42,42 "Colleges and Universities Attended by Senators of the 107th Congress. This report identifies the colleges and universities attended by Senators serving in the 107th Congress. Where available in published sources, the degrees earned are also listed.",55,55 "The Budget of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) FY1999. This report provides an overview of FY1999 budget request for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Initially, the report is limited to the Administration's budget request for HUD. The report is updated periodically as legislative action occurs on FY1999 appropriations for HUD and as action occurs on authorizing legislation to implement the budget proposals.",74,74 "Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or ""Mad Cow Disease"") in North America: A Chronology of Selected Events. This report provides a chronology of selected events leading up to and following the discoveries of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or ""mad cow disease"") in North America. These are primarily regulatory, legal, and congressional developments that are frequently referenced in the ongoing policy debate. The chronology generally does not contain entries for the introduction of the many BSE-related bills introduced into this or previous Congresses, except for those in recent years where committee or floor action has occurred. This report, which will be updated if significant developments ensue, is intended to be used alongside other CRS reports that provide more background and context for the BSE policy debate, and that cover many specific legislative proposals. The chronology begins in 1986, when BSE was first identified by a British laboratory. As the United Kingdom and others attempted to understand and contain BSE, the U.S. and Canadian governments were establishing panels to study the disease and began instituting a series of safeguards aimed at keeping it out of North America or stopping any spread if it should occur here. The chronology proceeds into May 2003, when Canada reported the first native case in North America, December 2003, when the United States reported finding a case in a U.S. herd, and most of 2004, when both countries worked to reassure consumers of the safety of North American cattle and beef and to reopen foreign markets blocking these exports. U.S. and Canadian officials since 2003 also have been strengthening various regulatory safeguards aimed at protecting the cattle herd and the food supply from BSE. The chronology continues with major events of 2004, 2005, and the first half of 2006, which have revolved around efforts to re-establish more open cattle and beef trade within North America even while a handful of new cases of BSE have emerged here, and the steps being taken to regain the Japanese and Korean markets, which were until December 2003 two of the four leading foreign buyers of U.S. beef. Both were closed as of mid-2006 (although Japan appeared on the verge of reopening as of this writing). Congress can be expected to continue to play a role, holding oversight hearings, providing funding for BSE-related activities, and possibly considering legislative options to address one or more of the outstanding issues.",0,0 "Automatic Enrollment in 401(k) Plans. Most employers that sponsor retirement savings plans under §401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) require employees to decide whether to enroll in the plan. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued rulings to inform employers that it is permissible under current law to enroll employees in these plans automatically, provided that the employee is notified in advance and is permitted to leave the plan if he or she chooses to do so. Automatic enrollment, in which a percentage of the employee's salary is placed in an individual account without requiring the worker to take any action, has been shown to increase worker participation in §401(k) plans and similar salary reduction retirement savings plans. In 2004, automatic enrollment had been adopted by an estimated 11% of §401(k) plans. About 1% of plans with fewer than 50 participants and 31% of plans with 5,000 or more participants had automatic enrollment in 2004. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-280) includes provisions to promote automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans.",88,88 "Safeguarding Federal Elections from Possible Terrorist Attack: Issues and Options for Congress. Concerns have arisen that terrorist attacks near the November 2, 2004 federal election might be launched to disrupt voting and affect the outcome. As a result, questions have arisen about what might be done both to prevent such attacks and to respond to any that occur. Deliberations have centered largely around two questions: If a terrorist attack occurs, should the election be postponed in whole or in part, and if so, by whom and under what authority? What steps should and are being taken to enhance security for the election? Questions about election postponement include who has the constitutional authority, to whom could such power be delegated, and what legal limitations exist. Congressional authority to regulate elections may vary depending on what contest or contests are affected. The executive branch does not currently have authority to set or change the times of elections, a power reserved for Congress under the Constitution, although Congress may be able to delegate such authority. Either Congress or the states might also pass legislation in response to a terrorist attack that would change the timing of any elections that were affected. Some states have enacted statutes providing for the temporary postponement of elections. Many state statutes also grant the Governor the power to suspend certain state laws during an emergency. Those statutes might also be able to be used to postpone the general presidential election in the state during an emergency. Actual postponement of elections has occurred in relatively few cases over the last 150 years. The best known recent examples are the New York state primary scheduled for September 11, 2001, and the Florida primary scheduled on September 1, 1992, shortly after Hurricane Andrew. In New York, the entire election was rescheduled, in Florida, only Dade County was rescheduled. In many other cases in the United States and other countries, elections have been held despite difficult situations arising from natural events or conflicts. It is generally the responsibility of state and local governments to provide security at polling places. State and local laws regarding police presence vary, with some states prohibiting and others requiring it. Federal law prohibits the use of federal military forces at the polls except ""to repel armed enemies of the United States."" A recently released guide for state election-security planning recommends establishment of planning teams and preparation for a range of possible scenarios. Reactions of state and local officials have varied, with some intending to make as few visible changes as possible and others planning to increase police presence or even move polling places. Whether Congress considers actions to safeguard elections may depend on events associated with U.S. elections or those in other countries. Among the options are to take no legislative action to explicitly delegate authority to the executive branch to the extent permitted by the Constitution to provide mechanisms for improved coordination, and to encourage early and absentee voting. All these options have some potential benefits but also significant potential disadvantages.",61,61 "China's Economy and the Beijing Olympics. China will host the 2008 Olympic Summer Games from August 8 to 24, 2008. Most of the events will be held in the vicinity of Beijing, with selected competitions held in Hong Kong, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Tianjin. Since the International Olympic Committee's decision in July 2001 to select Beijing as the host for the 2008 Olympics, China has spent billions of dollars for facilities and basic infrastructure in preparation for the international event. China anticipates that the 2008 Olympics will provide both short-term and long-term direct and indirect benefits to its economy, as well as enhance the nation's global image. However, the experience of past host cities and China's current economic conditions cast serious doubt that the Games of the XXIX Olympiad will provide the level of economic growth being anticipated. This report will not be updated.",14,85 Common Questions About Postage and Stamps. Constituents and interest groups often approach congressional offices with questions about postage and stamps. This report provides brief answers to commonly asked questions and provides sources where Members and congressional staff may learn more about these topics. The Senate usually has not had rules or policies regarding legislation to establish postage stamps. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform long has had a rule against considering legislation that proposes the issuance of new semipostal and commemorative stamps.,62,55 Number of African American Judges Reaches All-Time High;Do Issues Remain?. This report provides historical and statistical information related to the appointment of African Americans as U.S. circuit and district court judges. Such information addresses ongoing congressional interest in the demographic characteristics of lower federal court judges.,92,92 "Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) in Transportation. Public-private partnerships (P3s) in transportation are contractual relationships typically between a state or local government, who are the owners of most transportation infrastructure, and a private company. P3s provide a mechanism for greater private-sector participation in all phases of the development, operation, and financing of transportation projects. Although there are many different forms P3s can take, this report focuses on the two types of agreements that generate the most interest and discussion: (1) design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM), and (2) long-term lease. P3s have emerged, in part, because of the growing demands on the transportation system and constraints on public resources. To date, however, the number of transportation P3s in the United States is relatively small, as is the amount of long-term private financing provided. Among the reasons for this are the availability to state and local governments of tax-preferred municipal bonds, the need for some kind of revenue stream, such as a toll, fare, or tax, to provide funding, and the fact that many states have very limited experience with P3s. Most transportation P3s to date have been in highways or marine cargo terminals, only a few have involved public transportation, intercity passenger rail, or airports. There are three main potential benefits of P3s: (1) P3s are a way to attract private capital to invest in transportation infrastructure, (2) P3s may be able to build and operate transportation facilities more efficiently than the public sector through better management and innovation in construction, maintenance, and operation, and (3) the public sector can transfer to the private-sector partner many of the risks of building, maintaining, and operating transportation infrastructure. Concerns with P3s include the types of projects involved, the risks retained by the public sector, and transportation planning. P3s that are reliant on tolls or other user fees are unlikely to address transportation issues in rural areas or on lightly traveled routes. However, P3s in these areas may be viable if based on state and local government availability payments. Although some risks are typically transferred to the private sector in a P3, the public sector may retain significant risk. P3s may have longer-term effects on the transportation system because they influence decisions about what to build and where, and can limit what other projects the government can pursue. The federal government exerts influence over the prevalence and structure of P3s through its transportation programs, funding, and regulatory oversight, but is usually not a party to a P3 agreement. The current federal role in P3s includes project loans through the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) Program, the authorization of private activity bonds (PABs), certain tax provisions such as depreciation schedules, state infrastructure banks, and the provision of technical advice through the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Limiting the formation of P3s would predominantly entail restricting federal benefits to such projects. Two broad policy options for expanding use of P3s would be to actively encourage P3s with program incentives, but with regulatory controls to protect the public interest, or to aggressively encourage the use of P3s through program incentives and deregulation. This report discusses several possible issues and policy options that Congress may want to consider. These include P3 project evaluation and transparency, asset recycling, incentive grants, a national infrastructure bank, equity investment tax credits, and deregulation of Interstate highway tolling. The report also discusses changes to the existing TIFIA and PABs programs.",120,120 "Drought Policy, Response, and Preparedness. This report examines the various ways Congress and other federal, state, and local policymakers are considering to prepare for and respond to drought, how to coordinate actions and assign responsibilities, and who bears the costs of impacts, disaster response, and long-term adjustment to drought.",11,11 "Federal Evacuation Policy: Issues for Congress. When government officials become aware of an impending disaster, they may take steps to protect citizens before the incident occurs. Evacuation of the geographic area that may be affected is one option to ensure public safety. If implemented properly, evacuation can be an effective strategy for saving lives. Evacuations and decisions to evacuate, however, can also entail complex factors and elevated risks. Decisions to evacuate may require officials to balance potentially costly, hazardous, or unnecessary evacuations against the possibility of loss of life due to a delayed order to evacuate. Some observers of evacuations, notably those from New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, claim evacuations pose unique challenges to certain segments of society. From their perspective, special-needs populations, the transit-dependent, and individuals with pets faced particular hardships associated with the storm. This, they claim, is because some evacuation plans, and the way in which they were carried out, appeared to inadequately address their unique circumstances or needs. In responding to these challenges, then-Senator Obama introduced S. 1685 in the 109th Congress, which would have directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure that each state provided detailed and comprehensive information regarding its pre-disaster and post-disaster plans for the evacuation of individuals with special needs in emergencies. President Barack Obama indicated during his campaign that he would continue to pursue similar evacuation polices. Another facet of evacuation is sheltering displaced individuals. For short-term sheltering, federally provided resources include food, water, cots, and essential toiletries. When displaced individuals need long-term sheltering, federal policy provides financial assistance for alternative accommodations such as apartments, motels and hotels, recreational vehicles, and modular units. While federal law provides for certain aspects of civilian emergency evacuation, evacuation policy generally is established and enforced by state and local officials. In recent years, Members of Congress have focused, in part, on policy options that addressed issues of equity during evacuations as well as attempts to integrate federal, state, and local evacuation efforts more fully. This report discusses federal evacuation policy and analyzes potential lessons learned from the evacuations of individuals in response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005. Several issue areas that might arise concerning potential lawmaking and oversight on evacuation policy are also highlighted. This report will be updated as significant legislative or administrative changes occur.",11,11 "The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Private Schools. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a grants and civil rights statute which provides federal funding to the states to help provide education for children with disabilities. If a state receives funds under IDEA, it must make available a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) for all children with disabilities in the state. Education for children with disabilities in private schools is included in IDEA, but the requirements of the statute for children in private schools are not always the same as the requirements for children with disabilities in public schools. Under current law, there are several ways a child with a disability may be placed in a private school, and the LEA's responsibilities under IDEA vary depending on the type of placement. A child with a disability may be placed in a private school by the local education agency (LEA) or state educational agency (SEA) as a means of fulfilling the FAPE requirement for the child. In this situation, the full cost is paid for by the LEA or the SEA. A child with a disability may also be unilaterally placed in a private school by his or her parents. In this situation, the cost of the private school placement is not paid by the LEA unless a hearing officer or a court makes certain findings. However, IDEA does require some services for children in private schools, even if they are unilaterally placed there by their parents, and there is no finding that FAPE was not made available to the child. In this situation, IDEA requires that a proportionate amount of the federal funds shall be made available.",35,35 "Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues, Challenges, and U.S. Responses. The 115th Congress and the Trump Administration are reviewing existing U.S. policies and programs in sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth, ""Africa"") as they establish their budgetary and policy priorities toward the region while also responding to emerging crises. Africa-specific policy questions did not feature prominently in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, and the views of the Trump Administration on many U.S.-Africa policy issues remain unspecified. The Obama Administration's Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa identified its policy priorities as strengthening democratic institutions, spurring economic growth, trade, and investment, advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and development. Analysts continue to debate whether that Strategy reflected an appropriate mix and ranking of priorities, as well as the degree to which the Obama Administration's actions reflected its stated goals. Congressional action on trade and electrification projects in Africa in the 114th Congress suggested some shared priorities with the Obama Administration. The Obama Administration's efforts to promote greater private sector engagement and youth leadership in Africa won praise from various quarters. At the same time, analysts have probed whether the Obama Administration's emphasis on building democratic institutions in Africa was matched with appropriate resource allocations, and whether President Obama's stated support for democratic accountability was undermined by close U.S. partnerships with authoritarian-leaning states in East Africa and by a growing emphasis on security relationships. Africa is a top destination of U.S. foreign aid. Following significant increases during the George W. Bush Administration in the 2000s, civilian-administered aid levels allocated for African countries remained largely flat during the Obama Administration, reflecting overarching budgetary constraints among other considerations. The areas of emphasis nonetheless shifted in some ways, with new presidential development initiatives focusing on electrification, trade, agricultural development, and health system strengthening. U.S. military cooperation and Defense Department-administered security assistance spending in Africa also increased substantially, in line with new congressionally enacted authorities for defense spending as well as Administration-led peacekeeping and counterterrorism initiatives. The United States has long been a top bilateral donor of emergency humanitarian and disaster assistance in Africa, as well as the top financial contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations, the majority of which are in Africa. The 114th Congress enacted several pieces of legislation that shaped U.S.-Africa policy and programs. These included the reauthorization of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 114-27), the Electrify Africa Act (P.L. 114-121), the Global Food Security Act (P.L. 114-195), the Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act (P.L. 114-231), annual National Defense Authorization Acts (most recently, P.L. 114-328), and foreign aid and defense appropriations measures. Congress has also influenced U.S.-Africa policy through its oversight activities, and through Member statements and communications with the executive branch and African leaders. To inform further congressional consideration of U.S.-Africa policy issues and challenges, this report provides background on the following Sub-Saharan Africa's development and economic challenges U.S.-Africa trade, investment, and economic cooperation Governance, democracy, and human rights issues Peace and security issues, and U.S. aid to Africa and other selected U.S. responses to policy challenges.",85,85 "Energy Policy: Conceptual Framework and Continuing Issues. Energy policy continues to be a major legislative issue, despite passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT, P.L. 109-58). Shortly after EPACT's enactment, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita temporarily shut down production of oil and gas and refining capacity in Texas and Louisiana. World and domestic demand for oil remained strong, and other factors have placed pressure on gasoline prices and deliverability in the United States. In the face of these developments, and because the prospect that this episode of elevated prices is likely to be a long one, interest in energy policy remains high in the 110th Congress. When the United States experiences a period marked by sharp increases in the price for energy and concern about the adequacy of essential supplies, there is widespread concern that the nation has no energy policy. The nation has, in fact, adopted several distinct policy approaches over the years, and many of the debates have been about determining the appropriate extent of the federal government's role in energy. There were episodes from 1973-2003 when oil prices spiked, but these were generally for comparatively brief periods, overall, the period was one of general price and supply stability. It isn't so much that energy policy failed to be adequately responsive to past crises, rather, during lengthy periods of stability and declining prices for conventional fuels, it has proven difficult to sustain certain policy courses that might help shield the nation from occasional episodes of instability. Because prices are now expected by some analysts to remain high, the prospect for certain longer-range energy policies may now be more favorable. Traditionally, the energy debate has been most vigorous over the balance to be struck between increasing supply and encouraging conservation. However, when markets are unstable, debate turns on another axis as well, that of short-term versus long-term policies. Energy policy issues of continuing interest include Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE) for passenger vehicles, improving U.S. energy infrastructure, including pipelines and refineries, seeking effective means to promote energy conservation using currently available technologies, and developing new technologies and alternative fuels.",39,39 "Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP): Implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act. Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), authorizes financial aid to local educational agencies (LEAs) for the education of disadvantaged children and youth at the preschool, elementary, and secondary levels. Over the last several years, the accountability provisions of this program have been increasingly focused on achievement and other outcomes for participating pupils and schools. Since 1994, and particularly under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), a key concept embodied in these requirements is that of ""adequate yearly progress (AYP)"" for schools, LEAs, and states. AYP is defined primarily on the basis of aggregate scores of various groups of pupils on state assessments of academic achievement. The primary purpose of AYP requirements is to serve as the basis for identifying schools and LEAs where performance is unsatisfactory, so that inadequacies may be addressed first through provision of increased support and, ultimately, a variety of ""consequences."" Under NCLB, the Title I-A requirements for state-developed standards of AYP were substantially expanded. AYP calculations must be disaggregated—determined separately and specifically for not only all pupils but also for several demographic groups of pupils within each school, LEA, and state. In addition, while AYP standards had to be applied previously only to pupils, schools, and LEAs participating in Title I-A, AYP standards under NCLB must be applied to all public schools, LEAs, and to states overall, if a state chooses to receive Title I-A grants. However, consequences for failing to meet AYP standards need be applied under federal law only to schools and LEAs participating in Title I-A. Another major break with the pre-NCLB period is that state AYP standards must incorporate concrete movement toward meeting an ultimate goal of all pupils reaching a proficient or advanced level of achievement by 2014. The overall percentage of public schools identified as failing to make AYP for one or more years on the basis of test scores in 2007-2008 was approximately 35% of all public schools. The percentage of schools for individual states in 2007-2008 varied from 7% to 80%. Approximately 13% of public schools were in the ""needs improvement"" status (i.e., they had failed to meet AYP standards for 2 consecutive years or more) on the basis of AYP determinations for 2007-2008 and preceding school years. The AYP provisions of NCLB are challenging and complex, and they have generated substantial interest and debate. Debates regarding NCLB provisions on AYP have focused on the provision for an ultimate goal, use of confidence intervals and data-averaging, population diversity effects, minimum pupil group size (n), separate focus on specific pupil groups, number of schools identified and state variations therein, the 95% participation rule, state variations in assessments and proficiency standards, and several issues specific to the use of growth models to determine AYP. The authorization for ESEA programs expired at the end of FY2008, and the 111th Congress may consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA. This report will be updated regularly to reflect major legislative developments and available information.",33,33 "North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?. Whether North Korea should be included on the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting countries has been a major issue in U.S.-North Korean diplomacy since 2000, particularly in connection with negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea demanded that the Clinton and Bush Administrations remove it from the terrorism support list. On October 11, 2008, the Bush Administration removed North Korea from the terrorism list. This move was one of the measures the Bush Administration took to implement a nuclear agreement that it negotiated with North Korea in September 2007 and finalized details of in April 2008. The agreement was reached under the format of the six party talks, which involve the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. The President also announced that he was immediately lifting sanctions on North Korea under the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act. North Korea's obligations under this nuclear agreement were to allow the disabling of its plutonium facility at Yongbyon and present to the United States and other government in the six party talks a declaration of its nuclear programs. North Korea submitted its declaration in June 2008. The removal of North Korea from the terrorism list, however, did not result in an early conclusion of the February 2007 six party nuclear agreement. The North Korean government and the Bush Administration disagreed over the content of an October 2008 agreement on verification, particularly over whether it allowed inspectors to take samples of nuclear materials from the Yongbyon installations. The other parties to the talks also had not completed the delivery of 1 million tons of heavy oil that they had promised in the February 2007 agreement. Against this backdrop, along with an apparent stroke suffered by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, the six party process broke down. In the months after the breakdown of the talks, North Korea took a series of actions that have led to calls for its reinstatement on the terrorism list. In April 2009, North Korea launched devices suspected of being long-range missiles. In May 2009, North Korea tested a nuclear device. In March 2010, a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, sank in waters disputed by the two Koreas. Nearly 50 South Korean sailors died in the incident. A multinational investigation team led by South Korea determined that the ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine. In June 2010, the State Department determined that the Cheonan sinking was not an act of terrorism and thus by itself was an insufficient reason for placing North Korea back on the terrorism list. Meanwhile, reports in 2009 and 2010 from French, Japanese, South Korean, and Israeli sources described North Korean programs to provide arms and training to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, two groups on the U.S. list of international terrorist organizations. Large quantities of North Korean arms bound for Iran, intercepted in 2009, contained weapons that Iran supplies heavily to Hezbollah and Hamas. Moreover, a large body of reports describe a long-standing, collaborative relationship between North Korea and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. This report describes the rationales for including North Korea on the terrorism list from 1987-2008, for North Korea's delisting in 2008, and the debate in 2010 over whether to re-list North Korea. The major impact of a decision to return North Korea to the list would likely be symbolic, because removing North Korea from the list does not appear to have provided Pyongyang with direct, tangible benefits.",86,85 "Appropriations for FY1999: Legislative Branch. Appropriations are one part of a complex federal budget process that includes budget resolutions, appropriations (regular, supplemental, and continuing) bills, rescissions, and budget reconciliation bills. This report is a guide to one of the 13 regular appropriations bills that Congress passes each year. It is designed to supplement the information provided by the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Legislative Branch Appropriations.",55,59 "The Islamic State in Egypt: Implications for U.S.-Egyptian Relations. This report discusses Islamist militancy in Egypt, specifically the presence the Islamic State organization (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS). The report also briefly discusses what the propagation of militants means for relations between the United States and Egypt.",86,86 "Appropriations for FY1999: Department of Transportation and Related Agencies. For FY1999, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requested total funding of approximately $43 billion, a 1% increase over the FY1998 enacted level of $39 billion. The FY1999 budget request for the DOT was similar in many respects to the FY1998 appropriation. There are many ""macro"" issues or factors that are influencing the debate over the Administration's FY1999 budget request. Some of them have been carried over from the previous fiscal year. Complicating the budget process had been the delay associated with reauthorizing many of the Department's programs. The recently concluded reauthorization of surface transportation programs will dramatically effect the FY1999 appropriations process. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (P.L. 105-178, TEA-21) provides for an increase in spending at a level above that contemplated in the Administration budget request. In addition, the new legislation provides a new budget environment for highway and transit programs that limits the ability of the appropriations process to alter spending for these activities. In its FY1999 request, the Administration reiterated that safety is its highest priority, followed by technology development, environmental enhancement, infrastructure needs, and innovative financing. The budget proposal included requests of: $3.1 billion for direct safety funding, $30.0 billion for infrastructure investments, $1.1 billion for transportation research and development (R&&D) and $0.6 billion for Amtrak (See CRS Issue Brief 97030). On July 15, 1998, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 2307 (S.Rept. 105-249). The committee recommended total funding of approximately $47 billion for FY1999. S. 2307 was passed by the Senate on July 24, 1998. Few amendments were made, excepting one controversial proposal to bar the use of federal funds to impose ""project labor agreements"" on highway and transit fund projects. A compromise substitute was offered. The House Appropriations Committee reported its own bill (H.R. 4328, H.Rept. 105-648) which would have provided a total of $46.9 billion, an amount $4.8 billion greater than FY1998 and $3.9 billion greater than the amount requested by the Administration. The committee voiced its objections to the impact of TEA-21 legislation, whose ""firewalls"" significantly limited its latitude in funding. According to the report, ""These 'firewalls' make it virtually impossible for the Appropriations Committee to make downward adjustments to those funding levels in the annual appropriations process over the next 5 years. By July 31, both the House and Senate had passed their respective bills, the House bill was referred to the Senate, the Senate substituted its own language, and the House requested a conference on the substitute amendment. See the ""Most Recent Developments"" section of this report for the latest legislative action.",120,120 "Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture. Persons suspected of criminal or terrorist activity may be transferred from one State (i.e., country) to another for arrest, detention, and/or interrogation. Commonly, this is done through extradition, by which one State surrenders a person within its jurisdiction to a requesting State via a formal legal process, typically established by treaty. Far less often, such transfers are effectuated through a process known as ""extraordinary rendition"" or ""irregular rendition."" These terms have often been used to refer to the extrajudicial transfer of a person from one State to another. In this report, ""rendition"" refers to extraordinary or irregular renditions unless otherwise specified. Although the particularities regarding the usage of extraordinary renditions and the legal authority behind such renditions are not publicly available, various U.S. officials have acknowledged the practice's existence. During the Bush Administration, there was controversy over the use of renditions by the United States, particularly with regard to the alleged transfer of suspected terrorists to countries known to employ harsh interrogation techniques that may rise to the level of torture, purportedly with the knowledge or acquiescence of the United States. In January 2009, President Obama issued an Executive Order creating a special task force to review U.S. transfer policies, including the practice of rendition, to ensure compliance with applicable legal requirements. In August, the task force issued recommendations to ensure that U.S. transfer practices comply with applicable standards and do not result in the transfer of persons to face torture. These recommendations include strengthening procedures used to obtain assurances from a country that a person will not face torture if transferred there, and the establishment of mechanisms to monitor the treatment of transferred persons. This report discusses relevant international and domestic law restricting the transfer of persons to foreign states for the purpose of torture. The U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and its domestic implementing legislation (the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998) impose the primary legal restrictions on the transfer of persons to countries where they would face torture. Both CAT and U.S. implementing legislation generally prohibit the rendition of persons to countries in most cases where they would more likely than not be tortured, though there are arguably limited exceptions to this prohibition. Historically, the State Department has taken the position that CAT's provisions concerning the transfer of persons do not apply extraterritorially, though as a matter of policy the United States does not transfer persons in its custody to countries where they would face torture (U.S. regulations and statutes implementing CAT, however, arguably limit the extraterritorial transfer of individuals nonetheless). Under U.S. regulations implementing CAT, a person may be transferred to a country that provides credible assurances that the rendered person will not be tortured. Neither CAT nor its implementing legislation prohibits the rendition of persons to countries where they would be subject to harsh treatment not rising to the level of torture. Besides CAT, additional obligations may be imposed upon U.S. rendition practice via the Geneva Conventions, the War Crimes Act (as amended by the Military Commissions Act (P.L. 109-366), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Legislation was introduced in the 110th Congress to limit or bar U.S. participation in renditions. It is possible that similar legislation will be proposed in the 111th Congress.",81,81 "Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs): An Institutional Overview. Congress chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to improve the workings of credit markets. This report briefly describes the nature of GSEs, their mixed governmental-private nature, the differences between GSEs and government agencies, and the arguments for and against GSEs.",5,51 "Georgia's October 2012 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications. Georgia's continued sovereignty and independence and its development as a free market democracy have been significant concerns to successive Congresses and Administrations. The United States and Georgia signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership in early 2009 pledging U.S. support for these objectives, and the United States has been Georgia's largest provider of foreign and security assistance. Most recently, elections for the 150-member Parliament of Georgia on October 1, 2012, have been viewed as substantially free and fair by most observers. Several Members of Congress and the Administration have called for a peaceful transition of political power in Georgia and have vowed continued support for Georgia's development and independence. In the run-up to the October 2012 election, Georgia's Central Electoral Commission registered 16 parties and blocs and several thousand candidates to run in mixed party list and single-member constituency races. A new electoral coalition, Georgia Dream—set up by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili—posed the main opposition to President Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement, which held the majority of legislative seats. A video tape of abuse in a prison released by Georgia Dream late in the campaign seemed to be a factor in the loss of voter support for the United National Movement and in the electoral victory of Georgia Dream. According to observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the election freely reflected the will of the people, although a few procedural and other problems were reported. In the days after the election, Saakashvili, Ivanishvili, and other officials from Georgia Dream and the United National Movement have met to plan an orderly transition, including the appointment of a new cabinet. Ivanishvili has pledged that GD will continue to support Georgia's democratization and anti-corruption efforts, and its European and Euro-Atlantic orientation. The White House has described the election as ""another milestone"" in Georgia's development as a democracy, and has called for Ivanishvili and Saakashvili to work together to ensure the country's continued peaceful transition of power. The Administration also stated that it looked forward to strengthening the U.S.-Georgia partnership. Several Members of Congress observed the election, and several Members of the Senate issued a post-election statement commending President Saakashvili for his efforts to transform Georgia into a prosperous democracy, and pointing to the competitive and peaceful election as evidence of his success. At the same time, they raised concerns about some bickering and unrest in the wake of the election, and cautioned that the future of U.S.-Georgia relations depends on the country's continued commitment to democratization. Some observers have suggested that relations between the two parties in the legislature and between a Georgia Dream cabinet and the president may well be contentious in coming months, as both sides maneuver before a planned 2013 presidential election. Saakashvili is term-limited and cannot run, but the United National Movement plans to retain the presidency. Under constitutional changes, the legislature is slated to gain greater powers vis-à-vis the presidency, so a divided political situation could endure for some time. In such a case, statesmanship and a commitment to compromise and good governance are essential for Georgia's continued democratization, these observers stress.",85,85 "Mileage-Based Road User Charges. A mileage-based road user charge would involve assessing owners of individual vehicles on a per-mile basis for the distance the vehicle is driven. Currently, federal highway and public transportation programs are funded mainly by motor fuel tax receipts that flow into the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). The tax rates, set on a per-gallon basis, have not been raised since 1993, and receipts have been insufficient to support the transportation programs authorized by Congress since FY2008. The long-term viability of motor fuels taxes is also questionable because of increasing vehicle fuel efficiency and the wider use of electric vehicles. Economists have favored the use of mileage-based user charges as an alternative to motor fuels taxes to support highway funding. Congress, in Section 6020 of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act, P.L. 114-94), provided $95 million to fund large-scale pilot studies by states or groups of states to demonstrate ""user-based revenue systems"" to maintain the solvency of the HTF. Under this user charge concept, motorists would pay based on distance driven and, perhaps, other costs of road use, such as wear and tear on roads, traffic congestion, and air pollution. Mileage-based road user charges could range from a flat cent per mile charge based on a simple odometer reading to a variable charge based on a global positioning system (GPS). Other proposals envision mileage-based road user charges that would mimic the way Americans now pay their fuel taxes by collecting the charge at the pump. Most road user charge systems would require electric vehicle users to pay for their use of the roads. Charging by the mile could in itself provide an incentive to drive less. Such a reaction would reduce revenue, however. Implementation of a mileage-based road user charge would have to overcome a number of potential disadvantages relative to the motor fuels tax, including public concern about personal privacy, the higher costs to establish, collect, and enforce (estimates range from 5% to 13% of collections), the administrative challenge of the billing process given the size of the private vehicle fleet (estimated at roughly 256 million vehicles or points of collection), and the setting and adjusting of the road user charge rates, which would likely face as much opposition as increasing the motor fuels taxes. Experiments with road user charges have been conducted in the United States. Although useful, most of these have been small-scale experiments done at the state or local level. Other countries have implemented full-scale road user charge systems that offer more information on the potential costs and benefits. These include road user charges on trucks in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, as well as charges on both trucks and automobiles in New Zealand.",120,121 Income and Poverty Among Older Americans in 2008. This report describes the sources and amounts of income received by the 37.8 million Americans aged 65 and older who lived in non-institutional settings in 2008. The report also describes how the proportion of total income received from each source differs between high-income individuals and households and low-income individuals and households.,116,116 "AIDS Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC): Problems, Responses, and Issues for Congress. Since HIV/AIDS was discovered in 1981, more than 20 million people have lost their lives to the virus. According to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), nearly 40 million are currently living with HIV/AIDS, including nearly 2.2 million children under the age of 15. In 2004, 4.9 million people acquired the virus, and 3.1 million died from AIDS. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the most affected region with 25.4 million people living with HIV/AIDS at the end of 2004 1.9 million of whom were children under the age of 15. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and UNAIDS estimate that at the end of 2003, 15 million children under the age of 18 had lost one or both parents to AIDS, with the majority (82%) in sub-Saharan Africa. In just two years, from 2001 to 2003, the global number of children orphaned by AIDS increased from 11.5 million to 15 million. By 2010, it is expected that more than 25 million children will be orphaned by this deadly virus. Due to the 10-year time lag between HIV infection and death, officials predict that orphan populations will continue to rise for a similar period, even after the HIV rate begins to decline. Experts say only massive spending to prolong the lives of parents could be expected to change this trend. The impact of HIV/AIDS on children is just beginning to be explored. Not only are children orphaned by AIDS affected by the virus, but those who live in homes that have taken in orphans children with little education and resources, and those living in areas with high HIV rates are also impacted. Children who have been orphaned by AIDS may be forced to leave school, engage in labor or prostitution, suffer from depression and anger, or engage in high-risk behavior that makes them vulnerable to contracting HIV. Children who live in homes that take in orphans may see a decline in the quantity and quality of food, education, love, nurturing, and may be stigmatized. Impoverished children living in households with one or more ill parent are also affected, as health care increasingly absorbs household funds, which frequently leads to the depletion of savings and other resources reserved for education, food, and other purposes. Congress passed P.L. 108-25 (""The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003"") in the 108th Congress, which authorizes 10% of HIV/AIDS funds to be used for children orphaned or made vulnerable by the virus. In the 109th Congress, H.R. 1408, ""Assistance for Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children in Developing Countries Act of 2005,"" passed the House and Senate on October 18, 2005, and October 25, 2005, respectively. Ultimately, the bill was enacted on November 8, 2005. The act, P.L. 109-95, established a monitoring and evaluation system to measure the effectiveness of related assistance activities directed the appointment of a Special Advisor for Assistance to Orphans and Vulnerable Children within USAID, and required an annual report on project implementation. This report explores some of the challenges facing children affected by HIV/AIDS, outlines U.S. and international efforts to assist those children, and outlines some key issues that may be considered by Congress in the 109th session. This report will be updated.",77,65 "Ethanol Imports and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Fuel ethanol consumption has grown significantly in the past several years, and it will continue to grow with the establishment of a renewable fuel standard (RFS) in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) and the expansion of that RFS in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140). This standard requires U.S. transportation fuels to contain a minimum amount of renewable fuel, including ethanol. Most of the U.S. market is supplied by domestic refiners producing ethanol from American corn. However, imports play a small but growing role in the U.S. market. One reason for the relatively small role is a 2.5% ad valorem tariff and (more significantly) a 54-cent-per-gallon added duty on imported ethanol. These duties offset an economic incentive of 51 cents per gallon for the use of ethanol in gasoline. However, to promote development and stability in the Caribbean region and Central America, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) allows the imports of most products, including ethanol, duty-free. While many of these products are produced in CBI countries, ethanol entering the United States under the CBI is generally produced elsewhere and reprocessed in CBI countries for export to the United States. The U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) would maintain this duty-free treatment and set specific allocations for imports from Costa Rica and El Salvador. Duty-free treatment of CBI ethanol has raised concerns, especially as the market for ethanol has the potential for dramatic expansion under P.L. 109-58 and P.L. 110-140.",37,37 "U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 2002-2009. This report provides background data on U.S. arms sales agreements with and deliveries to its major purchasers during calendar years 2002-2009, made through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. In a series of data tables, it lists the total dollar values of U.S. government-to-government arms sales agreements with its top five purchasers, and the total dollar values of U.S. arms deliveries to those purchasers, in five specific regions of the world for three specific periods: 2002-2005, 2006-2009, and 2009 alone. In addition, the report provides data tables listing the total dollar values of U.S. government-to-government arms agreements with and deliveries to its top 10 purchasers worldwide for the periods 2002-2005, 2006-2009, and for 2009 alone. This report is prepared in conjunction with CRS Report R41403, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2002-2009, by Richard F. Grimmett. That annual report details both U.S. and foreign arms transfer activities globally and provides analysis of arms trade trends. The intent here is to complement that elaborate worldwide treatment of the international arms trade by providing only the dollar values of U.S. arms sales agreements with and delivery values to its leading customers, by geographic region, for the calendar years 2002-2005, 2006-2009, and 2009. Unlike CRS Report R41403, this annual report focuses exclusively on U.S. arms sales and provides the specific names of the major U.S. arms customers, by region, together with the total dollar values of their arms purchases or deliveries. This report will not be updated.",28,28 "Public Participation in the Management of Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management Lands: Overview and Recent Changes. Historically, opportunities for public participation in the management of the federal lands managed by the Forest Service (FS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) increased over the years as the statutes and regulations governing the lands were modernized, and the remaining federal lands became increasingly important to the public. Public participation in the management of FS and BLM lands derives primarily from four sources: (1) the relevant management laws, regulations, and agency guidance -- especially as to planning procedures, (2) the National Environmental Policy Act environmental review processes, (3) the Administrative Procedure Act, and (4) administrative and judicial appeals. Recently, administrative changes have been made to the planning, environmental review, and administrative appeals procedures to streamline them and make them more efficient. In addition the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-148) also seeks to promote efficiency in the context of hazardous fuels reduction projects by limiting the scope of environmental reviews and expediting administrative and judicial review. The act also allows other authorities to be used including new agency-developed ""categorical exclusions"" (agency procedures that eliminate formal environmental evaluations), and a new approach to considering ""extraordinary circumstances"" that could reduce the number of environmental analyses and the associated opportunities for public input. The FS may also place more of its management direction below the level of regulations, arguably making it more difficult for the public to obtain information, participate in management decisions and perform oversight or seek enforcement. Both the FS and BLM have changed their systems of administrative appeals. The FS has eliminated appeals of plans, revisions, and amendments, unless the amendment is made as part of a project decision. Instead, the FS has instituted a pre-decisional opportunity to object to a proposed plan. BLM has made fire-related project decisions effective immediately. This could result in eliminating administrative appeals in favor of more costly judicial review, and a drop in appeals numbers may result. A similar stance is proposed by BLM for grazing decisions. Some applaud these changes as producing long-overdue efficiency and economy in agency processes. Others assert that the changes are closing the public out of management decisions for the publicly owned lands, and question whether the breadth and effects of some of the changes comport with the spirit and letter of the governing laws. The extent to which recent changes in agency procedures allow or preclude meaningful public participation in the management of these federal lands may raise questions of compliance with current statutory requirements, and may raise policy issues of either legislative or oversight interest to the Congress. This report discusses these issues and will be updated as circumstances warrant.",107,107 "Policy Challenges in International Migration. Immigration is a leading policy concern for many countries around the world, including the United States. Members of Congress have for several years had immigration policy as one of their main legislative issues. Yet, determining an optimal immigration policy has grown increasingly complex as economic, cultural, and security pressures all compete for political consideration. In an effort to tackle some of this complexity, this report serves as a broad overview of the standard theory of international migration and offers a brief synopsis of the major immigration-related policy challenges potentially involved in the legislative debates in Congress. The overview examines several possible issues for Congress as it considers new legislation on immigration reform, including (1) how new immigration legislation might affect migratory behavior and (2) the possible effects of increased or decreased migration on related policy issues. In addressing these issues, this report lays out a basic theoretical foundation for migration, as well as the mitigating role of laws and regulations on migratory behavior. With the exception of certain trafficking circumstances, all migration is based on a decision-making process by the individual migrant (or in some cases by the migrant's household). The decision-making elements are commonly referred to as ""push/pull"" factors. Essentially, while some factors appeal to potential migrants to ""pull"" them toward another country, other circumstances tend to ""push"" them away from their place of residence. If the perceived benefits of these push/pull factors outweigh the perceived cost, an individual is expected to migrate. Despite there being several possible motivations to migrate, the range of choices available for an individual to migrate are limited. Limitations occur in part because of the constraints placed on human behavior by institutions—or ""rules of the game""—such as laws, regulations, or even cultural expectations. Policy makers can actively modify a number of institutions to both deter some forms of migration and facilitate others, thereby mitigating the impact of push/pull factors to the policy maker's advantage. Consequently, institutional manipulation plays a key role in addressing numerous immigration-related policy challenges, because it can be used to facilitate the migration of some potential migrants and deter the migration of others. The increasingly global migration of individuals has created both challenges and opportunities for advanced industrial countries. Despite the idiosyncrasies and unique policies of certain countries, a string of commonalities underlies the pressures all open economies face. Several of the themes partially mirror debates and efforts occurring in the United States. Perhaps most prominent of these is integration, that is, efforts to peaceably adjust society to accommodate any new demographic dynamics. A second recurring theme is the alleged burden placed by some immigrants on the state, including acts of violence, threats to security, crime, and supposed net non-contributors to the welfare state. A final theme concerns how international migration may provide numerous benefits, including alleviating labor shortages, addressing an aging society, and otherwise providing cultural diversity. This report will not be updated.",76,76 "Federal Reserve Issues Final Rule on Emergency Lending. This report briefly discusses major provisions of the Federal Reserve's (Fed's) Final Rule, governing emergency lending under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act and implementing Section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).",100,100 "Advance Appropriations, Forward Funding, and Advance Funding: Concepts, Practice, and Budget Process Considerations. Federal programs that are funded through the annual appropriations process in regular appropriations acts may typically obligate those funds during a period that starts at the beginning of that fiscal year. For certain programs, however, the period of availability for some or all of their funds may be delayed until after the start of the fiscal year or even until a future fiscal year. Three types of delayed periods of availability are discussed in this report: ""advance appropriations,"" ""forward funding,"" and ""advance funding."" Advance appropriations become available for obligation one or more fiscal years after the budget year covered by the appropriations act. Although advance appropriations are provided in order to manage specific planning concerns, they also have implications for the prevention of funding gaps and the avoidance of continuing appropriations for those programs. Advance appropriations are typically enacted at an interval of one fiscal year prior to when such appropriations become available. For accounts that receive advance appropriations, the amount of budget authority that will become available once the fiscal year commences is sometimes adjusted in subsequent appropriations acts through supplemental appropriations or rescissions. Forward funding becomes available beginning late in the budget year and is carried into at least one following fiscal year. This period of availability's main implication is that it facilitates obligations during the summer months for programs that start their activities during the fall, particularly for the Department of Education and Department of Labor. Forward funds tend to become available at an interval that starts on July 1 and are available during at least two fiscal years. Typically, this schedule of availability is combined with annual or advance appropriations so that only the portions of the program that require summer obligations are funded in this manner. Advance funding becomes available late in the budget year and is in addition to the funds for that entire fiscal year, any expenditure of the advance funds is charged to the following fiscal year's appropriation. This period of availability has tended to be used for accounts that fund mandatory payments to individuals. The aggregate amount of such payments may be particularly sensitive to changes in eligible beneficiaries or difficult to predict more than a year in advance. In such instances, providing extra funds that become available late in the fiscal year might lessen or eliminate the potential for a funding shortfall and the need for separate supplemental appropriations. In the two cases where advance funds are currently used, they are available only during the final weeks of the fiscal year. Choosing a delayed period of availability when funding a program may have budget process implications due to the scorekeeping rules that govern the fiscal year to which such funds are attributed. The congressional budget resolution has also imposed various limits on advance appropriations for discretionary spending since FY2001. For FY2014, these limits were established in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. In certain circumstances, making funds available for a delayed period of availability may also violate House and Senate rules that prohibit unauthorized appropriations and other types of legislative provisions.",59,59 "Antipoverty Effects of Unemployment Insurance. This report examines the antipoverty effects of unemployment insurance benefits during the past recession and the economic recovery. The analysis highlights the impact of the additional and expanded unemployment insurance (UI) benefits available to unemployed workers through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) and the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program (Title IV of P.L. 110-252). In 2011, approximately 56% of all unemployed individuals were receiving UI benefits (down from a high of 66% in 2010) and thus were directly affected by legislative changes to the UI system. UI benefits appear to have a large poverty-reducing effect among unemployed workers who receive them. Given the extended length of unemployment among jobless workers, the additional weeks of UI benefits beyond the regular program's 26-week limit appear to have had an especially important effect in poverty reduction. Estimates presented in this report are based on Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of 25 years of data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS/ASEC), administered from 1988 to 2012. The period examined includes the three most recent economic recessions. This report contributes to recent research on the antipoverty effects of unemployment insurance in several ways. Its period of analysis allows comparisons across the three most recent recessions. The report includes estimates of the effects on the poverty rate for the unemployed, for those receiving UI, and for families that report at least one family member receiving UI. It also estimates how much of reported UI benefits went directly to decreasing family poverty levels. This report's analysis shows that UI benefits appear to reduce the prevalence of poverty significantly among the population that receives them. The UI benefits' poverty reduction effects appear to be especially important during and immediately after recessions. The analysis also finds that there was a markedly higher impact on poverty in the most recent recession than in the previous two recessionary periods. The estimated antipoverty effects of UI benefits in 2011 were about 50% higher than that of two previous peak years of unemployment—1993 and 2003. In 2011, over one quarter (26.5%) of unemployed people who received UI benefits would have been considered poor prior to taking UI benefits into account, after counting UI benefits, their poverty rate decreased by just under half, to 13.8%. UI receipt affects not only the poverty status of the person receiving the benefit, but the poverty status of all related family members, as well. In 2011, while an estimated 10.2 million people reported UI receipt during the year, an additional 15.8 million family members lived with the 10.2 million receiving the benefit. Consequently, UI receipt in 2011 affected the income status of some 26.0 million persons. In 2011, the poverty rate for persons in families who had received unemployment benefits was almost 40% less than it otherwise would have been. In 2011, UI benefits lifted an estimated 2.3 million people out of poverty, of which well over one quarter (26.8%, 620,000) were children living with a family member who received UI benefits.",88,103 "Centralized Collection and Disbursement of Child Support Payments. P.L. 104-193 requires state Child Support Enforcement (CSE) agencies to operate a centralized automated unit for collection and disbursement of payments on two categories of child support orders: (1) those enforced by the CSE agency and (2) those issued or modified on or after January 1, 1994, which are not enforced by the state CSE agency but for which the noncustodial parent's income is subject to withholding. The state disbursement unit generally must use automated procedures, electronic processes, and computer-driven technology to collect and disburse support payments, to keep an accurate identification of payments, to promptly disburse money to custodial parents or other states, and to furnish parents with a record of the current status of support payments. The collection and disbursement unit provisions went into effect on October 1, 1998, except that states that processed the receipt of child support payments through local courts could continue to process those payments through such courts until September 30, 1999. All of the jurisdictions with the October 1, 1998 deadline, with the exception of California, are now operating state disbursement units. Information is not yet officially available with regard to states with the October 1, 1999 deadline. (States have until December 31, 1999 to notify the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as to whether or not they have a centralized disbursement unit.) HHS expects that California, Nebraska, Ohio and perhaps five or six other states will not meet the October 1, 1999 deadline. Because of the total loss of CSE funding plus possible loss of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funding for states that are not in compliance with the state disbursement unit requirements, Congress has passed legislation (H.R. 3194) that would impose a lesser alternative penalty for these states. On November 18, 1999, the House passed H.R. 3194, an omnibus appropriations bill, that contains a provision that would lessen the penalty for states that are not in compliance with the centralized state disbursement unit requirement. On November 19, 1999, the Senate passed H.R. 3194. This bill was signed into law (P.L. 106-113) on November 29, 1999. This report will not be updated.",95,95 "The FDA 2009 Budget Request. The Administration's FY2009 budget request of $2.4 billion for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would provide a 5.7% increase ($130 million) over FY2008. User fees would make up about 26% of the total amount requested and would account for 61% of the proposed increase. Budget documents indicate that the additional funding would provide for expanded activities to ensure the safety of foods and drugs, as well as to accelerate the availability of new medical products. About half of the requested increase would be used for cost-of-living pay increases, as opposed to new program activities.",2,2 "Interrogation of Detainees: Requirements of the Detainee Treatment Act. U.S. treatment of enemy combatants and terrorist suspects captured in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations has been a subject of long-standing debate, including whether such treatment complies with U.S. statutes and treaties such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT). In response to this controversy, Congress approved additional guidelines concerning the treatment of detainees via the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which was enacted pursuant to both the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-148, Title X), and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163, Title XIV). Among other things, the DTA contains provisions that (1) require Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to employ United States Army Field Manual guidelines while interrogating detainees, and (2) prohibit the ""cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment of persons under the detention, custody, or control of the United States Government."" These provisions of the DTA, which were first introduced by Senator John McCain, have popularly been referred to as the ""McCain Amendment."" This report discusses provisions of the DTA concerning standards for the interrogation and treatment of detainees. This report discusses the application of the DTA by the DOD in the updated 2006 version of the Army Field Manual, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. In addition, the report discusses the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) (P.L. 109-366), which contains provisions that reference or amend the DTA. It also addresses the Executive Order issued by President Barack Obama that generally instructs all U.S. agencies to comply with Army Field Manual requirements when interrogating persons captured in an armed conflict. The report also discusses the recommendations made by the Special Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer established by the Executive Order, and the DTA's relevance in the event of the prosecution of U.S. personnel for authorized interrogation or detention activities. For discussion of the provisions in the DTA that limit judicial review of challenges to U.S. detention policy, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Kenneth R. Thomas, and Michael John Garcia. Several legislative proposals were introduced during the 110th Congress that referenced or modified the DTA's requirements relating to the treatment and interrogation of detainees, including H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, which was vetoed by President Bush on March 8, 2008, and House-passed H.R. 4156, the Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment Appropriations Act, 2008. Both bills would have barred the CIA and other intelligence agencies from employing any interrogation tactic that is not authorized by the Army Field Manual. Similar proposals have been introduced in the 111th Congress. It remains to be seen whether President Obama's recent Executive Order on detainee treatment will affect congressional interest in passing further legislation affecting U.S. interrogation policy.",30,24 "Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief. While not defined by statute, DOD doctrine describes clandestine activities as ""operations sponsored or conducted by governmental departments in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment"" that may include relatively passive intelligence collection information gathering operations. Unlike covert action, clandestine activities do not require a presidential finding but may require notification of Congress. This definition differentiates clandestine from covert, using clandestine to signify the tactical concealment of the activity. By comparison, covert operations are ""planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor."" Since the 1970s, Congress has established and continued to refine oversight procedures in reaction to instances where it had not been given prior notice of intelligence activities—particularly covert action—that had significant bearing on United States national security. Congress, for example, had no foreknowledge of the CIA's orchestration of the 1953 coup that overthrew Iran's only democratically elected government, or of the U-2 surveillance flights over the Soviet Union that ended with the Soviet shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers in 1960. Eventually, media disclosures of the CIA's domestic surveillance of the anti-Vietnam War movement and awareness of the agency's covert war in Laos resulted in Congress taking action. In 1974, Congress began its investigation into the scope of past intelligence community activities that provided the basis for statutory provisions for intelligence oversight going forward. The 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (§32 of P.L. 93-559) provided the earliest provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. In the late 1970s, Congress established a permanent oversight framework, standing up the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). These committees were given exclusive oversight jurisdiction of the intelligence community. Recent events in North Korea, Yemen, and elsewhere have underscored the important function Congress can have in influencing the scope and direction of intelligence policy that supports United States national security. However, despite Congress's work during the past decades to establish statutory provisions for conducting intelligence oversight, those efforts have not always achieved Congress's desired result. For example, there has been occasional confusion over whether the congressional intelligence or defense committees have jurisdiction for oversight purposes. This confusion is due in part to overlapping or mutually supporting missions of the military and intelligence agencies, particularly in the post-9/11 counterterrorism environment. Intelligence and military activities fall under different statutory authorities, but they may have similar characteristics that warrant congressional notification (e.g., a need to conceal United States sponsorship and serious risk of exposure, compromise, and loss of life).",27,27 "Trade Remedies and the WTO Rules Negotiations. At the November 2001 Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Doha, Qatar, member countries launched a new round of trade talks known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Discussions continue, although negotiations at this time seem to be at an impasse. One of the negotiating objectives in the DDA called for ""clarifying and improving disciplines"" under the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement or ADA) and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement or ASCM). The frequent use of trade remedies by the United States and other developed nations—and increasingly, developing countries—has come under criticism by some WTO members as being protectionist. In a March 2010 report, the chairman of the rules negotiations mentioned that consensus had been reached on many technical issues, but that there was no agreement on the larger ""political"" issues. Some in Congress cite U.S. use of trade remedies as necessary to protect U.S. firms and workers from unfair competition. Some also credit the existence of trade remedies with helping to increase public support for additional trade liberalization measures. These groups would like increased trade enforcement of trade remedies and intellectual property laws. Others in Congress, especially those who represent U.S. importers, manufacturers, and export-oriented businesses, tend to support liberalizing the ADA and ASCM, in ways that could make use of U.S. trade remedy laws less frequent and relief harder to obtain. For example, there is support in Congress for legislation that would require administering authorities to determine whether or not a trade remedy action is in the overall public interest before such a measure can be imposed. DDA negotiations involve Congress because any trade agreement made by the United States must be implemented by legislation, thus Congress also has an important oversight role in trade negotiations. For example, preserving ""the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws"" was included as a principal negotiating objective in legislation granting presidential Trade Promotion Authority—the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). In the WTO talks, the positions of major players in trade remedy talks are well-documented by position papers written by WTO members that are circulated through the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules. Major themes that have emerged include limiting the use of trade remedy actions in favor of ""price undertakings,"" reducing the level of duties assessed per action by ending mandatory offsets (also known as ""zeroing""), or limiting the duration of trade remedy measures through mandatory ""sunset"" reviews. Some members also support placing more restrictions on the ability of officials to grant relief to domestic industries through the use of economic interest tests and other administrative procedures and ""special and differential treatment"" for developing countries. Some countries see revision of the ADA and ASCM and other WTO disciplines on trade remedies as a ""make or break"" issue if the Doha Development Agenda is to succeed. This report examines trade remedy issues in DDA in three parts. The first part provides background information and contextual analysis. The second section focuses on how these issues fit into the DDA. A third section provides a more specific overview of major reform proposals that are being considered.",52,53 "Bolivia: In Brief. In the last decade, Bolivia has transformed from a country plagued by political volatility and economic instability that was closely aligned with the United States to a relatively stable country with a growing economy that now has strained relations with the U.S. government. Located in the Andean region of South America, Bolivia, like Peru and Colombia, has been a major producer of coca leaf, the main ingredient in the production of cocaine. Since 2006, Bolivia has enjoyed a period of relative political stability and steady economic growth during the two presidential terms of populist President Evo Morales, the countrys first indigenous leader and head of the countrys coca growers union. Buoyed by a booming natural gas industry, Morales and his party, the leftist Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, have decriminalized coca cultivation, increased state control over the economy, expanded social programs, and enacted a new constitution favoring the rights of indigenous peoples. U.S. interest in Bolivia has traditionally centered on counternarcotics, trade, and development matters. From the late 1980s through the mid-2000s, successive Bolivian governments, with financial and technical assistance from the United States, tried various strategies to combat illicit coca production, including forced eradication. In support of Bolivias counternarcotics efforts, the United States has provided significant interdiction and alternative development assistance, and has forgiven all of Bolivias debt for development assistance projects and most of the debt for food assistance. From 1991 through November 2008, Bolivia also received U.S. trade preferences in exchange for its counternarcotics cooperation under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA, Title II of P.L. 102-182). Bolivia also received U.S. development, democracy, and health assistance provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1961 through 2013. Although President Morales policies have proven popular with his supporters, they have worried foreign investors and strained U.S. relations, particularly in the realm of drug control. With an antagonistic foreign policy closely aligned with that of Venezuela, Bolivian-U.S. relations have been more tense during the Morales Administrations than they have been in decades. Despite significant strains in the bilateral relationship, the two countries have not formally severed diplomatic or consular relations, even though they have not exchanged Ambassadors since President Morales expelled the U.S. Ambassador in the fall of 2008. Due to actions taken by the Morales government (including the 2013 expulsion of USAID from the country) and a lack of counterdrug cooperation with the United States, Bolivia has lost U.S. trade preferences and no longer receives U.S. foreign aid. This report provides background information on Bolivia, an analysis of its current political and economic situation, and an assessment of some key issues in Bolivian-U.S. relations.",85,85 "Federal Counter-Terrorism Training: Issues for Congressional Oversight. Federal counter-terrorism training programs are varied and are provided by numerous federal agencies and departments. Some of these departments and agencies include the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), Health and Human Services (HHS), Justice (DOJ), Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Each department and agency provides specific counter-terrorism training targeted to given categories of recipients. Training recipients include federal, state, and local government personnel, emergency responders, and private and public critical infrastructure personnel. The programs train individuals to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. Most of these federal departments and agencies provide training in conjunction with private and public educational institutions, federal laboratories, and federal research and development centers. The mission of DHS to secure the nation from terrorist attacks gives it primary federal responsibility for providing counter-terrorism training to federal, state, and local emergency responders. Other departments and agencies provide counter-terrorism training, but these programs focus either on specific critical infrastructure sectors, such as energy and transportation, or on specific emergency responders, such as HHS training for medical personnel and DOJ training for law enforcement personnel. DHS provides training to a wide range of critical infrastructure personnel, law enforcement and other emergency responders, government (federal, state, and local) personnel, and medical personnel. This report is an overview of the major training activities and facilities of the federal departments and agencies that provide counter-terrorism training. It identifies some of the issues associated with the training, including the following possible duplication of federal counter-terrorism training programs determination of Department of Homeland Security counter-terrorism training priorities, and possible redundancy and coordination of DHS counter-terrorism training programs. The report will be updated as congressional actions warrant.",22,22 "Discretionary Spending Limits for FY2002: A Procedural Assessment. This report discusses discretionary spending, which is provided in annual appropriations acts, is constrained in part by limits set in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.",55,101 "End-of-Life Care: Services, Costs, Ethics, and Quality of Care. End-of-life care can be broadly defined as health care provided to persons who are very ill, have a prognosis that is likely to worsen, and most likely will die in the near term from their illness. End-of-life care may be in the form of acute care provided in the days or months prior to death or palliative care, which focuses on relieving the patient's suffering and reducing the severity of disease symptoms as well as improving quality of life. Hospice care is a form of palliative care that delivers comfort care to those who forgo curative treatment and have a life expectancy that can be measured in months. Achieving a health care system where the provision of end-of-life care services are sensitive to and accommodate the needs of all those involved requires attention to a range of ethical and policy issues, including personal choice, cost, and quality of care. Over the past century, several demographic and historical changes have affected the experience of death and dying in the United States. The development of new technologies, and the associated prospect of longer, more protracted deaths, has focused some policy discussions on the topic of patients' preferences. Federal law generally defers to state law concerning health-care decision making. Given the complexities in decision making surrounding medical interventions that have life-extending potential, states have passed laws to address end-of-life care issues, such as advance directives. However, there is considerable variation among state laws. Costs of care at the end of life may be paid by Medicare or Medicaid, private insurance, or out-of-pocket. According to CMS, about one-fourth of total Medicare spending is for the last year of life. This share has remained generally constant for the past 20 years. The majority of Medicare end-of-life costs are from inpatient hospital expenditures. Researchers have also found that there is wide geographic variation in end-of-life Medicare costs. This geographic variation may reflect differences in practice patterns of physicians and is not necessarily due to differences in prevalence of disease among chronically ill patients. End-of-life care presents numerous challenges and opportunities for quality measurement, assessment, and improvement. Assessments of quality end-of-life care are often based on family and patient satisfaction. Factors associated with perceptions of higher quality care include expressions of patients' wishes, discussions of families' spiritual needs, documentation of a living will, and family presence at the time of death. A number of initiatives are currently underway to improve the quality of care individuals receive at the end of life, and specifically the quality of palliative and hospice care. As the nation prepares for an aging population and likely increase in the need for high quality end-of-life care services among the elderly, Congress may face a decision whether to expand the role of the federal government in providing support to individuals and families to assist with end-of-life care. This report provides information on various aspects of end-of-life care. The report is divided into six sections that address (1) demographic and historical changes affecting death and dying in the United States, (2) the definitions of end-of-life, palliative, and hospice care, (3) costs associated with end-of-life care, (4) end-of-life care laws and ethics, (5) quality of care at the end of life, and (6) policy issues that would modify or expand the federal government's role in addressing end-of-life care. This report will be updated as warranted.",71,71 "Farm Commodity Legislation: Chronology, 1933-2002. This report discusses legislation regarding commodities and price supports. Since 1933, Congress has required the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to administer various price and income support programs for U.S. farmers. Some standing authority for these programs is provided by three permanent laws, from 1938, 1948, and 1949. However, Congress frequently alters the basic provisions of these laws. The omnibus law now guiding farm support (through 2007) is the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002.",3,3 "Samantar v. Yousef: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and Foreign Officials. On June 1, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided unanimously in Samantar v. Yousef that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which governs the immunity of foreign states in U.S. courts, does not apply in suits against foreign officials. The ruling clarifies that officials of foreign governments, whether present or former, are not entitled to invoke the FSIA as a shield, unless the foreign state is the real party in interest in the case. Samantar's particular facts involve the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), but the ruling applies to all causes of action against foreign officials. The ruling leaves open the possibility that foreign officials have recourse to other sources of immunity or other defenses to jurisdiction or the merits of a lawsuit. Officials may assert immunity under the common law, for example, perhaps aided by State Department suggestions of immunity. The Court also left open the possibility that Congress could enact new provisions to address the immunity of foreign officials. Prior to the Samantar decision, most federal judicial circuits interpreted the FSIA to cover foreign officials as ""agencies or instrumentalities"" of the foreign state based on their interpretation that Congress had intended to fully codify the common law of foreign sovereign immunity. To the extent the FSIA exceptions codify sovereign immunity of states under the common law, as in the case of lawsuits based on commercial activity under the restrictive theory, the recognition of a separate theory of immunity for foreign officials may not yield results significantly different from those cases in which courts applied the FSIA. The same common law considerations some courts previously applied to determine whether a foreign official is an ""agency or instrumentality"" under the FSIA would likely lead to similar results where the common law is applied directly. However, where Congress enacts exceptions to the FSIA that depart from the common law, outcomes may vary from cases decided under the pre-Samantar approach. This report provides an overview of the FSIA, followed by a consideration of the remaining options for foreign officials who seek immunity from lawsuits, as well as some of the questions that may emerge from each option. The report also discusses legislation addressing the immunity of foreign officials (the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, H.R. 3143 and S. 1535).",78,76 "Monetary Aggregates: Their Use in the Conduct of Monetary Policy. Economic theory and history make a compelling case that monetary policy is powerful in affecting the pace of economic activity and employment in the short run and the rate of inflation in the longer run. Thus, unambiguous indicators should exist for those formulating, executing, and overseeing monetary policy. To this end, definitions of money are sought, as are collections of assets consistent with those definitions. For these measures of money—known as monetary aggregates—to be useful in a policy context, they must, at a minimum, be stable and predictably related to spending, meaning that when they are changed, the subsequent change in spending can be closely predicted. If they meet that test they can provide information about the current stance of monetary policy. Should they be under the control of the Federal Reserve (Fed), they may be useful as intermediate target variables in the execution of monetary policy. The monetary aggregates constructed by the Fed are no longer stable and predictably related to spending, although they once may have been. A vast number of studies have sought to explain the reason for this sudden instability. Their findings highlighted efforts by financial institutions to get around federal regulations, structural changes related to economic development, the use of U.S. currency abroad, and a number of one-time events such as the thrift crisis of the mid-1980s. Accounting for these developments led to refinements of the existing aggregates, development of new aggregates, and new measures of opportunity costs. At most, this research suggests that the refined old and new aggregates can provide useful information about future income growth, employment, and inflation. Several of the aggregates, however, do not seem to be under the control of the Fed. Were monetary aggregates to exist that were stable and predictably related to spending and under the control of the Fed, their use in the conduct of monetary policy would likely be controversial. Some economists, who see monetary instability as the major cause of business cycles, favor a rule-based policy of increasing the aggregates at a fixed percentage per year. Others, with different notions of the causes of cyclical instability, tend to favor a discretionary approach to policy and monetary fine tuning. If ideal monetary aggregates do not exist or are not under the control of the Fed if they do exist, monetary policy can be formulated and executed in terms of interest rates. However, the relevant interest rates for household and business spending decisions are the real or inflation-adjusted rates. These rates can be affected by actions of others in the economy in addition to the Fed and by developments abroad. Thus, their movements may provide little information about monetary policy. The oversight of monetary policy is handicapped by a lack of reliable, objective, and unambiguous monetary indicators. This leads to the unhealthy situation in which those responsible for overseeing monetary policy must rely heavily on the Fed to provide them with an assessment of policy, which may hinder an arms length assessment. This report will be updated.",100,100 "Israeli-Turkish Relations. Agreements reached in the Arab-Israeli peace process from 1993 until 1995 made relations between Israel and its Arab and Muslim neighbors more acceptable in the latter circles. Israeli-Turkish ties are the most portentous development in this area, and they have not been impeded by subsequent difficulties in the peace process. The main dimension of Turkish-Israeli relations is military. Landmark agreements on military cooperation in February 1996 and on military industrial cooperation in April 1996 have produced unprecedented military exercises and training, arms sales, and strategic talks. The civilian dimension of the new partnership is expanding rapidly, spurred by a 1996 Free Trade Agreement and resulting increases in non-military trade. Israeli-Turkish relations are founded on historical cordiality between Turks and Jews, and are motivated by the self-interest of each side. Turkey had been concerned about what it viewed as detrimental repercussions from a possible Israeli-Syrian peace agreement and wanted to be consulted. It also sought to send a cautionary message to Damascus about its aid to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK),which has been waging a guerrilla war in southeast Turkey since 1984, and about unresolved disputes over water and territory. Moreover, Turkey needed a response to Greece's policy of encircling it with military agreements, including an unsubstantiated arrangement with Syria. Finally, the Israeli connection enables Turkey to circumvent U.S. and European arms embargos and what it believes to be the influence of anti-Turkish ethnic lobbies in Congress. Purchase of Israeli arms allows Turkey to avoid the strictures of politically conditioned European and U.S. sales, and possibly to mitigate the anti-Turkish policies of governments competing with Israel to sell arms to Turkey. For its part, Israel initially perceived Turkey as a bridge to the Arab and Muslim worlds, but also may have wanted to vent its frustrations over what it views as Syria's intransigence in peace talks. Israel has found a more lasting commonality with Turkey on anti- terrorism and in military and civilian trade. There is only mild domestic dissent in Turkey and Israel over enhanced relations. Some governments in the region have reacted more forcefully. Syria, viewing itself as the unstated target of the new allies, has mobilized Arab and Islamic condemnation, reached out to Baghdad to indicate possibilities of a counter-bloc, but eventually opened a dialogue with Turkey. Egypt's reaction has been moderate in bilateral talks with Ankara, but negative in multilateral Arab and Muslim forums. Jordan has attended some Turkish-Israeli events, but has pointedly noted that its actions were in response to invitations from Ankara, not Israel, while the peace talks are stalled. Greek officials and some in Cyprus are concerned that Israeli military and intelligence assistance to Turkey might eventually be used against them, and direct their criticism to Jerusalem. The U.S. government views Israeli-Turkish relations positively, as contributing to regional peace and stability. Possible effects on other U.S. policy priorities in the region are not yet clear. The U.S.-Israeli Free Trade Agreement and the Arms Export Control Act may be implicated in individual Israeli-Turkish deals.",85,85 "Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background and Issues for Congress. The Coast Guard's FY2007 budget requests $934.431 million for the Deepwater acquisition program. The House-reported version of H.R. 5441, the FY2007 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations bill, recommends $892.64 million for the Deepwater program, the Senate-reported version recommends $993.631 million.",122,122 "Child Care Issues in the 109th Congress. Federal support for child care comes in many forms, ranging from grant programs to tax provisions. Some programs serve as specifically dedicated funding sources for child care services (e.g., the Child Care and Development Block Grant, or CCDBG), while for others (e.g., Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF), child care is just one of many purposes for which funds may be used. In many cases, federal programs target low-income families in need of child care assistance, but in the case of certain tax provisions, the benefits reach middle- and upper-income families as well. This report provides an overview of federal child care and related programs as they were addressed by the 109th Congress. The 109th Congress inherited several child care-related agenda items from the previous Congress(es), but resolved only a few. Efforts to reauthorize the CCDBG and TANF block grants, as well as the Head Start program, had started in the 108th Congress, and ultimately, in February 2006, after 12 temporary extensions, the TANF block grant and the mandatory portion of child care funding was reauthorized for a five-year period via the Deficit Reduction Act (P.L. 109-171). Whereas bills to reauthorize the Child Care and Development Block Grant itself (H.R. 240 and S. 525) and the Head Start Program (H.R. 2123 and S. 2206) failed to make their way to enactment in law, and remain on the agenda for the 110th Congress. Funding for many child care and related programs is provided each year as part of the annual appropriations process for the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Education (ED). Fiscal Year 2007 appropriations bills for those departments (among most others) did not receive floor action in the House or Senate during the 109th Congress, although the 2007 fiscal year began on October 1, 2006. The process extended into the 110th Congress, with a third continuing resolution (P.L. 109-383) temporarily funding government operations (through February 15, 2007) at rates based on the FY2006 funding levels. The FY2006 appropriations (P.L. 109-149) included funding slightly below FY2005 amounts for most child care and related programs, as a result of an across-the-board rescission of 1% applied to most discretionary programs. Additional targeted funding for Head Start and the Social Services Block Grant—supplemental funding targeted specifically in response to needs arising from the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005—was included in the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-148). The President's FY2007 budget proposals in areas related to child care and early childhood development were framed in the context of the Administration's Early Childhood Initiative—""Good Start, Grow Smart""—which was initially launched in April 2002. The initiative emphasized the importance of promoting school readiness, a key focus of the President's Head Start reauthorization proposals. In efforts to promote school readiness among pre-school children, there has also been a growing emphasis on better coordination of early childhood programs, including most of the federal programs described in this report, as well as state pre-kindergarten programs and other state-funded efforts. This is the final update of this report, the 109th Congress has adjourned.",115,115 "Department of Veterans Affairs FY2017 Appropriations. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans and eligible dependents who meet certain criteria as authorized by law. These benefits include medical care, disability compensation and pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, administration of life insurance as well as traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers, and death benefits that cover burial expenses. The President's FY2017 budget request for the VA was submitted to Congress on February 9, 2016. The President's FY2017 request for VA is approximately $177.54 billion. This amount, which includes $102.53 billion in mandatory funding and $75.01 billion in discretionary appropriations, is a 9.14% increase over the FY2016-enacted level of $162.67 billion. On April 13, 2016, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2017 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies (MILCON-VA) appropriations bill (H.R. 4974, H.Rept. 114-497). The House passed the measure on May 19. The House-passed measure provides a total of $176.06 billion for the VA, a slight decrease (0.83%) from the President's request of $177.54 billion and an 8.23% increase from the FY2016-enacted amount. This amount includes $102.53 billion in mandatory appropriations and $73.53 billion in discretionary appropriations. On April 14, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill (S. 2806, S.Rept. 114-237). The Senate passed the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill on May 19 as an appropriations package that included the FY2017 Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations bill (Division A), the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill (Division B), and the Zika Response appropriations bill (Title V of Division B). The Senate-passed version of the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations bill (Division B of H.R. 2577) provides a total of $177.39 billion for VA, a 9.04% increase over the FY2016-enacted level of $162.67 billion and slightly less than the President's request for FY2017. This amount includes $102.53 billion in mandatory appropriations and $74.85 billion in discretionary appropriations. On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act (H.R. 5325, P.L. 114-223). Division A of this act contained the FY2017 MILCON-VA appropriations act. P.L. 114-223 would provide $176.89 billion for VA for FY2017. This includes $102.53 billion in mandatory funding and $74.36 billion in discretionary funding. The act also contained several administrative provisions including, among others, fertility counseling and treatment using assisted reproductive technology (e.g., in vitro fertilization, IVF) for eligible veterans and their spouses or adoption reimbursement. It also included the VA Patient Protection Act of 2016, which would establish another process for VA employees to file whistleblower complaints in addition to the relief under the Whistleblower Protection Act (P.L. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16, P.L. 103-424, 108 Stat. 4361). On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, which included the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs—Additional Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31, Division L). This act provides an additional $50 million for implementation costs associated with the Jason Simcakoski Memorial and Promise Act (Title IX of P.L. 114-198). Thus the total enacted amount provided for VA for FY2017 is $176.94 billion. This report provides an overview of VA appropriations, for a discussion on military construction appropriations, see CRS Report R44639, Military Construction: FY2017 Appropriations.",30,30 "The Animal Welfare Act: Background and Selected Animal Welfare Legislation. In 1966, Congress passed the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (P.L. 89-54) to prevent pets from being stolen for sale to research laboratories, and to regulate the humane care and handling of dogs, cats, and other laboratory animals. Farm animals are not covered by the AWA. The law was amended in 1970 (P.L. 91-579), changing the name to the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The AWA is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Congress periodically amends the act to strengthen enforcement, expand coverage to more animals and activities, or curtail practices viewed as cruel (e.g., animal fighting), among other things. Congress also addresses animal welfare issues through other legislation (e.g., the Horse Protection Act), but the AWA remains the central federal statute governing the humane care and handling of mammals, including marine mammals. Animal welfare bills introduced in the 114th Congress include the Pet Safety and Protection Act (H.R. 2849), which would amend the AWA to ensure that all cats and dogs used in research were properly obtained. H.R. 3136, the Enforcement Transparency Act of 2015, would amend the AWA to require USDA to issue guidelines relating to civil fines imposed for violating the AWA. H.R. 3193, the Animal Emergency Planning Act of 2015, would amend the AWA to require that research facilities, animal dealers, exhibitors, handlers, and carriers under the AWA, develop and implement emergency contingency plans for animals in their charge. The Orca Responsibility and Care Advancement Act of 2015 (H.R. 4019) would amend both the AWA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 to prohibit the capture, importation, and exportation of orcas for public display. The bill would amend the AWA to prohibit the breeding of orcas for exhibition purposes. The Safe Transport for Horses Act (S. 946) and the Horse Transportation Safety Act (H.R. 1282) would amend the Transportation title (49 U.S.C. 80502) to prohibit the interstate transportation of horses in motor vehicles containing two or more levels stacked on top of one another. The Refuge from Cruel Trapping Act (S. 1081/H.R. 2016) would ban body-gripping traps from National Wildlife Refuges. Each of these bills has been referred to committees, but no further action was taken as of late 2015. Following publication of USDA Inspector General's report on the inadequacy of the current horse soring inspection system, legislation to amend the Horse Protection Act (P.L. 91-540) was introduced. H.R. 3268/S. 1121, the Prevent All Soring Techniques (PAST) Act, would amend the current soring inspection system to place inspections under APHIS control rather than under the horse industry as it is currently. The Horse Protection Amendments Act (S. 1161) would also modify the inspection system, but retain inspection control within the horse industry. Also introduced in the 114th Congress were bills that would end the exemption of farm animals from regulation under the AWA, and bring federal research under AWA registration and inspection. H.R. 746/S. 388, the Animal Welfare in Agricultural Research Endeavors Act, is a response to a widely reviewed article in the New York Times on the research activities at the Meat Animal Research Center, a USDA Agricultural Research Serviced facility. Among APHIS regulatory actions in 2015 concerning the AWA, APHIS announced in May 2015 that it was seeking public comment on a petition from several animal welfare groups asking for specific rules on the care of all primates regarding their social and psychological well-being. APHIS also announced receiving a petition in 2013 from the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine to amend the AWA to define alternatives to procedures that may cause pain or distress to animals and to establish standards to consider these alternatives. APHIS is currently considering public comments that it received regarding these two petitions.",0,0 "Capturing CO2 from Coal-Fired Power Plants: Challenges for a Comprehensive Strategy. Any comprehensive approach to substantially reduce greenhouse gases must address the world's dependency on coal for one-quarter of its energy demand, including almost half of its electricity demand. To maintain coal in the world's energy mix in a carbon-constrained future would require development of a technology to capture and store its carbon dioxide emissions. This situation suggests to some that any greenhouse gas reduction program be delayed until such carbon capture technology has been demonstrated. However, technological innovation and the demands of a carbon control regime are interlinked, a technology policy is no substitute for environmental policy and should be developed in concert with it. Much of the debate about developing and commercializing carbon capture technology has focused on the role of research, development, and deployment (technology-push mechanisms). However, for technology to be fully commercialized, it must also meet a market demand—a demand created either through a price mechanism or a regulatory requirement (demand-pull mechanisms). Any conceivable carbon capture technology for coal-fired power plants will increase the cost of electricity generation from affected plants because of efficiency losses. Therefore, few companies are likely to install such technology until they are required to, either by regulation or by a carbon price. Regulated industries may find their regulators reluctant to accept the risks and cost of installing technology that is not required. The Department of Energy (DOE) has invested millions of dollars since 1997 in carbon capture technology research and development (R&D), and the question remains whether it has been too much, too little, or about the right amount. In addition to appropriating funds each year for the DOE program, Congress supported R&D investment through provisions for loan guarantees and tax credits. Congress also authorized a significant expansion of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) spending at DOE in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Funding for carbon capture technology has increased substantially as a result of enactment of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Legislation introduced in the 111th and 110th Congresses invokes the symbolism of the Manhattan project of the 1940s and the Apollo program of the 1960s to frame proposals for large-scale energy policy initiatives that include developing CCS technology. However, commercialization of technology and integration of technology into the private market were not goals of either the Manhattan project or Apollo program. Finally, it should be noted that the status quo for coal with respect to climate change legislation isn't necessarily the same as ""business as usual."" The financial markets and regulatory authorities appear to be hedging their bets on the outcomes of any federal legislation with respect to greenhouse gas reductions, and becoming increasingly unwilling to accept the risk of a coal-fired power plant with or without carbon capture capacity. The lack of a regulatory scheme presents numerous risks to any research and development effort designed to develop carbon capture technology. Ultimately, it also presents a risk to the future of coal.",42,42 "Duration of Continuing Resolutions in Recent Years. Continuing appropriations acts (commonly known as continuing resolutions or CRs), which provide interim funding in the event that regular appropriations have not been enacted, have been an integral component of the annual appropriations process for decades. Whenever action on one or more of the regular appropriations acts for a fiscal year is incomplete, an issue that arises is the appropriate duration of any period for which continuing resolutions will be used. Continuing resolutions may have a relatively short duration in the expectation that action on the regular appropriations acts will be concluded within several days or weeks. Alternatively, continuing resolutions may have a longer duration to postpone final action on appropriations decisions until after elections, or through the beginning of the next congressional session. Finally, a continuing resolution may provide funding for the remainder of the fiscal year. The duration of a continuing resolution refers to the period for which budget authority is provided for covered projects and activities. The period ends either upon enactment of the applicable regular appropriations act or on an expiration date specified in the continuing resolution, whichever occurs first. Based upon their duration, continuing resolutions may be classified as either interim or full-year measures. Interim (or temporary) continuing resolutions provide funding for periods usually measured in days or weeks (but sometimes months), while full-year continuing resolutions provide funding through September 30, the last day of the fiscal year. Over the past half century, the timing patterns for congressional action on regular appropriations acts have varied considerably, but tardy enactment has been a recurring problem. During the 24-year period covering FY1952-FY1976, when the fiscal year began on July 1, at least one regular appropriations bill was enacted after the start of the fiscal year. Continuing resolutions were used in all fiscal years during this period except FY1953, despite the fact that only one regular appropriations bills was enacted before the start of that fiscal year. From FY1977 to FY2011, after the start of the fiscal year was moved to October 1, all of the regular appropriations acts were enacted on time in only four instances (FY1977, FY1989, FY1995, and FY1997). No continuing resolutions were enacted for three of these fiscal years, but continuing resolutions were enacted for FY1977 to fund certain unauthorized programs whose funding had been dropped from the regular appropriations acts. Full-year continuing resolutions provide funding for one or more of the regular appropriations acts for the remainder of the fiscal year. While Congress has employed full-year continuing resolutions on many occasions, it has not done so consistently over time. For each of the 11 fiscal years covering FY1978-FY1988, Congress enacted a full-year continuing resolution to provide funding for programs and activities covered by at least one regular appropriations act. Three years later, Congress enacted another full-year continuing resolution, for FY1992. Most recently, Congress enacted a full-year continuing resolution for FY2011. During the past 15 fiscal years (FY1998-FY2012), Congress provided funding under continuing resolutions for an average of over four months (126.6 days). The period for which continuing appropriations were provided in these 15 years ranged from 21 days to 365 days. On average, each of the 92 continuing resolutions enacted during this period lasted for about 29 (28.8) days, 45 of these were for 7 days or less.",101,101 "U.S. and International Health Responses to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. In March 2014, an Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak was reported in Guinea, West Africa. The outbreak is the first in West Africa and has caused an unprecedented number of cases and deaths. The outbreak is continuing to spread in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (the ""affected countries""), it has been contained in Nigeria and Senegal, and has been detected in Mali. As of October 22, 2014, more than 10,000 people have contracted EVD, more than half of whom have died. Until October 2014, no secondary EVD cases had occurred outside of Africa. That month, health workers in Spain and the United States contracted EVD cases while providing care for Ebola patients. Other factors make this outbreak unique, including its introduction into West Africa multi-country outbreaks occurring simultaneously disease transmission within urban areas, and an unprecedented scale and pace of transmission. In the aggregate, between 1976, when Ebola was first identified, through 2012, there were 2,387 cases, including 1,590 deaths, all in Central and East Africa. The number of Ebola cases in this outbreak is four times higher than the combined total of all prior outbreaks, and the number of cases is doubling monthly. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have projected an exponential increase in cases. WHO estimated that by the end of November, some 20,000 people may contract Ebola, CDC estimated that ""without additional interventions or changes in community behavior,"" up to 1.4 million could contract EVD in Liberia and Sierra Leone by January 2015. CDC indicates, however, that the outbreak may not reach such proportions since responses are intensifying. In Liberia, for example, improvements in burial practices have resulted in roughly 85% of all bodies being collected within 24 hours of being reported to national officials. In an August 2014 report, WHO estimated that it would cost roughly $500 million to contain the outbreak by January. In September, international responses accelerated. The United Nations (U.N.) established the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) ""to utilize the assets of all relevant U.N. agencies"" to address the health and broader social impacts of the outbreak. A proposed U.N. response would cost roughly $1 billion, about half of which would be aimed at addressing health impacts. The United States is the leading funder of the international Ebola response, and its financial support is growing. As of October 25, almost 900 U.S. government personnel had deployed to the region, and some 4,000 military personnel will be deployed to the region. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reports that as of October 22, U.S. funding for EVD responses totaled $344.6 million. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) is planning to spend more than $1 billion on EVD activities in West Africa. On October 17, President Obama established an Ebola Czar to coordinate U.S. domestic and global responses to the Ebola outbreak. Some global health experts have criticized the U.S. and international response to the Ebola outbreak, decrying the pace and scale of assistance. The limited impact of U.S. and international responses to the Ebola outbreak has raised several questions regarding global health governance structures, international commitment to bolstering pandemic preparedness and response capacity in poor countries, and global support for strengthening health systems. The international community lacks a rapid response team of health professionals prepared to address health emergencies like the ongoing West African Ebola outbreak. Debates about whether WHO should have such capacity have been at the heart of recent WHO reform debates. While deliberating the appropriate response to ongoing Ebola outbreak, Congress is likely to discuss the breadth of health, social, economic, development, and security challenges that this outbreak is causing, as well as how U.S. global health aid is apportioned. This report focuses on the health impacts of the outbreak and discusses U.S. and international responses to those health challenges.",77,65 "Protecting Classified Information and the Rights of Criminal Defendants: The Classified Information Procedures Act. A criminal prosecution involving classified information may cause tension between the government's interest in protecting classified information and the criminal defendant's right to a constitutionally valid trial. In some cases, a defendant may threaten to disclose classified information in an effort to gain leverage. Concerns about this practice, referred to as ""graymail,"" led the 96th Congress to enact the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) to provide uniform procedures for prosecutions involving classified information. Examples of recent cases implicating CIPA have arisen in the context of prosecutions against alleged terrorists, as well as prosecutions involving the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by former intelligence officials. CIPA provides procedures that permit a trial judge to rule on the relevance or admissibility of classified information in a secure setting. The Act requires a defendant to notify the prosecution and the court of any classified information that the defendant may seek to discover or disclose during trial. During the discovery phase, CIPA authorizes courts to issue protective orders limiting disclosure to members of the defense team that have obtained adequate security clearances and to permit the government to use unclassified redactions or summaries of classified information that the defendant would normally be entitled to receive. If classified information is to be introduced at trial, the court may allow substitutes of classified information to be used, so long as they provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to present a defense and do not otherwise violate his constitutional rights. Among the rights that may be implicated by the application of CIPA in a criminal prosecution are the defendant's right to have a public trial, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, and to have the assistance of counsel. Application of CIPA may also be implicated by the obligation of the prosecution to provide the defendant, under Brady v. Maryland, with exculpatory information in its possession and the separate obligation to provide the defendant with government witnesses' prior written statements pursuant to the Jencks Act.",94,19 "The Voting Rights Act of 1965: Background and Overview. The Voting Rights Act (VRA) was successfully challenged in a June 2013 case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder. The suit challenged the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA, under which certain jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination in voting—mostly in the South—were required to ""pre-clear"" changes to the election process with the Justice Department (the U.S. Attorney General) or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The preclearance provision (Section 5) was based on a formula (Section 4) that considered voting practices and patterns in 1964, 1968, or 1972. At issue in Shelby County was whether Congress exceeded its constitutional authority when it reauthorized the VRA in 2006—with the existing formula—thereby infringing on the rights of the states. In its ruling, the Court struck down Section 4 as outdated and not ""grounded in current conditions."" As a consequence, Section 5 is intact, but inoperable, unless or until Congress prescribes a new Section 4 formula. The Voting Rights Act is a landmark federal law enacted in 1965 to remove race-based restrictions on voting. It is perhaps the country's most important voting rights law, with a history that dates to the Civil War. After that conflict ended, a number of constitutional amendments were adopted that addressed the particular circumstances of freed slaves, including the Fifteenth Amendment that guaranteed the right to vote for all U.S. citizens regardless of ""race, color, or previous condition of servitude."" During Reconstruction, federal troops occupied the former Confederate states as they were reintegrated into the Union. The Fifteenth Amendment achieved its purpose for a time and black voting participation and representation in the South increased rapidly. The first black representatives to Congress were elected, as well as hundreds of state and local officeholders. Reconstruction continued for a decade, until the disputed presidential election of 1876. Under the agreement known as the ""Compromise of 1877"" that resolved the dispute, federal troops were withdrawn from the South and the political gains of the ""freedmen"" were subsequently rolled back. As the Reconstruction effort receded into the past, most blacks were prevented from voting by tactics such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and the grandfather clause, as well as intimidation and violence. By the turn of the 20th century, blacks were almost completely disenfranchised in the South. The civil rights movement and the federal government made progress in regaining the franchise for black voters by mid-century, but significant impediments remained. When efforts to register voters in the Deep South in the early 1960s provoked a violent backlash, a protest march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama, was organized in March 1965. Attacks on the marchers by state troopers and others prompted the Johnson Administration to intervene and, shortly thereafter, to propose a voting rights law that called for direct federal intervention to uphold the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Voting Rights Act was enacted on August 6, 1965, and it prohibited states from imposing qualifications or practices to deny the right to vote on account of race, permitted direct federal intervention in the electoral process in certain places, based on a ""coverage formula"", and required preclearance of new laws in covered states' jurisdictions to ensure that they did not have the purpose, nor would have the effect, of denying the right to vote on account of race, among other provisions. Black voter registration and participation increased dramatically shortly thereafter. This report provides background information on the historical circumstances that led to the adoption of the VRA, a summary of its major provisions, and a brief discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court decision and related legislation in the 113th and 114th Congresses. Two identical bills—H.R. 3899 and S. 1945—were introduced in the 113th Congress that would have amended the VRA to add a new coverage formula, among other provisions. The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on S. 1945 on June 25, 2014. H.R. 885, an identical bill to the two 113th Congress bills, has been introduced in the 114th Congress. Companion bills H.R. 2867 and S. 1659 would amend the VRA to add a more far-reaching coverage formula than H.R. 885, among other provisions.",20,17 "FDA Regulation of Cosmetics and Personal Care Products. The 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) granted the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate cosmetic products and their ingredients. The statutory provisions of the FFDCA that address cosmetics include adulteration and misbranding provisions. In addition to the FFDCA, cosmetics are regulated under the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA) and related regulations. The cosmetics provisions were amended by the Color Additive Amendments Act of 1960 and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, but remain basically the same as the provisions in the 1938 FFDCA. FDA's authorities over cosmetic products include some of those applicable to other FDA-regulated products, such as food, drugs, medical devices, and tobacco. For example, FDA has the authority to take certain enforcement actions—such as seizures, injunctions, and criminal penalties—against adulterated or misbranded cosmetics. Additionally, as with drug and food companies, FDA may conduct inspections of cosmetic manufacturers and prohibit imports of cosmetics that violate the FFDCA. The agency also has issued rules restricting the use of ingredients that the agency has determined are poisonous or deleterious. However, FDA's authority over cosmetics is less comprehensive than its authority over other FDA-regulated products with regard to registration, testing, premarket notification, clearance, or approval, good manufacturing practices, mandatory risk labeling, adverse event reports, and recalls. For example, FDA does not impose registration requirements on cosmetic manufacturers. Rather, cosmetic manufacturers may decide to comply with voluntary FDA regulations on registration. With the exception of color additives, FDA does not require premarket notification, safety testing, review, or approval of the chemicals used in cosmetic products. Cosmetic manufacturers also are not required to use good manufacturing practices (GMP)—although FDA has released GMP guidelines for cosmetic manufacturers—nor required to file ingredient information with, or report adverse reactions to, the agency. Instead, under a voluntary FDA program, cosmetic manufacturers and packagers may report the ingredients used in their product formulations. FDA does not have the authority to require a manufacturer to recall a cosmetic product from the marketplace, although the agency has issued general regulations on voluntary recalls. The agency's ability to issue regulations on cosmetic products is limited by the agency's statutory authorities or lack thereof. As a result, cosmetics are arguably more self-regulated than other FDA-regulated products. The manner in which a cosmetic product could or should be regulated, however, is not always clear. FDA's guidelines have provided the cosmetic industry with considerable flexibility for product development and claims. The question remains as to whether that flexibility and the extent of government oversight of cosmetic products are still appropriate.",67,67 "FY2017 Defense Budget Request: In Brief. The Administration's FY2017 budget request includes $619.5 billion for national defense of which $590.6 billion is for the Department of Defense (DOD). Of the DOD total, $523.9 billion covers the base budget, discretionary spending subject to the spending caps established for FY2017 by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 2015. An additional $58.8 billion of the DOD total is to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). OCO funding supports the continued U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and assistance to Iraqi and Syrian opposition forces. The OCO request also includes $3.4 billion to enhance the U.S. presence in Eastern Europe, referred to as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). The budget request would reduce active-component end-strength of the armed forces from 1.30 million to 1.28 million. The Army would drop by 15,000 to 460,000 (heading toward a planned level of 450,000). The Navy decline is 4,400, largely to reflect a proposal to disband one of 10 carrier air wings. Military basic pay would increase by 1.6%, costing about $300 million less than if military pay rose at the 2.1% rate that is the average in the private sector (according to the Labor Department's Employee Compensation Index). The Administration has acknowledged that procurement accounts—and aircraft accounts in particular—bore the brunt of DOD's belt-tightening. For example, although the Army's total procurement request for FY2017 was a net of $1.3 billion lower than the amount appropriated in FY2016, the amount requested for procurement of Army aircraft was a net $2.3 billion less than the corresponding FY2016 appropriation. The request funds 63 Joint Strike Fighters (43 for the Air Force, 16 for the Marine Corps, and 4 for the Navy), deferring the planned FY2017 procurement of an additional five F-35As. DOD officials cited this reduction as one instance of a program reduction made in response to budgetary limits. To compensate for the slower-than-planned fielding of the F-35, the budget request includes funds to enlarge and upgrade DOD's fleet of earlier model fighters. Thus the Administration's budget includes funds for programs that been funded in recent years as congressional initiatives, for instance To mitigate a shortfall in the Navy's fleet of strike fighters, the Administration requests $185 million (in FY2017 OCO funds) to replace two Navy F/A-18s lost in combat, and it plans to continue F/A-18 purchases in future budget years. The budget request would fund two DDG-51 Aegis destroyers for $3.4 billion, two Virginia-class submarines for $5.2 billion, and two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) for $1.3 billion. The budget assumes the Navy would save $200 million by removing seven Aegis cruisers from service for long-term modernization. Congress has rejected similar proposals in previous years. The budget requests $900.0 million in FY2017 to keep in service A-10 ground-attack planes that the Administration has been trying for years to retire, over congressional objections. The current plan is to keep the planes in service—at a cost of $3.4 billion—through FY2022 when they would be replaced by F-35s.",25,25 "Federal Excise Tax on Tires: Where the Rubber Meets the Road. The excise tax on tires was first levied in 1918 mainly because of revenue needs brought about by World War I. The tax was reduced after the war and then repealed in 1926. The levy was reintroduced during the Great Depression at a time when federal individual income tax revenues were plummeting and was increased to help finance World War II. A general reduction in rates was in the offing just before the outbreak of the Korean conflict but revenue needs brought about by that war prevented the lowering of rates. More recent history shows that in 1956 the rate of the tax was raised in response to legislation enacted to build the interstate highway system and to create the Highway Trust Fund. Scheduled reductions did not occur after the construction of the interstate highway system had been extended. A goal of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 was to redistribute highway costs between car and truck users. At that time, the tax structure was changed so that the tax was imposed only on heavy tires with tax rates that are graduated, and increased along with the tire's weight. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 repealed the exclusion of the value of the tires from the 12% retail excise tax on heavy highway trucks, trailers, and tractors but provided a credit offset to the retail tax for the tire tax paid. Under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 the tax based on tire weight was replaced with rates based on the load capacity of the tire. The federal excise tax imposed on tires is now scheduled to expire on October 1, 2011. Today, the premise for the excise tax on tires is that heavier vehicles cause greater damage to both roadways and bridges, and that the excise tax on tires resembles a pricing mechanism that is a proxy for highway wear-and-tear charges. This premise still holds true as load capacity must exceed 3,500 pounds before the tax is imposed, thus exempting tires on lighter vehicles. Tire excise taxes still produce revenues for the Highway Trust Fund and repeal of the existing tax would require additional taxes to be imposed on other sources so as to provide an equivalent amount of revenues to build and maintain roadways. This excise tax is said to be easy to administer with minimal federal collection costs. Several arguments are advanced against the imposition of the tire tax. First, some view this selective excise tax as discriminating against the tire and related industries whose products are taxed and also the trucking industry, which depends on the product. The commercial truck transportation industry pays this tax while competitors such as railroads and waterways have no corresponding excise tax, thus creating an intermodal equity issue. Second, to the extent that the excise tax on tires is passed forward into the cost of goods sold, it places a burden on lower income individuals since individuals with lower incomes, relative to those with higher incomes, tend to spend a larger portion of their income for the same consumption amount (thus, to the extent that the tax is passed forward to consumers, the tax is regressive). This report will not be updated.",102,118 "International Climate Change Financing: The Green Climate Fund (GCF). Over the past several decades, the United States has delivered financial and technical assistance for climate change activities in the developing world through a variety of bilateral and multilateral programs. The United States and other industrialized countries committed to such assistance through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, Treaty Number: 102-38, 1992), the Copenhagen Accord (2009), and the UNFCCC Cancun Agreements (2010), wherein the higher-income countries pledged jointly up to $30 billion in ""fast start"" climate financing for lower-income countries for the period 2010-2012, and a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion annually by 2020. The Cancun Agreements also proposed that the pledged funds are to be new, additional to previous flows, adequate, predictable, and sustained, and are to come from a wide variety of sources, both public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. One potential mechanism for mobilizing a share of the proposed international climate financing is the UNFCCC Green Climate Fund (GCF), proposed during the 2009 Conference of Parties (COP) in Copenhagen, Denmark, accepted by Parties during the 2011 COP in Durban, South Africa, and made operational in the summer of 2014. The fund aims to assist developing countries in their efforts to combat climate change through the provision of grants and other concessional financing for mitigation and adaptation projects, programs, policies, and activities. The GCF is capitalized by contributions from donor countries and other sources, potentially including innovative mechanisms and the private sector. The GCF currently complements many of the existing multilateral climate change funds (e.g., the Global Environment Facility, the Climate Investment Funds, and the Adaptation Fund), however, as the official financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, some Parties believe that it may eventually replace or subsume the other funds. The GCF was made operational in the summer of 2014. Parties have pledged approximately $10 billion for the initial capitalization of the fund. The Obama Administration announced a pledge of $3 billion over four years during the G-20 meetings in Australia on November 15, 2014. The Administration's FY2016 budget requested $500 million for the fund. Notwithstanding these financial pledges, some operational details remain to be clarified. They include what role the GCF would play in providing sustained finance at scale, how it would fit into the existing development assistance and climate financing architecture, whether sources beyond public funding would successfully contribute to it, and how it would allocate and deliver assistance efficiently and effectively to developing countries. The U.S. Congress—through its role in authorizations, appropriations, and oversight—would have significant input on U.S. participation in the GCF. Congress regularly determines and gives guidance to the allocation of foreign aid between bilateral and multilateral assistance as well as among the variety of multilateral mechanisms. In the past, Congress has raised concerns regarding the cost, purpose, direction, efficiency, and effectiveness of the UNFCCC and existing international institutions of climate financing. Potential authorizations and appropriations for the GCF may rest with several committees, including the U.S. House of Representatives Committees on Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, and Appropriations, and the U.S. Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations. Appropriations for foreign aid are generally provided through the U.S. Administration's State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 150 account.",42,42 "Appropriations for FY2005: U.S. Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies. On November 20, 2004, the House and Senate approved the conference agreement on the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818, H.Rept. 108-792), which combined nine annual appropriations bills into one measure. The President signed H.R. 4818 into law (P.L. 108-447) on December 8, 2004. Division A of the act provides the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies with $85.28 billion in budget authority for FY2005, which is $1.3 billion below FY2004 and $2.0-$2.3 billion above the FY2005 House-passed (H.R. 4766) and Senate-reported (S. 2803) bills, and the Administration's FY2005 request. An estimated $66.4 billion, or nearly 80%, of the total FY2005 spending in Division A is for mandatory USDA programs, primarily farm commodity support programs and various nutrition programs. The mandatory total for FY2005 is $1.45 billion below FY2004, mainly because improved farm commodity prices have required reduced spending for farm commodity support authorized by the 2002 farm bill. FY2005 mandatory spending is approximately $2 billion above the recommendations of the House, Senate, and the Administration, mainly because of a revision in nutrition program funding needs subsequent to these recommendations. For all discretionary programs, USDA and related agencies receive $16.98 billion for FY2005 before taking into account the effect of a 0.8% across-the-board rescission on all discretionary accounts required by P.L. 108-447. Discretionary spending is the category over which appropriators have direct control in annual spending bills. The pre-rescission discretionary total is about $140 million above the enacted FY2004 level and the FY2005 House level, $210 million above the Senate level, and $413 million above the Administration request. Once it is applied, the rescission likely will bring FY2005 spending close to the FY2004 and House level of $16.84 billion. In order to meet an FY2005 discretionary allocation that was close to the FY2004 enacted level appropriators, as in past years, placed limitations on authorized levels of spending in the 2002 farm bill for various mandatory conservation, rural development, and research programs. P.L. 108-447 reduced authorized FY2005 mandatory spending levels for these programs by a total of about $1.2 billion, and applied those savings toward meeting the discretionary allocation. Among the provisions that were deleted by conferees in the final law were a Senate provision that would have relaxed licensing rules for businesses seeking to travel to Cuba to promote and sell agricultural products, and a House provision that would have prohibited FDA from enforcing the current law that bans importation of prescriptions drugs by parties other than drug companies.",2,2 "Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns: Overview and Analysis. The presidential public campaign financing program (the Presidential Election Campaign Fund [PECF]) is funded through ""checkoff"" designations on individual income tax returns. Choosing to participate (or not) in the checkoff does not affect one's tax liability or refund. Candidates who choose to participate in the program may receive taxpayer-funded matches of privately raised funds during primary campaigns, and grants during the general-election contest. Public funds also subsidize nominating conventions. The public financing system has remained largely unchanged since the 1970s. However, there is general agreement that, if the program is to be maintained, updates are necessary to provide greater financial resources and higher spending limits to participants. Some contend that the program should be curtailed or eliminated. This report discusses current controversies and arguments for and against public financing of presidential campaigns, legislative history, elements of the program, taxpayer and candidate participation, financial status of the program, recent legislation, and analysis of various policy proposals. If Congress chooses to alter the program, consensus will be necessary in what has historically been a particularly complex and contentious area of campaign finance policy. In recent Congresses, most legislative activity has concerned efforts to curtail the program. In the 113th Congress, the House has passed legislation (H.R. 2019) to eliminate funding for presidential nominating conventions. The Committee on House Administration has reported two related bills (H.R. 94, H.R. 95). Other bills that would eliminate convention financing include H.R. 260, H.R. 1724, H.R. 2857, and S. 118. Another bill, H.R. 270, would eliminate convention financing but modernize other parts of the presidential public financing program. As this report discusses, various options, each with potential strengths and weaknesses, exist for revisiting the presidential public financing system. Two other CRS reports contain overviews of specific topics addressed in this report. These include CRS Report R41604, Proposals to Eliminate Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns, by R. Sam Garrett, and CRS Report RL34630, Federal Funding of Presidential Nominating Conventions: Overview and Policy Options, by R. Sam Garrett and Shawn Reese. This report will be updated occasionally to reflect major developments.",61,61 "Ukraine: Background and U.S. Policy. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many Western analysts have viewed a stable independent and sovereign Ukraine as a key element in European security, pointing to its size strategic location and economic potential. Those who are concerned about Russia's motives and goals in the region see an independent Ukraine as a guarantee against the revival of a Russian empire that would threaten the security of central Europe. Conversely, analysts worry that a weak or unstable Ukraine could fall under Russian domination or become a focus of conflict between Russia and the West. The spillover effects of crime, illegal immigration and other problems from an unstable Ukraine could hurt other countries in the region. Ukraine continues to undergo a difficult transition from communism to democracy and a free market economy. It is also undergoing a related search for its international identity, whether as an independent central European state or as a state closely aligned with Russia, with which most of Ukraine has close linguistic, cultural and historic ties. A series of recent events have clouded Ukraine's relationship with the United States. In November 2000, an audio tape produced by a former bodyguard of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma purportedly captured Kuchma's orders to top officials to neutralize independent journalist Georgiy Gongadze, whose headless, mutilated body had been found by police. In September 2002 the United States authenticated another tape which implicated Kuchma in the possible sale of sophisticated anti-aircraft radars to Iraq. These incidents led to a deterioration of U.S.-Ukrainian ties. However, relations improved in 2003, when Ukraine deployed 1650 troops to Iraq as part of a Polish-led peacekeeping force. However, despite recent setbacks, there is a consensus among U.S. policymakers that a strong multi-faceted relationship with a stable, democratic, prosperous and sovereign Ukraine, integrated with Europe and the wider world, is key to Europe's stability, a vital U.S. interest. The United States has tried to bolster Ukraine with political support and over $3 billion in U.S. aid from FY 1992 to FY 2001, although aid has declined in recent years. U.S. policy has had notable successes particularly in the areas of security policy and nuclear safety. Achievements since Ukraine's independence in political and economic reform have been significant, but U.S. policymakers have often been frustrated by Ukraine's slowness to reform and fight corruption. Congressional support has remained consistent despite Ukraine's troubles. Ukraine's current problems raise important issues for U.S. policy. One problem is how to deal with President Kuchma and the opposition to his rule. More broadly, the United States must decide how to better support the building of the political, economic and social infrastructure that will provide a foundation for democracy, rule of law and a market economy in the long term. Another problem U.S. policymakers face is how to support Ukraine's sovereignty and independence and promote closer ties with the West. Efforts could include helping reduce Ukraine's energy dependency on Russia, and promoting greater security ties with the United States and NATO, in the face of possible Russian pressure against such a relationship.",85,85 "Water Resource Issues in the 115th Congress. The 115th Congress faces various water resource development, management, and protection issues. Water resource activities generally encompass navigation improvements, flood damage reduction measures, water supply augmentation, hydropower generation, and aquatic ecosystem restoration. Congressional actions shape reinvestment in aging federal infrastructure (e.g., dams, locks, and levees) and federal and nonfederal investment in new projects. The principal agencies involved in federal water resource infrastructure are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation). Oversight of Enacted Legislation. Water resource issues during 115th Congress are shaped in part by legislation enacted in earlier Congresses. The 114th Congress passed a broad water bill in December 2016—the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN or WIIN Act, P.L. 114-322)—that addressed water resource and water quality issues. Of its water resource provisions, WIIN authorized a broad array of water resource activities for the Corps addressed selected Department of the Interior water issues, including Reclamation projects and related water project management in California and other western states and management of selected Indian water projects, and authorized various regional aquatic ecosystem restoration activities. Some of WIIN's Reclamation-related provisions on water conveyance and supply in California in particular remain the subject of attention by federal and local policymakers. Supporters of the WIIN provisions view these provisions as a compromise that may deliver greater water supplies to users, critics suggest that the provisions may alter environmental protections in California, thereby potentially harming threatened and endangered species, and that they may alter Congress's ability to oversee new projects. For more on WIIN, see CRS In Focus IF10536, Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN), by Nicole T. Carter et al. Water Resource Issues in the 115th Congress. The 115th Congress may consider legislative proposals on water resource issues that were not addressed by WIIN, including those in legislative proposals considered but not enacted in previous Congresses. Congressional deliberations are within the context of broad issues shaping federal water resource activities. Areas of interest include the following financing investments in water resource infrastructure changing federal partnerships funding and authorizing projects and the earmark debate restoring aquatic ecosystems, and improving drought and flood preparedness and response. Within these broad issues, potential topics of congressional interest include authorization of additional studies and projects, public and private hydropower improvements, aging water infrastructure rehabilitation, recreational activities at federal projects, water research and science investment and coordination, and environmental requirements, including protection of threatened and endangered species. The 115th Congress also may consider issues that arise at the regional or local levels but have some federal involvement. For example, Congress may engage in policy debates and oversight related to the Columbia River, the Sacramento and San Joaquin River basins, the Colorado River, and the Southeast's Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin due to the role of federal infrastructure and other efforts in these areas. Additionally, budget and appropriations issues often play a key role in directing each agency's activities and priorities.",108,108 "Presidential Directives: Background and Overview. This report provides an overview of the different kinds of directives that have been utilized primarily by twentieth century Presidents. It presents background on their historical development, accounting, use, and effect.",55,55 "Security Clearance Process: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions. This report provides a primer on some of the fundamental aspects of the security clearance process, using a ""Frequently Asked Questions"" format. A security clearance is a determination that an individual—whether a direct federal employee or a private contractor performing work for the government—is eligible for access to classified national security information. A security clearance alone does not grant an individual access to classified materials. Rather, a security clearance means that an individual is eligible for access. In order to gain access to specific classified materials, an individual should also have a demonstrated ""need to know"" the information contained in the specific classified materials. There are three levels of security clearances: Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret, which correspond to the levels of sensitivity of the information that a cleared individual will be eligible to access. In addition, there are two major categories of classified information that require additional handling and access restrictions—Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), which includes intelligence sources, methods, and processes, and Special Access Programs (SAPs), which are highly sensitive projects and programs. These categories exist for classified information that has been deemed particularly vulnerable. Eligibility standards and investigative requirements for access to SCI and SAPs are higher than for access to information otherwise classified at the same level, which further restricts the number of individuals eligible for access. Federal employees and private contractors must be cleared in order to gain access to classified materials. An individual may not obtain or initiate a security clearance on his or her own. A sponsoring federal agency initiates the process and will make the final security clearance determination based on a background investigation. Although the process involves a number of stages, the key steps to obtaining and maintaining a security clearance are (1) agency sponsorship and submission of clearance application materials, (2) a background investigation, the extent of which may vary by level of clearance, and (3) adjudication to determine whether an individual is deemed eligible for access. Adjudication and final clearance determinations are generally handled by the sponsoring agency. To maintain a security clearance, an individual is also subject to periodic reinvestigations and, more recently, continuous monitoring and evaluation of his or her background. Previously, the Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Services (OPM-FIS) oversaw approximately 95% of all background investigations. On October 1, 2016, President Obama transferred responsibility for investigative work and related services from OPM-FIS to the newly established National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB). Like OPM-FIS, the NBIB conducts some of the investigative work itself and contracts the rest out to private firms. Typically, the costs of a background investigation, including background investigations of private contractors, are paid for by the requesting agency. While the final determination to grant or deny a security clearance is typically made by the requesting agency, with certain exceptions a security clearance granted by one agency must be accepted by other agencies. It is difficult, however, to determine the degree to which reciprocity occurs between agencies.",27,27 "Congressional Redistricting: The Constitutionality of Creating an At-Large District. This report discusses the constitutionality of legislation, such as the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 157 (111th Congress), that would create an at-large congressional district. While it is not without doubt, based on the authority granted to Congress under the Constitution to regulate congressional elections and relevant Supreme Court precedent, it appears that federal law establishing a temporary at-large congressional district would likely be upheld as constitutional. H.R. 157, among other provisions, would expand the U.S. House of Representatives by two members to a total of 437 members. The first of these two new seats would be allocated to create a voting member representing the District of Columbia. The second seat would be assigned in accordance with 2000 census data and existing federal law, resulting in the addition of a fourth congressional seat in the state of Utah that would be a temporary at-large district. On March 2, 2009, the House Judiciary Committee reported the bill, as amended (H.Rept. 111-22), but no further action was taken by the House. On February 26, 2009, the Senate passed a related bill, S. 160, by a vote of 61-37. During the 110th Congress, the House passed similar legislation, H.R. 1905, by a vote of 241 to 177. A companion bill, S. 1257, was considered by the Senate, but a motion to invoke cloture failed by a vote of 57 to 42.",20,55 "Mandatory Funding for Agriculture Conservation Programs. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 authorized large increases in mandatory funding for several agricultural conservation programs. Most of these programs expire in FY2007, and the 110th Congress is likely to address future funding levels in a farm bill. Since FY2002, Congress has acted, through the appropriations process, to limit funding for some of these programs below authorized levels. It limited total funding for all the programs to 97.6% of the authorized total in FY2003, and the percentage declined annually to 87.3% in FY2006. Program supporters decry these growing limitations as reductions that compromise the intent of the farm bill. Others counter that, even with the limitations, overall conservation funding has grown substantially, from almost $3.1 billion in FY2003 to almost $3.8 billion in FY2006. This report reviews the funding history of the programs since the 2002 farm bill was enacted. It will be updated periodically.",2,2 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): FY2017 Budget Request Overview and Resources. Click here and type your Summary,74,74 "Frequently Asked Questions About Tax-Exempt Organizations. This report answers frequently asked questions about tax-exempt organizations. It provides basic answers and refers to sources of additional information that might be useful. The report focuses on the types of organizations described in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 501(c), with the main emphasis on Section 501(c)(3) charitable organizations. One set of questions addresses some of the primary characteristics of tax-exempt organizations, including whether they may participate in lobbying and election-related activities, and defines the terms ""tax-exempt,"" ""nonprofit (not-for-profit),"" and ""private foundation."" Another group of questions provides general information on how to form a tax-exempt organization, what information must be disclosed to the IRS and the public, and how an organization might lose its tax-exempt status. The report ends with questions intended to help the reader find resources that provide information on specific organizations and additional information on tax-exempt organizations in general. This report summarizes information with respect to tax-exempt organizations. It should not be relied on for specific tax advice. Such advice should be sought directly from the IRS or qualified tax professionals.",102,102 "Possible Federal Revenue from Oil Development of ANWR and Nearby Areas. Recent high petroleum prices, and the related economic burden on consumers and energy-intensive industries, has raised the issue of stimulating domestic supplies of crude oil. One possible source is the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), which is estimated to contain significant quantities of oil and gas. Interest in developing the ANWR oil resources has also focused on the revenues that the federal government could collect should exploration and development be successful. Some observers have suggested using such revenues for purposes such as providing relief to petroleum consumers, further subsidizing energy conservation measures, or reducing federal budget deficits. However, current federal law prohibits the production of oil and gas in ANWR. Federal revenues would consist primarily of corporate income taxes on profits earned by oil producers from the production and sale of ANWR oil. As landowner, the federal government would also collect royalties from such production on federal lands, which are included in the estimates. If producers were able to recover 10.3 billion barrels of oil over the life of the properties—the United States Geological Survey has estimated there is a 50-50 chance that the ANWR coastal plain contains at least this amount of oil—and if oil prices are $125/barrel, then the federal government might be able to collect $191 billion in revenues over the production period, estimated to be at least 30 years once production commences. This estimate consists of nearly $132 billion in federal corporate income taxes, and about nearly $59 billion in federal royalties. These estimates are subject to major limitations. Estimates of technologically recoverable oil used in this report include the resources from the federal lands, and assume the availability of resources in Native lands in the Refuge and offshore state lands. The Alaska Statehood Act would allot 90% of gross royalties to the state and 10% to the federal government. The federal government would collect revenues from bonus bids from federal leases, and rents on undeveloped leases. These are not estimated separately by CRS. Independent estimates by the Congressional Budget Office for President Bush's FY2009 budget proposal show estimated bonus bid revenues of $6 billion between FY2011 and FY2018. Finally, income tax revenues from the secondary feedback effects would also increase as a result of the stimulus to general economic activity. However, these revenues are not included here due to the difficulty in estimation over the projection time horizon.",40,40 "Russia's March 2012 Presidential Election: Outcome and Implications. Challenges to Russia's democratic development have long been of concern to Congress as it has considered the course of U.S.-Russia cooperation. The Obama Administration has been critical of the apparently flawed Russian presidential election which took place on March 4, 2012, but has called for continued engagement with Russia and newly elected President Vladimir Putin on issues of mutual strategic concern. Some in Congress also have criticized the conduct of the election, but have endorsed continued engagement, while others have called for stepping back and reevaluating the Administration's engagement policy. Congress may consider the implications of another Putin presidency, lagging democratization, and human rights abuses in Russia as it debates possible future foreign assistance and trade legislation and other aspects of U.S.-Russia relations. Five candidates were able to register for the March 4, 2012, presidential election. Of these, Prime Minister Putin had announced in September 2011 that he intended to switch positions with current President Dmitriy Medvedev, and return to the presidency for a third term. Three of the other four candidates—Communist Party head Gennadiy Zyuganov, Liberal Democratic Party head Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and A Just Russia Party head Sergey Mironov—were nominated by parties with seats in the Duma. The remaining candidate, businessman Mikhail Prokhorov, was self-nominated and was required to gather 2 million signatures to register. Other prospective candidates dropped out or were disqualified on technical grounds by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). Opposition Yabloko Party head Grigoriy Yavlinskiy was disqualified by the CEC on the grounds that over 5% of the signatures he gathered were invalid. Many critics argued that he was eliminated because he would have been the only bona fide opposition candidate on the ballot. Of the registered candidates running against Putin, all but Prokhorov had run in previous presidential elections and lost badly. According to the final report of the CEC, Putin won 63.6% of 71.8 million votes cast, somewhat less than the 71.3% he had received in his last presidential election in 2004. In their preliminary report, monitors led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that the election was well organized but that there were several problems. Although the report did not state outright that the election was ""not free and fair,"" some of the monitors at a press conference stated that they had not viewed it as free and fair. According to the report, Prime Minister Putin received an advantage in media coverage, and authorities mobilized local officials and resources to garner support for Putin. The OSCE monitors witnessed irregularities in vote-counting in nearly one-third of the 98 polling stations visited and in about 15% of 72 higher-level territorial electoral commissions. The initial protests after Putin's election by those who view the electoral process as tainted appeared smaller in size and number than after the Duma election. Authorities approved a protest rally in Pushkin Square in central Moscow on March 5, along with Putin victory rallies elsewhere in the city. After some of the protesters allegedly did not disperse after the time for the rally had elapsed, police forcibly intervened and reportedly detained up to 250 demonstrators, including activist Alexey Navalny, who later was released.",85,85 "The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's Essential Health Benefits (EHB). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) requires all non-grandfathered health plans in the non-group and small-group private health insurance markets to offer a core package of health care services, known as the essential health benefits (EHB). The ACA does not specifically define this core package but rather lists 10 benefit categories from which benefits and services must be included. The 10 benefit categories are as follows ambulatory patient services emergency services hospitalization maternity and newborn care mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment prescription drugs rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices laboratory services preventive and wellness and chronic disease management, and pediatric services, including oral and vision care. For the 2014-2017 coverage years, each state was required to select an EHB-benchmark plan. The benchmark plan serves as a reference plan on which non-group and small-group market plans must substantially base their benefits packages. Because states select their own EHB-benchmark plans, there is considerable variation in EHB coverage from state to state. This variation occurs in terms of specific covered services as well as in terms of amount, duration, and scope. For example, some state EHB-benchmark plans may include bariatric surgery as a covered service whereas other state EHB-benchmark plans may not cover bariatric surgery. State benefit mandates also may be considered to be part of that state's EHB and thus add to state-level coverage differences. Furthermore, because states can allow non-group and small-group plans to substitute certain services within the categories, coverage in plans within a state also may vary by benefit amount, duration, and scope. For example, a state's EHB-benchmark plan could offer up to 20 physical therapy visits and 10 occupational therapy visits. Another plan in the state could offer coverage consistent with the EHB-benchmark plan by covering up to 10 physical therapy visits and 20 occupational therapy visits. In addition to covering the EHB, the ACA imposes a limit on cost sharing (which includes co-payments, coinsurance, and deductibles) for the EHB. The ACA also prohibits plans from applying lifetime and annual dollar limits on the EHB.",69,70 "Temporary Professional, Managerial, and Skilled Foreign Workers: Legislation in the 113th Congress. The admission of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers raises a complex set of policy issues as the United States competes internationally for the most talented workers in the world, without adversely effecting U.S. workers and U.S. students entering the labor market. Legislative proposals that Congress has considered include streamlining procedures that govern the admission of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers, increasing the number of temporary professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers admitted each year, requiring employers of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to make efforts to recruit U.S. workers and offer wages and benefits that are comparable to similarly employed U.S. workers, extending labor protections and worker rights to professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to prevent abuse or exploitation of the worker, enabling professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to have ""visa portability"" so they can change jobs, and allowing professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to have ""dual intent"", that is, to apply for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status while seeking or renewing temporary visas. Adding to the complexity of the debate is the variety of temporary visa categories that enable employment-based temporary admissions for highly skilled foreign workers. They perform work that ranges from skilled labor to management and professional positions to jobs requiring extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics. These visa categories are commonly referred to by the letter and numeral that denote their subsection in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Congress has focused on two visa categories in particular: H-1B visas for professional specialty workers, and L visas for intra-company transferees. These two nonimmigrant visas epitomize the tensions between the global competition for talent and potential adverse effects on the U.S. workforce. The United States struggles to support the recruitment of highly skilled professionals on H-1B visas and L visas without displacing U.S. workers or putting downward pressures on the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers and U.S. students entering the labor market. Achieving this end through a process that both meets the expeditious needs of U.S. business and preserves employment opportunities for U.S. workers is a challenge, and there are critics of the current H-1B and L policies on each side of the issue. Congress is also weighing reforms of other professional and outstanding worker visas as well as treaty-specific visas. The 113th Congress has acted on legislation that would make extensive revisions to nonimmigrant categories for professional specialty workers (H-1B visas), intra-company transferees (L visas), and other skilled temporary workers. The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744), as passed by the Senate, and the Supplying Knowledge-based Immigrants and Lifting Levels of STEM Visas Act (SKILLS Visa Act, H.R. 2131), as ordered reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary, would substantially revise these visa categories. Both bills have provisions aimed at streamlining procedures, strengthening enforcement, and expanding admissions.",76,76 "The Glass-Steagall Act: A Legal and Policy Analysis. The phrase ""Glass-Steagall"" generally refers to the separation of commercial banking from investment banking. Congress effected a separation of commercial and investment banking through four sections of the Banking Act of 1933—Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32. These four statutory provisions are commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act. Key Takeaways of This Report The Glass-Steagall debate is not centered on prohibiting risky financial services, rather, the debate is about whether to permit inherently risky commercial and investment banking activities to be conducted within a single firm—specifically within firms holding federally insured deposits. Over the course of the nearly 70-year-long Glass-Steagall era, the clear-cut separation of traditional commercial banking and securities activities gradually eroded. This erosion was the result of a confluence of matters, including market changes, statutory changes, and regulatory and judicial interpretations. The Glass-Steagall era formally ended in 1999 when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) repealed the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions on affiliations between commercial and investment banks. Less than a decade after GLBA, the United States suffered its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Some have argued that the partial repeal either was a cause of the financial crisis that resulted in the so-called Great Recession or that it fueled and worsened the crisis's deleterious effect. On the other hand, some policymakers argue that Glass-Steagall issues were not significant causes of the crisis, and that the Glass-Steagall Act would have made responding to the crisis more difficult if it had remained in place. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act, P.L. 111-203) was Congress's primary legislative prescription to prevent a similar financial crisis in the future. The Dodd-Frank Act neither reinstated the sections of the Glass-Steagall Act that were repealed by GLBA nor substantially modified the ability of banking firms to affiliate with securities firms. It did, however, include some arguably Glass-Steagall-like provisions, which were designed to promote financial stability going forward, reduce various speculative activities of commercial banks, and reduce the likelihood that the U.S. government would have to provide taxpayer support to avert or minimize a future financial crisis. Some believe that a more effective way of accomplishing these policy objectives would be to fully reinstate the Glass-Steagall Act. In fact, multiple bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress with that stated purpose. These bills include: S. 1709/H.R. 3054, The 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2015, and H.R. 381, the Return to Prudent Banking Act of 2015. On the other side of the policy discussion, some argue that the Glass-Steagall Act is ill-suited for the current financial system and that the recent financial crisis would have occurred even if GLBA had never partially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act. Even if the Dodd-Frank Act had completely re-enacted the repealed provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, the financial history of the Glass-Steagall era shows that regulatory walls could be difficult to maintain or enforce.",5,5 "DHS Appropriations FY2017: Security, Enforcement, and Investigations. This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the second title of the homeland security appropriations bill—Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service. Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as ""Security, Enforcement, and Investigations."" The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2017 request for these components, and the appropriations proposed by the Senate and House appropriations committees in response. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the first titles of the bills, the report includes information on provisions throughout the bills and reports that directly affect these components. Security, Enforcement, and Investigations is the largest of the four titles that carry the bulk of the funding in the bill. The Administration requested $32.27 billion for these components in FY2017, $797 million less than was provided for FY2016. The amount requested for these components is 68% of the Administration's $47.7 billion request in net discretionary budget authority and disaster relief funding for DHS. The largest budget increase proposed in the request for these components was a $625 million (5.7%) increase for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, while the largest budget decrease proposed was a $745 million (15.3%) reduction in the budget for the Transportation Security Administration, which was proposed to be replaced with an $880 million increase in fee collections. Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S. 3001 would provide the components included in this title $32.92 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would be $652 million (2.0%) more than requested, but $145 million (0.4%) less than was provided in FY2016. House Appropriations Committee-reported H.R. 5634 would provide the components included in this title $32.85 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would be $592 million (1.8%) more than requested, but $206 million (0.6%) less than was provided in FY2016. Additional information on the broader subject of FY2017 funding for the department can be found in CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017, as well as links to analytical overviews and details regarding appropriations for other components. On September 29, 2016, the President signed into law P.L. 114-223, which contained a continuing resolution that funds the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.496% through December 9, 2017. A second continuing resolution was signed into law on December 10, 2016 (P.L. 114-254), funding the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.1901%, through April 28, 2017. For details on the continuing resolution and its impact on DHS, see CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017, which also includes additional information on the broader subject of FY2017 funding for DHS as well as links to analytical overviews and details regarding components in other titles. This report will be updated once the annual appropriations process for DHS for FY2017 is concluded.",22,22 "Encryption and Evolving Technology: Implications for U.S. Law Enforcement Investigations. Because modern-day criminals are constantly developing new tools and techniques to facilitate their illicit activities, law enforcement is challenged with leveraging its tools and authorities to keep pace. For instance, interconnectivity and technological innovation have not only fostered international business and communication, they have also helped criminals carry out their operations. At times, these same technological advances have presented unique hurdles for law enforcement and officials charged with combating malicious actors. Technology as a barrier for law enforcement is by no means a new issue in U.S. policing. In the 1990s, for instance, there were concerns about digital and wireless communications potentially hampering law enforcement in carrying out court-authorized surveillance. To help combat these challenges, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, P.L. 103-414), which, among other things, required telecommunications carriers to assist law enforcement in executing authorized electronic surveillance. The technology boundary has received renewed attention as companies have implemented advanced security for their products—particularly their mobile devices. In some cases, enhanced encryption measures have been put in place resulting in the fact that companies such as Apple and Google cannot unlock devices for anyone under any circumstances, not even law enforcement. Law enforcement has concerns over certain technological changes, and there are fears that officials may be unable to keep pace with technological advances and conduct electronic surveillance if they cannot access certain information. Originally, the going dark debate centered on law enforcement's ability to intercept real-time communications. More recent technology changes have potentially impacted law enforcement capabilities to access not only communications, but stored data as well. There are concerns that enhanced encryption may affect law enforcement investigations. For instance, following the December 2, 2015, terrorist attack in San Bernardino, CA, investigators recovered a cell phone belonging to one of the suspected shooters. FBI Director Comey testified before Congress two months later and indicated that the bureau was still unable to unlock the device. On February 16, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ordered Apple to provide ""reasonable technical assistance to assist law enforcement agents in obtaining access to the data"" on the cell phone. The outcome of this case may have implications for how law enforcement and policymakers respond to the broader conversation on enhanced encryption. If evidence arises that investigations are hampered, policymakers may question what, if any, actions they should take. One option is that Congress could update electronic surveillance laws to cover data stored on smartphones. Congress could also prohibit the encryption of data unless law enforcement could still access the encrypted data. They may also consider enhancing law enforcement's financial resources and manpower, which could involve enhancing training for existing officers or hiring more personnel with strong technology expertise. Some of these options may involve the application of a ""back door"" or ""golden key"" that can allow for access to smartphones. However, as has been noted, ""when you build a back door... for the good guys, you can be assured that the bad guys will figure out how to use it as well."" This is often maintained to be an inevitable tradeoff. Policymakers may debate which—if either—may be more advantageous for the nation on the whole: increased security coupled with potentially fewer data breaches and possibly greater impediments to law enforcement investigations, or increased access to data paired with potentially greater vulnerability to malicious actors.",110,19 Federal Financial Services Regulatory Consolidation: Structural Response to the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis. This report provides a brief history and overview of the U.S. federal financial services regulatory structure and examines the regulatory structural changes the three major federal government proposals would make to remedy the causes of the financial crisis. It concludes with a discussion of some possible implications of reform.,5,5 "Intelligence Community Programs, Management, and Enduring Issues. Congress's and the American public's ability to oversee and understand how intelligence dollars are spent is limited by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence budget process. Yet, total spending on the Intelligence Community (IC) programs discussed in this report equates to approximately $70 billion dollars—roughly 10% of national defense spending. This report is designed to shed light on the IC budget—in terms of its programs, management, and enduring issues—using unclassified materials available in the public domain. This report focuses those IC programs, grouped, for the most part, under two labels: (1) the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and (2) the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Nevertheless, the combined NIP and MIP budgets do not encompass the total of U.S. intelligence-related spending. Intelligence-related programs that are not part of the IC include, for example, the large Office of Intelligence within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division. The ICE Office of Intelligence is not included in the IC because, theoretically, ICE activities primarily support the DHS mission to protect the homeland. This report explains the management structure for the NIP and MIP to include their two separate budget processes and the roles of the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). The concluding section of this report considers the ability of the U.S. government to make the best use of its intelligence-related resources when: (1) total intelligence spending is impossible to calculate, (2) its management and oversight is completely decentralized, and (3) IC funding alone is largely divided into two categories (NIP and MIP)–managed within the executive branch separately, justified to Congress separately, and overseen by separate congressional committees. The Appendices are designed, in a number of cases, to provide quick reference tables summarizing the more detailed information available in the body of the report. Appendix A provides a summary of intelligence disciplines. Appendix B provides very brief explanations of NIP and MIP subordinate programs. Appendix C examines two unique and relatively obscure NIP programs, the Central Intelligence Agency's Retirement and Disability System and the IC's Community Management Account. Appendix D briefly describes a program called the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP). Appendix E provides a summary table of management hats. (Senior executives are often referred to as dual-hatted, triple-hatted, and so on, when they are charged with a number of different roles and responsibilities and associated titles.) Appendix F provides a summary table comparing the IPPBE and PPBE budget systems. Appendix G provides a figure illustrating the ways in which the IPPBE and PPBE are integrated. Appendix H provides a list of IC-related acronyms, many of which are commonly used in this report. For more on IC spending trends, see CRS Report R44381, Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues, by Anne Daugherty Miles.",27,27 "Social Media in Congress: The Impact of Electronic Media on Member Communications. The mediums through which Members and constituents communicate have changed significantly over American history and continue to evolve today. Whereas most communications traditionally occurred through the media, via postal mail, or over a telephone, the adoption and use of electronic communications via email and social media technologies (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other sites) changes how Representatives and Senators disseminate and gather information, who they communicate with, and what types of information they share and receive from the general public, many not residing in their district or state. In less than 20 years, the entire nature of Member-constituent communication has been transformed, perhaps more than in any other period in American history. Over the last several years, the number of Representatives and Senators adopting social media and the number of different services being utilized has increased. In 2009, for example, Members of Congress were just beginning to adopt social media and only a small number were actively using Twitter, mostly as a dissemination tool. Today, all 100 Senators and almost all Representatives have adopted Twitter, Facebook, and other social media tools as a way to supplement their overall office communication strategies and disseminate information. Electronic communication and social media differ from traditional Member-constituent communication in three key ways. Electronic communication is inexpensive. Members can reach large numbers of constituents for a fixed cost, and constituents can reach Members at virtually zero cost. Electronic communication is fast. The relay of information from Capitol Hill to the rest of the country (and vice versa) has been reduced, time-wise. As soon as something happens in Congress, it can be known everywhere in real time. Electronic communication reaches a wide audience. Members can reach large numbers of citizens who are not their own constituents. The cost, speed, and reach of social media have wide-ranging implications for the work of Congress. When Members choose to use electronic communication, they must consider many issues, including office operations (communications expectations and staff allocation), communications strategies (gathering and evaluating constituent opinions, content, interactivity, policies for posting and responding to content), and consequences for representation, including whether the office will respond to postings and, if so, how often. How an office evaluates and manages its social media presence varies from Member to Member.",55,55 "Globalized Supply Chains and U.S. Policy. In the globalized world of business, production is becoming fragmented into discrete activities and can be spread geographically within and across national borders while remaining integrated organizationally within a multinational company or network of companies. Such globalized production networks are called supply chains or value-added networks. This world of supply chains raises both challenges and opportunities for U.S. policymakers, firms, and workers. The globalization of production networks has raised policy issues and has called into question certain long-held perceptions about the efficacy and effects of policy initiatives. Traditional trade and investment policy is based on national governments, national economies, and country-to-country relations, but much of trade today is between related companies spread across the globe. How does protecting or promoting one domestic industry affect other parts of its or other supply chains? How does the United States ensure the security and integrity of products assembled offshore from components that are procured from a variety of markets around the world? How does policy affect the competitiveness of U.S.-based businesses in the global marketplace? Congressional interest in this issue stems from the essential American interests of economic well-being, security, and the projection of values as well as the constitutional mandate for Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Congress also deals with a variety of policies related to investments and capital flows, market access, currency misalignment, intellectual property rights, product safety, shipping security, labor, and the environment. In a broader sweep, the globalization of business strikes directly at issues related to maintaining the U.S. industrial base, the education and training of the American labor force, immigration, health care, and myriad other factors that determine the well-being of Americans. In international trade, traditional policies aimed at reducing border barriers still tend to increase economic efficiency, but global supply chains may affect the incidence or impact of those policies. Raising import barriers in the United States on products from China, for example, may increase costs for Chinese exporters, but they also have a parallel effect on U.S. multinational companies with manufacturing operations in China that ship to the United States. In fiscal policy, globalized supply chains affect the ""multiplier effect"" of government policies to stimulate the economy. In shipping security policies, a distinct trade-off exists between greater security and shipping costs. A variety of government policies, both at the national and state level, affect the ability of businesses to compete in the international marketplace and the incentive to locate in the U.S. market. These include tax, labor, environmental, infrastructure, and education policies. A possible test for policy is to ask if the predominant effect is one of trade diversion or trade creation. Does a proposed policy divert production from the U.S. economy to a foreign location, draw production toward a U.S.-based location, or shift production between two foreign locations? Does the proposed policy create more production, or does it discourage productive activity? Does the policy encourage job creation in the United States or does it induce firms to shift jobs overseas? Does the policy disrupt or enhance supply chain operations and decrease or increase overall supply chain efficiency and profitability? And perhaps most fundamentally, how can policy be fashioned to encourage the retention of jobs in the United States while keeping U.S. firms internationally competitive in a complex and globalized world?",50,50 "Agriculture in WTO Negotiations. The World Trade Organization's (WTO) fifth ministerial conference (held September 10-14 2003 in Cancun, Mexico) ended without an agreement on a framework for continuing multilateral negotiations on agricultural trade liberalization. The inconclusive end of the Cancun ministerial places in doubt the ability of WTO member countries to complete the current round of negotiations by the scheduled January 1, 2005 deadline. WTO member countries launched this new round of multilateral trade negotiations in November 2001 at the WTO's fourth ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar. Because of its emphasis on integrating developing countries into the global trading system, the round is called the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The new round incorporates agriculture into a comprehensive framework that includes negotiations on industrial tariffs, services, dispute settlement, and other trade issues. The ambitious agenda for agricultural trade liberalization calls for substantially improving market access, reducing and phasing out export subsidies, and substantially reducing trade-distorting domestic support. While the United States and the EU reached agreement on a broad framework for negotiating agricultural trade liberalization before the Cancun meeting, a group of developing countries, the G-22 which includes Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, among others, made a counter-proposal which makes fewer demands on developing countries than the EU-U.S. framework. The Chairman of the Cancun ministerial circulated a draft declaration at the meeting that attempted to reconcile differences between developed and developing countries on the agricultural issues. Neither the proposals made by the United States and the EU and the G-22 nor the Chairman's draft declaration propose specific modalities (formulas, targets, or timetables) for reducing tariffs and trade-distorting support and for phasing out export subsidies. WTO meetings are scheduled to continue, beginning with an agriculture negotiating group meeting in October and ending with a senior level stock taking in December 2003. Amid considerable uncertainty about prospects for completing the round, WTO members, including the United States, the EU, the G-21 and other countries, are taking stock and considering options for concluding the round. U.S. trade officials also have indicated they will be focusing attention on bilateral and regional trade negotiations. Much of U.S. agriculture would benefit from further multilateral trade liberalization, but some U.S. products might face stiffer foreign competition at home or in third-country markets. DDA negotiations, if they result in new commitments to reduce trade-distorting domestic support or export subsidies, also could affect U.S. farm programs authorized in the 2002 farm bill (P.L. 107-171). Any agreements reached in the new round would be taken up by Congress under fast-track procedures for legislation to implement trade agreements as spelled out in the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). This report will be updated periodically.",4,53 "Comparison of the Bills to Extend State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Funding. The State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is a means-tested program that provides health coverage to targeted low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid eligibility levels but have no health insurance. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and the states, and the states are responsible for administering CHIP. In statute, FY2017 was the last year a federal CHIP appropriation was provided. Federal CHIP funding was not extended before the beginning of FY2018. As a result, states do not currently have full-year FY2018 CHIP allotments and states are funding their CHIP programs with unspent federal CHIP funds from prior years. The continuing resolutions enacted on December 8, 2017, and December 22, 2017, both include provisions that provide short-term funding for CHIP. The continuing resolution enacted on December 8, 2017, includes a special rule for redistribution funds, and the continuing resolution enacted on December 22, 2017, includes short-term appropriations and an extension of the special rule for redistribution funds. This short-term funding is not sufficient to fund CHIP through the end of FY2018.There are a couple of bills that would extend federal funding for CHIP for five years. On October 4, 2017, both the Senate Finance Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee had markups on different bills that would extend CHIP federal funding through FY2022, among other provisions. The Senate Finance Committee reported the Keeping Kids' Insurance Dependable and Secure Act of 2017 (KIDS Act, S. 1827), which would extend federal CHIP funding through FY2022 and extend the increased enhanced federal medical assistance percentage (E-FMAP) rates for one year (i.e., through FY2020) but with an 11.5 percentage point increase instead of the 23 percentage point increase under current law. The bill also includes extensions of other CHIP provisions (e.g., the Express Lane eligibility option and the maintenance of effort for children with incomes below 300% of the federal poverty level) and other programs and demonstrations (e.g., the Child Obesity Demonstration Project and the Pediatric Quality Measures Program). The House Energy and Commerce Committee reported the Helping Ensure Access for Little Ones, Toddlers, and Hopeful Youth by Keeping Insurance Delivery Stable Act of 2017 (HEALTHY KIDS Act, H.R. 3921, H.Rept. 115-358), which includes almost identical language to the KIDS Act that would extend CHIP federal funding through FY2022 and extend the increased E-FMAP for one year at 11.5 percentage points. The HEALTHY KIDS Act also includes almost identical language that would extend the same CHIP provisions and other programs and demonstrations as the KIDS Act. The HEALTHY KIDS Act also includes some provisions that are not in the KIDS Act, such as adding a new CHIP state option for qualified CHIP look-alike plans, modifying the Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) allotment reductions, and providing additional Medicaid funding to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The HEALTHY KIDS Act includes the following provisions as offsets: modifications to Medicaid third party liability, treatment of lottery winnings for Medicaid eligibility, and Medicare Part B and D premium subsidies for higher-income individuals. On October 30, 2017, the House Rules Committee posted an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the Community Health And Medical Professionals Improve Our Nation Act of 2017 (CHAMPION Act, H.R. 3922), meaning that it is intended to be considered by the House as an amendment to H.R. 3922 and the language of the CHAMPION Act would be stricken and the text of the amendment in the nature of the substitute would be inserted in its place. This amendment in the nature of a substitute is entitled the Continuing Community Health And Medical Professional Programs to Improve Our Nation, Increase National Gains, and Help Ensure Access for Little Ones, Toddlers, and Hopeful Youth by Keeping Insurance Delivery Stable Act of 2017 (CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act), and it includes revised language for the CHAMPION Act (which would extend funding for community health centers and other programs among other things) under Division A and revised language for the HEALTHY KIDS Act under Division B. The House passed the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act on November 3, 2017, by a vote of 242 to 174. This report compares and summarizes the provisions in the KIDS Act and in Division B of the CHAMPIONING HEALTHY KIDS Act.",70,70 "The FCC's 10 Commissioned Economic Research Studies on Media Ownership: Policy Implications. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) has released for public comment 10 economic research studies on media ownership that it had commissioned to provide data and analysis to support the policy debate on what ownership limitations are in the public interest. These studies also provide data and analysis useful to the on-going policy debates on how best to foster minority ownership of broadcast stations and on tiered vs. à la carte pricing of multichannel video program distribution (MVPD) services, such as cable and satellite television. The FCC also has released peer reviews of these studies that are required by the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, and Free Press (Consumer Commenters) jointly submitted to the FCC very detailed comments on the 10 FCC-commissioned studies that included statistical results from re-running the models in those studies, applying the same empirical data to models revised to correct for alleged specification errors. Despite the lack of consensus on many issues, it appears that the following general statements can be made about the status of the data collection and analysis available to policy makers Large, systematic, detailed, and accurate data sets on media ownership characteristics, viewer/listener preferences, and programming are now available for analysts and policy makers. Several gaps remain in data collection, however. Most significantly the databases on minority and female ownership of broadcast and telecommunications properties are incomplete and inaccurate, and statistical analysis based on those data would not be reliable. Although the 10 FCC-commissioned studies present a large number of statistical findings, many of these relationships are not statistically significant across alternative model specifications. This has led the researchers and peer reviewers to offer disclaimers that the findings are not robust and where they find statistical relationships they demonstrate correlation, not causality. The peer reviewers and the Consumer Commenters identified a number of possible technical problems in the econometric analyses performed in the 10 studies. The potentially most noteworthy criticism appears to be that all but one of the studies addressed the impact of media ownership characteristics on the programming provided by individual cross-owned stations, not on the total programming available to consumers in the local market, which arguably is the key public policy concern. It has not yet been determined whether the criticisms are valid and/or whether the study results are reliable. The Consumer Commenters claim that when they modified the FCC-commissioned studies to take into account these criticisms, they obtained robust results demonstrating that loosening the media ownership limits harmed the public interest, though their results were not always consistent across model specifications. Their modified studies have not yet been subject to full review by others.",109,109 "Distribution of Child Support Collections. P.L. 104-193, the 1996 welfare reform law, substantively changed the rules governing how child support collections are distributed among families, states, and the federal government. The general rules in effect as of October 1, 2000 are that child support collected during the time a family receives cash welfare belongs to the state, current child support and arrearages (past-due payments) that are owed to a family that is no longer receiving welfare belongs to the family, and child support owed to a family that never received welfare belongs to the family. This is referred to as the ""families first"" child support distribution policy. (These ""families first"" distribution rules do not apply to child support collections made by intercepting federal income tax refunds.) Many policymakers contend that Congress should simplify the child support distribution system which currently requires the tracking of six categories of arrearage payments to properly pay custodial parents. Legislation that included provisions to simplify child support distribution procedures and provide more of the child support collected to custodial parents (rather than the government) was passed by the House in the 106th and 107th Congresses, but not by the Senate. Similar legislation has been reintroduced as part of the welfare reauthorization measure in the 108th Congress. This report will be updated as needed to reflect legislative activity.",95,95 "Legal Analysis of the 10% Disadvantaged Small Business Set-Aside Provisions of H.R. 2400, the ""Building Efficient Surface Transportation and Equity Act of 1997"". This report discusses the vote on H.R. 2400, the ""Building Efficient Surface Transportation and Equity Act of 1997""(BESTEA), an omnibus bill to fund surface transportation into the next century.",13,120 "Foreign Investor Protection Under NAFTA Chapter 11. Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) affords various protections to investors of one signatory nation having investments in the territory of another. Such foreign-investor protections exist in the large majority of modern bilateral investment treaties, but NAFTA is different. NAFTA is apparently the only instance where such protections, including a mechanism for resolving investor-state disputes by binding arbitration, have been made available for use against the United States by countries (Mexico and Canada) that invest heavily in the U.S. NAFTA, that is, has created not only the legal possibility of investor claims against the United States, but the actual occurrence of them as well. The ""actual occurrence"" of several multi-million-dollar arbitration claims against the U.S. under Chapter 11 has sparked a lively debate as to the precise content of the substantive obligations it imposes on the NAFTA parties -- and as to whether the claims of foreign investors might chill enforcement of legitimate government regulation in the public interest. While the U.S. has won each of the three finally decided arbitrations to date, one could argue that the hour is still early. In response to such concerns, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 instructs U.S. negotiators of future trade agreements to ensure that foreign investors in this country receive ""no greater substantive rights"" than U.S. investors under U.S. law. The Act does not apply to NAFTA. Part I of the report summarizes the arbitration procedure used when an investor from one NAFTA party believes that another NAFTA party (or one of its political subdivisions) has breached an obligation under Chapter 11, and the investor suffered loss as a result. Part II examines one of the two most-debated Chapter 11 obligations imposed on the parties the ""fair and equitable treatment"" of foreign investors. An important clarification of this phrase came in 2001, when the Free Trade Commission established under NAFTA declared that fair and equitable treatment creates no free-standing standard, but refers only to existing customary international law establishing minimum standards of treatment for aliens. However, customary international law offers few clear principles. Part III treats the other widely debated Chapter 11 provision, on indirect expropriation. A claim of indirect expropriation is made when an investor believes that his/her investment in another NAFTA country has been so severely regulated as to have been effectively expropriated. Such claims have long been recognized in international law, the importance of NAFTA is that it has given rise to a significant number of them, including, for the first time, several against the United States. As with fair and equitable treatment, the meaning of indirect expropriation is uncertain, owing to scarce precedent, though it is clear the impact must be substantial. Finally, Part IV describes the roughly 20 claims filed so far under NAFTA Chapter 11 including the six against the U.S.",51,53 "Consumer Proposals in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998: H.R. 3150, 105th Congress, 2d Session (1998). This report considers the legislative history of the current consumer bankruptcy scheme. It examines current consumer bankruptcy practice and surveys the consumer proposals set forth in Title I of H.R. 3150, with an emphasis on the likely impact of the bill on family support obligations.",6,6 "Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation was created pursuant to language contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 (H.R. 5408), which was incorporated into the H.R. 4205 conference report (H.Rept. 106-945), enacted into law on October 30, 2000 (P.L. 106-398). The Institute was created by Congress in response to a legislative initiative sponsored by the Clinton Administration. When the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation was formally established in Section 2166 of Title 10 U.S.C., the authorities of its controversial predecessor, the U.S. Army School of the Americas, were repealed. This report provides background on the purpose, structure, and other aspects of the new Institute. It will be revised as events warrant.",80,22 "China's Foreign Policy: What Does It Mean for U.S. Global Interests?. Since the late 1990s, China's robust international engagement has caught many by surprise and prompted growing American debate over the PRC's motivations and objectives. This international engagement has expanded while the United States has been preoccupied with its military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress and other U.S. policymakers are becoming increasingly concerned that China's expanded international engagement could have its ""soft power"" projection and affect U.S. economic and strategic interests. Experience suggests that abrupt, unexplained shifts in policy occur with some regularity in the PRC system. Still, it is possible to point to some fundamental objectives that appear to be motivating Beijing's foreign policy. These include an imperative to promote and enhance China's economic development, particularly its voracious need for energy resources and raw materials to sustain its double-digit annual growth, an effort to separate the island of Taiwan, over which the PRC claims sovereignty, from its 23 remaining official relationships, and a desire to increase China's international stature and compete more successfully with perceived U.S. supremacy. To achieve these ends, China in recent years has crafted a multitude of bilateral agreements and partnerships, joined and become more active in existing multilateral organizations, and become a founding member of new multilateral institutions in which the United States is not a member. Of alarm to some, China's policy approach has several competitive ""soft power"" advantages over the United States. The ""unrestricted"" nature of Beijing's overseas loans and investments is attractive to foreign governments wanting swifter, more efficient, and less intrusive solutions to their development problems than western lenders will offer. And Beijing's large state-owned companies, with deep pockets and no shareholders to answer to, can afford short-term losses in pursuit of longer-term, more strategic gains. But China's approach also has structural limitations in areas where the United States is strong. Beijing's foreign development policy operates from a much narrower base, with China's ""win-win"" approach tackling easy issues first and postponing difficult issues, perhaps indefinitely. Acquiring and maintaining an international presence also brings certain complications that are new to the PRC, including multiple opportunities for international misunderstanding, resentment, and cultural backlash. Finally, unlike the United States, China lacks the advantage of a substantial private-sector investment presence overseas. Whatever policy options the United States adopts, China's growing international political and economic clout poses demanding challenges and questions for U.S. policymakers. This report will be updated periodically as events warrant.",85,85 "American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5): Title V, Medicaid Provisions. The economy officially was considered in a recession in December 2008, but many forecasters had long recognized the downturn and some believed this economic contraction would be more severe than other post-World War II slowdowns. A combination of factors combined to present policymakers with difficult decisions on how best to stimulate the economy. Troubling instability in the housing and financial services sectors, weak auto manufacturing demand, and high energy costs earlier in 2008 had slowed growth dramatically and forced millions into unemployment. With declining tax revenue and increasing costs to provide unemployment and other benefits to unemployed workers, states were implementing measures to rein in spending, including restricting Medicaid eligibility and services. Congress considered legislation aimed at stimulating economic activity in selected industrial sectors to save existing and create new jobs, reduce taxes, invest in future technologies, and fund infrastructure improvements. In addition to reducing some taxes and funding infrastructure projects, ARRA provisions were designed to provide: temporary support to families and individuals by increasing unemployment compensation benefits, financial assistance for individuals to maintain their health coverage under provisions in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), temporary increases in Medicaid matching rates, and increases in disproportionate share hospital allotments. The House approved the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (H.R. 1) on January 28, 2009. The Senate passed an amendment (S.Amdt. 570) as a replacement for the House-approved version of ARRA on February 10, 2009. ARRA was referred to a joint House and Senate conference committee. The joint Senate and House Conference Committee reached agreement, and ARRA was passed by the House and Senate on February 13, 2009. President Obama signed ARRA (P.L. 111-5) into law on February 17, 2009. This report is a summary of ARRA's Medicaid provisions. For more information on the Medicaid provisions included in House and Senate versions of ARRA, see CRS Report R40158, Medicaid Provisions in the House and Senate American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1, S.Amdt. 570), coordinated by Cliff Binder. This report will not be updated. For further information on implementation of FMAP changes in ARRA, see CRS Report RL32950, Medicaid: The Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP).",70,99 "Aviation Taxes and the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. This report discusses the reauthorization of excise tax revenues for the airport and airway trust fund, which has been a contentious issue for the last two years. Most of the concern during this period was about future funding needs for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The issue, somewhat unexpectedly, became an element of the tax plans embedded in House and Senate FY1998 budget reconciliation proposals. The House proposed a major structural change in how aviation taxes would be imposed.",119,119 "Resources for Grantseekers. This report describes key sources of information on government and private funding, and outlines eligibility for federal grants. Federal grants are intended for projects benefiting states and communities. Individuals may be eligible for other kinds of benefits or assistance, or small businesses and students may be eligible for loans. Free information is readily available to grantseekers, who generally know best the details of their projects. The Assistance Listings database at beta.SAM.gov describes more than 2,200 federal programs, more than half of them grants, and can be searched by keyword, department or agency, program title, beneficiary, and applicant eligibility. Federal department and agency websites provide additional information and guidance, and they provide state agency contacts. Once a program has been identified, eligible grantseekers may apply electronically for grants at the website Grants.gov through a uniform process for all agencies. Through Grants.gov, grantseekers may identify when federal funding notices and deadlines for a program become available, sign up for email notification of funding opportunities, and track the progress of submitted applications. Because government funds may be limited, the report also discusses sources of private and corporate foundation funding. The Foundation Center is a clearinghouse for information about private, corporate, and community foundations, with collections of resources in every state. This report includes sources of information on writing grant proposals. See also CRS Report RL32159, How to Develop and Write a Grant Proposal, by Maria Kreiser and Julie Jennings. Additional sources are also included in the CRS web page, ""Grants and Federal Assistance."" See also CRS Report RL34035, Grants Work in a Congressional Office, by Maria Kreiser and Julie Jennings. This report will be updated at the beginning of every Congress and as needed.",60,60 "Military Health Care: The Issue of ""Promised"" Benefits. Many military health care beneficiaries, particularly military retirees, their dependents, and those representing their interests, state that they were promised ""free health care for life at military facilities"" as part of their ""contractual agreement"" when they entered the armed forces. Efforts to locate authoritative documentation of such promises have not been successful. Congressional report language and recent court decisions have rejected retiree claims seeking 'free care at military facilities' as a right or entitlement. These have stated that the medical benefit structure made up of military health care facilities, Tricare and Medicare currently provide lifetime health care to military members, retirees and their respective dependents. Nevertheless, claims continue to be made particularly by those seeking additional benefits from the Department of Defense, or attempting to prevent an actual or perceived reduction in benefits. Recent changes in the availability of military benefits and eligibility for these benefits have lead to speculation that retiree out-of-pocket costs may be increased. Growth in military health care spending, it has been argued, will lead to increased competition for defense dollars. Groups representing military retirees have stated that it is among their objectives to prevent what they describe as cost-shifting from the military to the beneficiaries. Although military health care is arguably among the most generous health benefit programs available, these groups see potential increases in out-of-pocket beneficiary payments as a part of the ""broken promise.",70,30 "The Federal Government's Authority to Impose Conditions on Grant Funds. Commonly known as the Spending Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution has been widely recognized as providing the federal government with the legal authority to offer federal grant funds to states and localities that are contingent on the recipients engaging in, or refraining from, certain activities. However, the Supreme Court has articulated certain limitations on the exercise of this power. In its 1987 decision in South Dakota v. Dole, which arguably remains the leading case regarding the use of the federal government's conditional spending power, the Court held that legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause must be in pursuit of the ""general welfare."" In addition, the Dole Court held that any conditions attached to the receipt of federal funds must: (1) be unambiguously established so that recipients can knowingly accept or reject them, (2) be germane to the federal interest in the particular national projects or programs to which the money is directed, (3) not violate other provisions of the Constitution, such as the First Amendment or the Due Process or Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, and (4) not cross the line from enticement to impermissible coercion, such that states have no real choice but to accept the funding and enact or administer a federal regulatory program. The fourth of these criteria, in particular, is intended to ensure that any conditions on federal grant funds do not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment's prohibition on the federal government's ""commandeering"" of state or local governments or officials by requiring them to carry out federal programs. The power of the federal government to attach conditions to federal grants has received renewed attention due to a January 2017 executive order issued by President Trump that is intended to encourage state and local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement by withholding federal grants to nonfederal entities that have adopted ""sanctuary"" policies. Several jurisdictions that could be affected by the executive order have filed suit against the President and his senior officials challenging the order's constitutionality and seeking an injunction that would bar its implementation. The plaintiffs argue, among other things, that the executive order: (1) does not comport with the restrictions on the spending power that were articulated by the High Court in Dole, and (2) violates the Tenth Amendment by compelling states and localities to enforce federal immigration law. This litigation regarding the executive order, and other legal challenges that may be filed in the future, could provide an opportunity for the federal courts to elaborate further on the federal government's power to impose conditions on the use of federal funds.",60,60 "Passenger Train Access to Freight Railroad Track. Pressure is building for greater passenger use of freight railroad rights of way. Freight railroad rights of way are owned by private, for-profit corporations, and the routes potentially most useful for passenger service are typically the busiest with freight traffic. In many cases, states or commuter rail authorities have reached agreement with freight railroads to share either their track or right of way. However, unlike Amtrak, which has eminent domain power over freight facilities and can appeal to a federal agency to determine the terms of its access to freight track, other would-be passenger rail operators do not have any statutory leverage when negotiating with freight railroads. This likely increases the price public authorities pay for access and leaves them with no apparent recourse when freight railroads reject their offers. During House committee mark-up of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-432), a provision to require binding arbitration when commuter rail authorities and freight railroads fail to reach agreement over access proved controversial. The committee chose instead to require non-binding arbitration. Some Members of Congress have urged greater reliance on private companies to provide intercity rail services similar to those offered by Amtrak, but such private services may be difficult to develop so long as potential operators lack Amtrak's statutory right to compel freight railroads to carry passenger trains. Freight railroads can be expected to object to such initiatives as unfair ""takings"" of their private property. In the 112th Congress, the version of surface transportation legislation passed by the Senate (S. 1813) calls for a federal study to evaluate passenger service in shared-use rail corridors and to survey processes for resolving disputes over passenger access. Passenger access to freight railroad track raises old but recurring questions about the fundamental nature of railroad rights of way. Railroads are not like other businesses that are free to decide how and where they allocate resources solely on the principle of maximizing shareholder returns. While railroad rights of way are private property, more than a century of case law has upheld a public duty on them. The public nature of railroads is evident from the fact that they were designated as ""common carriers,"" granted eminent domain power, and regulated by government. However, the private interest of railroads is protected by the limitation that the government's right to regulate does not mean the right to confiscate. Railroad rights of way, unlike highways, were not considered part of the ""public domain."" When competition from other modes eroded passenger rail travel, it was confirmed that the public duty attached to railroads could obligate them to operate some trains at a loss, provided the railroad's overall operations were profitable. The issue for Congress is whether freight railroads and prospective passenger rail authorities should negotiate over the terms of use of railroad property just as any private parties would or if a governmental third party, such as the federal Surface Transportation Board (STB), should have some role in determining the terms. Given that a public service obligation is still attached to railroads, albeit largely lifted with respect to passenger service, do freight railroads have the right to set the price for passenger access unilaterally, or should the public's convenience and necessity be given some consideration? Granting track access rights to potential private operators of passenger service could be a particularly thorny issue. Given the increasing demands on urban rail corridors, Congress might examine alternative methods for managing them. A public ""rail port authority"" might have some advantages over private railroads in optimizing an urban rail network.",123,123 "National Park Service Appropriations: Ten-Year Trends. The National Park Service (NPS) generally receives appropriations in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. This report examines trends in NPS appropriations over the past decade (FY2009-FY2018), as well as changes during the decade in the size of the National Park System, numbers of recreational visits to the parks, and NPS staffing levels. NPS's appropriations fluctuated during the decade, mainly declining in the first part of the decade and then increasing during the second part. In the first and last years of the decade (FY2009 and FY2018), as well as in one intervening year (FY2013), appropriations totals were notably increased by supplemental funding. In FY2009, supplemental appropriations for economic stimulus affected NPS accounts for park operations, construction, and historic preservation, in FY2013 and FY2018, supplemental funding for hurricane recovery affected the accounts for construction and historic preservation. With the supplemental appropriations included, the total discretionary appropriation for FY2018 represented an increase (+5.6%) in nominal dollars over the FY2009 total but a decrease (-8.0%) in inflation-adjusted dollars. Excluding supplementals, NPS appropriations increased between FY2009 and FY2018 by 26.8% in nominal dollars and 10.5% in inflation-adjusted dollars. During this period, NPS's discretionary appropriations were organized primarily in five accounts. A sixth account (Centennial Challenge) was funded only in certain years. Regular appropriations fluctuated over the decade for all the accounts, and the extent to which an account increased or decreased also was affected by supplemental appropriations. With supplementals included, two accounts received more funding in FY2018 than in FY2009 in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, including one account that funds federal land acquisition and outdoor recreation assistance to states and one that provides grants to states and tribes for historic preservation activities. Three other accounts received less funding in FY2018 than in FY2009 in inflation-adjusted dollars—including NPS's largest account, which funds basic park operations, as well as the account that funds construction and major repairs and the account for NPS assistance to nonfederal entities. Excluding supplementals, funding still grew in real terms for the land acquisition and historic preservation accounts, but it also grew for the operations and construction accounts, declining only for assistance to nonfederal entities. The operations and construction accounts are partially used to address NPS's deferred maintenance backlog, which has grown throughout the decade. The funding changes took place in the context of relative stability in the size of the National Park System, which was about 85 million acres throughout the decade, with slight growth (+0.8%). The total consisted of roughly 80 million acres of federal land, with the remainder nonfederal. Although system acreage remained relatively stable, 26 new units were added to the system during the decade. NPS staffing levels hovered around 20,000 and were highest in the first part of the decade, stemming partly from the economic stimulus measures in FY2009. Visits to the parks increased over the decade, peaking at approximately 331 million visits in 2016.",106,106 "The U.N. Convention Against Torture: Overview of U.S. Implementation Policy Concerning the Removal of Aliens. The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) requires signatory parties to take measures to end torture within their territorial jurisdictions. For purposes of the Convention, torture is defined as an extreme form of cruel and inhuman punishment committed under the color of law. The Convention allows for no circumstances or emergencies where torture could be permitted. Additionally, CAT Article 3 requires that no state party expel, return, or extradite a person to another country where there are substantial grounds to believe he would be subjected to torture. CAT Article 3 does not expressly prohibit persons from being removed to countries where they would face cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment not rising to the level of torture. The United States ratified CAT subject to certain declarations, reservations, and understandings, including that the Convention was not self-executing, and therefore required domestic implementing legislation to take effect. In accordance with CAT Article 3, the United States enacted statutes and regulations to prohibit the transfer of aliens to countries where they would be tortured, including the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, and certain regulations implemented and enforced by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of State. These authorities, which require the withholding or deferral of the removal of an alien to a country where he is more likely than not to be tortured, generally provide aliens already residing within the United States a greater degree of protection than aliens arriving to the United States who are deemed inadmissible on security- or terrorism-related grounds. Further, in deciding whether or not to remove an alien to a particular country, these rules permit the consideration of diplomatic assurances that an alien will not be tortured there. Nevertheless, under U.S. law, the removal or extradition of all aliens from the United States must be consistent with U.S. obligations under CAT. CAT obligations concerning alien removal have additional implications in cases of criminal and other deportable aliens. The Supreme Court's ruling in Zadvydas v. Davis suggests that certain aliens receiving protection under CAT cannot be indefinitely detained, raising the possibility that certain otherwise-deportable aliens could be released into the United States if CAT protections make their removal impossible. CAT obligations also have implications for the practice of ""extraordinary renditions,"" by which the U.S. purportedly has transferred aliens suspected of terrorist activity to countries that possibly employ torture as a means of interrogation. For additional background on renditions and other CAT-related issues, see CRS Report RL32890, Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture, and CRS Report RL32438, U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT): Overview and Application to Interrogation Techniques, both by Michael John Garcia.",83,81 "Fundamental Tax Reform: Options for the Mortgage Interest Deduction. The mortgage interest deduction, which is one of the largest sources of federal tax revenue loss with an estimated annual cost of $72 billion, is intended to encourage homeownership. Empirical studies suggest that the mortgage interest deduction subsidizes mortgage lending, which has more impact on housing consumption than homeownership rates. Other homeownership subsidies, like down-payment assistance programs, are proven to be more effective at increasing homeownership among lower-income families and are less expensive than the mortgage interest deduction. A recent enhancement to the mortgage interest deduction was enacted in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-432),which temporarily allowed, for tax year 2007, mortgage insurance premiums paid for a personal residence to be tax deductible as mortgage interest. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 (H.R. 3648, P.L. 110-142) extended that provision through the end of 2010. Early in the 109th Congress, tax reform was a major legislative issue. President Bush appointed a bipartisan panel to study the federal tax code and to propose options to reform the code. The panel produced a report in the fall of 2005 that included a proposal to change the mortgage interest deduction. Legislation for fundamental tax reform was introduced, and some bills proposed to change the tax base such that income tax credits and deductions, like the mortgage interest deduction, would have been eliminated. Late in the first session of the 110th Congress, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rangel indicated that fundamental tax reform might still be considered in the 110th Congress. There are many possible options to alter the mortgage interest deduction. If the deduction were eliminated as a result of fundamental tax reform, the resulting effects would depend on a variety of variables, including the nature of tax reform, the resulting changes in the tax base and tax rates, changes in interest rates, and other economic variables. If the deduction were eliminated without other tax policy changes, federal income tax revenues would increase, the tax base could be broadened, and the federal budget deficit could be reduced. Modifications to the mortgage interest deduction could take any one of several approaches. Congress could choose to allow the deduction for only one residence and/or to reduce the allowable principal debt, which is currently $1 million. These changes would reduce the amount of tax revenue loss associated with the provision. Congress could choose to improve equity by allowing more low-income households to claim mortgage interest, either as an above-the-line deduction or as a tax credit. Finally, the mortgage interest deduction could remain unaltered. This report, which will be updated to reflect legislative developments, describes the deduction for home mortgage interest, provides economic analysis, and concludes with possible changes to the mortgage interest deduction and the potential impacts of those changes.",7,7 "TARP Assistance for Chrysler: Restructuring and Repayment Issues. The recent recession and accompanying credit crisis posed severe challenges for all automakers, but especially for General Motors and Chrysler. Executives of both companies testified before congressional committees in the fall of 2008 requesting federal bridge loans. Legislation that would have provided such financial assistance passed the House of Representatives but did not pass the Senate. In lieu of that assistance, the Bush Administration turned to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a $700 billion program that was enacted in October 2008 to shore up the financial system and prevent spillover to the broader economy. The Bush Administration used TARP to provide both automakers and two auto financing companies with nearly $25 billion in loans, and told the automakers to submit viability plans if they were to seek additional aid. Chrysler submitted such a plan in February 2009, outlining how it planned to restructure its operations, including a strategic alliance with Fiat. Some questions were raised as to whether Chrysler could survive as a free-standing company, even with government assistance, because of its relatively small size. The Obama Administration rejected Chrysler's initial viability plan as insufficient and gave the company 30 days to develop a new plan in an effort to avert bankruptcy. Working with the Administration's Auto Task Force, Chrysler developed a restructuring plan that included a revised labor agreement, cost reductions from dealers and suppliers, reductions in creditor claims, and limitations on executive compensation. Despite agreement with most stakeholders, all creditors did not agree to the restructuring, prompting Chrysler to file for bankruptcy in April 2009. With much of the restructuring plan in place, however, the bankruptcy court was able to quickly approve the proposals, including a creditor agreement. Many of the assets of Old Chrysler were sold to a new legal entity, Chrysler Group LLC, whose largest equity owner was the United Auto Workers' retiree medical trust fund, owning 67.7%. Fiat took a management role in the new company and a 20% equity stake, which was deemed central to the survival of New Chrysler. Under new Fiat management, New Chrysler revamped its fleet of automobiles and light trucks, and has been profitable in 2011 and 2012. Its commercial and financial success accelerated its plans for repaying federal assistance. In May 2011, New Chrysler repaid a $5.9 billion debt to the U.S. government that was not fully due until 2017. On July 21, 2011, Fiat purchased the U.S. government's common equity interests and options in New Chrysler for $560 million. In addition, the ownership of New Chrysler significantly changed as Fiat met a series of performance benchmarks that allowed it to raise its equity stake to 58.5% at the end of 2011. Of the $10.9 billion that was loaned to Chrysler through TARP, not all of it has been, or will be, recouped by the U.S. Treasury. Following the transaction that closed on July 21, 2011, the U.S. government has no remaining financial interest in New Chrysler. While $9.6 billion of the assistance given to the company has been recouped, an approximate $1.3 billion shortfall remains. New Chrysler has no legal responsibility to make up this shortfall.",118,118 "The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA): Background and Funding. Native Americans living in tribal areas experience some of the poorest housing conditions in the United States. Native Americans in tribal areas are several times more likely to live in housing that is physically substandard or overcrowded than the U.S. population as a whole. They are also more likely to live in poverty than the general population, further contributing to housing problems. In addition, a number of issues, such as the legal status of tribal land, pose unique barriers to housing for many people living in tribal areas. In light of these conditions, and the federal government's trust responsibility to Native American tribes, Congress has provided funding for Native American housing programs for several decades. The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA) reorganized the previous system of housing assistance for Native Americans and replaced it with a single block grant program, the Native American Housing Block Grant (NAHBG). In addition, the law focused on self-determination for tribes, giving tribes broad authority to choose how to use the affordable housing funds they receive under NAHASDA. Through the NAHBG, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) distributes formula funding to Native American tribes and Alaska Native villages, or to organizations the tribes have designated to administer the funding (known as tribally designated housing entities (TDHEs)). Tribes and TDHEs, in turn, use the funding for a range of affordable housing activities to benefit low-income tribal households. These activities include developing new housing for rental or homeownership, maintaining or operating existing housing units, providing infrastructure, and offering housing-related services. In addition to the NAHBG, NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program to help tribes obtain private financing for housing activities (the Title VI Loan Guarantee program) and authorizes funding for training and technical assistance. An amendment to NAHASDA in 2000 established the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant (NHHBG) program to provide housing assistance for Native Hawaiians similar to the assistance provided under the NAHBG. HUD estimates that about 100,000 housing units have been built, acquired, or rehabilitated since the NAHBG began. The majority of these units have been substantially rehabilitated rather than built or acquired. In general, many tribes choose to use their NAHBG funds to develop more homeownership units than rental units, in part because homeownership units have fewer ongoing costs for tribes. The NHHBG has been used to build, acquire, or rehabilitate nearly 600 homes since the program began, and to provide services or training to another 1,500 households. The authorization for NAHASDA programs, other than the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant, expired at the end of FY2013. (The Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant program has not been reauthorized since its initial authorization expired at the end of FY2005.) Congress has been considering bills to reauthorize NAHASDA.",105,106 "United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues. The United Nations (UN) has had an active presence in Afghanistan since 1988, and it is highly regarded by many Afghans for playing a brokering role in ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As a result of the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, coordinating international donor activity and assistance have been tasked to a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). However, there are other coordinating institutions tied to the Afghan government, and UNAMA has struggled to exercise its full mandate. The international recovery and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is immense and complicated and, in coordination with the Afghan government, involves U.N. agencies, bilateral donors, international organizations, and local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The coordinated aid programs of the United States and its European allies focus on a wide range of activities, from strengthening the central and local governments of Afghanistan and its security forces to promoting civilian reconstruction, reducing corruption, and assisting with elections. Some of the major issues UNAMA is wrestling with include the following Most observers agree that continued, substantial, long-term development is key, as is the need for international support, but questions have been raised about corruption, aid effectiveness (funds required, priorities established, impact received), and the coordination necessary to achieve sufficient improvement throughout the country. The international community and the Afghan government have sought to establish coordinating institutions and a common set of goals in order to use donor funds effectively. The international donor community has also sought to encourage Afghan ""ownership""-meaning leadership and control-of reconstruction and development efforts by the country itself. Although the Afghan government is taking on an increasingly central role in development planning and the management of aid funds, the international community remains extensively involved in Afghan stabilization, not only in diplomacy and development assistance, but also in combating insurgents and addressing broader security issues. In December 2009, the Obama Administration laid out its strategy for Afghanistan in response to a battlefield assessment, reemphasized an earlier commitment to civilian efforts in cooperation with the United Nations, and further highlighted Afghanistan as a top national security priority. In 2010, a number of events and meetings took place that taken together provide a snapshot of ways that the Afghan government and international community are engaged in Afghanistan. These include the London Conference (January), the Peace Jirga (June), the Kabul Conference (July), and the NATO Summit in Lisbon (November). In addition, on September 18, 2010 Afghanistan held its second parliamentary election, the results of which were certified by electoral commissions in November. In its Afghanistan strategy review in December, the Obama Administration cautiously stated that while progress is being made on security matters, it remains fragile and requires sustained involvement by the United States and its allies. This report examines the role of UNAMA in Afghanistan and discusses the obstacles the organization faces in coordinating international efforts and explores related policy issues and considerations for the 112th Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.",83,83 "Federal Lands Managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service (FS): Issues in the 111th Congress. Congress, the Administration, and the courts are considering many issues related to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) public lands and the Forest Service (FS) national forests. Key issues include the following. Energy Resources. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) led to new regulations on federal land leasing for oil and gas, oil shale, geothermal, and renewable energy. The Obama Administration is reviewing some rules and has withdrawn certain oil and gas leases in Utah. Hardrock Mining. The General Mining Law of 1872 allows prospecting for minerals in open public domain lands. Several bills to reform aspects of the Law have been introduced to require royalties on production and establish a fund to clean up abandoned mines, among other changes. Wildfire Protection. Various initiatives seek to protect communities from wildfires by expanding fuel reduction, and one related program was established in P.L. 111-11. Cost concerns led to new fire suppression accounts in the FLAME Act (Title V of P.L. 111-88). Wild Horses and Burros. To reduce program costs and the number of wild horses and burros on the range, the Secretary of the Interior has proposed wild horse preserves and increased fertility controls. Legislation would prohibit the slaughter of healthy wild horses and burros and more. National Landscape Conservation System. The 111th Congress affirmed BLM's 27 million-acre land protection system by establishing it legislatively (P.L. 111-11). Questions focus on funding and management for these specially protected conservation areas. Wilderness. P.L. 111-11 designated more than 2 million acres of wilderness, and more wilderness bills have been introduced. Many recommendations for wilderness areas are pending. Questions persist about wilderness review and managing wilderness study areas (WSAs). National Forest System Roadless Areas. Debates persist about managing roadless areas for different values, and bills have been introduced to protect the areas. Regulations from previous administrations were challenged successfully, leading to potentially conflicting court rulings. FS NEPA Application. The FS has altered its process for activity review under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), and has added activities that can be categorically excluded from reviews. Many of these changes and proposals have been challenged in court. BLM Land Sales. The Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act authorizes the sale or exchange of BLM lands and use of the proceeds for certain land acquisitions. The authority was extended to July 25, 2011. H.R. 3339 would make the authorization permanent, while S. 1787 would extend it to 2020. National Forest Planning. The National Forest Management Act of 1976 requires land and resource management plans for the national forests. Regulations from previous administrations have not been implemented, and the Obama Administration has begun a new rulemaking effort.",107,107 "Major Agricultural Trade Issues in the 115th Congress. Trade, particularly exports, is critical to the vitality of American agriculture. On average, foreign markets absorb about one-fifth of U.S. agricultural production, thus contributing significantly to the health of the farm economy. The positive economic effects of trade in farm products are felt well beyond the farm gate. Farm product exports make up about 10% of total U.S. exports and contribute positively to the U.S. balance of trade. The economic benefits of agricultural exports also extend across rural communities, while overseas farm sales help to buoy a wide array of industries linked to agriculture, including transportation, processing, and farm input suppliers. Moreover, most of the future growth in food demand is expected to occur in developing countries. Congress has traditionally displayed a keen interest in agricultural trade issues given their importance to farmers and ranchers and to the overall economy. The plethora of agriculture-related policy questions and trade issues in play as the 115th Congress convenes suggests that trade policy in general, as well as specific farm trade issues, may continue to draw congressional oversight and input. One ongoing concern has centered on the trade-distorting domestic policies abroad, including in China, which ranked as the second largest market for U.S. farm exports in FY2016. In late 2016 the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) launched two trade enforcement actions against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over its administration of tariff rate quotas for imports of wheat, rice, and corn and over its domestic support measures for these crops. On the multilateral front, President Trump has ordered the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional free trade agreement (FTA), which the United States and 11 other Pacific-facing nations signed but which Congress has not ratified. As negotiated, TPP would have significantly improved access for U.S. farm exports. USTR continues to negotiate with the European Union (EU) over a regional FTA—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP)—involving a number of thorny agricultural issues that have proved to be impediments to trade, including differences over geographic indications (GI) and discontinuity in regulating the application of biotechnology to agricultural production, as well as access for these products to commercial markets. The United Kingdom vote to exit the EU has added to the already uncertain prospects for T-TIP. At the global level, further liberalization of agricultural trade is an objective of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO, but those talks have been at an impasse for several years. Of concern to the developing world, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)—which provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products from developing countries and benefits from $2.6 billion in U.S. agricultural imports in 2015—will expire at the end of 2017 unless Congress extends it. Beyond trade agreements, numerous other trade issues of importance to U.S. agriculture may be of interest to Congress. For one, suspension agreements that limit Mexico's sugar exports to the United States have come under increasing criticism from U.S. stakeholders and may have implications for the U.S. sugar program. In Cuba, U.S. farm and food interests see potential to meaningfully expand exports, but a prohibition on private U.S. financing is viewed as a major obstacle to this end. U.S. dairy interests object to a Canadian dairy ingredient pricing strategy that it believes is aimed at displacing U.S. ingredient exports. U.S. exports of beef, pork, and chicken continue to face bans and trade restrictions over disease outbreaks that are inconsistent with international trade protocols. Examples include China's ongoing bans on imports of U.S. beef and poultry and restrictions imposed by several foreign markets on U.S. ractopamine-fed pork. As the 115th Congress convenes, the United States has settled two long-running WTO challenges to its policies: one to its cotton program and another to its country-of-origin labeling (COOL) law.",4,4 "Joint Select Committee on Solvency of Multiemployer Pension Plans: Structure, Procedures, and CRS Experts. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed into law on February 9, 2018, creates a new joint select committee of the House and Senate. The Joint Select Committee on Solvency of Multiemployer Pension Plans, made up of 16 members of the House and Senate—four chosen by each of the chambers' party leaders—is intended to formulate recommendations and legislative language that will ""significantly improve the solvency of multiemployer pension plans and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation."" The law directs the joint select committee to, no later than November 30, 2018, vote on a report, which, if approved, is to be submitted along with legislative language to the President, Vice President, the Speaker of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate. The legislative recommendations of the joint select committee are subject to consideration under expedited procedures in the Senate, which differ slightly from the procedures the Senate normally uses to process most legislation. These procedures are intended to allow the Senate to reach a timely vote on whether to consider legislation embodying the recommendations of the joint select committee. Under the terms of the act, the Senate is directed to vote on a motion to consider any reported joint committee bill before the conclusion of the 115th Congress (2017-2018). The support of at least three-fifths of the Senate would be necessary to take up and approve the measure. The act does not provide any special procedures governing House consideration of such legislation. This report discusses the structure, powers, and funding of the Joint Select Committee on Solvency of Multiemployer Pension Plans and provides an overview of the parliamentary procedures the chambers may use to consider its work product. The report includes contact information for CRS policy analysts who work on issues related to the structure and policy work of the panel.",88,55 "Overview of Immigration Issues in the 112th Congress. There is a broad-based consensus that the U.S. immigration system is broken. This consensus erodes, however, as soon as the options to reform the U.S. immigration system are debated. Substantial efforts to comprehensively reform immigration law failed in the 109th and 110th Congresses. Whether and how the 112th Congress will address immigration reform in the midst of historically high levels of unemployment and budgetary constrictions is difficult to project. The number of foreign-born people residing in the United States is at the highest level in U.S. history and has reached a proportion of the U.S. population—12.5%—not seen since the early 20th century. Of the 38 million foreign-born residents in the United States, approximately 16.4 million are naturalized citizens. The remaining 21.6 million foreign-born residents are noncitizens. According to the latest estimates by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), about 10.8 million of the 21.6 million noncitizens were unauthorized aliens living in the United States in January 2010, down from a peak of 11.8 million in January 2007. Some observers and policy experts maintain that the presence of millions of unauthorized residents is evidence of inadequacies in the legal immigration system as well as failures of immigration control policies and practices. This report synthesizes immigration issues as a multi-tiered debate. It breaks down the U.S. immigration law and policy into key elements: border control and visa security, legal immigration, documentation and verification, interior immigration enforcement, integration, status, and benefits, and refugees and other humanitarian populations. It delineates the debate in the 112th Congress for a range of issues, including border security, criminal aliens, worksite enforcement, employment eligibility verification, permanent admissions, temporary workers, legalization, noncitizen eligibility for federal benefits, birthright citizenship, and the role of state and local law enforcement in enforcing immigration laws. Current circumstances may sharpen the social and business cleavages as well as narrow the range of options. Nonetheless, selected immigration issues are likely to be a major concern for the 112th Congress, even if legislative action on such contentious issues appears daunting. For a discussion of legislative action on immigration issues, see CRS Report R42036, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 112th Congress.",76,76 "Regulatory Reform 10 Years After the Financial Crisis: Systemic Risk Regulation of Non-Bank Financial Institutions. When large, interconnected financial institutions become distressed, policymakers have historically faced a choice between (1) a taxpayer-funded bailout, and (2) the destabilization of the financial system—a dilemma that commentators have labeled the ""too-big-to-fail"" (TBTF) problem. The 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the significance of the TBTF problem. During the crisis, a number of large financial institutions experienced severe distress, and the federal government committed hundreds of billions of dollars in an effort to rescue the financial system. According to some commentators, the crisis underscored the inadequacy of existing prudential regulation of large financial institutions, and of the bankruptcy system for resolving the failure of such institutions. In response to the crisis, Congress passed and President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) in 2010. Titles I and II of Dodd-Frank are specifically directed at minimizing the systemic risk created by TBTF financial institutions. In order to minimize the risks that large financial institutions will fail, Title I of Dodd-Frank establishes an enhanced prudential regulatory regime for certain large bank holding companies and non-bank financial companies. In order to ""resolve"" (i.e., reorganize or liquidate) systemically important financial institutions, Title II establishes a new resolution regime available for such institutions outside of the Bankruptcy Code. The Title I regime applies to (1) all bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more, and (2) any non-bank financial companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) designates as systemically important. To date, FSOC has designated four non-bank financial companies for enhanced supervision: AIG, GE Capital, Prudential, and MetLife. However, FSOC has rescinded its designations of AIG and GE Capital as a result of changes to those companies, and MetLife successfully challenged its designation in federal court, leaving Prudential as the sole remaining designee as of the publication of this report. Legislation that would repeal FSOC's authority to designate non-banks for enhanced supervision has passed the House of Representatives (H.R. 10), and a bill that would alter FSOC's designation process and standards in more limited ways has also been introduced in the House (H.R. 4061). Title II of Dodd-Frank creates an ""Orderly Liquidation Authority"" (OLA) pursuant to which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can serve as the receiver for failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States. The OLA, which was developed as an alternative to the Bankruptcy Code, is similar to the mechanisms the FDIC uses to resolve failed commercial banks. The OLA grants the FDIC broad powers to manage the liquidation or sale of a failed financial company, and Title II includes provisions that offer financial institutions more robust protections against ""runs"" by their derivatives counterparties than they would have under the Bankruptcy Code. The FDIC, Federal Reserve, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have promulgated a number of rules that have important consequences for the OLA concerning the FDIC's powers as receiver, its general strategy for resolving failed institutions, ""loss-absorbing capacity"" requirements for certain bank holding companies, and derivatives contracts. There have also been a number of proposals to reform Title II. A bill that would (among other things) repeal Title II passed the House in June 2017, and bills to amend the Bankruptcy Code to allow it to deal more effectively with the failure of large financial institutions have been introduced in the House and the Senate (H.R. 10 (115th Cong.), H.R. 1667 (115th Cong.), S. 1840 (114th Cong.)).",5,5 "The 2014 Farm Bill: Changing the Treatment of LIHEAP Receipt in the Calculation of SNAP Benefits. The Agricultural Act of 2014 (""the 2014 farm bill"") was enacted on February 7, 2014. Included in the law's reauthorization of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is a change to how Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) payments are treated in the calculation of SNAP benefits. This change is expected to reduce some households' monthly benefit amounts, particularly households in states that have adopted the so-called ""Heat and Eat"" practice, where states leverage a nominal LIHEAP benefit into a larger SNAP benefit. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that this change will reduce SNAP spending by approximately $8.6 billion over the 10-year budget window of FY2014-FY2023. Based on CBO's May 2013 baseline, this is approximately a 1% reduction in forecasted program spending over the 10-year period. SNAP law provides for both eligibility rules and, for eligible households, benefit calculation rules. The SNAP statute allows for certain deductions from income when calculating a household's monthly benefit amount, one of these deductions is the ""excess shelter deduction,"" which incorporates utility costs. If a family incurs heating and/or cooling expenses, this deduction from income can be higher than for households not incurring these expenses, allowing for a higher SNAP benefit for the household. One way households can document heating and cooling expenses is by showing receipt of LIHEAP assistance. Under prior law, any amount of LIHEAP assistance could increase benefit amounts, under the 2014 farm bill change, LIHEAP assistance will have to be greater than $20 per year in order to be included in a household's benefit calculation. In SNAP benefit calculation, a LIHEAP payment documents that the household has incurred heating and cooling costs. This documentation triggers a standard utility allowance (SUA), a figure intended to represent typical state-specific utility costs, which enters into the SNAP benefit calculation equation. (Most states use an SUA, but some opt not to and use only actual utility costs.) Unless the household is receiving the maximum SNAP benefit already, a household's monthly benefit can increase if the inclusion of an SUA results in an excess shelter deduction. Proof of heating or cooling expenses will trigger a higher SUA than proof of only telephone or water expenses. The higher SUA then gets factored into the calculation of a household's excess shelter deduction. In many cases, the higher the excess shelter deduction, the higher the monthly SNAP benefit will be. The 2014 farm bill's change is expected to impact the ""Heat and Eat"" practice. Approximately 16 states provide nominal LIHEAP benefits through a ""Heat and Eat"" practice. ""Heat and Eat"" is a phrase that the low-income and anti-hunger advocacy community has used to describe state and program policies that leverage nominal (as little as 10 cents) LIHEAP payments into an increase in households' SNAP benefits that is larger than the initial LIHEAP payment. Also, a 17th state allows SNAP applicants to benefit from an SUA if the household applies for LIHEAP. Thus, the farm bill is expected to change 17 states' administration of SNAP and is expected to reduce some households' benefit amounts. The 2014 farm bill's change in the law will require more than $20 a year in LIHEAP assistance in order to trigger the potential increase in benefits. The exact implementation timeline, details, and share of households affected will depend upon the U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service's (USDA-FNS) interpretation and implementation of the policy, the options states choose in their implementation, and the share of households that will be able to document their heating and cooling expenses in other ways. Congress's final decision to change the law came after the passage of related proposals in both the House and the Senate. The 113th Congress's Senate-passed farm bill (S. 954) would have set a $10 threshold for LIHEAP payments to confer this potential advantage. The House-passed farm bill (H.R. 2642 combined with H.R. 3102) included the $20 threshold.",2,114 "Analysis of Issues Concerning Extended Learning Time. School reformers have pointed out for decades that schools operate on a nine-month agrarian calendar that is seen as no longer relevant. The idea of extended learning time captured national attention in 1983 with the publication of A Nation at Risk by the National Commission on Excellence in Education. The report recommended that the amount of school time be increased from 180 days to between 200 and 220 seven-hour school days. More recent reports and reformists have agreed that some students require more time to meet academic standards, but few schools have moved away from the standard schedule. Policymakers, however, have recently expressed more interest in extended learning time. For example, during the 110th Congress, a number of bills were introduced that focused on, or had provisions concerning, extended learning time. Additionally, the Obama Administration has repeatedly talked about the importance of extended learning time. This report begins with a brief review of past extended learning time initiatives, instructional time in other countries, and research on extended learning time. It provides examples of extended learning time programs and discusses barriers to implementation. It then covers current federal support for extended learning time before concluding with summaries of recent action by the Obama Administration and the 110th and 111th Congresses concerning extended learning time. S. 804 of the 111th Congress is included in the summaries.",33,33 "The United Nations Security Council -- Its Role in the Iraq Crisis: A Brief Overview. On September 12, 2002, President Bush in his address to the U.N. General Assembly, focused on Iraq and its failure to comply with various resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council. He urged the Council to act in the face of such repeated violations. On November 8, 2002, the Council responded, adopting Resolution 1441 (2002) unanimously. This short report provides background information on what the U.N. Security Council is and what it does, including the occasions when it has authorized the use of force or its equivalent. As the U.N. organ having primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, the 15-member Security Council set the major international response to the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, authorizing the use of ""force to gain Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait in compliance with the 11 resolutions previously passed in 1990. In 1991, after the war, the Council adopted a series of 12 resolutions that assigned an extensive set of tasks to the United Nations and imposed on Iraq an equally extensive series of obligations. As hostilities became imminent, U.N. activities inside Iraq were suspended. After March 19, 2003, the Council met in late March to air U.N. member concerns over the hostilities. This report ends with the start of hostilities and will not be updated.",24,83 "Oil Industry Financial Performance and the Windfall Profits Tax. Over the past 13 years, surging crude oil and petroleum product prices have increased oil and gas industry revenues and generated record profits, particularly for the top five major integrated companies, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips. These companies, which reported a predominant share of those profits, generated more than $104 billion in profit on nearly $1.8 trillion of revenues in 2008, before declining as a result of the recession and other factors. From 2003 to 2008, revenues increased by 86%, net income (profits) increased by 66%. Oil output by the five major companies over this time period declined by more than 7%, from 9.85 million to 9.12 million barrels per day. In 2010 the companies' oil production was 9.4 million barrels per day. Being largely price-driven, with no accompanying increase in output resulting from increased investment in exploration and production, some believe that a portion of the increased oil industry income over this period represents a windfall and unearned gain. A windfall income is not earned as a result of additional production effort on the part of the firms, but due primarily to record crude oil prices, which are set in the world oil marketplace. Since the 109th Congress, numerous bills have been introduced seeking to impose a windfall profits tax (WPT) on oil. An excise-tax based WPT would tax only domestic production and, like the one in effect from 1980-1988, would increase marginal oil production costs. Theoretically, such a policy could reduce domestic oil supply, which could raise petroleum imports, making the United States more dependent on foreign oil, undermining goals of energy independence and energy security. By contrast, an income-tax based WPT would likely be more economically neutral (less economic distortion) in the short-run. Sizeable tax revenues could potentially be raised without reducing domestic oil supplies. Neither the excise-tax based nor income-tax based WPT are expected to have significant price effects. Neither tax would increase the price of crude oil, which means that refined petroleum product prices, such as pump prices for gasoline, would likely not increase. In lieu of these two types of WPT, an administratively simple way of increasing the tax burden on the oil industry, and therefore recouping some of any excess or windfall profits, particularly from major integrated producers, would be to raise the effective corporate tax rate. One option would be repealing or reducing the domestic manufacturing activities deduction under IRC § 199. The 112th Congress voted on this measure as part of the Close Big Oil Tax Loopholes Act (S. 940). Going forward, in the context of deficit reduction, the 112th Congress may continue evaluating various methods for increasing taxes on the oil and gas industry to address concerns surrounding possible windfall profits.",40,40 "Climate Change Legislation in the 108th Congress. Climate change and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were an issue in the 108th Congress, as they were over the preceding decade. Bills directly addressing climate change issues ranged from those focused primarily on climate change research (H.R. 1578 and S. 1164) to comprehensive emissions cap and trading programs for all six greenhouse gases (S. 139 and H.R. 4067). Additional bills focused on GHG reporting and registries (H.R. 6 (Senate-passed), H.R. 1245, S. 17, and S. 194), or on power plant emissions of carbon dioxide (H.R. 2042, S. 139 S. 366, and S. 843). These climate change bills differed within and across categories. Among the climate change research bills, there were common and divergent research focuses. For example, a few bills including S. 139 and S. 1164, would have directed research on historical instances of climate change to develop climate change models. Additional bills focused on research to examine vulnerabilities to climate change in the United States, particularly with respect to human health, environmental, and economic outcomes. Furthermore, some bills would have promoted research on political and technological options to reduce GHG emissions. Among the six bills with GHG reporting and registry requirements, there were also differences. The primary difference between reporting bills was how each determined which entities must report. H.R. 6 (Senate version), H.R. 1245, H.R. 4067, and S. 139 would have established GHG emission thresholds, usually around 10,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide (or equivalent) per year, above which an entity must submit records of its GHG emissions. However, H.R. 6 and H.R. 1245 excluded farms from the reporting requirement. The remaining bills, S. 17 and S. 194, would have tasked the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with establishing the threshold requirement. There were also similarities and differences between cap and trade bills. Specifically H.R. 2024, S. 366, and S. 843 would have focused on fossil fuel-fired electric generating facilities, while S. 139 and H.R. 4067 would have covered a broader array of sources. Furthermore, H.R. 2024, S. 366, and S. 843 would have capped one GHG -- carbon dioxide -- while S. 139 and H.R. 4067 would have capped all six GHGs. This report briefly discusses basic concepts on which these bills were based, and compares major provisions of the bills in each of the following categories: climate change research, GHG reporting and registries, and cap and trade programs. This report will not be updated.",42,42 "The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Automobile Rules of Origin. The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) was signed on June 30, 2007. The provisions on the automotive sector were among the most difficult areas negotiated, and were among those in which the Obama Administration and South Korean officials reached further agreement on December 3, 2010. The agreement's effect on the automotive sector has drawn particular scrutiny as Congress considers implementation of the KORUS FTA. In particular, the specific rules of origin (ROO) for automobiles and auto parts have become a matter of debate. These rules determine whether the products imported into an FTA participating country are eligible to receive the duty-free or reduced tariff benefits of the agreement. For autos and auto parts, a certain percentage of the parts, labor, and other associated costs must come from the region. This is known as a regional value content (RVC) test. Few vehicles built today are built of parts made in any one country. The roughly 15,000 parts needed to produce a single motor vehicle are typically supplied by a complex web of manufacturers located throughout the world. This makes it challenging to determine whether a particular vehicle or a complex component, such as an engine or a transmission, qualifies for duty-free access to the U.S. or South Korean markets under the KORUS FTA. Based on analysis of the regional value content required under the KORUS FTA rules of origin, a significant proportion of a vehicle's value would need to originate in South Korea or the United States for that vehicle to enter the United States duty-free. Simply assembling a product from inputs obtained from other countries would likely result in insufficient regional value content for a product to qualify for the tariff benefits of the KORUS FTA. It appears that the requirements under the KORUS FTA are roughly equivalent to those imposed upon South Korean and European Union vehicles under the South Korea-European Union Free Trade Agreement, which takes effect July 1, 2011. Content produced in North Korea is not presently allowed into the United States, a situation that the KORUS FTA would not change. If at some future time the United States were to ease trade restrictions on North Korea, U.S. and South Korean negotiators would then need to discuss the treatment of North Korean inputs to South Korean products under the agreement. The KORUS FTA contains provisions to promote cooperation between the two countries' customs officials. Nonetheless, ensuring that North Korean parts are not used in South Korean products exported to the United States will remain a challenge, whether or not the KORUS FTA takes effect.",53,53 "Military Personnel and Food Stamps. In response to reports that members of the U.S. armed services qualify for and receive food stamps there have been calls for a policy response to reduce or eliminate member eligibility. The desirability of such a response has been questioned, however, on several grounds, including cost and its potential affects on Department of Defense (DoD) personnel policy. This report examines the possible extent of service-member participation in the food stamp program and provides background information on several aspects of the policy debate. Quantitative estimates of military participation and eligibility in the food stamp program vary because of limited available data, different methodologies and specific assumptions about the calculation of income. Recent estimates have varied from a few thousand to over twenty thousand. Although the true difference in estimates between eligibility and participation is unknown, assuming an excess of eligibles over participants would be somewhat consistent with the situation in the U.S. population as a whole, where only about two-thirds of eligibles actually receive stamps. Legislative proposals to reduce military food stamp eligibility in the United States were considered for those stationed in the United States but voted down in the first session of the 106th Congress. In the second session, Sen. McCain introduced S. 2322 which would provide a subsistence allowance for food stamp eligibles. Major concerns include whether or not participation in the program is primarily a result of inadequate pay or other factors such as household size. Concerns also exist that policy intervention could have unintended social and personnel affects on the military. Available policy options range from including the value of in-kind benefits (most notably housing) in the income/eligibility calculation, to mandating pay raises in every grade. The first approach would arguably equalize conditions for members on and off base by eliminating the relative advantage on-base members have in meeting eligibility criteria, which considers income in cash, but not in-kind benefits. Similarly situated members living off-base receive housing allowances as part of their compensation packages which may increase their income sufficiently to make them ineligible for food stamps. Pay raises, by contrast, would more directly ameliorate financial pressure on many or all families.",30,30 "Assistance to Firefighters Program. The Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) Program, also known as the FIRE Act grant program, was established by Title XVII of the FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398). The program provides federal grants directly to local fire departments and unaffiliated Emergency Medical Services (EMS) organizations to help address a variety of equipment, training, and other firefighter-related and EMS needs. A related program is the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Firefighters (SAFER) program, which provides grants for hiring, recruiting, and retaining firefighters. The Administration proposed $300 million for fire grants in FY2009, a 46% cut from the FY2008 level of $560 million. No funding was proposed for SAFER grants. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved $750 million for firefighter assistance in FY2009 ($560 million for fire grants and $190 million for SAFER grants), while the House Appropriations Committee approved $800 million for firefighter assistance ($570 million for fire grants and $230 million for SAFER grants). This report will be updated as events warrant.",97,97 "Surface Transportation Program Reauthorization Issues for the 112th Congress. The law authorizing federal surface transportation programs expired at the end of FY2009, but Congress has failed to enact a new authorization. Surface transportation programs continue to operate on the basis of authority provided in extension legislation. This situation should not be a surprise to those familiar with the history of the reauthorization process. Especially during the last two decades, reauthorization has become a difficult undertaking. This is primarily due to controversy over how and to whom federal-aid highway funds should be distributed. The most recent law, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU or SAFETEA) (P.L. 109-59), was enacted 22 months after previous legislation had originally expired. Previous reauthorization bills also were enacted well behind schedule. The most difficult issue to be considered during reauthorization is how to finance federal surface transportation programs. The highway trust fund and the revenue sources that feed it have been a reliable mechanism for financing highway and transit programs for five decades, but this is no longer the case. Fuel taxes, which provide most of the money for surface transportation, are unlikely to provide a solid long-term foundation for the programs, although a rate increase could help in the near-term. The choice for policymakers, therefore, is to find new sources of income for the current-size program or an expanded program, or alternately, to settle for a smaller program that might look very different from the one currently in place. The growing consensus on the need to reduce the federal budget deficit will likely influence this debate. One perennial subject of debate concerning the highway program is whether grants to individual states are in line with the taxes those states' motorists pay into the highway trust fund—the so-called donor-donee issue. Program consolidation, restructuring, and elimination are expected to receive extensive congressional attention due to public concerns about the condition of the nation's transportation infrastructure and the efficiency of existing programs. The speed of project delivery and environmental review streamlining are of growing interest in Congress. Congress also can be expected to look closely at transit program spending levels and priorities. Freight and passenger rail issues have also been of growing importance in recent years and figure to get significantly more attention than in past reauthorization debates. This report will not track legislative action on surface transportation reauthorization.",120,120 "Engrossment, Enrollment, and Presentation of Legislation. Engrossment, enrollment, and presentation of legislation are components of the legislative process that attest to the accuracy of bill texts, confirm House and Senate action, and confirm delivery of the bills to the President for review.",55,55 "Derivatives Legislation in the 112th Congress. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, amid the perception that the unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market contributed to systemic risk, the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) sought to remake the OTC market in the image of the regulated futures exchanges. Reforms included a requirement that swap contracts be cleared through a clearinghouse regulated by one or more federal agencies. Clearinghouses require traders to put down cash (called initial margin) at the time they open a contract to cover potential losses, and they require subsequent deposits (called maintenance margin) to cover actual losses to the position. The intended effect of margin requirements is to prevent firms from building up uncapitalized exposures so large that default would have systemic consequences. While addressing systemic concerns, the clearing of derivatives also imposes the cost of posting margin on those trading derivatives. Many nonfinancial firms argued during the debate over the Dodd-Frank Act that their use of derivatives posed no systemic threat and thus they should not be subjected to the cost of clearing these OTC derivatives. This particular debate came to be known as ""the end user debate."" As a result of these concerns, the Dodd-Frank Act included a broad exemption from the clearing requirement for firms that are primarily nonfinancial in nature. Nevertheless, such firms have continued to be concerned that Dodd-Frank could impose indirect costs on them, or that the rulemaking process by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) could do so. As such, some legislation in the 112th Congress, such as H.R. 1610, S. 947, S.Amdt. 814 to H.R. 2112, S. 1650, H.R. 2779, and H.R. 2682, addresses potential indirect costs to ""end users."" In addition, concern about derivatives has been fueled by sharp rises in commodity prices—particularly oil—in 2008 and early 2011. Such steep jumps, along with high price volatility in a range of commodities, have fostered apprehension that financial speculation in derivatives might be creating such volatility in commodity prices. For instance, during the course of 2008, oil prices doubled to more than $145 per barrel and then fell by 80% before rebounding, while there was little evidence suggesting disruption of physical supplies. In early 2011, there was again a run-up of about 20%, sending gasoline prices to near 2008 highs. Such severe fluctuations tend to anger consumers, and thus can become an issue for Congress. In the 112th Congress, a number of bills, such as H.R. 2328, S. 1200, H.R. 3006, S. 1598, H.R. 2003, H.R. 3313, and S. 1787 seek to address the impact financial speculation and derivatives may have on spot commodity prices. Other bills introduced in the 112th Congress aim to either tighten or loosen other aspects of derivatives regulation, in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act, such as H.R. 2586, H.R. 3045, H.R. 3283, and H.R. 1573. This report focuses primarily on legislation introduced in the 112th Congress. Additional background on how derivatives work, their role in the financial crisis, and the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on their regulation can be found in another CRS report cited below. This report will be updated as events warrant.",12,12 "Military Support to the Severely Disabled: Overview of Service Programs. Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused serious injuries to some military personnel. Many have been returned to medical facilities in the U.S., especially Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the National Naval Medical Center, and Brooke Army Medical Center. These severe and traumatic injuries—including amputations, burns, blindness, brain injury, and paralysis—often create significant hardships for the affected individuals that make independent living difficult or impossible. For example, an injured service member may need extensive physical therapy, transportation assistance, and job retraining in order to make the transition back to civilian life. In 2003 and 2004, some pointed out inadequacies in the military's ability to provide these services to its seriously injured personnel. Members of Congress have frequently expressed concern about the level of care for these wounded warriors and their family members. The Department of Defense (DOD) and each of the military services have established new programs to care for the severely disabled, ensuring rehabilitative assistance and easing the transition back to civilian life. Congress has followed these initiatives with interest and recently directed DOD to develop policies and procedures to standardize these programs. This report examines the background for the new initiatives and provides a status of each program, including contact information. This report will be updated as these programs continue to evolve and mature.",30,30 "The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act and the One-Stop Delivery System. The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA, P.L. 113-128), which succeeded the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-220) as the primary federal workforce development legislation, was enacted in July 2014 to bring about increased coordination among federal workforce development and related programs. Most of WIOA's provisions went into effect July 1, 2015. WIOA authorizes appropriations for each of FY2015 through FY2020 to carry out the programs and activities authorized in the legislation. Workforce development programs provide a combination of education and training services to prepare individuals for work and to help them improve their prospects in the labor market. They may include activities such as job search assistance, career counseling, occupational skill training, classroom training, or on-the-job training. The federal government provides workforce development activities through WIOA's programs and other programs designed to increase the employment and earnings of workers. WIOA includes five titles: Workforce Development Activities (Title I), Adult Education and Literacy (Title II), Amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act (Title III), Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Title IV), and General Provisions (Title V). Title I, whose programs are primarily administered through the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), includes three state formula grant programs, multiple national programs, and Job Corps. Title II, whose programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), includes a state formula grant program and National Leadership activities. Title III amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, which authorizes the Employment Service (ES). Title IV amends the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which authorizes vocational rehabilitation services to individuals with disabilities. Title V includes provisions for the administration of WIOA. The WIOA system provides central points of service via its system of around 3,000 One-Stop centers nationwide, through which state and local WIOA employment and training activities are provided and certain partner programs must be coordinated. This system is supposed to provide employment and training services that are responsive to the demands of local area employers. Administration of the One-Stop system occurs through Workforce Development Boards (WDBs), a majority of whose members must be representatives of business and which are authorized to determine the mix of service provision, eligible providers, and types of training programs, among other decisions. WIOA provides universal access (i.e., an adult age 18 or older does not need to meet any qualifying characteristics) to its career services, including a priority of service for low-income adults. WIOA also requires Unified State Plans (USPs) that outline the workforce strategies for the six core WIOA programs—adult, dislocated worker, and youth programs (Title I of WIOA), the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA, Title II of WIOA), the Employment Service program (amended by Title III of WIOA), and the Vocational Rehabilitation State Grant Program (amended by Title IV of WIOA). Finally, WIOA adopts the same six ""primary indicators of performance"" across most of the programs authorized in the law. This report provides details of WIOA Title I state formula program structure, services, allotment formulas, and performance accountability. In addition, it provides a program overview for national grant programs. It also offers a brief overview of the Employment Service (ES), which is authorized by separate legislation but is an integral part of the One-Stop system created by WIOA.",89,89 "Small Business Tax Relief: Proposals in the 108th Congress and Their Economic Justification. This report examines the economic arguments for and against small business tax subsidies in the context of current congressional proposals to expand them. It begins with a brief description of current federal tax subsidies for small firms, moves on to consider the principal economic arguments for and against these subsidies, and concludes with a discussion of proposals in the 108th Congress to expand small business tax subsidies and their likely economic effects.",13,13 "A Retrospective of House Rules Changes Since the 110th Congress. One of the majority party’s prerogatives is writing House rules and using its numbers to effect the chamber’s rules on the day a new House convenes. Because all Members of the House stand for election every two years, the Members-elect constitute a new House that must adopt rules at the convening of each Congress. Although a new House largely adopts the chamber rules that existed in the previous Congress, it also adopts changes to those rules. Institutional and political developments during the preceding Congress inform rules changes that a party continuing in the majority might make. Those same developments, perhaps over the whole time that a party was in the minority, inform rules changes when the minority party wins enough seats to become the majority party and organize the House. This report analyzes rules changes made on only the opening day of the 110th, 111th, 112th, 113th, 114th, and 115th Congresses (the Congresses convening in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017, respectively), with references in footnotes to other selected legislation and actions during these Congresses that also affected House rules. Freestanding legislation such as the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act or a budget resolution can change House rules in consequential ways. Changes made by Democrats after they took majority control in the 110th Congress and by Republicans after they took majority control in the 112th Congress reflected critiques of the other party’s management of the House. Democrats emphasized changes to ethics rules and laws in their new majority beginning in the 110th Congress, and Republicans emphasized changes to legislative procedures in their new majority beginning in the 112th Congress. Both parties also addressed budget policymaking, in both rules changes and separate orders. Most standing rules, however, did not change, at all or substantially, under either party because the rules reflect decades of experience with majority control of the House. Most of the changes that were made in each of the six Congresses covered in this report were incremental and, largely, grounded in experience. Changes, nonetheless, have touched the committee system and its procedures, the floor of the House, budgetary legislation, the administration of the House, and ethical norms of conduct. Rules facilitate the majority’s organization and operation of the House, they do not dictate to party leaders and others how to run the House—their policy goals or procedural and political strategy—or determine what outcomes can be achieved. This report is the second in a series on House rules changes at the beginning of a Congress. For changes in the 104th through the 109th Congresses, see CRS Report RL33610, A Retrospective of House Rules Changes Since the 104th Congress through the 109th Congress, by Michael L. Koempel and Judy Schneider.",55,55 "An Examination of the Issues Surrounding Biotechnology Patenting and Its Effect Upon Entrepreneurial Companies. The biotechnology industry is notable both for its heavy concentration of small businesses and its weighty research and development (R&D) expenditures. Given the small size and heavy expenses of many biotechnology firms, their ability to raise venture capital may be of some consequence. The patent law has been identified as a facilitator of these R&D financing efforts. Although many observers believe that the patent law plays a significant role in the biotechnology industry, two principal issues have arisen regarding biotechnology patenting. First observers have fundamentally questioned whether patents should be granted for living inventions genetic materials and other biotechnologies. Ethical issues, concerns that biotechnology patenting promotes animal suffering and decreases genetic diversity, as well as regard for the traditional agricultural community animate many of these objections. Supporters of biotechnology patenting counter that trade secret protection is a less attractive social alternative, observe that patents have long been granted for biotechnologies, and question whether the patent law is the appropriate vehicle for technology assessment. Commentators have also differed over the extent to which an inventor must show a specific practical use for a biotechnology in order to be awarded a patent. Some observers favor a strict view of the utility requirement due to concerns over overlapping upstream patents that discourage research and commercialization. Others believe that the utility requirement should be applied leniently stating that a strict view of utility will only lead to industry concentration and that biotechnology research tools cannot be meaningfully distinguished from other sorts of inventions. Congress may choose to exercise oversight on these issues. Such consideration would likely include examination of U.S. commitments in international agreements along with other factors.",72,111 "Allocations and Subdivisions in the Congressional Budget Process. The annual budget resolution sets forth total spending and revenue levels for at least five fiscal years. The spending amounts are allocated, or ""crosswalked,"" to the House and Senate committees having jurisdiction over discretionary spending (the Appropriations Committees) and direct spending (the legislative committees). The committee allocations provide Congress with one means of enforcing the spending levels of a budget resolution after it has been adopted. While the budget resolution allocates spending among the 20 major functional categories of the federal budget for the purpose of providing a broad statement of budget priorities, the functional categories do not correspond to the committee system by which Congress operates. The committee allocations reformulate the functional category amounts in a budget resolution to correspond to committee jurisdictions. By allocating the spending among committees responsible for spending legislation, the committee allocations allow Congress to hold its committees accountable for staying within the spending limits established in the budget resolution.",55,101 "The Take Care Clause and Executive Discretion in the Enforcement of Law. The Take Care Clause would appear to stand for two, at times diametrically opposed propositions—one imposing a ""duty"" upon the President and the other viewing the Clause as a source of Presidential ""power."" Primarily, the Take Care Clause has been interpreted as placing an obligation on both the President and those under his supervision to comply with and execute clear statutory directives as enacted by Congress. However, the Supreme Court has also construed the Clause as ensuring Presidential control over the enforcement of federal law. As a result, courts generally will not review Presidential enforcement decisions, including the decision of whether to initiate a criminal prosecution or administrative enforcement action in response to a violation of federal law. In situations where an agency refrains from bringing an enforcement action, courts have historically been cautious in reviewing the agency determination—generally holding that these nonenforcement decisions are ""committed to agency discretion"" and therefore not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. The seminal case on this topic is Heckler v. Chaney, in which the Supreme Court held that an ""agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review."" However, the Court also clearly indicated that the presumption against judicial review of agency nonenforcement decisions may be overcome in a variety of specific situations. For example, a court may review an agency nonenforcement determination ""where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers,"" or where the agency has ""'consciously and expressly adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities."" As such, it would appear that Congress may overcome the presumption of nonreviewability and restrict executive discretion through statute by expressly providing ""meaningful standards"" for the manner in which the agency may exercise its enforcement powers. Nevertheless, legislation that can be characterized as significantly restricting the exercise of executive branch enforcement decisions, in either the criminal, civil, or administrative context, could raise questions under the separation of powers.",55,55 "Presidential Terms and Tenure: Perspectives and Proposals for Change. The terms of the President and Vice President are set at four years by Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution. The 20th Amendment, ratified in 1933, sets the expiration date of these terms at noon on January 20 of each year following a presidential election. From 1789 to 1940, chief executives adhered to a self-imposed limit of two terms, although only 7 of the 31 Presidents from 1789 through 1933 actually served two consecutive terms in office. The precedent was exceeded only once, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was elected to four terms, and served from 1933 through 1945. The 22nd Amendment, proposed and ratified following the Franklin Roosevelt presidency, provides that ""No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice."" It also specifies that Vice Presidents who succeed to the presidency may be elected to two full terms as President if they have served less than two years of their predecessor's term, for a theoretical total of 10 years' service as President. If, however, they have served more than two years of their predecessor's term, they can be elected to only one additional term, for a total of between four and eight years of service, depending on when the Vice President succeeded to the presidency. The debate continues as to whether the 22nd Amendment is an absolute limit on service as President. For instance, could a former President elected to two terms later be elected Vice President, and then succeed to the presidency on the departure of the incumbent chief executive? The 25th Amendment, ratified in 1967, provided, among other things, for vacancies in the office of Vice President, empowering the President to make nominations to that office when it becomes unoccupied, subject to approval by a vote of both houses of Congress. Although the length of the presidential term was decided after spirited debate at the 1787 Constitutional Convention, and the 22nd Amendment provides term limits for the President, proposed constitutional amendments that would alter these provisions are occasionally introduced in Congress. One proposal, which would lengthen the President and Vice President's terms to six years, was introduced frequently through the 103rd Congress. Some six-year term amendments proposed limiting the President to a single term, while others allowed for two terms, or no limit at all. Another category of amendment, which continues to be introduced in most Congresses, would repeal the 22nd Amendment. H.J.Res. 5, introduced in the 111th Congress by Representative José E. Serrano, falls into this category. H.J.Res. 5 was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, but no further action has been taken to date. This report will be updated as events warrant.",55,55 "Tesla's Home Battery--An Electricity Storage Breakthrough?. Cost-effective electricity storage has long been a kind of ""Holy Grail"" for the electric power sector. This report briefly discusses potential innovations in electricity storage.",38,38 "U.S.-EU Cooperation on Ukraine and Russia. This report briefly discusses U.S.-EU responses to the Ukrainian conflict, specifically focusing on the possible expansion of sanctions against Russia.",87,87 "Global Climate Change Treaty: Negotiations and Related Issues. This report discusses the negotiations leading the Kyoto conference of the parties. The United States and other parties to the 1992 Climate Change Convention signed at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro will meet December 1-12 in Kyoto Japan, to conclude year-long negotiations on a legally binding protocol or amendment to reduce or stabilize emissions of greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S. proposal to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and five other greenhouse gases to 1990 levels between 2008-2012 is less ambitious than environmentalists and many other treaty Parties urge, but represents a commitment that others, including many in business fear could damage the economy. A key aspect of the negotiations also is what should be expected of developing nations, whose current emissions of greenhouse gases are relatively small, but are expected to increase rapidly over the next decade with economic development. A sense of the Senate resolution calls for all countries to meet scheduled reductions, and would agree to U.S. participation only if harm to the domestic economy is avoided. If agreement is reached in Kyoto, Senate approval would be required for U.S. ratification, and legislation to implement commitments would also likely be necessary.",42,42 "Mandatory Minimum Sentencing for Federal Sex Offenses: An Abridged Overview. Sex offenses are usually state crimes. Federal law, however, outlaws sex offenses when they occur on federal lands or in federal prisons, when they involve interstate or foreign travel, or when they involve child pornography whose production or distribution is associated in some way with interstate or foreign commerce. Mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment attend conviction for any of several of these federal sex crimes. The most severe mandatory minimum sentences have been reserved for aggravated sexual assaults committed in federal enclaves or federal prisons, for sex offenses resulting in death, and for sex crimes committed against children by repeat offenders. Two-thirds of the federal trial judges responding to a U.S. Sentencing Commission survey questioned the severity of the mandatory minimum penalties required for receipt of child pornography (5 years, 15 years for repeat offenders). The Commission's report suggested that as a preliminary matter the perception may lead to inconsistent sentencing in child pornography cases. It explained that more study would be required before it could make any specific recommendations concerning mandatory minimum sentencing in sex offenses. The constitutional authority to enact federal sex offense punishable by mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment is not unlimited. The ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component, the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, the separation of powers and the reservation of powers principles—all establish boundaries that must be honored. Nevertheless, few defendants have successfully challenged the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment imposed following their conviction for a federal sex offense. This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R42386, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing for Federal Sex Offenses: An Overview, without the footnotes or citations to authority found here.",94,94 "Stafford Act Declarations 1953-2016: Trends, Analyses, and Implications for Congress. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act authorizes the President to issue declarations that provide states, tribes, and localities with a range of federal assistance in response to natural and man-made incidents. Since 1953 the frequency of declarations has increased. For example, the average number of major disaster declarations issued from 1960 to 1969 was roughly 18.6 per year. In contrast, the average number of major disaster declarations issued from 2000 to 2009 was 57.1 per year. The highest number was declared in 2011, with 97 major disaster declarations. Declarations are of concern to Members of Congress and state delegations when incidents occur in their states and/or congressional districts. Declarations are also of broader congressional interest for at least two reasons: (1) the costs involved with the federal assistance provided by the declarations, and (2) concerns that declarations may be used as political tools—especially during election years. Analysis of Stafford Act declarations from 1953 to 2016 demonstrates that most emergency declarations are for winter storms and hurricanes most major disaster declarations are for floods, tornados, winter storms, and hurricanes the average number of declarations issued per year in presidential election years from 1974 to 2016 is slightly higher than the average number of declarations in other years from 1974 to 2016, but the number is not significant enough to draw a decisive conclusion regarding their use as a political tool. After providing an overview of each type of declaration, this report discusses factors that may be responsible for the increase in frequency of declarations, including federal policy changes, increases in severe weather incidents, population growth, and development. Some may contend that declaration policies should not be changed because they trigger important federal assistance to states and localities. Others argue that policies should be implemented to reduce either the number of declarations being issued each year, or the amount of federal assistance that they provide, or both. These policies include amending certain Stafford Act policies changing the per capita threshold formula used to recommend the issuance of a declaration implementing a state capacity indicator to assess whether the state is capable of addressing an incident on its own substituting federal loans to states for recovery grants, and adjusting the federal to state cost-share. Such changes could reduce declarations and shift a portion of the funding back to the states. On the other hand, reducing declarations could hamper the ability of states and localities to recover from an incident and could create long-term consequences. The selected approach will likely be influenced by how policymakers view the role of the government when a disaster strikes. It is generally agreed that the government should help disaster victims in times of need, but it is debatable whether the fiscal responsibility resides primarily with the federal or the state government. Many of the policy options described in this report shift a greater share of disaster-related costs to states and localities. It remains to be seen if reducing declarations and/or limiting the amount of disaster assistance provided to requesting states would severely disrupt the state's ability to respond and recover from an incident. This report concludes that the upward trend in declarations will likely continue if declaration policies remain unchanged and severe weather patterns, population growth, and development continue to increase. All of these variables appear to play a role in declaration activity. It could be argued that the policy mechanisms used to address the increase in declarations should be shaped in response to the given variable or variables. This may prove to be difficult because it is unclear which of the variables (or combination of variables) has had the greatest impact on the increase in disaster declarations over the years. This report will be updated as events warrant.",11,11 "Alien Removals and Returns: Overview and Trends. The ability to remove foreign nationals (aliens) who violate U.S. immigration law is central to the immigration enforcement system. Some lawful migrants violate the terms of their admittance, and some aliens enter the United States illegally, despite U.S. immigration laws and enforcement. In 2012, there were an estimated 11.4 million resident unauthorized aliens, estimates of other removable aliens, such as lawful permanent residents who commit crimes, are elusive. With total repatriations of over 600,000 people in FY2013—including about 440,000 formal removals—the removal and return of such aliens have become important policy issues for Congress, and key issues in recent debates about immigration reform. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides broad authority to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to remove certain foreign nationals from the United States, including unauthorized aliens (i.e., foreign nationals who enter without inspection, aliens who enter with fraudulent documents, and aliens who enter legally but overstay the terms of their temporary visas) and lawfully present foreign nationals who commit certain acts that make them removable. Any foreign national found to be inadmissible or deportable under the grounds specified in the INA may be ordered removed. The INA describes procedures for making and reviewing such a determination, and specifies conditions under which certain grounds of removal may be waived. DHS officials may exercise certain forms of discretion in pursuing removal orders, and certain removable aliens may be eligible for permanent or temporary relief from removal. Certain grounds for removal (e.g., criminal grounds, terrorist grounds) render foreign nationals ineligible for most forms of relief and may make them eligible for more streamlined (expedited) removal processes. The ""standard"" removal process is a civil judicial proceeding in which an immigration judge from DOJ's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) determines whether an alien is removable. Immigration judges may grant certain forms of relief during the removal process (e.g., asylum, cancellation of removal), and the judge's removal decisions are subject to administrative and judicial review. The INA also describes different types of streamlined removal procedures, which generally include more-limited opportunities for relief and grounds for review. In addition, two alternative forms of removal exempt aliens from certain penalties associated with formal removal: voluntary departure (return) and withdrawal of petition for admission. These are often called ""returns."" Following an order of removal, an alien is inadmissible for a minimum of five years after the date of the removal, and therefore is generally ineligible to return to the United States during this time period. The period of inadmissibility is determined by the reason for and type of removal. For example, a foreign national ordered removed based on removal proceedings initiated upon the foreign national's arrival is inadmissible for five years, while a foreign national ordered removed after being apprehended within the United States is inadmissible for 10 years. The length of inadmissibility increases to 20 years for an alien's second or subsequent removal order, and is indefinite for a foreign national convicted of an aggravated felony. Absent additional factors, unlawful presence in the United States is a civil violation, not a criminal offense, and removal and its associated administrative processes are civil proceedings. As such, aliens in removal proceedings generally have no right to counsel (though they may be represented by counsel at their own expense). In addition, because removal is not considered punishment by the courts, Congress may impose immigration consequences retroactively. There were a record number of removals between FY2009 and FY2013, including 438,421 removals in FY2013. Approximately 71% of the foreign nationals removed were from Mexico. However, during the same time period the number of returns (most of which occur at the Southwest border) decreased to a low of 178,371 in FY2013—the fewest returns since 1968.",76,76 "Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the communist nation through economic sanctions, which the Bush Administration has tightened significantly. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. As in past years, the main issue for U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 110th Congress was how to best support political and economic change in one of the world's remaining communist nations. Unlike past years, however, Congress examined policy toward Cuba in the context of Fidel Castro's departure from heading the government because of poor health. Ra√∫l Castro, who had served as provision head of government since July 2006, was selected on February 24, 2008 by Cuba's legislature to continue in that role officially. In the first session of the 110th Congress, Congress fully funded the Administration's FY2008 request for $45.7 million for Cuba democracy programs in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161). In other first session action, on July 27, 2007, the House rejected H.Amdt. 707 to H.R. 2419, the 2007 farm bill, that would have facilitated the export of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. In the second session, the Senate approved S.Res. 573 on May 21, 2008, which recognized the struggle of the Cuban people. In both sessions, there were Cuba provisions in several House and Senate appropriations measures (H.R. 2829, H.R. 3161, S. 1859, H.R. 7323, and S. 3260) that would have eased restrictions on travel and on U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba, but none of these provisions were included in enacted measures. Numerous other legislative initiatives on Cuba were introduced in the 110th Congress, but were not considered. Several of these initiatives would have eased sanctions: H.R. 177 (educational travel), H.R. 216 (Cuban baseball players), H.R. 217 and H.R. 624 (overall sanctions), H.R. 654, S. 554, and S. 721 (travel), H.R. 757 (family travel and remittances), H.R. 1026 (sale of U.S. agricultural products), H.R. 2819/S. 1673 (sale of U.S. agricultural and medical products and travel), and S. 1268, S. 2953, H.R. 3182, and H.R. 3435 (development of Cuba's offshore oil). S. 554 would have terminated U.S.-government sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba. Several initiatives would have tightened sanctions: H.R. 525 (related to U.S. fugitives in Cuba), and H.R. 1679/S. 876 and S. 2503 (related to Cuba's offshore oil development). Two initiatives, H.R. 1306 and S. 749, would have amended a provision of law restricting the registration or enforcement of certain Cuban trademarks, five initiatives—H.R. 217, H.R. 624, H.R. 2819, S. 1673, and S. 1806—would have repealed the trademark sanction. H.R. 5627 and S. 2777 would have awarded the congressional gold medal to Cuban political prisoner Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet. H.Res. 995 would have commemorated the 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes by Cuba. S. 3288 had a provision that would have funded U.S. work to establish anti-drug cooperation with Cuba. In the aftermath of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, several initiatives would have temporarily eased some U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba: H.R. 6913, H.R. 6962, and S.Amdt. 5581 to S. 3001. This report reflects legislative developments through the 110th Congress, and will not be updated. For additional information on Cuba, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, and CRS Report RS22742, Cuba's Political Succession: From Fidel to Raul Castro",85,85 "Appropriations for FY2000: Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs. The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. foreign aid budget and influences executive branch foreign policy making generally. It contains the largest share -- over two-thirds -- of total U.S. international affairs spending. For FY2000, President Clinton requested $14.1 billion (later amended upward to $14.4 billion) plus $1.9 billion over three years for the Wye River/Middle East peace accord. The President's proposal, excluding the Wye River funds, was about $1.35 billion, or 9% less than FY1999 amounts. Congressional action on the FY2000 budget resolution resulted in preliminary funding allocations for Foreign Operations programs well below the requested amount. H.Con.Res. 68, which cleared Congress on April 15, cut the $20.9 billion overall foreign policy discretionary budget request to $17.7 billion, 15% less than the President seeks. Because Foreign Operations funds represent over two-thirds of the foreign policy budget, a reduction of this order would substantially limit amounts available for Foreign Operations programs. In addition to total funding levels, five issues were among those that received the most attention during the FY2000 debate, and in some cases, resulted in the sharpest split between House and Senate, and Congress-Executive branch positions: 1) U.S. development aid policy and spending priorities, 2) population aid and international family planning policy, 3) regional aid allocations, 4) U.S. funding for North Korea's heavy fuel oil and broad U.S.-North Korean policy, and 5) competing initiatives to reduce debt owed to the United States and other creditors by the world's poorest and most highly indebted nations. During the summer, the Senate (S. 1234) and House (H.R. 2606) approved FY2000 Foreign Operations spending measures providing $12.69 billion and $12.62 billion, respectively. Because of the reduced funding levels and a House-passed abortion restriction the White House said the President would veto either bill. A House-Senate conference committee after deleting the House abortion restriction, agreed to $12.69 billion for Foreign Operations. President Clinton vetoed the bill, however, due to cuts totaling $1.92 billion to his budget request. Following weeks of negotiations, Congress and the White House agreed to a revised Foreign Operations bill (H.R. 3422, enacted by reference in H.R. 3194, P.L. 106-113) that totals $15.3 billion, including $1.8 billion for the Wye River/Middle East peace accord. The compromise package further funds $799 million of White House spending priorities that Congress had rejected in the vetoed H.R. 2606.",59,59 "Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy. As the Administration and Congress move forward to pursue engagement, harsher sanctions, or both, regional actors are evaluating their policies and priorities with respect to Iran. Iran's neighbors share many U.S. concerns, but often evaluate them differently than the United States when calculating their own relationship with or policy toward Iran. Because Iran and other regional concerns—the Arab-Israeli peace process, stability in Lebanon and Iraq, terrorism, and the ongoing war in Afghanistan—have become increasingly intertwined, understanding the policies and perspectives of Iran's neighbors could be crucial during the consideration of options to address overall U.S. policy toward Iran. Iran's neighbors seek to understand and influence changes in the following areas Iran's regional influence Iran's nuclear program Iran's role as an energy producer, and Iran's support for terrorism and non-state actors. Although the Obama Administration may share many goals of the previous administration on Iran, it also sees the need for new strategies and approaches. The Obama Administration has advocated a policy of engagement with Iran to determine the nature of its nuclear program and address other subjects of international concern. While post-election turmoil in Iran delayed these efforts temporarily, it appears that the Administration is committed to pursue engagement through the P5+1 framework. At the same time, some Members of Congress have called for increased sanctions on Iran. The United States, Israel, and the EU proposed the end of 2009 as a deadline for Iran to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate on the nuclear issue. That deadline has lapsed with no visible progress toward a resolution and the Administration is now working with its P5+1 partners to determine a course of action for 2010. Regardless of how they decide to proceed, any actions on the part of the Obama Administration, Congress, or the international community, and any developments in or provocations by Iran, will have implications for U.S. interests in the region as Iran's neighbors react and reevaluate their policies accordingly. This report provides a description of Iran's neighbors' policies and interests, options for Congressional consideration, and an analysis of potential regional implications. For more information on Iran and regional perspectives, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and Relations with the United States, by Carol Migdalovitz, CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M. Blanchard, CRS Report RS22323, Iran's Activities and Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report R40653, Iran's 2009 Presidential Elections, by Casey L. Addis.",85,85 "Government Procurement in Times of Fiscal Uncertainty. When confronted with actual or potential funding gaps, funding shortfalls, or budget cuts, the federal government has a number of options as to prospective and existing procurement contracts. Many of these options arise from contract law and, in particular, certain standard clauses included in federal procurement contracts. Among other things, these clauses may allow the government to (1) unilaterally change certain terms of the contract, such as the specifications or the method and manner of performing the work, (2) delay, suspend, or ""stop work"" on the contract, and (3) terminate the contract for the government's convenience. However, courts have also found that the government has certain rights because it is the government, regardless of whether the contract provides for these rights. Such rights are commonly described as ""inherent rights,"" and include the right to terminate the contract for convenience and, according to one tribunal, the right to suspend work. The government's rights are broadest where prospective contracts are concerned. Prospective contractors generally do not have a right to a government contract, and the government, like private persons, is generally free to determine whether to enter a contract to procure goods or services. This is true even if the agency has issued a solicitation for a proposed procurement, and prospective contractors have expended time and money in responding to that solicitation. Agencies have broad discretion in canceling solicitations prior to contract award, and contractors must generally show that cancellation was in bad faith or otherwise unreasonable in order to recover the costs of preparing bids or proposals for canceled solicitations. The exercise of an option is, similarly, a unilateral right of the government. The extent of the government's rights where existing contracts are concerned depends upon the type of contract (e.g., indefinite-quantity), the nature of the goods or services being procured (e.g., construction), and the facts and circumstances of the case. For example, the terms of indefinite-quantity contracts would generally permit the government to cease ordering goods or services from the contractor once the guaranteed minimum has been ordered. Various changes clauses would similarly permit the government to make certain unilateral reductions, or increases, in the work to be performed under the contract, including the quantity of goods and services provided. Other clauses provide for suspension or delay of work by the government, or permit the government to order the contractor to stop work. In addition, the government may terminate all or part of a contract for its convenience, as well as cancel multi-year contracts. When the government exercises these rights, the contractor could potentially be entitled to an equitable or other adjustment, other compensation, or an extension of time in which to perform. The nature of such recourse varies significantly, however, and in some cases, the government could potentially avoid liability for actions that delayed or increased the costs of the contractor's performance because it acted in its sovereign capacity. Recent events have prompted significant congressional and public interest in how the government may go about reducing spending on procurement contracts. The prospect of a funding gap and government shutdown in April 2011 was followed by the enactment of legislation (P.L. 112-25) that called for mandatory cuts in federal spending, effective January 2, 2013, if legislation cutting the deficit was not enacted by January 15, 2012. Such legislation was not enacted, and although the mandatory cuts were briefly delayed, sequestration took effect on March 1, 2013. It remains in effect as of this writing. There have also been debates in each of the calendar years 2011, 2012, and 2013 over whether to raise the debt limit.",63,63 "Federal Interagency Coordinative Mechanisms: Varied Types and Numerous Devices. Interagency coordinative mechanisms at the federal level have become more prominent and prevalent recently. The Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the companion Homeland Security Council (HSC), along with proposals for change, are the most visible. Other examples not only include such well-known entities as the National Security Council (NSC) and the so-called ""drug czar"" but also extend to a multiplicity of nearly anonymous working groups and task forces. Some of them have short life spans, while others have remained in place for long periods. Seven different types of interagency coordinators are described here. They cross a broad spectrum of categories and cover a large number and wide variety of specific mechanisms and arrangements, established by public law, executive orders, administrative directives, and other legal instruments councils chaired by the President and consisting of the Vice President and the heads of certain departments and agencies, with the NSC, HSC, and the USA Freedom Corps Council being the only three committees whose members are department and agency heads, including ones connected to the NSC and to the HSC specially created offices and positions, especially the offices of Homeland Security, National Drug Control Policy, and USA Freedom Corps, along with their directors specified agency heads and other officers—notably, the Director of Central Intelligence (head of the CIA), Director of the Secret Service, and inspectors general—with qualified authority to enlist the assistance of organizations outside their own establishments sub-cabinet boards, committees, and councils, such as those associated with inspectors general and with chief financial officers transfers of personnel and resources among new or existing entities, by way of operational task forces, working groups, staff details, and redeployments, and transfers of authority between and among agencies, through cross-designation and special deputation of personnel. The diverse arrangements and devices, collectively numbering in the hundreds, extend across a broad range of policy areas, exist in a wide variety of institutional locations, consist of different echelons of members and categories of leaders, carry out different types of responsibilities, perform different operations and activities, and vary in terms of their capabilities, resources, and powers.",55,56 "The International Wine Market: Description and Selected Issues. Global trade in wine has increased rapidly during the past 25 years, steadily rising from under $1 billion in 1977 to over $7 billion in 2001. Reports of health benefits and rising global incomes have spurred increasing demand for wine, particularly in mid- to upper-income countries. In 2001, the United States was the world's leading importer, just ahead of the European Union (EU). Together the two countries accounted for over 60% of global imports. The European Union has traditionally dominated global wine production and exports. However, the United States, along with several Southern Hemisphere producing countries -- Argentina, Australia, Chile, and South Africa -- are growing in importance. Several important issues have emerged in recent years with respect to international wine trade particularly between the EU and non-EU countries, including oenological (wine-making) practices and the use of ""semi-generic"" names for wines. The latter issue is encompassed under the debate on ""geographical indications"" at the World Trade Organization. Ongoing bilateral negotiations between the United States and the EU seek to resolve both of these issues. This report will be updated as events warrant.",53,4 "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC): Background and Issues for Congress. On November 25, 2002, ninety-two countries, including the United States, signed a draft international code of conduct (ICOC) intended to control the proliferation of ballistic missiles. This code of conduct joins the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as the primary means by which the international community attempts to regulate missile proliferation. Both are arrangements, not treaties, requiring voluntary application of standards and measures by participating countries. While the MTCR has been credited with a number of successes over the years, critics point out that it lacks treaty status and only addresses the supply side of the missile proliferation equation. The ICOC was developed primarily to focus on the demand aspect of proliferation but a great deal of work may lie ahead for the drafters and signatories of the ICOC in order to craft the code into a useful nonproliferation tool. The MTCR has been credited by many analysts with slowing or impeding missile proliferation and preventing many countries from advancing beyond SCUD-based missile technology. The ICOC created by MTCR members, is intended to employ confidence building measures (CBMs) as a means to promote transparency and hopefully decrease the demand for ballistic missiles among developing nations. The existence of two multilateral missile nonproliferation arrangements leads to the possibility of potential synergies but also could result in conflicts that could reduce the overall effectiveness of the arrangements. The Bush Administration cites both the MTCR and ICOC in the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. While U.S. commitment to the MTCR is acknowledged by the international community, many countries feel there is less U.S. commitment to the ICOC. The United States sees useful roles for both arrangements in dealing with missile proliferation but appears to place a great deal more emphasis on the MTCR than the ICOC. Both arrangements are administered through the interagency process with the U.S. State Department assuming lead agency responsibilities in both cases. While no laws related to the U.S. involvement in the ICOC currently exist, there are a number of key pieces of legislation dealing with the MTCR. There are several proposals that might be put before Congress which proponents believe could potentially improve the efficacy of both the MTCR and ICOC, and increase their usefulness as a means of addressing the global issue of missile proliferation. This report will be updated as significant events occur.",29,29 "North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options. North Korea has confronted the United States with its decision, failing other security accommodations, to pursue production of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration has stated that, although the situation is unacceptable, it will pursue its resolution through diplomatic means. Military means, however, could be considered at some point and become a serious issue for Congress. This short report discusses the geography and military balance on the Korean Peninsula presents the range of military options that might be applied there to specific U.S. political objectives and assesses possible consequences. Military options discussed are: status quo, improved defensive posture, enforce sanctions, preemptive strike against nuclear facilities, and preemptive war. Also see CRS Issue Brief IB98045 on U.S.-Korean relations and CRS Issue Brief IB91141 on North Korea's nuclear weapons. This report will be updated if major changes occur.",24,85 "Biomass: Comparison of Definitions in Legislation. The use of biomass as an energy feedstock has regularly been presented as a potentially viable alternative to address U.S. energy security concerns, foreign oil dependence, and rural economic development, and as a tool to possibly help improve the environment (e.g., through greenhouse gas emission reduction). Biomass (organic matter that can be converted into energy) may include food crops, crops grown specifically to produce energy (e.g., switchgrass or prairie perennials), crop residues, wood waste and byproducts, and animal manure. Most legislation involving biomass has focused on encouraging the production of liquid fuels from corn. Efforts to promote the use of biomass for power generation have focused on wood, wood residues, and milling waste. Comparatively less emphasis has been placed on the use of non-corn-based biomass feedstocks—other food crops, non-food crops, crop residues, animal manure, and more—as renewable energy sources for liquid fuel use or for power generation. This is partly due to the variety, lack of availability, and dispersed location of non-corn-based biomass feedstock. The technology development status and costs to convert non-corn-based biomass into energy are also viewed by some as obstacles to rapid technology deployment. To aid in understanding the role of biomass as an energy resource, this report investigates the characterization of biomass in legislation. For over 30 years, the term biomass has been a part of legislation enacted by Congress for various programs, indicating some interest by the general public and policy makers in expanding its use. Biomass-related legislation has provided financial incentives to develop technologies that use biomass. How biomass is defined influences decisions about the types of crops that are grown, where they are grown, and potential preferred energy uses, among other things. There have been 14 biomass definitions included in legislation and in the tax code since 2004. Future discussions about energy—particularly legislation involving the Renewable Fuel Standard, energy tax incentives, or tribal biomass demonstration projects—may prompt further discussion about the definition of biomass. For example, one point of contention regarding the biomass definition and the Renewable Fuel Standard is whether the term should be defined to include biomass from federal lands. Some argue that removal of biomass from these lands may lead to ecological harm. Others contend that biomass from federal lands can aid the production of renewable energy to meet certain mandates (e.g., the Renewable Fuel Standard) and that removal of biomass can enhance forest protection from wildfires. Bills introduced in the 113th Congress (e.g., H.R. 4426, H.R. 4956, H.R. 3084, S. 1267) would have modified the biomass definition. However, little legislative action occurred regarding the definition of biomass in the 113th Congress. This report lists biomass definitions enacted by Congress in legislation and the tax code since 2004, and discusses the similarities and differences among the definitions.",37,37 "The Cost of Prescription Drugs for the Uninsured Elderly and Legislative Approaches. The purpose of this report is to explain why many of those who are least able to afford high drug costs are those who are most frequently charged the most. This report describes the basic economic theory underlying price differentiation and, in the context of the pharmaceutical market, analyzes the role and behavior of pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), pharmaceutical manufacturers, and retail pharmacies, respectively. It also looks at a number of the criticisms that have been made of the practice of differential pricing. Finally, this report discusses various policy approaches aimed at assisting the elderly to purchase prescription drugs.",66,66 "Industry Trade Effects Related to NAFTA. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed by President George Bush on December 17, 1992, has been in effect since January 1994. After eight years of implementation, the full effects of NAFTA on the U.S. economy are still unclear. There are numerous indications that NAFTA has achieved many of the trade and economic benefits that proponents claimed it would bring, although there have been adjustment costs. However, there is not enough evidence to quantify the impacts on specific U.S. industries. Some studies show that the agreement has had an overall positive effect on the U.S. economy, but that some industries have experienced losses. As the United States considers further free trade initiatives with Latin American countries, the effects of NAFTA may provide policymakers some indication of how these initiatives might affect U.S. industries and the overall U.S. economy. Most of the trade effects related to NAFTA are due to changes in U.S. trade and investment patterns with Mexico. At the time of NAFTA implementation, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement already had been in effect for five years and some industries in the United States and Canada were already highly integrated. Since NAFTA, the automotive, textile, and apparel industries have experienced some of the more significant changes in trade flows, which may also have affected U.S. employment in these industries. U.S. trade with Mexico has increased considerably more than U.S. trade with other countries, and Mexico has become a more significant trading partner with the United States since NAFTA implementation. Consequently, Mexico's share of total U.S. trade has increased while that of other countries has decreased. Some data on U.S. imports suggest that Mexico may be supplying the U.S. market with goods that may have otherwise been supplied by Asian countries. Not all changes in trade patterns since 1994, however, can be attributed to NAFTA because trade was also affected by other unrelated economic factors such as economic growth in the United States and Mexico, and currency fluctuations. Also, trade-related job gains and losses since NAFTA may have accelerated trends that were ongoing prior to NAFTA and may not be totally attributable to the trade agreement. To address concerns about worker dislocations related to NAFTA, Congress included two employment adjustment assistance programs in the implementing legislation: the NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance (NAFTA-TAA) Program and the U.S. Community Adjustment and Investment Program (USCAIP). The NAFTA-TAA program is now part of a new consolidated Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program passed under the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). The NAFTA-TAA program provides assistance, such as employment services and training, to workers who have lost their jobs because of increased import competition or by production shifts. The USCAIP provides assistance to communities with significant job losses due to changes in trade patterns with Canada or Mexico. While the programs have been successful in providing assistance to communities who have had significant job losses, the overall effectiveness of the programs has been limited. This report will be updated as events warrant.",53,53 "Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues. Cyprus has been divided since 1974. Greek Cypriots, 76% of the population, live in the southern two-thirds of the island and lead the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots, 19% of the populace, live in the ""Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"" (TRNC), recognized only by Turkey, with about 36,000 Turkish troops providing security. United Nations peacekeeping forces (UNFICYP) maintain a buffer zone between the two. Since the late 1970s, the U.N., with U.S. support, has promoted negotiations aimed at reuniting the island as a federal, bicommunal, bizonal republic. The U.N. Secretary-General's April 5, 1992, ""Set of Ideas"" was a major, but unsuccessful, framework for negotiations for a settlement. Next, both sides accepted U.N. confidence-building measures only in principle and they were not recorded or implemented. The prospect of Cyprus's European Union (EU) accession and its eventual membership intensified and complicated settlement efforts. On November 11, 2002, Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted a comprehensive settlement Plan, but the two sides did not agree on it. After more negotiations, Annan announced on March 11, 2003 that his efforts had failed. Cyprus signed an accession treaty to join the EU on April 16. The December 14, 2003, Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections produced a new government determined to reach a settlement. After the U.N. led negotiations between the parties and with Greek and Turkish leaders present, Annan presented a final, revised Plan on March 31, 2004. In referenda on April 24, 76% of Greek Cypriot voters rejected the Plan, while 65% of Turkish Cypriot voters accepted it. Annan blamed President Tassos Papadopoulos, a Greek Cypriot, for the result. Cyprus joined the EU on May 1, 2004. More than two years later, Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat agreed, on July 8, 2006, to discuss ""issues that affect day-to-day life"" and, concurrently, substantive issues. The accord was not implemented. Dimitris Christofias's election as Cypriot president on February 24, 2008 ended the impasse. On March 21, he and Talat agreed to resume the settlement process, with working groups and technical committees. In September, they began direct negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus issue. Negotiations continue. Some Members of Congress have urged the Administration to be more active, although they have not proposed an alternative to the U.N.-sponsored talks. After the 2004 referenda, the Administration worked to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots in order to diminish economic disparities between them and the Greek Cypriots and pave the way for reunification. Some Members questioned this policy. Members are maintaining their interest in Cyprus in the 111th Congress partly due to keen constituent concern. This CRS report will be updated as developments warrant.",85,85 "Policy Issues in the General Motors Vehicle Recall. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NHTSA, Department of Transportation, DOT, General Motors, GM, motor vehicle air bags, ignition switch, vehicle recalls, product liability, bankruptcy, chapter 11, highway safety, TREAD Act.",118,118 "The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons from Japan's Lost Decade of the 1990s. During the 1990s and into the early years of the 21st century, Japan experienced prolonged recessionary economic conditions triggered by the bursting of a bubble in its equity and real estate markets and an ensuing banking crisis. Although the current global financial crisis is much more than Japan's ""Great Recession"" writ large, many have turned to Japan's experience to either support or oppose various policies and to improve general understanding of the underlying forces of financial crises. In fiscal policy, the Japanese experience has been used both as an example of stimulus packages that did not work and as a rationale for making stimulus packages large enough to help ensure that they would work. Fiscal stimulus did have the desired economic effect in Japan, but it mainly substituted for depressed bank lending and consumer spending. Recovery had to wait until the balance sheets of banks and households had been rehabilitated. Japan also shifted its policy focus toward reducing its fiscal deficit ""too early"" after authorities thought the recession had ended in 1996. The ensuing increase in taxes along with reduced fiscal stimulus (along with the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis) pushed the economy back into recession. In monetary policy, the Bank of Japan's zero-interest rate policy demonstrated the futility of attempting to induce investment and consumer credit purchases through low borrowing rates. The Japanese experience also may be instructive in resolving problems of companies that technically are bankrupt but are being kept alive through outside financial support and in dealing with nationalization and subsequent privatization of insolvent banks. Japan's case also illustrates that national debt may continue to rise for years after the financial crisis has ended. With respect to rehabilitating banks, Japan's five bank rescue packages may hold some lessons for the United States. Most of the packages were administered by the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ). The packages had an announced value of $495 billion. The DICJ reports that it provided $399 billion to Japan's troubled financial institutions of which it has recovered $195 billion. Overcoming the crisis in Japan's banks took a combination of capital injections, new laws and regulations, stronger oversight, a reorganization of the banking sector, moderate economic recovery, and several years of banks working off their non-performing loans. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.",85,82 "Keystone XL: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Assessments in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement. On June 25, 2013, President Obama announced a national ""Climate Action Plan"" to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHG), as well as to encourage adaptation to expected climate change. During his speech, the President made reference to the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline and stated that an evaluation of the project's impacts on climate change would factor into the U.S. State Department's national interest determination. The State Department, in the March 2013 Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the Keystone XL Pipeline, reports estimates for both the direct (i.e., operational) and indirect (i.e., associated with crude oil production and use) GHG emissions that would be attributable to the proposed project. The DEIS finds that ""the proposed Project would be responsible for incremental GHG emissions in the range of 0.07... 5.3 [million metric tons of CO2 equivalent] annually."" These emissions would represent an increase of 0.001%-0.08% over the domestic GHG emissions totals of 6,822 MMTCO2e in 2010. The State Department bases its findings on the following conclusions: (1) approval or denial of the proposed pipeline is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the rate of development in the oil sands, or on the amount of heavy crude oil refined in the Gulf Coast area in the long term, (2) denial of the proposed pipeline is offset entirely by the expansion of new rail and pipeline infrastructure in North America in the long term, and (3) the cumulative impact of the proposed pipeline would be the additional oil sands production that would become economical given the marginal cost savings afforded by the project over non-pipeline transport. Many industry stakeholders, the Canadian and Albertan governments, and proponents of the proposed pipeline have generally supported the State Department's findings. They contend that the demand for the oil sands resource, as well as the economic incentives for producers and the Canadian governments, is too significant to dampen production. However, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), among other stakeholders, has questioned several of the conclusions put forth by the DEIS and recommended that the State Department revisit the analysis. Opponents of the project argue that the Keystone XL Pipeline may have greater impacts than projected in the DEIS if certain State Department assumptions were to differ, including projections for global crude oil markets, rail transport costs, new project costs, refinery inputs, and carbon pricing policies. Members of Congress remain divided on the merits of the proposed project, as many have expressed support for the potential energy security and economic benefits, while others have expressed reservations about its potential environmental impacts. Though Congress, to date, has had no direct role in permitting the pipeline's construction, it may have oversight stemming from federal environmental statutes that govern the review. Further, Congress may seek to influence the State Department's permitting process or to assert direct congressional authority over approval through new legislation. On January 31, 2014, the State Department released the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Keystone XL Pipeline, which contained revised analysis and estimates. For a detailed review of these findings, see CRS Report R43415, Keystone XL: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Assessments in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, by Richard K. Lattanzio.",42,42 "The Death of Justice Scalia: Procedural Issues Arising on an Eight-Member Supreme Court. On February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia unexpectedly passed away at the age of 79, vacating a seat on the Supreme Court that he had held for nearly 30 years. Supreme Court vacancies that arise in presidential election years rarely occur, and have in the past led to a seat on the Court staying open for extended periods of time. With suggestions that Justice Scalia's successor may not be confirmed for several months, let alone before the fall election, a possibility exists that Justice Scalia's seat on the High Court may remain open for an extended period of time, including throughout the remainder of the 2015 Supreme Court term. While the Supreme Court consists of nine Justices, it does not need nine Justices to decide a case. Instead, Congress has established quorum requirements for the Court, providing that any six Justices ""shall constitute a quorum."" By tradition, the agreement of a majority of the quorum is necessary to act for the Court. As a consequence, with an eight-member Court, there is the possibility of split votes, where a majority cannot agree on the outcome in a given case. With several high-profile cases pending on the Court's docket, including cases on public employee unions, abortion, and immigration, it appears that the Court could become equally divided on a number of matters in the near future. In the absence of a full Court, when the quorum of Justices is evenly divided (four to four or three to three), the Supreme Court has empirically adopted one of two approaches. First, if the participating Justices are equally divided on the merits of a case, the Court's practice has, at times, been not to write an opinion, but to enter a judgment that tersely affirms the lower court judgment without any indication of the Court's voting alignment. Such an order has no precedential value. Second, in lieu of issuing a summary affirmance of the lower court opinion, the Court could instead order reargument of the case. The Court possesses inherent authority to order reargument of a case sua sponte or on its own volition, and has exercised such authority in the past when there was an open seat on the Court. In addition, an unsuccessful petitioner could petition the Court for a rehearing in anticipation of a Court with a changed composition. Nonetheless, the ""more likely"" vehicle for rehearing, where the Court is equally divided among its members, is for the Court to order a rehearing sua sponte prior to issuing a decision on the merits. This report provides an overview of the Supreme Court's procedural rules and requirements when the Court is staffed with less than nine members. Included in this discussion is an overview of the Court's quorum requirements, rehearing procedures, and vote count practices, with a focus on how the Court has traditionally responded to a change of composition during a term. The report concludes by highlighting over a dozen cases from the current term that could result in an evenly divided Supreme Court.",92,92 "The Federal Election Commission (FEC) With Fewer than Four Members: Overview of Policy Implications. Three recess appointments to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) expired at the end of the first session of the 110th Congress, leaving the agency with just two commissioners. Because the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) requires that at least four commissioners vote affirmatively to execute some of the agency's major functions, the FEC was unable to issue regulations, approve enforcement actions, and administer aspects of the presidential public campaign financing program. The Commission also could not issue advisory opinions. Existing campaign finance law and regulations remained in effect. Remaining commissioners and staff continued routine business. On June 24, 2008, the Senate confirmed five nominees to the FEC. Those five commissioners joined a sixth member who continued to serve in holdover status. Therefore, the Commission was restored to full decision-making strength. By the end of April 2009, the terms of three commissioners (total) had expired, but because commissioners may continue to serve in holdover status, six members remained in office. Examining the Commission's operating status and its backlog from 2008 may be an oversight or appropriations issue of interest to the 111th Congress. CRS Report R40091, Campaign Finance: Potential Legislative and Policy Issues for the 111th Congress, by R. Sam Garrett, discusses other recent campaign finance developments, including FEC issues.) Although the loss of the Commission's policymaking quorum has now been resolved, this report will be updated occasionally to reflect subsequent developments.",61,61 "House of Representatives and Senate Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2010. This report provides staffing levels in House and Senate Member, committee, leadership, and other offices since 1977. Data presented here are based on staff listed by chamber entity (offices of Members, committees, leaders, officers, officials, and other entities) in telephone directories published by the House and Senate.",55,55 "Material Support of Terrorists and Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Sunset Amendments. Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) temporarily amended two federal terrorist assistance prohibitions. Those amendments were to expire on December 31, 2006, P.L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3762-764 (2004). P.L. 109-160 extended their expiration date until February 3, 2006, 119 Stat. 2957 (2005), P.L. 109-170 extended it yet again until March 10, 2006, 120 Stat. 3 (2006). Section 104 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Actand Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act (H.R. 3199), made the amendments permanent, P.L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 195 (2006). In response to court decisions that found certain of their central terms unconstitutionally vague, section 6603 amended the federal statutes that outlaw assistance to terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. 2339A, 2339B. Initial judicial reaction suggests they may still be considered vague. Section 6603 temporarily rejected a narrow construction of the knowledge requirements under section 2339B, an interpretation which might have dissipated any vagueness problems. Section 6603 expanded the overseas application of section 2339B as well. It permits federal prosecution of an act proscribed in section 2339B and committed entirely abroad by a foreign national if the offender can be brought to this country for trial. Section 2339A outlaws providing material support or resources with the intent that they be used for the commission of certain predicate terrorism offenses. Section 6603 enlarged the list of predicate offenses to include any federal crime of terrorism (18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B)) and added two crimes to the list, 18 U.S.C. 1361 (destruction of federal property) and 18 U.S.C. 2156 (production of defective national defense material). Finally, section 6603 added an immunity provision under which an individual or entity who provides assistance in violation of section 2339B may not be prosecuted in certain instances if the offense was committed with the prior approval of the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. This report appears in abridged form—without footnotes, appendix, and some citations to authority—as CRS Report RS22222, Material Support of Terrorists and Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Sunset Amendments in Brief.",24,22 "Use of National Statuary Hall: Assignment and Historic Events. Statuary Hall has been used as the setting for a variety of events, including memorial ceremonies and receptions for new Members of Congress, award presentations, and as media space after presidential addresses. This report identifies and categorizes uses of Statuary Hall since 2005. Use of Statuary Hall is at the discretion of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Under House Rule I, clause 3, the Speaker has the authority to assign unappropriated rooms on the House of Representatives side of the Capitol, including Statuary Hall. Use of Statuary Hall could also be authorized by House resolution, but no events since 2005 have been held in Statuary Hall on such authority. Since 2005, 159 events have been held in Statuary Hall. Events held in Statuary Hall can be divided into four categories: (1) receptions and dinners, (2) ceremonies, (3) media events, and (4) memorial services. The report provides a brief explanation of each category and examples of activities in each category.",64,55 "Debt Reduction: Initiatives for the Most Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. Many developing nations have experienced declining economic conditions while accumulating higher levels of debt, largely owed to multilateral public lending agencies, such as the World Bank and the IMF, and to foreign governments, including the United States. For the 41 nations that have been identified as the most Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), external long-term debt rose rapidly from less than $7 billion in 1970, to $47 billion a decade later, to $158 billion by 1990, and to $169 billion today. The largest portion -- 85% -- is owed to public lenders (governments and institutions like the World Bank). Although roughly half of the HIPC long-term debt is owed to bilateral lenders, only 3.7% is owed to the United States. Since 1989, the U.S., Japan, and major European governments, recognizing that the mounting debt burden for some borrowers has undermined efforts to stimulate economic growth and to finance basic social programs, have extended a series of increasingly broad debt relief arrangements. The most recent initiative -- HIPC -- aims to reduce the debt burden of poor countries that have demonstrated sound economic and social policy reforms to manageable, or ""sustainable"" levels that can be serviced comfortably by export revenues and capital inflows. When it was launched, poor country debt relief proponents hailed the initiative for its comprehensive and integrated approach especially the inclusion of World Bank and IMF participation, and for its objective to provide lasting debt solutions. But after three years, only four countries fully qualified for HIPC debt reduction terms and strong international pressure built to expand and deepen HIPC terms. Critics argued that it takes countries too long to qualify, that the conditions for eligibility are inappropriate, and that the poverty reduction focus is insufficient. U.S. and other G-7 leaders forged an agreement for expanding HIPC at the June 18-20, 2000 summit in Germany, the contents of which were adopted by the World Bank and the IMF at their annual meetings in September. Several legislative initiatives were introduced in 1999. H.R. 1095 (Representative Leach), would reform HIPC by providing debt relief more quickly, to more countries, and in greater amounts, with an emphasis on poverty reduction. Senator Mack introduced similar legislation (S. 1690), recommending that debt relief savings finance both poverty and economic reform activities. Other legislation includes H.R. 2232 (Representative Waters) H.R. 3049 (Representatives McKinney and Rohrabacher), H.R. 772 (Representative Jackson), and S. 1636, a modified companion measure to H.R. 772 (Senator Feingold). As one of the final legislative issues of the first session, Congress agreed (H.R. 3422), to $123 million for bilateral debt reduction in FY2000 and (in H.R. 3425) to authorize U.S. support for an off-market IMF gold sale to finance the Fund's participation in HIPC. (Each bill was incorporated into the Consolidated Appropraitions Act, FY2000, P.L. 106-113.) But lawmakers did not approve an additional $847 million requested by the President for debt relief through FY2003 and barred the U.S. to use any of the $123 million this year for multilateral debt reduction and contributions to the HIPC Trust Fund.",77,77 "The National Space Council. According to press reports, the Trump Administration may reestablish the National Space Council, a coordinating body in the Executive Office of the President that was last active in 1993. The National Space Council was established in 1989 ""to provide a coordinated process for developing a national space policy and strategy and for monitoring its implementation."" It was chaired by the Vice President and included the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, and Transportation, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the President's Chief of Staff, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The National Space Council was active in overseeing policy and management for the civil space program, but less active in the national security space arena. Its statutory authority has never been repealed. A predecessor, the National Aeronautics and Space Council, existed from 1958 to 1973. It consisted of a similar but smaller group of senior federal officials, initially joined by three non-federal members and chaired by the President. In 1961, the non-federal members were dropped and the Vice President took over as chair. The National Aeronautics and Space Council was briefly influential in the early 1960s, but most Administrations relied more on other sources of space policy advice. Other bodies in the Executive Office of the President that have space policy coordination responsibilities include the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Security Council, and the National Science and Technology Council. In 2008, the incoming Obama Administration also planned to reestablish the National Space Council, but that plan was not implemented. The Administration concluded that a strengthened interagency process led by the National Security Council and the Office of Science and Technology Policy would meet its goals. Because the original statutory authority for the National Space Council remains in effect, congressional action would not be necessary for its reestablishment. Congress could choose to play a role, however, either by amending the existing authority or by conducting oversight. Among the topics Congress might wish to consider are the goals of the council, who should chair it, and whether it should have an advisory committee.",112,112 "Earmark Disclosure Rules in the Senate: Member and Committee Requirements. Earmark disclosure rules in both the House and the Senate establish certain administrative responsibilities that vary by chamber. Under Senate rules, a Senator requesting that an earmark be included in legislation is responsible for providing specific written information, such as the purpose and recipient of the earmark, to the committee of jurisdiction. Further, Senate committees are responsible for compiling and presenting such information in accord with Senate rules. In the Senate, disclosure rules apply to any congressional earmark, limited tax benefit, or limited tariff benefit included in either the text of a bill or any report accompanying the measure, including a conference report and joint explanatory statement. The disclosure requirements apply to earmarks in appropriations legislation, authorizing legislation, and tax measures. Furthermore, they apply not only to measures reported by committees but also to measures not reported by committees, floor amendments, and conference reports. This report will be updated as needed.",55,55 "FDA Legislation in the 110th Congress: A Side-by-Side Comparison of S. 1082 and H.R. 2900. Both the House and the Senate have passed comprehensive legislation to reauthorize existing Food and Drug Administration (FDA) programs and expand the agency's authority to ensure the safety of prescription drugs, medical devices, and biologics. The Senate passed the Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act (S. 1082) on May 9, 2007. The House passed the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (H.R. 2900) on July 11, 2007. At its core, the legislation renews authority for two key user fee programs that are set to expire on October 1, 2007: the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA, P.L. 107-188) and the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA, P.L. 107-250). These account for 87% of FDA's user fee revenue and 19% of FDA's total FY2008 program level budget. Without the reauthorizations, and absent a substantial increase in FDA's annual appropriations, the agency would lose a significant source of funding. FDA had warned that a failure to reauthorize the user fee programs before August 1, 2007, would require the agency to issue layoff notices, but the agency has reportedly forestalled that necessity by switching to reserve funds. In addition to user fee programs, the bills reauthorize two other FDA authorities related to prescription drugs for pediatric populations, which are also set to expire on October 1, 2007: the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA, P.L. 107-109) and the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA, P.L. 108-155). These laws provide marketing exclusivity incentives and requirements for studying pediatric use of on-patent and off-patent drugs. S. 1082 and H.R. 2900 also contain provisions related to drug safety, pediatric medical devices, clinical trial registration, and the creation of a new nonprofit entity to assist FDA with its mission. The bills' overlapping provisions are similar, but not identical. S. 1082 contains some additional provisions that are not present in H.R. 2900, on the topics of food safety, prescription drug importation, and domestic pet turtle market access. Attempts to expand the legislation to address several other FDA-related issues, for example, follow-on biologics and genetic testing, have thus far been unsuccessful. Differences between the bills may be addressed in conference. This report contains a side-by-side comparison of S. 1082 and H.R. 2900, and includes links to relevant CRS reports. It will be updated as further legislative events warrant.",67,67 "Environmental Protection Agency: FY2006 Appropriations Highlights. As enacted in August 2005, Title II of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-54, H.R. 2361) provided $7.73 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), subject to an across-the-board rescission of 0.476%. The law also included $80 million for EPA in unobligated funds ""rescinded"" from past appropriations. Overall, P.L. 109-54 provided more funding for EPA than the Administration's FY2006 request of $7.52 billion, but less than the FY2005 appropriation of $8.03 billion. Among individual programs, funding decreased for some activities and increased for others, compared with the FY2006 request and the FY2005 appropriation. In the debate over EPA's appropriation, considerable attention focused on the adequacy of funding for State Revolving Funds (SRFs) to assist states in issuing loans to communities for constructing and upgrading wastewater and drinking water infrastructure. Prior to the above rescission, P.L. 109-54 provided $900 million for the clean water SRF, less than the FY2005 appropriation of $1.09 billion but more than the request of $730 million. The law provided $850 million for the drinking water SRF, the same as requested, and similar to the FY2005 appropriation. Other prominent issues included the adequacy of funding for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the Superfund program, the cleanup of commercial and industrial sites referred to as brownfields, EPA's homeland security activities, ""congressional project priorities"" or earmarks, and EPA's use and consideration of intentional human dosing studies. At the end of its first session, the 109th Congress enacted a government-wide rescission in Section 3801 of Title III of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-148, H.R. 2863). This rescission reduced FY2006 funding for EPA and all other federal agencies by 1%, except for the Department of Veterans Affairs, and excluded ""emergency"" spending. P.L. 109-148 also reallocated $8 million in emergency funds to EPA for responding to leaking underground tanks in areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Administration had recommended a $15 million reallocation for this purpose in October 2005. The law did not include the $166 million rescission for the clean water SRF that the Administration also had proposed in October. The table below indicates congressional action on EPA's appropriation for FY2006, the Administration's request, and the FY2005 appropriation. (Also see CRS Report RL32856, Environmental Protection Agency: Appropriations for FY2006, by Robert Esworthy and David M. Bearden, Environmental Protection Agency: Appropriations for FY2006.)",45,45 "Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information. The Revelations in December 2005 that President Bush had authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to collect signals intelligence from communications involving U.S. persons within the United States, without obtaining a warrant or court order, raised numerous questions regarding the President's authority to order warrantless electronic surveillance. President Bush stated that he believes his order to be fully supported by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and Attorney General Gonzales clarified that the Administration based its authority both on inherent presidential powers and the joint resolution authorizing the use of ""all necessary and appropriate force"" to engage militarily those responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (""AUMF""). Although the resolution does not expressly specify what it authorizes as ""necessary and appropriate force,"" the Administration discerned the intent of Congress to provide the statutory authority necessary to take virtually any action reasonably calculated to prevent a terrorist attack, including by overriding at least some statutory prohibitions that contain exceptions for conduct that is ""otherwise authorized by statute."" Specifically, the Administration asserts that a part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that punishes those who conduct ""electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute"" does not bar the NSA surveillance at issue because the AUMF is just such a statute. On December 22, 2005, the Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs released a letter to certain members of the House and Senate intelligence committees setting forth in somewhat greater detail the Administration's position with regard to the legal authority supporting the NSA activities described by the President. This report lays out a general framework for analyzing the constitutional and statutory issues raised by the NSA electronic surveillance activity. It then outlines the legal framework regulating electronic surveillance by the government, explores ambiguities in those statutes that could provide exceptions for the NSA intelligence-gathering operation at issue, and addresses the arguments that the President possesses inherent authority to order the operations or that Congress has provided such authority. This report supersedes CRS memorandum product WD00002, Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information, by Elizabeth B. Bazan and Jennifer K. Elsea.",27,27 "Argentina's Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the ""Holdouts"". In December 2001, Argentina suffered a severe financial crisis, leading to the largest sovereign debt default in history, until Greece. In 2005, after prolonged, contentious, and unsuccessful attempts to restructure the debt, Argentina abandoned the negotiation process and made a unilateral offer. The terms were highly unfavorable to creditors, but $62.3 billion of the $81.8 billion in principal owed was exchanged. A diverse group of ""holdouts"" representing $18.6 billion did not exchange their bonds, and some have opted to litigate instead. These actions resulted in attachment orders against Argentine assets, leaving the country unable to access the international credit markets. Holdout creditors also lobbied against Argentina's debt policy, which has triggered actions by the U.S. government and legislation in previous Congresses. The lingering effects of the debt default became a legacy problem for Argentina. The government decided to open another bond exchange in 2010 to deal with remaining holdouts, on slightly less favorable terms than before. Argentina reduced its outstanding defaulted debt by another $12.4 billion. As of December 31, 2010, Argentina reported that it owed private investors $11.2 billion ($6.5 billion in principal and $4.7 billion in past due interest). Holdout creditors estimate that with additional interest, this number could be as high as $15 billion by 2013, with $1.3 billion under litigation in federal court. Argentina also owes the Paris Club countries $6.3 billion in principal and past due interest. The U.S. portion is estimated at $550 million. Argentina does not recognize the remaining private holdout debt in its official budget and is legislatively barred from making another offer to bondholders. Nonetheless, in the eyes of holdout creditors, the bond exchanges have set a precedent that cannot be condoned, even though 91.3% of total bondholders have accepted terms. Although Argentina continues to argue that the restructurings were negotiated solutions, they were not mutually agreed ones. Bondholders had to accept or reject the offers with the alternative being the promise of no restitution at all. Holdout bondholders remain unpaid while Argentina is current on its obligations to bondholders who participated in the two bond exchanges, an outcome that is currently being challenged in court under the equal treatment provision of the bonds. Recent district court decisions require Argentina to treat both holdout and exchange bondholders equally. In this case, the court ordered Argentina to pay litigant holdouts the full $1.3 billion of their claim. The appeals court stayed the order and required Argentina to offer a payment plan to the holdouts that would satisfy the equal treatment clause. On April 19, 2013, the holdouts formally rejected an offer that was effectively the same as the 2010 exchange, and urged the appeals court to enforce the lower court ruling. Argentina has said it will continue to pay the restructured bonds, but is no position to pay the holdouts in full. A final ruling against Argentina could prohibit banks from allowing Argentina to make those payments unless it also paid the holdouts, creating a conundrum for Argentina: either pay all parties per the court order, or for lack of an ability to pay only the exchange bondholders, find itself in technical default. This report reviews Argentina's financial crisis, the bond exchanges of 2005 and 2010, ongoing litigation, prospects for a final solution, related U.S. legislation, and broader policy issues. These include lessons on the effectiveness and cost of Argentina's default strategy, the ability to force sovereigns to meet their debt obligations, and ways to avoid future defaults like Argentina's.",85,82 "Excess Defense Articles: Grants and Sales to Allies and Friendly Countries. The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides one means by which the United States can advance foreign policy objectives assisting friendly and allied nations through provision of equipment excess to the requirements of its own defense forces. The current program is an outgrowth of military assistance programs developed by the United States in the 1950s and 1960s to provide allies and friends with relatively inexpensive military items during the Cold War. Since many EDA recipients already have U.S. military equipment in their inventories, U.S. EDA items can supplement earlier acquisitions at a reduced cost to the recipient. They can be made available through outright grants or sales at a depreciated price. Among objectives furthered by transfer of EDA are assisting modernization efforts of U.S. allies, assisting in multilateral peacekeeping efforts combating illegal narcotics production and narco-trafficking, and aiding de-mining programs. United States Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiatives have been augmented by providing grant EDA materiel which meets NATO standards, supplying such equipment helps fulfill modernization and standardization needs of eligible PfP partners in a timely and less costly manner. This report provides background on the EDA program. It gives the rationale for the program discusses the key elements of the program, and how it operates. It provides data on recent EDA transactions, and also discusses the means by which Congress oversees the program and its uses. The report will be updated only if significant developments occur regarding the EDA program.",28,32 "California Agricultural Production and Irrigated Water Use. California ranks as the leading agricultural state in the United States in terms of farm-level sales. In 2012, California's farm-level sales totaled nearly $45 billion and accounted for 11% of total U.S. agricultural sales. Five counties—Tulare, Kern, Fresno, Monterey, and Merced—rank among the leading agricultural counties in the nation. Given current drought conditions in California, however, there has been much attention on the use of water to grow agricultural crops in the state. Depending on the data source, irrigated agriculture accounts for roughly 40% to 80% of total water supplies. Such discrepancies are largely based on different survey methods and assumptions, including the baseline amount of water estimated for use (e.g., what constitutes ""available"" supplies). Two primary data sources are the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the California Department of Water Resources (DWR). USGS estimates water use for agricultural irrigation in California at 25.8 million acre-feet (MAF), accounting for 61% of USGS's estimates of total withdrawals. DWR estimates water use withdrawals for agricultural irrigation at 33 MAF, or about 41% of total use. Both of these estimates are based on available data for 2010. These estimates differ from other widely cited estimates indicating that agricultural use accounts for 80% of California's available water supplies, as reported in media and news reports. Attention has also focused on trends in California toward growing more permanent orchard crops, such as fruit and nut trees and vineyard crops, as well as production of grain and pasture crops, much of which is used to support the state's meat and dairy industries. Orchard crops refer to tree or vineyard crops that are planted once, require continuous watering to reach maturation, and cannot be fallowed during dry years without loss of investment. In contrast, most vegetables and other row crops (including grain and pasture crops) are annual crops that are sown and harvested during the same production year, sometimes more than once, and may be fallowed in dry years. Between 2004 and 2013, overall harvested acres in California increased for almonds, walnuts, pistachios, raisins, grapes, berries, cherries, pomegranates, and olives, but also for corn. During the same period, overall harvested acreage decreased for some field crops (cotton, alfalfa, rice, wheat), but also for certain orchard crops (wine grapes and some citrus and tree fruits). This shift to growing more permanent crops, especially tree nuts, appears to be largely market-driven. The availability of irrigation water has been a major factor in the development of California's agricultural production. California has the largest number of irrigated farmed acres compared to other states and accounts for about one-fourth of total applied acre-feet of irrigated water in the United States. Water use per acre in California is also high compared to other states. Available data for 2013 indicate that, of total irrigated acres harvested in California, about 31% of irrigated acres were land in orchards and 18% were land in vegetables. Another 46% of irrigated acres harvested were land in alfalfa, hay, pastureland, rice, corn, and cotton. Congressional interest in California agriculture and water use centers largely on the Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project (CVP), which supplies water to numerous agricultural and municipal contractors. In recent years, the CVP has cut back water deliveries due to drought and environmental factors. Congress also authorizes and oversees U.S. Department of Agriculture support for individual crops and farmers, and some Members have expressed concern over the broader implications of decreased agricultural production and/or lack of water availability throughout the state.",2,43 "State Department and Related Agencies FY2001 Appropriations. On February 7, 2000, the President submitted his FY2001 budget request which included nearly $7 billion for the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. This represented an increase of $661.5 million (or 10.5%) from the FY2000 enacted level which Congress had passed in an omnibus bill on November 19, 1999, the President had signed it into law (P.L. 106-113) on November 29, 1999. Earlier, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1999 (P.L. 105-277, section 1001) had required the foreign policy agencies to be reorganized before FY2000. Subsequently, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) merged its functions into the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reorganized and came directly under the authority of the Secretary of State as of April 1, 1999. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) consolidated its information and exchange functions into the Department of State, while as of October 1, 1999 the broadcasting functions became an independent agency referred to as the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). The Administration's FY2001 request would have: 1) provided more than $1 billion for worldwide security upgrades at U.S. facilities, 2) continued increasing the capital investment fund and 3) increased U.S. Contributions to the U.N.'s International Organizations (CIO) and its U.N. Contributions to International Peacekeeping (CIPA) funds. In addition, the international broadcasting budget request of $6.96 billion represented a 6.3% increase over the FY2000 level. The House Commerce, Justice, State (CJS) Appropriations Subcommittee reported out its version of the CJS FY2001funding legislation on June 6, 2000. The full House Appropriations Committee reported out its version on June 15th. The bill (H.R. 4690) was formally introduced on June 19, 2000. House floor action occurred on June 22nd and 23rd, the House passed the bill (214-195-1) on June 26, 2000 after agreeing to transfer $10 million out of State and into the Legal Services Corp. The House funding level for the State Department and international broadcasting totaled $6.55 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported their version of H.R. 4690 on July 18, 2000. The Senate Committee recommended no significant increase in worldwide security upgrade funding, but a 30% increase in the Capital Investment Fund and 10% increase in exchange programs. The Senate Committee recommended a total FY2001 funding level of $6.56 billion for State and international broadcasting. On October 27, 2000, Congress approved the CJS conference report (H.R. 4942 H.Rept. 106-1005). The President signed the measure into law on December 21, 2000 (H.R. 5548 as contained in the conference report on H.R. 4942, P.L. 106-553). This is the final update of this report.",80,80 "Governmental Tracking of Cell Phones and Vehicles: The Confluence of Privacy, Technology, and Law. This report will briefly survey Fourth Amendment law as it pertains to the government's tracking programs. It will then summarize federal electronic surveillance statutes and the case law surrounding cell phone location tracking. Next, the report will describe the GPS-vehicle tracking cases and review the pending Supreme Court GPS tracking case, United States v. Jones. Finally, the report will summarize the geolocation and electronic surveillance legislation introduced in the 112th Congress.",19,19 "National Park System: What Do the Different Park Titles Signify?. Congress names individual units of the National Park System in the enabling legislation for each unit. In so doing, Congress establishes the range of titles used in the park system. The system's 409 units currently bear a wide range of titles—national park, national monument, national preserve, national historic site, national recreation area, national battlefield, and many others. This report addresses the significance of the different titles and discusses potential advantages and disadvantages of systemwide recommendations to simplify park nomenclature. Legislators are concerned with park titles in several ways. First, Congress must determine appropriate titles for individual units when parks are established. Although the laws, regulations, and policies governing the National Park System generally apply to all units regardless of title, some meaningful differences nonetheless exist among the designations. Congress has grouped similar units under similar titles and has authorized resource-intensive activities, such as sport hunting or off-road vehicle use, in some types of units more than in others. In particular, Congress has been reluctant to allow such activities in national parks, but has authorized them in national preserves, national recreation areas, and national seashores and lakeshores, among other areas. A few unit titles are further associated with specific statutory authorities that govern their creation or development. National monuments, for example, can be proclaimed by the President under the Antiquities Act of 1906 (whereas other types of units cannot). National scenic trails and wild and scenic rivers are subject to requirements of the National Trails System Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-543) and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-542), respectively, as well as general park authorities. In addition to naming units when they are established, Congress also considers proposals to retitle existing park units. For example, H.R. 3619 in the 114th Congress proposes to redesignate Rock Creek Park in Washington, DC, as a national park, and H.R. 2880 would redesignate the Martin Luther King Jr. National Historic Site in Georgia as a national historical park. In the 112th Congress, P.L. 112-245 redesignated the former Pinnacles National Monument in California as Pinnacles National Park. Among other things, such proposals may aim to increase visitation at a given unit and thus to boost local and regional economies. In particular, some studies have suggested that the ""national park"" title may attract visitors and bring economic benefits. Those opposing redesignations may be concerned that unwanted restrictions would be pursued along with a change in title. An issue for Congress is whether the current wide array of park titles should be consolidated. The House Natural Resources Committee explored this question in 2010 hearings. The National Parks Second Century Commission, and the National Park Service (NPS) itself, have recommended reducing the number of park titles to better ""brand"" the units and make them more recognizable as part of the park system. Such branding could potentially bring more visitors to under-recognized units and thus help businesses in surrounding communities. On the other hand, the current, more loosely structured system maximizes Congress's flexibility to title units to reflect their unique features.",106,106 "Tax-Exempt Bonds: A Description of State and Local Government Debt. This report provides information about state and local government debt. State and local governments issue debt instruments in exchange for the use of individuals' and businesses' savings. This debt obligates state and local governments to make interest payments for the use of these savings and to repay, at some time in the future, the amount borrowed. State and local governments may finance capital facilities with debt rather than out of current tax revenue to more closely align benefits and tax payments. There was just over $3 trillion in state and local debt outstanding in the third quarter of 2017. The federal government subsidizes the cost of most state and local debt by excluding the interest income from federal income taxation. This tax exemption is granted in part because it is believed that state and local capital facilities will be underprovided if state and local taxpayers have to pay the full cost. The federal government also provides a tax preference through tax credit bonds (TCBs), which either provide investors with a federal tax credit in lieu of interest payments or a direct payment to the issuer. P.L. 115-97, the 2017 tax revision, repealed the authority to issue TCBs beginning in 2018. For more on TCBs, see CRS Report R40523, Tax Credit Bonds: Overview and Analysis. State and local debt is issued as bonds, to be repaid over a period of time greater than one year and perhaps exceeding 20 years, and as notes, to be repaid within one year. General obligation bonds are secured by the promise to repay with general tax revenue, and revenue bonds are secured with the promise to use a specific stream of tax revenue. Most debt is issued to finance new capital facilities, but some is issued to refund a prior bond issue (usually to take advantage of lower interest rates). Tax-exempt bonds issued for some activities are classified as governmental bonds and can be issued without federal constraint because most of the benefits from the capital facilities are enjoyed by the general public. Many tax-exempt revenue bonds are issued for activities Congress has classified as private because most of the benefits from the activities appear to be enjoyed by private individuals and businesses. The annual volume of a subset of these tax-exempt private-activity bonds (PABs) is capped. For more on private activity bonds, see CRS Report RL31457, Private Activity Bonds: An Introduction. Arbitrage bonds devote a substantial share of the proceeds to the purchase of assets with higher interest rates than that being paid on the tax-exempt bonds. Such arbitrage bonds are not tax exempt because Congress does not want state and local governments to issue tax-exempt bonds and use the proceeds to earn arbitrage profits. The arbitrage profits could substitute for state and local taxes. A number of tax reform proposals have been introduced that would modify the tax treatment of state and local government bonds. Another policy issue is whether constraints should be relaxed on the types of activities, such as infrastructure spending, for which entities can issue tax-exempt debt. The list of activities that classify tax-exempt private-activity bonds—and whether they should be included in the volume cap—is another area of potential change or reform. The 2017 tax revision repealed authority to issue TCBs and advanced refunding bonds, but did not otherwise modify tax-exempt bonds or PABs.",12,60 "Questions of Privilege in the House. The House of Representatives distinguishes between privileged business and questions of privilege. Privileged business relates to the order or priority of business before the House and is defined in House rules and precedents as business that has precedence over the regular order of business and so may supersede or interrupt other matters that might be called up or pending before the House. Questions of privilege constitute one form of privileged business. Clause 1 of House Rule IX recognizes two kinds of questions of privilege: questions of the privileges of the House and questions of personal privilege. A question of the privileges of the House is a formal declaration by a Member of the House asserting that a situation has arisen affecting “the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity and the integrity of its proceedings.” Once a question of the privileges of the House is raised, the Speaker must, at some point, entertain the question and rule on its validity. The Speaker makes such a ruling with guidance from the House Parliamentarian based on House rule and precedent. If it is ruled to be valid, a question of the privileges of the House will be considered and possibly voted on by the House. For more information, see CRS Report R44005, Questions of the Privileges of the House: An Analysis, by Megan S. Lynch",55,55 "School Prayer: The Congressional Response, 1962 - 1998. For at least a century and a half the issue of school prayer has periodically convulsed the body politic. But only in recent times -- since 1962 when the Supreme Court in Engel v. Vitale held government sponsorship of devotional activities in the public schools to be unconstitutional -- has Congress become persistently involved. Since that decision Congress has considered a variety of measures to promote or permit devotional activities in the public schools: (1) Constitutional amendments -- Numerous proposals have been introduced in every Congress since Engel to overturn or limit the Court's decisions by amending the Constitution, and numerous hearings have been held. The House has voted on a constitutional amendment twice (in 1971 and 1998), the Senate four times (in 1966, 1970, and twice in 1984). But only in the Senate vote in 1970 did such a proposal garner the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption, and that vote was perceived less as a vote on school prayer than as a vote to kill the measure to which the school prayer proposal was attached -- the Equal Rights Amendment. (2) Limitations on federal court jurisdiction -- Proposals were introduced in every Congress from the 93d through the 103d to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over the school prayer issue. The Senate voted in favor of such a measure the first time it came up for a vote in 1979, but in 1982 1985, and 1988 it rejected the proposal by increasingly wide margins. (3) Equal access proposals -- Following the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Widmar v. Vincent holding student- initiated religious groups to be entitled to meet on the same basis as other student-initiated groups at public colleges and universities, Congress in 1984 enacted the ""Equal Access Act"" extending the principle to student-initiated religious groups at the public secondary school level. (4) Appropriations riders -- Since fiscal 1981 Congress has added a prophylactic rider (the Walker amendment) to the annual appropriations bills for the Department of Education barring funds from being used ""to prevent the implementation of programs of voluntary prayer and meditation in the public schools."" (5) Cutoff of funds -- Since 1984 both the House and the Senate have voted on various amendments to cut off federal education funds from state and local educational agencies that prevent individuals from participating in voluntary prayer. In 1994 Congress enacted the Kassebaum amendment and converted several school prayer amendments to the ""Goals 2000: Educate America Act"" into a mandate to state and local educational agencies similar to the Walker amendment. (6) Sense-of-the-Congress resolutions -- Measures to express Congress' views on what devotional activities remain permissible in the public schools under the Court's rulings have frequently been offered as alternatives to constitutional amendments. The Senate has rejected two such proposals (in 1966) and approved one (in 1994), but none have become law. This report provides a Congress-by-Congress review of legislative action on the school prayer issue from 1962 through 1998.",15,15 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): FY2016 Budget Request Overview and Resources. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) FY2016 Budget Request.,74,74 "FATCA Reporting on U.S. Accounts: Recent Legal Developments. Enacted in 2010, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) is intended to curb U.S. tax evasion occurring through the use of offshore accounts. Key among its provisions is the requirement that foreign financial institutions (FFIs), such as foreign banks and hedge funds, report information on their U.S. account holders to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). FFIs that fail to comply will have tax withheld at a rate of 30% on many payments made to them from U.S. sources, including interest and dividends. Since FATCA's passage, there has been international criticism of the FFI provisions, generally focused on whether the United States was correct to take FATCA's unilateral approach. Questions have arisen about whether FATCA's requirements are inconsistent with existing U.S. treaty obligations, how to handle potential conflict of law issues arising when an FFI is faced with complying with FATCA or its home country's domestic (e.g., banking and privacy) laws, and whether the United States has intruded into other countries' sovereignty. Recognizing that these concerns could affect the success of FATCA, the United States has entered into bilateral intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) with numerous countries in order to implement the FFI requirements. Under some of these agreements, FFIs report information on their U.S. account holders to their home country, which then provides the information to the IRS. In general, for those FFIs that are not covered by such an agreement, FATCA requires that they report the information directly to the IRS. As of August 1, 2016, there are 63 IGAs that are currently in force. Additionally, the United States treats certain countries as having an IGA in effect even though the country has not taken all the steps necessary to actually bring the agreement into force. In July 2016, the IRS made a significant announcement regarding these countries: they will stop being treated as having an IGA in effect in 2017 unless they comply with certain requirements by December 31, 2016. Among other things, the country must explain why the IGA is not yet in force and provide a step-by-step timeline for doing so. The Treasury Department and the IRS will then decide whether it is appropriate to continue to treat the country as having an IGA in effect. Some praise the FFI reporting requirements as an effective tool to combat tax evasion and argue that using the IGAs leads to positive outcomes, including reduced compliance costs for FFIs and avoidance of international conflict of law issues. Others, meanwhile, have expressed concerns about the privacy of information reported by FFIs and the appropriateness of the IGAs. These concerns are illustrated in an ongoing lawsuit, Crawford v. Department of the Treasury, in which the plaintiffs argue that the executive branch does not have the power to enter into IGAs and that the FFI reporting requirements violate the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable search and seizures by requiring FFIs to report information about U.S. account holders without any judicial oversight. In April 2016, a U.S. district court in Ohio dismissed the case after determining that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The plaintiffs have appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which has not yet issued a decision. Finally, legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress that would repeal much of FATCA (S. 663), modify FATCA with the intent of ""strengthening"" it (Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 297 and S. 174), or require that its effects on U.S. citizens living overseas be studied (Commission on Americans Living Abroad Act, H.R. 3078).",51,102 "Air Quality and Emissions Trading: A Primer. This report briefly discusses the extent to which emissions trading has been used in the United States, explains how trading programs work, analyzes factors that can influence the effectiveness of trading, and examines some of the principal arguments related to the use of trading to control air pollution.",42,42 "Proposals to Reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the 112th Congress. As households and taxpayers, Americans have a large stake in the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Homeowners and potential homeowners indirectly depend on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which in recent years backed and guaranteed home loans accounting for nearly half of the outstanding home mortgages in the nation. Taxpayers have a large investment in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Department of the Treasury kept the two insolvent companies in business by providing more than $175 billion in support. Based on past performance, it is not clear how the enterprises will be able to repay Treasury out of future earnings. In addition to the $175 billion in direct support, Treasury and the Federal Reserve (the Fed) purchased nearly $1.4 trillion in GSE-issued and guaranteed mortgage-backed securities (MBS). These two entities are stockholder-owned, congressionally chartered companies that purchase home mortgages, commonly called government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). In 2008, increasing mortgage delinquencies and the general financial crisis weakened the two enterprises to the point that they agreed to a voluntary takeover by the federal government known as conservatorship. This report summarizes and analyzes bills introduced in the 112th Congress that seek to enhance the public accountability of the two enterprises. The bills covered are H.R. 31, H.R. 408, H.R. 463, H.R. 1182, H.R. 1221, H.R. 1222, H.R. 1223, H.R. 1224, H.R. 1225, H.R. 1226, H.R. 1227, H.R. 1859, H.R. 2413, H.R. 2425, H.R. 2428, H.R. 2436, H.R. 2439, H.R. 2440, H.R. 2441, H.R. 2462, S. 178, and S. 693. Some seek to reduce the cost to the government, while others seek to change the enterprises' charters if or when they leave conservatorship. None of the above bills introduced proposes government actions to replace the two enterprises. To date, two bills, H.R. 1859 and H.R. 2413, propose creating a replacement for the two enterprises. H.R. 1859 would authorize the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to charter special purpose associations to support the secondary mortgage market by issuing MBS with an explicit federal catastrophic guarantee. The associations would be charged for this guarantee. H.R. 1859 would require FHFA to develop a plan to transition from enterprise support for the secondary mortgage market to support by these new associations. The second bill, H.R. 2413, would create a government corporation (the Secondary Market Facility for Residential Mortgages) to purchase and to securitize mortgages. Those selling mortgages to the facility would be required to pay guarantee and reinsurance fees for an explicit federal guarantee on the securities. Because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are under conservatorship, Congress has unusual leverage to direct FHFA, which is both their regulator and conservator, to implement policy changes. Currently, FHFA has unusual control in that it both regulates and manages Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This report will be updated as warranted.",73,73 "National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA): Background and Issues for Congress. Title XVII of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ""Buck"" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291) established the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) to conduct a comprehensive study of the structure of the Army. The NCFA reported its findings to Congress and the Administration on January 28, 2016, and made a number of recommendations that may or may not be acted upon. Some have suggested the historical post-war practice of reducing defense budgets contributed to the perceived need for a commission to address proposed changes to the Army. The perceived success of two previous commissions—the 2014 National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force and the 2015 Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission—also likely played a role in the establishment of the commission. Some say controversy surrounding the Army's 2013 Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) significantly influenced the decision to establish the NCFA. As part of its final report, the NCFA produced a classified appendix, which is available to those with the appropriate clearance and a ""need to know."" The 208-page report contained 63 recommendations for the Nation, the President, Congress, the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, the Army, and Army Service Component Commands. Some of the report's major recommendations include forward stationing an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Europe, retaining an 11th Regular Army Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) and forward stationing it in Korea, and recommending the Army maintain 24 manned AH-64 Apache battalions—20 in the Regular Army and 4 in the National Guard. Major themes of the NCFA's report include developing ""One Army"" and the prioritization of training and readiness. Some general observations of the commission's recommendations include the importance of the NCFA classified appendix, the impact of the commission's recommendations on the ""Corporate"" Army, the history and challenges of past and current Army initiatives, and force structure issues outside the Title XVII mandate. Potential issues for Congress include to what extent will Congress and the Administration implement NCFA's recommendations how much would it cost to implement the recommendations potential difficulties in implementing the NCFA's recommendations, and how Congress would oversee the implementation of the NCFA's recommendations. The author of this report served on the staff of the National Commission on the Future of the Army from June 1, 2015, until September 30, 2015. The information and analysis contained in this report are derived from open source data. Participation on this commission informed but did not influence the content of this report.",32,32 "Government Performance and Results Act: Overview of Associated Provisions in the 106th Congress. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P. L. 103-62, known as GPRA, or the Results Act) established a new framework for performance management and budgeting in federal agencies. In complying with GPRA, agencies must set goals, devise performance measures, and assess results achieved. This report identifies and analyzes provisions in public laws and committee reports from the 106th Congress (1999-2000) relating to GPRA and its implementation, including comparisons to similar provisions in the 104th and 105th Congresses. The purpose of these studies is to review ways in which Congress and its committees engage in oversight of GPRA, and, more generally, monitor implementation efforts by the executive branch agencies. Online databases were used to identify language of potential interest in committee reports and in the public laws from the 106th Congress. The resulting electronic files were examined and pruned with the remaining relevant excerpts captured for further analysis.* This approach covered specific citations to GPRA, as well as provisions that are or might be deemed associated with GPRA, such as performance measures and strategic plans. The research identified 42 public laws from the 106th Congress containing statutory language relating to GPRA and performance measurement. Two of these laws were omnibus measures containing GPRA-associated provisions from 10 separate bills arguably better counted as 10 items rather than two, for a total of 50 enacted measures from the 106th Congress with GPRA-related provisions. Previous CRS studies identified 14 public laws with performance-related provisions enacted during the 104th Congress, and 28 in the 105th. Although the rate of increase of 100% from the 104th to the 105th in the number of public laws with GPRA-associated provisions was not quite sustained, the rate of increase from the 105th to the 106th was significant at almost 79%. In addition to statutes with GPRA-associated provisions, a search of committee reports identified 24 additional public laws from the 106th Congress that contained GPRA-associated passages in accompanying reports, compared with 17 laws so identified in the 105th. Thus a total of 74 laws enacted in the 106th Congress were determined to have GPRA-relevant provisions in statutory language or in committee report language, compared with a total of 45 public laws from the 105th Congress with GPRA-relevant provisions in statute or accompanying reports. Congressional efforts to oversee GPRA implementation continued in the 107th Congress. Moreover, the inclusion of budget and performance integration as a key initiative in the President's Management Agenda arguably has increased attention to GPRA-related issues in the executive branch. This report, with its focus on the 106th Congress, will not be updated, but other CRS products on GPRA and performance management and budgeting will be revised and expanded as events warrant. *Genevieve Knezo, Resources, Science, and Industry Division, participated equally with the author in this phase of the research, and her contributions are gratefully acknowledged.",56,56 "Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Issues and Debate in the 115th Congress. On April 27, 2018, the House of Representatives passed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (H.R. 4), a six-year Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization measure that does not include a controversial proposal to privatize air traffic control laid (ATC) out in an earlier bill, H.R. 2997. On May 9, 2018, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation reported a four-year FAA reauthorization bill (S. 1405, S.Rept. 115-243) that does not address ATC privatization. The enactment of either bill would be the first long-term FAA reauthorization act since the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95) expired at the end of FY2015. Despite many similarities, there are a number of differences in the two bills, including the length of authorization, funding amounts, and other provisions. Key differences include the following S. 1405 would authorize funding to aviation programs from FY2018 through FY2021, while funding authorization in H.R. 4 would cover two additional years, through FY2023. H.R. 4 would provide higher annual funding. H.R. 4 would establish a pilot program to provide air traffic services on a preferential basis to aircraft equipped with upgraded avionics compatible with FAA's NextGen ATC system, while S. 1405 would require FAA to identify barriers to complying with the current 2020 equipage deadline. H.R. 4 proposes a number of actions to address noise complaints attributed to NextGen procedures, while S. 1405 addresses noise concerns by clarifying the availability of certain airport grant funds for noise mitigation programs. While both bills would establish a process for certifying drone package delivery operations, S. 1405 addresses the privacy policies of unmanned aircraft operators and would require FAA to establish a public database of unmanned aircraft to aid with compliance and enforcement of airspace restrictions and applicable regulations. Whereas S. 1405 would allow FAA to revise airline pilot qualification standards to allow certain ground instruction to count toward the 1,500 flight-hour minimum, H.R. 4 does not propose any changes to the current requirements. H.R. 4 would create a new supplemental funding authorization for Airport Improvement Program (AIP) discretionary funds from the general fund appropriations, exceeding $1 billion each year. Large hub airports would not be eligible for these funds. H.R. 4 would make involuntary bumping of passengers after boarding an unfair and deceptive practice. It would also allow an air carrier to advertise base airfare rather than the final cost to the passenger, as long as it discloses additional taxes and fees via a link on its website. Such practice is currently deemed ""unfair and deceptive"" by a Department of Transportation (DOT) consumer protection rule.",119,119 "Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for Congress. The Navy's proposed FY2014 budget, like the Navy's proposed FY2013 budget, requested no funding for Military Construction (MilCon) projects required to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at Mayport, FL. The Navy's FY2013 budget deferred the Navy's plan to homeport a CVN at Mayport, and the Navy's FY2013-FY2017 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contained no funding for MilCon projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The Navy stated in its FY2013 budget submission: ""Although the FY 2013 budget does not contain a construction project supporting the homeporting of a CVN in Mayport, FL, the Department [of the Navy] is committed to the requirement and policy to strategically disperse CVNs on each coast. This is a deferral at this time due to fiscal constraints."" The Navy's Atlantic Fleet CVNs are all homeported at Norfolk, VA. The Navy wants to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by homeporting a CVN at Mayport. Prior to the submission of the FY2013 budget, Navy plans called for having Mayport ready to homeport a CVN in 2019. Transferring a CVN from Norfolk to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources estimate as being worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year. The Navy's desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport is an issue of strong interest to certain Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Certain Members of Congress from Florida have expressed support for the Navy's desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing (as have DOD and the Navy) that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy's Atlantic Fleet CVNs are worth the costs associated with moving a CVN to Mayport. Certain Members of Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition to, the Navy's desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy's Atlantic Fleet CVNs are questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could achieve greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities.",31,32 "Appropriations for FY2003: Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies. The Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and other related agencies (often referred to as CJS) appropriations for FY2003 were completed by Congress and signed (P.L. 108-7) by the President on February 20, 2003, five months into the budget year. The enacted CJS appropriation provides $44,773.7 million in new budget authority (before applying an across-the-board rescission of 0.65%). President Bush sent the FY2003 budget request to Congress on February 4, 2002 seeking a total budget authority level for CJS appropriations of $44,019.0 million -- a mandatory level of $649.3 million and a discretionary level of $43,369.7 million. The major components of the Administration's FY2003 CJS request included: Department of Justice -- $22,800.3 million Department of Commerce -- $5,638.5 million, the Judiciary -- $5,241.6 million, and Department of State -- $8,139.2 million. The 107th Congress Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its CJS appropriations bill (S. 2778, S.Rept. 107-218) July 24, 2002. No House CJS bill was introduced by the 107th Congress. Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions keeping the government running through February 20, 2003. In the 108th Congress, the Senate passed an omnibus budget bill (H.J.Res. 2) on January 23, 2003. It set CJS totals at $44,939.6 million. Congressman Frank Wolf, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, introduced a CJS bill (H.R. 247) on January 8, 2003, to provide a House version of funding for the conference. No other action occurred on that bill. Its CJS totals were $44,352.9 million. Following are some key CJS issues for the FY2003 budget Department of Justice. The FY2003 request was $22.8 billion, nearly $1 million below the FY2002 enacted level. The total enacted level, before an across-the-board rescission, is $23,988.3 million. Department of Commerce. The FY2003 request was $5,638.5 million, almost 3% below the FY2002 funding level. The decline was largely due to reduced funding for science and technology. The enacted level, before rescissions, is $5,774.8 million. The Judiciary. The FY2003 request emphasized court security an increase in hourly pay to court-appointed attorneys representing indigent defendants in federal criminal cases, and cost-of-living salary increases for judges and justices. Department of State and broadcasting. The FY2003 request was more than $8,139.2 million similar to the FY2002 enacted level, including supplementals. The Department stressed its three top priorities from the previous year: additional hiring, embassy security, and technology improvements worldwide. The enacted FY2003 level is $7,900.7 million, before applying the rescissions.",59,59 "Amendments Between the Houses: A Brief Overview. The House and Senate must approve an identical version of a measure before it can be presented for the President's approval or veto. If the House and Senate approve differing versions of a measure, the differences must first be resolved. One way to do this is through an exchange of amendments between the houses. When the House or Senate passes a measure, it is sent to the other chamber for further consideration. If the second chamber passes the measure with one or more amendments, it is then sent back to the originating chamber. In modern practice, the second chamber often substitutes its version of a measure as a single amendment to the measure as passed by the first chamber. The first chamber then may accept the amendment or propose its own further amendment. In this way, the measure may be messaged back and forth between the House and Senate in the hope that both houses will eventually agree to the same version of a measure.",55,55 "U.S. Trade and Investment in the Middle East and North Africa: Overview and Issues for Congress. U.S. interest in deepening economic ties with certain countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has increased in light of the political unrest and transitions that have swept the region since early 2011. Policymakers in Congress and the Obama Administration are discussing ways that U.S. trade and investment can bolster long-term economic growth in the region. In May 2011, President Obama announced the MENA ""Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative"" (MENA-TIP), through which various federal government agencies are engaged in efforts to enhance trade and investment with the region. Such activities are in line with long-standing U.S. trade policy goals and measures. Some Members of Congress have called for deeper economic ties with MENA countries undergoing political change. However, continued political uncertainty and changing security environments in the region have prompted greater scrutiny of U.S. engagement. This report analyzes policy approaches that Congress might consider concerning U.S.-MENA trade and investment. MENA Economies and Integration in the Global Economy Economic performance in the MENA as a whole lags behind other regions in the world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (living standards), employment, and economic diversification, despite the fact that several MENA countries are major producers of oil and natural gas. Limited integration in the global economy is frequently cited as an obstacle to the region's overall economic development. MENA's trade with the world is concentrated in a small number of products (oil exports and imports of manufactured goods) and among a small number of trading partners (particularly the European Union). Tariffs also remain high in some MENA countries, and intra-regional trade and investment flows are relatively low. With regard to the United States, the MENA region accounts for less than 5% of U.S. total trade and 1% of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows. U.S. businesses face a number of non-tariff barriers, such as lack of transparency, bureaucratic red tape, corruption, weak rule of law, and differences in business cultures. Policy Approaches and Challenges Current U.S. trade and investment policies with MENA countries are quite varied. The United States has free trade agreements (FTAs) with five MENA countries (Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman), but more limited ties with other countries, such as Libya, which is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Important exceptions to overall U.S. trade policy objectives in the region are Iran and Syria, which are both subject to trade sanctions. Analysts disagree about the merits of deepening U.S. trade and investment ties with the MENA region. Some analysts maintain that new trade and investment agreements help anchor domestic reforms, such as in governance and rule of law, support sound economic growth, are a cost-effective way to support transitioning countries in an environment of budgetary constraints, and could promote U.S. exports and investment. Others argue that the empirical record between economic openness and democracy is weak and that it is unclear whether protesters in various Arab countries favor more economic liberalization, which they sometimes associate with corruption, inflation, and inequality. They also argue that political uncertainty in the region, such as the fluidity of Egypt's political transition, merits a ""wait-and-see"" approach before proceeding with substantial policy changes. The 113th Congress could consider a number of approaches regarding U.S. trade and investment with the region, including maintaining the status quo until the impact of the political changes in MENA countries is clear providing technical assistance to countries working towards WTO membership, as well as trade capacity building support to countries working to implement WTO commitments negotiating new trade and/or investment agreements with countries in the region that do not already have them, such as Egypt and Tunisia utilizing existing trade frameworks for greater dialogue and progress on trade and investment and encouraging regional integration reauthorizing existing trade preferences through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program or creating a U.S. trade preference program, differing from GSP, that grants preferential market access to exports from MENA countries, and increasing assistance from federal export and investment promotion agencies to the region. In considering such approaches, some questions that could arise include Should the U.S. government promote expanded trade and investment in the near term in order to support democratic transitions, or should it wait until the political situation stabilizes in various countries? To what extent should the United States balance a regional approach of increased trade and investment with more tailored policies to the specific needs of individual countries? To what extent should the United States cooperate with the European Union or others on trade and investment in the MENA region? Are existing U.S. frameworks and agreements on trade and investment with MENA countries benefitting the region, and achieving the intended objectives? What lessons can be learned from past U.S. efforts to promote trade and investment? How effective are current efforts to expand trade and investment under the MENA-TIP initiative?",53,53 "Visa Security Policy: Roles of the Departments of State and Homeland Security. Foreign nationals (i.e., aliens) not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted, with certain exceptions noted in law. The Departments of State (DOS) and Homeland Security (DHS) each play key roles in administering the law and policies on the admission of aliens. Although the DOS's Consular Affairs is responsible for issuing visas, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigrant Services (USCIS) in DHS approves immigrant petitions, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in DHS operates the Visa Security Program in selected embassies abroad, and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in DHS inspects all people who enter the United States. In addition, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) in the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has a significant policy role through its adjudicatory decisions on specific immigration cases. Although there was a discussion of assigning all visa issuance responsibilities to DHS when the department was being created, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) opted not to do so. Rather, P.L. 107-296 drew on compromise language stating that DHS issues regulations regarding visa issuances and assigns staff to consular posts abroad to advise, review, and conduct investigations, and that DOS's Consular Affairs continues to issue visas. The case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who allegedly attempted to ignite an explosive device on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, refocused attention on the responsibilities of the Departments of State and Homeland Security for the visa process. He was traveling on a multi-year, multiple-entry tourist visa issued to him in June 2008. State Department officials have acknowledged that Abdulmutallab's father came into the Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, on November 19, 2009, to express his concerns about his son, and that those officials at the Embassy in Abuja sent a cable to the National Counterterrorism Center. State Department officials maintain they had insufficient information to revoke his visa at that time. In the aftermath of the Abdulmutallab case, policymakers explored what went wrong and whether statutory and procedural revisions were needed. Some have expressed the view that DOS has too much control over visas, maintaining that the Homeland Security Act intended DHS to be the lead department and DOS to merely administer the visa process. Proponents of DOS playing the principal role in visa issuances assert that only consular officers in the field have the country-specific knowledge to make decisions about whether an alien is admissible and that staffing 250 diplomatic and consular posts around the world would stretch DHS beyond its capacity. Whether the visa security roles and procedures are adequately funded may arise as the budget issues are considered. The House Committee on the Judiciary has reported legislation (H.R. 1741) that would give the Secretary of Homeland Security ""exclusive authority to issue regulations, establish policy, and administer and enforce the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) and all other immigration or nationality laws relating to the functions of consular officers of the United States in connection with the granting and refusal of a visa."" This report will be updated as significant developments occur.",76,76 "Corporate Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS): An Examination of the Data. Congress and the Obama Administration have expressed interest in addressing multinational corporations' ability to shift profits into low- and no-tax countries with little corresponding change in business operations. Several factors appear to be driving this interest. Economists have estimated that profit shifting results in significant tax revenue losses annually, implying that reducing the practice could help address deficit and debt concerns. Profit shifting and base erosion are also believed to distort the allocation of capital as investment decisions are overly influenced by taxes. Fairness concerns have also been raised. If multinational corporations can avoid or reduce their taxes, other taxpayers (including domestically focused businesses and individuals) may perceive the tax system as unfair. At the same time, policymakers are also concerned that American corporations could be unintentionally harmed if careful consideration is not given to the proper way to reduce profit shifting. Consistent with the findings of existing research, the analysis presented in this report provides indications that the magnitude of profit shifting may be significant. For example, of the $1.2 trillion in overseas profits American companies reported earning in 2012, $600 billion was attributed to seven ""tax haven"" or ""tax preferred"" countries: Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, and the U.K. Caribbean Islands. The Netherlands was the most popular location to report profits, accounting for 14.1% of all overseas earnings of American companies. Further analysis reveals that the share of profits reported is significantly disproportional to the amount of hiring and investment made by American companies in these countries. Data on the foreign direct investment (FDI) positions of American companies are also analyzed. Examining FDI data allows for an indirect investigation into the degree of profit shifting. The FDI data show that the same seven ""tax haven"" or ""tax preferred"" countries accounted for nearly half (47%) of the worldwide FDI position of the United States. The data also show that an increasing share of FDI is being held via holding companies. The report discusses that some of the increased use of holding companies may be tax motivated. Lastly, data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations (UN) on the location of the FDI positions of all countries indicate that profit shifting is likely an international issue. Several policy options for addressing base erosion and profit shifting are briefly discussed. Included in the discussion are the tradeoffs and considerations involved in moving closer to either a pure worldwide tax system or a pure territorial tax system. The adoption of a minimum tax or a formula apportionment system is also discussed, as well as the effects of modifying current tax policy such as broadening the definition of Subpart F income or reducing corporate tax rates. The report concludes with a discussion of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) plan, which may have implications for American corporations even if the U.S. does not adopt the OECD's recommendations. This report is intended to assist Congress as it considers what, if any, action to take to curb profit shifting. It is one of several CRS products related to the subject of profit shifting. Where appropriate, reference is made to related CRS products that discuss the more technical issues in the international corporate tax debate.",102,51 "Even Start Family Literacy Programs: An Overview. The Even Start program provides education and related services jointly to parents lacking a high school diploma (or equivalent) and their young children. Even Start services include basic academic instruction and parenting skills training for the adults, and early childhood education for their children, along with necessary supplementary services such as child care or transportation. Generally, Even Start programs do not directly provide all of these services, rather, they establish networks of service providers, including Head Start programs and grantees under the Adult Education Act (AEA). Even Start is the only federal program specifically dedicated to providing services to both disadvantaged young children and their parents. The families served by Even Start programs are highly disadvantaged, with very low levels of education and income, and increasing proportions of them have limited English language skills. The Even Start program was reauthorized in the 106th Congress, in P.L. 106-554, the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2001. ESEA Title I, Part B was renamed the William F. Goodling Even Start Family Literacy Programs and was reauthorized for five years beginning with an authorization of $250 million for FY2001. The reauthorizing language is largely the same as language contained in the Literacy Involves Families Together Act, H.R. 3222 (Goodling), which was passed by the full House on September 12, 2000. However, language in H.R. 3222 specifying that religious organizations should be treated the same as other nongovernmental organizations in the awarding of subgrants was not included in the final reauthorization language. P.L. 107-110 (the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001), the Elementary and Secondary Education Act reauthorization legislation, which was signed into law on January 8, 2002, moved the William F. Goodling Even Start Family Literacy Programs from Title I Part B of the ESEA to Subpart 3 of Title I Part B of the No Child Left Behind Act and extended the authorization period through FY2007. The only change to the program was an amendment allowing states to use funds for state-level activities to improve the quality of family literacy services provided (in addition to other previously authorized uses). The Even Start program's funding was reduced to $99 million for FY2006 (including the FY2006 across-the-board reduction). For FY2007, the Administration has requested no funding for the program, the House Committee on Appropriations has recommended $70 million in funding for the program, and the Senate Committee on Appropriations has recommended no funding for the program.",36,36 "V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Program. The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter and flies forward like an airplane. Department of Defense plans call for procuring a total of 458 V-22s, including 360 MV-22s for the Marine Corps, 50 CV-22 special operations variants for U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM (funded jointly by the Air Force and USSOCOM), and 48 HV-22s for the Navy. Through FY2012, a total of 282 V-22s have been procured—241 MV-22s for the Marine Corps and 41 CV-22s for USSOCOM. These totals include several V-22s that have been procured in recent years through supplemental appropriations bills. V-22s are currently procured under a $10.4 billion, multiyear procurement arrangement covering the period FY2008-FY2012. The proposed FY2013 budget requests about $1.2 billion in procurement and advance procurement funding for procurement of 17 MV-22s, and about $309.2 million in procurement and advance procurement funding for procurement of 4 CV-22s. For FY2013, the V-22 program poses a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including whether to approve a follow-on multiyear procurement contract and the aircraft's readiness rates, reliability and maintainability, and operational suitability. FY2012 defense authorization bills: The conference report accompanying H.R. 1540, H.Rept. 112-329, authorized $2.2 billion in Aircraft Procurement, Navy, for the V–22. Compared to the request, the report cut $15 million for ""support funding carryover"" and $10.5 million to ""reduce ECO"" (engineering change orders.) The request for $84.0 million in advance procurement was reduced by $20.24 million for ""advance procurement equipment cost growth."" The request for $60.3 million in support equipment was reduced by $2.5 million for ""Deficiencies modifications other support growth"" and $2.0 million for ""Reliability modifications other support growth."" The request for $30 million in Overseas Contingency Operations funding was also reduced by $2.5 million for ""Deficiencies modifications other support growth"" and $2.0 million for ""Reliability modifications other support growth."" Overseas Contingency Operations funding was also cut by $15 million for V-22 modifications as having been funded in FY2011. Air Force V-22 R&D was cut by $7.5 million for ""Contract delay."" FY2012 DOD appropriations bills: The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference on H.R. 2055 detailed the $2.2 billion appropriated for V-22 procurement as follows: In Aircraft Procurement, Navy, reductions of $15 million for ""support funding carryover"" and $10.5 million to ""reduce ECO"" (engineering change orders.) $2.8 million was added for ""V-22 voice recorder-Navy identified shortfall."" The request for $84.0 million in advance procurement was reduced by $20.24 million for ""advance procurement equipment cost growth."" The request for $60.3 million in support equipment was reduced by $2.5 million for ""Deficiencies modifications other support growth"" and $2.0 million for ""Reliability modifications other support growth."" Air Force V-22 R&D was cut by $7.5 million for ""Slow execution/contract delay."" $15 million of modifications requested as Overseas Contingency Operations funding was cut as having been funded in FY2011.",31,31 "National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) for Law Enforcement. This report provides a brief history of how the current National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) system evolved and operates. It includes information about issues that may be of concern to Members and committees of the 107th Congress, such as whether expanding NIBIN to include new gun purchases could be construed as a step toward a national gun registry system. The report also summarizes bills introduced in the 107th Congress related to NIBIN.",97,97 "Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation: State Tax on Motor Fuels Distributed to Indian Tribal Retailers. This report discusses the U.S. Supreme Court decison, in Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation (No. 94-631), which upheld the application of a non-discriminatory Kansas motor fuels tax to gasoline sold by off-reservation distributors to Indian tribal retailers for on-reservation sales.",105,105 "Ban on Use of Polygraph Evidence Does Not Amount to Abridgement of Military Defendant's Right to Present a Defense. Military Rule of Evidence 707 excludes polygraph evidence in military trials. The Supreme Court on March 31,1998, upheld the ban, holding that it did not violate the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants. The Court also said that the military ban on the use of such evidence ""...does not unconstitutionally abridge the right to present a defense.",30,30 "WTO Compliance Status of the Conservation Security Program (CSP) and the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). Under the auspices of the Uruguay Round's Agreement on Agriculture (AA), members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed to limit and reduce their most distortive domestic support subsidies. Several types of domestic subsidies were identified as causing minimal distortion to agricultural production and trade, as identified in Annex II (the so-called Green Box) of the AA, and were provided exemption from WTO disciplines. Potential ""Green Box"" policies include outlays for conservation activities such as the Conservation Security Program and long-term land retirement programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program. Yet, certain aspects of both programs potentially are ambiguous or fall into ""gray"" zones concerning their compliance with WTO rules. This report is not a legal opinion, but describes both the CSP and CRP programs, the WTO Annex II provisions that govern compliance, and the potential issues involved in evaluating the compliance status of the two programs. The Conservation Security Program (CSP) makes payments to participating landowners who advance conservation and improvement of natural resources on tribal and private working lands. Payments are determined by the level (or tier) of participation, conservation activities completed, and acres enrolled. In FY2006, USDA spent $259 million supporting 19,375 CSP contracts covering 15.8 million acres. Federal outlays for CSP activities have yet to be notified to the WTO, however, it is likely that CSP payments will be notified as Green Box-compliant environmental program payments under paragraph 12 of Annex II. Inclusion under paragraph 12 hinges on the payments being limited to the cost of expenses incurred or income forgone in implementing conservation practices. CSP cost-share payments fit this requirement. However, other CSP payments either made in excess of costs incurred or income forgone, or made in the nature of bonus or incentive payments to induce participation, are more difficult to classify. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) compensates producers for removing environmentally sensitive, privately owned land from production for 10 years or more to conserve soil and water resources. The CRP is the federal government's largest conservation and private land retirement program. In FY2006, CRP outlays totaled $1.8 billion and covered almost 37 million enrolled acres. CRP payments for the period 1996 through 2001 have been notified to the WTO as Green Box-compliant long-term resource retirement payments under paragraph 10 of Annex II. Inclusion under paragraph 10 hinges on the payments being used to retire land from marketable agricultural production for at least three years. Use of CRP land for agricultural production (e.g., cutting hay, grazing, or biomass production) potentially could disqualify the land from Green Box eligibility for that particular year, and potentially for all years of a long-term retirement contract if the productive activity is engaged in more frequently than once every four years. A potential alternative would be to reclassify the productive use of CRP land as a type of environmental program where payments would be subject to the criteria discussed under the CSP program. This report will be updated as events warrant.",53,53 "Agriculture in the WTO: Member Spending on Domestic Support. Under the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Agreement on Agriculture (AA), member countries agreed to general rules regarding disciplines on domestic and export subsidies, and concessions on market access. This report focuses solely on the commitments made by WTO member countries concerning government outlays in support of domestic agricultural production. The three sections of the report provide a brief overview of WTO domestic policy commitments, background information on WTO member requirements for reporting on domestic subsidy outlays, WTO member outlays made to support agricultural production, and U.S. agricultural support outlays compared against spending limits. In addition, the report briefly discusses the implications for U.S. agricultural policy of continued adherence to existing WTO commitments.",4,53 "Immigration: Frequently Asked Questions about ""Public Charge"". Immigration law in the United States has long contained exclusion and removal provisions designed to limit government spending on indigent non-U.S. nationals (aliens). Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an alien may be denied admission into the United States or adjustment to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status if he or she is ""likely at any time to become a public charge."" An admitted alien may also be subject to removal from the United States based on a separate public charge ground of deportability, but this ground is rarely employed. Certain categories of aliens, such as refugees and asylees, are exempted from application of the public charge grounds. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State (DOS) have primary responsibility for implementing the INA's public charge provisions. DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration and Services may make a public charge determination when an alien applies to adjust to LPR status. Abroad, DOS consular officers may make a public charge determination when an alien applies for a visa. Although the INA does not explicitly define the term ""public charge,"" since 1999, agency guidance has defined it to mean a person who is or is likely to become ""primarily dependent"" on ""public cash assistance for income maintenance"" or ""institutionaliz[ed] for long-term care at government expense."" However, new public charge rules for DHS are expected to be published in the Federal Register, according to the Unified Agenda of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In addition, in January 2018, DOS revised the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) to instruct consular officers to consider a wider range of public benefits when determining whether visa applicants who have received or are currently receiving benefits are inadmissible on public charge grounds. This report provides answers to frequently asked questions about current public charge policy, including the sources of laws that govern public charge determinations, who is subject to determinations, factors that are considered in determinations, and the consequences of determinations.",76,76 "Kosovo's Future Status and U.S. Policy. This report discusses the issue of Kosovo's future status, that is, whether it should become an independent country, or have some form of autonomy within Serbia.",85,85 "Medicaid Issues for the 109th Congress. Medicaid is jointly financed by the federal and state governments, but each state designs and administers its own state program under broad federal guidelines. Accordingly, state variation in eligibility, covered services, and the delivery of, and reimbursement for, services is the rule rather than the exception. How is Congress to respond to the numerous proposals to move Medicaid forward into the near and long term? This report lays out some of these issues, explains the factors underlying them, and provides links to CRS products that can help Members of Congress and their staff prepare to discuss Medicaid's role today and into the future.",70,70 "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent discussions of religious extremism have called attention to Islamic puritanical movements known as Wahhabism and Salafiyya. Al Qaeda leaders and their ideological supporters have advocated a violent message that some suggest is rooted in these conservative Islamic traditions. Other observers have accused Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Wahhabism, of having disseminated religious ideology that promotes hatred and violence, targeting the United States and its allies. Saudi officials strenuously deny these allegations. This report provides a background on these traditions and their relationship to active terrorist groups, it also summarizes recent charges and responses, including the findings of the final report of the 9/11 Commission and relevant legislation in the 110th Congress. The report will be updated to reflect major developments. Related CRS products include CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M. Blanchard, CRS Report RL32499, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues, by Christopher M. Blanchard, CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, CRS Report RS21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background, by Christopher M. Blanchard, and CRS Report RL31718, Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M. Blanchard.",86,86 "Miscellaneous Tariff Bills: Overview and Issues for Congress. U.S. importers often request that Members of Congress introduce bills seeking to temporarily suspend or reduce tariffs on certain imports. The rationale for these requests is that they cut costs for U.S manufacturers, thus enabling them to hire more workers, invest in research and development, and reduce costs for consumers. In recent congressional practice, the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, the committees of jurisdiction over tariffs, have combined individual duty suspension bills and other technical trade provisions into larger pieces of legislation known as miscellaneous tariff (or trade) bills (MTBs). When Members introduce bills, they must also file disclosure forms indicating that they have no economic interest in the entity requesting the suspension. Before inclusion in an MTB, the individual bills are reviewed by the trade subcommittee staff in each of the relevant committees, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), and executive branch agencies to ensure that they are noncontroversial (generally, that no domestic producer, Member, or government agency objects), relatively revenue-neutral (revenue loss due to the duty suspension of no more than $500,000 per product), and are able to be administered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). All bills, bill reports, and disclosure forms are also placed on committee websites for public comment. Duty suspensions in MTBs are only available for a limited time (generally, three years from the date of enactment), and if no subsequent MTB legislation is passed, the duty-free or reduced duty status of the products expires. Expired duty suspensions must be re-introduced to be included in new MTB legislation, and in most cases, the favorable duty status is not retroactively renewed. The last enacted MTB expired on December 31, 2012. This MTB, the United States Manufacturing Enhancement Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-227), suspended entirely or reduced duties on over 600 products. Since legislative attempts to pass an additional MTB extending the duty suspension on these products were not successful, currently, duties must be paid on these products, most of which are inputs in various U.S. manufactured products. Additional MTB legislation was introduced in the 112th Congress (H.R. 6727) and 113th Congress (H.R. 2708), but neither bill was taken up in either the House or the Senate, possibly due to controversy over whether MTB legislation violated House and Senate rules on congressionally directed spending. The Trade Facilitation and Enforcement Act of 2015, P.L. 114-125, enacted on February 24, 2016, included a sense of Congress that urged the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees to ""advance, as soon as possible, after consultation with the public and Members of the Senate and House of Representatives, a regular and predictable legislative process for the temporary suspension and reduction of duties that is consistent with the rules of the Senate and of the House."" Some in Congress propose changing the MTB process by requiring an agency outside Congress, such as the ITC, to receive petitions and vet products for duty suspensions. Bills supporting this approach have been introduced in 114th Congress (S. 2794, H.R. 4923). Thus, Congress may discuss a procedure to change the MTB process in the second session of the 114th Congress. This report provides recent developments regarding the proposed MTB process, and compares this proposal for vetting MTBs with the existing review process. It also tracks the current proposal and provides information on MTB legislation introduced from the 109th to the 113th Congresses. Legislation and House and Senate rules covering ""earmarks"" and ""limited tariff benefits"" that may affect the current MTB debate are also discussed. The report also presents issues for Congress.",52,52 "Bioterrorism: Summary of a CRS/National Health Policy Forum Seminar on Federal, State, and Local Public Health Preparedness. The September 11th attack and subsequent intentional release of anthrax spores via the U.S. postal system have focused policymakers' attention on the preparedness and response capability of the nation's public health system. The anthrax attacks put a tremendous strain on the U. S. public health infrastructure, an infrastructure that many experts argue has been weakened by years of neglect and under-funding. To better understand the preparedness gaps that exist, as well as the disparate functions and agencies that define public health in this country, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), in conjunction with George Washington University's National Health Policy Forum (NHPF), convened a seminar on October 26, 2001, entitled, The U.S. Health Care System: Are State and Local Officials Prepared for Bioterrorism? How Should the Federal Government Assist?",22,22 "Cost-Benefit Analysis and Financial Regulator Rulemaking. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the federal rulemaking process is the systematic examination, estimation, and comparison of the potential economic costs and benefits resulting from the promulgation of a new rule. Agencies with rulemaking authority implement regulations that carry the force of law. While this system allows technical rules to be designed by experts that are to some degree insulated from political considerations, it also results in rules being implemented by executive branch staff that arguably are not directly accountable to the electorate. One method for Congress to increase accountability is to require the regulators to conduct analyses of likely effects of proposed regulations. In this way, an agency demonstrates that it gave reasoned consideration to the effects of the proposed rules. CBA is an important type of such analysis, as comparing costs and benefits can be useful in determining whether or not a regulation is beneficial. However, performing CBA can be a difficult and time-consuming process, and it produces uncertain results because it involves making assumptions about future outcomes. Some observers argue that financial regulation CBA is particularly challenging. This raises questions about what parameters and level of detail agencies should be required to include in their CBA. While most federal regulatory agencies are directed by Executive Order 12866 and Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4 in their performance of CBAs, financial regulators are generally not subject to these directives. Financial regulators are statutorily required to perform certain CBA: requirements such as the Paperwork Reduction Act (P.L. 104-13) and Regulatory Flexibility Act (P.L. 96-354) generally apply to all financial regulators, financial regulators that regulate the banking system are subject to requirements set out in the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act (P.L. 103-325), and agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB,) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) face requirements specific to them. However, the requirements facing individual financial regulators generally allow them to perform analysis under less specific instruction than is contained in the requirements that are cited above and apply to nonindependent regulatory agencies. Whether the requirements facing financial regulators should allow for this discretion is a contentious issue. Some observers assert that financial regulators should maintain a relatively high degree of discretion over when and how to conduct CBA. They argue that characteristics of the financial industry and regulation make CBAs in this area especially uncertain and contestable, and assert that financial regulation effects depend entirely on human and market reactions, finance plays a central role in a huge, complex economic system, and financial regulations' effects are more likely (relative to other types of regulation) to include transfers between groups not well accounted for in net measurements. They further argue that requisite CBAs that are uncertain and contestable are more likely to disguise agency discretion as objective fact and provide the opportunity for interested parties to challenge socially beneficial regulation with their own subjective, self-interested analyses. Other observers assert that financial regulators should face more stringent requirements than they currently do. They refute claims that financial CBAs are necessarily more uncertain or contestable than in other areas. Also, they argue that tools and techniques would be developed to overcome challenges if CBAs were required. They further argue that even uncertain and contestable CBAs are effective in disciplining agencies because they create transparency of the agency's evaluations of proposed regulations and allow for outside assessment of that evaluation. Recent Congresses have been active on this issue, and the House has passed several bills in the 115th Congress that would increase CBA requirements. Recent proposals would affect either all regulators including financial regulators, financial regulators as a group, or individual financial regulators.",56,56 "The Statutory PAYGO Process for Budget Enforcement: 1991-2002. ""Pay-as-you-go"" (PAYGO) procedures play an important role in enforcing budget policies with respect to the consideration of revenue and direct spending legislation. Generally, the purpose of PAYGO procedures is to discourage or prevent the enactment of legislation that would cause, or increase, a deficit or reduce a surplus in the federal budget. PAYGO procedures are not a comprehensive means of budget enforcement because they do not apply to discretionary spending, which is provided in annual appropriations acts, such spending is subject to other enforcement procedures. Further, PAYGO rules deal only with the budgetary impact of legislation considered by Congress, they do not address changes in direct spending and revenue levels under current law stemming from changes in the economy, demographic trends, and other factors. Over the years, several different PAYGO procedures have been used for budget enforcement purposes. The PAYGO procedures have been based in statute as well as congressional rules. Statutory and rules-based PAYGO procedures have been in effect simultaneously at times, while at other times only one form of PAYGO procedures was in effect. This report examines the statutory PAYGO process that was in effect from 1991 through 2002, beginning with a discussion of the complex and evolving budget enforcement framework of which it was an important part. The report continues with an explanation of the origin, extension, and termination of the PAYGO process, a review of its regular operation and statutory interventions in that operation involving directed scorekeeping, and an identification of major direct spending and revenue legislation subject to the PAYGO process. It concludes with a brief discussion of proposals to restore the PAYGO process. The statutory PAYGO process was established in 1990 as Section 252 of an underlying law, the 1985 Balanced Budget Act. As extended in 1993 and 1997, the PAYGO process applied to legislation enacted through the end of FY2002, but it covered the effects of such legislation through FY2006. The PAYGO process was effectively terminated in December 2002 by the enactment of P.L. 107-312, which set all remaining balances on the PAYGO scorecard to zero. Under the PAYGO process, if the OMB director determined that there was a positive balance for a fiscal year on the PAYGO scorecard, then the President was required to issue a sequestration order implementing across-the-board cuts in nonexempt direct spending to eliminate the balance. The OMB director issued 12 final sequestration reports under the PAYGO process, for FY1992-FY2003. The final balances on the PAYGO scorecard for all years were either negative amounts (reflecting net savings) or zero. Accordingly, no PAYGO sequester was required for any fiscal year during this period. While the OMB director's final determinations indicated compliance with the PAYGO requirement in all years, in some cases the balances reflected adjustments due to emergency requirements, provided for under the process, or directed scorekeeping provisions in law that intervened in the normal operation of the process in order to prevent a sequester. Emergency designations and directed scorekeeping provisions sometimes involved amounts ranging from tens of billions to more than one hundred billion dollars for a year. This report will be updated as developments warrant.",101,101 "Federal Prize Competitions. Prize competitions are a tool for incentivizing the achievement of scientific and technological innovation by offering monetary and nonmonetary benefits (e.g., recognition) to competition participants. Prize competitions have a long history of use in both the public and private sectors, but have gained popularity in recent years. Experts view federal prize competitions as an alternative policy instrument for spurring innovation, not a substitute for more traditional methods of federal support for research and innovation such as competitive research grants and procurement contracts. The use of prize competitions by the federal government has increased significantly since the passage of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-358). P.L. 111-358 encouraged the use of prize competitions by providing the head of any federal agency with the authority to carry out prize competitions that have the potential to stimulate innovation and advance the agency's mission. Congress has also provided various federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Health and Human Services, with additional authority to conduct prize competitions. The United States General Services Administration estimates that since 2010 federal agencies have conducted more than 840 prize competitions and offered more than $280 million in prize money. While the total amount of prize money offered by federal prize competitions conducted under P.L. 111-358 has increased over time—from $247,000 in FY2011 to over $30 million in FY2016—the median amount of prize money offered per prize has remained relatively steady—$34,500 in FY2011 compared to $41,590 in FY2016. According to the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, prize competitions benefit the federal government by allowing federal agencies to (1) pay only for success, (2) establish ambitious goals and shift technological and other risks to prize participants, (3) increase the number and diversity of individuals, organizations, and teams tackling a problem, including those who have not previously received federal funding, (4) increase cost effectiveness, stimulate private-sector investment, and maximize the return on taxpayer dollars, and (5) motivate and inspire the public to tackle scientific, technical, and societal problems. Despite an increase in the use of federal prize competitions, there is limited information on their effectiveness and impact in spurring innovation and providing other potential benefits to the federal government. Members of Congress may wish to examine the ability of prize competitions to spur innovation in comparison to more traditional policy tools (e.g., grants and contracts), the cost effectiveness of prize competitions, the metrics federal agencies are using to evaluate the success of federal prize competitions, and the capability of federal agencies to appropriately design and administer prize competitions.",111,48 "Common Questions About Federal Records and Related Agency Requirements. Federal departments and agencies create federal records in the course of their daily operations. Congress first enacted the Federal Records Act (FRA, 44 U.S.C. Chapters 21, 29, 31, and 33) in 1950. Congress deemed federal records worthy of preservation for their ""informational value,"" and also because they document ""the transaction of public business"" and the ""organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government."" The FRA requires executive branch departments and agencies to collect, retain, and preserve—or dispose of—these records. This report provides an introduction to federal records. It describes the scope and requirements of the FRA and its associated regulations. Among the questions this report addresses are the following What is a federal record? What is not a federal record? Which agencies are required to comply with the Federal Records Act? How do agencies transfer or dispose of federal records? This report includes amendments to the Federal Records Act made by the Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014 (P.L. 113-187). The law, enacted on November 26, 2014, amends the FRA by, among other things, modifying the definition of federal record and clarifying the Archivist's role as the final determinant of whether certain materials qualify as a federal record. This report focuses on federal recordkeeping laws, regulations, and policies. This report does not address the recordkeeping requirements of Congress, the Supreme Court, the President, or the Architect of the Capitol. Additional information on presidential records is available in CRS Report R40238, The Presidential Records Act: Background and Recent Issues for Congress, by Wendy Ginsberg. This report will be updated at the beginning of each new Congress or in the event of significant legislative activity.",56,56 "Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works Program: Issues for the 109th Congress. This report presents the issues considered by the 109th Congress related to the civil works program of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). The Corps plans, constructs, and operates water resources facilities primarily for flood control, navigation, and environmental purposes.",108,32 "Committee System Rules Changes in the House, 108th Congress. This fact sheet details changes in the committee system contained in H.Res. 5, the rules of the House for the 108th Congress, adopted by the House January 7, 2003. (1) The fact sheet will not be updated unless further rules changes for the 108th Congress are adopted. 1. The resolution agreed to by the House, H.Res. 5 also changed the rules affecting floor procedure. These changes are described in CRS Report RS21388(pdf), House Rules Changes Affecting Floor Proceedings in the 108th Congress. The resolution also made technical and grammatical changes to the House rules.",55,55 "Foreign Surveillance and the Future of Standing to Sue Post-Clapper. Recent news accounts (and government responses to those news accounts) have indicated that the government is reportedly engaged in a surveillance program that gathers vast amounts of data, including records regarding the phone calls, emails, and Internet usage of millions of individuals. The disclosures to the media reportedly suggest that specific telecommunication companies have been required to disclose certain data to the government as part of the intelligence community's surveillance efforts. The recent controversy over the reports of government targeting efforts comes months after the Supreme Court ruled in a case called Clapper v. Amnesty International. In Clapper, the Court dismissed a facial constitutional challenge to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act on constitutional standing grounds. Specifically, the Clapper court found that the litigants, a group of attorneys and human rights activists who argued that their communications with clients could be the target of foreign intelligence surveillance, could not demonstrate they would suffer a future injury that was ""certainly impending,"" the requirement the majority of the Court found to be necessary to establish constitutional standing when asking a court to prevent a future injury. Notwithstanding the Clapper decision, in light of the recent revelations about the government's intelligence gathering methods, several lawsuits have been filed by individuals who are customers of the companies allegedly subject to court orders requiring the disclosure of data to the government. The litigants in these newly filed lawsuits would appear to have a stronger argument for how they have been injured than the plaintiffs in Clapper did. Notably, unlike the Clapper plaintiffs, the litigants in these new lawsuits have evidence that the government is actually using its authority to gather data that is pertinent to the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs in these lawsuits may still have significant difficulties in establishing standing, as they have arguably not alleged that they have been specifically targeted by the government or injured in any concrete and particularized way by the government's conduct. Moreover, gathering evidence to prove an injury will be difficult because of evidentiary privileges protecting the government information. As a consequence, litigation challenging the government surveillance programs that are the topic of recent media accounts may have the same difficulties found in the Clapper litigation.",19,19 "Veterans' Health Care Issues. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides services and benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. VA carries out its programs nationwide through three administrations and the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA). The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is responsible for veterans' health care programs. The Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) is responsible for providing compensation, pensions, and education assistance, among other things. The National Cemetery Administration's (NCA) responsibilities include maintaining national veterans cemeteries. VHA operates the nation's largest integrated health care system. Unlike most other federal health programs, VHA is a direct service provider rather than a health insurer or payer for health care. VA health care services are generally available to all honorably discharged veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces who are enrolled in VA's health care system. VA has a priority enrollment system that places veterans in priority groups based on various criteria. Under the priority system, VA decides each year whether its appropriations are adequate to serve all enrolled veterans. If not, VA could stop enrolling those in the lowest-priority groups. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. Armed Forces have been deployed in two major theaters of operation. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) constitute the largest sustained ground combat mission undertaken by the United States since the Vietnam War. Veterans from these conflicts and from previous wars are exerting tremendous stress on the VA health care system. With increased patient workload and rising health care costs, the 110th Congress is focused on such issues as how to contain costs and at the same time maintain high-quality health care services to veterans who need them. Among other things, Congress may address the best method of funding for veterans' health care, while continuing to focus on ensuring a ""seamless transition"" process for servicemembers moving from the military health system into the VA health care system, improving mental health care services for veterans with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and improving rehabilitation and mental health services for those with Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBI). In recent years, VA has made an effort to realign its capital assets, primarily its buildings, to better serve veterans' needs. VA established the Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES) initiative to identify how well the geographic distribution of VA health care resources matches the projected needs of veterans. Given the tremendous interest in the implementation of the CARES initiative in the previous Congress, the 110th Congress will likely continue to monitor the CARES implementation. H.R. 327 was enacted into law (P.L. 110-110) on November 5. The House has passed several measures to improve and expand health care services to veterans: H.R. 327, H.R. 612, H.R. 1315, H.R. 1470, H.R. 2199, H.R. 2623, and H.R. 2874. The Senate VA Committee has reported the following measures: S. 1233, S. 2004, S. 2142, S. 2160, and S. 2162. This report will be updated as legislative activities warrant.",70,70 "Independent Evaluators of Federal Programs: Approaches, Devices, and Examples. Congress and the executive, as well as outside organizations, have long been attentive to the evaluation of federal programs, with frequent interest paid to the independent status of the evaluator. This interest continues into the current era, with numerous illustrations of the multi-faceted approaches adopted and proposed. An evaluation may provide information at any stage of the policy process about how a federal government policy, program, activity, or agency is working. Congress has required evaluations through legislation (or requested these via its committee and Member offices), and the executive branch has pursued evaluations through presidential or agency directives. Part of choosing how to carry out an evaluation involves deciding if some kind of ""independence"" would be a desirable attribute. Observers often see independence as a means of avoiding or deterring bias and ensuring an objective, impartial assessment. In the context of evaluation, independence may apply to an evaluation or to an evaluator. On one hand, for example, the term may relate to independence of an evaluation from the policy preferences of an individual or group (""independent evaluation""), perhaps by prohibiting political appointees from revising or evaluating a program. Independence may refer to an entity that conducts evaluations that also is located outside the immediate organization responsible for policy implementation (""independent evaluator""). There is some diversity of opinion regarding the definition of independence and how it might be ensured. For example, an evaluator's ""external"" status, outside the organization that is implementing a program, does not necessarily equate with independence. Nor would an evaluator's ""internal"" status, inside the implementing organization, necessarily equate with a lack of independence for an evaluation (e.g., if an expert panel reviewed the internally produced evaluation for bias). There is varying opinion concerning when independence is necessary, or possibly counterproductive, and what value it may bring. The differences of opinion among definitions and perceived need notwithstanding, instances of independent program evaluators appear to be growing in number and variety at the federal level. This report focuses on examples of independent evaluators (IEs): when an evaluation is to be conducted by an entity outside the immediate organization that is responsible for policy implementation, and the entity also is intended to have one or more dimensions of independence. IEs and similar constructs, however, vary across a number of characteristics and attributes: structure, jurisdiction, authority, resources, length of tenure, and specific duties and responsibilities. These differences, in turn, could affect their capabilities, effectiveness, and assistance to others, including their contributions to the oversight of a program or project by Congress and the executive branch. After an overview of such entities—which encompass new units created specifically for conducting an evaluation as well as existing ones, such as the Government Accountability Office and offices of the inspectors general—this report suggests possible broad characteristics and criteria of independent evaluators or similar units, which could be valuable in oversight or legislative endeavors. The Appendix describes a number of such offices—past, present, and proposed—along with citations to relevant official documents and other materials for each example (public laws, legislative proposals, executive branch directives, and secondary analyses). This report will be updated as conditions warrant.",56,56 "Bosnia and Kosovo: U.S. Military Operations. With the on-going requirements of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the continuing peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans have come under congressional scrutiny to determine whether or not they could be safely reduced or terminated. This report examines the history and current status of U.S. military operations in the Balkans, and will be updated as events warrant. In Paris on December 14, 1995, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the peace settlement negotiated in Dayton, OH (Dayton Accords). The United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1031 authorized the NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) for one year. On December 12, 1996, the Security Council authorized a follow-on force, dubbed the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This authorization has been renewed annually. In March 1998, the NATO allies agreed that SFOR will remain in Bosnia until significant progress has been made in the implementation of the Dayton Accords. SFOR is now a force of about 12,000 troops. The U.S. contingent has been about 1,800. It will be reduced to 800 by summer 2004, and probably withdrawn by 2005 when the European Union is expected to take over peacekeeping duties from NATO. U.S. forces have suffered no fatal casualties from hostile action in Bosnia. SFOR continues the mission of monitoring and enforcing demilitarized zones and weapon cantonment. These efforts have been credited a success. NATO commanders have lent assistance to civilian authorities in their efforts to create a stable political environment (e.g., detaining war crimes suspects, and providing support for elections and limited assistance for refugees). In Kosovo, with the failure of peace talks on March 24, 1999 NATO began Operation Allied Force airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. In June Yugoslavia accepted a peace proposal and signed a military-technical agreement with NATO providing for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and turning military control of the province over to NATO's peacekeeping forces (KFOR). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 endorsed the peace settlement and ""an international security presence with substantial NATO participation."" It is expected that NATO forces will remain in Kosovo until its political status is resolved. KFOR totals about 20,000 troops in Kosovo, with the United States contributing about 2,100 troops. The U.S. has suffered no casualties from hostile action. Congress has appropriated approximately $23.5 billion for Bosnia and Kosovo operations from FY1992 through FY2004. Congressional concerns have focused on the impact of Balkan operations on 1) military readiness and the ability to maintain military operations in Iraq, 2) whether there has been an equitable distribution of responsibilities among the NATO allies and 3) if the United States needs to participate in Balkan peacekeeping operations at all.",21,21 "Congressional Redistricting Law: Background and Recent Court Rulings. In addition to various state processes, the legal framework for congressional redistricting involves constitutional and federal statutory requirements. Interpreting these requirements, in a series of cases and evolving jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued rulings that have significantly shaped how congressional districts are drawn and the degree to which challenges to redistricting plans may succeed. As the 2020 round of redistricting approaches, foundational and recent rulings by the Court regarding redistricting are likely to be of particular interest to Congress. This report analyzes key Supreme Court and lower court redistricting decisions addressing four general topics: (1) the constitutional requirement of population equality among districts, (2) the intersection between the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause (3) the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering, and (4) the constitutionality of state ballot initiatives providing for redistricting by independent commissions. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to require that each congressional district within a state contain approximately an equal number of persons. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the ""equality standard"" or the principle of ""one person, one vote."" In several cases, the Supreme Court has described the extent to which population equality among districts is required. For congressional districts, less deviation from precise equality has been held by the Court to be permissible than is permissible for state legislative districts. In addition, congressional districts are required to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which prohibits any voting qualification or practice that results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a language minority. This includes congressional redistricting plans. Under certain circumstances, the VRA may require the creation of one or more ""majority-minority"" districts, in which a racial or language minority group comprises a voting majority. However, under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, if race is the predominant factor in the drawing of district lines, then a ""strict scrutiny"" standard of review applies. To withstand strict scrutiny in this context, the state must demonstrate that it had a compelling governmental interest in creating a majority-minority district and the redistricting plan was narrowly tailored to further that compelling interest. These cases are often referred to as ""racial gerrymandering"" claims because the plaintiffs argue that race was improperly used in the drawing of district boundaries. Much of the Supreme Court's redistricting jurisprudence has been triggered by disputes involving the intersection between requirements under the VRA and the constitutional standards of equal protection. For example, during its current term, the Court has decided one case regarding the degree to which racial considerations are permitted to impact how district lines are drawn and is considering another such case. While racial gerrymandering claims have been a recent focus of litigation, the Supreme Court is also currently considering an appeal of a case involving partisan gerrymandering. In February 2017, a state appealed a three-judge federal district court ruling that invalidated a redistricting map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. This case presents the Court with an opportunity to establish a standard for determining what constitutes unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. While leaving open the possibility that such claims may be justiciable (that is, within the scope of judicial review), to date, the Supreme Court has yet not decided on a standard for assessing such claims. Finally, a 2015 Supreme Court ruling held that the Elections Clause of the Constitution permits states to create nonpartisan independent redistricting commissions for congressional redistricting by ballot initiatives and referenda. If more states adopt similar laws, it could change the process of congressional redistricting nationwide.",20,20 "The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A Legal Analysis. In the wake of the worst U.S. financial crisis since the Great Depression, Congress passed and the President signed into law sweeping reforms of the financial services regulatory system through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), P.L. 111-203. Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFP Act). The CFP Act establishes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or Bureau) within the Federal Reserve System (FRS) with rulemaking, enforcement, and supervisory powers over many consumer financial products and services, as well as the entities that sell them. The CFP Act substantially, though not completely, consolidates in the CFPB federal consumer protection powers that previously were held by seven other regulators. It has the authority to write rules to implement a broad array of federal consumer financial protection laws, as well as most consumer compliance supervisory and enforcement powers over larger depositories. However, the CFPB did not acquire from the banking regulators the primary supervisory and enforcement powers over smaller depositories. The Bureau also wields new federal consumer financial protection powers to regulate nondepository financial institutions, which previously were largely unregulated at the federal level. However, the CFP Act wholly exempts certain nondepository financial institutions from the Bureau's regulatory reach and curtails the CPFB's authority to regulate others. Although the powers that the CFPB has at its disposal are largely the same or analogous to those that other federal regulators have held for decades, there is a great deal of uncertainty in how the new agency will exercise these broad and flexible authorities, especially in light of its almost exclusive focus on consumer protection and the novel expansion of federal oversight to nondepository financial institutions. This uncertainty has some anxious that the Bureau, in the name of protecting consumers, may excessively restrict consumer credit and unduly increase regulatory costs. As the Bureau continues to exercise its authorities, policy makers will have a performance record on which to evaluate how the CFP Act is working and whether amendments might improve consumer protections, increase access to credit markets, reduce the costs of consumer financial products and services, or reduce compliance costs. The 113th Congress has been actively involved in conducting oversight of the implementation of the CFP Act. The 113th Congress also has considered bills that would either eliminate the CFPB altogether or significantly alter the structure of the Bureau by, for example, making the CFPB's primary funding subject to the traditional appropriations process, converting the CFPB's leadership structure from a sole directorship to a commission, or allowing the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to overturn CFPB-issued regulations with a simple majority vote, as opposed to the current supermajority vote. This report provides an overview of the regulatory structure of consumer finance under existing federal law before the Dodd-Frank Act went into effect and examines arguments for modifying the regime in order to more effectively regulate consumer financial markets. It then analyzes how the CFP Act changes that legal structure, with a focus on the Bureau's organization, the entities and activities that fall (and do not fall) under the Bureau's supervisory, enforcement, and rulemaking authorities, the Bureau's general and specific rulemaking powers and procedures, and the Bureau's funding.",8,8 "Deeming Resolutions: Budget Enforcement in the Absence of a Budget Resolution. The budget resolution reflects an agreement between the House and Senate on a budgetary plan for the upcoming fiscal year. When the House and Senate do not reach final agreement on this plan, it may be more difficult for Congress to reach agreement on subsequent budgetary legislation, both within each chamber and between the chambers. In the absence of agreement on a budget resolution, Congress may employ alternative legislative tools to serve as a substitute for a budget resolution. These substitutes are typically referred to as ""deeming resolutions,"" because they are deemed to serve in place of an annual budget resolution for the purposes of establishing enforceable budget levels for the upcoming fiscal year. Since the creation of the budget resolution, there have been nine years in which Congress did not come to agreement on a budget resolution. In each of those years, one or both chambers employed at least one deeming resolution to serve as a substitute for a budget resolution. While referred to as deeming resolutions, such mechanisms are not formally defined and have no specifically prescribed content. Instead, they simply denote the House and Senate, often separately, engaging legislative procedures to deal with enforcement issues on an ad hoc basis. As described below, the mechanisms can vary significantly in content and timing. This report covers the use of deeming resolutions pertaining to fiscal years for which the House and Senate did not agree on a budget resolution. The House and Senate ultimately agreed to a budget resolution for FY2017, and so data pertaining to FY2017 is not included in this report. It may be of interest, however, that the appropriations process for FY2017 moved forward even without agreement on a budget resolution. For the Senate, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74) included a provision directing the Senate Budget Committee chair to file levels in the Congressional Record that would be enforceable in the Senate as if they had been included in a budget resolution for FY2017. On April 18, 2016, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Enzi filed such levels. No such provision was included for the House. In the absence of any such enforceable levels, the House Appropriations Committee adopted ""interim 302(b) sub-allocations"" for some individual appropriations bills. Such levels did not act as an enforceable cap on appropriations measures when they were considered on the floor. A separate House rule, however, prohibited floor amendments that would increase spending in a general appropriations bill, effectively creating a cap on individual appropriations bills when they were considered on the floor.",55,101 "Ethical Considerations in Assisting Constituents With Grant Requests Before Federal Agencies. There is no inherent ethical problem with a Member's office assisting constituents and constituent organizations with the procedures and applications for federal grants. Although in most instances such assistance would involve the provision and distribution of grant information to constituents and constituent groups, it is possible that on occasion, if the office deems it appropriate, the office may contact a federal agency to express interest in and support of the grant application. In conducting such assistance, three general areas of ethical considerations should be noted In prioritizing grant assistance requests, and deciding whether and at what level assistance is to be provided, Member offices should consider generally the overall ""public interest"" and the potential public benefits of the proposal or project. One factor that should not be considered is whether or not the constituent or the organization has supported the Member financially with campaign contributions, and no such ""linkage"" should be made either internally or overtly. If it is decided that a proposal has particular merit, or would be particularly beneficial to the community, the office may contact an agency to express interest in the proposal, and may even advocate for the grant proposal. It should be remembered, however, that the administrative agency has the final decision on the matter, and that the awarding of grants is generally a competitive process in which the agency decision is to be made on the merits of the proposal and not on political considerations. It is considered an abuse of a Member's representational role to threaten agency officials, or to make promises to the agency, in an effort to gain administrative action. After official assistance is given to a constituent or a constituent group, the Member and the staff should not receive personally anything of value from the group or person as a ""thank you,"" ""in appreciation of,"" or otherwise as a payment for the official duties performed on its behalf.",61,61 Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Legislative Issues. This report discusses the ongoing debate about whether or not to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) for energy development. The report discusses arguments for and against such development and focuses especially on related pieces of legislation that directly affects the future of the ANWR.,47,47 "Assessing the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG): In Brief. On January 5, 2012, President Obama announced a new defense strategy entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, and commonly referred to as the defense strategic guidance or DSG. The DSG was significant at the time because it was explicitly intended to reshape future Department of Defense (DOD) priorities, activities, and budget requests for the following decade. That reshaping meant, in part, reducing defense spending by about $487 billion over 10 years, to meet the initial budget caps set in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. And it meant in part refining DODs 10-year strategic outlook in response to changes in the global security environment and the end of the decade of warfare that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The DSG is significant now, in 2013, because it is still intended to serve as the strategic foundation for further DOD policy and resource decision-making, under tighter fiscal constraints. By all accounts, the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR), conducted by DOD at the direction of Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel during spring 2013, adopted the DSG as its baseline and tested options for cutting costs against the impact such steps might have on DODs ability to execute that defense strategy. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which is statutorily mandated to be conducted in 2013, with a report based on the review due to Congress in February 2014, is also expected to be based broadly on the premises of the DSG. Importantly, the DSG did not account for the possibility of sequestrationfurther significant, across-the-board cuts triggered by the BCA. At the time the DSG was issued, defense officials stated that, were they directed to find an additional $500 billion in cuts, the guidance would not apply, and DOD would have to shed missions and commitments and capabilities that we believe are necessary to protect core U.S. national security interests. This year, discussing the outcome of the SCMR, senior DOD officials argued that sequester-level budget cuts would break some parts of the defense strategy as reflected in the DSG, and that an in-between approach, half-way between sequester-level cuts and the Presidents budget request, would bend the strategy. Some observers have wondered whether the next step should be further evaluating the risks posed to the execution of the strategy by proposed spending cuts, or whether the next step should be, instead, reconsidering the objectives and priorities of the strategy itself in the context of tighter fiscal constraints. Of course, one might explore both of those approaches simultaneously. This CRS report highlights and analyzes key strategic-level issues raised by the DSG.",32,32 "Capital Punishment: An Overview of Federal Death Penalty Statutes. With the passage of P.L. 103-322, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 the federal death penalty became available as a possible punishment for a substantial number of new and existing civilian offenses. On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 made further modifications and additions to the list of federal capital crimes. On June 25 2002, P.L. 107-197, the Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2002, added another capital crime to the United States Code. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, enacted December 17, 2004, included provisions which impacted or expanded some of the existing death penalty provisions. This report lists the current federal capital offenses and summarizes the procedures for federal civilian death penalty cases.",94,94 "The House Agriculture Committee's 2018 Farm Bill (H.R. 2): A Side-by-Side Comparison with Current Law. Congress sets national food and agriculture policy through periodic omnibus farm bills. The 115th Congress has the opportunity to establish the future direction of farm and food policy because many of the provisions in the current farm bill (the Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) expire in 2018. The 2014 farm bill addresses a broad range of farm and food programs and policies, including commodity support, crop insurance, conservation, domestic food assistance, trade and food aid, credit, rural development, research, horticulture, forestry, and bioenergy, among others. On June 21, 2018, the House voted 213-211 to approve H.R. 2, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018, an omnibus farm bill that would establish farm and food policy for the next five years, covering FY2019-FY2023. The vote to approve H.R. 2 followed a failed vote of 198-213 on the same bill on May 18, 2018. The final passage vote of June 21 occurred after a vote of 233-191 approving a motion to reconsider, which was made following the unsuccessful vote on final passage of May 18. In terms of cost, the most recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) score of the programs in the bill with mandatory spending, such as nutrition programs, commodity support programs, major conservation programs, and crop insurance, amounts to $867 billion over a 10-year budget window (FY2019-FY2028). This amount is equivalent to CBO's baseline scenario in which existing farm bill programs would be extended with no changes. H.R. 2 would reauthorize most existing programs for five years through FY2023. Overall, the bill provides continuity with the existing framework of farm and food programs even as it modifies numerous programs, alters the amount and type of program funding certain programs receive, and exercises the committee's discretion not to reauthorize others. Among its many policy provisions, H.R. 2 would make changes to the eligibility requirements for individuals participating in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), including expanding the population that is subject to work requirements, while requiring states to offer employment or training opportunities and increasing funding to the states for those purposes. Among the changes to commodity programs, an escalator provision could raise the effective reference price for crops enrolled in the Price Loss Coverage program (PLC) under certain market conditions. H.R. 2 would also amend payment limits and the adjusted gross income limit on eligibility for farm program payments to expand the list of producer exemptions from payment and income limits. Payment limits on certain disaster assistance programs would also be raised. The Dairy Margin Protection Program for milk producers is recast as the Dairy Risk Management Program, featuring an expanded range of coverage choices and lower premium rates on the first 5 million pounds of annual milk production. Within the conservation title, H.R. 2 would repeal the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), which has an enrollment of 70 million acres, and uses some of the savings to increase funding for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). It also raises the acreage enrollment limit under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The bill further increases the loan limits for guaranteed farm ownership and operating loans. Bioenergy programs that comprise a separate title in the 2014 farm bill are included in a title on rural infrastructure and economic development. Also, while many of these bioenergy programs are currently authorized for mandatory funding in addition to being authorized for discretionary funds, H.R. 2 authorizes only discretionary funding. For rural communities, the bill authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to reprioritize certain loan and grant programs to respond to specific health emergencies and to develop prevention, treatment, and recovery services. It would also require the Secretary to promulgate minimum acceptable standards for broadband service from the present day up to 30 years into the future.",2,2 "Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process. The Department of Defense (DOD) acquires goods and services from contractors, federal arsenals, and shipyards to support military operations. Acquisition is a broad term that applies to more than just the purchase of an item or service, the acquisition process encompasses the design, engineering, construction, testing, deployment, sustainment, and disposal of weapons or related items purchased from a contractor. As set forth by statute and regulation, from concept to deployment, a weapon system must go through a three-step process of identifying a required (needed) weapon system, establishing a budget, and acquiring the system. These three steps are organized as follows The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)—for identifying requirements. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBE)—for allocating resources and budgeting. The Defense Acquisition System (DAS)—for developing and/or buying the item. The Defense Acquisition System uses ""milestones"" to oversee and manage acquisition programs. At each milestone, a program must meet specific statutory and regulatory requirements before the program can proceed to the next phase of the acquisition process. There are three milestones Milestone A—initiates technology maturation and risk reduction. Milestone B—initiates engineering and manufacturing development. Milestone C—initiates production and deployment. Both Congress and DOD have been active in trying to improve defense acquisitions. A comprehensive legislative effort to improve weapon system acquisition occurred in May 2009, when Congress passed and the President signed into law the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (S. 454/P.L. 111-23). Key provisions in the act include appointment of a Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation within DOD to establish guidance on cost estimating, appointment of a Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation, appointment of a Director of Systems Engineering, and a requirement that the Director of Defense Research and Engineering periodically assess technological maturity of Major Defense Acquisition Programs. DOD has undertaken a comprehensive effort to improve defense acquisitions, including rewriting elements of the regulatory structure that govern defense acquisitions and launching the Better Buying Power and Better Buying Power II initiatives aimed at ""implementing practices and policies designed to improve the productivity of the Department of Defense and of the industrial base."" An oversight issue for Congress is the extent to which the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act and the various DOD initiatives are having a positive effect on acquisitions, and what additional steps, if any, Congress can take to further the effort to improve defense acquisitions.",31,31 "Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2009 Appropriations. Soon after it convened, the 111th Congress initiated H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), otherwise known as the ""economic stimulus."" Passed by both chambers and enacted by President Barak Obama on February 17, 2009, the Act adds approximately $4.3 billion to the $119.6 billion regular FY2009 appropriations for military construction and veterans affairs accounts contained in Division E of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2009. The President's request for those funds and Congress' disposition of the request are discussed in this report on pp. 2 through 9, below. The balance of the report discusses those parts of the President's regular FY2009 budget request covered by the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies appropriations bill. President George W. Bush submitted his regular FY2009 appropriations request to Congress on February 4, 2008, including $115.3 billion for programs covered in the regular Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies appropriations bill: $24.4 billion for Title I (military construction and family housing), $90.8 billion for Title II (veterans affairs), and $183 million for Title III (related agencies). Compared with funding appropriated for FY2008 (emergency supplemental appropriations are pending), this represented increases for Title I of $3.8 billion (18.3%), for Title II of $3.2 billion (3.6%), and for Title III of $16.7 million (10.1%). The overall increase in appropriations between that requested for FY2009 and enacted for FY2008 is $7.0 billion (6.4%). The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations reported their versions of the FY2009 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies appropriations bill on June 24 (H.R. 6559) and July 22 (S. 3301), 2008, respectively. The bill's legislative path is laid out in detail in the Regular Fiscal Year 2009 Appropriations section of this report. The House committee recommended appropriating $118.7 billion in new budget authority, $3.4 billion above the President's request. This included $24.8 billion for Title I, $400 million above the request and $4.2 billion above the FY2008 enactment. The Senate committee recommended $119.8 billion, including $24.7 billion for Title I. The Continuing Appropriations Act appropriated $119.6 billion, including $25.0 billion for Title I. In the area of veterans' non-medical benefits, mandatory spending is increasing as claims for disability compensation, pension, and readjustment benefits increase due to a combination of several factors including the aging of the veterans population and the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of the increase in the number of claims, the average processing time for a disability claim in FY2007 was 183 days. To reduce the pending claims workload and improve processing time, funds were provided in the FY2008 appropriation for hiring and training additional claims processing staff. In FY2008 mandatory spending was $44.5 billion, increasing to $46.0 billion in FY2009. In terms of medical care afforded to veterans, similar to the past six years, the Administration has included several cost sharing proposals including increase in pharmacy copayments and enrollment fees for lower priority veterans. An additional proposal would bill veterans directly for treatment of nonservice-connected conditions. The House Appropriations Committee draft bill provides $40.8 billion for Veterans Health Administration for FY2009, a 9.6% increase over the FY2008 enacted amount of $37.2 billion, and 4.1% above the President's request of $39.2 billion. The bill did not include any provisions that would give the Department of Veterans Affairs the authority to implement fee increases.",25,25 "Benefits for the Aged and the Federal Budget: Short- and Long-Term Projections. As the 108th Congress addresses short-term budget decisions, it may also want to consider the long-run impacts of those decisions and the major shifts in budget composition that are underway. Congress may be pressed to add new benefits in response to population aging, such as improved support for long-term care and broader Medicare drug coverage.",116,101 "Department of State and Foreign Operations Appropriations: History of Legislation and Funding in Brief. Congress currently appropriates foreign affairs funding through annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPs) appropriations. This was not always the case, however. Prior to FY2008, Congress provided funding for the Department of State, international broadcasting, and related programs within the Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies appropriations. In those years, Congress separately appropriated funding for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and foreign aid within the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs appropriations. The 110th Congress aligned the two foreign affairs appropriations into the SFOPs legislation. SFOPs appropriations over the past 20 years have included enduring (ongoing or base funding), emergency supplemental appropriations, and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) appropriations. Total SFOPs funding levels in both current and constant dollars show a general upward trend, with FY2004 as the peak because of emergency supplemental appropriations for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds. In current dollars, SFOPs funding levels off after FY2013, while in constant dollars it declines somewhat. In addition, the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 and the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015 appear to have had an impact on both enduring and OCO funding levels. This report discusses legislation, funding levels, and funding designations for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations between FY1995 and FY2017.",80,80 "The Middle East: Selected Key Issues and Options for the 112th Congress. The Middle East, broadly defined as an area stretching from North Africa to Afghanistan, presents an array of challenges to U.S. foreign policy. Although the United States maintains strong relations with several key Arab and non-Arab states such as Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey, other state and non-state actors, such as Iran, the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Palestinian Sunni group Hamas, are aligned against U.S. interests. The United States and its regional and international allies continue to work to limit the influence of these actors while advocating for economic and political reform to address ongoing socioeconomic challenges and to promote democracy and a greater respect for human rights in the region. Members of the 112th Congress may face any number of issues in or relating to the Middle East including the war in Afghanistan, terrorism, foreign assistance, democracy promotion, and ongoing effects of the global financial crisis. This report provides an overview of key issues, a summary of past congressional action on these issues, and options for congressional consideration during the 112th Congress. Key issues include Iran Sanctions Preserving Israel's Qualitative Military Edge Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process U.S. Aid to the Palestinians Saudi Arabia: Arms Sales and Security Cooperation Yemen Iraq: Defining Post-2011 Relations Turkey U.S. Policy Toward Syria U.S. Support for Lebanon U.S. Democracy Promotion in Egypt Islam, Al Qaeda, and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy This report also contains a section, Appendix A, with links to relevant Congressional Research Service reports, along with analyst contact information.",85,85 "The Clean Air Act's Good Neighbor Provision: Overview of Interstate Air Pollution Control. Notwithstanding air quality progress since 1970, challenges remain to reduce pollution in areas exceeding federal standards and to ensure continued compliance elsewhere. The movement of air pollutants across state lines, known as interstate transport, has made it difficult for some downwind states to attain federal ozone and fine particulate matter (PM2.5) standards, partly because states lack authority to limit emissions from other states. The Clean Air Act's ""Good Neighbor"" provision (Section 110(a)(2)(D)) seeks to address this issue and requires states to prohibit emissions that significantly contribute to another state's air quality problems. It requires each state's implementation plan (SIP)—a collection of air quality regulations and documents—to prohibit emissions that either ""significantly contribute"" to nonattainment or ""interfere with maintenance"" of federal air quality standards in another state. The act also authorizes states to petition EPA to issue a finding that emissions from ""any major source or group of stationary sources"" violate the Good Neighbor provision (Section 126(b)). EPA and the states have implemented regional programs to address interstate ozone and PM2.5 transport and comply with the Good Neighbor provision. These programs set emission ""budgets"" for ozone and PM2.5 precursor emissions—specifically, sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) as PM2.5 precursors and seasonal NOx emissions as an ozone precursor. The current program—the Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR)—focuses on limiting interstate transport of power sector SO2 and NOx emissions to eastern states. Power sector emissions in CSAPR states are below emission budgets as a result of regulatory and market factors (see figure). Annual SO2, annual NOx, and ozone season NOx emissions from CSAPR sources decreased 77%, 41%, and 15%, respectively, between 2009 and 2016. CSAPR Emission Trends: 2009-2016 / Source: EPA Air Markets Program Data, https://ampd.epa.gov/ampd/. Notes: The Clean Air Interstate Rule was in effect 2009 through the end of 2014 and was replaced by CSAPR on January 1, 2015. EPA has concluded that regional SO2 and NOx programs have reduced interstate transport of PM2.5 and ozone. The Energy Information Administration's national-scale analysis identifies market and regulatory factors contributing to emission reductions. It is unclear whether emissions will remain well below budgets, given recent prices of ozone season NOx allowances (i.e., authorization for each ton emitted) and the supply of banked allowances for future use in lieu of emission reductions. Research indicates that ozone transport harms air quality in downwind states. However, stakeholder views vary regarding the extent to which interstate transport impacts air quality. Some note that some coal-fired power plants do not fully use already-installed pollution controls. Several states have sought additional upwind reductions in ozone precursors through Section 126(b) petitions. Others have questioned the feasibility of achieving additional reductions in ozone precursors, raising concerns about emissions from international or natural sources. EPA recently proposed to determine that CSAPR fully addresses Good Neighbor obligations for the 2008 ozone standard but has not yet made a ""Good Neighbor"" determination for the more stringent 2015 ozone standard. The agency has therefore not yet determined whether and how it will update the CSAPR budgets with respect to the 2015 ozone standard. Members of Congress may have an interest in better understanding how EPA and states implement the Clean Air Act's Good Neighbor provision, particularly as EPA continues its assessment of Good Neighbor obligations under the 2015 ozone standard. The following issues, among others, may inform deliberations about interstate air transport. First, the extent to which existing programs will improve air quality in areas not meeting the 2015 ozone standard is to be determined. CSAPR has not addressed NOx emissions from nonpower sector sources, such as large industrial boilers. EPA concluded that industrial sources have potential to cost-effectively reduce NOx emissions but is less certain about the structure of potential NOx control strategies. Second, some have questioned whether additional regulatory incentives are necessary to fulfill Good Neighbor obligations, particularly given current NOx allowance prices. These prices are below the marginal abatement cost, which may result in higher emissions. Third, EPA's current air quality initiatives may indirectly affect its Good Neighbor assessments. EPA recently sought comment on potential flexibilities for the development of Good Neighbor SIPs.",42,42 "How to Develop and Write a Grant Proposal. This report is intended for Members and staff assisting grant seekers in districts and states and covers writing proposals for both government and private foundation grants. In preparation for writing a proposal, the report first discusses preliminary information gathering and preparation, developing ideas for the proposal, gathering community support, identifying funding resources, and seeking preliminary review of the proposal and support of relevant administrative officials. The second section of the report covers the actual writing of the proposal, from outlining of project goals, stating the purpose and objectives of the proposal, explaining the program methods to solve the stated problem, and how the results of the project will be evaluated, to long-term project planning, and, finally, developing the proposal budget. The last section of the report provides a listing of free grants-writing websites, including guidelines from the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance and the Foundation Center's ""Introduction to Proposal Writing."" Related CRS reports are CRS Report RL34035, Grants Work in a Congressional Office, by Julie Jennings and Maria A. Kreiser, and CRS Report RL34012, Resources for Grantseekers, by Julie Jennings and Maria A. Kreiser. This report will be updated as needed.",60,60 "Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan: Presidential Authority and the Separation of Powers. In light of Elena Kagan's nomination to serve as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, this report analyzes then-Professor Kagan's views of executive power and the doctrine of separation of powers as laid most extensively out in her 2001 Harvard Law Review article Presidential Administration. This report will proceed as follows. First, it will briefly describe the constitutional and legal basis for presidential authority with respect to domestic policy, focusing on the relevant constitutional text as well as the Supreme Court jurisprudence that forms the foundation for almost all discussions of executive authority. Second, the report will provide a discussion of the well-established and competing theories of executive power, the traditional view as well as the ""unitary theory of the executive."" Third, the report will discuss Professor Kagan's theory of ""presidential administration"" and her legal responses to both of the aforementioned theories. Fourth, the report will turn to the application of Professor Kagan's theory to the field of administrative law, with an emphasis on the non-delegation doctrine and the level of deference often afforded to executive branch agencies by the judiciary, often referred to as Chevron deference. Finally, the report will provide a discussion of some of the criticism of Professor Kagan's views, especially as they relate to the President's legal authority in the areas of foreign policy and national security, both of which are expected by many to be issues that the Supreme Court will adjudicate in future terms.",54,54 "Gun Control, Mental Incompetency, and Social Security Administration Final Rule. On February 2, 2017, the House of Representatives passed a Congressional Review Act disapproval resolution (H.J.Res. 40) to overturn a final rule promulgated by the Social Security Administration (SSA) regarding implementation of firearms restrictions for certain persons. On February 16, 2017, the Senate passed H.J.Res. 40 without any amendments. On February 28, 2017, President Donald Trump signed this resolution into law (P.L. 115-8). This enacted joint resolution vacates the SSA final rule. It also bars the SSA from promulgating any future rule that would be ""substantially the same"" as the vacated rule unless the agency receives a new statutory authorization to do so. The vacated SSA final rule was intended to implement provisions of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA, P.L. 110-180) on reporting requirements for any federal agency holding records on persons prohibited from possessing firearms. NIAA mandates that agencies must share those records with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for inclusion in a computer index accessible to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). As described in this report, some of these prohibiting records are based upon findings of ""mental incompetency"" made during certain federal benefit claims processes administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) since 1998 and to be administered by the SSA beginning in December 2017. Activated by the FBI, NICS is a national computer network that allows federally licensed gun dealers to initiate a background check through either the FBI or a state or local authority, before transferring a firearm to an unlicensed, private person. Under federal law, persons who are ""adjudicated as a mental defective"" are ineligible to ship, transport, receive, or possess firearms or ammunition. In 1998, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives promulgated a rule that defined this term to include any individual that a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority has made a determination that—as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, mental illness, incompetency, condition or disease—he or she is a person who is a danger to himself or others lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his or her own affairs is found insane by a court in a criminal case, or is found incompetent to stand trial, or not guilty by reason of lack of moral responsibility. Since 1998, the Department of Veterans Affairs has referred the name of any beneficiary determined to be incompetent—because he or she lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his or her own affairs due to injury or disease—to the FBI for inclusion in the NICS index pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 1993 (Brady Act, P.L. 103-159). Under NIAA, since 2007, the VA must inform any benefits claimant that such determinations could lead to a loss of his or her firearms rights and privileges. But, NIAA also requires any federal authority that provides prohibiting mental health records to the FBI for inclusion in the NICS index to establish an administrative process, by which mentally incompetent, prohibited beneficiaries may petition to have those rights and privileges restored. Pursuant to both the Brady Act and NIAA, the SSA final rule specified conditions under which individuals would have been reported for inclusion in the NICS index as Social Security or SSI disability beneficiaries who would have been deemed too mentally incompetent to be trusted with firearms or ammunition. The rule also outlined SSA's process for notifying affected individuals as well as an administrative appeals process under which such individuals may request relief from the federal firearms prohibitions. The vacated rule was to have become effective on January 18, 2017, however, compliance would not have been required until December 19, 2017. Since the release of this report, the House has passed a bill (H.R. 1181) that would clarify the conditions under which veterans and survivors who are beneficiaries of programs administered by the VA may be treated as ""adjudicated as a mental defective."" For further information, see CRS Report R44818, Gun Control, Veterans Benefits, and Mental Incompetency Determinations.",97,97 Remedies for the Improper Disclosure of Personal Information. This report provides an overview of the available remedies in selected federal privacy laws. This report will be updated as events warrant.,19,19 "The National Nanotechnology Initiative: Overview, Reauthorization, and Appropriations Issues. Nanotechnology—a term encompassing the science, engineering, and applications of submicron materials—involves the harnessing of unique physical, chemical, and biological properties of nanoscale substances in fundamentally new and useful ways. The economic and societal promise of nanotechnology has led to investments by governments and companies around the world. In 2000, the United States launched the world's first national nanotechnology program. From FY2001 through FY2015, the federal government invested approximately $20.9 billion in nanoscale science, engineering, and technology through the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). President Obama has requested $1.5 billion in NNI funding for FY2016. U.S. companies and state governments have invested billions more. The United States has, in the view of many experts, emerged as a global leader in nanotechnology, though the competition for global leadership is intensifying as countries and companies around the world increase their investments. Nanotechnology's complexity and intricacies, early stage of development (with commercial pay-off possibly years away for many potential applications), and broad scope of potential applications engender a wide range of public policy issues. Maintaining U.S. technological and commercial leadership in nanotechnology poses a variety of technical and policy challenges, including development of technologies that will enable commercial scale manufacturing of nanotechnology materials and products, as well as environmental, health, and safety concerns. Congress established programs, assigned responsibilities, and initiated research and development related to these issues in the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-153). Although many provisions of this act have no sunset provision, FY2008 was the last year of agency authorizations included in the act. Bills to amend and reauthorize the act were introduced in the 110th, 111th, and 113th Congresses but were not enacted. No comprehensive reauthorization bill was introduced in the 112th Congress. In the 114th Congress, as of the date of this report, one bill has been introduced that seeks to amend the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act. The National Nanotechnology Initiative Amendments Act of 2015 is incorporated as Subtitle B of Title 1 of the America Competes Reauthorization Act of 2015 (H.R. 1898). The bill was introduced April 21, 2015, and referred to the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology and the House Committee on Education and the Workforce. In August 2015, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology referred the bill to the Subcommittee on Research and Technology. No further action had been taken as of the date of this report. Proponents of the NNI assert that nanotechnology is one of the most important emerging and enabling technologies and that U.S. competitiveness, technological leadership, national security, and societal interests require an aggressive approach to its development and commercialization. Critics of the NNI voice concerns that reflect disparate underlying beliefs. Some critics assert that the government is not doing enough to move technology from the laboratory into the marketplace. Others argue that the magnitude of the public investment may skew what should be market-based decisions in research, development, and commercialization. Still other critics say that the inherent risks of nanotechnology are not being addressed in a timely or effective manner.",111,111 "Appropriations for FY2003: District of Columbia. On February 20, 2003, President Bush signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2003 P.L. 108-7 (formerly H. J. Res. 2). Division C of the act appropriates $512 million in federal funds for the District of Columbia. for fiscal year 2003. On February 13, 2003, the House and the Senate approved the conference report (H.Rept. 108-10) accompanying H. J. Res. 2. The Senate approved an earlier version of H.J.Res. 2, on January 23, 2003, that would have allowed the District of Columbia to spend $5.8 billion in locally raised funds while Congress completed action on the proposed $517 million in federal contributions to the District's FY2003 budget. The 107th Congress failed to complete action on the District's FY2003 Appropriations Act before it adjourned. As a consequence, Congress passed eight continuing budget resolutions freezing District of Columbia and several other FY2003 appropriations bills at their FY2002 level until a budget compromise could be reached. during the 108th Congress. On October 2, 2002, several days after the submission of a revised FY2003 budget by District officials, the House Appropriations Committee reported the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2003, H.R. 5521. In response to a congressionally imposed October 1, 2002 deadline, District of Columbia officials completed action on a revised budget for FY2003 on September 27, 2002. Passage of an amended FY2003 budget by District officials was aimed at addressing a $323 million budget shortfall identified by the city's chief financial officer. On July 26, 2002, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 2809, the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2003. The Senate and House bills included $517 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia, which was significantly less than the $592 million requested by the District. The House and Senate bills included special federal payments of $17 million for the District's college access program and $15 million for security and emergency preparedness activities associated with the city's status as the national capital. The Senate bill included $15 million for capital infrastructure development while the House bill included $24 million, which was less than the $96 million requested by the District. The House and Senate bills, as reported during the 107th Congress, would have continued to allow the District to use its local funds to administer a domestic partners health insurance act approved by the city in 1992. Prior to the passage of the P.L. 107-96, the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2002, Congress prohibited the implementation of the Health Care Benefits Expansion Act. The Act allows unmarried couples to register as domestic partners and extends health care benefits of city employees to unrelated individuals registered as domestic partners. P.L. 108-7, includes a provision included in the House bill prohibiting the use of local and federal funding of a needle exchange program. The Senate bill would have allowed the use of District funds for a needle exchange in an effort to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS. In addition, the final act included a provision found in both House and Senate bills prohibiting the use of District or federal funds to prepare a medical marijuana ballot initiative and the use of federal or District funds for abortion services except in instance of rape or incest. This report will be updated as warranted.",57,57 "Nanotechnology: A Policy Primer. Nanoscale science, engineering, and technology—commonly referred to collectively as ""nanotechnology""—is believed by many to offer extraordinary economic and societal benefits. Congress has demonstrated continuing support for nanotechnology and has directed its attention particularly to three topics that may affect the realization of this hoped for potential: federal research and development (R&D) in nanotechnology, U.S. competitiveness in the field, and environmental, health, and safety (EHS) concerns. This report provides an overview of these topics and two others: nanomanufacturing and public attitudes toward nanotechnology. The development of nanotechnology has been fostered by significant and sustained public investments in R&D. Nanotechnology R&D is directed toward the understanding and control of matter at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers. (One nanometer is equal to a billionth of a meter. A human hair is 80,000 to 100,000 nanometers wide.) At this size, the properties of matter can differ in fundamental and potentially useful ways from the properties both of individual atoms and molecules, on the one hand, and of bulk matter, on the other. Since the launch of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in 2000, Congress has appropriated approximately $21.8 billion for nanotechnology R&D through FY2016. President Obama has requested $1.443 billion in NNI funding for FY2017, little changed from the FY2016 level of $1.435 billion, but down $478.2 million (25.0%) from its regular appropriation peak of $1.913 billion in FY2010. According to one estimate, worldwide public sector investment in nanotechnology R&D in 2014 was $7.9 billion and private sector investment was an estimated $9.8 billion. The United States is estimated to account for approximately one-third of total global nanotechnology R&D funding. Data on economic outputs used to assess competitiveness in mature technologies and industries, such as revenues and market share, are also not broadly available for nanotechnology. As an alternative, data on inputs (e.g., R&D expenditures) and non-economic outputs (e.g., scientific papers or patents) may provide insight into the current U.S. position and serve as bellwethers of future competitiveness. By these criteria, the United States appears to be the overall global leader in nanotechnology, though some believe the U.S. lead may not be as large as it was for previous emerging technologies. In recent years, China and the countries of the European Union have surpassed the United States in the publication of nanotechnology papers. Some research has raised concerns about the safety of nanoscale materials. There is general agreement that more information on EHS implications is needed to assess and manage risks to the public and the environment, and to create a regulatory environment that fosters prudent investment in nanotechnology-related innovation. Nanomanufacturing—the bridge between basic nanoscience and nanotechnology products—may require the development of new technologies, tools, instruments, measurement science, and standards to enable safe, effective, and affordable commercial-scale production of nanotechnology products. Public attitudes may also affect the environment for R&D, regulation, and market acceptance of nanotechnology products. In 2003, Congress enacted the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act (P.L. 108-153), providing a legislative foundation for some of the activities of the NNI, addressing concerns, establishing programs, assigning agency responsibilities, and setting authorized funding levels for some agencies. Certain provisions of this act authorizing specific appropriations have expired, other provisions have not expired. In the 114th Congress, Subtitle B of the America Competes Reauthorization Act of 2015 (H.R. 1898) would reauthorize the NNI. The American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (S. 3084) would modify certain NNI statutory reporting requirements. Efforts to enact comprehensive NNI reauthorization legislation in the 110th Congress, 111th Congress, and 113th Congress were unsuccessful. The products that emerge from these efforts may bring significant economic and social benefits to the United States and to the world, however, substantial research, development, and innovation-related hurdles remain before many of these benefits might be realized. Congress may play an active role in addressing some or all of these hurdles. The issues Congress may opt to consider include budget authorization levels for the covered agencies, R&D funding levels, priorities, and balance across the program component areas, administration and management of the NNI, translation of research results and early-stage technology into commercially viable applications, environmental, health, and safety issues, ethical, legal, and societal implications, education and training for the nanotechnology workforce, metrology (the science of measurement), standards, and nomenclature, public understanding, and international dimensions.",111,111 "Reduce, Refinance, and Rent? The Economic Incentives, Risks, and Ramifications of Housing Market Policy Options. The bursting of the housing bubble in 2006 precipitated the December 2007-June 2009 recession and a financial panic in September 2008. With the housing market seen as a locus for many of the economic problems that emerged, some Members of Congress propose intervening in the housing market as a means of improving not only the housing market itself but also the financial sector and the broader economy. Critics are concerned that further intervention could prolong the housing slump, delay recovery, and affect outcomes based on the government's preferences. Three frequently discussed proposals for the housing market are (1) reducing mortgage principal for borrowers who owe more than their homes are worth, (2) refinancing mortgages for borrowers shut out of traditional financing methods, and (3) renting out foreclosed homes. Principal reductions have the potential to improve the housing market by minimizing disruptive defaults and foreclosures. However, by shifting the debt burden from the borrower to the lender, principal reduction may negatively impact financial institutions that would have their investments' principal balances reduced. Principal reduction, nonetheless, might improve the broader economy if it stimulates consumer spending, diverting income from debt repayment to spending on other goods and services. Legislation introduced in the 112th Congress to reduce mortgage principal includes H.R. 1587, H.R. 3841, H.R. 4058, and S. 2093. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the regulator and conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, decided against allowing the enterprises to reduce principal for mortgages that they guarantee. Large-scale refinancing helps borrowers who are current on mortgage payments to refinance into a new mortgage with a lower interest rate. Because refinancing generally helps borrowers who are current, it is unlikely to have a major effect on the housing market, but it may prevent some foreclosures that could occur in the absence of a refinance. In addition, refinancing has the potential to have a larger effect on the economy by stimulating consumer spending. A mortgage refinance could lower a borrower's monthly payment, freeing up more income for non-housing-related spending. Some of the additional spending of borrowers may come at the cost of the financial sector. Although some financial institutions may lose investment income from refinancing, others could benefit from the increased business associated with refinancing. President Obama, in his 2012 State of the Union address, proposed streamlining the existing program to refinance Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans and establishing a new mass refinancing plan for non-Fannie Mae and non-Freddie Mac loans. Congressional proposals for large-scale refinancing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans include H.R. 363, S. 170, and S. 3085. Renting out foreclosed homes currently held by banks and other financial institutions has the potential to stabilize housing prices by reducing the supply of homes on the ""for sale"" market. However, this policy depends on house prices increasing in the future such that, when the rented properties are eventually sold, they are sold in a healthier market. Unlike principal reductions and mass refinancing, renting foreclosed homes does not reduce existing homeowners' payments or increase their disposable income. Any impact on consumer spending is likely to be indirect through stabilizing house prices and preserving neighboring homeowners' equity. FHFA implemented a pilot project to convert foreclosed homes into rentals. Legislative proposals to expand the renting of foreclosed properties include H.R. 1548, H.R. 2636, and S. 2080.",74,7 "Klamath River Basin: Background and Issues. The Klamath River Basin on the California-Oregon border is a focal point for local and national discussions on water allocation and species protection. Previously, water and species management issues have exacerbated competition and generated conflict among several interests—farmers, Indian tribes, commercial and sport fishermen, federal wildlife refuge managers, environmental groups, and state, local, and tribal governments. As is true in many regions in the West, the federal government plays a prominent role in the Klamath Basin's waters. This role stems primarily from (1) operation and management of the Bureau of Reclamation's Klamath Water Project, (2) management of federal lands, including six national wildlife refuges, and (3) implementation of federal laws such as the Endangered Species Act. Allocation of the Klamath Basin's water has been contentious in the past. Controversy peaked in 2001 when the federal government halted irrigation water deliveries to protect species listed as threatened under the federal Endangered Species Act. Later issues with basin fisheries exacerbated these conflicts. Efforts to permanently settle many of the basin's water and species issues began during the Bush Administration and were continued by the Obama Administration. In 2010, the Secretary of the Interior and the governors of Oregon and California, along with multiple interest groups, announced two interrelated settlement agreements, supported by the federal government and signed by numerous other parties. These agreements are meant to address many of the previous conflicts in the basin. The first agreement, known as the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA), provides for restoration, water deliveries, and related actions, including a defined range of water supplies for Reclamation project users as well as projects to restore and protect threatened and endangered fish species. The second agreement, known as the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (KHSA), lays out a process for studies and a decision by the Secretary of the Interior regarding whether the removal of four dams in the Lower Klamath Basin (funded by power customers in Oregon and California, as well as the State of California) would be in the public interest. Together, removal of the dams would constitute one of the largest, most complex dam removal projects ever undertaken. More than forty groups are signatories (or ""parties"") to the Klamath agreements, including the states of Oregon and California, three area tribes, Reclamation Project irrigators, environmental interests, and others. In addition to these parties, many who were not formally involved in negotiations also support the agreements. Opponents of the agreements include a subset of non-Reclamation project (""off-project"") irrigators, as well as some other environmental groups, tribes, Siskiyou County in California, and other area residents. The Obama Administration has endorsed the Klamath agreements, but Congress has to formally authorize both agreements for the federal government to move forward with most of their actions. Legislation currently before Congress (H.R. 3398 and S. 1851) would authorize the agreements, including approximately $800 million for federal actions (mostly in the KBRA). Considerations related to the Klamath agreements may include whether the federal government is obligated to act beyond current activities in the Klamath Basin (and, if so, to what extent) and what specific strategies should be authorized.",43,43 "Laos: Background and U.S. Relations. The United States and the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) cooperate in important areas despite ideological differences and U.S. concerns about alleged human rights abuses against the ethnic Hmong minority. The U.S. government has gradually upgraded its relations with the communist state, which has strong ties to Vietnam and growing economic linkages with China. Major areas of U.S. assistance and bilateral cooperation include de-mining and counter-narcotics programs, strengthening the country's regulatory framework and trade capacity, HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, the recovery of Americans missing in action during the Vietnam War, and military education and training. In 2008, the United States and Laos exchanged defense attachés the first time in over 30 years. The U.S. government has embarked upon a policy of economic engagement with the LPDR as a means of influencing the future direction of Lao policy. The Obama Administration and Members of Congress have expressed concerns about the plight of former ethnic Hmong insurgents and their families, who have historical ties to the U.S.-backed Lao-Hmong guerilla army of the Vietnam War period, and efforts by Thai authorities to repatriate over 4,500 Lao-Hmong living in camps in Thailand, many of whom claim that they likely will be persecuted or discriminated against if they return to Laos. In June 2009, 31 Members of Congress signed a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urging her to appeal to the Thai government not to forcibly repatriate Hmong asylum seekers. U.S. officials have called upon the Thai and Lao governments for greater transparency in the repatriation and resettlement process. In April 2009, H.Con.Res. 112, ""Expressing Support for Designation of a ‘National Lao-Hmong Recognition Day,'"" was introduced in the House of Representatives. Laos, one of the poorest countries in Asia, has made some notable political, social, and economic progress in recent years. Religious freedom reportedly has improved, particularly in urban areas. In 2009, the LPDR ratified the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and promulgated a legal framework for non-governmental organizations. Opium production and use have dropped dramatically since 1998. Between 1988 and 2008, the economy grew by over 6% per year, with the exception of 1997-1998 due to the Asian Financial Crisis. Meanwhile, U.S.-Laos trade has grown rapidly, albeit from a low base. In 2008, total trade between Laos and the United States was valued at $60 million compared to $15 million in 2006. The government has implemented market-oriented reforms, but progress has been slow. Major U.S. policy considerations include urging the Lao government to accept independent, international monitoring of the resettlement of former Lao-Hmong insurgents and Hmong returnees from Thailand, urging the Thai government not to forcibly repatriate Hmong determined to be political refugees, increasing assistance for de-mining activities in Laos, granting trade preferences or tariff relief for Lao products, particularly garments, and developing programs for sustainable management of the Mekong River.",85,85 "U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Resources: Prospects and Processes. Access to potential oil and gas resources under the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) continues to be controversial. Moratoria on leasing and development in certain areas were largely eliminated in 2008 and 2009, although a few areas remain legislatively off limits to leasing. The 112th Congress may be unlikely to reinstate broad leasing moratoria, but some Members have expressed interest in protecting areas (e.g., the Georges Bank or Northern California) or establishing protective coastal buffers. Pressure to expand oil and gas supplies and protect coastal environments and communities will likely lead Congress and the Administration to consider carefully which areas to keep open to leasing and which to protect from development. The oil spill that occurred on April 20, 2010, in the Gulf of Mexico brought increased attention to offshore drilling risks. Consideration of offshore development for any purpose has raised concerns over the protection of the marine and coastal environment. On December 1, 2010, the Obama Administration announced its Revised Program (RP) for the remainder of the 2007-2012 OCS Leasing Program. Among other components, the RP eliminates five Alaskan lease sales (sales 209, 212, 214, 217, and 221) that had been contemplated in the current lease program. Lease sale 219 in the Cook Inlet (scheduled to be held in 2011) was cancelled because of a lack of industry interest. Further, the Obama Administration, under executive authority, withdrew the North Aleutian Basin Planning Area from oil and gas leasing activity until June 30, 2017. Public hearings began in 2010 on the scope of the 2012-2017 OCS oil and gas leasing program, but three planning areas in Alaska (Cook Inlet, Chukchi, and Beaufort Sea) are being scoped as well. On November 8, 2011, the Administration announced its second draft proposed oil and gas leasing program for 2012-2017, which excludes all three Atlantic and all four Pacific Coast planning areas at least through 2017. On December 14, 2011, the Obama Administration held lease sale 218 in the Western Gulf of Mexico, the first sale since the oil spill. A combined lease sale in the Central Gulf of Mexico (sale 216 and 222) is scheduled for June 20, 2012, the final sale of the 2007-2012 leasing program. Three bills that were passed in the House in May 2011 would address permitting efficiencies (H.R. 1229), enforce certain lease sales in the current five-year planning period (H.R. 1230) and require lease sales in the ""most promising"" OCS Planning Areas during the 2012-2017 Lease Program (H.R. 1231). Most recently, legislation introduced in the House—the Energy Security and Transportation Jobs Act (H.R. 3410) on November 14, 2011—combines some of the language from bills passed earlier by the House (H.R. 1230 and H.R. 1231, discussed below) and incorporates this proposal into H.R. 7, the American Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act of 2012, as Title XVII – Subtitle B. Exploration and production proceed in stages during which increasing data provide increasing certainty about volumes of oil and gas present. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) conducts assessments of undiscovered technically recoverable resources (UTRR) on the U.S. OCS. The statistical certainty of these assessment estimates varies by region because the availability of geologic data varies widely by region. One characteristic of the U.S. oil market, as well as of world oil markets, is that the access to supply tends to be sequential. Normally, the first source of oil used by a nation is domestic production, if available. The ultimate impact of oil and gas development in offshore areas will depend on oil and gas prices, volumes of resources actually discovered, infrastructure development, and restrictions placed on development, all of which currently carry significant uncertainties.",40,40 "The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics: Security and Human Rights Issues. The President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced on July 4, 2007, that Sochi, Russia, had been selected as the host city for the Olympic Winter Games and Paralympics. The Olympic Games, which will be held February 7-23, 2014, are the first to be hosted by Russia as a successor state to the former Soviet Union. Reportedly, some 230 U.S. athletes out of approximately 2,900 from some 88 countries, and about 10,000 U.S. visitors, are expected in Sochi. Olympic events will take place at two main locations: a coastal cluster along the Black Sea and a mountain cluster in the Krasnaya Polyana mountains. Since the 2007 selection of Sochi as the site of Olympic Games, many observers, including some in Congress, have raised concerns about security and human rights conditions in Sochi and elsewhere in Russia. Sochi is in Russia's North Caucasus area, which has experienced ongoing terrorist incidents, including several bombings in recent weeks. Through hearings, legislation, oversight, and other action, some Members of Congress have expressed concerns over Russia's hosting of the Sochi Olympic Games and Paralympics, particularly the risks that terrorism and human rights violations might pose to U.S. athletes and visitors. Other broader congressional concerns have included whether the United States should participate in the Games in the face of increasing tensions in U.S.-Russia relations and the Russian government's growing restrictions on the civil and human rights of its citizens. Some Members of Congress have called for boycotting the Games. Others have cautioned that U.S. citizens should carefully weigh the security risks of attending, and have urged greater U.S.-Russia counter-terrorism cooperation to ameliorate threats to the Games. In the period during and after the Games, Congress may continue to exercise oversight and otherwise raise concerns about the safety and human rights treatment of U.S. athletes and visitors and the impact of the Games and other developments in Russia on the future of U.S.-Russia relations. On January 24, 2014, a senior Administration official stressed that the full resources of the U.S. government were being readied to support U.S. athletes, the official delegations, and other citizens attending the Games. Administration officials have argued that U.S.-Russia security cooperation is adequate for safely holding the Games, but have added that conditions are being monitored and U.S. athletes and the public will be notified if they change. They also have stated that there are contingencies for emergencies, including the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens if necessary. Some observers have raised concerns about whether security is adequate and have criticized Russia for not cooperating more with the United States on safeguarding the Games. One non-sport-related factor that has added an additional dimension to the Olympics beyond security has been the issue of human rights. In 2013 the Russian legislature, at the urging of President Putin, adopted a series of anti-LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) laws. In reaction, in late July 2013, the State Department called on Russia to protect freedom of assembly and association and freedom of expression of U.S. citizens attending or participating in the Olympic Games, including LGBT persons and others traveling to Sochi. In late December 2013, the Obama Administration announced that the U.S. delegates to the Games would not include top-level officials, but would include several LGBT sports figures. The State Department's January 2014 travel alert reflects human rights concerns when it advises U.S. visitors that they should have ""no expectation of privacy,"" and that all means of communication should be assumed to be monitored. The travel alert also cautions that the anti-LGBT propaganda law applies to foreigners, who may be fined, jailed, and/or deported.",83,83 "Federal Lands Managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service (FS): Issues for the 110th Congress. The 110th Congress, the Administration, and the courts are considering many issues related to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) public lands and the Forest Service (FS) national forests. Key issues include the following. Energy Resources. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 has led to new regulations on the leasing programs and application of environmental laws to certain agency actions. H.R. 6 was enacted as P.L. 110-140 on December 19, 2007, without many of the federal lands provisions considered earlier. Hardrock Mining. The General Mining Law of 1872 allows prospecting for minerals in open public domain lands, and staking a claim, developing the minerals, and applying for a patent to obtain title to the land and minerals. The House passed H.R. 2262 on November 5, 2007, to reform aspects of the General Mining Law. National Landscape Conservation System. The BLM created the National Landscape Conservation System in 2000 to enhance the focus on specially protected conservation areas. Congress is considering measures to establish the 27 million acre system legislatively and debating the adequacy of funds for the system. Wilderness. Many agency recommendations for wilderness areas are pending. Questions persist about wilderness review and managing wilderness study areas (WSAs). Nearly fifty wilderness area bills have been introduced this Congress, several have been passed by at least one chamber, and one has been enacted into law. Wild Horses and Burros. Changes in 2004 to the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971 removed the ban on selling certain animals for commercial products, the House passed H.R. 249 on April 26, 2007, to overturn these changes. The BLM continues to dispose of animals by sale, adoption, and long-term holding. Wildfire Protection. Various initiatives seek to protect communities from wildfires by expanding fuel reduction, and bills have been offered to restore forest health. Concerns over high and rising suppression costs have led to bills for separate wildfire suppression funding accounts. FS NEPA Application. The FS has proposed altering its process for activity review under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), and has added activities that can be categorically excluded from such environmental and public reviews. Many of these changes and proposals have been challenged in court. Other issues discussed briefly include roadless areas in the National Forest System, national forest planning, national forest county payments, BLM land sales, and grazing management.",107,107 "Weather-Related Power Outages and Electric System Resiliency. High winds, especially when combined with precipitation from seasonal storms, can cause damage to electricity utility systems, resulting in service interruptions to large numbers of electricity customers. While most such power outages are caused by damage from trees and tree limbs falling on local electricity distribution lines and poles, major power outages tend to be caused by damage to electricity transmission lines, which carry bulk power long distances. Depending on the severity of the storm and resulting impairment, power outages can last a few hours or extend to periods of several days, and have real economic effects. Power outages can impact businesses (primarily through lost orders and damage to perishable goods and inventories), and manufacturers (mainly through downtime and lost production, or equipment damage). Data from various studies lead to cost estimates from storm-related outages to the U.S. economy at between $20 billion and $55 billion annually. Data also suggest the trend of outages from weather-related events is increasing. Suggested solutions for reducing impacts from weather-related outages include improved tree-trimming schedules to keep rights-of-way clear, placing distribution and some transmission lines underground, implementing Smart Grid improvements to enhance power system operations and control, inclusion of more distributed generation, and changing utility maintenance practices and metrics to focus on power system reliability. However, most of these potential solutions come with high costs which must be balanced against the perceived benefits. A number of options exist for Congress to consider which could help reduce storm-related outages. These range from improving the quality of data on storm-related outages, to a greater strategic investment in the U.S. electricity grid. Congress could empower a federal agency to develop standards for the consistent reporting of power outage data. While responsibility for the reliability of the bulk electric system is under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (as per the Energy Policy Act of 2005), no central responsibility exists for the reliability of distribution systems. One possible option could be to bring distribution systems under the Electric Reliability Organization for reliability purposes. Recovery after storm-related outages might be enhanced by a federal role in formalizing the review or coordination of electric utility mutual assistance agreements (MAAs). This would not necessarily mean federal approval of MAAs, but may help in the cooperative coordination of additional federal and state resources, especially in a wide, multi-state weather event. While there has been much discussion of transmission system inadequacies and inefficiencies, many distribution systems are in dire need of upgrades or repairs. The cost of upgrading the U.S. grid to meet future uses is expected to be high, with the American Society of Civil Engineers estimating a need of $673 billion by 2020. While the federal government recently made funding available of almost $16 billion for specific Smart Grid projects and new transmission lines under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, there has not been a comprehensive effort to study the needs, set goals, and provide targeted funding for modernization of the U.S. grid as part of a long-term national energy strategy. Such an effort would also require decisions about the appropriate roles of government and the private sector. Power delivery systems are most vulnerable to storms and extreme weather events. Improving the overall condition and efficiency of the power delivery system can only serve to improve the resiliency of the system, and help hasten recovery from weather-related outages. Ultimately, however, electric utilities are responsible for this infrastructure. They are in the business of selling electricity, and they cannot sell electricity if their power delivery systems are out of service.",38,38 "Public Financing of Congressional Campaigns: Overview and Analysis. To critics, public campaign financing, generally in conjunction with spending limits, is the ultimate solution to perceived problems arising from ever-growing costs of campaigns and the accompanying need for privately donated campaign funds. Public financing supporters maintain that replacing private funds with public money would most effectively reduce potentially corrupting influence from ""interested"" money. On the other hand, opponents of public financing question whether real or apparent corruption from private fundraising is as serious a problem as critics claim. They also argue that public financing would be an inappropriate use of taxpayer dollars and would compel taxpayers to fund candidates they find objectionable. In the early 1970s, supporters succeeded in enacting public financing in presidential elections, a system that has been available since 1976. In addition, many states and localities have provided public financing in their elections since the 1970s (or before). Today, 16 states offer some form of direct aid to candidates' campaigns through fixed subsidies or matching funds. Perceptions about the presidential and state public financing systems have shaped opinions about adding public financing to congressional elections. Also shaping that debate was the Supreme Court's landmark 1976 Buckley v. Valeo ruling, which struck down mandatory spending limits, but sanctioned voluntary spending limits accompanying public financing. Proposals for publicly funded congressional elections have been offered in almost every Congress since 1956, the issue was prominently debated in the mid-1970s and the late 1980s through early 1990s. Proposals were passed twice by the Senate in the 93rd Congress and by both the House and Senate in the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses. Only the 102nd Congress proposal was reconciled in conference but was vetoed by the President. Thus far in the 112th Congress, Senator Durbin and Representative Larson introduced the latest versions of the Fair Elections Now Act (FENA) on April 6, 2011. These include S. 750 and H.R. 1404, S. 749 is a separate measure that would finance the program proposed in S. 750. The two versions of FENA, S. 750 and H.R. 1404, are similar to three bills introduced during the 111th Congress (H.R. 6116, which superseded H.R. 1826, and S. 752). Like their predecessors, the current versions of FENA propose to provide participating candidates with a mix of base subsidies, matching funds, and broadcast vouchers. The current versions of FENA propose two changes in incentives for participating candidates compared with 111th Congress versions of the legislation. First, although the types of available funding remain consistent, participants would be eligible for larger funding amounts. Second, coordinated party expenditures would be unlimited if funds used for those expenditures came from individual contributions of less than $500. Appendix D and Appendix E at the end of the report summarize major provisions of legislation introduced in the 111th and 112th Congresses respectively. In addition to discussing recent legislation, this report reviews past proposals for, and debate over, congressional public financing. It also discusses experiences with the presidential and state public financing systems. Finally, the report offers potential considerations for Congress in devising a public financing system for its elections. The report will be updated periodically, on the basis of congressional and state activities.",61,61 "The Department of the Treasury's Authority to Regulate GSE Debt: A Legal Analysis. The Department of the Treasury is developing a more formalized approach for approving Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's debt issuances. Although the Department of the Treasury has traditionally used its approval authority merely to coordinate the timing of debt issuances, the department may seek to regulate the amount of debt that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may issue. This report analyzes the Department of the Treasury's legal authority over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and concludes that a court would likely hold that the department possesses the power to regulate the amount of debt issued by these two organizations.",100,12 "Selected Laws Governing the Disclosure of Customer Phone Records by Telecommunications Carriers. Telephone records contain a large amount of intimate personal information. Recent years have seen a rise in the use of this information for marketing and even for criminal purposes. The purchase and sale of telephone record information, therefore, became a booming business. Websites and data brokers claiming to be able to obtain the phone records for any phone number within a few days abounded. However, the methods by which these data brokers obtained their information came under intense fire from public interest groups concerned about consumer privacy. Consumer groups and news outlets reported that telephone records were being obtained fraudulently by data brokers or other individuals without the knowledge or consent of the customers to whom the records related. Data brokers are thought to employ three different practices to obtain customer telephone records without the approval of the customer. The first method occurs when an employee of one of the phone companies sells the records to the data broker. The second method occurs through a practice called ""pretexting,"" where a data broker pretends to be the owner of the phone and obtains the records from the telephone company under false pretenses. The third method is employed when a data broker obtains the customer's telephone records by accessing the customer's account on the Internet. In response to increased concern over the unauthorized disclosure of private telephone records, Congress and other regulatory agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of this information. Congress enacted the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, which makes ""pretexting"" a federal offense. The Federal Trade Commission has instituted a number of enforcement actions against data brokers. And the FCC recently amended its regulations governing the disclosure of Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI) in an attempt to address the concerns raised by Congress, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and other consumer groups regarding the unauthorized disclosure of such information. This report discusses recent efforts to protect the privacy of customer telephone records and efforts to prevent the unauthorized use, disclosure, or sale of such records by data brokers. In addition, it provides a brief overview of the confidentiality protections for customer information established by the Communications Act of 1934. It does not discuss the legal framework for the disclosure by telephone companies of phone records to the government. For an overview of laws that address disclosure of telephone records to the government, see CRS Report RL33424, Government Access to Phone Calling Activity and Related Records: Legal Authorities, by Elizabeth B. Bazan, Edward C. Liu, and Gina Stevens. For an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, see CRS Report 98-326, Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, by Gina Stevens and Charles Doyle. This report will be updated when warranted.",19,8 "Community Service Requirement for Residents of Public Housing. The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-276) included provisions designed to promote employment and self-sufficiency among residents of assisted housing, including a mandatory work or community service requirement for residents of public housing. Non-elderly, non-disabled, non-working residents of public housing are required to participate in eight hours per month of either community service or economic self-sufficiency activities in order to maintain their eligibility for public housing. The community service requirement has been controversial since its inception. Supporters of the provision believe that it is consistent with the goals of welfare reform and that it will promote civic engagement and ""giving back"" among residents of public housing, detractors argue that it is punitive, unfairly applied, and administratively burdensome. In February 2015, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Inspector General released an audit critical of HUD's implementation and enforcement of the community service requirement. In response to the report, HUD issued further guidance in August 2015 related to the statutory/regulatory requirements for administering the community service requirement, data collection and reporting requirements, action to take against noncompliant tenants, and penalties against PHAs that do not comply. Recent HUD data indicate that approximately 14% of public housing residents are subject to the community service requirement and not otherwise exempt. Of those nonexempt residents, approximately 19% were reported as noncompliant (or about 3% of all public housing residents).",75,75 "Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan. Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) requires the President to impose sanctions on any country that he has determined is a ""non-nuclear-weapon state"" and has received or detonated a ""nuclear explosive device."" Sanctions include prohibitions on foreign assistance, munitions sales and licenses, foreign military financing, government credits, guarantees, and financial assistance U.S. support for multilateral financial assistance, private bank lending to the affected government and exports of certain specific controlled goods and technology. Specific exceptions exist for humanitarian aid, food and agricultural exports, food assistance, private bank loans and credits for purchases of food and agricultural commodities, and certain transactions involving intelligence activities. The statute does not provide for terminating or suspending sanctions once imposed. The President placed Section 102(b) sanctions on India and Pakistan in May 1998 following nuclear tests by those countries earlier that month. The statute had never before been invoked and its full implementation give rise to various legal and policy issues. After an inter-agency review, the Administration announced its overall implementation plan for both countries June 18, 1998. Concerns over the lack of an exemption for agricultural goods in Section 102(b)(2)'s prohibition on government credits and guarantees led to enactment of the Agriculture Export Relief Act (P.L. 105-194), which exempted Department of Agriculture programs through FY99, it also permanently exempted government financing for medicine and medical goods and allowed private loans for fertilizer exports. In October 1998, Congress authorized the President to waive for one year certain Section 102(b)(2) prohibitions applicable to the two countries, as well as other related statutory restrictions (India-Pakistan Relief Act, P.L. 105-277). The President exercised this authority December 1, 1998. Congress has since authorized the President to waive indefinitely, as they apply to India and Pakistan, all sanctions imposed under Section Section 101 or 102 of the AECA, a nuclear-related restriction in the Export-Import Bank Act, and Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)(Pressler Amendment), which restricts military aid and exports to Pakistan (DOD Appropriations Act, 2000, P.L. 106-79, Section 9001). The President may waive military and export control sanctions only if he certifies to Congress that applying a restriction would not be in U.S. national security interests, any licenses for defense exports must be notified to Congress and are subject to congressional review. In October 1999, President Clinton waived sanctions with regard to certain programs and commercial transactions specific to each country. In August and early September 2001, both the Bush Administration and Members of Congress began to call for removal of the sanctions, mainly as applicable to India, legislation to lift the measures has also been introduced. Following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the President waived for both India and Pakistan prohibitions on exports of defense items and sensitive technology and military financing, citing U.S. national security interests, also waived were any remaining sanctions in Section Section 101 or 102 of the AECA, the Export-Import Bank Act, and the Pressler Amendment. Foreign assistance to Pakistan continues to be restricted because of an anti-coup provision in appropriations legislation and other debt-related restrictions, also, three Pakistani entities are subject to two-year AECA missile proliferation sanctions. Legislation allowing removal of restrictions on Pakistan (S. 1465) was reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee October 4. This report will be updated.",29,29 "Statistics on Livestock Grazing on Federal Lands: FY2002 to FY2016. Livestock grazing on federal lands primarily occurs on lands of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM, in the Department of the Interior) and the Forest Service (FS, in the Department of Agriculture). Both agencies manage lands under sustained-yield and multiple-use principles, with livestock grazing among generally authorized uses. Congress continues to be interested in the extent to which BLM and FS lands are protected and used for a variety of activities, including livestock grazing. This report provides data on the extent of livestock grazing in recent years to assist with congressional deliberations on uses of federal lands generally and decisionmaking on the availability of lands for livestock grazing in particular. This report generally provides data for 15 years, from FY2002 to FY2016, for four categories of livestock data. The four categories of data are similar but not identical between the agencies. The categories roughly correspond with the number of livestock operators, the number of grazing permits and leases held by these operators, how much grazing could have been authorized for use, and how much grazing was actually used. Both agencies saw increases over the period in the amount of grazing used, based on the time livestock spent on the range. This time is measured in animal unit months (AUMs) for BLM and head months (HD-MOs) for FS. The increase in the amount of grazing was higher for BLM (5.2%) than for FS (1.1%). For the other three categories of data, livestock grazing on BLM land was the same or somewhat less in FY2016 than in FY2002. FS saw relatively larger declines than BLM for these other three categories of livestock grazing. With regard to livestock operators, BLM started and ended the FY2002-FY2016 period with nearly the same number, with some fluctuation in between, whereas the number of FS livestock permittees decreased steadily from FY2006 to FY2016 and ended the period down 12.4%. Regarding the number of BLM permits and leases, there was a relatively small overall decline of 1.7% from FY2002 to FY2016. By contrast, the number of FS active permits decreased steadily from FY2006 to FY2016 and by a larger amount—12.5% overall. As for the amount of grazing that could have been used, BLM's AUMs declined by 2.6% between FY2002 and FY2016, whereas FS's HD-MOs declined by 18.4% over the same period. The size of the change in livestock grazing on BLM and FS lands depends on the length of the period examined and the particular years of analysis. For instance, although AUMs used on BLM lands increased by 5.2% over the last 15 years, since 1954 there has been a 52.2% reduction in the number of AUMs—from 18.2 million to about 8.7 million. Changes in grazing on BLM and FS lands nationally reflect a variety of different conditions on rangelands in diverse locations. The national changes can be attributed to various factors, including amendments to agency land use plans, resource protection needs and the long-term health of rangelands, the effect of weather (e.g., rain/drought) and fire on forage, voluntary nonuse by permit holders for a variety of reasons, and development on nearby private lands. The relative extent to which any one of these factors contributed to any national, regional, or local changes in grazing on federal lands is beyond the scope of this report.",107,107 "Phantom Traffic"" -- Problems Billing for the Termination of Telephone Calls: Issues for Congress. This report provides an overview of ""phantom traffic"" -- i.e., telephone calls for which a carrier is unable to obtain appropriate compensation. The report discusses the causes of phantom traffic, phantom traffic and rural companies, issues, and related proposals.",113,113 "Pesticide Legislation: Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-170). The 104th Congress enacted significant changes to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), governing U.S. sale and use of pesticide products, and the Federal Food Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), which limits pesticide residues on food. The vehicle of these changes was H.R. 1627, the ""Food Quality Protection Act of 1996"" (FQPA), enacted August 3, 1996, as P.L. 104-170. Under FIFRA, the new law will facilitate registrations and reregistrations of pesticides for special (so-called ""minor"") uses and authorize collection of maintenance fees to support pesticide reregistration. Coordination of regulations implementing FIFRA and FFDCA will be required. Food safety provisions will establish a single standard of safety for pesticide residue on raw and processed foods, provide information through large food retail stores to consumers about the health risks of pesticide residues and how to avoid them, preempt state and local food safety laws if they are based on concentrations of pesticide residues below recently established federal residue limits (called ""tolerances""), and ensure that tolerances protect the health of infants and children. Contrary to widespread reports, the FQPA does not repeal the Delaney Clause or amend FFDCA Section 409: food additives that are not pesticide residues remain subject to the ""zero-risk Delaney standard. Rather, P.L. 104-170 eliminated the distinction between raw and processed food tolerances so that all pesticide residues will be regulated under an amended FFDCA Section 408. New Section 408 requires all tolerances to be ""safe,"" ensuring a ""reasonable certainty of no harm from pesticides. It authorizes slightly higher residue concentrations on foods when pesticide use avoids greater health risks to consumers or significant disruptions to domestic production of an adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply. The FQPA, as enacted, does not address two issues that were addressed by H.R. 1627, as introduced and reported in the House, but were deleted before the House and Senate debates. The FQPA does not include a proposal to federally preempt local pesticide use regulations which was opposed by several states with laws either authorizing or preempting local regulation. The FQPA also omits a provision opposed by Indian tribes and the Administration that would have prohibited tribal enforcement of pesticide use laws on land within tribal boundaries if less than half that land were owned by the tribe or tribal members. The FQPA has widespread support in the community of growers, food processors, chemical suppliers, environmental and consumer advocacy groups, and state government agriculture officials. The Clinton Administration also generally supports its provisions. For readers not familiar with the statutes, Appendix A describes key FIFRA and FFDCA authorities and provisions. Appendix B provides a brief section-by-section summary of P.L. 104-170.",1,1 "State and Local Restrictions on Employing, Renting Property to, or Providing Services for Unauthorized Aliens: Legal Issues and Recent Judicial Developments. An estimated 37 million foreign-born persons currently reside in the United States, almost a third of whom may be present without legal authorization. The reaction of state and local jurisdictions to unauthorized immigration has varied. In some cases, states and localities have adopted measures intended to deter unlawfully present aliens from arriving and settling within their jurisdictions, including by restricting such aliens' access to work, housing, and benefits. Typically, such measures have sought to (1) limit the hiring and employment of unauthorized aliens, including through the denial of permits to persons that employ unauthorized aliens and the regulation of day labor centers, (2) restrict the ability of unlawfully present aliens to rent or occupy dwellings within the state or locality, and/or (3) deny unlawfully present aliens access to state or local services or benefits. State or local restrictions upon unlawfully present aliens' access to employment or housing and eligibility for public benefits have been challenged on various grounds, including on the grounds that they (1) are preempted by federal law, including the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and thus unenforceable by federal or state courts, (2) deprive persons of equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, (3) deprive persons of property or liberty interests without providing them due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (4) run afoul of federal civil rights statutes, including the Fair Housing Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The outcomes of such challenges have varied, depending upon the specific restrictions at issue and the jurisdiction of the courts reviewing the restrictions. However, based upon the cases decided to date, these challenges appear to be more significant with regard to state and local restrictions on employing or renting property to unlawfully present aliens than they are with regard to state and local restrictions on unlawfully present aliens' access to public services and benefits. This term, the Supreme Court is considering the case of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, which involves arguments as to whether federal law preempts a 2007 Arizona statute that requires employers to use the federal government's E-Verify system to determine the work eligibility of employees and suspends or revokes the business licenses of entities found to have hired unauthorized aliens. This report discusses the constitutional issues raised by state and local laws intended to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens by limiting their access to housing, employment, and public benefits, as well as the implications that federal civil rights statutes might have for the implementation and enforcement of these laws. It also discusses recent federal court cases addressing the constitutionality of such measures. The report does not discuss recent state laws that seek to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens by requiring state law enforcement to enforce federal immigration law, or that criminalize conduct that may facilitate the presence of unauthorized aliens within the state. Such laws are discussed in a separate report, CRS Report R41221, State Efforts to Deter Unauthorized Aliens: Legal Analysis of Arizona's S.B. 1070, by Kate M. Manuel, Michael John Garcia, and Larry M. Eig.",76,76 "U.S. and International Responses to the Global Spread of Avian Flu: Issues for Congress. Influenza A/H5N1 is one of many influenza (flu) strains currently spreading throughout the world. Although it is a bird flu, it has infected some people and killed more than half of those infected. Since 1997, when the first human contracted H5N1 in Hong Kong, the virus has resurfaced and spread to more than 50 countries across Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa—infecting more than 260 people and killing more than 150 of those infected. In February 2006, the virus spread from Asia and central Europe to western Europe. By March 2006, health experts had confirmed new bird flu cases in more than 20 countries across Europe, Asia, and Africa. The first human H5N1 fatalities outside of Asia occurred in that year, with Turkey and Iraq reporting H5N1-related human deaths for the first time in January and February, followed by Azerbaijan and Egypt in March. Congress has provided funds for U.S. international avian flu efforts through three appropriations. P.L. 109-13, FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, provided $25 million to combat the spread of avian influenza. The act also permitted the Secretary of State to transfer up to $656 million for U.S. avian flu initiatives. Ultimately, $6.3 million was transferred to USAID for those purposes, providing a total of $31.3 million for U.S. global avian flu activities from those appropriations. P.L. 109-148, FY2006 Defense Department appropriations, included $3.8 billion to address pandemic influenza. P.L. 109-234, FY2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, provided $2.3 billion for avian and pandemic flu efforts, of which $30 million was appropriated to USAID for international avian flu efforts and $200 million was appropriated to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for global and domestic disease surveillance, laboratory capacity, research, and other activities. Relevant FY2007 U.S. department and agency budget justifications included some $205 million for global H5N1 initiatives. As in previous fiscal years, U.S. agencies and departments might commit additional resources to global avian flu efforts that were not specifically appropriated for those purposes. This report provides an up-to-date account of global H5N1-related human infections and deaths, outlines U.S. global avian flu programs, and presents some foreign policy issues for Congress. This report will be updated should Congress provides additional funds for global purposes, and then only if H5N1 becomes effectively transmissible from person-to-person. For information on U.S. domestic preparedness efforts, agricultural issues, and anti-avian flu efforts of overseas governments, see CRS Report RL33145, Pandemic Influenza: Domestic Preparedness Efforts, by Sarah A. Lister, CRS Report RL33795, Avian Influenza in Poultry and Wild Birds, by Jim Monke and M. Lynne Corn, and CRS Report RL33871, Foreign Countries' Response to the Avian Influenza (H5N1) Virus: Current Status, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.",79,65 "Bills, Resolutions, Nominations, and Treaties: Characteristics, Requirements, and Uses. In each chamber of Congress, four forms of legislative measure may be introduced (or, for resolutions, submitted) and acted on: bills, joint resolutions, concurrent resolutions, and resolutions of one house (""simple resolutions""). In addition, under the Constitution the Senate acts on two forms of executive business: nominations and treaties. This report provides a tabular comparison of the formal characteristics and uses of these six different kinds of business. For more information on legislative process, see http://www.crs.gov/¬øproducts/¬øguides/¬øguidehome.shtml.",55,55 "Energy and Water Development: FY2006 Appropriations. The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill in the past included funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies. After the budget request for FY2006 was submitted in February 2005, both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees reorganized their subcommittee structure and with it the content of the various appropriations bills to be introduced. In the case of Energy and Water Development, the only changes were the consolidation of DOE programs that had previously been funded by the Interior and Related Agencies bill. When these programs are included, the requested amount for FY2006 Energy and Water Development totals $29.75 billion. For FY2005, $30.17 billion was appropriated for comparable programs. On May 18, 2005, the House Appropriations Committee reported out H.R. 2419 (H.Rept. 109-86), with a total appropriation of $29.75 billion, including the programs formerly funded in the Interior and Related Agencies bill. The House passed the bill May 24. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its version of H.R. 2419 on June 16 (S.Rept. 109-84), and the Senate passed it June 30. The Senate bill totaled $31.245 billion. On November 7, 2005, the House-Senate Conference on H.R. 2419 agreed to a bill funding Energy and Water Development programs at $30.49 billion (H.Rept. 109-275). The House approved the conference report November 9, and the Senate November 14. President Bush signed the bill November 19 (P.L. 109-103). Key budgetary issues involving these programs include — the effects of performance-based budgeting and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on Army Corps of Engineers priorities, and limiting the reprogramming of funds from one Corps project to another and restricting the use of multiyear contracts (Title I) — support of major ecosystem restoration initiatives, such as Florida Everglades (Title I) and California ""Bay-Delta"" (CALFED) (Title II) — funding for the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal) — funding for developing nuclear warheads, in light of congressional action last year to cut funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and for a ""Modern Pit Facility"" to build nuclear weapons components (Title III: Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship), and — plans to reduce the time necessary to prepare the Nevada Test Site to resume nuclear weapons testing (Title III: Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship). This report will be updated as events warrant.",59,59 "Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom: Questions and Answers About U.S. Military Personnel, Compensation, and Force Structure. This report provides short answers to commonly asked questions about military personnel, compensation, and force structure issues related to Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Operation Noble Eagle is the name given to military operations related to homeland security and support to federal, state, and local agencies in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Operation Enduring Freedom includes ongoing operations in Afghanistan, operations against terrorists in other countries, and training assistance to foreign militaries which are conducting operations against terrorists. Operation Iraqi Freedom includes the invasion of Iraq, the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime, and the subsequent rebuilding and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq. The questions are grouped into three major thematic areas: personnel, compensation and force structure. The section on personnel addresses issues such as casualties, reserve mobilization, ""sole surviving"" son or daughter status, conscientious objection, and ""stop-loss."" The section on compensation addresses issues related to the pay and benefits—including casualty and death benefits—provided to members of the U.S. military participating in ONE/OEF/OIF and their families. The section on force structure addresses issues related to how ONE/OEF/OIF might affect the number of personnel needed by the military, and responds to common questions about whether a return to conscription is likely under current circumstances. This report will be updated as needed.",24,24 "From Burma to Thailand: Refugee Flows and U.S. Policy. The ruling military junta in Burma, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), has been involved in a series of attacks against Burmese minorities. Refugees from Burma currently living in Bangladesh and Thailand come from a variety of ethnic groups that have fled attacks on their villages by the Burmese army and warlords. Seven ethnic groups—Shan, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Chin, Arakan, and Kachin—have been particularly victimized. Approximately 135,000 refugees from Burma reside in camps in Thailand. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has worked with the Thai government since 1998 to register and protect those in refugee camps along the border. With no access to Burma, UNHCR is limited in its repatriation efforts. Camps were first established in Thailand in 1984. Thailand has been cooperative in helping refugees, but the scale of the problem goes beyond the refugee and resettlement camps as thousands of refugees are living elsewhere in Thailand. While the influx of asylum seekers is currently accepted by Thailand on humanitarian grounds, it has been tightening the restrictions on urban refugees and defining anyone living outside the camps as an illegal immigrant. The United States has been providing assistance for refugees along the Burmese border since the 1990s. It does not provide any bilateral assistance to Burma and sanctions against that country continue. Recent legislation (P.L. 108-61) places further sanctions on the SPDC. This report will be updated as events warrant.",81,81 """Dear Colleague"" Letters in the House of Representatives: Past Practices and Issues for Congress. The practice of one Member, committee, or office broadly corresponding to other Members, committee, or officers dates back to at least the 1800s. At least as early as 1913, this correspondence was labeled as ""Dear Colleague"" letters. Since 2003, it has been possible to track the volume of House ""Dear Colleague"" letters sent through an email-based distribution system (from 2003 to 2008) and a web-based distribution system (since 2008). The creation of the web-based e-""Dear Colleague"" distribution system in 2008 has made it possible to systematically examine ""Dear Colleague"" letters, thereby offering a clearer understanding of what are largely, but not exclusively, intra-chamber communications. Named for their opening salutation, ""Dear Colleague"" letters are official correspondence widely distributed to congressional offices. Members, committees, and officers of the House of Representatives often use ""Dear Colleague"" letters to encourage others to cosponsor, support, or oppose legislation. Additionally, senders use these letters to collect signatures, invite members to events, update congressional offices on administrative rules, and provide general information. In analyzing data on the volume of ""Dear Colleague"" letters sent between January 2003 and December 2014 in the House of Representatives, several discernable trends can be observed. Overall the total number of ""Dear Colleague"" letters continued to increase from 5,161 letters sent in 2003 to 40,487 letters sent in 2014. Additionally, examining data from the web-based e-""Dear Colleague"" system from the 111th Congress (2009-2010) and the 113th Congress (2013-2014) shows that the most common reason ""Dear Colleague"" letters are sent is to solicit cosponsorships for legislation. These cosponsor ""Dear Colleague"" letters accounted for 53.0% of letters in the 111th Congress and 42.0% in the 113th Congress. The second most frequent category in both congresses was asking for signatures for letters to congressional leadership, the President, or executive branch officials. These letters accounted for 20.8% of all letters in the 111th Congress and 25.4% in the 113th Congress. Each ""Dear Colleague"" letter can be tagged in the electronic system with up to three self-selected policy categories. Analysis of the self-selected categories shows that the broad public policy issues that were most frequently tagged in the 111th Congress remained similar in the 113th Congress. Healthcare was the most frequently selected issue category with 8.8% of letters in the 111th Congress and 8.3% of letters in the 113th Congress. In both congresses, the next most popular category was foreign affairs (7.9% and 6.9%, respectively). In the 111th Congress, education (6.0%) was third most popular followed by family issues (5.8%). For the 113th Congress, family issues was third most popular (6.1%), followed by education (5.5%). In light of the analysis of the volume, use, characteristics, and purpose of ""Dear Colleague"" letters, several possible administrative and operational questions are raised in this report to aid the House in future discussion of the electronic ""Dear Colleague"" system. These include questions on handling the growth in volume of ""Dear Colleague"" letters sent per year, and the potential to create additional mechanisms within the e-""Dear Colleague"" system to aid subscribers in managing the ""Dear Colleague"" letters they receive. For a brief explanation of how to send ""Dear Colleague"" letters, see CRS Report RL34636, ""Dear Colleague"" Letters: Current Practices, by Jacob R. Straus.",55,55 "The Year 2000 Computer Problem: Congressional Issues. Many computers were designed to store a two-digit number for the year, which makes the year 2000 indistinguishable from 1900. Unless they are corrected, many computers will not be able to process dates beyond the year 2000, and may cause many costly problems in commerce and government. In the 106th Congress, hearings are being held and will continue to provide the public with the most accurate information available on the status of Y2K remediations at federal agencies, state and local agencies, private sector entities, and international organizations. Congress may also consider additional legislation to ensure that private sector systems are compliant, to establish emergency preparedness measures to address problems that might occur, and to limit liability associated with Y2K failures for manufacturers and industry groups.",110,55 "Minimum Wage, Overtime Pay, and Child Labor: An Inventory of Proposals in the 109th Congress to Amend the Fair Labor Standards Act. This report discusses potential changes to the Fair Labor Standards Act that may occur during the 109th Congress.",90,90 "Iraqi Civilian Casualties Estimates. This report presents various governmental and non-governmental estimates of Iraqi civilian deaths. The Department of Defense (DOD) regularly updates total U.S. military deaths statistics from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as reflected in CRS Report RS21578, Iraq: U.S. Casualties, by Susan G. Chesser. However, no Iraqi or U.S. government office regularly releases publically available statistics on Iraqi civilian deaths. Statistics on Iraqi civilian deaths are sometimes available through alternative sources, such as nonprofit organizations, or through statements made by officials to the press. Because these estimates are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using these statistics and should look on them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact. See also CRS Report RS22532, Iraqi Police and Security Forces Casualties Estimates, by Hannah Fischer. This report will be updated as needed.",24,24 "U.S. Command and Control and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Aircraft. The fleet of manned aircraft accomplishing the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions for the joint military community (E-8, E-3, RC-135, WC-135, OC-135, and E-6) is primarily based on Boeing 707 aircraft procured from the 1960s to the early 1990s. As the age of these legacy C2ISR aircraft increases, understanding the Air Force and Navy modernization and recapitalization plans is likely important for Congress. This report examines the Air Force's and Navy's current sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization efforts for these Boeing 707-based aircraft, and issues Congress may take into account when considering appropriating funds for continued sustainment and modernization of these aircraft versus funding for recapitalization of these missions to new aircraft. This report addresses potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization of the DOD's Boeing 707-based legacy C2ISR aircraft fleet. It does not address options for recapitalization currently being offered by industry to other countries. Congress has the authority to approve, reject, or modify Air Force and Navy funding requests for C2ISR aircraft sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization, as well as oversight of the nation's C2ISR requirements and capabilities. Congress's decisions on appropriations for the C2ISR force could impact the nation's C2ISR capabilities and have additional consequences for the U.S. aerospace industry. The starting point for Congress's debate on legacy C2ISR sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization is the existing Boeing 707-based C2ISR fleet consisting of 89 operational aircraft, which includes 16 E-8C Joint Surveillance Targeting Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft providing airborne battle management, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 31 E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft with integrated command and control battle management (C2BM), surveillance, target detection, and tracking 17 RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT aircraft supporting theater and national level forces with near real time on-scene intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities 2 RC-135U COMBAT SENT aircraft that locate and identify foreign military land, naval, and airborne radar signals to determine detailed operating characteristics and capabilities of those systems 3 RC-135S COBRA BALL aircraft that collect optical and electronic data on ballistic missile targets 2 WC-135 Constant Phoenix atmospheric collection aircraft that collect particulate and gaseous effluents and debris from accessible regions of the atmosphere supporting the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 2 OC-135B Open Skies aircraft that perform unarmed observation flights over participating parties of the Open Skies Treaty, and 16 E-6B Mercury communications relay and strategic airborne command post aircraft. Potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the sustainment, modernization, and/or recapitalization of the DOD's Boeing 707-based legacy C2ISR aircraft fleet include a potential shortfall in C2ISR capabilities if there is a funding gap for sustainment and upgrades that would keep the weapon systems viable until they are recapitalized ascertaining DOD, Air Force, and Navy priorities for sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization determining if modernization efforts allow for delayed recapitalization efforts consideration of shifting some of the legacy C2ISR missions to remotely piloted aircraft the potential implications of reduced legacy C2ISR aircraft sustainment and modernization, and subsequent diminishing numbers of airframes on any future rounds of base realignment and closure efforts, and the ability of the nation's industrial base to sustain the legacy C2ISR aircraft force.",32,32 "Russia's Paris Club Debt and U.S. Interests. Russia faced both fiscal and external debt crises in August 1998. Russia's external debt became unmanageable as the servicing of the debt would have required 80% to 90% of the anticipated federal revenue. These crises threatened Russia's ability to govern and to continue a process of transition to a democratic market system. U.S. interests were directly involved because of the danger posed by a potentially unstable Russian economic, political and security system and the possible linkage by policy makers between economics, security, political interests and debt settlement. Relief came from a new IMF program, a short-term rescheduling ""framework agreement"" that suspended principal payments for Russian Paris Club debt through the year 2000, and substantial forgiveness of the Soviet era commercial London Club debt. Russia made debt rescheduling a key issue at the Okinawa G-8 meeting on July 21-23, 2000 and in subsequent bilateral and international meetings. When the short term framework agreement ended, Prime Minister Kasyanov announced in January 2001 a policy of partial servicing of their Paris Club debt. Creditor reaction was so strong President Putin reversed Kasyanov and assured creditors that all debt obligations would be met. Later, in early 2001, Russian leadership shifted its concern to an external debt servicing crisis expected in 2003, noting that Russia would then either need debt relief or would face default. Germany's position as leading Paris Club creditor is that Russia should be able to meet its debt obligations. Germany holds about half of the $42 billion of outstanding Paris Club debts inherited from the Soviet Union. Germany's Paris Club Russian debt rose in 2001 by inclusion of a Russian commitment to pay an earlier debt by the Soviet Union to the German Democratic Republic. The additional $6 billion Russian debt is being given special treatment by Germany. Russia and Germany are discussing debt for asset swaps for this debt. Improved Russian economic performance has generated additional currency reserves and increased revenue that has eased the burden of servicing their debts and meeting their needs for discretionary spending. Even with substantial reserves in the Russian Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance must either buy the reserves or reduce budget outlays in order to meet Paris Club debt servicing commitments. Without structural reform with changes in the incentive system, the economic upswing may be part of a cycle rather than a new trend line of sustainable economic growth. Reducing the debt service requirements through further rescheduling, limiting subsidies and containing defense spending may be necessary if Russia is to meet the budgetary needs for implementing the structural reform. U.S. options in Paris Club Soviet Era negotiations range from no rescheduling to deep debt restructuring and use of debt swaps. The United States gives more explicit attention than Germany and other Paris Club members to the linkage between Paris Club agreements and foreign and security affairs.",82,85 "Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) and other Administration documents have assigned the Department of Homeland Security specific duties associated with coordinating the nation's efforts to protect its critical infrastructure, including using a risk management approach to set priorities. Many of these duties have been delegated to what is now called the National Protection and Programs Directorate. Risk assessment involves the integration of threat, vulnerability, and consequence information. Risk management involves deciding which risk reduction measures to take based on an agreed upon risk reduction strategy. Many models/methodologies have been developed by which threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences are integrated to determine risks and then used to inform the allocation of resources to reduce those risks. For the most part, these methodologies consist of the following elements, performed, more or less, in the following order. identify assets and identify which are most critical identify, characterize, and assess threats assess the vulnerability of critical assets to specific threats determine the risk (i.e., the expected consequences of specific types of attacks on specific assets) identify ways to reduce those risks prioritize risk reduction measures based on a strategy Beginning in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security has been accumulating a list of infrastructure assets (specific sites and facilities). From this list the Department selects high-priority assets that it judges to be critical from a national point of view, based on the potential consequences associated with their loss. The Department intends to assess the vulnerability of all the high-priority assets it has identified. Department officials have described, in very general terms, that these vulnerability and consequence assessments are used to determine the risk each asset poses to the nation. This risk assessment is then used to prioritize subsequent additional protection activities. While these statements allude to some of the steps mentioned above, they do so only in a most general way. With its release of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan in June 2006, the Department has laid out a much more detailed discussion of the risk management methodology it intends to use (or is using). The Department's efforts, to date, still raise several questions, ranging from the process and criteria used to populate its lists of assets, its prioritization strategy, and the extent to which the Department is coordinating its efforts with the intelligence community and other agencies both internal and external to the Department. This report will be updated as needed.",22,22 "Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in the United States. Carbon capture and sequestration (or storage)—known as CCS—is a process that involves capturing man-made carbon dioxide (CO2) at its source and storing it permanently underground. (CCS is sometimes referred to as CCUS—carbon capture, utilization, and storage.) CCS could reduce the amount of CO2—an important greenhouse gas—emitted to the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels at power plants and other large industrial facilities. The concept of carbon utilization has gained interest within Congress and in the private sector as a means for capturing CO2 and converting it into potentially commercially viable products, such as chemicals, fuels, cements, and plastics, thereby reducing emissions to the atmosphere and helping offset the cost of CO2 capture. Direct air capture is also an emerging technology, with the promise to remove atmospheric CO2 directly and reduce its concentration. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has funded research and development (R&D) of aspects of CCS since 1997 within its Fossil Energy Research and Development (FER&D) portfolio. Since FY2010, Congress has provided more than $5 billion total in appropriations for DOE CCS-related activities. The Trump Administration proposed to reduce FER&D funding substantially in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests, but Congress has not agreed to the proposed reductions. In FY2018, Congress increased funding for DOE FER&D by nearly $59 million (9%) compared to FY2017, and the House- and Senate-passed appropriations bills for FY2019 would match or increase the appropriated amount compared to what Congress enacted for FY2018 ($727 million). The Petra Nova plant in Texas is the only U.S. fossil-fueled power plant currently generating electricity and capturing CO2 in large quantities (over 1 million tons per year). Globally, the Boundary Dam plant in Canada is the only other large-scale fossil-fueled power plant with CCS. Both facilities retrofitted post-combustion capture technology to units of existing plants, and both offset a portion of the cost of CCS by selling captured CO2 for the purpose of enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Some CCS proponents point to the expanded Section 45Q of the Internal Revenue Code tax credits for CO2 capture and sequestration or its use as a tertiary injectant for EOR or natural gas production that were enacted as part of P.L. 115-123 as a significant step toward incentivizing more development of large-scale CCS deployment like Petra Nova and Boundary Dam. A number of bills introduced in the 115th Congress potentially would affect CCS in the United States. Several bills or provisions of bills address the Section 45Q tax credits (S. 1535, S. 1663, S. 2256, H.R. 1892, H.R. 2010, H.R. 3761, H.R. 4857). H.R. 1892, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, enacted into law as P.L. 115-123, amended Section 45Q and increased the amount of the tax credit from $20 to $50 per ton of CO2 for permanent sequestration, increased it from $10 to $35 for EOR purposes, and effectively removed the 75 million ton cap on the total amount of CO2 injected underground, among other changes. Some proponents suggest that enactment of this provision could be a ""game changer"" for CCS, leading to more widespread adoption of the technology, although others question whether the increased incentives are large enough to affect CCS deployment. Other bills address a suite of measures to advance CCS. Several would provide additional financial incentives, such as tax-exempt private activity bonds, and provisions that would enable eligibility of master limited partnerships for CCS infrastructure projects (S. 843, S. 2005, H.R. 2011, and H.R. 4118). One bill (S. 2602) could help advance CCS by making CCS infrastructure projects eligible under the FAST Act (42 U.S.C. 4370m(6)). Other bills (S. 2803, S. 2997, H.R. 2296, H.R. 5745) would support increased R&D for CCS, carbon utilization technologies, and direct air capture of CO2. One bill (H.R. 4096) would authorize a $5 million prize to promote advances in CCS technology research and development. There is broad agreement that costs for CCS would need to decrease before the technologies could be deployed commercially across the nation. The issue of greater CCS deployment is fundamental to the underlying reason CCS is deemed important by a range of proponents: to reduce CO2 emissions (or reduce the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere) and to help mitigate against human-induced climate change.",42,42 "Synthetic Poliovirus: Bioterrorism and Science Policy Implications. In July 2002, an online scientific journal published a report describing how to make the virus that causes polio from mail-ordered pieces of DNA. This sparked widespread concern that the same process could be used by terrorists to make this or other biological agents. Most bioterrorism experts agree that it would be much easier, cheaper, and quicker to obtain most such agents from naturally occurring sources. Smallpox and Ebola are frequently cited as exceptions, however, these agents would be significantly more difficult to synthesize than poliovirus. To limit the threat posed by this type of research, policymakers have discussed approaches that include: increasing oversight of the DNA suppliers, limiting access to the genetic information of select pathogens, and regulating the publishing of information deemed possibly helpful to terrorists. This report will be updated as events warrant.",22,65 "State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Legislative History. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33, BBA-97) established the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) under a new Title XXI of the Social Security Act. CHIP builds on Medicaid by providing health care coverage to low-income, uninsured children in families with incomes above applicable Medicaid income standards. This report provides a summary of major changes to the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) enacted in public laws beginning with the legislation authorizing the program in 1997. It will be updated as legislative activity warrants.",70,70 "Temporary Professional, Managerial, and Skilled Foreign Workers: Policy and Trends. Temporary visas for professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers have become an important gateway for high-skilled immigration to the United States. Over the past two decades, the number of visas issued for temporary employment-based admission has more than doubled from just over 400,000 in FY1994 to over 1 million in FY2015. While these visa numbers include some unskilled and low-skilled workers as well as accompanying family members, the visas for managerial, skilled, and professional workers dominate the trends. Since 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) has authorized visas for foreign nationals who would perform needed services because of their high educational attainment, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability. Today, there are several temporary visa categories that enable employment-based temporary admissions for highly skilled foreign workers. These visa categories are commonly referred to by the letter and numeral that denote their subsection in the INA. They perform work that ranges from skilled labor to management and professional positions to jobs requiring extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics. Policymakers and advocates have focused on two visa categories in particular: H-1B visas for professional specialty workers, and L visas for intra-company transferees. These two nonimmigrant visas epitomize the tensions between the global competition for talent and potential adverse effects on the U.S. workforce. The employers of H-1B workers are the only ones required to meet labor market tests in order to hire professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers. Although foreign students on F visas are generally barred from off-campus employment, some F-1 foreign students are permitted to participate in employment known as Optional Practical Training (OPT) after completing their undergraduate or graduate studies. OPT is temporary employment that is directly related to an F-1 student's major area of study. Generally, an F-1 foreign student may work up to 12 months in OPT status. In 2008, the Bush Administration added a 17-month extension to OPT for F-1 students in STEM fields, and the Obama Administration recently proposed a 24-month extension for F-1 students in STEM fields. Congress has an ongoing interest in regulating the immigration of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to the United States. This workforce is seen by many as a catalyst of U.S. global economic competitiveness and is likewise considered a key element of the legislative options aimed at stimulating economic growth. The challenge central to the policy debate is facilitating the migration of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers without putting downward pressures on U.S. workers and U.S. students entering the labor market.",76,76 "WTO Doha Round: Implications for U.S. Agriculture. The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, launched in November 2001, has been at an impasse since 2009 and presently shows no signs of restarting, despite an interim agreement reached at the December 2013 Bali Ministerial. The goal of the Doha Round's agriculture negotiations is to make progress simultaneously across the three pillars of the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) 1994 Agricultural Agreement—domestic support, market access, and export competition—by building on the specific terms and conditions established during the previous Uruguay Round of negotiations. Negotiators have attempted to maintain a balance across the three pillars by simultaneously achieving concessions from exporters and importers alike in the form of tighter spending limits on trade-distorting domestic support, elimination of export subsidies and new disciplines on other forms of export competition, and expansion of market access by lowering tariffs, increasing quota commitments, and limiting the use of import safeguards and other trade barriers. However, as a concession to poorer WTO member countries, the degree of new conditions is to be less stringent for developing than for developed nations. Substantial progress had been made by 2008 in narrowing differences in Doha Round negotiating positions. As a result, a ""modalities framework"" (i.e., specific formulas and timetables for reducing trade-distorting farm support, tariffs, and export subsidies, and for opening import markets) was released in December 2008, in an attempt to lock in the status of negotiated concessions, while adding detail to outstanding issues as a basis for further, more specific talks. By 2009, outstanding differences had been reduced to a short list of contentious issues, including designating additional products as sensitive coupled with establishing new tariff quotas, designating developing country products as special and thus exempt from tariff reductions, and allowing developing countries to raise tariffs temporarily to deal with import surges or price declines. However, these differences proved sufficient to deadlock the negotiations. From the U.S. perspective, a successful Doha agreement (under the current negotiating text) would significantly lower allowable spending limits for certain types of U.S. domestic support and eliminate export subsidies, while allowing U.S. agricultural products wider access to foreign markets. Any assessment of the potential effect of the new domestic support programs authorized by the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) is very preliminary at this time. Many of the new programs have yet to be fully implemented, thus producer participation is uncertain and program outlays hinge on future market conditions. For example, under a relatively high price environment, as existed during the 2010-2013 period, U.S. program outlays could easily fall within proposed Doha Round limits with no or only modest changes. However, if market prices were to decline substantially below support levels for an extended period, then outlays could escalate rapidly and threaten to exceed the proposed spending limits. A concern of U.S. trade negotiators, Congress, and commodity groups is whether the draft modalities include too many exceptions for foreign importers (in terms of their ability to restrict imports) to ensure that an adequate balance will be achieved between U.S. domestic policy concessions and potential U.S. export gains. This report reviews the current status of agricultural negotiations and the modalities framework for domestic support, market access, and export subsidies, as well as the potential implications of a Doha Round agreement for U.S. agriculture.",4,4 "Social Security Retirement Earnings Test: How Earnings Affect Benefits. Under the Social Security Retirement Earnings Test (RET), the monthly benefit of a Social Security beneficiary who is below full retirement age (FRA) is reduced if he or she has earnings that exceed an annual threshold. In 2012, a beneficiary who is below FRA and will not attain FRA during the year is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $2 of earnings above $14,640. A beneficiary who will attain FRA in 2012 is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $3 of earnings above $38,880. The annual exempt amounts ($14,640 and $38,880 in 2012) generally are adjusted each year according to average wage growth. If a beneficiary is affected by the RET, his or her monthly benefit may be reduced in part or in full, depending on the total applicable reduction. For example, if the total applicable reduction is greater than the beneficiary's monthly benefit amount, no monthly benefit is payable for one or more months. If family members also receive auxiliary benefits based on the beneficiary's work record, the reduction is pro-rated and applied to all benefits payable on that work record (including benefits paid to spouses who are above FRA). For example, in the case of a family consisting of a worker beneficiary who has earnings above the annual exempt amount and a spouse and child who receive benefits based on his or her work record, the benefit reduction that applies under the RET is charged against the total family benefit. The RET has been part of the Social Security program in some form throughout the program's history. The original rationale for the RET was that, as a social insurance system, Social Security protects workers from certain risks, including the loss of earnings due to retirement. Therefore, benefits should be withheld from workers who show by their earnings that they have not ""retired."" The RET does not apply to Social Security disability beneficiaries who are subject to separate limitations on earnings. If a beneficiary is affected by the RET, his or her monthly benefit is recomputed, and the dollar amount of the monthly benefit is increased, when he or she attains FRA. This feature of the RET, which allows beneficiaries to recoup benefits ""lost"" as a result of the RET, is not widely known or understood. The benefit recomputation at FRA is done by adjusting (lessening) the actuarial reduction for retirement before FRA that was applied in the initial benefit computation to take into account months for which benefits were reduced in part or in full under the RET. Any spousal benefits that were reduced because of the RET are recomputed when the spouse attains FRA. For a spouse who has already attained FRA, however, there is no subsequent adjustment to benefits to take into account months for which no benefit or a partial benefit was paid as a result of the RET. The Social Security Administration estimates that elimination of the RET for individuals aged 62 or older would have a negative effect on the Social Security trust fund in the amount of $81 billion from 2012 to 2018, although it would have no major effect on Social Security's projected long-range financial outlook. This report explains how the RET works under current law. In addition, it provides benefit examples to illustrate the effect of the RET on Social Security beneficiaries who are below FRA and family members who receive benefits based on their work records. It also briefly discusses policy issues, including recent research on the effect of the RET on work effort and the decision to claim Social Security benefits. This report will be updated periodically.",116,116 "Osama bin Laden's Death: Implications and Considerations. The May 1, 2011, killing of Osama bin Laden (OBL) by U.S. forces in Pakistan has led to a range of views about near- and long-term security and foreign policy implications for the United States. Experts have a range of views about the killing of OBL. Some consider his death to be a largely symbolic event, while others believe it marks a significant achievement in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Individuals suggesting that his death lacks great significance argue that U.S. and allied actions had eroded OBL's ability to provide direction and support to Al Qaeda (AQ). For these analysts, OBL's influence declined following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan to a point where prior to his death he was the figurehead of an ideological movement. This argument reasons that a shift of terrorist capability has occurred away from the core of AQ to affiliated organizations. Still others argue that OBL pursued a strategy of developing the AQ organization into an ideological movement thus making it more difficult to defeat. They contend that, even if OBL were no longer involved in the decision-making apparatus of AQ, his role as the inspirational leader of the organization was far more important than any operational advice he might offer. As such, his death may not negatively affect the actions of the ideological adherents of AQ and as a martyr he may attract and inspire a greater number of followers. Individuals suggesting that his death is a major turning point in U.S. counterterrorism efforts contend that OBL remained an active participant in setting a direction for the strategy and operations of AQ and its affiliates. In addition to disrupting AQ's organizational activities some believe his death may serve as a defining moment for the post 9/11 global counterterrorism campaign as current and potential terrorists, other governments, and entities that wish to threaten U.S. interests will take note of the U.S. success in achieving a long-held security goal. The death of OBL may have near- and long-term implications for AQ and U.S. security strategies and policies. The degree to which OBL's death will affect AQ and how the U.S. responds to this event may shape the future of many U.S. national security activities. Implications and possible considerations for Congress related to the U.S. killing of OBL in Pakistan are addressed in this report. As applicable, questions related to the incident and U.S. policy implications are also offered. They address Implications for AQ (core, global affiliates, and unaffiliated adherents) Congressional notification Legal considerations National security considerations and implications for the homeland Military considerations Implications for Pakistan and Afghanistan Implications for U.S. security interests and foreign policy considerations The death of OBL is a multifaceted topic with information emerging frequently that adds perspective and context to many of the issues discussed in this report. This report is based on open-source information and will be updated as necessary.",86,86 "Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986. Estimates derived from the March Supplement of the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) indicate that the unauthorized resident alien population (commonly referred to as illegal aliens) rose from 3.2 million in 1986 to 12.4 million in 2007, before leveling off at 11.7 million in 2012. The estimated number of unauthorized aliens had dropped to 1.9 million in 1988 following passage of a 1986 law that legalized several million unauthorized aliens. Jeffrey Passel, a demographer with the Pew Research Center, has been involved in making these estimations since he worked at the U.S. Bureau of the Census in the 1980s. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) reported an estimated 11.5 million unauthorized alien residents as of January 2011, up from 8.5 million in January 2000. The OIS estimated that the unauthorized resident alien population in the United States increased by 37% over the period 2000 to 2008, before leveling off since 2009. The OIS estimated that 6.8 million of the unauthorized alien residents in 2011 were from Mexico. About 33% of unauthorized residents in 2011 were estimated to have entered the United States since 2000, but the rate of illegal entry appears to be slowing. The OIS based its estimates on data from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey. Although increased border security, a record number of alien removals, and high unemployment, among other factors, have depressed the levels of illegal migration in recent years, the number of unauthorized aliens residing in the United States remains sizeable. Research suggests that various factors have contributed to the ebb and flow of unauthorized resident aliens, and that the increase is often attributed to the ""push-pull"" of prosperity-fueled job opportunities in the United States in contrast to limited job opportunities in the sending countries. Accordingly, the economic recession that began in December 2007 may have curbed the migration of unauthorized aliens, particularly because sectors that traditionally rely on unauthorized aliens, such as construction, services, and hospitality, have been especially hard hit. Some researchers also suggest that the increased size of the unauthorized resident population during the late 1990s and early 2000s is an inadvertent consequence of border enforcement and immigration control policies. They posit that strengthened border security curbed the fluid movement of seasonal workers. This interpretation, generally referred to as a caging effect, argues that these policies raised the stakes in crossing the border illegally and created an incentive for those who succeed in entering the United States to stay. More recently, some maintain that strengthened border security measures, such as ""enforcement with consequences,"" coordinated efforts with Mexico to reduce illegal migrant recidivism, and increased border patrol agents, may be part of a constellation of factors holding down the flow. The current system of legal immigration is cited as another factor contributing to unauthorized migration. The statutory ceilings that limit the type and number of immigrant visas issued each year create long waits for visas. According to this interpretation, many foreign nationals who have family in the United States resort to illegal avenues in frustration over the delays. Some researchers speculate that record number of alien removals (e.g., reaching almost 400,000 annually since FY2009) caused a chilling effect on family members weighing unauthorized residence. Some observers point to more elusive factors when assessing the ebb and flow of unauthorized resident aliens—such as shifts in immigration enforcement priorities away from illegal entry to removing suspected terrorists and criminal aliens, or well-publicized discussions of possible ""amnesty"" legislation.",76,76 "Carbon Control in the U.S. Electricity Sector: Key Implementation Uncertainties. Congress has been debating a range of potential initiatives for reducing atmospheric CO2 from U.S. sources. Legislative proposals would seek to limit U.S. CO2 emissions to historical levels through emissions caps, carbon taxes, or other mechanisms. In the 110th Congress, the most prominent CO2 proposals sought reductions of nationwide CO2 emissions to 1990 levels or lower by 2030. President-elect Barack Obama has proposed cutting carbon CO2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and by an additional 80% by 2050. A fundamental question arising from carbon control proposals is how the CO2 reduction targets can be achieved in the electricity industry, which is responsible for nearly 40% of U.S. CO2 emissions. It appears from the policy research and technical studies that substantially reducing CO2 emissions in the U.S. electricity sector over the next few decades would likely require every key carbon mitigation measure at the nation's disposal. However, it is also clear that significant uncertainty exists about the potential of individual measures to achieve their hoped-for carbon impact Energy efficiency—Can the United States overcome socioeconomic barriers to achieve four times more potential savings than ever before? Renewable energy—Will there be enough transmission for wind power? Is there enough land to grow the needed biomass? Nuclear power—Could the United States build new plants fast enough to matter? Advanced coal power—Will banks fund them and regulators approve them? Carbon capture and sequestration—Will the technology be commercially deployable in 10 years, 25 years, or never? Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles—How much ""low carbon"" electricity would be available to charge their batteries? Distributed energy resources—Would carbon costs change distributed energy economics enough to spur deployment? As the nation's CO2 mitigation policies develop, the inherent uncertainty associated with specific carbon measures may be a critical concern. Commitments to specific carbon emissions targets over time, or to a specific schedule of carbon costs (whatever form they may take) may be greatly affected by the success of the underlying measures relied upon to achieve them. Notwithstanding the best efforts of federal policy makers, it is possible that, given the uncertainties each faces, few if any of the major measures proposed to moderate U.S. carbon emissions will achieve their anticipated impacts in a 20-year time frame. As Congress considers implementing CO2 policies, keeping a close eye on the technology and market developments associated with every key measure could be a priority. Balancing responses to energy market volatility and unexpected structural changes against the need for a predictability in R&D and private capital investment may be essential to maintaining the nation on course to meaningful atmospheric CO2 reduction.",42,42 "The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC): A Brief Legislative History. The earned income tax credit (EITC), when first enacted on a temporary basis in 1975, was a modest tax credit that provided financial assistance to low-income, working families with children. After various legislative changes over the past 40 years, the credit is now one of the federal government's largest antipoverty programs. Since the EITC's enactment, Congress has shown increasing interest in using refundable tax credits for a variety of purposes, from reducing the tax burdens of families with children (the child tax credit), to helping families afford higher education (the American opportunity tax credit), to subsidizing health insurance premiums (the premium assistance tax credit). The legislative history of the EITC may provide context to current and future debates about these refundable tax credits. The origins of the EITC can be found in the debate in the late 1960s and 1970s over how to reform welfare—known at the time as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). During this time, there was increasing concern over growing welfare rolls. Senator Russell Long proposed a ""work bonus"" plan that would supplement the wages of poor workers. The intent of the plan was to encourage the working poor to enter the labor force and thus reduce the number of families needing AFDC. This ""work bonus"" plan, renamed the earned income tax credit, was enacted on a temporary basis as part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-12). As originally enacted, the credit was equal to 10% of the first $4,000 in earnings. Hence, the maximum credit amount was $400. The credit phased out between incomes of $4,000 and $8,000. The credit was also viewed as a means to encourage economic growth in the face of the 1974 recession and rising food and energy prices. Over the subsequent 40 years, numerous legislative changes have been made to this credit. Some changes increased the amount of the credit by changing the credit formula. Major laws that increased the amount of the credit include the following P.L. 101-508, which adjusted the credit amount for family size and created a credit for workers with no qualifying children P.L. 103-66, which increased the maximum credit for tax filers with children and created a new credit formula for certain low-income, childless tax filers P.L. 107-16, which increased the income level at which the credit phased out for married tax filers in comparison to unmarried tax filers (referred to as ""marriage penalty relief""), and P.L. 111-5, which increased the credit amount for families with three or more children and expanded the marriage penalty relief enacted as part of P.L. 107-16. Other legislative changes changed the eligibility rules for the credit. Major laws that changed the eligibility rules of the credit include the following P.L. 103-66, which expanded the definition of an eligible EITC claimant to include certain individuals who had no qualifying children P.L. 104-193, which required tax filers to provide valid Social Security numbers (SSNs) for work purposes for themselves, spouses if married filing jointly, and any qualifying children, in order to be eligible for the credit, and P.L. 105-34, which introduced additional compliance rules to reduce improper claims of the credit. Together, these changes reflect congressional intent to expand this benefit while also better targeting it to certain recipients.",102,117 "Tax Activity in the 107th Congress. After passing a major multi-year tax cut in Mid-2001 (which was sunsetted after 10 years) and a stimulus bill in 2002, Congress considered, but did not complete, work on energy tax subsidies, tax incentives for charitable giving deductions, pension diversification in the wake of the ENRON problems, and tax shelters. The House passed several bills that would make the multiyear tax cut permanent as well as a bill to speed up certain provisions. This report will not be updated.",102,102 "The Special Registration for Telemedicine: In Brief. Suppress In response to the concerns about the opioid epidemic, the Trump Administration proposed expanding access to telemedicine services such as for the prescribing of medicine used for substance abuse or mental health treatment. Telemedicine is the electronic delivery of a clinical health care service via a technological method. Section 311(h)(1) of the Controlled Substance Act (CSA), which was added by Section 3 of the Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2008 (Ryan Haight Act, P.L. 110-425), authorized the special registration for telemedicine with the goal of increasing patients' access to practitioners that can prescribe controlled substances via telemedicine in limited circumstances. Section 802(21) of Title 21, U.S.C. defines a practitioner as a physician, dentist, veterinarian, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices or does research, to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis, a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research. The registration would enable a practitioner to deliver, distribute, dispense, or prescribe via telemedicine a controlled substance to a patient who has not been medically examined in-person by the prescribing practitioner. For example in the event of an opioid overdose, a patient might need a prescription for an opioid antagonist such as naloxone from a practitioner who has never examined the patient in-person prior to the telemedicine encounter. While the CSA authorized the special registration for telemedicine, practitioners have not been able to apply for this special registration. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has yet to finalize a rule on the registration's application process and procedures and the limited circumstances that warrant it. As a result, Congress is considering the Special Registration for Telemedicine Clarification Act of 2018 (H.R. 5483). H.R. 5483 would require the DEA, in a joint effort with the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to issue a rule on the special registration for telemedicine within one year of the enactment of the bill (as amended). On June 12, 2018, the House passed H.R. 5483 under suspension of the rules. On June 13, 2018, the Senate referred the bill to the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee.",66,67 "Muslims in Europe: Promoting Integration and Countering Extremism. Many European countries have large and growing Muslim minorities. This is particularly true for the countries of Western Europe that have experienced influxes of Muslim immigrants over the last several decades from a variety of Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries, as well as Turkey and the Balkans. Today, although some Muslims in Europe are recent immigrants, others are second- or third-generation Europeans. While expanding Muslim communities pose significant social and economic policy questions for European governments, the realization that some segments of Europe's Muslim populations may be susceptible to radicalization and terrorist recruitment has also sparked security concerns in the decade since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involved in radical activities. However, events such as the 2004 and 2005 terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, respectively, that were carried out by Muslim citizens or residents, have raised the question of whether European countries have done enough to integrate their Muslim communities and prevent feelings of social exclusion and marginalization. Although not the sole cause of radicalization and terrorism, some experts believe that past failures to fully integrate Muslims into mainstream European society may make some Muslims in Europe more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Over the last several years, European governments have stepped up their efforts to improve Muslim integration. These have included introducing new citizenship laws and language requirements, promoting dialogue with Muslim organizations, developing ""homegrown"" imams more familiar with European culture and traditions, improving educational and economic opportunities for Muslims, and tackling racism and discrimination. At the same time, European governments have also sought to strengthen security measures and tighten immigration and asylum policies to prevent radicalization and combat terrorism. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. officials have expressed concerns that Europe may be a potential recruiting ground for attacks on the United States or U.S. interests abroad. Successive U.S. administrations and Members of Congress have welcomed European initiatives to promote better integration of Muslims and curtail Islamist extremism in the hopes that such efforts will ultimately help prevent future terrorist incidents. U.S. interest in how European countries are managing their growing Muslim populations has also been motivated by worries about the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), especially given that terrorists with European citizenship have entered U.S. territory on the VWP in the past. Recently, U.S. and European policymakers have also sought to enhance cooperation on measures aimed at countering violent extremism, especially the brand promoted by Al Qaeda. In light of the July 2011 killings in Norway by a right-wing extremist disturbed by what he viewed as Islam's growing influence in the West, some note that in addition to improving measures to counter Islamist extremists, U.S. and European security services should cooperate on combating threats posed by domestic radicals on both the extreme right and left. This report examines policies aimed at promoting integration, combating terrorism, and countering violent extremism in five European countries with significant Muslim populations: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The report also evaluates the role of the 27-member European Union (EU) in shaping European laws and policies related to integration and counter-radicalization.",86,87 "U.S. Aerospace Manufacturing: Industry Overview and Prospects. Aircraft and automobile manufacturing are considered by many to be the technological backbones of the U.S. manufacturing base. As the Obama Administration and Congress debate how to strengthen American manufacturing, aerospace is likely to receive considerable attention. Like other manufacturing industries, the worldwide recession has affected aerospace manufacturing, with both the defense and commercial sides of the industry facing difficult business conditions for the near and medium term. This report primarily provides a snapshot of the U.S. commercial (non-defense, non-space) aerospace manufacturing industry and a discussion of major trends affecting the future of this industry. The large commercial jet aviation market is a duopoly shared by the U.S. aircraft manufacturer Boeing and the European aircraft maker Airbus, with fierce competition between these two companies. The regional jet market is dominated by two non-U.S. headquartered manufacturers, Brazil's Embraer and Canada's Bombardier, both of which utilize a high level of U.S.-produced content in their products. The general aviation market includes companies such as Cessna and Gulfstream. Aerospace manufacturing is an important part of the U.S. manufacturing base. It comprised 2.8% of the nation's manufacturing workforce in 2008 and employed over 500,000 Americans in high-skilled and high-wage jobs. More than half (61%) of the nation's aerospace industry jobs are located in six states: Washington state, California, Texas, Kansas, Connecticut, and Arizona. Several smaller aerospace manufacturing clusters are found in states such as Florida, Georgia, Ohio, Missouri, and Alabama. Other aerospace centers are beginning to emerge in southern states, such as South Carolina, where Boeing is now building a second production line to produce the 787 Dreamliner. Aerospace manufacturing contributes significantly to the U.S. economy, with total sales by aerospace manufacturers (including defense and space) comprising 1.4% of the U.S. gross domestic product in 2008. U.S. aircraft manufacturers depend heavily on the international market for their sales. The aerospace industry sold more than $95 billion in aerospace vehicles and equipment (including defense and space) to overseas customers in markets such as Japan, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and imported over $37 billion in aerospace products from abroad, providing a significant positive contribution of $57.7 billion to the U.S. trade balance in 2008. Increasingly, other markets are becoming important as an opportunity to increase U.S. sales, but also because of the potential for future competitors to challenge the U.S. aerospace industry's competitive position. U.S. aerospace exports to China have increased since 2003, totaling $5.5 billion in 2008. At the same time, some analysts maintain that China could become a global competitor in the commercial aerospace market. Already, China is working to develop airplanes that could become globally competitive in both the regional jet and large commercial jet aviation market. Russia has stated that it wants to become the world's third-largest aircraft manufacturer by 2015. Congress has been discussing issues affecting the competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace manufacturing industry for most of this decade. Among the concerns and issues affecting the future of the commercial sector of the industry are export control policies, environmental concerns, and an aging aerospace workforce. Additionally, the United States and the European Union are engaged in a long-running trade dispute over subsidies, with each side claiming the other subsidizes its domestic companies.",112,48 "The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress. In its May 2009 budget request for FY2010, the Obama Administration has requested $96.8 million for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). GPOI was established in mid-2004 as a five-year program with intended annual funding to total $660 million from FY2005 through FY2009. (Actual funds allocated to the GPOI program from FY2005 through FY2009 totaled, as of April 2009, some $480.4 million.) The centerpiece of the Bush Administration's efforts to prepare foreign security forces to participate in international peacekeeping operations, GPOI's primary purpose has been to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. In October 2008, the National Security Council's Deputies Committee approved a five-year renewal of GPOI's mandate. Congressional approval of the FY2010 budget request would provide funding for the first year of this extension. To date, GPOI also provides support for the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), an Italian ""train-the-trainer"" training center for gendarme (constabulary police) forces in Vicenza, Italy. In addition, GPOI promotes the development of an international transportation and logistics support system for peacekeepers, and encourages information exchanges to improve international coordination of peace operations training and exercises. Through GPOI, the United States supports and participates in a G* Africa Clearinghouse and a G8++ Global Clearinghouse, both to coordinate international peacekeeping capacity building efforts. GPOI incorporates previous capabilities-building programs for Africa. From FY1997 to FY2005, the United States spent just over $121 million on GPOI's predecessor program that was funded through the State Department Peacekeeping (PKO) account: the Clinton Administration's African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor, the Bush Administration's African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. (ACOTA is now GPOI's principal training program in Africa.) Some 16,000 troops from ten African nations were trained under the early ACRI/ACOTA programs. Some $33 million was provided from FY1998 to FY2005 to support classroom training of 31 foreign militaries through the Foreign Military Financing account's Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Within a year after GPOI was initiated in late 2004, the Administration began expanding its geographical scope to selected countries in Central America, Europe, and Asia. In 2006 and 2007, the program was further expanded to countries in Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific. GPOI now includes 53 ""partner"" countries and two partner organizations throughout the world, although the emphasis is still on Africa. According to figures provided by the State Department, almost 57,600 peacekeeper trainees and peacekeeper trainers were trained as of January 31, 2009.. Congress has tended to view the concept of the GPOI program favorably, albeit sometimes with reservations. Over the years, the State Department has addressed various congressional concerns. In a June 2008 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended several further improvements (GAO-08-754). In its first action on GPOI during the 111th Congress, the House passed legislation authorizing the Secretary of State to carry out and expand GPOI programs and activities (Section 1108 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, H.R. 2410, passed June 10, 2009).",21,79 "Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy. Congress created Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to help workers and firms adjust to dislocation that may be caused by increased trade liberalization. It is justified now, as it was then, on grounds that the government has an obligation to help the ""losers"" of policy-driven trade opening. TAA is also presented as an alternative to policies that would restrict imports, and so provides assistance while bolstering freer trade and diminishing prospects for potentially costly tension (retaliation) among trade partners. As in the past, critics strongly debate the merits of TAA on equity, efficiency, and budgetary grounds. Nonetheless, finding agreement on TAA remains important for forging a compromise on national trade policy. TAA program authorizations are scheduled to expire on December 31, 2013. The Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2013 (S. 1357) was introduced in the 113th Congress. It would extend TAA programs through 2020. President Obama also supports TAA reauthorization, linking it to renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which Congress may also take up this year. This report discusses the role of TAA in U.S. trade policy from its inception as a legislative option in the early 1950s to its core role as a cornerstone of modern trade policy that many argue has served to promote the long-term U.S. trade liberalization agenda. When TAA was reauthorized through December 31, 2013 in the 112th Congress, Democratic leaders and the Obama Administration considered TAA a quid pro quo for passage of three implementing bills for free trade agreements (FTAs) with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. There was, however, considerable partisan debate over the direction TAA should take. Congress had expanded TAA in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 from an earlier version in the Trade Act of 2002. The issue before the 112th Congress was how to craft a compromise TAA bill that would receive bipartisan support in the both houses, and assure its passage along with the three implementing bills. Such an understanding was developed and became part of H.R. 2832, a bill to reauthorize the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In an elaborate legislative procedure, both chambers passed the four trade bills on October 12, 2011. TAA reauthorization in the 113th Congress will likely revive a historical debate over the role of TAA as part of broader trade policy. Legislation introduced so far reflects a status quo extension of existing programs through the end of 2020, including reauthorization at existing levels of $16 million and $90 million, respectively, for the firms and workers programs. Nonetheless, Congress may take up a broader debate on the issue, if history provides any guidance.",52,50 "Energy and Water Development: FY2016 Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship. The annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and several independent agencies. The DOE budget includes funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE. NNSA operates three programs: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, which secures nuclear materials worldwide, conducts R&D into nonproliferation and verification, and operates the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program, Naval Reactors, which ""is responsible for all U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion work"", and Weapons Activities. The latter is the subject of this report. It operates the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which maintains the U.S. nuclear gravity bombs and missile warheads and has science and infrastructure programs that support that mission. (The Department of Defense [DOD] operates the bombers and missiles that would deliver nuclear weapons, it is funded in the Department of Defense appropriations bill.) The Armed Services Committees authorize funds for DOD and NNSA programs. The FY2016 request proposed moving counterterrorism programs from Weapons Activities to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. On a basis comparable to the FY2016 budget structure, the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 83/P.L. 113-235) provided $8,007.7 million for Weapons Activities. The FY2016 request was $8,846.9 million, a 10.5% increase over FY2015. The House Appropriations Committee recommended providing $8,713.0 million for FY2016. The House passed H.R. 2028, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016, by a vote of 240-177 on May 1. The bill as passed by the House made no changes to the Weapons Activities section of the committee bill. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported the bill on May 21. It recommended providing $8,882.4 million. Congress provided 8,846.9 million for Weapons Activities in the omnibus appropriations bill for FY2016 (H.R. 2029). Weapons Activities has four main programs, each with a request of over $1 billion for FY2016, as follows. FY2015-enacted amounts included below are comparable to the FY2016 budget structure. Directed Stockpile Work works directly on nuclear weapons. It includes life extension programs, maintenance, and others. The FY2015-enacted amount was $2,797.2 million, the FY2016 request was $3,187.3 million, a 13.9% increase. H.R. 2028, as passed by the House, provided $3,354.3 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $3,039.5 million. The omnibus appropriations bill provided $3,387.8 million. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Programs, which advances the science, engineering, computation, and manufacturing that support Directed Stockpile Work. The FY2015-enacted amount was $1,766.2 million, the FY2016 request was $1,776.6 million, a 0.6% increase. H.R. 2028, as passed by the House, provided $1,774.2 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $1,766.3 million. The omnibus appropriations bill provided $1,818.5 million. Infrastructure and Safety (I&S), a budget category that NNSA proposed in its FY2016 request, includes operations of facilities, recapitalization, maintenance, safety operations, and other programs. The FY2015-enacted comparable amount was $1,386.7 million, the FY2016 request was $1,466.1 million, a 5.7% increase. The House Appropriations Committee recommended consolidating I&S into Infrastructure and Operations. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $1,466.1 million for I&S. The omnibus appropriations bill accepted the House budget structure and consolidated I&S into Infrastructure and Operations, as described next. Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) funds material recycle and recovery, recapitalization of facilities, and construction of facilities. Prior to FY2016, it also funded operations of the nuclear weapons complex. The FY2015-enacted amount was $2,033.4 million, the FY2016 request was $1,054.5 million, with the decrease due to transferring funds to I&S. The FY2015 comparable request for RTBF was $688.0 million, so on a comparable basis FY2016 RTBF increased by 53.3%. The House Appropriations Committee recommended consolidating funding for RTBF, Infrastructure and Safety, and Site Stewardship into a new category, Infrastructure and Operations (I&O), for which it recommended $2,228.2 million. H.R. 2028, as passed by the House, accepted this budget structure. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended keeping I&S and Site Stewardship as separately funded categories, and providing $1,021.1 million for I&O and $36.6 million for Site Stewardship. The omnibus appropriations bill accepted the consolidated funding structure, and provided $2,279.1 million for Infrastructure and Operations (I&O). Weapons Activities also includes several smaller programs, all of which are described in this report: Secure Transportation Asset, Site Stewardship, Defense Nuclear Security, Information Technology and Cybersecurity, and Legacy Contractor Pensions.",59,32 "Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education: FY2013 Appropriations Overview. This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress to provide FY2013 appropriations for the accounts funded by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) appropriations bill. The L-HHS-ED bill provides funding for all accounts subject to the annual appropriations process at the Departments of Labor (DOL) and Education (ED). It provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration is funded via the Agriculture bill). The L-HHS-ED bill also provides funding for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration. Continuing Resolutions: On March 26, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6). Division F of this law includes a full-year continuing resolution (CR) for L-HHS-ED. With limited exceptions, the full-year CR generally funds discretionary L-HHS-ED programs at their FY2012 levels, minus an across-the-board rescission of 0.2% per Section 3004, as interpreted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The full-year CR superseded a six-month CR for FY2013 (P.L. 112-175) that had been enacted on September 28, 2012. The six-month CR generally funded discretionary L-HHS-ED programs at their FY2012 rates, plus 0.612%. Sequestration: On March 1, 2013, President Obama issued a sequestration order, as required under the terms of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended. The order called for an across-the-board cut of 5.0% for non-exempt nondefense discretionary funding, 2.0% for certain Medicare funding (per a special rule), and 5.1% for other non-exempt nondefense mandatory funding. Because the sequester was ordered before the enactment of the FY2013 full-year CR, OMB calculated the amounts to be sequestered based on annualized funding levels in place under the six-month FY2013 CR (P.L. 112-175). In light of the enactment of the full-year appropriations law, the effect of these reductions at the account, program, project, and activity level remains unclear, pending further guidance from OMB as to how these reductions are to be applied. Disaster Relief Funding: On January 29, 2013, the President signed into law a supplemental appropriations bill in response to Hurricane Sandy (P.L. 113-2). This disaster supplemental included roughly $827 million for L-HHS-ED programs and activities, the majority of which ($800 million) went to HHS to support health, mental health, and social services needs in affected states, including costs related to the construction and renovation of damaged health, mental health, biomedical research, child care, and Head Start facilities. House Actions on L-HHS-ED Bill (112th Congress): On July 18, 2012, the House Appropriations L-HHS-ED Subcommittee approved a draft FY2013 L-HHS-ED bill. This bill was not introduced or marked up by the full committee prior to the end of the 112th Congress. A detailed table on programs funded by the bill was not made publicly available and, as such, this report includes only limited information on the draft House subcommittee bill. Senate Actions on L-HHS-ED Bill (112th Congress): On June 14, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2013 L-HHS-ED bill (S. 3295, S.Rept. 112-176). The committee report estimated that this bill included $166.0 billion in discretionary funds, which is about 1.2% more than the committee's estimate of comparable FY2012 funds ($164.1 billion). In addition, the committee report estimated the bill included $611.6 billion in mandatory funds, for a combined total of $777.6 billion (+4.9% from the comparable FY2012 funding level). President's Request: On February 13, 2012, prior to the initiation of congressional action on FY2013 appropriations, the Obama Administration released the FY2013 President's Budget. The President's Budget, as estimated in the committee report accompanying the FY2013 Senate bill (S.Rept. 112-176), called for $166.1 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED accounts (+1.2% from FY2012). In addition, the President requested $611.6 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $777.6 billion (+4.9% from FY2012) in L-HHS-ED appropriations. DOL Snapshot: The FY2013 Senate committee bill from the 112th Congress would have provided roughly $12.3 billion in discretionary funding for DOL. This amount is 1.7% less than the comparable FY2012 funding level of $12.6 billion and 3.0% more than the FY2013 request of $12.0 billion, as estimated in S.Rept. 112-176. HHS Snapshot: The FY2013 Senate committee bill from the 112th Congress would have provided roughly $71.0 billion in discretionary funding for HHS. This amount is 2% more than the comparable FY2012 funding level of $69.6 billion and 1.4% more than the FY2013 request of $70.0 billion, as estimated in S.Rept. 112-176. ED Snapshot: The FY2013 Senate committee bill from the 112th Congress would have provided roughly $68.5 billion in discretionary funding for ED. This amount is 0.6% more than the comparable FY2012 funding level of $68.1 billion and 2.0% less than the FY2013 request of $69.9 billion, as estimated in S.Rept. 112-176. Related Agencies Snapshot: The FY2013 Senate committee bill from the 112th Congress would have provided roughly $14.1 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED related agencies. This amount is 2.3% more than the comparable FY2012 funding level of $13.8 billion and 0.2% less than the FY2013 request of $14.2 billion, as estimated in S.Rept. 112-176.",59,59 "Medicare's Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) Three-Day Inpatient Stay Requirement: In Brief. Medicare beneficiaries are generally entitled to coverage for care they receive in a skilled nursing facility (SNF). However, Medicare beneficiaries can be liable for substantial cost sharing related to the care they receive in an SNF if that care is not preceded by a hospital inpatient stay of at least three days. On an increasing basis, however, Medicare beneficiaries are failing to meet this three-day inpatient stay requirement because they are receiving shorter inpatient hospital stays and overnight observation care as hospital outpatients, often for days at a time, which does not qualify for Medicare Part A-covered SNF care. key terms: Medicare, SNF, hospital, outpatient observation, three day, three day inpatient, skilled nursing facility, post-acute care, 3-day inpatient stay requirement, Medicare Part A, Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA, P.L. 100-360), NOTICE Act (P.L. 114-42).",71,71 "Discriminatory Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act: Brief Background and Analysis. The Robinson-Patman (R-P) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a, makes it unlawful, with certain exceptions, to knowingly sell goods ""in commerce,"" for use or sale within the United States, at differing prices to contemporaneous buyers of those goods. The ""in commerce"" language of Robinson-Patman has been held to mean that the interstate commerce requirement is satisfied only when at least one of the two (or more) sales is made ""in the stream of commerce""—that is, across state lines. Enacted during the Depression at the behest of small grocers who feared the buying power of large and growing chain grocers, Robinson-Patman is the exception to the notion that the antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors in that it generally prohibits precisely the kind of price differentiation which would normally be thought to result from vigorous competition. Allegations of Robinson-Patman violations may be defended by asserting and proving either that the differing prices reflect only the cost of the seller's manufacture or delivery (the ""cost justification"" defense), or, that the seller is attempting either (1) to meet the competition of another seller, or (2) enable his buyer to meet the competition of a competitor of the buyer (""meeting competition"" defense). In addition, there is also a broad exception to the prohibition against price discrimination when one of the sales is made to any of certain entities listed in the Nonprofit Institutions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13c, and the goods are purchased for the institution's ""own use"", nonprofits may not, however, take advantage of their privileged Robinson-Patman status to purchase commodities at favorable prices in order to compete commercially with entities not so entitled. Further, lower courts have found that health maintenance organizations (HMOs) qualify as organizations entitled to take advantage of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, on the theory that they perform services that traditionally have been considered as ""charitable"", the Supreme Court has not had occasion to rule on the status of HMOs. Disfavored purchasers who prove a Robinson-Patman violation are not, however, automatically entitled to damages on that account. The Supreme Court has held that since, technically, Robinson-Patman prohibits any price differential whose effect ""may be substantially to lessen competition, (emphasis added),"" not all proven R-P violations actually damage those who prove them: ""[t]o recover treble damages... a plaintiff must... make some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent""—that is, a causal connection between the violation and the injury allegedly suffered. Although there have been some attempts at amending or repealing Robinson-Patman, none has been successful. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has always believed the statute to be inflationary, that it artificially deprives consumers of the advantages of the lower prices that are the aim of the antitrust laws, and that, inter alia, it ""reduces pricing flexibility [and] discourages the development of efficient distribution systems."" Small businesses, and others, have contended, on the other hand, that their survival depends on the prevention of unjustified price differentials. Whether the current economic climate will revive efforts to modify the statute, which has not been enforced by the Department of Justice since its enactment, and has been enforced sporadically by the Federal Trade Commission, is not known.",10,10 "Internet Gambling: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal Law. This is a summary of the federal criminal statutes implicated by conducting illegal gambling using the Internet. Gambling is primarily a matter of state law, reinforced by federal law in instances where the presence of an interstate or foreign element might otherwise frustrate the enforcement policies of state law. State officials and others have expressed concern that the Internet may be used to bring illegal gambling into their jurisdictions. Illicit Internet gambling implicates at least seven federal criminal statutes. It is a federal crime (1) to conduct an illegal gambling business under the Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18 U.S.C. 1955, (2) to use the telephone or telecommunications to conduct an illegal gambling business involving sporting events or contests under the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. 1084, (3) to use the facilities of interstate commerce to conduct an illegal gambling business under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952, (4) to conduct the activities of an illegal gambling business involving either the collection of an unlawful debt or a pattern of gambling offenses, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provisions, 18 U.S.C. 1962, (5) to launder the proceeds from an illegal gambling business or to plow them back into such a business under money laundering provisions of 18 U.S.C. 1956, (6) to spend more than $10,000 of the proceeds from an illegal gambling operation at any one time and place under the money laundering provisions, 18 U.S.C. 1957, or (7) for a gambling business to accept payment for illegal Internet gambling under the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA), 31 U.S.C. 5361-5367. Enforcement of these provisions has been challenged on constitutional grounds. Attacks based on the Commerce Clause, the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech, and the Due Process Clause have enjoyed little success. The commercial nature of a gambling business seems to satisfy doubts under the Commerce Clause. The limited First Amendment protection afforded crime facilitating speech encumbers free speech objections. The due process arguments raised in contemplation of federal prosecution of offshore Internet gambling operations suffer when financial transactions with individuals in the United States are involved. This report is an abridged form, without footnotes, full citations, or supplementary material, of CRS Report 97-619, Internet Gambling: Overview of Federal Criminal Law. Related CRS reports include CRS Report RS22749, Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) and Its Implementing Regulations, and CRS Report R41614, Remote Gaming and the Gambling Industry.",14,14 "Comparative Clinical Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness Research: Background, History, and Overview. Comparative clinical effectiveness research has been discussed as a source of information for health care decision makers that may aid them in reaching evidence-based decisions. The premise that ""what is newest is not always the best"" is the core of the rationale behind comparative effectiveness research. Diverse governmental and non-governmental organizations have publicly expressed their support and reservations about comparative effectiveness research. Many bills have been introduced in the 110th Congress that support comparative effectiveness research, including S. 3, H.R. 2184, H.R. 3162 (CHAMP Act), and the Healthy Americans Act (S. 334 and H.R. 3163). Although publicly supported by many governmental and non-governmental entities in the abstract, controversy about comparative clinical effectiveness research lies in its practice and implementation. Health technology assessment tools (e.g., comparative clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and cost-benefit analysis) have been used for decades in the United States. To determine whether and what type of research is needed, the scope and scale of current comparative effectiveness research efforts must be understood. This report summarizes research efforts that have been funded and conducted. Both the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) provide extramural research funding for health technology assessments. AHRQ's ongoing health technology assessment program includes the Centers for Education and Research on Therapeutics (CERTs), the Developing Evidence to Inform Decisions about Effectiveness (DEcIDE) Program, Evidence-based Practice Centers (EPCs), and the Research Initiative in Clinical Economics (RICE). The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) also have centers that conduct health technology assessments to help the agencies make formulary and pricing decisions. Health technology assessments by AHRQ's Medical Treatment Effectiveness Program (MEDTEP) and the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) were terminated in 1995. Some organizations that have used these assessments include the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP), Consumer Reports' Best Buy Drugs project, the DOD, for-profit firms (including consulting firms, private insurers, and pharmaceutical manufacturers), the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Oregon Health Plan, and the VHA. Some other countries have given comparative clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness more explicit roles in their health care systems. Proponents maintain that a new comparative clinical effectiveness research entity in the United States could have the potential to increase the efficiency and coordination of research, boost the perceived independence and scientific integrity of the research, or generate research not currently being conducted. Realizing such anticipated gains could depend on many factors. This report will be updated upon legislative activity.",72,67 "Government Performance and Results Act: Brief History and Implementation Activities. This report discusses implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) P.L. 103-62 (107 Stat. 285). General Accounting Office reports, congressional reviews, and Office of Management and Budget documents indicate that while agencies are making progress in implementing the law, they encounter difficulties when trying to use results-oriented goals measures, and data. Interest is growing in using results-oriented information in authorizations oversight, and funding decisions. The Bush Administration identifies budget and performance integration as one of five government-wide initiatives to improve management. S. 837 H.R. 1227, H.R. 3826, and S. 1668 / H.R. 3213 would require use of performance measures. This report will not be updated. For updated information see Federal Program Performance Review: Some Recent Developments, CRS Report RL32671, Performance Management and Budgeting in the Federal Government: Brief History and Recent Developments, CRS Report RL32164, and A Sunset Commission for the Federal Government, CRS Report RS22181.",56,56 "The Section 198 Brownfields Tax Incentive: 2007 CRS Survey. What was regarded as a key brownfields tax incentive in the Internal Revenue Code expires on December 31, 2007. Originally enacted in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34), the provision allows a taxpayer to fully deduct the costs of environmental cleanup in the year the costs were incurred (called ""expensing""), rather than spreading the costs over a period of years (""capitalizing""). The provision was adopted to stimulate the cleanup and development of less seriously contaminated sites by providing a benefit to taxpaying developers of brownfield properties. It also contains a ""recapture"" provision, which diminishes its benefits. In each of its budget proposals since FY2003, the administration has proposed that Congress make the incentive permanent. The 109th Congress renewed the provision (for the fourth time) through 2007 (P.L. 109-432) and made it effective retroactively to December 31, 2005, when the previous extension expired. The law also made sites contaminated by petroleum products eligible for the tax incentive. The 110th Congress may consider a variety of options, including granting another extension, making the incentive permanent, allowing it to expire, or repealing the recapture requirement. Until recently, information on the extent of use of the brownfields tax incentive could not be determined from federal income tax returns. Use of a new tax form, Schedule M-3, for corporations and partnerships with assets over $10 million began being phased in with tax year 2004. The first of those data, covering the 2004 tax year, became available in February 2007. They showed that section 198 environmental remediation costs of $295 million were reported by 110 corporations, out of a population of 5,557,965 corporate returns. This information is understated because it excluded more than half of all corporations, and all partnerships. To take advantage of the tax break, a developer has to obtain a certification from the state environmental agency that the site qualifies as a brownfield. CRS surveyed the agencies of all states in 2003, and again in 2007, to ask how many certification applications they had received and approved. In 2003, 27 states reported that they had received a total of 161 applications since enactment in 1997, of which 147 were approved. In 2007, 29 states reported that they had received 175 applications over the previous four years, of which 170 were approved. The results were somewhat surprising, before enactment in 1997 the Treasury Department and the Environmental Protection Agency had expected it to be used as many as 10,000 times per year. Accordingly, CRS also asked the state agencies, four private developers, and the editor of a trade publication for their views on why the tax incentive was so little used. There was divided opinion on the utility of the tax incentive, and criticism of its stop-and-go nature due to its expiration and renewal every one or two years. The Schedule M-3 data for firms with more than $10 million in assets confirm the CRS survey findings of modest use of the section 198 brownfields tax incentive. The tax form was fully phased in with tax year 2006, and full information will be available in February 2009. However, as discussed in this report, it appears that the section 198 tax break is a useful tool in some brownfield situations.",102,102 "Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values. This report considers proposals to extend the duration of copyrights by 20 years (as in H.R. 2589 and other bills) and related proposals to charge a fee to the owners in order to receive the extension. The method of analysis is economic rather than legal. The report reviews the basic economic principals involved in copyright law and gives rough estimates of the value of copyrights on books, music, and movies produced in the 1920s and 1930s — those that would be most immediately affected by an extension of copyright terms.",9,9 "Making Private Entities and Individuals Immune from Tort Liability by Declaring Them Federal Employees. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2671-2680, makes the United States liable, in accordance with the law of the state where a tort occurs, for some of the torts of its employees committed within the scope of their employment. It also makes federal employees immune from all lawsuits arising under state law for torts committed within the scope of their employment. (The FTCA does not prevent a federal employee from being sued for violating the Constitution or a federal statute that authorizes suit against an individual.) Sometimes, Congress wishes to immunize a private organization, or its employees or volunteers, from tort liability. One way it may do so is to enact a statute declaring that the organization or its employees or volunteers shall be deemed federal employees for purposes of the FTCA. This report discusses the pros and cons of this type of statute, and then provides examples of more than 50 such statutes.",58,58 "United States-Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Free Trade Agreement Negotiations: Background and Potential Issues. Negotiations to launch a free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and the five members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland) began on June 3, 2003. In April 2006, negotiators suspended FTA negotiations, launching a new work program on intensifying the trade and investment relationship with an FTA as a long term goal. A potential FTA would eliminate tariffs over time, reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers, liberalize service trade, protect intellectual property rights, and provide technical assistance to help SACU nations achieve the goals of the agreement. This potential agreement would be subject to congressional approval. This report will be updated as negotiations progress.",53,53 Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law. This report provides background on foreign policy sanctions. It addresses the following questions: Why do we apply sanctions? What objectives does the U.S. government seek to achieve when it imposes sanctions? Who imposes sanctions? What tools are available? How likely is it that sanctions will achieve the stated goal? What secondary consequences might sanctions have? What change is required for the sanctions to be lifted? Would multilateral sanctions be more desirable and achievable? The report also provides an uncomplicated map of where sanctions policies and options currently may be found in U.S. law.,49,85 "Middle East Elections 2009: Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The strategic influence of Iran in the Middle East, the stability of Iraq, and the ongoing war in Afghanistan are at the forefront of U.S. policy and Congressional interest in the region. The Obama Administration and many Members of the 111th Congress are making decisions about the U.S. approach to the Middle East at a time when the consequences of recent decisions and events may constrain U.S. options. In 2009, key elections in Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq could reshape regional dynamics and either complicate or advance U.S. policy goals in the Middle East. This report provides an overview of the election contests in Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq, including possible outcomes and implications for U.S. policy. It will be updated periodically to reflect major developments. For more information, see CRS Report R40054, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations, by Casey L. Addis, CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman.",85,85 "Federal Government Corporations: An Overview. To assist Congress in its oversight activities, this report provides an overview of the government corporation as an administrative model. As defined in this report, a government corporation is a government agency that is established by Congress to provide a market-oriented public service and to produce revenues that meet or approximate its expenditures. By this definition, currently there are 17 government corporations. In the typical contemporary Congress, several bills are introduced to establish government corporations. At the time of publication of this report, two bills had been introduced in the 112th Congress to improve U.S. infrastructure by establishing government corporations—H.R. 404 and S. 652. Similarly, in the 111th Congress, government corporations bills included ones that would have created an Indian Development Finance Corporation (H.R. 1607), a Green Bank (H.R. 1698), and a National Infrastructure Development Bank (H.R. 2521). The government corporation model has been utilized by the federal government for over a century. Today's government corporations cover the spectrum in size and function from large, well-known entities, such as the U.S. Postal Service and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, to small, low-visibility corporate bodies, such as the Federal Financing Bank in the Department of the Treasury and Federal Prison Industries in the Department of Justice. The federal government does not possess a general incorporation statute as states do. Each government corporation is chartered through an act of Congress. The use of separate acts to charter each corporation has resulted in wide variance in the legal and organizational structure of government corporations. That said, the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, as amended, does provide for the standardized budget, auditing, debt management, and depository practices for those corporations listed in the act. Within the executive branch, no one agency is responsible for the oversight and supervision of government corporations. Neither the House nor the Senate have single committees with the responsibility to oversee all government corporations. Instead, each corporation is overseen by the committee(s) with jurisdiction over its policy area. Many government corporations, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, have been established to exist in perpetuity. Other government corporations, such as the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, though, have been designed to serve as transition vehicles to transform from governmental entities into private firms. Congress at times has found the government corporation an attractive governance option. A well-designed and -operated government corporation does not require annual appropriations because it generates revenues from the provision of goods and services. Moreover, each government corporation may be endowed with the administrative flexibilities required to accomplish its goals while remaining responsive to Congress and the President. Finally, as noted above, the government corporation may be established to serve an enduring purpose or may serve as a vehicle for privatization. This report will be updated in the event of a significant development.",56,56 "Federal Research and Development Organization, Policy, and Funding for Counterterrorism. Before the September 11th terrorist attacks, experts questioned whether the government was prepared adequately to conduct and use research and development (R&D) to counter terrorism. They cited inadequate planning, conflicting information about agency funding, the absence of coordinated ways to set priorities and eliminate duplication, and the need to use research resources effectively. Mechanisms have been established since then to set specific R&D priorities and to coordinate interagency policy. The Office of Homeland Security (OHS), created by Executive Order 13228 does not list R&D among its major responsibilities, but R&D is a topic of one of the interagency Policy Coordination Committees attached to the Homeland Security Council (HSC), OHS's interagency group. The director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was not named to participate in OHS activities, but an OSTP staff member is filling the HSC interagency R&D policy coordination role. The President gave OSTP responsibilities for policies regarding foreign student visas, foreign enrollment in ""sensitive"" courses, and technology for immigration. The National Science and Technology Council, an interagency body, staffed by OSTP, has five antiterrorism R&D working groups. Proposals have been made to expand the interagency Technical Support Working Group and the Defense Department's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which have funded counterterrorism R&D in the past. The House passed H.R. 5005, an amended version of legislation that the President sent to Congress to create a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which would plan, fund, and coordinate some R&D. S. 2452, the Lieberman substitute agreed to by the Governmental Affairs Committee, would give broader R&D authority to a national homeland security department. Each proposal would create different kinds of units to analyze and evaluate counterterrorism technologies before procurement and deployment and to coordinate some federal counterterrorism R&D. The President's FY2003 counterterrorism R&D budget request was $3 billion, the DHS envisioned in H.R. 5005 would handle about 17% of this, comprised of about $300 million of newly authorized R&D and between $200 to $300 million of already authorized R&D to be transferred to the proposed department. Bioterrorism R&D funding is managed largely by the Defense and Health and Human Services departments. Each agency has intra-agency coordination mechanisms, and formal interagency groups have been established. The interagency President's Critical Infrastructure Board has responsibility for information security R&D, OSTP was tasked to help it coordinate R&D priorities and the board was authorized to request federal agencies to fund priority R&D programs. Among the issues to be considered in creating a new homeland security department with R&D responsibilities are: which R&D areas should be transferred, can other related R&D be coordinated effectively and without erecting barriers between the conduct of civilian and security-related R&D and how should the existing counterterrorism R&D coordination mechanisms in OSTP, OHS and other departments be linked to a homeland security department with R&D responsibilities?",22,22 "The 21st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255). The 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255) was signed into law on December 13, 2016, by President Barack Obama. On November 30, 2016, the House passed the House amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 34, the 21st Century Cures Act, on a vote of 392 to 26. The bill was then sent to the Senate where it was considered and passed, with only minor technical modification, on December 7, 2016, on a vote of 94 to 5. The law consists of three divisions Division A—21st Century Cures Act Division B—Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis, and Division C—Increasing Choice, Access, and Quality in Health Care for Americans. CRS has published a series of reports on this law, one on each Division. This is the report for Division A of the law. This report provides a brief summary of each provision of the 21st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255), by title, subtitle, and section. The Division includes five titles, as follows: (1) Innovation projects and state responses to opioid abuse, (2) Discovery, (3) Development, (4) Delivery, and (5) Savings. Title I provides funding for biomedical research, including the Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI) and the Cancer Moonshot Initiative, for the opioid crisis response, and for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to support certain new activities authorized by the law. Title II, consisting of seven subtitles, requires or authorizes a number of activities to support biomedical research, including the reauthorization of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the reform of that agency through numerous administrative, reporting, and data access provisions. The Title includes provisions that support young investigators funded by NIH, pediatric research, collaborative research such as research on neurological disease, and precision medicine efforts, and specifically the PMI. Title III, consisting of ten subtitles, focuses on modifying the drug and device approval pathways at the FDA to support innovation, and specifically includes provisions that support patient-focused drug development and streamlined and clarified pathways to approval for drugs, combination products, antimicrobials, Orphan drugs, drugs for rare disease, and regenerative therapies. This Title also contains provisions making modifications to the medical device approval pathway and reforms to the FDA's hiring process. Finally, it addresses FDA's regulation of medical countermeasure and vaccine development. Title IV focuses on health care delivery, and includes provisions that together address the federal policies to promote the adoption and use of electronic health record (EHR) technology, as well as a handful of Medicare delivery provisions addressing telehealth services in Medicare, site-of-service price transparency for certain Medicare services, Local Coverage Determinations (LCDs) under Medicare, and a technology and pharmaceutical ombudsman for Medicare. Title V provides savings for the Division, and includes Medicare and Medicaid savings, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) savings, including Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF) and territory funding, and savings from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) drawdown.",72,69 "Legal Consequences of EPA's Endangerment Finding for New Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions. On December 15, 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took its most important action to date related to climate change. EPA published its final determination that the combined greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles in the United States contribute to an ""endangerment"" from climate change. More precisely, EPA found that such emissions, in the words of Clean Air Act (CAA) section 202(a), ""cause or contribute to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."" Under section 202(a), this finding requires that EPA promulgate ""standards"" to control such emissions—as the agency proposed to do for light-duty motor vehicles in advance of its endangerment determination. Some groups have objected to the endangerment determination and the emission standards to follow, arguing they will trigger a ""cascade"" of unacceptable regulatory consequences under other CAA provisions. These regulatory consequences, they say, would impose unattainable GHG-concentration goals on EPA and the states, and/or economically and administratively unreasonable burdens. This report examines the CAA provisions that have figured in this debate to see whether this alleged cascade of legal consequences likely would occur. First, the report examines CAA sections that, like section 202(a), are triggered by endangerment findings. Of these, the one most likely to require EPA regulatory action after the 202(a) endangerment finding is section 111, authorizing new source performance standards—but only as to stationary source categories emitting the largest amounts of GHGs. Section 111, however, affords EPA wide discretion in setting new source performance standards. Two other sections that arguably might be triggered are 108, requiring national ambient air quality standards, and 115, which requires states to revise their implementation plans to prevent or eliminate the endangerment of public health or welfare in a foreign country. As to these sections, however, the arguable infeasibility of the regulatory goals—even if GHG emissions in the United States are significantly reduced, atmospheric concentrations would decline little—will give EPA room to argue that regulatory action is not mandatory. Other endangerment-triggered sections of the CAA can be distinguished from section 202(a) by their explicit terms, and thus would likely not be triggered by the 202(a) endangerment finding. Second, the report looks at CAA provisions having no endangerment trigger. Of these, EPA has conceded that two require the agency to act after it promulgates the required emission standards following the 202(a) endangerment finding. One provision would require EPA to impose ""best available control technology"" (BACT) on GHG emissions from any major emitting facility proposed to be constructed in a Prevention of Significant Deterioration area. The other, Title V, creates an operating permit program for stationary sources of emissions, and would require stationary sources subject to BACT under the first provision to also apply for Title V permits. As to each of these requirements, EPA has proposed a ""tailoring rule"" setting emission thresholds far higher than in the CAA, at least for a few years. EPA justifies the departure from statutory language under the case law doctrines of ""absurd results"" and ""administrative necessity."" A caveat: the issue analyzed in this report is important primarily if Congress does not enact climate change legislation that puts regulation of GHGs beyond the reach of some of the CAA provisions discussed here. In particular, the House-passed climate change bill, H.R. 2454 (the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009), states that three of the CAA sections treated in this report, and one CAA title, may not be used to address air pollutants based on their climate change impacts.",42,42 "Nominations to U.S. Circuit and District Courts by President Obama During the 111th and 112th Congresses. Recent Senate debates in the 112th Congress over judicial nominations have focused on issues such as the relative degree of success of President Barack Obama's nominees in gaining Senate confirmation (compared with other recent Presidents) as well as the effect of delayed judicial appointments on judicial vacancy levels. The following report addresses these issues, and others, by providing a statistical overview of President Obama's nominees to U.S. circuit court of appeals and U.S. district court judgeships, current through May 31, 2012. Findings include the following President Obama thus far in his presidency has nominated 41 persons to U.S. circuit court judgeships, 29 of whom have been confirmed. Of the 150 persons nominated thus far by President Obama to U.S. district court judgeships, 117 have been confirmed. The greatest number of President Obama's circuit court nominees have been confirmed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (6) and the Second Circuit (5). The greatest number of President Obama's district court nominees have been confirmed to judgeships located within the Ninth Circuit (22) and the fewest to district court judgeships within the First Circuit (3). District court vacancies have grown in number over the course of the Obama presidency, from 42 judgeships vacant when President Obama took office to 59 at present. There currently are 13 circuit court vacancies (the same number as when President Obama took office). During the Obama presidency thus far, fewer circuit court nominees have been confirmed by the Senate than were confirmed during the first terms of any of the four preceding Presidents (Reagan through G.W. Bush). Likewise, fewer Obama district court nominees have been confirmed by the Senate than were confirmed during the first terms of the four preceding Presidents. President Obama is the only one of the three most recent Presidents to have begun his fourth year in office with more circuit and district court judgeships vacant than when he took office. During the Obama presidency, the average waiting time from nomination to committee hearing has been, thus far, 69.6 days for circuit court nominees and 83.2 days for district court nominees. During the Obama presidency, the average waiting time from Senate Judiciary Committee report to Senate confirmation has been 139.7 days for circuit court nominees and 105.1 days for district court nominees. Various factors might help explain differences or variation found in judicial appointment statistics across recent presidencies. A President's opportunities to make circuit and district court appointments will be affected by the number of judicial vacancies existing at the time he takes office, as well as by how many judges depart office, and how many new judgeships are statutorily created, during his presidency. The time taken by a President to select nominees for judicial vacancies may be affected by whether the selection of lower court nominees must compete with filling a Supreme Court vacancy, whether the selection process itself is a priority for a President, the level of consultation between a President and a nominee's home state Senators, and the time taken by home state Senators to make judicial candidate recommendations. Institutional and political factors which may influence the processing of judicial nominations by the Senate include ideological differences between the President and the opposition party in the Senate, the extent of interest group opposition to certain nominees, the presence or absence of ""divided government,"" the point in a congressional session when nominations arrive in the Senate, whether nominees have the support of both of their home state Senators, and whether the blue slip policy of the Senate Judiciary Committee requires the support of both home state Senators before a nominee can receive a hearing or committee vote.",54,54 "In Brief: Highlights of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act. {To be suppressed for publishing} The President's FY2018 budget request, submitted to Congress on May 23, 2017, seeks $677.1 billion in budget authority for national defense-related activities (budget function 050). Of the national defense total, $667.6 billion is discretionary spending. The remaining $9.6 billion is mandatory spending that not provided by annual appropriations acts. H.R. 2810, the version of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) passed by the House on July 14, 2017, would authorize $689.0 billion in discretionary funding for defense activities within the jurisdictions of the House Armed Services Committee. That total includes $593.4 billion in base discretionary funding for the Department of Defense, $74.6 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), and $21.0 billion for defense-related programs of the Energy Department and other agencies. S. 1519, the version of the FY2018 NDAA reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 10, 2017, would authorize $692.1 billion in discretionary funding for defense activities within that committee's jurisdiction. That total includes $610.9 billion in base discretionary funding for the Department of Defense, $60.2 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), and $21.0 billion for defense-related programs of the Energy Department and other agencies. National defense (function 050) appropriations provided at the level recommended by H.R. 2810 would exceed the Budget Control Act (BCA) limit on discretionary defense appropriations by approximately $72.5 billion. Appropriations at the level recommended by S. 1519 would exceed the BCA defense cap by approximately $90.0 billion.",25,25 "Incapacity of a Member of Congress. There is no specific protocol or procedure set out in the United States Constitution, federal law, or congressional rule for the Senate or the House of Representatives that has been followed to recognize an ""incapacity"" of a sitting member and thereby declare a ""vacancy"" in such office. Under the general practice in the Senate and in the House of Representatives, a personal ""incapacity"" of a sitting, living member has not generated proceedings to declare the seat vacant, and sitting members of the Senate and the House who have become incapacitated, and who have not resigned, have generally served out their terms of office. In one instance in the House, a member-elect who was incapacitated and comatose, and thus could not present herself to take the oath of office (Gladys Noon Spellman, of Maryland), was found not likely to recover, and the House proceeded to declare her seat vacant after the beginning of the new Congress. However, no such precedent exists for a sitting member of either house of Congress who has taken the oath of office, and a vacancy with respect to such a sitting member would generally exist only by virtue of resignation, death, acceptance of an incompatible office, or expulsion. This report has been updated from previous versions, and will be updated as events, opinions, or decisions warrant.",55,55 "Financial Services and General Government (FSGG): FY2014 Appropriations. The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill provides funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. Among those independent agencies are the General Services Administration (GSA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the United States Postal Service (USPS). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded in the House through the Agriculture appropriations bill and in the Senate through the FSGG bill. CFTC funding is included in all FSGG funding tables in this report. On April 10, 2013, President Obama submitted his FY2014 budget request. The request included a total of $45.4 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $315 million for the CFTC. On July 23, 2013, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 2786, the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2014. H.R. 2786 would have provided $38.3 billion for agencies funded through the House FSGG Appropriations Subcommittee. In addition, the CFTC would have received $194.6 million through the FY2014 Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 2410). Total FY2014 funding in the House bill was $38.3 billion, about $7.1 billion below the President's FY2014 request. On July 25, 2013, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2014 financial services bill, S. 1371. The Senate committee's bill would have provided $44.3 billion for FSGG agencies, including $315 million for the CFTC, for FY2014, $1.1 billion below the President's FY2014 request. Because none of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2014 were enacted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, a funding gap commenced on October 1, 2013. On October 16, 2013, the Senate passed a previously passed House bill, H.R. 2775, with an amendment that, in part, provided interim continuing appropriations for the previous fiscal year's projects and activities and retitled H.R. 2775 as the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014. Later that same day, the House agreed to the Senate amendment to H.R. 2775. H.R. 2775 was signed into law on October 17, 2013 (P.L. 113-46), thus terminating the funding gap that same day. With some routine exceptions, P.L. 113-46 provided budget authority through January 15, 2014. On January 17, 2014, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76), funding the government for the rest of FY2014. The FSGG appropriations were included as Division E of P.L. 113-76. P.L. 113-76 appropriates a total of $43.2 billion for FSGG agencies, including $215 million for the CFTC, whose funding was contained in Division A of the law.",59,59 "Crime Victims' Rights Act: A Summary and Legal Analysis of 18 U.S.C. §3771. Section 3771 of Title 18 of the United States Code is a statutory bill of rights for victims of crimes committed in violation of federal law or the laws of the District of Columbia. It defines victims as anyone directly and proximately harmed by such an offense, individuals and legal entities alike. It does not appear to include family relatives of a deceased, child, or incapacitated victim except in a representative capacity. Numbered among the rights it conveys are (1) the right to be reasonably protected from the accused, (2) the right to notification of public court and parole proceedings and of any release of the accused, (3) the right not to be excluded from public court proceedings under most circumstances, (4) the right to be heard in public court proceedings relating to bail, the acceptance of a plea bargain, sentencing, or parole, (5) the right to confer with the prosecutor, (6) the right to restitution under the law, (7) the right to proceedings free from unwarranted delays, (8) the right to be treated fairly and with respect to one's dignity and privacy, (9) the right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement, and (10) the right to be informed of the statutory rights and services to which one is entitled. The section directs the courts and law enforcement officials to see to it that the rights it creates are honored. Both victims and prosecutors may assert the rights and seek review from the appellate courts should the rights be initially denied. The section vests no rights in the accused nor does it create cause of action damages in any instance where a victim is afforded less than the section's full benefits. Conforming amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective on December 1, 2008. The Justice Department promulgated implementing regulations on November 17, 2005. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 added to the inventory of victims' statutory rights and clarified the appellate standard to be used to enforce those rights. Section 3771 in text form is appended. Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is as well. This report is available in an abridged form, without quotation marks, footnotes, appendixes, and most of the citations to authority, as CRS Report RS22518, Crime Victims' Rights Act: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. 3771, by Charles Doyle.",93,93 "Navy Shipbuilding: Recent Shipyard Mergers -- Background and Issues for Congress. In April 2001, General Dynamics (GD) and Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) announced an agreement under which GD would purchase NNS. The following month, Northrop Grumman (NOC) announced an unsolicited counteroffer to purchase NNS. The Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Department of Defense (DoD) reviewed the two merger proposals and in October 2001 announced that they would oppose the GD merger proposal on the grounds that it would eliminate competition in nuclear submarines and harm competition for emerging technologies for both nuclear submarines and surface ships. DoJ and DoD did not oppose the NOC merger proposal, and in November 2001, NOC assumed control of NNS. NOC's acquisition of NNS brought to an apparent conclusion a 5-year process of consolidation in the ownership of the 6 private-sector shipyards that build the Navy's major ships. The 6 yards are now owned by two firms -- NOC, which owns 3 of the yards, and GD, which owns the other 3. In theory, the 6 yards might have been consolidated under 3 owners rather than 2. Although the consolidation of the ownership of the 6 yards now appears complete, there may be further mergers and acquisitions involving shipyards that perform work for the Navy. DoD concluded that the consolidation-related savings of the NOC-NNS merger would be comparable to those of a GD-NNS merger. NOC stated that these savings might amount to $1.9 billion to $2.6 billion over the next 10 years. Critics of the NOC-NNS merger can argue that it might pose competition concerns in areas such as construction of aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious ships. Supporters of the merger can argue that DoJ and DoD reviewed these issues and did not object to the merger on competition (or other) grounds. Shipyard mergers are unlikely to lead to significant changes in the total number of blue-collar production workers employed at the yards, but can alter the distribution of the total number of blue- collar workers among the yards. Shipyard mergers may increase the strength of the shipyards and shipbuilding in the competition for limited DoD procurement dollars. The mergers may raise questions concerning the treatment of shipbuilding in industry proposals for large DoD ""system-of- systems"" acquisition efforts. The mergers may also raise questions concerning the movement of senior officials (particularly those with backgrounds in shipbuilding) between DoD/Navy and industry. The debate over the merger proposals involving NNS raises a question regarding the adequacy of the ""savings-vs.-competition"" framework for describing the merger- review process. It also poses a potential question for Congress regarding the executive branch view that DoD (rather than Congress or the taxpayers) is the sole or primary customer for a firm whose products are purchased solely by DoD. Lastly, the NOC-NNS merger raises a potential question regarding the technology- transmission risks of building non-nuclear-powered submarines at NOC's Ingalls shipyard for export to a foreign buyer.",31,31 "Internet Privacy: Overview and Legislation in the 109th Congress, 1st Session. Internet privacy issues encompass several types of concerns. One is the collection of personally identifiable information (PII) by website operators from visitors to government and commercial websites, or by software that is surreptitiously installed on a user's computer (""spyware"") and transmits the information to someone else. Another is the monitoring of electronic mail and Web usage by the government or law enforcement officials, employers, or email service providers. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks intensified debate over the issue of monitoring by the government and law enforcement officials, with some advocating increased tools to help them track down terrorists, and others cautioning that fundamental tenets of democracy, such as privacy, not be endangered in that pursuit. Congress passed the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) that inter alia, makes it easier for law enforcement officials to monitor Internet activities. That act was amended by the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296), loosening restrictions as to when, and to whom, Internet Service Providers may voluntarily release the content of communications if they believe there is a danger of death or injury. Some provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, including two that relate to Internet use, would have expired on December 31, 2005. Congress passed a brief extension (to February 3, 2006) in P.L. 109-160. Debate over whether civil liberties protections need to be added if the provisions are to be made permanent is expected to continue in the second session of the 109th Congress. Revelations that President Bush directed the National Security Agency to monitor some communications, including e-mails, in the United States without warrants may affect those deliberations. The debate over website information policies concerns whether industry self regulation or legislation is the best approach to protecting consumer privacy. Congress has considered legislation that would require commercial website operators to follow certain fair information practices but the only law that has been enacted (COPPA, P.L. 105-277) concerns the privacy of children under 13 not the general public. Legislation has passed regarding information practices for federal government websites, including the E-Government Act (P.L. 107-347). The growing controversy about how to protect computer users from ""spyware"" without creating unintended consequences is discussed briefly in this report, but in more detail in CRS Report RL32706. Another issue, identity theft, is not an Internet privacy issue per se, but is often debated in the context of whether the Internet makes identity theft more prevalent. For example Internet-based practices called ""phishing"" and ""pharming"" may contribute to identity theft. Identity theft is briefly discussed in this report, more information is available in CRS Report RS22082, CRS Report RL31919, and CRS Report RL32535. Wireless privacy issues are discussed in CRS Report RL31636. This is the final edition of this report. It provides an overview of Internet privacy issues and related laws passed in previous Congresses, and discusses legislative activity in the first session of the 109th Congress.",110,110 "Numerical Limits on Permanent Employment-Based Immigration: Analysis of the Per-country Ceilings. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) specifies a complex set of numerical limits and preference categories for admitting lawful permanent residents (LPRs) that include economic priorities among the criteria for admission. Employment-based immigrants are admitted into the United States through one of the five available employment-based preference categories. Each preference category has its own eligibility criteria and numerical limits, and at times different application processes. The INA allocates 140,000 visas annually for employment-based LPRs, which amount to roughly 14% of the total 1.0 million LPRs in FY2014. The INA further specifies that each year, countries are held to a numerical limit of 7% of the worldwide level of LPR admissions, known as per-country limits or country caps. Some employers assert that they continue to need the ""best and the brightest"" workers, regardless of their country of birth, to remain competitive in a worldwide market and to keep their firms in the United States. While support for the option of increasing employment-based immigration may be dampened by economic conditions, proponents argue it is an essential ingredient for economic growth. Those opposing increases in employment-based LPRs assert that there is no compelling evidence of labor shortages and cite the rate of unemployment across various occupations and labor markets. With this economic and political backdrop, the option of lifting the per-country caps on employment-based LPRs has become increasingly popular. Some argue that the elimination of the per-country caps would increase the flow of high-skilled immigrants without increasing the total annual admission of employment-based LPRs. The presumption is that many high-skilled people (proponents cite those from India and China, in particular) would then move closer to the head of the line to become LPRs. To explore this policy option, analyses of approved pending employment-based petitions are performed on two different sets of data: approved pending petitions with the Department of State (DOS) National Visa Center (NVC), and approved pending petitions with U.S. Citizenship and Immigrant Services (USCIS). Because DOS and USCIS play different roles in the visa application process, their datasets represent different populations. DOS's data from the NVC contains individuals who apply for a visa while residing outside of the United States. They are considered new arrivals once they are issued a visa and enter the United States. USCIS's data contains individuals who are already residing in the United States and are applying to change their immigration status from a temporary status to a permanent LPR visa. This process is referred to as an adjustment of status. As of November 2015, there were 100,747 approved employment-based LPR petitions pending at the National Visa Center. The 3rd preference category of ""professional, skilled, and unskilled"" workers had the highest number of pending approved petitions (67,792). The 5th preference category of ""immigrant investors"" had 17,662 approved petitions pending and the 2nd preference category of ""advanced degree"" workers had 11,400 approved petitions pending. There were also 3,747 approved petitions pending for the 1st preference category of ""extraordinary"" workers and 379 for the 4th preference category for ""special immigrants."" In terms of the USCIS data, there were a total of 117,731 approved I-485 petitions pending as of April 2016, and most were for the 2nd preference ""advanced degree"" workers (46,765). There were 37,971 approved I-485 petitions pending in the 3rd preference ""professional, skilled, and unskilled"" category and 30,457 pending in the 1st preference ""extraordinary"" category. In addition, there were 1,409 5th preference ""immigrant investor"" and 1,129 4th preference ""special immigrant"" approved I-485 petitions pending. The top four countries in the National Visa Center data set were (in descending rank order) India, the Philippines, China, and South Korea. The top four countries in the USCIS data sets were (in descending rank order) India, China, the Philippines, and Mexico. The data indicates that more Indians and Mexicans are waiting to adjust status in the United States, while more Filipinos and Chinese are waiting to immigrate from abroad. Some argue that the per-country ceilings are arbitrary and observe that employability has nothing to do with country of birth. Others maintain that the statutory per-country ceilings restrain the dominance of high-demand countries and preserve the diversity of immigrant flows.",76,76 "Major Disaster Declarations for Snow Assistance and Severe Winter Storms: An Overview. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides two types of assistance for winter incidents: (1) snow assistance, and (2) assistance for severe winter storms. The assistance is triggered by a presidential disaster declaration. The criteria used by FEMA to determine whether to recommend a declaration depend on the type of winter incident. Snow assistance is based on record, or near record snowfall according to official government reports on snow accumulations. Acceptable government reports are snowfall amounts measured and published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Climatic Data Center, or measurements made by observers from the National Weather Service. Determinations for severe winter storms are based on the severity and magnitude of the event and the capabilities of the state and affected local governments to respond to the incident. Both requests for snow assistance and assistance for severe winter storms must also include the estimated cost of federal and nonfederal public assistance associated with the incident. FEMA divides the estimated cost of federal and nonfederal public assistance by the statewide population to give some measure of the per capita impact the incident has had on the state. Snow assistance is available for all eligible costs incurred over a continuous 48-hour period. State and tribal governments may select a 48-hour period during which the highest eligible costs have been incurred. The 48-hour period selected cannot be changed after it has been submitted. As with most major disaster declarations, the types of assistance for severe winter storms vary according to the nature and severity of the incident. Generally, only a limited amount of snow removal is provided for severe winter storms. This is done to perform otherwise eligible emergency work (for example, to repair utility lines). This report describes snow assistance and assistance for severe winter storms, the declaration process, the criteria used to make eligibility determinations, and the types of assistance that are provided after the President has issued a major disaster declaration for the incident. This report also provides some historical data including obligations for the incidents from FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The DRF is the main account used to fund a wide variety of programs, grants, and other forms of emergency and disaster assistance to states, local governments, certain nonprofit entities, and families and individuals affected by disasters.",11,11 "Asian Financial Crisis: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Interests and Options. The principal focus of this report is on the foreign policy ramifications of the Asian financial crisis and U.S. options for addressing them. This report tracks and analyzes the efforts of the most seriously affected Asian countries to deal with their economic and financial problems, and their interaction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States, and other major sources of financial support and policy advice. It also addresses the implications of the crisis for such U.S. interests as regional stability and the prevention of conflict, trade liberalization, and U.S. regional and global leadership, and discusses the principal factors that could influence the duration and severity of the crisis. A final section considers options for Congress in the context of various criticisms of the IMF's stabilization programs and the operations of the Fund itself.",85,82 "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Amendment Contained in S. 254, 106th Congress. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. ¬ø¬ø1400 et seq. provides federal funds to the states to assist them in providing an education for children with disabilities. As a condition for the receipt of these funds, IDEA contains requirements on the provision of services and detailed due process procedures. In 1997 Congress amended IDEA in the most comprehensive and controversial reauthorization since IDEA's original enactment in 1975. One of the most contentious issues addressed in the 1997 legislation related to the disciplinary procedures applicable to children with disabilities. This issue was raised again in Amendment 355 to S. 254, 106th Congress, the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, which passed the Senate on May 20, 1999. This report will be updated as appropriate.",35,35 "Western Water Resource Issues. For more than a century, the federal government has constructed water resource projects for a variety of purposes, including flood control, navigation, power generation, and irrigation. While most municipal and industrial water supplies have been built by non-federal entities, most of the large, federal water projects in the West, including Hoover and Grand Coulee dams, were constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation (Department of the Interior) to provide water for irrigation. Growing populations and changing values have increased demands on water supplies and river systems, resulting in water use and management conflicts throughout the country, particularly in the West, where population is expanding rapidly. In many western states, agricultural needs are often in direct conflict with urban needs, as well as with water demand for threatened and endangered species habitat, recreation, and scenic enjoyment. Debate over western water resources revolves around the issue of how best to plan for and manage the use of this renewable, yet sometimes scarce and increasingly sought after, resource. Some observers advocate enhancing water supplies, for example, by building new storage or diversion projects, expanding old ones, or funding water reclamation and reuse facilities. Others emphasize the need to manage existing supplies more efficiently—through conservation, revision of policies that encourage inefficient use of water, and establishment of market mechanisms to allocate water. The 109th Congress is considering a number of bills on western water issues, including title transfer, water recycling (e.g., S. 3639 and H.R. 5768), rural water supply (e.g., S. 895), and drought legislation (e.g., H.R. 5136 and S. 2751). Oversight of CALFED—a joint federal and state program to restore fish and wildlife habitat and address California water supply/quality issues—and Klamath River Basin and San Joaquin River Basin issues are also under consideration. The 109th Congress may also consider Indian water rights settlement legislation, however, Indian settlement bills are not tracked in this report.",108,43 "Membership of the 113th Congress: A Profile. This report presents a profile of the membership of the 113th Congress (2013-2014). Statistical information is included on selected characteristics of Members, including data on party affiliation, average age, occupation, education, length of congressional service, religious affiliation, gender, ethnicity, foreign births, and military service. As of November 24, 2014, in the House of Representatives, there are 234 Republicans, 207 Democrats (including 5 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner), and no vacant seats. The Senate has 45 Republicans, 53 Democrats, and 2 Independents, who caucus with the Democrats. The average age of Members of the House at the beginning of the 113th Congress was 57.0 years, of Senators, 62.0 years. The overwhelming majority of Members of Congress have a college education. The dominant professions of Members are public service/politics, business, and law. Most Members identify as Christians, and Protestants collectively constitute the majority religious affiliation. Roman Catholics account for the largest single religious denomination, and numerous other affiliations are represented. The average length of service for Representatives at the beginning of the 113th Congress was 9.1 years (4.6 terms), for Senators, 10.2 years (1.7 terms). One hundred three women (a record number) serve in the 113th Congress: 83 in the House, including 3 Delegates, and 20 in the Senate. There are 43 African American Members of the House and 2 in the Senate. This House number includes 2 Delegates. There are 37 Hispanic or Latino Members (a record number) serving: 33 in the House, including 1 Delegate and the Resident Commissioner, and 4 in the Senate. Thirteen Members (10 Representatives, 2 Delegates, and 1 Senator) are Asian American or Pacific Islanders. Two American Indians (Native Americans) serve in the House. The portions of this report covering political party affiliation, gender, ethnicity, and vacant seats will be updated as events warrant. The remainder of the report will not be updated.",55,55 "Safeguarding the Nation's Drinking Water: EPA and Congressional Actions. The events of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the security status of the nation's drinking water supplies and the vulnerability of this critical infrastructure sector to attack. Congress since has enacted security requirements for public water systems and has provided funding for vulnerability assessments, emergency planning, and drinking water research. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the lead federal agency for the water sector, has worked with water utilities, state and local governments, and federal agencies to improve the drinking water security. However, water facilities have not been required to address identified risks and vulnerabilities, and recent Congresses have considered legislation to mandate such actions. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188) amended the Safe Drinking Water Act to require some 8,400 community water systems to assess vulnerabilities and prepare emergency response plans. It authorized funding for these activities and for emergency grants to states and utilities, and it directed EPA to review methods to prevent, detect, and respond to threats to water safety and infrastructure security. The act did not require water systems to make security upgrades to address potential vulnerabilities. In most years since FY2002, Congress appropriated roughly $5 million annually for EPA to work with states and the water sector to improve the security of drinking water supplies. In creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), Congress gave DHS responsibility for assessing and protecting the nation's critical infrastructures. However, the act did not transfer EPA's water security functions, and the 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-7) affirmed EPA's lead role in protecting the water infrastructure. Under this directive, EPA has responsibility for developing and providing tools and training on improving security to roughly 52,000 community water systems and 16,000 municipal wastewater treatment facilities. In the 109th Congress, the Department of Homeland Security FY2007 appropriations act (P.L. 109-295) authorized DHS to regulate for three years high-risk chemical facilities, but the law excluded from coverage drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities. In the 111th Congress, interest in extending and expanding security requirements for the chemical facility sector continued, as has debate over whether to include certain water utilities within the scope of such requirements. House-passed H.R. 2868 would have imposed new security requirements on drinking water and wastewater utilities, while retaining EPA's regulatory authority for water sector utilities. The substitute version of H.R. 2868 reported by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs excluded water utilities and proposed to extend DHS chemical facility authority for three years, create voluntary technical assistance and training programs, and create a best practices clearinghouse. Although EPA, states, localities, and water utilities have taken steps to address security concerns, the security of the nation's water supplies has continued to attract congressional attention. Issues have included the status of efforts by the water sector to improve security, whether to impose new federal requirements, funding needs for water systems to make security improvements, the relative roles and responsibilities of EPA and DHS regarding the water sector, and the status of research and development of technologies to help water systems detect and address potential biological and chemical contaminants. This report reviews governmental and water utility efforts to improve drinking water security.",44,44 "State and Local Government Series (SLGS) Treasury Debt: A Description. On February 4, 2014, in anticipation of no increase in the statutory debt limit, the U.S. Treasury announced in a press release that it would suspend ""sales of State and Local Government Series (SLGS) nonmarketable Treasury securities until further notice"" on February 7, 2014. The debt limit was extended on February 15, 2014, and the Treasury resumed sales of SLGS on February 18, 2014. As of September 30, 2014, SLGS represented 0.6% ($105.7 billion) of total debt outstanding. Suspending SLGS does not change the debt limit but rather just delays the date when it is reached. Some have expressed concern that a suspension may have a negative impact on state and local government finances. This report explains SLGS and how suspension may impact state and local government bond issuers.",60,60 "The Amending Process in the Senate. This report summarizes many of the rules, precedents, and practices of the Senate affecting the consideration of amendments to measures on the floor. Much of the information presented here has been extracted from Riddick's Senate Procedure (Senate Document 101-28) the published collection of Senate precedents.",55,55 "The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax of the 1980s: Implications for Current Energy Policy. In April 1980, the federal government enacted the crude oil windfall profit tax on the U.S. oil industry. The main purpose of the tax was to recoup for the federal government much of the revenue that would have otherwise gone to the oil industry as a result of the decontrol of oil prices. Supporters of the tax viewed this revenue as an unearned and unanticipated windfall caused by high oil prices, which were determined by the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) cartel. Despite its name, the windfall profit tax (WPT) was actually an excise tax, not a profits tax imposed on the difference between the market price of oil and an adjusted base price. While most domestically produced oil was subject to the tax (about 2/3 in 1985), the remaining 1/3 that was tax-exempt was significant (1.3 billion barrels in 1985, or 360,000 barrels per day). The $80 billion in gross revenues generated by the WPT between 1980 and 1988 was significantly less than the $393 billion projected. Due to the deductibility of the WPT against the income tax, cumulative net WPT revenues were about $38 billion, significantly less than the $175 billion projected. This report presents estimates of the amount of foregone oil production from 1980-1986 due to the WPT under three alternative supply price responses, reflecting three different assumptions about the price elasticity of the domestic oil supply function, a critical factor (statistic) in estimating lost oil output and increased import dependence. From 1980 to 1988, the WPT may have reduced domestic oil production anywhere from 1.2% to 8.0% (320 to 1,269 million barrels). Dependence on imported oil grew from between 3% and 13%. The tax was repealed in 1988 because (1) it was an administrative burden to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), (2) it was a compliance burden to the oil industry, (3) due to low oil prices, the tax was generating little or no revenues in 1987 and 1988 and (4) it made the United States more dependent on foreign oil. The depressed state of the U.S. oil industry after 1986 also contributed to the repeal decision. Reinstating the windfall profit tax would reduce recent oil industry windfalls due to high crude and petroleum prices but could have several adverse economic effects. If imposed as an excise tax the WPT would increase marginal production costs and be expected to reduce domestic oil production and increase the level of oil imports, which today is at nearly 60% of demand. Crude prices would not tend to increase. Some have proposed an excise tax on both domestically produced and imported oil as a way of mitigating the negative effects on petroleum import dependence. Such a broad-based WPT would tend to reduce import dependence, but it would lead to higher crude oil prices and likely to oil industry profits, potentially undermining its original goals. Because the pure corporate profits tax is relatively neutral in the short run -- few, if any, price and output effects occur because marginal production costs are unchanged in the short run -- a possible option would be a corporate income surtax on the upstream operations of crude oil producers. Such a tax that would recoup any recent windfalls with less adverse economic effects, imports would not increase because domestic production would remain unchanged. In the long run, such a tax is a tax on capital, it reduces the rate of return, thus reducing the supply of capital to the oil industry.",40,40 "House Subcommittees: Assignment Process. House rules, Republican Conference and Democratic Caucus rules, and individual committee rules all address the subcommittee assignment process, although to varying degrees. This report describes the assignment process for House Subcommittees.",55,55 "Calling Up Measures on the Senate Floor. The Senate takes up measures under procedures set in Senate rules and by longstanding customs, thereby giving it flexibility in setting its floor agenda. This report first treats those processes or customs most often used by the Senate and then discusses some procedures less often used to call up measures.",55,55 "The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Defense Strategy: Issues for Congress. By statute, the Department of Defense (DOD) is required, by Section 118, Title 10, U.S. Code, to submit to Congress a report based on its most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process, no later than the President submits his budget request for Fiscal Year 2015. The ""2014 QDR"" review process took place against the backdrop of key changes in the global strategic context, recent evolutions in U.S. strategic priorities, and a tighter fiscal context. The 2014 process also drew on a series of recent reviews and guidance documents—a 2011 DOD ""comprehensive review"" initially launched by Secretary of Defense Gates and continued by Secretary of Defense Panetta, the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance document (DSG), and the 2013 review process known as the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR). Statute prescribes that DOD, in each QDR process, ""delineate a national defense strategy,"" determine the force structure, modernization plans, and infrastructure required to implement that strategy, and craft an associated budget plan. Statute also spells out 16 items—as well as any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate—that the QDR report must address. More broadly, a QDR process, and its associated report, may play any number of helpful roles: refining and updating defense strategic thinking, forging a shared vision within DOD of both priorities, and roles and missions, helping ensure a common view across the Executive Branch, of the role of DOD, in cooperation with other Departments and agencies, in support of broader national security strategy, facilitating Congressional oversight, communicating a sense of defense strategy to the American people, the taxpayers, and signaling intent abroad, to reassure Allies and partners and deter or dissuade potential foes. In evaluating the 2014 QDR report and current defense strategy more broadly, Congress may choose to consider a number of issues the role of the United States on the world stage changes and trajectories in the global security environment DOD's mission and geographic priorities the extent and nature for U.S. global military presence the extent and nature of U.S. international military partnerships the strategic rationale for deterrence the force planning construct (FPC), a shorthand statement of the number and type of missions the force is expected to be able to accomplish simultaneously, which is used to shape and size the force the division of labor among Military Services and components in executing the strategy, and the nature and extent of the risks that defense strategy assumes. Congress may also wish to consider the extent of DOD's compliance with the statutory mandate for the QDR, the appropriateness of the mandate itself, and DOD's tools and approaches for crafting strategy in general.",32,32 "Federal Research and Development: Budgeting and Priority-Setting Issues, 109th Congress. Federal research and development (R&D) funding priorities reflect presidential policies and national needs. For FY2007, R&D is requested at almost $137 billion of budget authority, about 1.8% more than enacted in FY2006. The FY2007 budget would fund three interagency R&D initiatives: networking and information technology, climate change science, and nanotechnology. The Administration is using performance measures for R&D budgeting, including the Government Performance and Results Act and the Program Assessment Rating Tool.",111,111 "U.S.-European Union Relations and the 2007 Summit. The U.S. Congress and successive U.S. administrations have supported the European Union (EU) and the process of European integration as ways to foster a stable Europe, democratic states, and strong trading partners. In recent years, a number of trade and foreign policy conflicts have strained the U.S.-EU relationship. Since the divisive dispute over Iraq in 2003, however, both the United States and the EU have sought to improve cooperation and demonstrate a renewed commitment to partnership in tackling global challenges. This report evaluates the results of the annual U.S.-EU summit on April 30, 2007, in Washington, DC. It will not be updated again. Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick, and CRS Report RL30732, Trade Conflict and the U.S.-European Union Economic Relationship, by Raymond J. Ahearn.",87,87 "Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy. Africa has historically held a peripheral role in the transnational illicit drug trade, but in recent years has increasingly become a locus for drug trafficking, particularly of cocaine. Recent estimates suggest that in recent years, apart from late 2008 and 2009, between 46 and 300 metric tons of South American cocaine may have transited West Africa en route to Europe. Recent cocaine seizure levels are sharply higher than those in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which in all of Africa rarely exceeded 1 metric ton a year. Africa's emergence as a trafficking nexus appears to have resulted from structural shifts in international drug trafficking patterns, including heighted European demand for cocaine, international counternarcotics pressure driving drug traffickers away from traditional trafficking routes, and the operational allure for traffickers of low levels of law enforcement capacity and high rates of corruption in many African countries. The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses new challenges to international counternarcotics efforts, as well as a variety of emergent threats to the United States. Novel strategies and adaptations of existing efforts may be required to track emergent drug flow patterns, dismantle major criminal syndicates involved in such trafficking, and prevent future hotspots from emerging. While most of the cocaine transiting Africa is destined for Europe, and little of it enters the United States, other illicit substances trafficked through the region, notably heroin and illegally traded chemical precursors used to produce illicit drugs, do enter the United States. The growing drug trade in Africa also poses other threats to U.S. interests. These include the reported involvement of Latin American criminal groups, including elements of at least one U.S.-designated terrorist organization, which are targets of U.S. counternarcotics or military operations. Other challenges include threats to U.S. policy interests and assistance programs in Africa, such as efforts to advance good governance, political stability, rule of law, and human rights, and programs to build African law enforcement and counternarcotics capacities. U.S. counternarcotics policy responses to the rise in trans-Africa drug trafficking are in the formative stages. Several U.S. agencies are evaluating the scope of the problem and identifying short-term remedies, such as efforts to expand drug monitoring and interdiction in Africa, and long-term efforts designed to strengthen local capacity to combat drugs in the region. In recent years, U.S. agencies have begun to devote greater resources to combating the drug trade in Africa. The State Department requested $7.5 million for counternarcotics assistance in Africa in FY2010, up from about $0.5 million in FY2006, while the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to allocate $19.3 million in FY2009 and $28 million in FY2010 to counternarcotics programs in Africa. The threat of drug trafficking in Africa has drawn attention in recent Congresses. P.L. 110-417, for instance, required that DOD submit a report to Congress laying out a counternarcotics strategy for the region. On June 23, 2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing entitled Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa. In responding to recent and ongoing executive branch efforts to devote increased resources and attention to this problem, Congress may choose to review existing authorities and funding levels for counternarcotics programs in Africa. Key policy questions that may arise in this respect include how best to reduce gaps in intelligence and data collection relating to the drug trade in Africa, how to balance short-term and long-term counternarcotics goals and strategies, how various U.S. civilian and military and international agency counternarcotics roles and responsibilities in Africa should be defined, and what types and levels of resources these efforts may require.",96,96 "Drug Certification Requirements and Congressional Modifications in 2001-2002. This report provides a brief summary of the existing drug certification requirements for drug producing and drug-transit countries, background on the experience, criticisms, and reform efforts under these provisions, a summary of early congressional options and proposals advanced in 2001, with possible advantages and disadvantages, a summary of later initiatives with legislative activity, and (5) a tracking of legislative action on the major initiatives.",67,67 "Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education: FY2007 Appropriations. This report tracks FY2007 appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED). This legislation provides discretionary funds for three major federal departments and 14 related agencies. The report, which will be updated, summarizes L-HHS-ED discretionary funding issues but not authorization or entitlement issues. On February 6, 2006, the President submitted the FY2007 budget request to Congress, including $138.3 billion in discretionary L-HHS-ED funds, the comparable FY2006 amount was $147.3 billion, enacted primarily through P.L. 109-149. The Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, H.J.Res. 20, provides an estimated $144.4 billion in discretionary funds for L-HHS-ED activities, the bill was signed into law on February 15, 2007, as P.L. 110-5. Actual FY2007 appropriations for programs, projects, and activities were not specified by P.L. 110-5, these amounts will become available at a later time. A series of continuing resolutions, beginning with P.L. 109-289, provided temporary L-HHS-ED funding from October 1, 2006, through February 15, 2007. Department of Labor (DOL). DOL discretionary appropriations were $11.7 billion in FY2006, $11.0 billion was requested for FY2007. FY2007 funding for Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs would be decreased by $822 million. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS discretionary appropriations were $66.7 billion in FY2006, $61.8 billion was requested for FY2007. Funding would be increased by $181 million for Community Health Centers. Funding would be decreased by $198 million for the Children's Hospital Graduate Medical Education (CHGME). The Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) would be decreased by $379 million. The $550 million Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) and the $630 million Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) would be eliminated. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, funded at $5.4 billion in FY2006, would receive no new funds. Department of Education (ED). ED discretionary appropriations were $57.6 billion in FY2006, $54.3 billion was requested for FY2007. Funding would be increased for Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) programs in aggregate, and five K-12 initiatives, including $1.5 billion for High School Reform, were proposed. Decreases of $385 million for Pell Grants and $448 million for TRIO were requested. Funding would be eliminated for the $272 million Educational Technology State Grants, the $303 million GEAR UP program, and the $1.9 billion education hurricane recovery programs. Related Agencies. Discretionary appropriations for L-HHS-ED related agencies were $11.4 billion in FY2006, $11.2 billion was requested for FY2007. Two-year advance funding for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) would be eliminated. An increase of $271 million was requested for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) discretionary activities.",59,59 "Tribal Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Legal Overview. Indian tribes are quasi-sovereign entities that enjoy all the sovereign powers that are not divested by Congress or inconsistent with the tribes' dependence on the United States. As a general rule, this means that Indian tribes cannot exercise criminal or civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. There are two exceptions to this rule for criminal jurisdiction. First, tribes may exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Second, tribes may try non-Indians who commit dating and domestic violence crimes against Indians within the tribes' jurisdictions provided the non-Indians have sufficient ties to the tribes. There are three exceptions to this rule for civil jurisdiction. First, tribes may exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members. Second, tribes may exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers within a reservation when the nonmember's conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. These first two exceptions, enunciated in the case of Montana v. United States, are based on the tribes' inherent sovereignty, and exercises of jurisdiction under them must relate to a tribe's right to self-government. Third, Indian tribes may exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers when Congress authorizes them to do so. Congress may delegate federal authority to the tribes, or re-vest the tribes with inherent sovereign authority that they had lost previously. Indian tribes may also exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers under their power to exclude persons from tribal property. However, it is not clear whether the power to exclude is independent of the Montana exceptions. The question of a tribe's jurisdiction over nonmembers can be very complex. It is fair to say, however, that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is quite limited. Tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is more extensive. Federal courts, however, consistently require nonmember defendants to challenge tribal court jurisdiction in tribal court before pursuing relief in federal court.",105,105 "McDade-Murtha Amendment: A Sketch of Legislation in the 107th Congress Concerning Ethical Standards for the Justice Department Litigators. The McDade-Murtha Amendment, 28 U.S.C. 530B, instructs Department of Justice litigators to adhere to the ethical standards which apply to other attorneys in the places where the litigators perform their duties. While supporters argue the Amendment is the only existing, effective means of preventing and punishing prosecutorial abuse, critics contend that the Amendment impedes effective federal law enforcement. Twice in the last year, the Senate has passed legislation that included sections substantially modifying the amendment, but in each instance the modifications have been stripped out of the host legislation prior to its passage. This is a discussion of those sections and other similar proposals introduced in the 107th Congress. It is an abridged version of McDade- Murtha Amendment: Legislation in the 107th Congress Concerning Ethical Standards for Justice Department Litigators, CRS Report RL31221(pdf) (Dec. 18, 2001), without its footnotes or appendix. For more detailed background information, see, McDade-Murtha Amendment Ethical Standards for Justice Department Attorneys, CRS Report RL30060(pdf) (Dec. 18, 2001).",91,92 "Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues. Terrorist's use of the internet and other telecommunications devices is growing both in terms of reliance for supporting organizational activities and for gaining expertise to achieve operational goals. Tighter physical and border security may also encourage terrorists and extremists to try to use other types of weapons to attack the United States. Persistent Internet and computer security vulnerabilities, which have been widely publicized, may gradually encourage terrorists to continue to enhance their computer skills, or develop alliances with criminal organizations and consider attempting a cyberattack against the U.S. critical infrastructure. Cybercrime has increased dramatically in past years, and several recent terrorist events appear to have been funded partially through online credit card fraud. Reports indicate that terrorists and extremists in the Middle East and South Asia may be increasingly collaborating with cybercriminals for the international movement of money, and for the smuggling of arms and illegal drugs. These links with hackers and cybercriminals may be examples of the terrorists' desire to continue to refine their computer skills, and the relationships forged through collaborative drug trafficking efforts may also provide terrorists with access to highly skilled computer programmers. The July 2005 subway and bus bombings in England also indicate that extremists and their sympathizers may already be embedded in societies with a large information technology workforce. The United States and international community have taken steps to coordinate laws to prevent cybercrime, but if trends continue computer attacks will become more numerous, faster, and more sophisticated. In addition, a recent report by the Government Accountability Office states that, in the future, U.S. government agencies may not be able to respond effectively to such attacks. This report examines possible terrorists' objectives and computer vulnerabilities that might lead to an attempted cyberattack against the critical infrastructure of the U.S. homeland, and also discusses the emerging computer and other technical skills of terrorists and extremists. Policy issues include exploring ways to improve technology for cybersecurity, or whether U.S. counterterrorism efforts should be linked more closely to international efforts to prevent cybercrime. This report will be updated as events warrant.",22,86 "Summary Cost Data for Health Plans Available in Florida's Exchange, 2014: Fact Sheet. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) contains a number of provisions that may affect the individual health insurance market. This fact sheet offers a first look at selected costs and options for individual and family plans in Florida's exchange, providing information about individual and family premiums for selected ages, as well as two cost-sharing measures: medical deductible and maximum out-of-pocket expenses.",70,70 "Fairness Doctrine: History and Constitutional Issues. The Fairness Doctrine was a policy of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) that required broadcast licensees to cover issues of public importance and to do so in a fair manner. Issues of public importance were not limited to political campaigns. Nuclear plant construction, workers' rights, and other issues of focus for a particular community could gain the status of an issue that broadcasters were required to cover. Therefore, the Fairness Doctrine was distinct from the so-called ""equal time"" rule, which requires broadcasters to grant equal time to qualified candidates for public office, because the Fairness Doctrine applied to a much broader range of topics. In 1987, after a period of study, the FCC repealed the Fairness Doctrine. The FCC found that the doctrine likely violated the free speech rights of broadcasters, led to less speech about issues of public importance over broadcast airwaves, and was no longer required because of the increase in competition among mass media. The repeal of the doctrine did not end the debate among lawmakers, scholars, and others about its constitutionality and impact on the availability of diverse information to the public. The debate in Congress regarding whether to reinstate the doctrine continues today. Recently, Chairman Upton of the House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology sent a letter to FCC Chairman Genachowski urging the Commission to remove the regulations relating to the Fairness Doctrine from the Code of Federal Regulations. Chairman Genachowski responded by reasserting his lack of support for the Fairness Doctrine and agreeing to begin the process of repealing the regulations. Any attempt to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine likely would be met with a constitutional challenge. Those opposing the doctrine would argue that it violates their First Amendment rights. In 1969, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine, but applied a lower standard of scrutiny to the First Amendment rights of broadcasters than it applies to other media. Since that decision, the Supreme Court's reasoning for applying a lower constitutional standard to broadcasters' speech has been questioned. Furthermore, when repealing the doctrine, the FCC found that, as the law stood in 1987, the Fairness Doctrine violated the First Amendment even when applying the lower standard of scrutiny to the doctrine. No reviewing court has examined the validity of the agency's findings on the constitutional issue. Therefore, whether a newly instituted Fairness Doctrine would survive constitutional scrutiny remains an open question.",109,109 "Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union. Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget to over $1 billion per year across three agencies—DOD, DOE, and the State Department. It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups, to a global program to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these nations eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under the START Treaty, secure weapons storage areas, construct a storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials. The State Department manages the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev. These centers have provided research grants to scientists and engineers so that they will not sell their knowledge to other nations or terrorist groups. The State Department has also provided assistance with export and border control programs in the former Soviet states. The Department of Energy manages programs that seek to improve the security of nuclear warheads in storage and nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and nuclear weapons complex facilities. It also funds programs that help nuclear scientists and engineers find employment in commercial enterprises. DOE is also helping Russia dispose of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons and shut down its remaining plutonium-producing reactors by replacing them with fossil-fuel plants. Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs in the U.S. government, questions about Russia's willingness to provide the United States with access to its weapons facilities, questions about the President's ability to waive certification requirements so that the programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the efforts into a global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union. This report will be updated as needed.",29,29 "National Security Education Program: Background and Issues. The National Security Education Program (NSEP), authorized by the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (NSEA, Title VIII of P.L. 102-183), provides aid for international education and foreign language studies by American undergraduate and graduate students, plus grants to institutions of higher education. The statement of purpose for the NSEA emphasizes the needs of federal government agencies, as well as the Nation's postsecondary education institutions for an increased supply of individuals knowledgeable about the languages and cultures of foreign nations, especially those which are of national security concern and have not traditionally been the focus of American interest and study. Three types of assistance are authorized and currently provided by the NSEA: (a) David L. Boren Scholarships for undergraduate students to study in ""critical"" foreign countries, (b) grants to institutions of higher education to establish or operate programs in ""critical"" foreign language and area studies areas, including a National Flagship Language Initiative-Pilot Program, and (c) David L. Boren Fellowships to graduate students for education abroad or in the U.S. in ""critical"" foreign languages, disciplines, and area studies. Individuals who receive NSEP fellowships and scholarships are obligated for a limited period of time to seek employment in a national security position with a federal agency. Grant recipients who demonstrate that such positions are not available may fulfill the requirement through work in any federal agency or in the field of higher education in an area of study for which the scholarship or fellowship was awarded. The NSEP is intended to complement, and not duplicate, other federal programs of aid for foreign language and area studies education, such as those authorized under Title VI of the Higher Education Act and the Fulbright-Hays Act. Distinctive elements of the NSEP, compared to most other federal programs of aid to international education or exchange, include the service requirement for aid recipients, administration by the Department of Defense (rather than the Departments of Education or State), and support for international travel by American undergraduate students. The recent establishment of the NSEP pilot program, the National Flagship Language Initiative distinguishes it even further from Title VI programs. The NSEP is administered by the Department of Defense's National Defense University, under the guidance of a Presidentially appointed National Security Education Board. Several bills passed in the 107th and 108th Congressional sessions that would have altered the NSEP's funding and administration. In addition, the intelligence reform bill (P.L. 108-458) signed by the President on December 17, 2004, amends Title X of the National Security Act to create a new Intelligence Community Scholarship Program (ICSP) that is quite similar to the NSEP (Section 1042). This report provides background information on the NSEP and an analysis of related issues including the ICSP. It will be updated in response to major legislative developments.",34,34 "Social Security Benefits Are Not Paid for the Month of Death. Social Security benefits are not paid for the month in which a beneficiary dies. In most cases, the check that an individual receives in a given month represents payment for the preceding month. In other words, by design, the check (or direct bank deposit) arrives after the month for which it applies. In cases where a beneficiary dies late in the month, the Social Security Administration often is not notified of the death in time to stop the payment. When family members are informed that the check must be returned, they often complain that the policy is unfair and creates a financial hardship because the deceased beneficiary incurred expenses for part (or even most) of the month. Over the years, legislation has been introduced that would provide a full benefit for the month of death or a pro-rated benefit based on the proportion of the month that the beneficiary was alive. Supporters of such legislation argue that withholding benefits for the month of death does not make sense given that a person's bills do not stop at the beginning of the month in which they die. They argue that the public views the policy as anomalous in a system designed to provide monthly income to retirees, the disabled, and survivors of deceased workers. Critics of such legislation argue that paying full benefits for the month of death would cost an estimated $1.6 billion annually (excluding administrative costs). They point out that a deceased beneficiary's spouse and children can collect survivor benefits for the month of death, regardless of when the death occurred, that survivors may be entitled to a $255 lump-sum death payment, and that those seeking to have benefits paid for the month of death have little appreciation for the administrative difficulties involved in determining who should get the more than 2 million final benefit checks issued each year.",116,116 "House Standing Committees' Rules on Legislative Activities: Analysis of Rules in Effect in the 114th Congress. Rule XI, clause 2(a)(1) directs each standing committee to adopt ""written rules governing its procedure."" This paragraph continues: ""Such rules... (B) may not be inconsistent with the Rules of the House or with those provisions of law having the force and effect of Rules of the House...."" Rule XI, clause 1(a)(1)(A) in addition states: ""The Rules of the House are the rules of its committees and subcommittees so far as applicable."" Finally, Rule XI, clause 1(a)(1)(B) subordinates subcommittees to the committee of which they are a part: ""Each subcommittee is a part of its committee and is subject to the authority and direction of that committee and to its rules, so far as applicable."" Many provisions of House rules applicable to committee procedures appear in Rule XI, which also includes procedures specifically applicable to the Committee on Ethics. Rule X contains the legislative and oversight jurisdiction of standing committees, several clauses on committee operations, and a clause specifically addressing the jurisdiction and operation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Rule XII concerns the referral of legislation and related matters. In addition to calendars, Rule XIII addresses the filing and content of committee reports. Each House standing committee implements these rules, and select provisions of other House rules, in adopting its rules. Variety as well as consistency in committee rules is analyzed in this report as the rules relate to legislative activities, principally hearings, oversight, and markups. Administrative provisions in House and committee rules are not analyzed. Provisions of committee rules on legislative activities are clustered by topic, rather than by House rule number. In adopting their rules for the 113th Congress, committees in some instances adopted House rules unchanged, and in other instances adapted House rules to their own needs where they had discretion to do so. Committee rules change incrementally from one Congress to the next, with a committee typically making several amendments to its rules from the preceding Congress. Variations in key committee rules are highlighted in five tables referring measures or matters to subcommittees—whether the chair may or must refer legislation to a subcommittee, the time frame within which a decision must be made, and where authority to discharge a subcommittee resides scheduling hearings and meetings—committees' regular meeting day and time, authority to schedule additional meetings, and authority to cancel meetings hearings—quorum requirements, extending witness questioning time, and order of questioning witnesses subpoenas—committee authority, chair authority, ranking minority member authority, and notification to committee members of issuance of a subpoena, and record votes—obtaining a record vote, and postponing further proceedings when a record vote is requested. See CRS Report RS20794, The Committee System in the U.S. Congress, by Judy Schneider, for an explanation of the types of committees. See also CRS Report R40233, House Ad Hoc Select Committees with Legislative Authority: An Analysis, by Michael L. Koempel, and CRS Report 96-708, Conference Committee and Related Procedures: An Introduction, by Elizabeth Rybicki.",55,55 "U.S. Trade in Financial Services: An Overview. Financial services -- banking, securities, and insurance -- are a key element of the U.S. economy. With international trade in services generally rising, financial services have become a critical element of new and proposed multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements, as well as a source of some disputes with major trading partners. Congress not only oversees this critical industry, but it also has very substantial responsibilities with regard to U.S. trade, trade policy, and trade agreements, of which financial services are today an important part. U.S. policy has been to extend national treatment to foreign financial firms operating within the United States and to seek national treatment for U.S. firms operating abroad. In addition, the United States has sought to improve market access by seeking the reduction of various barriers, including for example, limits on types of products that may be sold, ceilings on the level of activity, or limitations on the right to establish a commercial presence within a country. The World Trade Organization (WTO) provides the first multilateral framework for trade in financial services -- the Financial Services Agreement (FSA) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The FSA went into effect on March 1, 1999, after difficult and drawn out negotiations. It's impact has largely been to bind current practices, but it is a work-in-progress. Under Article XIX of the GATS, a new set of negotiations on services, including financial services commenced in February 2000. Financial services will also likely be part of a new round of WTO negotiations that might be launched. Although the completed, but still pending, agreements with Vietnam and Jordan do not open up financial markets of any significant size, they may provide opportunities for some U.S. firms. The United States is negotiating free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore. The financial sectors of these two countries are largely open, but financial services issues, nevertheless, are important aspects of these negotiations. The United States is also in the midst of negotiating the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) with the 34 countries of the Western Hemisphere (excluding Cuba), an area with which the United States already enjoys a healthy surplus in financial services. The FTAA is to be implemented by December 2005. Financial services trade remains an important element of established U.S. regional and bilateral trade arrangements and relationships. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) historically the first trade agreement to address financial services trade issues, fully opened the financial markets of our two NAFTA partners, Canada and Mexico, resulting in a financial services trade surplus for the United States. The European Union (EU) is fully open without a bilateral accord. Financial services trade with Japan is modest. It has not grown appreciably in recent years and the United States has been pressing Japan to open up its financial services market to more trade. WTO access for China is likely to open a few opportunities for U.S. financial firms in the short-term with opportunities likely increasing as the Chinese economy develops. This report will be updated as events warrant.",53,53 "Supreme Court Justices: Demographic Characteristics, Professional Experience, and Legal Education, 1789-2010. This report provides an introduction of Supreme Court appointments in historical context. The report discusses the Supreme Court Justices demographic characteristics, professional background, and educational background.",92,54 "Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress. The Navy in 2017 initiated a new program, called the FFG(X) program, to build a class of 20 guided-missile frigates (FFGs). The Navy wants to procure the first FFG(X) in FY2020, the second in FY2021, and the remaining 18 at a rate of two per year in FY2022-FY2030. The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget requests $134.8 million in research and development funding for the program. Although the Navy has not yet determined the design of the FFG(X), given the capabilities that the Navy's wants the FFG(X) to have, the ship will likely be larger in terms of displacement, more heavily armed, and more expensive to procure than the Navy's Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs). The Navy envisages developing no new technologies or systems for the FFG(X)—the ship is to use systems and technologies that already exist or are already being developed for use in other programs. The Navy's desire to procure the first FFG(X) in FY2020 does not allow enough time to develop a completely new design (i.e., a clean-sheet design) for the FFG(X). Consequently, the Navy intends to build the FFG(X) to a modified version of an existing ship design—an approach called the parent-design approach. The parent design could be a U.S. ship design or a foreign ship design. The Navy intends to conduct a full and open competition to select the builder of the FFG(X). Consistent with U.S. law, the ship is to be built in a U.S. shipyard, even if it is based on a foreign design. Multiple industry teams are reportedly competing for the program. Given the currently envisaged procurement rate of two ships per year, the Navy envisages using a single builder to build the ships. The FFG(X) program presents several potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2019 funding request for the program whether the Navy has accurately identified the capability gaps and mission needs to be addressed by the program whether procuring a new class of FFGs is the best or most promising general approach for addressing the identified capability gaps and mission needs whether the Navy has chosen the appropriate amount of growth margin to incorporate into the FFG(X) design the Navy's intent to use a parent-design approach for the program rather than develop an entirely new (i.e., clean-sheet) design for the ship the Navy's plan to end procurement of LCSs in FY2019 and shift to procurement of FFG(X)s starting in FY2020 whether the initiation of the FFG(X) program has any implications for required numbers or capabilities of U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers.",32,32 "The 2002 Farm Bill: Comparison of Commodity Support Provisions with the House and Senate Proposals, and Prior Law. A new farm bill, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-171), covering crop years 2002-2007, was signed into law May 13, 2002. Conferees resolved the differences between the H.R. 2646 and S. 1731 and the conference report (H.Rept. 107-424) was adopted by the House on May 2 and the Senate on May 8. The previous farm bill (now prior law) was the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-127), popularly called the FAIR Act. Commodity support authority in the FAIR Act (Title I, Agricultural Market Transition Act (AMTA)) was set to expire after crop year 2002. This report provides a side-by-side comparison of prior law (AMTA), with most commodity support provisions of Title I of the new law, and the House and Senate farm bills. There are important similarities and differences between the various versions. The new law takes effect immediately and applies to crops harvested in 2002. While the House bill would have authorized support programs through 2011 (10 years), and the Senate bill 2006 (5 years), conferees agreed to authorize support through 2007 (6 years). As proposed in both bills conferees agreed to continue marketing assistance loans, first adopted in the 1985 farm bill and extended by AMTA. The new law will continue the annual fixed, decoupled contract payments first adopted under AMTA in 1996. And, as both bills proposed, the new law will restore the counter-cyclical payments (target price deficiency payments) discontinued by AMTA. The peanut support program is transformed to mirror the program for grains and oilseeds. At the more detailed level of commodity loan rates, contract payment rates, counter-cyclical target prices, and payment limitations, the conference report made compromises between the two bills that were adopted as new law.",3,2 "The Appointment Process for U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations: An Overview. In recent decades, the process for appointing judges to the U.S. circuit courts of appeals and the U.S. district courts has been of continuing Senate interest. The responsibility for making these appointments is shared by the President and the Senate. Pursuant to the Constitution's Appointments Clause, the President nominates persons to fill federal judgeships, with the appointment of each nominee also requiring Senate confirmation. Although not mentioned in the Constitution, an important role is also played midway in the appointment process by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Presidential Selection of Nominees The need for a President to make a circuit or district court nomination typically arises when a judgeship becomes or soon will become vacant. With almost no formal restrictions on whom the President may consider, an informal requirement is that judicial candidates are expected to meet a high standard of professional qualification. By custom, candidates whom the President considers for district judgeships are typically identified by home state Senators if the latter are of the President's party, with such Senators, however, generally exerting less influence over the selection of circuit nominees. Another customary expectation is that the Administration, before the President selects a nominee, will consult both home state Senators, regardless of their party, to determine the acceptability to them of the candidate under consideration. In recent Administrations, the pre-nomination evaluation of judicial candidates has been performed jointly by staff in the White House Counsel's Office and the Department of Justice. Candidate finalists also undergo a confidential background investigation by the FBI and an independent evaluation by a committee of the American Bar Association. The selection process is completed when the President, approving of a candidate, signs a nomination message, which is then sent to the Senate. Consideration by Senate Judiciary Committee Once received by the Senate, the judicial nomination is referred to the Judiciary Committee, where professional staff initiate their own investigation into the nominee's background and qualifications. Also, during this pre-hearing phase, the committee, through its ""blue slip"" procedure, seeks the assessment of home state Senators regarding whether they approve having the committee consider and take action on the nominee. Next in the process is the confirmation hearing, where judicial nominees engage in a question and answer session with members of the Judiciary Committee. Questions from Senators may focus, among other things, on a nominee's qualifications, understanding of how to interpret the law, previous experiences, and the role of judges. The committee, when it ultimately votes on a nomination, has three reporting options—to report favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation. Only on rare occasions has the committee voted to reject a judicial nomination or to report it other than favorably. Senate Floor Consideration Customarily, most circuit or district court nominations have reached confirmation under the terms of unanimous consent agreements. On this procedural track, the Senate by unanimous consent not only takes up nominations for floor consideration, but also arranges for them to either receive up-or-down confirmation votes or be confirmed simply by unanimous consent. If a roll call vote is asked for, a simple majority of Senators voting, with a minimal quorum of 51 being present, is required to approve a nomination. For a minority of judicial nominations, however, particularly those facing strong opposition, the procedural track, for moving forward without unanimous consent, customarily has involved the Senate voting on cloture motions to bring floor debate on them to a close. A simple majority of Senators voting is needed to close debate on all nominations except to the Supreme Court. (Prior to a Senate reinterpretation of its rules in November 2013, a three-fifths majority was required.) Nominations Not Confirmed Judicial nominations sometimes fail to be confirmed. This occurs most often when nominations in committee or on the Senate's Executive Calendar are returned to the President at the end of a session or upon a recess or more than 30 days. Senate votes rejecting a nomination are rare.",54,54 "The Role of the Senate in Judicial Impeachment Proceedings: Procedure, Practice, and Data. During the 111th Congress, for the first time in over 30 years, the House of Representatives was confronted with the task of investigating and impeaching not one, but two, federal judges. After the House fulfilled its constitutional responsibility as the chamber with the ""sole Power of Impeachment,"" the Senate was faced with executing its constitutional responsibility to ""try all Impeachments."" One of these judges, Samuel B. Kent of the Southern District of Texas, resigned before the Senate could complete his trial. The second, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., of the Eastern District of Louisiana, chose to contest his impeachment before the Senate. Despite the gravity of this responsibility, the Senate receives little constitutional guidance on how these trials should be conducted. Procedure in the Senate is primarily governed by the special rules established for impeachment trials, precedents established by previous impeachment trials, and existing Senate procedure. Impeachment trials in the Senate are rare, in that only 12 impeachment trials have been completed over the 222-year history of the Senate, while three others terminated before a determination on the merits of the case due to the resignation of the judges in question. Impeachment trials are also unique, in that each trial presents a wholly complex and individual set of facts and circumstances for the Senate's consideration. Thus, although this report may provide guidance as to the general structure of the process, each trial presents new procedural, factual, and evidentiary questions that must be resolved by either the full Senate, acting as a Court of Impeachment, or an impeachment trial committee charged with building a record and reporting it to the full Senate. This report examines the history, practice, and procedures of the Senate in fulfilling its constitutional obligation to try and to vote whether to convict and impose judgment upon judges impeached by the House of Representatives. The first section presents an overview of the impeachment process, including observations on parallels and contrasts between this institutional mechanism and the more familiar criminal judicial process. The second section discusses the rules used by the Senate to structure its proceedings. The third section describes the role of the Senate's Presiding Officer. The fourth section examines the use of Rule XI committees, otherwise known as impeachment trial committees. Special attention is given to the procedures of the committee during various stages of its proceedings. The fifth and sixth sections address deliberation and judgment by the full Senate, respectively. The seventh section provides a discussion of the length of Senate impeachment trials, examining in particular whether the use of impeachment trial committees have affected the length of Senate trials. The eighth and final section provides some concluding observations on Senate impeachment proceedings against judges. This report will be updated as events warrant.",55,55 "Trade Adjustment Assistance for Communities: The Law and Its Implementation. The Trade Adjustment Assistance for Communities (CTAA) grant program was created with the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, P.L. 111-5. Included among the subtitles of Division B of ARRA, was the Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act (TGAAA) of 2009. The CTAA program, as authorized by ARRA, comprises four subchapters Subchapter A—Trade Adjustment Assistance to Communities (CTAA) directs the EDA to provide technical assistance and to award strategic planning and implementation grants to eligible trade-impacted communities. Subchapter B—Community Colleges and Career Training (CCCT) creates a competitive grant program administered by the Department of Labor which is intended to strengthen the role of community colleges in filling the education and skills gap of workers in trade impacted communities. Subchapter C—Industry or Sector Partnership Grants Program for Communities Impacted by Trade (ISG) creates a grant program intended to encourage the creation of public private partnerships that develop a skilled workforce. Subchapter D—General Provisions includes language prohibiting workers receiving trade adjustment assistance from being disqualified from receiving assistance under activities funded by the CTAA program. The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, P.L. 111-32, included a $40 million appropriation that funded both Community Trade Adjustment Assistance and Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms. For FY2010, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2010, P.L. 111-117, included an appropriation of $15.8 million to be shared between the trade adjustment assistance programs for communities and firms. In addition, on March 30, 2010, the President signed the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, P.L. 111-152, which included $500 million in funding for each of the fiscal years FY2011 through FY2014 for Subchapter B, Community Colleges and Career Training Grants. On January 21, 2011, the Department of Labor's (DOL's) Employment and Training Administration (ETA) published in the Federal Register a notice of solicitation for grant applications (SGA) for the TAA Community College and Career Training Grant (CCCT) Program. The notice of availability of funds and solicitation for grant applications set April 21, 2011, as the closing date for the receipt of applications. On August 18, 2009, the Department of Commerce's (DOC) Economic Development Administration (EDA) published in the Federal Register final rules and regulations governing the CTAA program. The regulations outlined the responsibilities of EDA in administering the program, including determining a community's eligibility for CTAA grants, providing technical assistance to impacted communities, and evaluating grant applications. On January 11, 2010, EDA published in the Federal Register a notice soliciting applications for CTAA grants. Concurrently, it published the full announcement and application for assistance at http://www.grants.gov and established April 20, 2010, as the deadline for applications. Between August 3, 2010, and September 20, 2010, DOC announced the awarding of $36.768 million in CTAA grant funds to 36 grant recipients. This report will be updated as events warrant.",88,53 "Russia: Background and U.S. Policy. Over the last five years, Congress and the executive branch have closely monitored and responded to new developments in Russian policy. These developments include the following increasingly authoritarian governance since Vladimir Putin's return to the presidential post in 2012 Russia's 2014 annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Moscow's intervention in Syria in support of Bashar al Asad's government increased military activity in Europe, and cyber-related influence operations that, according to the U.S. intelligence community, have targeted the 2016 U.S. presidential election and countries in Europe. In response, the United States has imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions related to Russia's actions in Ukraine and Syria, malicious cyber activity, and human rights violations. The United States also has led NATO in developing a new military posture in Central and Eastern Europe designed to reassure allies and deter aggression. U.S. policymakers over the years have identified areas in which U.S. and Russian interests are or could be compatible. The United States and Russia have cooperated successfully on issues such as nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, support for military operations in Afghanistan, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, the International Space Station, and the removal of chemical weapons from Syria. In addition, the United States and Russia have identified other areas of cooperation, such as countering terrorism, illicit narcotics, and piracy. Like previous U.S. Administrations, President Donald J. Trump has sought to improve U.S.-Russian relations at the start of his tenure. In its first six months, the Trump Administration expressed an intention to pursue cooperation or dialogue with Russia on a range of pursuits (e.g., Syria, North Korea, cybersecurity). At initial meetings with President Putin in April and July 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and President Trump said they agreed to find ways to improve channels of communication and begin addressing issues dividing the two countries. At the same time, the Administration has indicated that it intends to adhere to core international commitments and principles, as well as to retain sanctions on Russia. Secretary Tillerson has stated that Ukraine-related sanctions will remain in place ""until Moscow reverses the actions that triggered"" them. Secretary Tillerson and other officials also have noted the severity of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the need for an appropriate response. Since the start of the 115th Congress, many Members of Congress have actively engaged with the Administration on questions concerning U.S.-Russian relations. As of August 2017, Congress has held more than 20 hearings on matters directly relating to Russia, codified and strengthened sanctions through the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II), and considered other measures to assess and respond to Russian interference in the 2016 elections, influence operations in Europe, INF Treaty violations, and illicit financial activities abroad. This report provides background information on Russian politics, economics, and military issues. It discusses a number of key issues for Congress concerning Russia's foreign relations and the U.S.-Russian relationship.",85,85 "Military Sexual Assault: A Framework for Congressional Oversight. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy and make rules for the governance of those forces. Under this authority, Congress determines military criminal law applicable to members of the Armed Forces. Congress has determined that sexual assault is a criminal act under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). As such, Congress has an interest in overseeing the implementation and enforcement of these laws in order to provide for the health, welfare, and good order of the Armed Forces. Prevention and response to sexual violence in the military is not a new concern, nor is sexual violence a problem confined to the military. While prevalence is difficult to estimate, some surveys suggest that up to 19.3% of women and 1.7% of men in the United States have been a victim of sexual assault at some point in their lives. There is a continued national dialogue with regard to sexual violence at universities and other government and private organizations. Sexual assault can have both deleterious physical and psychological effects on the victim and, when an assault occurs in or around the workplace, it can harm the working environment and function of the organization. In the military context, when an assault occurs it impairs the unit's ability to work effectively, it can have an impact on cohesion, stability, and ultimately, mission success. Thus, concern about sexual assault in the military stems from complementary imperatives: protecting the individual health and welfare of military servicemembers, and ensuring preparedness and effectiveness of military units. Congressional efforts to address military sexual assault, pursuant to its Constitutional authority, have intensified over the past two decades in response to rising public concern about incident rates and perceptions of a lack of adequate response by the military to support the victims and hold perpetrators accountable. Since 2004, Congress has enacted over 100 provisions intended to address some aspect of the problem as part of the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In addition, DOD has devoted significant resources to the issue in terms of funds, personnel, and training time. Given the scope and complexity of this issue, it is helpful to apply a framework for analysis and oversight. This report provides such a framework to help congressional staff understand the legislative and policy landscape, link proposed policy solutions with potential impact metrics, and identify possible gaps that remain unaddressed. Congressional oversight and action on military sexual assault can be organized into four main categories: (1) Department of Defense (DOD) management and accountability, (2) prevention, (3) victim protection and support, and (4) military justice and investigations. The first category deals with actions to improve management, monitoring, and evaluation of DOD's efforts in sexual assault prevention and response. The second category includes efforts to reduce the number of sexual assaults through screening, training, and organizational culture. The third category focuses on DOD's response once an alleged assault has occurred, including actions to protect and support the victim. Finally, the last category addresses bringing perpetrators to justice through military investigative and judicial processes.",30,30 "Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), H.R. 1318/H.R. 1886/H.R. 2410 and S. 496: Issues and Arguments. This report discusses legislation related to the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act (H.R. 1886), the Afghanistan-Pakistan Security and Prosperity Enhancement Act (H.R. 1318), and the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (H.R. 2410). It also discusses the Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act (S. 496).",85,79 Legislation to Approve the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. This report discusses the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement and analyzes relevant legislative initiatives (S. 812 and H.R. 1613) and other legislative action surrounding Congress's approval of the Agreement (P.L. 113-67).,53,84 "Superfund: Implementation and Selected Issues. Superfund is the federal government's principal program for cleaning up the nation's contaminated waste sites and protecting public health and the environment from releases of hazardous substances. Enacted into law as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA, P.L. 96-510), the program became known as Superfund because Congress established a large trust fund—originally supported by taxes levied on specific petroleum products and chemicals—to provide the majority of the program's funding needs. Although the 26-year-old program has seen less attention compared with earlier years, Superfund issues continue to generate debate. This report provides a background and overview of the Superfund program and examines four topics that received interest in recent years. The first issue concerns Superfund program funding: who should pay for the program, general taxpayers or a dedicated tax on industry? The program was originally funded by a tax on industry that expired at the end of 1995. Without dedicated taxes, and with a relatively small balance in the trust fund, Congress has been using general revenues for a larger percentage of cleanup funds. Members introduced bills to reinstate the taxes in the current and past three Congresses, but so far these efforts have lacked the necessary support. The second issue regards Superfund program appropriations. Recent evidence indicates that appropriations from the past several years have fallen short of program needs. The Administration's FY2007 budget proposal for Superfund also fell below levels that, according to some estimates, are needed to meet program obligations. Without reinstating the Superfund taxes, any increased appropriation would be funded through General Treasury revenues. The third issue involves Superfund interaction with abandoned and contaminated hardrock mines. The number of hardrock mining sites requiring cleanup in future years, particularly those without identifiable responsible parties, could play an important role in the Superfund funding debate. There is also a concern that the threat of CERCLA liability may act as a cleanup disincentive for ""good samaritans"" who might offer cleanup assistance at abandoned hardrock mines. The fourth issue concerns Superfund's role at animal feeding operations. Stakeholders argue about whether these operations should be required to report ammonia air emissions, primarily resulting from animal waste, as hazardous substance releases. This issue also concerns the responsibility for releases of animal waste that reach water bodies.",46,46 "U.S. International Trade: Trends and Forecasts. The global financial crisis and the U.S. recession, during the 19 months from December 2007 through June 2009, caused the U.S. trade deficit to decrease, or lessen, from August 2008 through May 2009. Since then it has begun to increase again as recovery has commenced. The financial crisis caused U.S. imports to drop faster than U.S. exports, but that trend has reversed as U.S. demand for imports recovers. Exports of goods of $1,497 billion in 2011 increased from 2010 by $209 billion or 16%, while imports of goods of $2,236 billion in 2011 increased by $302 billion, also 16%, over 2010. Though both exports and imports increased by 16%, this led to an increase in the overall merchandise trade deficit (i.e., the trade balance became more negative) for 2011 of $93 billion or 15% over 2010. Because imports are greater than exports, exports must increase at a greater percentage than imports to maintain the current trade balance. In 2011, the trade deficit in goods reached $738 billion on a balance of payments (BoP) basis, still lower than the previous peak of $836 billion in 2006, but greater than the deficits in 2009 and 2010 of $506 billion and $645 billion. The 2011 U.S. deficit on merchandise trade (Census basis) with China was $295.4 billion, with the European Union (EU27) was $99.9 billion, with Canada was $34.5 billion, with Japan was $63.2 billion, and with Mexico was $64.5 billion. With the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), the trade balance moved from a deficit of $5.5 billion in 2007 to surpluses increasing from $2.2 billion in 2008 to $15.4 billion in 2011. Related to the goods trade balance is the balance on the current account, which includes merchandise and services trade plus investment income and unilateral transfers. The deficit on the current account grew in 2011 to $466 billion from $442 billion in 2010. This smaller increase in the current account deficit ($24 billion), as compared to the increase in the goods trade deficit ($93 billion), reflects an increase in the U.S. surplus in both services trade and investment income. Trade deficits are a concern for Congress because they may generate trade friction and pressures for the government to do more to open foreign markets, to shield U.S. producers from foreign competition, or to assist U.S. industries to become more competitive. Overall U.S. trade deficits reflect excess spending (a shortage of savings) in the domestic economy and a reliance on capital imports to finance that shortfall. Capital inflows serve to offset the outflow of dollars used to pay for imports. Movements in the exchange rate help to balance trade. The rising trade deficit (when not matched by capital inflows) places downward pressure on the value of the dollar, which, in turn, helps to shrink the deficit by making U.S. exports cheaper and imports more expensive. However, interventions in foreign exchange markets by countries such as China and South Korea can keep the value of their currencies from rising too fast, thus keeping the dollar strong and imports cheaper. Areas to watch in 2012 in international trade include the energy and transportation sectors. In energy, unconventional oil and gas production are increasing U.S. domestic supply, reducing imports, and increasing exports. In transportation, U.S. automakers appear to be exporting well to growth markets such as China. Note: This report is current through U.S. Department of Commerce annual data revisions, published June 8, 2012, and Bureau of Economic Analysis revisions published June 14, 2012.",50,53 "Grazing Regulations: Changes by the;Bureau of Land Management. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued changes to grazing regulations (43 C.F.R. Part 4100) on August 11, 2006, after a three year review. Some portions of the regulations have been enjoined. The previous major revision of grazing rules, which took effect in 1995, was highly controversial. The 2006 changes addressed many of the same issues, and received mixed reviews. BLM asserted that the 2006 changes were needed to increase flexibility for grazing managers and permittees, to improve rangeland management and grazing permit administration, to promote conservation, and to comply with court decisions. Critics contend that a need for change was not justified and that changes adopted removed important environmental protections and opportunities for public comment. Under the 2006 changes, the BLM and a permittee could share title to structural range improvements, such as a fence. Permittees could acquire water rights for grazing, consistent with state law. The occasions on which BLM would be required to get input from the public on grazing decisions were reduced. The administrative appeals process on grazing decisions was modified and the extent to which grazing could continue in the face of an appeal or stay of a decision was delineated. The definition of grazing preference was broadened to include a quantitative meaning—forage on public land. Changes were made to the timeframe and procedures for changing grazing management after a determination that grazing is a significant factor in failing to achieve rangeland health standards. The three-year limit on temporary nonuse of a permit was removed, and permittees are able to apply for nonuse of a permit for up to one year at a time. Conservation use grazing permits were eliminated. Changes that have been enjoined relate primarily to public participation, sharing title to range improvements, and fundamentals of rangeland health. BLM also considered, but did not propose, certain changes due to adverse public reaction or other considerations. On June 17, 2005, BLM had issued a final environmental impact statement (FEIS) analyzing the potential impact of proposed changes in the regulations, an alternative, and the status quo. On March 31, 2006, BLM published an addendum to the FEIS addressing public comment received after the closing date of March 2, 2004, primarily from the Fish and Wildlife Service. Final regulatory changes took effect August 11, 2006. BLM also considered, but did not make, changes to its grazing policies, which the agency had believed could be carried out under existing rules. Potential changes that were examined included the establishment of reserve common allotments to serve as backup forage when permittees' regular allotments are unavailable, conservation partnerships between the BLM and permittees whereby permittees work to improve environmental health in return for certain benefits, voluntary allotment restructuring to allow multiple permittees to merge allotments, conservation easement acquisition to preserve open space, and landscape habitat improvement to promote species conservation and facilitate consultations under the Endangered Species Act.",107,107 "Digital Television: An Overview. Digital television (DTV) is a new television service representing the most significant development in television technology since the advent of color television. DTV can provide movie theater quality pictures and sound, a wider screen, better color rendition, multiple video programming or a single program of high definition television (HDTV), and other new services currently being developed. The nationwide deployment of digital television is a complex and multifaceted enterprise. A successful deployment requires the development by content providers of compelling digital programming, the delivery of digital signals to consumers by broadcast television stations, as well as cable and satellite television systems, and the widespread purchase and adoption by consumers of digital television equipment. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-104) provided that initial eligibility for any DTV licenses issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) should be limited to existing broadcasters. Because DTV signals cannot be received through the existing analog television broadcasting system, the FCC decided to phase in DTV over a period of years, so that consumers would not have to immediately purchase new digital television sets or converters. Thus, broadcasters were given new spectrum for digital signals, while retaining their existing spectrum for analog transmission so that they can simultaneously transmit analog and digital signals to their broadcasting market areas. Congress and the FCC set a target date of December 31, 2006, for broadcasters to cease broadcasting their analog signals and return their existing analog television spectrum to be auctioned for commercial services (such as broadband) or used for public safety communications. However, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) allowed a station to delay the return of its analog spectrum if 15% or more of the television households in its market did not subscribe to a multi-channel digital service and did not have digital television sets or converters. Given the slower-than-expected pace at which digital televisions have been introduced into American homes, and given the impetus to reclaim analog spectrum for commercial uses and public safety, the 109th Congress enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171), which established a ""date certain"" digital transition deadline of February 17, 2009. A key issue in the Congressional debate over the digital transition continues to be addressing the millions of American over-the-air households whose existing analog televisions will require converter boxes in order to receive digital signals when the analog signal is turned off. P.L. 109-171 established a digital-to-analog converter box program—administered by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce—that will partially subsidize consumer purchases of converter boxes. Specifically, Congress is actively overseeing the activities of federal agencies responsible for the digital transition—the FCC and the NTIA—while assessing whether additional federal efforts are necessary, particularly with respect to public education and outreach. This report will be updated as events warrant.",109,109 Veterans Affairs: Basic Eligibility for Disability Benefit Programs. This report examines the eligibility criteria and the fundamentals of the Department of Veterans Affairs-administered disability benefit programs and related issues. It supplements and condenses the relevant materials that are available from the VA and its website. It also provides specific citations for further information and more in-depth analysis of information contained herein.,30,30 "Physical Security of the U.S. Power Grid: High-Voltage Transformer Substations. The U.S. electric power grid consists of over 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines and hundreds of large transformer substations. High voltage (HV) transformer units make up less than 3% of U.S. transformers, but they carry 60%-70% of the nation's electricity. Because they serve as vital nodes, HV transformers are critical to the nation's electric grid. HV transformers are also the most vulnerable to damage from malicious acts. For more than 10 years, the electric utility industry and government agencies have engaged in activities to secure HV transformers from physical attack and to improve recovery in the event of a successful attack. These activities include coordination and information sharing, spare equipment programs, security standards, security exercises, and other measures. There has been some level of physical security investment and an increasing refinement of voluntary security practices across the electric power sector for at least the last 15 years. However, recent grid security exercises, together with a 2013 physical attack on transformers in Metcalf, CA, have changed the way grid security is viewed and have focused congressional interest on the physical security of HV transformers. They have also prompted new grid security efforts by utilities and regulators. On November 20, 2014, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved a new mandatory Physical Security Reliability Standard (CIP-014-1) proposed by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). The new standards require certain transmission owners ""to address physical security risks and vulnerabilities related to the reliable operation"" of the power grid by performing risk assessments to identify their critical facilities, evaluate potential threats and vulnerabilities, and implement security plans to protect against attacks. Legislative proposals would expand federal efforts to prevent or recover from a physical attack on the U.S. grid. These include the Enhanced Grid Security Act of 2015 (S. 1241), the Critical Electric Infrastructure Protection Act (H.R. 2271), the Terrorism Prevention and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015 (H.R. 85), a House bill to establish a strategic transformer reserve program (H.R. 2244), and the Grid Modernization Act of 2015 (S. 1243). There is widespread agreement among government agencies, utilities, and manufacturers that HV transformers in the United States are vulnerable to terrorist attack, and that such an attack potentially could have catastrophic consequences. But the most serious, multi-transformer attacks could require acquiring operational information and a certain level of sophistication on the part of potential attackers. Consequently, despite the technical arguments, without more specific information about potential targets and attacker capabilities, the actual risk of a multi-HV transformer attack remains an open question. As the electric power industry and federal agencies continue their efforts to improve the physical security of critical HV transformer substations, Congress may consider several issues as part of its oversight of the sector: identifying critical transformers, confidentiality of critical transformer information, adequacy of HV transformer protection, quality of federal threat information, recovery from HV transformer attacks, and the overall resiliency of the grid. Maintaining an integrated perspective on prevention, recovery, and resilience may help to promote an effective balance among industry investment, regulatory requirements, and federal oversight.",22,38 "The Appropriate Number of Advice and Consent Positions: An Analysis of the Issue and Proposals for Change. This report provides background information and analysis of issues concerning possible congressional action to reduce the number of positions to which the President makes appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions). Among other topics, the report discusses the constitutional framework that guides congressional action in this area, identifies potential congressional options, and analyzes associated institutional and political considerations. The Constitution provides Congress with considerable discretion over which officers of the United States will be in PAS positions, and which may be appointed by the President alone, the courts, or agency heads. At present, more than 2,000 high-level officials across the three branches are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The appointment process includes presidential selection and nomination, Senate consideration, and formal presidential appointment. In general, the number of PAS positions has grown and the appointment process has gotten longer over the last three decades. It is not clear, however, that the larger number is responsible for the lengthier process. Other factors, such as stricter vetting requirements, also play a role. Proponents of a reduction in the number of PAS positions have suggested that it might lead to an improvement in the efficiency and performance of the Senate confirmation process and to a decrease in the length of the appointment process, but this will probably be the case only if the positions removed from PAS status are those for which appointments consume the most time. Some argue that removing advice and consent requirements from such positions might have undesirable political and institutional consequences for Congress. A recently enacted provision directs each federal agency head to submit a PAS position reduction plan to the President and Congress. Congress might elect to make these plans the basis for future decisions concerning the reduction of PAS positions. Alternative options for Congress include maintaining the status quo, creating a commission to make recommendations for reductions of PAS positions, establishing a ""fast track"" procedure for these reductions, reducing the number of positions by category or function, distributing PAS positions in proportion to agency size, and delegating reduction choices to committees of jurisdiction. In lieu of maintaining PAS status for certain positions, Congress might continue to influence the appointment process by legislatively establishing qualifications or notification requirements for appointments to those positions. Congressional action on PAS positions would involve a number of institutional and political considerations. For example, participation in the appointment process through advice and consent gives Senators influence over the selection of nominees and facilitates obtaining testimony from appointees during oversight hearings. In addition, the confirmation process arguably provides the Senate with leverage during negotiations with the President over unrelated matters. This report will be updated as warranted by events.",55,55 "Energy and Water Development: FY2014 Appropriations. The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), for the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and several independent agencies. FY2013 Energy and Water Development appropriations were considered in the context of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25), which established discretionary spending limits for FY2012-FY2021. On March 26, 2013, the President signed H.R. 933, the FY2013 Defense and Military Construction/VA, Full Year Continuing Resolution (P.L. 113-6). The act funded Energy and Water Development accounts at the FY2012 enacted level for the rest of FY2013, with some exceptions. However, under BCA, an automatic spending reduction process, consisting of a combination of sequestration and lower discretionary spending caps, went into effect March 1, 2013. For FY2014, as in previous years, the level of overall spending was a major issue. President Obama's FY2014 budget request for Energy and Water Development was released in April 2013. The request totaled $34.4 billion. On June 26 the House Appropriations Committee reported a bill, H.R. 2609, with a total of $30.4 billion, the bill passed the House, with amendments, on July 10. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out a bill, S. 1245, on June 27, with a total of $34.4 billion. On October 16, 2013, Congress passed the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, H.R. 2775, P.L. 113-46, extending funding for all federal programs, including Energy and Water Development, through January 15, 2014, at the FY2013 post-sequestration spending level. On December 26 the President signed H.J.Res. 59 (P.L. 113-67), which contained the Bipartisan Budget Act establishing less stringent spending caps for FY2014 and FY2015 than the BCA and easing the way for an appropriations agreement. On January 17, 2014, the President signed H.R. 3547, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), containing appropriations for all 12 FY2014 appropriations bills, including Energy and Water Development programs (Division D). In addition to funding levels, issues specific to Energy and Water Development programs included the distribution of appropriations for Corps (Title I) and Reclamation (Title II) projects that have historically received congressional appropriations above Administration requests alternatives to the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, which the Administration has abandoned (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal) proposed FY2014 spending levels for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs (Title III) that were more than 50% higher in the Administration's request than the amount appropriated for FY2012, and funding for the nuclear weapons program and other defense activities, which make up half of the total Department of Energy budget.",59,59 Older Workers: Employment and Retirement Trends. This report begins by describing the change in the age distribution of the U.S. population that will occur between 2010 and 2030 and by summarizing the historical data on the labor force participation of older workers. This discussion is followed by an analysis of data from the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) on employment and receipt of pension income among persons aged 55 and older.,116,116 "Water Quality Initiatives and Agriculture. Congress most recently enacted amendments to the nation's water quality law, the Clean Water Act (CWA), in 1987. But national water quality policy has evolved in the intervening years, as a result of implementation of the 1987 amendments and related Administration initiatives intended to fulfill the requirements and meet the goals and objectives of the Act. Agriculture, which has been a relatively minor component of national water quality policies and programs, especially regulatory policies, is now involved in several aspects of three recent initiatives. In the Clean Water Action Plan, a Clinton Administration initiative intended to address the nation's remaining water quality challenges, several key actions focus on agriculture, federal lands and forestry as part of the overall goal of the Plan to more effectively control nonpoint source pollution. Specific outcomes, requirements affecting agriculture, if any, and any possible deadlines will be evident as the key actions are set in motion. One of the first Administration actions to carry out the Clean Water Action Plan was a national strategy for addressing waste management by one segment of agriculture, animal feeding operations (AFOs). Under the AFO strategy, all operators of animal feedings operations are expected to develop and implement site-specific comprehensive nutrient management plans, while an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 large AFOs and those contributing to water quality impairments will be priorities for regulatory programs and enforcement. A third policy development, separate from the Clean Water Action Plan, is implementation of existing CWA requirements which concern measures to improve the quality of waters that remain pollutant-impaired even after application of traditional pollution controls by industrial and municipal point sources."" Most of agriculture is classified as a ""nonpoint source"" and is not subject to CWA controls. These requirements are the Act's Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program. As states implement the TMDL program, where agricultural sources are identified as responsible for water quality impairments, they may be required to adopt control actions and/or management measures. Determinations of impairments and required actions will be site-specific and variable. However there is controversy over whether nonpoint sources of pollution (diffuse runoff that does not come from a pipe, ditch, or similar conveyance) are lawfully covered by the TMDL program. If only point sources are covered, impacts on agriculture would be considerably fewer. Regulatory changes proposed in 1999 to strengthen the TMDL program were widely criticized by agriculture and forestry groups, other industry groups, states and localities, and environmental groups. Final changes, issued in July 2000, dropped provisions that could have directly affected some in agriculture and forestry but the new rules remain controversial. This report provides background on the Clean Water Action Plan, the Unified National AFO Strategy, and implementation of the TMDL provisions of the Clean Water Act. It includes a glossary of terms and a chronology of key dates and deadlines related to the initiatives.",44,44 "Budget Process Reform: Proposals and Legislative Actions in 2012. An array of budget process reform proposals are put forth each year seeking to refine or modify the existing constitutional requirements, laws, and rules that make up the federal budget process. This report identifies, tracks, and explains current budget process reform proposals reported from committee or considered on the floor during 2012. The proposals are organized into categories related to the existing budget process. When appropriate, a brief description of the current process is provided. Measures included in this report are H.R. 3575, the Legally Binding Budget Act of 2011, H.R. 3521, the Expedited Legislative Line-Item Veto and Rescission Act of 2011, H.R. 3578, the Baseline Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 3582, the Pro-Growth Budgeting Act of 2011, and H.R. 3581, the Budget and Accounting Transparency Act of 2011.",101,101 "China's Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Policies. The 112th Congress continues to debate whether and how the United States should address climate change. Most often, this debate includes concerns about the effects of U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions controls if China and other major countries were not to take comparable actions. China recently surpassed the United States to become the largest emitter of human-related GHG globally, and together, the two nations emit about 40% of the global total (with shares of 21% and 19%, respectively). China's GHG emissions are growing rapidly and, even with policies adopted by China, are expected to rise until at least 2030. The emissions growth is driven by China's rapid economic and industrial growth and its reliance on fossil fuels despite measures to raise the shares of non-fossil energy sources. China requires 50% more energy to produce one billion dollars of GDP (its ""energy intensity"") compared with the United States. Over the past two decades, strong government directives and investments have dramatically reduced the energy and GHG intensities of China's economy, though the rates of improvement leveled off in the 2000s, and even reversed in subsequent years. A renewed emphasis on improving energy and GHG intensity emerged in the 11th 5-Year Plan, from 2006-2010, and the government says the nation nearly achieved its aggressive goal to reduce by 20% the energy required to produce GDP. In the context of China's 12th 5-Year Plan, from 2011-2015, leaders have set targets to further reduce energy intensity by 16% by 2015. Along with measures to reduce pollution and increase the shares of non-fossil fuels in the energy sector, China has set goals to improve its CO2 intensity by 40-45% by 2020, with an interim target in the 12th 5-Year Plan of 17% by 2015. Even if these targets are achieved, China's GHG emissions are expected to rise in absolute terms. In addition, the frequency, transparency, and data quality of China's reporting of its GHG emissions and mitigation actions (including underlying energy and other data) have been a challenging diplomatic issue between the United States and China and in the climate change negotiations. China has resisted reporting and reviews comparable to what other industrialized nations or what many developing countries accept. While technical bilateral cooperation on data has been productive and China has moved politically toward better information sharing, the continuing lack of transparency is apparent in uncertain emissions estimates and projections. Chinese negotiators adhere to the principle of ""common but differentiated"" responsibilities, agreed in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). They argue that emissions per person in China are low, that raising incomes must be their highest priority, and that industrialized countries bear primary responsibility for the historical buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere, therefore the industrialized countries should lead in mitigating emissions domestically. Industrialized countries also, they say, should assist developing countries with financial and technological support to mitigate emissions and adapt to coming change. Debate on potential climate change legislation in the United States has been influenced by China's surging GHG emissions, and uncertainty over whether, how, and when China might alter that trend. There is concern that strong U.S. domestic action taken without Chinese reciprocity would unfairly advantage China in global trade, and fail to slow significantly the growth of atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. The governments of both China and the United States have indicated some closure of their gap on future actions to address climate change by agreeing on national pledges to GHG targets and mitigation actions rather than binding international obligations. China is also engaged with many other countries in bilateral programs to build its governance and technological capacities to abate its GHG emissions.",42,42 "Teenage Pregnancy Prevention: Statistics and Programs. In 2015, U.S. teen births accounted for 5.8% of all births and 12.9% of all nonmarital births. The birth rate for U.S. teenagers (ages 15 through 19) increased in 2006 and 2007 after a steady decline since 1991. However, in each of 2008 through 2015, the teen birth rate dropped below the 2006 teen birth rate, reversing the two-year upward trend. Although the birth rate for U.S. teens has dropped in 22 of the past 24 years, it remains higher than the teen birth rate of most industrialized nations. Preventing teen pregnancy is generally considered a priority among policymakers and the public because of its high economic, social, and health costs for teen parents and their families. The Adolescent Family Life (AFL) program, created in 1981 (Title XX of the Public Health Service Act), was the first federal program to focus on pregnancy among adolescents. It was created to support demonstration projects that provide comprehensive and innovative health, education, and social services to pregnant and parenting adolescents, their infants, male partners, and their families. From 1998 to 2009, federal teen pregnancy prevention efforts in the AFL program and in general relied heavily on using abstinence-only education as their primary tool. The appropriation for the AFL program was $16.7 million in FY2010 and $12.4 million for FY2011. The AFL program has not received any funding since FY2011. P.L. 111-117 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010) included a new discretionary Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program, funded at $110 million for FY2010, which provides grants and contracts, on a competitive basis, to public and private entities to fund ""medically accurate and age appropriate"" programs that reduce teen pregnancy. Since FY2010, funding for the TPP program has fluctuated from a high of $109 million in FY2011 to a low of $98.4 million in FY2013 (post-sequester). P.L. 113-76 (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014) provided $101 million for the TPP program (and $8.5 million for program evaluation) for FY2014. P.L. 113-235 (the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015) funded the TPP program at $101 million for FY2015 (plus $6.8 million for program evaluation). Pursuant to P.L. 114-53 (the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016, enacted September 30, 2015), the TPP was funded for FY2016 at the FY2015 rate of $101 million (plus $6.8 million for program evaluation) minus an across-the-board rescission of 0.2108%, through December 11, 2015, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation. Pursuant to P.L. 114-113 (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, enacted December 18, 2015), the TPP was funded for FY2016 at $101 million (plus $6.8 million for program evaluation). Pursuant to P.L. 114-223 (the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act, enacted September 29, 2016), the TPP is funded for FY2017 at the FY2016 rate of $101 million annually (prorated) plus $6.8 million for program evaluation, minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, through December 9, 2016, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation. P.L. 111-148 (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act-ACA) established a new state formula grant program and appropriated $375 million, at $75 million per year for five years (FY2010-FY2014), to enable states to operate a new Personal Responsibility Education Program (PREP), which is a broad approach to teen pregnancy prevention that educates adolescents on both abstinence and contraception to prevent pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. PREP also provides youth with information on several adulthood preparation subjects (e.g., healthy relationships, adolescent development, financial literacy, parent-child communication, educational and career success, and healthy life skills). P.L. 113-93 (the Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014), which was enacted on April 1, 2014, extended PREP ($75 million per year) through FY2015 (i.e., September 30, 2015). P.L. 114-10 (the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015) extended PREP ($75 million per year) through FY2017 (i.e., September 30, 2017). The Title V Abstinence Education Block Grant to states was authorized under P.L. 104-193 (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996). The Title V Abstinence Education program is a formula grant program, specifically for abstinence-only education, funded by mandatory spending. The program's funding expired on June 30, 2009, but P.L. 111-148 reauthorized the program and restored funding at the previous annual level of $50 million for each of FY2010-FY2014. P.L. 113-93 extended the Title V Abstinence Education block grant ($50 million per year) through FY2015. P.L. 114-10 increased the Title V Abstinence Education block grant to $75 million per year for FY2016 and FY2017. Several appropriation laws included an additional $5 million for competitive grants for abstinence-only education for each of FY2012, FY2013, FY2014, and FY2015 (P.L. 112-74, P.L. 113-6, P.L. 113-76, and P.L. 113-164/P.L. 113-235). P.L. 114-113 (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, enacted December 18, 2015) included funding of $10 million for competitive grants which exclusively implement education in sexual risk avoidance (defined as refraining from nonmarital sexual activity) for FY2016. Pursuant to P.L. 114-223 (the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act, enacted September 29, 2016), the competitive sexual risk avoidance grant program (also referred to as abstinence education) is funded for FY2017 at the FY2016 rate of $10 million (annually, prorated) minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, through December 9, 2016, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation. This report briefly examines some of the data collected by the National Center for Health Statistics on teenage childbearing, offers potential reasons for high teen pregnancy and birth rates, and provides basic information on federal programs whose purpose is primarily to delay sexual activity among teenagers and to reduce teen pregnancy. Appendix A provides a funding history of the teen pregnancy prevention programs discussed in this report.",95,95 "Turkey: Continuity and Change after Elections. The April 18, 1999 election in Turkey reflected growing nationalism, a weakening of the political center, and a desire for more honest leadership. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit of the Democratic-Left Party (DSP) is continuing in office, joined by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Motherland Party (ANAP). Ecevit and ANAP leader Mesut Yilmaz have prior government experience. MHP's Devlet Bahceli does not, and his purported success in moderating the ultra-right MHP is being tested. DSP and ANAP control ministries of foreign and macroeconomic policy significance, while MHP holds portfolios important for its ideology and constituents in Turkey's Anatolian heartland. All agree on overall economic policies needed to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The government may last longer than its immediate predecessors, given its hefty majority, but multi-party coalitions are inherently unstable and the historic distrust between DSP and MHP could dim its prospects. There are many issues to engage U.S. and Turkish officials: democratization human rights, Greece, Cyprus, pipelines, the European Union, Iraq, and arms transfers. For background, see CRS Report RS20030(pdf) Turkey: Government Update, CRS Report 97-840(pdf), Turkey Situation Update, and CRS Report 97-462, Turkey's Unfolding Political Crisis. This report will not be updated.",85,85 "Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: New Independent Agency Status. This report examines initial responses to the 9/11 Commission's call for a board to oversee adherence to presidential guidelines on information sharing that safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom information is shared, and the implementation of this board.",19,19 "CRS Issue Statement on Child Well-Being. The nation's future depends in large part on its children's ability to develop into contributing adult members of society. For that reason, and for what many would consider a society's moral responsibility to care for the young and vulnerable, Congress and the nation take an interest in promoting children's well-being. It can be argued that children are the nation's most valuable resource, constituting the next generation of workers, taxpayers, and parents. Their well-being and ability to develop into productive adults in an increasingly competitive global economy is influenced by a variety of factors, and public policies can affect these factors to varying degrees.",34,95 "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: Issues for the 112th Congress. P.L. 112-96 funds TANF through the end of FY2012. It generally provides FY2012 TANF funding at FY2011 levels, but does not fund TANF ""supplemental grants."" In addition, P.L. 112-96 prevents electronic benefit transaction access to TANF cash at certain establishments, and also revises TANF reporting standards to facilitate data exchanges with other programs. The short-term extension of TANF defers major budget and policy decisions related to the block grant. Most federal TANF policy focuses on historical concerns related to cash assistance for needy families with children, which led to the 1996 welfare law. However, TANF has evolved into a funding stream that funds a wide range of economic aid and human services that address economic and social disadvantage for families with children. In FY2010, only 30% of all federal TANF and associated state dollars were used for basic monthly cash assistance. The recent recession was the first long and deep one since the enactment of the 1996 welfare law. TANF's contingency fund, established in 1996 to provide extra grants during recessions, was exhausted in early FY2010. Congress created a $5 billion temporary Emergency Contingency Fund (ECF) for FY2009 and FY2010 that provided extra funding to help pay for increased cash assistance caseloads, short-term aid, and subsidized employment. The ECF expired on September 30, 2010. Congress might consider policy alternatives to provide states with extra funding during the next economic downturn. A TANF-funded activity that was substantially expanded during the recent economic downturn was subsidized employment. The ECF provided $1.3 billion for subsidized employment for an estimated 262,500 slots during the lifetime of the fund. TANF-funded subsidized employment can be for those on the assistance rolls as well as other low-income parents, caretakers, or youth. Congress might consider ways to encourage states to continue subsidized employment activities, including providing dedicated funding for this activity and/or considering participation in subsidized employment for individuals not receiving ongoing assistance when assessing state TANF performance. Additionally, most traditional welfare reform issues have focused on families headed by a single mother. Current law provides TANF grants to community-based organizations for initiatives to promote both healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood. However, poor noncustodial fathers, like their poor single mother counterparts, tend to have low levels of educational attainment, weak attachment to work, and health barriers to employment. They might also have a criminal record. Congress might examine ways to expand TANF-funded work and employment services for disadvantaged noncustodial fathers.",117,117 "Fetal Tissue Research: Frequently Asked Questions. This report provides answers to frequently asked questions concerning the regulation and use of fetal tissue in research, including a description of what constitutes fetal tissue research, uses of fetal tissue for medical purposes, how such tissue is acquired, along with rules and regulations governing the use and acquisition of fetal tissue. fetal tissue, Planned Parenthood, fetal tissue transplantation research, Common Rule",72,72 "Federal Capital Offenses: An Abridged Overview of Substantive and Procedural Law. Murder is a federal capital offense if committed in any of more than 50 jurisdictional settings. The Constitution defines the circumstances under which the death penalty may be considered a sentencing option. With an eye to those constitutional boundaries, the Federal Death Penalty Act and related statutory provisions govern the procedures under which the death penalty may be imposed. Some defendants are ineligible for the death penalty regardless of the crimes with which they are accused. Children and those incompetent to stand trial may not face the death penalty, pregnant women and the mentally retarded may not be executed. There is no statute of limitations for murder, and the time constraints imposed by the due process and speedy trial clauses of the Constitution are rarely an impediment to prosecution. The decision to seek or forgo the death penalty in a federal capital case must be weighed by the Justice Department's Capital Review Committee and approved by the Attorney General. Defendants convicted of murder are death-eligible only if they are found at a separate sentencing hearing to have acted with life-threatening intent. Among those who have, capital punishment may be imposed only if the sentencing jury unanimously concludes that the aggravating circumstances that surround the murder and the defendant outweigh the mitigating circumstances to an extent that justifies execution. The Federal Death Penalty Act provides several specific aggravating factors, such as murder of a law enforcement officer or multiple murders committed at the same time. It also permits consideration of any relevant ""non-statutory aggravating factors."" Impact on the victim's family and future dangerousness of the defendant are perhaps the most commonly invoked non-statutory aggravating factors. The jury must agree on the existence of at least one of the statutory aggravating factors if the defendant is to be sentenced to death. The Federal Death Penalty Act permits consideration of any relevant mitigating factor, and identifies a few, such as the absence of prior criminal record or the fact that a co-defendant, equally or more culpable, has escaped with a lesser sentence. The Federal Death Penalty Act recognizes other capital offenses that do not necessarily involve murder: treason, espionage, large-scale drug trafficking, and attempted murder to obstruct a drug kingpin investigation. The constitutional standing of these is less certain or at least different. This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R42095, Federal Capital Offenses: An Overview of Substantive and Procedural Law, without some of the discussion, the footnotes, and much of the attributions of authority and quotations found there.",94,94 "Transforming Government Acquisition Systems: Overview and Selected Issues. Increasingly, the federal government uses technology to facilitate and support the federal acquisition process. Primary beneficiaries of this shift to online systems (websites and databases) are the government's acquisition workforce and prospective and incumbent government contractors. The suite of web-based systems supports contracting officers' efforts to ensure the government contracts only with responsible parties, is essential to the dissemination of information regarding contracting opportunities, and facilitates interagency contracting. From the contractor perspective, the government's online systems streamline the processes involved in fulfilling various administrative requirements, provide access to possible contracting opportunities, and are potential resources for market research. Congressional interest in the government's online procurement systems, and, relatedly, the federal acquisition process, flows from the institution's responsibilities involving government spending and oversight of executive branch operations. Congress monitors how well the federal acquisition process works, which includes several web-based systems, and also uses data and information available from some of the systems as resources for its oversight activities. The federal government's major, governmentwide web-based acquisition systems include Acquisition Central, Electronic Subcontracting Reporting System (eSRS), Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps), Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) Portal (this system is known as the ""FFATA Portal""), Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS), FFATA Sub-Award Reporting System (FSRS), Interagency Contract Directory (ICD), Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS), System for Award Management (SAM), USAspending.gov, and Wage Determinations On-line (WDOL). Interest in the federal government's online acquisition systems is reflected in a variety of issues and topics. Over the years, questions have been raised regarding the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of the contract award data available from FPDS and its successor, FPDS-NG. Recent efforts to remedy these problems include guidance issued by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in 2011, which provides instructions for calculating and reporting the accuracy and completeness of data submitted to FPDS-NG. The most recent information available regarding FPDS-NG data shows that, governmentwide, the four-year average (FY2008-FY2011) for completeness was 98.3% and for sample accuracy 94.0%. Another significant topic involving the government's web-based acquisition systems was the launch of the System for Award Management in 2012. The following three systems became part of SAM in July 2012: Central Contractor Registration (CCR, which includes Federal Agency Registration (FedReg)), Excluded Parties List System (EPLS), and Online Representations and Certifications Application (ORCA). When completed, SAM will also include five other online procurement systems, plus the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA). A variety of issues and problems, including separate logins, overlapping data, the absence of a single, uniform level of service, and multiple vendors hosting the systems, prompted interest in developing an integrated system. Although this report does not focus on transparency, several issues discussed here are related to transparency. First, while the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) website and FPDS-NG provide information about executive branch agencies' procurements, a database of federal agencies' contracts does not exist. In 2003, GSA established a working group to examine the feasibility, challenges, and anticipated benefits of posting federal contracts online. Ultimately, the working group concluded there were insufficient data to support recommending the establishment of a central system for posting contracts online. In 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD), GSA, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) regarding posting contracts online. Comments submitted in response to the notice identified several challenges, and the matter was concluded when the agencies withdrew the ANPR. Second, transparency does not necessarily equate to comprehension. Generally, variation exists among the users of government procurement systems regarding their knowledge of government procurement and procurement data. Third, during the 113th Congress, two similar bills (H.R. 2061 and S. 994) with the same name (Digital Accountability and Transparency Act, or DATA Act) were introduced, either of which would enhance transparency of spending data, including certain procurement data. If either bill is enacted, it might have implications for FPDS-NG.",63,63 "Health Care and Markets. Health care spending is one of the most rapidly growing portions of the federal budget. Projections suggest if the rapid growth in health care costs is not curtailed, governments at all levels will face an uncomfortable choice between significant cuts in other spending priorities or major tax increases. This report examines the economic justification for government intervention and involvement in health care markets. Many analysts claim market-oriented policies, in certain instances, could lower costs and enhance efficiency in health care. This report discusses the Invisible Hand Theorem, which states that when certain assumptions hold, market outcomes will be efficient. These assumptions require that no one has an informational advantage over another, that no spillover effects exist in consumption or production, that no one exerts market power, and that no scale economies exist in production. Many characteristics of health care markets fail to satisfy the assumptions of the Invisible Hand Theorem. Moreover, fundamental characteristics of health care (such as informational asymmetries between patients and health care professionals and between payers and providers, as well as ethical and distributional concerns) complicate efforts to expand the use of market or market-like incentives in health care. Rising health care costs in part reflect the cost of technological advances, whose benefits exceed their costs, and the aging of the U.S. population. The growing role of third-party reimbursement over the past half century weakened incentives to minimize costs and thus has also led to higher health care costs. Many analysts have called for initiatives which would improve the functioning of health care markets, such as improving consumer information and allowing greater use of bargaining. These initiatives may help reduce or slow the growth of health care costs, but may also have unintended negative consequences. Greater use of market-like incentives can improve the efficiency of the health care system, but only if they take into account the special characteristics of health care.",70,70 "Medicaid Rehabilitation Services. Medicaid rehabilitation includes a full range of treatments that licensed health practitioners may recommend to reduce physical or mental disability or restore eligible beneficiaries to their best possible functional levels. Over the last seven years of available data (1999-2005), reported Medicaid expenditures for rehabilitation increased from $3.6 billion to $6.4 billion, an increase of 77%. In comparison, over the same period, total Medicaid spending increased from approximately $147.4 billion (FY1999) to $275.6 billion (FY2005), an 87% increase. Both the executive and legislative branches have addressed Medicaid rehabilitation services. For instance, in recent annual budget submissions, the Bush Administration proposed administrative changes to reduce Medicaid rehabilitation expenditures. Congressional and executive branch oversight organizations have documented inconsistent policy guidance and states' practices for claiming federal matching funds that failed to comply with Medicaid rules. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a proposed rule on August 13, 2007, for Medicaid rehabilitation services. The proposed rule was intended to more clearly define for states the scope of the rehabilitation benefit and identify services that can be claimed as rehabilitation under Medicaid. CMS estimated that the proposed changes would reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by approximately $180 million in FY2008 and $2.2 billion between FY2008 and FY2012. The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 (MMSEA, P.L. 110-173) imposed a moratorium until June 30, 2008, on implementation of the rehabilitation proposed rule. On May 22, 2008, the Senate passed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 (H.R. 2642), which contained a moratorium until April 1, 2009, on implementation of the rehabilitation regulations. H.R. 2642 was amended by the House and passed on June 19, 2008. The House amendments included moratoria until April 1, 2009, for six Medicaid regulations, including rehabilitation services. On June 26, 2008, the Senate passed H.R. 2642 without changes to the House legislation, so that implementation of six Medicaid regulations, including rehabilitation services, would be delayed until April 1, 2009. The President signed P.L. 110-252 into law on June 30, 2008. Earlier, on June 4 and 5, 2008, the Senate and House, respectively, adopted the final version of the budget resolution (H.Rept. 110-659 accompanying S.Con.Res. 70). The conference agreement established budget-neutral reserve funds that could be used to impose moratoria on Medicaid rules and administrative actions and also includes a sense of the Senate provision on delaying Medicaid administrative regulations including rehabilitation services. This report describes Medicaid rehabilitation services, discusses major provisions of the Medicaid rehabilitation regulation, and provides various perspectives on the rehabilitation proposed rule. This report will be updated with legislative and regulatory activity.",71,71 "Elections in France, 2007. On May 6, 2007, the Gaullist Nicolas Sarkozy defeated the Socialist candidate Ségolène Royal in the second round of the French elections to become President of France. He will serve a five-year term. His party lost seats but maintained a solid majority in subsequent legislative elections. Since 1981, France has had only two presidents. There is a sense of malaise in the country, in part due to high unemployment and slow economic growth. Sarkozy represents a younger generation of leaders. Sarkozy casts himself as a tough-minded former Interior Minister. His campaign built on his reputation as hard on illegal immigration and insistent on greater efforts by the country's large Muslim community to better integrate itself into French life. Royal pursued a campaign meant to place her directly in touch with French voters. In doing so, she circumvented some of the steps normally necessary to gain the Socialist Party nomination. This campaign strategy put her at odds with some of the Party elders. She gambled that her campaign of ""participatory democracy"" would appeal to a range of voters beyond the Socialist Party. In the end, she failed to deliver a clear message to French voters and to unite her own party. Foreign policy played a secondary role in the elections. Sarkozy and Royal stressed the growing danger of Iran. Both candidates supported French participation in U.N., NATO, and EU security and stabilization missions, but there were disagreements with the United States over some elements of NATO's mission and future. Both candidates supported the EU, but neither brought to EU issues the passion of previous post-war French leaders. Sarkozy presents himself as a friend of the United States and an admirer of American culture but added that France under his leadership would assert its usual independence. Royal was sharply critical of the Bush Administration and contended that U.S. ""unilateralism"" in recent years has damaged bilateral relations and increased instability in the Middle East. It is possible that Sarkozy will pursue a practical and non-ideological posture towards the United States. He is unlikely to alter the U.S.-French relationship in a stark manner. Cooperation over counterterrorism measures, multinational operations in Lebanon, the Balkans, and Afghanistan, and good trade relations are likely to continue. This report will be updated to reflect the outcome of the presidential and legislative elections. See also CRS Report RL32464, France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations, by Paul Gallis.",87,85 "Clean Air Standards: The Supreme Court Agrees to Review. In May, 2000, the Supreme Court agreed to review this decision, raising the prospect of a major pronouncement on the non-delegation doctrine, the enforceability of the revised ozone standard, and the role of compliance costs in setting nationwide air quality standards.",42,42 "China's Emergence as a Major Economic Power: Implications for U.S. Interests. China's likely development as a major economic power over the next quarter century holds important implications for U.S. interests. Assuming a continuation of current trends, by 2025 China is likely to become a medium income economy with an estimated $3.5 trillion to $5.8 trillion gross domestic product and a 1.5 billion population. An optimistic view of China in 2025 is for it to be well integrated into the world economy with global standards for trade, investments, finance, labor and the environment and with a booming investment and trading relationship with the United States conducted in a peaceful world environment. A pessimistic view is that, in 2025, China with a huge and powerful economy and globally competitive industries would be presided over by a politically authoritarian regime with a modern military that views the United States as the enemy and with a government that poses a formidable threat to U.S. interests. The actual China in 2025 will probably contain elements of both these extremes. Chinese economic prosperity depends on its internal micro- and macroeconomic policies and reforms. It also depends on access to markets, foreign capital and technology of the United States and other countries of the world. In recent years, China's economic ties with the U.S., in effect, have resulted in an annual gain of some $60 billion for China from its bilateral trade surplus and direct foreign investment. Any major conflict between the two countries could jeopardize China's economic modernization and undermine its internal stability as well as its international status. Rising Chinese demand for resources, particularly food and energy, as incomes rise and population grows and becomes more urbanized may become a source of conflict. China could seek to assert its claims to disputed islands in the East and South China Sea for their resource and military value. The U.S. could be drawn into these territorial disputes. The status of Taiwan also could become a source of conflict as Beijing has not ruled out the use of force in dealing with Taiwan. With rapidly rising incomes, China could devote more resources to its military, but in view of growing domestic needs, military spending is likely to continue to take second place to economic expansion and modernization. Even if the military share of GDP remains constant, however, China's military spending could rise from about $30-35 billion in 1998 to a projected $135 billion to $225 billion by 2025. The Clinton Administration (as did the Bush Administration) has pursued a basic policy of engagement"" with China along with restrictions on exports of military and certain high-technology exports in response to Chinese activities deemed threatening to U.S. security. The ""engagement policy is based on a view that economic reforms and growth will make China less of a threat to U.S. interests. Those opposed to ""engagement,"" seek a stiffer and less accommodating U.S. position toward China. This is based on a view that a China with greater economic and military power would increasingly threaten U.S. interests. Both sides in the policy debate would have the United States apply firm pressures and maintain a strong military presence as a counterweight to rising Chinese power in Asia.",85,85 "Automobile and Light Truck Fuel Economy: The CAFE Standards. This report discusses the current corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standard of 35 miles per gallon (mpg), and the major issues on the CAFE debate. The report also offers an overview of Congressional interest in CAFE (1991-2005), and explains the CAFE and reduction of carbon dioxide emissions.",40,118 "FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues. Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, along with the regular use of the reserve component personnel for operational missions, further heighten interest in a wide range of military personnel policies and issues. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has selected a number of the military personnel issues considered in deliberations on H.R. 4435, the initial House-passed version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015, S. 2410, the version of the NDAA reported by the Senate Committee on Armed Services (S.Rept. 113-176) but not considered by the full Senate, and H.R. 3979, the proposed final version. This report provides a brief synopsis of sections in each bill that pertain to selected personnel policy. These include end strengths, compensation, health care, and sexual assault, as well as less prominent issues that nonetheless generate significant public interest. This report focuses exclusively on the annual defense authorization process. It does not include language concerning appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices, or any discussion of separately introduced legislation, topics which are addressed in other CRS products. Some issues were addressed in the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report R43184, FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues coordinated by Don J. Jansen. Those issues that were considered previously are designated with a ""*"" in the relevant section titles of this report.",30,30 "The OECD Initiative on Tax Havens. This report examines the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and its role in changes to U.S. laws related to bribery, tax havens.",82,82 "Overview of Private Health Insurance Provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Private health insurance is the predominant form of health insurance coverage in the United States, covering about two-thirds of Americans in 2014. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) builds on and modifies existing sources of private health insurance coverage—the non-group (individual), small-group, and large-group markets. The ACA provisions follow a federalist model in which they establish federal minimum requirements and give states the authority to enforce and expand those federal standards. The ACA includes provisions that restructure the private health insurance market by implementing market reforms that impose requirements on insurers and sponsors of health insurance (e.g., employers) creating health insurance exchanges (marketplaces) in which individuals and small businesses can shop for and purchase private health plans that meet or exceed federal standards providing financial assistance to qualified individuals and small employers who purchase health plans through an exchange establishing an individual mandate, which requires most individuals to either maintain health insurance coverage or pay a penalty creating three risk mitigation programs to help health insurance issuers adjust to the reformed private health insurance landscape assessing penalties on certain employers that either do not provide health insurance or provide health insurance that does not meet certain criteria, and including some state-option provisions, which states may choose to implement. This report provides a broad overview of some of the private health insurance provisions in the ACA and directs readers to more in-depth CRS reports.",70,70 "Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: The 18 U.S.C. 924(c) Tack-On in Cases Involving Drugs or Violence. Section 924(c) requires the imposition of one of a series of mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment upon conviction for misconduct involving the firearm and the commission of a federal crime of violence or a federal drug trafficking offense. The terms vary according to the type of firearm used, the manner of the firearm's involvement, and whether the conviction involves a single, first-time offense. Liability extends to co-conspirators and to those who aid or abet in the commission of a violation of the section. If a machine gun, silencer, short barreled rifle, short barreled shotgun, or body armor is involved, the offense is punished more severely. If the firearm is brandished or discharged, the offense is punished more severely. Repeat offenders are likewise punished more severely. Twenty-five-year mandatory minimum terms for multiple offenses must be served consecutively. The mandatory minimum terms range from imprisonment for five years to imprisonment for life, consecutive mandatory minimum terms may exceed 100 years. In each case the maximum term is life imprisonment. The United States Sentencing Commission has suggested that Congress consider amending Section 924(c) to (1) address the ""stacking"" of 25-year charges for multiple offenses, (2) require a prior conviction to trigger repeat offender enhancements, (3) provide sentencing courts with discretion over whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, and (4) clarify the statutory definitions of the terms used in Section 924(c). Section 924(c) has withstood constitutional challenges based on the Second Amendment's right to bear arms, the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments prohibition, the Sixth Amendment's right to jury trial, the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy and due process proscriptions, and the Constitution's structural limitations on preservation of the separation of powers and on Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.",94,94 "Overview of U.S.-South Korea Agricultural Trade. South Korea is an important export market for U.S. agricultural products. In 2017, U.S. farmers and ranchers sold about $7 billion of goods to South Korea, making it the sixth-largest export market by value for U.S. agricultural products. Leading U.S. agricultural exports to South Korea include beef, corn, soybeans, pork, wheat, oranges, nuts, and cheese. Further, the United States had a trade surplus of more than $6.3 billion in food and agricultural products with South Korea in 2017. The trading relationship between the two countries has been governed by the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, known as KORUS, since it took effect in 2012. The bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) reduces, and in many cases eliminates, tariff and nontariff barriers between the United States and South Korea. South Korea's agriculture sector is highly protected—its agricultural tariffs average 57%—but through KORUS, South Korea immediately granted duty-free status to almost two-thirds of U.S. agricultural product exports. In March 2018, the Trump Administration and South Korea reached an agreement in principle on modifications to KORUS. These changes reportedly did not address agricultural provisions. U.S.-South Korea Agricultural Trade / Source: USDA Global Agricultural Trade System (GATS), Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States (FATUS) product group. Data are in nominal dollars. The value of U.S. agricultural exports to South Korea almost tripled in nominal dollars between 2000 and 2017, increasing from $2.5 billion to $7 billion. From 2009 to 2011—the three years prior to the implementation of KORUS—U.S. exports to South Korea averaged about $5.4 billion. In the three years following the implementation of the FTA, 2012-2014, U.S. exports to South Korea averaged about $6 billion—a 12% increase. The value of U.S. exports to South Korea has continued to grow since then, averaging about $6.4 billion from 2015 to 2017. Because South Korea is reliant on food imports and has a growing middle class, it could be a growth market for U.S. agricultural exports. Although market access for U.S. agricultural exports to South Korea has generally increased under KORUS, certain issues may prevent the export of specific products. The Korean government's policies regarding certain plant pests and diseases have limited exports of U.S. cherries, potatoes, blueberries, apples, and pears. Further, South Korea's regulatory system for genetically engineered crops makes it difficult to introduce certain new U.S. crops. Moreover, long-standing South Korean protections on rice, which it considers necessary for national food security and which were not addressed in KORUS, allow imports of only a small amount of U.S. rice. Finally, new rules on pesticide residues on crops, animal drug residues in meat, and carcinogenicity labeling for alcoholic products also act as potential barriers to expanding trade in these products.",4,4 "The Jackson-Vanik Amendment: A Survey. This report discusses the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which was enacted as part of the Trade Act of 1974 and was directly a U.S. reaction to the severe restrictions the Soviet Union had placed in late 1972 on the emigration of its citizens, but was expanded in its scope to apply to all so-called ""nonmarket economy"" (NME) countries. The amendment, in effect, requires compliance with its specific free-emigration criteria as a key condition for the restoration of certain benefits theretofore denied to NME countries in their economic relations with the United States.",53,76 "Constitutional Approaches to Continuity of Congressional Representation: Background and Issues for Congress. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, subsequent biological incidents, and natural threats such as hurricanes or pandemic illness, have motivated consideration of contingency planning options in government and the private sector. In Congress, contingency planning includes the consideration of options for the succession of congressional leadership, or for filling multiple vacancies in either chamber that might occur due to wide-scale death of Members or their absence from Congress due to injury or incapacitation. Concerns have been expressed that current plans may be insufficient or raise constitutional issues. Several proposed constitutional amendments to address the consequences of catastrophic losses of congressional membership have been introduced since the 2001 attacks, including H.J.Res. 52, introduced on May 20, 2009, to temporarily fill mass vacancies in the House and the Senate. Many of the proposals introduced since 2001 are similar to those introduced during the early years of the Cold War, between 1946 and 1962. In each era, the measures attempted to address two or more of the following issues: the conditions under which the vacancies would be filled, the number or percentage of vacancies needed to invoke implementation of the measure, and the duration of the temporary appointments. This report will be updated as events warrant.",55,55 "National Forest System Management: Overview, Appropriations, and Issues for Congress. The 193 million acres of the National Forest System (NFS) comprise 154 national forests, 20 national grasslands, and several other federal land designations. Management of the NFS is one of the three principal responsibilities of the Forest Service (FS), an agency within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The other two principal responsibilities are providing assistance to nonfederal forest owners and conducting forestry research. Most NFS lands are concentrated in the western United States, although the Forest Service administers more federal land in the East than all other federal agencies combined. The original forest reserves were established to improve and protect federal forests and watersheds and provide a source of timber. Today, the statutory mission of the National Forest System is to provide a variety of uses and values—timber production, watershed management, livestock grazing, energy and mineral development, outdoor recreation, fish and wildlife habitat management, and wilderness—without impairing the productivity of the land. Although there is not a statutory mandate to do so, many of the uses and services available on NFS lands generate revenue. The revenue may be used to offset agency costs, shared with the local communities containing the NFS lands, or returned to the Treasury. Growing demands for the various uses, values, and services have led to conflicts over the location and timing of activities. In FY2016, the Forest Service received $1.5 billion to fund National Forest System management, approximately 24% of the $6.4 billion the agency received in discretionary appropriations. The NFS account includes several subaccounts, programs, and activities, many of which reflect the different ways in which national forests are used. These uses include activities related to recreation and wilderness, grazing, wildlife and fish habitat management, forest products and timber sales, and energy and minerals management. However, in FY2012, Congress authorized a pilot budget structure that consolidated several of the budget line items for three Forest Service regions. The Forest Service asserts that the budget flexibility provided in this Integrated Resources Restoration (IRR) program will facilitate various land and resource management objectives across the NFS. Reducing the risk and expense of catastrophic wildfires on National Forest System lands has been a major focus of Congress, the Forest Service, and the public. Reducing the risk of catastrophic wildfires involves land and resource management activities to restore the resilience and resistance of the forest ecosystem, such as reducing accumulated levels of biomass (which fuels fires) through timber sales, stewardship contracts, or prescribed burns. Many are also concerned about the cost of wildfires. Although wildfire management is funded separately from NFS management, some are concerned about the rising proportion of fire suppression costs on the rest of the Forest Service budget. In FY2006, wildfire management activities accounted for 44% of the agency's total discretionary appropriations, in FY2016, the $3.9 billion appropriated to wildfire management is 61% of the agency's total discretionary appropriation. This report provides an overview of the history and management of the National Forest System, including a discussion of the statutory framework for making land management plans and decisions as well as for acquiring or disposing of system lands. The report also discusses the multiple uses of the NFS and the revenue generated by those activities, appropriations to manage the NFS, and wildfire management issues and costs. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress often debates regarding national forest management.",107,107 "Arms Control Ratification: Opportunities for Modifying Agreements. This report briefly examines arms control ratification and opportunities for modifying agreements. On July 14, 2015, Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany (the P5+1) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)--an agreement that restricts Iran's nuclear program in an effort to ensure that it can only be used for peaceful purposes.",29,29 "Sourcing Policy: Statutes and Statutory Provisions. This report discusses the federal government's sourcing policy, which dates to the 1950s with the publication of three Bureau of the Budget bulletins. Congressional interest and involvement in sourcing policy, as measured by legislation that has been enacted, has grown over the years. Recently enacted provisions have addressed, for example, protest rights for federal government employees, funding limits on competitive sourcing activities, the development of a single consistent definition of ""inherently governmental,"" and the development of ""insourcing"" guidelines.",63,63 Mozambique and Other Recent Flood Disasters: Comparing the U.S. and International Responses. Some have criticized the U.S. response to the recent floods in southern Africa. Their concern has been that the U.S. response has been too little and too late in comparison with disasters in other parts of the world. U.S. spokesmen argue that their response has been appropriate and timely with contributions to Mozambique of over $32 million and additional contributions to the region of over $40 million. The U.S. government has responded to eight flood disasters thus far in FY2000 in addition to the current flooding in southern Africa. This report and the table on p. 6 compare the U.S. and international responses to each. The report will be updated.,79,79 "Small Business: Access to Capital and Job Creation. The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty and venture capital programs to enhance small business access to capital, contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting, direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters, and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion. Congressional interest in these programs has increased in recent years, primarily because assisting small business is viewed as a means to enhance economic growth. Some have argued that the SBA should be provided additional resources to assist small businesses in acquiring capital necessary to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small business economic growth and job creation. During the 111th Congress P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the SBA an additional $730 million, including $375 million to temporarily subsidize SBA fees and increase the 7(a) loan guaranty program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90% P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized $30 billion for the Small Business Lending Fund to encourage community banks to provide small business loans ($4 billion was issued), $1.5 billion for the State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs, numerous changes to the SBA's loan guaranty and contracting programs, $510 million to continue the SBA's fee subsidies and 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010, and about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses, and P.L. 111-322, the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, continued the SBA's fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted, which occurred on January 3, 2011. During the 112th Congress, legislation was enacted to enhance small business contracting opportunities, expand access to the SBA's surety bond guarantee program, amend the SBA's size standard practices, require a review and reassessment of the federal procurement small business goaling program, and expand small business mentor-protégé programs. Congress also adopted the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (P.L. 112-106) that established a regulatory structure for startups and small businesses to raise capital through securities offerings using the Internet through crowdfunding. During the 113th Congress, P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, increased the annual authorization amount for the SBA's Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) venture capital program to $4 billion from $3 billion. The increased authorization amount is designed to provide small businesses additional access to venture capital. During the 114th Congress P.L. 114-38, the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, authorized and made permanent the SBA's current practice of waiving the SBAExpress loan program's one-time, up-front loan guaranty fee for veterans (and their spouse). The act also increased the 7(a) loan program's FY2015 authorization limit from $18.75 billion to $23.5 billion, and P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, expanded the projects eligible for refinancing under the 504/CDC loan guaranty program in any fiscal year in which the refinancing program and the 504/CDC program as a whole do not have credit subsidy costs, generally limited refinancing under this provision to no more than 50% of the dollars loaned under the 504/CDC program during the previous fiscal year, and increased the SBIC program's family of funds limit (the amount of outstanding leverage allowed for two or more SBIC licenses under common control) to $350 million from $225 million. The act also increased the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit to $26.5 billion for FY2016. During the 115th Congress, P.L. 115-31, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $27.5 billion for FY2017 from $26.5 billion in FY2016 and P.L. 115-141, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $29.0 billion for FY2018. This report addresses a core issue facing the 115th Congress: What, if any, additional action should the federal government take to enhance small business access to capital? It discusses the role of small business in job creation and retention, then provides an assessment of the supply and demand for small business loans and recently enacted laws designed to enhance small business access to capital by increasing either the supply of small business loans or the demand for small business loans, or both. It also examines recent actions concerning the SBA's budget and concludes with a brief overview of three legislative options available to address small business access to capital issues during the 115th Congress: wait-and-see, enact additional programs, or reduce and consolidate existing programs.",13,13 "Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: China's December 2007 Decision. The prospects for democratization in Hong Kong became clearer following a decision of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress (NPCSC) on December 29, 2007. The NPCSC's decision effectively set the year 2017 as the earliest date for the direct election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive and the year 2020 as the earliest date for the direct election of all members of Hong Kong's Legislative Council (Legco). However, ambiguities in the language used by the NPCSC have contributed to differences in interpretation of its decision. According to Hong Kong's current Chief Executive, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, the decision sets a clear timetable for democracy in Hong Kong. However, representatives of Hong Kong's ""pro-democracy"" parties believe the decision includes no solid commitment to democratization in Hong Kong. The NPCSC's decision also established some guidelines for the process of election reform in Hong Kong, including what can and cannot be altered in the 2012 elections.",85,85 "Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA). Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits are available only to those individuals who have become unemployed as a direct result of a declared major disaster. First created in 1970 through P.L. 91-606, DUA benefits are authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (the Stafford Act), which authorizes the President to issue a major disaster declaration after state and local government resources have been overwhelmed by a natural catastrophe or, ""regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion in any part of the United States"" (42 U.S.C. 5122(2)). The DUA program provides income support to individuals who become unemployed as a direct result of a major disaster and who are not eligible for regular Unemployment Compensation (UC) benefits. DUA is funded through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL) through each state's UC agency. DUA beneficiaries (because they are not entitled to regular UC) are not eligible to receive Extended Benefits (EB). This report contains information on how to ascertain if an individual is eligible for DUA benefits. For information on how unemployment and employment programs respond to disasters, see CRS Report R45182, Unemployment and Employment Programs Available to Workers Affected by Disasters.",11,11 "The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA): An Overview of Programs and Funding. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the Department of Commerce, is the executive branch's principal advisory office on domestic and international telecommunications and information policies. Its statutory mission includes providing greater access for all Americans to telecommunications services, supporting U.S. efforts to open foreign markets, advising the President on international telecommunications negotiations, and funding research for new technologies and their applications. It is also responsible for managing spectrum use by federal agencies. Title VI of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), also known as the Spectrum Act, gives the NTIA responsibilities for improving public safety communications. The act required NTIA to assist with the development of the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet), created by Congress to deploy a nationwide public safety broadband network. NTIA is also required to assist in planning and funding for Next Generation 9-1-1 (NG 9-1-1) services, which refers to the transition to digital, Internet-based systems to replace existing analog systems that are currently prevalent throughout the United States. The Spectrum Act also gave the NTIA new responsibilities and requirements for spectrum management, especially regarding the reallocation of federal spectrum. The Spectrum Pipeline Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74, Title X) added further requirements for actions by the NTIA, including identification of additional spectrum for nonfederal use. The NTIA also plays a central role in representing U.S. interests in the Internet internationally, including an active role in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN is an international entity that develops policies to support the Internet worldwide. NTIA participates in ICANN as a member of the Governmental Advisory Committee, which provides advice to ICANN. Between FY2010 and FY2011, the NTIA's total budget appropriations increased by 4% to $41.6 million. During that same time, Congress defunded NTIA's Public Telecommunications Facilities Program (PTFP, funded at $20 million in FY2010), and more than doubled the budget for administration, salaries, and expenses, from $20.0 million to $41.6 million. This increase was largely attributed by the NTIA to its responsibilities in administering grants for broadband network deployment, as required by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). Enacted amounts remained above $40 million until FY2015.The Obama Administration's budget request for FY2015 was $51.0 million, and the enacted amount was $38.2 million. For FY2016, the enacted budget amount for the NTIA was $39.5 million, compared to a request for $49.2 million. The Obama Administration's budget request for FY2017 was $50.8 million. As reported by the Senate, S. 2837 would have provided a total of $39.5 million to NTIA for FY2017. As reported by the House, H.R. 5393 would have provided $36.3 million. A series of continuing appropriations acts (P.L. 114-223, P.L. 114-254, P.L. 115-30) provided funding for NTIA from October 1, 2016 through May 5, 2017 at about 99.5-99.8% of the FY2016 funding level. Signed by the President on May 5, 2017, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), provides $32.0 million to NTIA, $7.5 million (19%) less than the FY2016 enacted amount. For FY2018, the budget blueprint released by the White House in March 2017 signaled support for NTIA's role in multi-stakeholder forums on Internet governance and digital commerce and agency efforts on efficient use of federal spectrum. No funding cuts were specified in the blueprint for NTIA, though an overall decrease of $1.5 billion from the FY2017 continuing resolution level was proposed for the Department of Commerce.",113,113 "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein's regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. Over time, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping the Government of Iraq (GoI) improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. In 2009, the war in Iraq appears to be winding down, as security gains made since the height of the insurgency in 2006 and 2007 continue to be sustained, and as Iraqis increasingly seek management of their own affairs. A new U.S.-Iraqi security agreement that went into effect on January 1, 2009, which confirmed the Iraqis' responsibility for their own security, introduced a new era in OIF and in US-Iraqi bilateral relations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the agreement a ""watershed, a firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is winding down."" U.S. military commanders on the ground have indicated that in most parts of Iraq, the focus of U.S. military efforts has shifted from counterinsurgency (COIN) to stability operations, including advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and supporting security, economic, and governance capacity-building. On February 27, 2009, at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, President Obama delivered a speech addressing ""how the war in Iraq will end,"" in which he announced the drawdown of U.S. combat forces by August 2010 and the transition of the rest of the military mission to training and advising Iraq security forces, conducting counter-terrorism operations, and providing force protection for U.S. personnel. The United States begins this transition from a position of significant commitment – including some 140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq, in addition to civilian experts and U.S. contractors, who provide substantial support to their Iraqi counterparts in the fields of security, governance, and development. Senior U.S. officials, including outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Gates, have suggested that lasting change in Iraq will require substantially more time, and that while the U.S. military presence will diminish, U.S. engagement with Iraq is likely to continue. The Government of Iraq (GoI), for its part, still faces challenges at the operational level, in countering the lingering strands of the insurgency, and at the strategic level, in achieving a single, shared vision of the Iraqi state, and in improving its capacity to provide good governance, ensure security, and foster economic development for the Iraqi people. Key policy issues the Obama Administration may choose to address, with oversight from the 111th Congress, include identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement, monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq, and laying the groundwork for a future, more traditional bilateral relationship. This report is intended to provide background and analysis of current developments and options, and will be updated as events warrant.",24,24 "Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command. In 2002, President Bush signed a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishing United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to provide command and control of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate military support to civil authorities. As a geographical combatant command, NORTHCOM has an area of responsibility that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles, including the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. The NORTHCOM Commander also commands North American Aerospace Defense Command. NORTHCOM, headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, employs approximately 1,200 DOD civilians, contractors, and service members from each service component. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps have service components assigned to NORTHCOM, while Navy Fleet Forces Command is a supporting component. Additionally, NORTHCOM maintains five subordinate joint headquarters to carry out assigned missions. One of NORTHCOM's key charters is to build ongoing relationships with government agencies that play a role in homeland security and defense. To ensure integration of homeland security and defense efforts, NORTHCOM participates in the Joint Interagency Coordination Group while also working closely with both the Department of Homeland Security and the National Guard Bureau. To exercise these important relationships, NORTHCOM participates in the National Exercise Program. Further, as a geographical combatant command, NORTHCOM also plays a key role in facilitating military cooperation with both Canada and Mexico. During deliberations for the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, some issues for Congress involving NORTHCOM may include DOD reorganization and the Unified Command Plan, improving interagency relationships, NORTHCOM's increased reliance on reserve component service members, the ongoing Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center realignment, and the allocation of resources necessary for NORTHCOM to successfully plan for and execute its assigned missions. This report will be updated as conditions require.",22,22 "Recent Developments in Patent Administration: Implications for Innovation Policy. Congressional interest in the operation of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has been demonstrated by extensive discussion of patent reform proposals that would impact that agency. An increasing number of patent applications filed each year, the growing complexity of cutting edge technology, and heightened user demands for prompt and accurate patent services are among the challenges faced by the USPTO. Stakeholders have expressed concern over the agency's large backlog of patent applications that have been filed but have yet to receive examiner review. Others have expressed concerns about the agency's accuracy in approving applications only on those inventions that fulfill the statutory requirements to receive a patent. Even as discussion of patent reform has continued in Congress, the USPTO has actively engaged in efforts to address its application backlog, maintain high levels of patent quality, and more generally improve contemporary patent administration. The agency has launched a number of initiatives in recent years to address perceived concerns over the patent-granting process, including The Patent Application Backlog Stimulus Reduction Plan, which allows an individual who has filed multiple applications to receive expedited review of one patent application when he agrees to withdraw another, unexamined application. The Patent Prosecution Highway, which allows certain inventors who have received a favorable ruling from the USPTO to receive expedited review from foreign patent offices. The Enhanced First Action Interview Pilot Program, which allows applicants to conduct an interview with patent examiners early in the review process. The ""Three-Track Initiative,"" under which an application would be placed into one of three queues: prioritized examination, traditional examination, or delayed examination. The Adoption of Metrics for the Enhancement of Patent Quality, which endeavors to improve USPTO mechanisms for measuring the quality of patent examination. A number of patent reform issues under consideration by the 112th Congress would potentially impact upon the ability of the USPTO to respond to changing circumstances in the intellectual property environment. In particular, two bills before the 112th Congress, H.R. 1249 and S. 23, would grant the USPTO the ability to set its own fees, potentially allowing the agency to act in a more flexible manner. In addition, discussion persists over whether the USPTO should have greater ability to engage in substantive rulemaking.",9,9 "China, the United States and the IMF: Negotiating Exchange Rate Adjustment. In recent years, the United States and other countries have expressed considerable concern that China's national currency (the yuan or renminbi) is seriously undervalued. Some analysts say the yuan needs to rise by as much as 40% in order to reflect its equilibrium value. Critics say that China's undervalued currency provides it with an unfair trade advantage that has seriously injured the manufacturing sector in the United States. Chinese officials counter that they have not pegged the yuan to the dollar in order to gain trade advantages. Rather, they say the fixed rate promotes economic stability that is vital for the functioning of its domestic economy. On July 21, 2005, China announced a new foreign exchange system which is intended to allow more flexibility and to permit the international value of the yuan to be established by market forces. The yuan was increased in value by 2% and a ""managed float"" was introduced. However, the value of the yuan has changed little since then. Despite the publication of many studies, scholars do not agree whether or by what percent the yuan is undervalued. The wide range of estimates suggests that there is no reason to believe that any particular figure is correct. It is not clear that the U.S. trade deficit would be lower or U.S. manufacturers would benefit if China raised the value of the yuan. In the short run, U.S. producers might be able to sell higher-priced products to U.S. consumers if the inflow of Chinese goods were reduced. In the long run, though, as long as the United States is a net importer of capital, it would have a trade deficit and other countries would ultimately replace China as suppliers of low-cost goods to the U.S. market. The Treasury Department has strongly urged China in recent years to adopt procedures that would allow the yuan to rise in value. Congress is considering legislation that would penalize China if its currency is not revalued. The United States has pursued the yuan-dollar exchange rate issue as a bilateral U.S.-China issue. Other countries are also affected by the presumably undervalued yuan -- some more than the U.S. -- but they have allowed the United States to take the lead. There are at least five ways the United States could deal with the yuan exchange rate issue. Some of these would involve other countries more explicitly in the process. First, the United States could continue pressing China publicly to raise the value of the yuan on the assumption that change will not occur without foreign pressure. Second, it could stop pressing China publicly, on the expectation that China might move more rapidly towards reform if it is not pressured. Third, the United States could restrict imports from China pending action to revalue the yuan. Fourth, the U.S. could ask the IMF to declare that China is manipulating its currency in violation of IMF rules. Fifth the United States could refer the issue to the World Trade Organization (WTO), asserting that the United States has been injured by unfair trade practices linked to the undervaluation of China's currency. The WTO, in turn, could authorize trade remedies (tariffs on Chinese goods, for example) aimed at correcting this abuse. This report will be updated as new developments arise.",82,82 "Repealing Miranda?: Background of the Controversy over Pretrial Interrogation and Self-Incrimination. Although an involuntary confession has been inadmissible in federal cases since the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court did not denounce physically coercive abuses in State cases until its decision in Brown v. Mississippi. The Brown case established the basis for the Fourteenth Amendment ""voluntariness"" standard as the due process test for assessing the admissibility of confessions in State cases. Under this standard, the admissibility of a confession was evaluated on a case by case basis which would be governed by the ""totality of the circumstances,"" which included the facts of the case, the background of the accused, and the behavior of the police during the interrogation. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court established several procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment rights of persons during custodial interrogations. The Court reasoned that the suspects needed the safeguards because ""[t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of [the suspect..."" and without them no statement can be considered the product of his/her free will. Miranda was controversial among policy-makers and academics who debated its legitimacy and desirability over thirty years after its judicial creation. One of the major arguments offered for overruling Miranda was that it had caused great difficulty to law enforcement efforts in controlling crime. The ruling in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), struck down 18 U.S.C. 3501 a federal law that allowed confessions elicited without a police advisory to be used at trial as long as the ""totality of circumstances"" demonstrated that they were given voluntarily. Dickerson made Miranda 's constitutional status clear. The Miranda decisions announced during the Court's 2003-2004 term, however, suggest that continued vitality of seemingly conficting pre- Dickerson caselaw is less clear. United States v. Patane, divided the Court so that no single rationale united a majority of its members, although five Justices joined in a plurality decision that declined to overrule its pre- Dickerson decisions concerning the admissibility of physical derivate evidence. On the other hand, Missouri v. Seibert likewise resulted in a plurality opinion but in spite of contrary suggestions in the pre- Dickerson caselaw five Justices found inadmissible a confession intentionally wrung from the defendant before Miranda warnings and re-elicited thereafter. Five Justices did agree in Yarborough v. Alvarado that the state courts did not unreasonably apply federal law when -- without considering the inexperienced suspect's age (17 years old) -- they determined that Miranda 's custodial threshold had not been crossed. And they all agreed in Fellers v. United States, that the lower courts should not have addressed Miranda/Dickerson implications raised out of an interrogation that offended Sixth Amendment requirements.",97,92 "Iran's Threat to the Strait of Hormuz. Some officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have recently renewed threats to close or exercise control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's threats appear to have been prompted by the likely imposition of new multilateral sanctions targeting Iran's economic lifeline—the export of oil and other energy products. In the past, Iranian leaders have made similar threats and comments when the country's oil exports have been threatened. However, as in the past, the prospect of a major disruption of maritime traffic in the Strait risks damaging Iranian interests. U.S. and allied military capabilities in the region remain formidable. This makes a prolonged outright closure of the Strait appear unlikely. Nevertheless, such threats can and do raise tensions in global energy markets and leave the United States and other global oil consumers to consider the risks of another potential conflict in the Middle East. This report explains Iranian threats to the Strait of Hormuz, and analyzes the implications of some scenarios for potential U.S. or international conflict with Iran. These scenarios include Outright Closure. An outright closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a major artery of the global oil market, would be an unprecedented disruption of global oil supply and contribute to higher global oil prices. However, at present, this appears to be a low probability event. Were this to occur, it is not likely to be prolonged. It would likely trigger a military response from the United States and others, which could reach beyond simply reestablishing Strait transit. Iran would also alienate countries that currently oppose broader oil sanctions. Iran could become more likely to actually pursue this if few or no countries were willing to import its oil. Harassment and/or Infrastructure Damage. Iran could harass tanker traffic through the Strait through a range of measures without necessarily shutting down all traffic. This took place during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Also, critical energy production and export infrastructure could be damaged as a result of military action by Iran, the United States, or other actors. Harassment or infrastructure damage could contribute to lower exports of oil from the Persian Gulf, greater uncertainty around oil supply, higher shipping costs, and consequently higher oil prices. However, harassment also runs the risk of triggering a military response and alienating Iran's remaining oil customers. Continued Threats. Iranian officials could continue to make threatening statements without taking action. This could still raise energy market tensions and contribute to higher oil prices, though only to the degree that oil market participants take such threats seriously. If an oil disruption does occur, the United States has the option of temporarily offsetting its effects through the release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Such action could be coordinated with other countries that hold strategic reserves, as was done with other members of the International Energy Agency after the disruption of Libyan crude supplies in 2011. Iran's threats suggest to many experts that international and multilateral sanctions—and the prospect of additional sanctions—have begun to affect its political and strategic calculations. The threats have been coupled with a publicly announced agreement by Iran to resume talks with six countries on measures that would assure the international community that Iran's nuclear program is used for purely peaceful purposes. Some experts believe that the pressure on Iran's economy, and its agreement to renewed talks, provide the best opportunity in at least two years to reach agreement with Iran on curbing its nuclear program.",84,85 "Farm Credit Services of America Ends Attempt to Leave the Farm Credit System. In an unprecedented move, an institution of the Farm Credit System (FCS) -- a government-sponsored enterprise -- initiated procedures on July 30, 2004, to leave the FCS and be purchased by a private company. But after much controversy, including congressional hearings, the board of directors of Farm Credit Services of America (FCSA) voted on October 19, 2004, to terminate its agreement with Rabobank before seeking approval from the Farm Credit Administration, the System's federal regulator. FCSA is the FCS lending association serving Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Rabobank is a private Dutch banking company with extensive experience in agriculture and a growing global network. Under the plan, the loans, facilities, and employees of FCSA would have become part of Rabobank, and new FCS charters would have been issued to reestablish a System presence in the four-state region. The option to leave the System is allowed by statute under the Farm Credit Act of 1971, as amended, but has been exercised only once, and did not involve an outside purchaser. Although Congress had no direct statutory role in the approval process, the House held hearings on the implications of the deal, and Senators Daschle and Johnson introduced S. 2851 to require public hearings and a longer approval process. This report will not be updated.",3,3 "Naval Station Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal Issues Regarding Its Lease Agreements. This report briefly outlines the history of the establishment of the U.S. naval station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, during the first decade of the twentieth century, its changing relationship to the community around it, and its heightened importance with military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also explains in detail the legal status of the lease of the land on which the naval station stands, the statutory and treaty authorities granted to the President with regard to any potential closure of the naval station, and the second-order effects on such a closure that Cuba sanctions laws might have. A short list of additional readings ends the report. At the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Spanish colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines transitioned to administration by the United States. Of these four territories, only Cuba quickly became an independent republic. As a condition of relinquishing administration, though, the Cuban government agreed to lease three parcels of land to the United States for use as naval or coaling stations. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was the sole installation established under that agreement. The two subsequent lease agreements, one signed in 1903 and a second in 1934, acknowledged Cuban sovereignty, but granted to the United States ""complete jurisdiction and control over"" the property so long as it remained occupied. Relations between the naval station and its surrounding communities remained stable until the Cuban revolution of the late 1950s. As Cuban-American relations deteriorated in the aftermath of the 1959 Cuban revolution, the naval station found itself more and more isolated. When the Cuban government began shutting off the supply of potable water during the early 1960s, the United States took measures to render the naval station self-sufficient in both water supply and electrical power generation. It has remained so ever since. The prominence of Naval Station Guantanamo Bay rose briefly during the Haitian refugee and Cuban migrant crises of the early 1990s. At one point in late 1994, the migrant population of the naval station approached 45,000. However, by the end of January 1996, the last of these temporary residents had departed. The naval station's return to prominence arose due to the establishment of facilities to house a number of wartime detainees captured during military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This practice began in early 2002 with the refurbishment of some of the property formerly used to house refugees. It later expanded to more substantial housing that is operated by Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, a tenant for which the naval station provides logistical support. Additional temporary facilities were eventually constructed on a disused naval station airfield for use by the military commissions created to try detainees. The 1903 lease agreements between the governments of Cuba and the United States are controlled by the language of a 1934 treaty stipulating that the lease can only be modified or abrogated pursuant to an agreement between the United States and Cuba. The territorial limits of the naval station remain as they were in 1934, unless the United States abandons Guantanamo Bay or the two governments reach an agreement to modify its boundaries. While there appears to be no consensus on whether the President can modify the agreement alone, Congress is empowered to alter by statute the effect of the underlying 1934 treaty. There is no current law that would expressly prohibit the negotiation of lease modifications with the existing government of Cuba, but the House of Representatives passed a prohibition on carrying out such a modification without congressional approval as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017 (H.R. 4909/S. 2943). As for ""abandoning"" the naval station, it appears that there are no statutory prohibitions against closing an overseas military installation. Nevertheless, Congress has imposed practical impediments to closing the naval station by, for example, restricting the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to foreign countries and banning their transfer to the United States. The existence of various Cuba sanctions laws may also impede a closure of Naval Station Guantanamo Bay by making it difficult to give or sell any property to the government of Cuba. For information on the Guantanamo detention facility, see CRS Report R41920, Detainee Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Bills, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia, and CRS Report R40139, Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues, by Michael John Garcia et al. For background on U.S. policy toward Cuba, see CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.",24,24 Emergency Relief Program: Federal-Aid Highway Assistance for Disaster-Damaged Roads and Bridges. Report that looks at the eligibility of major highways and bridges recently damaged by Hurricanes Sandy and Irene to receive Emergency Relief Program assistance from the Federal Highway Administration.,11,121 "Heritage Areas: Background, Proposals, and Current Issues. Over more than 30 years, Congress has established 49 national heritage areas (NHAs) to commemorate, conserve, and promote areas that include important natural, scenic, historic, cultural, and recreational resources. NHAs are partnerships among the National Park Service (NPS), states, and local communities, in which the NPS supports state and local conservation through federal recognition, seed money, and technical assistance. NHAs are not part of the National Park System, in which lands are federally owned and managed. Rather, lands within heritage areas typically remain in state, local, or private ownership or a combination thereof. Heritage areas have been supported as protecting lands and traditions and promoting tourism and community revitalization, but opposed as potentially burdensome, costly, or leading to federal control over nonfederal lands. There is no comprehensive statute that establishes criteria for designating NHAs or provides standards for their funding and management. Rather, particulars for each area are provided in its enabling legislation. Congress designates a management entity, usually nonfederal, to coordinate the work of the partners. This entity typically develops and implements a plan for managing the NHA, in collaboration with other parties. Once approved by the Secretary of the Interior, the management plan becomes the blueprint for managing the area. NHAs might receive funding from a wide variety of sources. Congress typically determines federal funding for NHAs in annual appropriations laws for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. NHAs can use federal funds for many purposes, including staffing, planning, and projects. The FY2016 appropriation for the NPS for assistance to heritage areas was $19.8 million. The Obama Administration has expressed interest in having NHAs become financially self-sufficient. Some appropriators and other Members have emphasized self-sufficiency for these areas as well. One role of the NPS is to evaluate heritage areas at least three years before the expiration of the authorization for federal funds. The NPS has completed evaluations of nine NHAs designated in 1996 and continues to evaluate others. Each Congress typically considers bills to establish new heritage areas, study areas for possible heritage designation, and amend existing heritage areas. Bills with similar purposes are pending in the 114th Congress. Other 114th Congress measures seek to extend the authorizations for NHAs to receive financial assistance. The sizeable number of existing NHAs and proposals in recent years to study and designate new ones has fostered legislation to establish a system of NHAs, and to provide criteria for their designation, standards for their management, and limits on federal funding support. In the 114th Congress, one such measure (H.R. 581) has been introduced. The Obama Administration has supported such systemic NHA legislation. Some opponents believe that NHAs present numerous problems and challenges and that Congress should oppose efforts to designate new areas and to create a system of NHAs.",106,106 "Combating Terrorism: Possible Lessons for U.S. Policy from Foreign Experiences, Summary of the Major Points of a Seminar. Participants in a CRS seminar on the possible lessons to be learned from other countries experiences in dealing with terrorism, generally agreed on three things. First, terrorism is a used by a wide variety of groups for a wide variety of ends. Second, the current threat that the United States faces from Islamist terrorism is most likely long-term. And third, policymakers must think through anti-terrorist actions in order to avoid consequences that may be worse than the original problem. Much of the seminar discussion focused on matters that two and a half years later became the subject of 9/11 Commission recommendations. A revised introduction highlights the discussion summarized in this report that is relevant to Commission recommendations. The remainder of the report has not been changed. Discussions during the three hour seminar, held on January 22, 2002, centered on the relative utility of three main policy tools: (1) targeting members and leaders for arrest and assassination, or as speaker Christopher Hewitt labeled it, the ""model of attrition,"" (2) negotiations, and (3) reforms. Hewitt, who has studied the effectiveness of anti-terrorism policies in five countries said that the only one that showed clear results was a ""model of attrition,"" i.e., that arrest, internment, or killing of terrorists is the most effective means to significantly reduce levels of terrorist violence. Speaker Martha Crenshaw weighed the pros and cons of targeted assassinations, noting that for her the disadvantages -- principally the difficulty of avoiding mistakes and the possibility that assassinations would just encourage others to take the place of those killed -- outweighed the advantages -- principally that it was relatively more humane than a massive military response. The most controversial subject was the utility of political and economic reforms in countries that harbor terrorists. Many questions were raised about Hewitt's finding that improving economic conditions did not have any effect on levels of terrorism, and that fairly extensive political reforms might decrease, but did not end terrorism. Some raised the possibility that long-term educational reforms, and other methods of changing perceptions, might have more success. The difficulties of achieving negotiated settlements to end terrorism were examined. Participants suggested ways to increase the chances for successful outcomes. These included international support for legitimate core issues in order to increase support for negotiations international participation in the negotiations, and the adoption of measures that would isolate terrorists, including steps to increase the rule of law, and anti-corruption, educational, and cultural programs. The utility of controlling supporting structures for terrorism and restricting civil liberties were also discussed. Speakers noted that international cooperation is necessary to control arms and funds that usually flow from abroad. (This seminar was made possible in part by a grant from the Charles H. Revson Foundation.)",22,22 "Crisis in Mali. For the past 18 months, Mali has been mired in overlapping security, political, and humanitarian crises. A separatist rebellion launched in 2011 aggravated intra-military and political tensions in the country. In March 2012, junior military officers—led by a former participant in U.S. training programs—carried out a coup that overthrew a democratically elected government. Islamist extremist groups, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, took advantage of the ensuing chaos to expand their presence in Mali's vast, Saharan north. In the capital, Bamako, located in the south, the interim government formed in the wake of the coup has faced internal divisions, military interference, limited popular legitimacy, and economic constraints. Mali's crises have been driven by both internal and external factors, including a surge in regional arms and combatant flows from Libya. In turn, insecurity in Mali has displaced nearly half a million people and exacerbated poor regional humanitarian conditions. On January 11, 2013, France launched military operations in Mali, following a request from the Malian government for help in repelling a sudden insurgent advance toward the south. This marked a sudden and major shift in international responses, as regional and Western policymakers had previously emphasized that any solution in Mali had to be African-led. French forces have made rapid gains in the north, but whether these can be sustained remains to be seen. African militaries also have begun deploying to Mali under the U.N.-authorized African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Some—notably those from Chad—may be prepared for desert counterinsurgency, but nearly all suffer from severe capacity shortfalls. France has expressed a desire to begin withdrawing troops in April, while the U.N. Security Council is currently considering options for transitioning AFISMA into a fully U.N.-conducted operation. Whether a U.N. operation can be successful, and in what conditions, is under discussion. The United States has provided logistical and intelligence support to ongoing French operations in Mali, pledged $96 million in support for AFISMA, and provided new security assistance to neighboring states. U.S. policymakers have also reportedly debated the potential for unilateral action against terrorist actors in the region. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the United States is playing a key role in discussion of AFISMA's future status and funding. The Obama Administration also continues to call for Mali to organize national elections, and for reconciliation efforts to address political, ethnic, and regional cleavages. Congress authorizes and appropriates funding for foreign aid and defense programs in Mali and the Sahel region, and may further shape U.S. policy through legislation and oversight activities. Direct U.S. assistance to the Malian security forces—along with several other types of foreign aid—has been suspended in line with congressionally mandated restrictions triggered by the coup. The aid restrictions do not affect humanitarian assistance, of which the United States is the leading bilateral donor in the region, or election support. Looking forward, Congress may consider issues related to U.S. support for international military operations in Mali, whether unilateral U.S. action is required or wise, and future U.S. aid to Mali and the region. Congress may also seek to assess the successes and failures of previous U.S. security engagements in Mali and the region, and consider the possible implications of the situation in Mali for U.S. counterterrorism and good governance efforts in Africa and beyond. See also CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by Alexis Arieff, and CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.",85,85 "Credit Rating Agencies: Current Federal Oversight and Congressional Concerns. Credit rating agencies rate the creditworthiness of public companies so that the public will have an objective opinion as to the risk of investment. These ratings have become an important component of the financial reputation of a rated company. However, especially since the bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom, whose debt had been rated investment grade, there has been concern that perhaps credit rating agencies should be regulated. Section 702 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required the Securities and Exchange Commission to study the role of credit rating agencies. Over the years, the SEC has issued reports and proposed rules, in particular concerning adoption of a definition for the term ""nationally recognized statistical rating organization,"" but no statutory or regulatory requirements have been enacted or issued. Congress may, however, continue to pursue the issue of regulation, since hearings have been held on the issue and proposed legislation has been introduced. On June 14, 2006, the House Committee on Financial Services approved an amended version of H.R. 2990, the Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2006, which would set out procedures for registration by a credit rating agency with the SEC in order to be treated as a nationally recognized statistical rating organization. On July 12, 2006, the House passed H.R. 2990 in a version almost identical to the one approved by the Committee on Financial Services. On September 6, 2006, S. 3850, similar to a measure approved by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on August 2, 2006, originated in the Senate. S. 3850, which is very similar to the House-passed H.R. 2990, was passed by unanimous consent by the Senate on September 22, 2006. This report will be updated as needed.",7,7 "Forest Service Assistance Programs. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has numerous programs to support the management of state and private forests. These programs are under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees and are often examined in the periodic legislation to reauthorize agricultural programs, commonly known as farm bills. For example, the 2014 farm bill repealed, reauthorized, or modified many of these programs. The House version of the 2018 farm bill, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018 (H.R. 2), contains a forestry title (Title VIII) that would reauthorize, modify, and establish new forestry assistance programs. Forestry-specific assistance programs (in contrast to agriculture conservation programs that include forestry activities) are primarily administered by the USDA Forest Service (FS), with permanent authorization of funding as needed. Some programs have been combined through the appropriations process or for administration purposes. These programs generally provide technical and educational assistance such as information, advice, and aid on specific projects. Other programs provide financial assistance, usually through grants (with or without matching contributions from recipients) or cost-sharing (typically through state agencies, with varying levels of contributions from recipients). Many programs provide both technical and financial assistance. Some of the assistance programs provide support for planning and implementing forestry and related land management practices (e.g., Forest Stewardship, Urban and Community Forestry). Other programs provide assistance for forest restoration projects that involve more than one jurisdiction and address regional or national priorities (e.g., Landscape Scale Restoration). Other programs provide support for protecting forestlands from wildfires, insects and diseases, and from converting forestland to nonforest uses (e.g., Community Forest and Open Space Conservation, Forest Legacy). The Forest Health program provides support for protecting both federal and nonfederal forests from continuing threats, although most of the funding goes to federal forests. Programs also exist to enhance state and rural wildfire management capabilities (e.g., State Fire Assistance and Volunteer Fire Assistance) and to promote the use of forest products (e.g., Wood Innovation). International Forestry is often included as a forestry assistance program, because it provides technical forestry help and because it is funded through the FS appropriations account for forestry assistance programs (State and Private Forestry). Most of the programs provide assistance to state partner agencies. The state agencies can use the aid on state forestlands or to assist local governments or private landowners. How the states use the resources is largely at the discretion of the states, within the authorization of each program and consistent with the national priorities for state assistance established by Congress in the 2008 farm bill. Overall funding for the Forest Service's forestry assistance programs in FY2018 was $355.1 million, an 8% increase over FY2017 funding of $328.9 million. The Trump Administration requested $197.4 million in funding for FY2019. Overall funding has declined over the past 15 years, however, in both real and constant dollars. Over that time, funding for forestry assistance programs has ranged between 5% and 9% of the total annual Forest Service discretionary appropriation.",107,107 "Colombia: Summary and Tables on U.S. Assistance, FY1989-FY2004. Over the past 15 years, from FY1989-FY2003, the United States has provided Colombia with over $3.6 billion in assistance, most of it directed to counternarcotics or related efforts. During the first 11 fiscal years (FY1989-FY1999), when assistance totaled just over $1 billion, the annual levels were considerably lower than during the past three fiscal years and the current fiscal year. From FY2000-FY2003, assistance totals about $2,556 billion. The Clinton Administration increased assistance in FY2000 to fund its ""Plan Colombia"" programs to counter the spread of coca cultivation in southern Colombia. The Bush Administration has continued ""Plan Colombia"" programs through its Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), which also provides increased funding for Colombia's neighbors. In FY2002, President Bush also sought authority to expand the circumstances under which funding for the Colombian security forces can be used. As approved by Congress in 2002 and 2003, funding for FY2003 and previous years can be used for counternarcotics and anti-terrorist purposes. For FY2004, the Bush Administration has requested $573 million in State Department Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Foreign Military Financing funds, and estimates it will spend some $45 million in Colombia from the central State Department Air Wing account. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that it will spend almost $119 million for Colombia from its central counternarcotics account.",79,79 "Committee System Rules Changes in the House, 109th Congress. This fact sheet details changes in the committee system contained in H.Res. 5, the rules of the House for the 109th Congress, agreed to by the House January 4, 2005, and the Speaker's announced policies. The fact sheet will not be updated unless further rules changes for the 109th Congress are adopted.",55,55 "Anthem Data Breach: How Safe Is Health Information Under HIPAA?. This report discusses the implications of the recent data breach at Anthem Inc., which raised new concerns about the vulnerability of electronic health information. Security experts question whether the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy and security standards are sufficiently protective of sensitive patient information.",110,19 "The Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the 113th Congress: New and Recurring Issues. The Endangered Species Act (ESA, P.L. 93-205, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543) was enacted to increase protection for, and to provide for the recovery of, vanishing wildlife and vegetation. Under ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) can be listed as endangered or threatened according to assessments of their risk of extinction. Habitat loss is the primary cause for listing species. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to aid its recovery and protect its habitat. Accordingly, when certain resources are associated with listed species—such as water in arid regions like California, energy resources in sagebrush country, or free-flowing rivers—ESA is seen as an obstacle to continued or greater human use of these resources. ESA may also be controversial because dwindling species are usually harbingers of broader ecosystem decline or conflicts. As a result, ESA is considered a primary driver of large-scale ecosystem restoration issues. Previous Congresses have conducted oversight hearings on the implementation of various federal programs and laws that address threatened and endangered species. This has ranged from addressing listing and delisting decisions under ESA to justifying funding levels for international conservation programs. In the 113th Congress, resource-specific issues may be addressed independently, whereas oversight on the implementation of ESA may be addressed in debates about particular species (e.g., wolves, polar bears, sage grouse, and salmon). Major issues for the 113th Congress include how to allocate funds to activities and programs seeking to assist species adaptation to climate change. Other major issues concerning ESA in recent years have included the role of science in decision-making, critical habitat (CH) designation, incentives for property owners, and appropriate protection of listed species, among others. Authorization for spending under ESA expired on October 1, 1992. The prohibitions and requirements of ESA remain in force, even in the absence of an authorization, and funds have been appropriated to implement the administrative provisions of ESA in each subsequent fiscal year. Proposals to reauthorize and extensively amend ESA were last considered in the 109th Congress, but none was enacted. No legislative proposals were introduced in the 110th, 111th, 112th, or 113th Congresses for a broad reauthorization of ESA. This report discusses oversight issues and legislation in the 113th Congress that address ESA implementation and management of endangered and threatened species.",47,47 "Child Support Enforcement: Side-by-Side Comparison of Current Law and Two Versions of H.R. 4 (108th Congress). During the 108th Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate Finance Committee approved two different versions of a bill that would have reauthorized and revised the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant. This legislation, H.R. 4, also included many changes to the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program. H.R. 4 was passed by the House in February 2003. The Senate Finance Committee reported a substitute version of the bill in September 2003 (S.Rept. 108-162). On March 29-April 1, 2004, the Senate debated H.R. 4, disagreement arose regarding amendments to the bill, and Republicans failed to pass a motion to limit debate. H.R. 4 was not passed by the Senate. Although not identical, both versions of H.R. 4 were similar in focus, direction and content with respect to the CSE provisions. Both versions of H.R. 4 included provisions that sought to improve the CSE program and raise collections so as to increase the economic independence of former welfare families and provide a stable source of income for all single-parent families with a noncustodial parent. Both versions of the bill provided incentives (in the form of federal cost sharing) to states to direct more of the child support collected on behalf of families to the families themselves, thereby reducing the amount that state and federal governments retain (often referred to as a family-first policy). Under both bills, families currently receiving TANF benefits as well as former TANF recipients would have potentially received a larger share of child support that was collected on their behalf. The approach used by the bills differed significantly, however, with regard to how states would help TANF families receive more child support. Under the House-passed bill, states would have been given federal cost sharing incentives to encourage states to increase (or establish) the amount of child support payments they pass through to TANF families (and disregard in determining TANF benefits). The Senate Finance Committee version of the bill provided federal cost-sharing for the entire amount that the state disregards and passes through to families. Moreover, the House-passed bill provided a more limited amount of federal cost sharing for state pass-through and disregard policies than the Senate Finance Committee bill. Both versions of the bill would have revised some CSE enforcement tools and added others increased funding for the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS), increased funding for federal technical assistance to the states, required states to review child support orders of TANF families every three years, and required that a report be submitted to Congress on undistributed child support collections. The House-passed bill included a provision that would have established a $25 annual user fee for individuals who had never been on TANF but received CSE services and who received at least $500 in any given year. The Senate Finance Committee-approved bill included provisions that would have increased funding for the CSE access and visitation program, and required states to adopt a later version of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) so as to facilitate the collection of child support payments in interstate cases. This report will not be updated.",95,95 "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues. This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK's nuclear weapons production capabilities, warhead sophistication, the scope and success of its uranium enrichment program, or extent of its proliferation activities. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has between 30 and 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. North Korea's plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon has been shuttered since its cooling tower was destroyed under international agreement in June 2008. However, on April 1, 2013, North Korea said it would resume operation of its plutonium production reactor. Experts estimate it will take approximately six months to restart. This would provide North Korea with approximately one bomb's worth of plutonium per year. While North Korea's weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the past decade, intelligence emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. North Korea openly acknowledged a uranium enrichment program in 2009, but has said its purpose is the production of fuel for nuclear power. In November 2010, North Korea showed visiting American experts early construction of a 100 MWT light-water reactor and a newly built gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, both at the Yongbyon site. The North Koreans claimed the enrichment plant was operational, but this has not been independently confirmed. U.S. officials have said that it is likely other, clandestine enrichment facilities exist. Enrichment (as well as reprocessing) technology can be used to produce material for nuclear weapons or fuel for power reactors. An enrichment capability could potentially provide North Korea with a faster way of making nuclear material for weapons and therefore is of great concern to policymakers. North Korea has made multiple policy statements in the past year asserting its nuclear weapons status: in May 2012, North Korea changed its constitution to say that it was a ""nuclear-armed state."" In January 2013, North Korea said that no dialogue on denuclearization ""would be possible"" and it would only disarm when all the other nuclear weapon states also disarm. In March 2013, North Korea stated its goal of expanding its nuclear weapons program. Many experts believe that the prime objective of North Korea's nuclear program is to develop a nuclear warhead that could be mounted on North Korea's intermediate-range and long-range missiles. This was confirmed by North Korean official statements in late March 2013. Miniaturization of a nuclear warhead would likely require additional nuclear and missile tests. In January 2013, a North Korean statement said that it would respond with a nuclear test ""of higher level."" On February 12, 2013, the North Korean official news agency announced a ""successful"" underground nuclear detonation, and seismic monitoring systems measured a resulting earthquake that was 5.1 in magnitude. This is magnitude is slightly higher than past tests, but yield estimates are still uncertain. The South Korean Ministry of Defense estimated that the test yield was between 6 and 7 kilotons, while the U.S. Director of National Intelligence so far has said ""approximately several kilotons."" North Korea claimed that the February 12, 2013, nuclear test was to develop a ""smaller and light"" warhead. At a minimum, the test would likely contribute to North Korea's ability to develop a warhead that could be mounted on a long-range missile. To date, no open source data on test emissions is available that might show whether the North Koreans tested a uranium or plutonium device. This information could help determine the type and sophistication of the North Korean nuclear warhead design, about which little is known.",29,29 "Petroleum Refining: Economic Performance and Challenges for the Future. This report discusses the petroleum refining industry and its relation to the economy. Along with volatile changes in crude oil prices, the industry has faced evolving health, safety, and environmental requirements which have changed and multiplied product specifications and required capital investment in refineries. This report also seeks to describe the recent performance of the refining industry, to evaluate the structural changes that are occurring in the industry, and to analyze the nature and effects of the challenges confronting the industry.",40,40 "Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia. This report analyzes the policy implications of missile proliferation in South Asia, providing information on India's and Pakistan's missile programs and their role in regional security. The report also provides background on the India-Pakistan conflict and the U.S. role, and reviews the region's strategic security dynamics. The report concludes with a review of key issues and options for U.S. policy. The United States has long been concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in South Asia. This concern became acute after May 1998, when both India and Pakistan tested nuclear explosive devices. Since that time, both countries have continued testing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and both have established command and control authorities to oversee their nuclear arsenals. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since 1947 and have significant unsettled territorial disputes. Although the status of weaponization is unclear, a slow-speed arms race appears to be underway on the Asian Subcontinent, and the proliferation of missile capabilities in South Asia has been identified as a potentially major threat to regional stability and to key U.S. foreign policy goals. A persistent aspect of U.S. engagement in the region has been the difficulty of maintaining a balanced approach toward two antagonistic countries while simultaneously promoting perceived U.S. interests. During the 1990s, U.S. security policy toward South Asia focused on preventing weapons proliferation, but the Bush Administration shifted to a more ""pragmatic"" approach emphasizing restraint"" in this area. For perhaps the first period in history the United States currently enjoys simultaneously positive relations with both countries. While relationships between the United States, India, and Pakistan have taken on a positive hue potential for regional instability persists. The strategic capabilities of India and Pakistan could provide a ready catalyst for transforming disputes or terrorist incidents into potentially cataclysmic confrontations. Both countries also are pursuing the development or acquisition of missile defense systems. It is unknown at this early stage if missile defenses will offer a degree of stability to the region or if they will create an imbalance, thus prompting the other country to build more missiles to compensate for the disparity. Key issues for Congress addressed in this report are the extent to which missile proliferation in South Asia enhances or upsets regional stability and the role of U.S. policy in promoting such stability, as well as in tension reduction and nonproliferation. Levels of U.S. foreign assistance to India and Pakistan, the establishment of aid restrictions, the transfer of conventional weapons platforms (possibly including missile defense systems), the setting of export control parameters and nonproliferation goals, and the maintenance of policy and intelligence oversight of U.S. relations with India and Pakistan constitute additional issues of concern to Congress. This report will be updated as warranted by events.",29,85 "Energy Tax Incentives in the 108th Congress: A Comparison of the House and Senate Versions of H.R. 6 and the Senate Finance Committee Amendment. This report discusses energy taxes incentives, which have long been an integral component of this nation's energy policy. Efforts to significantly expand existing energy tax subsidies have been undertaken since the 106th Congress, but controversy over various non-tax energy policy provisions — corporate average fuel economy standards, the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge, etc. — have helped stall the legislation.",39,102 "Traditional Versus Benchmark Benefits Under Medicaid. The Medicaid program, which served 72 million people in FY2012, finances the delivery of a wide variety of preventive, primary, and acute care services as well as long-term services and supports for certain low-income populations. Benefits are available to beneficiaries through two avenues. First, the traditional Medicaid program covers a wide variety of mandatory services (e.g., inpatient hospital services, lab/x-ray services, physician care, nursing facility care for persons aged 21 and over), and other services at state option (e.g., prescribed drugs, physician-directed clinic services, physical therapy, prosthetic devices) to the majority of Medicaid beneficiaries across the United States. Within broad federal guidelines, states define the amount, duration, and scope of these benefits. Thus, even mandatory services are not identical from state to state. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171) created an alternative benefit structure for Medicaid. Under this authority, states may enroll certain Medicaid subpopulations into benchmark benefit plans that include four choices: (1) the standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield preferred provider plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, (2) a plan offered to state employees, (3) the largest commercial health maintenance organization in the state, and (4) other coverage appropriate for the targeted population, subject to approval by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). Since the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended), benchmark benefits have taken on a new importance in the Medicaid program. As per the ACA, a new mandatory group of non-elderly, non-pregnant adults with income up to 133% of the federal poverty level will be eligible for Medicaid beginning in 2014, or sooner at state option. (For more information about a Supreme Court ruling regarding this group, see CRS Report RL33202, Medicaid: A Primer.) These individuals will be required to enroll in benchmark plans rather than traditional Medicaid (with some exceptions for subgroups with special medical needs). However, to date, only a handful of states have experience administering these plans, nearly all of which have been tailored to specific subpopulations. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that coverage expansion provisions in the ACA would increase enrollment by about 7 million in FY2014, rising to 11 million by FY2022 in both the Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Programs (Congressional Budget Office, Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act Updated for the Recent Supreme Court Decision, July 2012). Many of these new enrollees will get benchmark benefits. To assist Congress in evaluating the current scope of benefits available under Medicaid, this report outlines the major rules that govern and define both traditional Medicaid and benchmark benefits. It also compares the similarities and differences between these two benefit package designs.",70,70 "Prosecution of Public Corruption: An Abridged Overview of Amendments Under H.R. 2572 and S. 2038. The House Judiciary Committee has approved an amended version of the Clean Up Government Act (H.R. 2572). The Senate has passed nearly identical provisions as Title II of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (STOCK Act, S. 2038). Title II, however, was dropped from the bill prior to its enactment as P.L. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012). Among other things, Title II and H.R. 2572 would each Expand the scope of federal mail and wire fraud statutes to reach undisclosed self-dealing by public officials—in response to Skilling. Amend the definition of official act for bribery purposes—to overcome the Valdes decision. Adjust the federal gratuities provision to reach ""goodwill"" gifts—in response to Sun Diamond. Increase the criminal penalties that attend various bribery, illegal gratuities, embezzlement statutes, and related provisions. Extend the statute of limitations from five to six years for several corruption offenses. Authorize the trial of perjury and obstruction charges in the district of the adversely effected judicial proceedings. Authorize the trial of multi-district cases in any district in which an act in furtherance is committed. Increase the number of public corruption offenses considered and wiretap predicate offenses. H.R. 2572, alone, would Increase the maximum penalties under the federal bribery and illegal gratuities statute. Amend the federal law criminalizing the theft or embezzlement of federal property to include property of the District of Columbia. Limit the prosecution of bribery and illegal gratuity cases under 18 U.S.C. 201 to cases involving $1,000 or more. This is an abridged version of a longer report, CRS Report R42016, Prosecution of Public Corruption: An Overview of Amendments Under H.R. 2572 and S. 2038, by Charles Doyle, without the footnotes, attribution, or citations to authority found in the longer report. Related CRS reports include CRS Report R40852, Deprivation of Honest Services as a Basis for Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Convictions, by Charles Doyle, and CRS Report R41930, Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal Criminal Law, by Charles Doyle.",61,98 "U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma. Major changes in Burma's political situation since 2008 have raised issues for Congress concerning the appropriateness of U.S. restrictions on relations with Burma (Myanmar). These issues include whether Congress should reexamine U.S. policy toward Burma in general, what criteria are appropriate for analyzing the current situation in Burma, and whether it should make adjustments to current U.S. restrictions on relations with Burma. On October 7, 2016, former President Obama revoked several executive orders pertaining to sanctions on Burma, and waived restrictions required by Section 5(b) of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-286), removing most of the economic restrictions on relations with Burma. On December 2, 2016, he issued Presidential Determination 2017-04, ending restrictions on U.S. assistance to Burma as provided by Section 570(a) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997. Various noneconomic restrictions, however, remain in effect, including bans on providing visas to certain Burmese nationals and other restrictions on U.S. assistance to Burma. Between 1989 and 2008, Congress passed several laws placing political and economic sanctions on Burma's military junta as part of a policy to identify individuals responsible for repression in Burma and hold them accountable for their actions, foster the reestablishment of a democratically elected civilian government, and promote the protection of human rights. In 2011, Burma's military junta, known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), transferred power to a mixed civilian/military government led by ex-SPDC Prime Minister General Thein Sein. Over the next five years, Congress and the Obama Administration waived or ended some of the sanctions on Burma, in part in response to reforms undertaken by the Thein Sein government. In November 2015, Burma held nationwide parliamentary elections from which Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) emerged as the party with an absolute majority in both chambers of Burma's Union Parliament. The NLD-led Union Parliament chose Htin Kyaw, a long-standing NLD member and close friend of Aung San Suu Kyi, as President. The new government subsequently appointed Aung San Suu Kyi to the newly created position of State Counselor, as well as Foreign Minister. While the NLD controls the Union Parliament and the executive branch, the Burmese military, also known as the Tatmadaw, continues to exercise significant power under provisions of Burma's 2008 constitution. For example, 25% of the seats in both chambers of the Union Parliament are military officers appointed by the Tatmadaw's Commander in Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, creating a voting bloc that can prevent any changes in the constitution. In addition, the Tatmadaw is engaged in fighting with several ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in a continuation of a nearly six-decade-old low-grade civil war, as well as allegedly engaging in serious human rights abuses in Rakhine State against Rohingya in response to an October 2016 attack on Tatmadaw posts along the Bangladesh border. As such, it is uncertain that the NLD-led government will have the ability to address its top priorities—national reconciliation and peace, further democratic reforms, respect for human rights, and greater prosperity for the Burmese people. Congress will have various opportunities to weigh in on U.S. policy toward Burma, including what restrictions, if any, to include in such a policy. In recent years, Congress has restricted foreign assistance to Burma in annual appropriations acts, such as the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31). In addition, Congress may consider whether to reexamine existing sanction laws on Burma in light of recent developments, to determine if it is time to amend, modify, replace, and/or repeal provisions in those laws.",85,85 "U.S. Response to the Global Threat of Tuberculosis: Basic Facts. Tuberculosis (TB) is one of the most widespread infectious diseases in the world, infecting an average of 9 million people annually. Although TB is curable, more than 1 million TB-related deaths occur each year. Due in part to a growing global response to TB, progress has been made in combating the disease. Globally, new TB infection rates have begun to slowly decline and TB mortality rates have decreased significantly since 1990. At the same time, absolute numbers of people infected with TB, particularly in Asia and Africa, continue to rise. Congress has recognized TB as an important humanitarian issue and increasingly as a potential threat to global security. In its second session, the 112th Congress will likely debate the appropriate funding levels and optimum strategy for addressing the continued challenge of global TB. Congress has enacted several key pieces of legislation related to the prevention, treatment, and care of people with TB around the world. These include the Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-264), the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25), and the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-293). These acts have authorized funds to be used in the fight against global TB and have recommended priority areas for the use of these funds. From FY2004 to FY2007, U.S. spending for global TB remained at around $90 million per fiscal year. TB received new attention as a critical issue in May 2007, when a man known to be carrying a drug-resistant form of the disease was able to cross several international borders, putting dozens of others at risk of infection. In response to this event and to growing recognition of the global threat posed by TB, congressional funding for global TB began to increase significantly in FY2008, when Congress provided $163.1 million to USAID for its TB programs and directed the State Department to spend at least $150 million of funds for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) on joint HIV/TB programs. Funding for global TB saw steady increases from FY2008 to FY2010 and has seen small fluctuations since. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead U.S. agency in global TB control and oversees bilateral programs in over 40 countries. The United States works closely with a range of multilateral partners in responding to global TB, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund), the largest external donor for TB. National governments play a critical role in responding to TB, and domestic government expenditures account for the majority of global TB funding. Several key issues threaten global control of TB. First, HIV/TB co-infection, particularly in Africa, is a growing challenge. TB is the leading cause of death for people with HIV, and TB control is significantly impeded in areas with high HIV prevalence. Second, drug-resistant forms of TB, including multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB) and extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB), are more difficult and expensive to treat, leading to greater TB-related mortality. Finally, the methods currently used for both TB diagnosis and treatment are antiquated and have varying degrees of success, particularly in the face of HIV/TB co-infection and drug-resistant TB. This report outlines basic facts related to global TB, including characteristics of the epidemic and U.S. legislation, programs, funding, and partnerships related to the global response to TB. The report will be updated as events warrant.",65,65 "Critical Infrastructure Protections: The 9/11 Commission Report and Congressional Response. Many of the recommendations made in the 9/11 Commission's report dealt indirectly with critical infrastructure protection, especially as the goals of critical infrastructure protection have evolved to include countering the type of attack that occurred on September 11. However, relatively few of the recommendations addressed critical infrastructure protection specifically. Those that did called for using a systematic risk management approach for setting priorities and allocating resources for critical infrastructure protection. None of these recommendations advocated a change in the direction of, or the organizational structures that have evolved to implement, existing infrastructure protection policies. Nevertheless, the Commission's recommendations could speed up implementation in some areas, given the attention and renewed urgency expressed by the Commission. Two bills were introduced as legislative vehicles for enacting some or many of the Commission recommendations (S. 2845 and H.R. 10). Like the Commission's recommendations, the language in these two bills, and the subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), for the most part, strengthen or reinforce existing policy and organization associated with critical infrastructure protection. For a more detailed discussion of national policy regarding critical infrastructure protection including its evolution, implementation, and continuing issues, see CRS Report RL30153 Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation. For a discussion on the use of risk management techniques in the context of critical infrastructure protection, see CRS Report RL32561 Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Consequences. This report will be updated as appropriate.",22,22 "Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies: FY2009 Appropriations. The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and for two agencies within other departmentsthe Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also includes funding for arts and cultural agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency, and numerous other entities. On February 17, 2009, the President signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, H.R. 1). This broad economic stimulus legislation contained $10.95 billion in emergency funds for FY2009 for some of the accounts within agencies typically funded by the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations laws. In general, the funds were made available for obligation until September 30, 2010 (the end of FY2010). On March 11, 2009, the President signed the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8, H.R. 1105). The omnibus law contained regular appropriations for FY2009 of $27.59 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. This funding was $825.9 million (3%) below the FY2008 level of $28.42 billion (including $1.82 billion in emergency appropriations), but $1.78 billion (7%) above the FY2009 Bush Administration request of $25.81 billion. Together with funding in the stimulus law, Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies received a total of $38.54 billion for FY2009. Regular appropriations for FY2009 were not enacted for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies before the October 1, 2008, start of the fiscal year. Instead, agencies were receiving funds under the terms of a continuing funding resolutionDivision A, Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009 (P.L. 110-329, FY2009 CR). The measure generally extended funding for accounts in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill at the amounts provided in the FY2008 regular appropriations law and under the terms and conditions provided in that FY2008 law. A notable exception was that the FY2009 CR removed the prohibitions on spending funds for oil and gas leasing activities in certain regions of the Outer Continental Shelf. No bills providing regular appropriations for FY2009 for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies were reported by the House or Senate Appropriations Committees or considered on the House or Senate floor during the 110th Congress. Perhaps the biggest impediment to developing and considering an Interior bill was divisiveness over whether to retain long-standing prohibitions on funding for oil and gas leasing in the OCS. Other issues that have been controversial in Interior deliberations have included funding for Bureau of Indian Affairs construction, education, and housing, Indian Health Service construction and urban Indian health, wastewater/drinking water needs, land acquisition, the Payments in Lieu of Taxes program, the Superfund program, and wildland fire fighting, in addition to Indian trust fund management and royalty relief. This report is not expected to be updated.",59,59 "Rural Highways. Of the nation's 4.1 million miles of public access roads, 2.9 million, or 71%, are in rural areas. Rural roads account for about 30% of national vehicle miles traveled. However, with many rural areas experiencing population decline, states increasingly are struggling to maintain roads with diminishing traffic while at the same time meeting the needs of growing rural and metropolitan areas. Federal highway programs do not generally specify how much federal funding is used on roads in rural areas. This is determined by the states. Most federal highway money, however, may be used only for a designated network of highways. While Interstate Highways and other high-volume roads in rural areas are eligible for these funds, most smaller rural roads are not. It is these roads, often under the control of county or township governments, that are most likely to have poor pavement and deficient bridges. Rural roads received about 37% of federal highway funds during FY2009-FY2015, although they accounted for about 30% of annual vehicle miles traveled. As a result, federal-aid-eligible rural roads are in comparatively good condition: 49% of rural roads were determined to offer good ride quality in 2016, compared with 27% of urban roads. Although 1 in 10 rural bridges is structurally deficient, the number of deficient rural bridges has declined by 41% since 2000. When it comes to safety, on the other hand, rural roads lag, the fatal accident rate on rural roads is over twice the rate on urban roads. The Federal Highway Administration has generally urged states to select highway projects based on a broad view of transportation benefits, the FHWA has asserted that transportation can shape development but cannot create development where there is no demand. However, an April 2018 statement by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) contended ""underinvestment in rural transportation systems has allowed a slow and steady decline in the transportation routes that connect rural American communities."" DOT said that it intends to favor rural areas in awarding discretionary grants for highway projects. If it seeks to focus on the condition of rural roads and bridges, Congress could expand the network of federal-aid highways to include more local roads, could create new programs that would specifically target transportation in rural areas, and/or could fund an expansion of the Interstate System. Without an increase in overall funding levels, however, such measures might cause states to spread their federal highway funds across wider networks of highways, making it more difficult for them to marshal the funds needed to undertake large and costly projects. Alternatively, given the population loss in some rural areas, Congress might provide incentives for states and counties to close or pulverize underused roads back to gravel and close underused and structurally deficient rural bridges, encouraging them to devote more of their resources to more heavily used roads.",121,121 "China: Pending Legislation in the 105th Congress. The 105 Congress has been active on issues involving China. This report, which will be updated as developments occur, tracks pending human rights legislation, including bills concerning: prison conditions and prison labor exports, coercive abortion practices, China's policies toward religion, and more general human rights issues.",85,85 "Initial Federal Budget Response to the 1941 Attack on Pearl Harbor. This report discusses initial federal budget response to attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which occurred as the federal government was half way through FY1942.",101,22 "Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices. Congress uses an annual appropriations process to fund the routine activities of most federal agencies. This process anticipates the completion of 12 regular appropriations bills to fund these activities before the beginning of the fiscal year. Over the past half century, the timing of congressional action on regular appropriations bills has varied considerably, but enactment after the start of the fiscal year has been a recurring issue. Until regular appropriations for a fiscal year are enacted, one or more continuing appropriations acts (commonly known as continuing resolutions or CRs) can be used to provide funding for a specified period of time. Under recent congressional practice, CRs typically include as many as six main components. First, CRs provide funding for certain activities, which are typically specified with reference to the prior fiscal year's appropriations acts. This is referred to in this report as the CR's coverage. Second, CRs provide budget authority for a specified duration of time. This duration may be as short as a single day or as long as the remainder of the fiscal year. Third, CRs typically provide funds based on an overall funding rate. Fourth, the use of budget authority provided in the CR is typically prohibited for new activities not funded in the previous fiscal year. Fifth, the duration and amount of funds in the CR, and purposes for which they may be used for specified activities, may be adjusted through anomalies. Sixth, legislative provisions—which create, amend, or extend other laws—have been included in some instances. Between FY1977 and FY2016 (excluding the four fiscal years in which all appropriations were enacted on time), over half of the regular appropriations bills for a fiscal year were enacted on time in only one instance (FY1978). In all other fiscal years, fewer than six regular appropriations acts were enacted on or before October 1. In addition, in 14 out of the 40 years during this period, none of these regular appropriations bills were enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year. Nine of these fiscal years have occurred in the interval since FY2001. For further information, see Table 1. In the interval since FY1997—the most recent fiscal year that all regular appropriations bills were completed on time—CRs have been enacted on average almost six times per fiscal year. During this period, CRs provided funding for an average of almost five months each fiscal year. For further information, see Table 2 and Figure 1. Congress has employed full-year CRs on a number of occasions. For each of the 11 fiscal years covering FY1978-FY1988, Congress enacted a full-year CR covering at least one regular appropriations act. Three years later, Congress enacted another full-year CR for FY1992. Most recently, full-year CRs were enacted for FY2007, FY2011, and FY2013. The budget authority in these full-year CRs was also provided in different forms. The 10 full-year CRs for FY1980 through FY1984, FY1992, FY2007, FY2011, and FY2013 included formulaic provisions that provided funding for at least one of the covered appropriations acts. The full-year CRs for FY1985 through FY1988, by contrast, did not use formulaic provisions but instead specified amounts for each account. For further information, see Table 3. For a list of all continuing resolutions enacted since FY1977, see Table 4 at the end of this report. This report will be updated after the annual appropriations process for a fiscal year has concluded.",101,55 "Burma-U.S. Relations. On May 2-3, 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit the Irrawaddy delta and the Rangoon area of Burma. Estimates of the number of people who died was 135,000 as of early June 2008. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their homes and sources of livelihood. Foreign governments and relief organizations sought to bring in massive aid, but the Burmese government (SPDC) restricted the volume of goods that came in and access of disaster experts and relief workers to the affected areas. In the meantime, the SPDC proceeded to hold a referendum on a new constitution in areas not affected by the cyclone. It announced on May 15 that voters approved the constitution by 92.4%. Many observers assessed the referendum process as not being free and open. This appeared in line with the SPDC's reported poor human rights record since 1990, including the suppression of anti-regime protests in September 2007. The SPDC appears unaffected by sanctions imposed by the United States and other Western nations. Western sanctions are uneven with U.S. sanctions being the heaviest. Burma has been able to expand exports of a variety of commodities, including growing earnings from natural gas production. China and India have signed deals with the SPDC for substantial purchases of natural gas. Burma also reportedly earns between $1 billion and $2 billion annually from exports of illegal drugs, heroin and methamphetamines. Most of these earnings go to drug traffickers connected to the Wa and Shan ethnic groups, but Burmese military officials have means to gain a substantial share of these earnings. Burma's fellow members in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have grown more critical of the SPDC, but they continue to oppose sanctions. Chinese diplomatic support of the SPDC and military and economic aid is very important: $2 billion in military aid since the early 1990s, $200 million annually in economic aid, substantial foreign investment including new investment in natural gas, and a huge influx of Chinese migrants into Burma, mainly traders. China's role is a prime justification for India's ""constructive engagement"" policy toward Burma, although India suspended arms sales after the September 2007 uprising. Burma has reestablished diplomatic relations with North Korea amidst reports of growing military cooperation between them. Since 1988, the United States has imposed sanctions against Burma, including congressional passage in 2003 of the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act (P.L. 108-61) banning imports from Burma (renewed by Congress in 2006). The Bush Administration proposed that the U.N. Security Council consider the Burma situation and introduced a resolution in the Council in December 2006. China and Russia vetoed the resolution in January 2007 and blocked a U.S. attempt to secure Security Council consideration of sanctions in September 2007. Since then, the Administration issued several executive orders prohibiting U.S. financial dealings and imposing a travel ban on named Burmese individuals and companies connected to the SPDC.",85,85 "Recovery Act Funding for DOE Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) Projects. Federal policymakers have long been interested in the potential of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) as a mitigation strategy for lowering global emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). Congress has appropriated more than $7 billion since FY2008 to CCS activities at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The Obama Administration has promulgated rules on CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-burning power plants and entered into a global agreement to limit CO2 emissions. Congress remains divided over those executive branch decisions. DOE, however, has continued to embrace CCS as part of the Administration's strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from power plants. Several bills introduced in the 114th Congress address CCS directly or indirectly (e.g., S. 601, S. 1283, H.R. 3392, and others). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act, P.L. 111-5) provided $3.4 billion for CCS projects and activities at DOE. The large infusion of funding was intended to help develop technologies that would allow for commercial-scale demonstration of CCS in both new and retrofitted power plants and industrial facilities by 2020. Nine individual projects garnered approximately $2.65 billion of the $3.4 billion—about 78%. Each of the nine projects was awarded more than $100 million, and these projects illustrate that DOE prioritized large-scale demonstration projects with Recovery Act funding. The lion's share of funding went to DOE's flagship CCS project FutureGen, which was awarded nearly $1 billion from the Recovery Act. Authority to spend Recovery Act funds expired on September 30, 2015. Of $3.4 billion allocated for CCS activities, approximately $1.4 billion went unspent as of the spending deadline. The largest portion of the unspent funds, $795 million, was intended for FutureGen, which DOE suspended in February 2015. FutureGen faced various impediments that led to its cancellation, including delays in receiving required injection well permits from the Environmental Protection Agency, court challenges to its plan to sell electricity, and a lawsuit from an environmental advocacy group. Several other large CCS demonstration projects also were canceled, suspended, or failed to spend all of their Recovery Act funding before the 2015 deadline. Some stakeholders argue that DOE's CCS programs have been inadequately funded, providing less incentive than they should for deploying CCS. One study concluded that even the financial boost from the Recovery Act was insufficient. To be sure, large-scale CCS projects are complex endeavors, requiring substantial capital investment and multiyear planning and construction schedules. However, the conclusion that more federal funding by itself would be sufficient to support development and commercialization of CCS technology may be overly simplistic. DOE acknowledges that many of the Recovery Act-funded projects were technologically difficult and challenging, but it does not consider the relinquishment of unspent funds to signify project failure. DOE notes that due to its spending on CCS and its partnerships with industry, the costs of capturing CO2 have dropped significantly and its projects have stored more than 10 million metric tons of CO2. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) final rule for reducing CO2 emissions from new fossil fuel power plants, part of the Administration's Clean Power Plan, found plants incorporating partial CCS to be the Best System of Emission Reduction (BSER). EPA asserts that CCS is technically feasible. Technical feasibility, however, is just one factor of many that determine whether a project successfully reaches its goal of producing electricity and capturing CO2 at commercial scale. EPA states that implementing partial CCS in the rule is likely to boost future research and development in CCS technologies and to make CCS implementation more efficacious and cost-effective. That may be the case, however, other issues also affect CCS implementation. These issues, as well as the outcomes from promulgation of EPA's final rule, will likely continue to shape the outlook for CCS commercialization and deployment.",42,42 "Immigration-Related Document Fraud: Overview of Civil, Criminal, and Immigration Consequences. In order to enter or remain in the United States and be eligible for various immigration-related benefits, non-citizens (aliens) must comply with a number of document requirements under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Attempts to circumvent these requirements are generally prohibited. Under the INA, an alien who uses, acquires, or produces fraudulent documents for immigration-related purposes may be subjected to civil penalties and denied certain immigration benefits. Additionally, certain fraudulent actions may carry criminal penalties under both the INA and the United States Criminal Code. This report discusses the primary civil, criminal, and immigration-related penalties associated with immigration-related document fraud. It does not discuss criminal statutes generally penalizing fraud or identity theft (other than 18 U.S.C. § 1028), though these statutes could also potentially be used to penalize immigration-related document fraud. Immigration reform was an active issue during the 110th Congress. Some legislative proposals contained provisions modifying the scope or penalties of laws restricting immigration-related document fraud, and it is possible that proposals addressing immigration-related document fraud will be introduced in the 111 th Congress. For a more general discussion of immigration-related fraud, see CRS Report RL34007, Immigration Fraud: Policies, Investigations, and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.",76,76 "House Office of General Counsel. The Office of General Counsel of the House of Representatives provides legal assistance and representation to Members, committees, officers, and employees of the House of Representatives on matters pertaining to their official duties. These services may include advising offices on confidentiality issues, release of constituent information, requests from executive branch agencies, and the issuance and response to subpoenas. The office is led by the House General Counsel, who is appointed by the Speaker of the House in consultation with the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group. The professional staff of the office includes a deputy general counsel, several assistant counsel, and a support staff. Services are provided upon request. For more information on the legislative process and congressional operations, see http://crs.gov/analysis/Pages/CongressionalOperations.aspx.",55,55 "Algeria: Current Issues. U.S.-Algeria ties are highly focused on counterterrorism cooperation and U.S. interest in Algeria's oil and gas production. The Obama Administration has indicated a desire to deepen and broaden bilateral relations, including security assistance, while periodically urging greater political and economic openness. While both governments express appreciation for bilateral cooperation, U.S. officials may lack well-developed levers of influence in Algiers due to Algeria's economic self-reliance and ties to non-Western strategic players such as Russia, along with Algerian leaders' storied reputation for resistance to outside pressure. Congress appropriates and oversees small amounts of foreign aid and reviews notifications of occasional arms sales. Algeria's political system, which is dominated by a strong presidency and security apparatus, has remained stable amid ongoing regional upheaval. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was first elected in 1999 amid the waning of Algeria's decade-long counterinsurgency against armed Islamist groups. His reelection to a fourth five-year term in April 2014, despite his evident ill health, has focused popular attention on succession issues. Bouteflika has initiated a process aimed at revising Algeria's constitution, but reforms proposed to date appear unlikely to substantially affect the political system. Algerians use the term Le Pouvoir (the powers-that-be) to refer to the opaque elite political and military networks that are widely viewed as driving policy decisions. Strong global prices for Algeria's energy resources have allowed the country to amass large foreign reserves as a buffer against economic instability, despite declining export volumes in recent years. However, bureaucratic red tape, corruption concerns, and stringent restrictions on foreign investment have inhibited growth and job creation. Localized public unrest over political and economic grievances periodically occurs, and ethnic violence has recently afflicted parts of the country. Yet public enthusiasm for dramatic political change appears limited, potentially due to factors such as the memory of violence during the 1990s and more recent examples of turmoil in Libya, Syria, and elsewhere. A terrorist attack at a natural gas compound in southeastern Algeria in January 2013, in which three Americans were killed, highlighted the challenges the United States faces in advancing and protecting its interests in an increasingly volatile region. The group that claimed responsibility is a breakaway faction of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional network with Algerian roots and leadership. Given its large military, available financial resources, and desire to avert direct Western military intervention in neighboring states, Algeria has periodically sought to lead a regional response to security threats. Yet Algeria's complex and sometimes distrustful relations with neighboring states may hinder cooperation. Meanwhile, U.S. unilateral action in response to security threats may present significant risks and opportunity costs. Algeria's foreign policy has often conflicted with that of the United States. Strained relations with neighboring Morocco continue, due to the unresolved status of the disputed territory of Western Sahara and a rivalry for regional influence. Morocco claims Western Sahara, Algeria supports and hosts a long-running independence movement. The legacy of Algeria's anti-colonial struggle contributes to its leaders' stance on the Western Sahara, their emphasis on sovereignty as a principle of foreign relations, and their frequent skepticism of Western and NATO intentions. The strategic importance of Algeria's natural gas exports to Europe may increase amid efforts to reduce reliance on supplies from Russia. See also CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara.",85,85 "Electric Utility Regulatory Reform: Issues for the 109th Congress. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) and the Federal Power Act (FPA) were enacted to eliminate unfair practices and other abuses by electricity and gas holding companies by requiring federal control and regulation of interstate public utility holding companies. Prior to PUHCA, electricity holding companies were characterized as having excessive consumer rates, high debt-to-equity ratios, and unreliable service. PUHCA remained virtually unchanged for 50 years until enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. PURPA was, in part, intended to augment electric utility generation with more efficiently produced electricity and to provide equitable rates to electric consumers. Qualifying facilities (QFs) are exempt from regulation under PUHCA and the FPA. Electricity regulation was changed again in 1992 with passage of the Energy Policy Act (EPACT). The intent of Title 7 of EPACT is to increase competition in the electric generating sector by creating new entities, called ""exempt wholesale generators"" (EWGs), that can generate and sell electricity at wholesale without being regulated as utilities under PUHCA. This title also provides EWGs with a way to assure transmission of their wholesale power to their purchasers. The effect of this act on the electric supply system has been more far-reaching than PURPA. On April 24, 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Orders 888 and 889. FERC issued these rules to remedy undue discrimination in transmission services in interstate commerce and provide an orderly and fair transition to competitive bulk power markets. Order 2000 issued December 20, 1999, established criteria for forming transmission organizations. Comprehensive electricity legislation may involve several components. The first is PUHCA reform. Some electric utilities want PUHCA changed so they can more easily diversify their assets. State regulators have expressed concerns that increased diversification could lead to abuses including cross-subsidization. Consumer groups have expressed concern that a repeal of PUHCA could exacerbate market power abuses in a monopolistic industry where true competition does not yet exist. The second issue is PURPA's requirement that utilities purchase power from QFs. Many investor-owned utilities support repeal of these mandatory purchase provisions. They argue that their state regulators' ""misguided"" implementation of PURPA has forced them to pay contractually high prices for power that they do not need. Opponents of this legislation argue that it would decrease competition and impede development of renewable energy. The third main issue is reliability. Without mandatory and enforceable reliability standards proponents argue that reliability of the electric power system will not be at acceptable levels. Opponents say these standards are unnecessary. This report will be updated as events warrant.",38,38 "House Committees: A Framework for Considering Jurisdictional Realignment. The House has chosen to handle committee jurisdiction in a number of ways. It has chosen to concentrate jurisdiction over an issue in new, existing, and temporary committees. It has chosen to keep jurisdiction over components of an issue distributed among several committees. And, it has chosen to vest in one committee jurisdiction over a narrow subject matter that could just as readily have been considered a component of subject matter within another committee's jurisdiction. Rules relating to referral and the Speaker's referral authority have also been changed to deal with jurisdictional issues. The House's most recent decision to create a standing Committee on Homeland Security reflected the several values that can bear on jurisdictional alignment (H.Res. 5, 109th Congress, and an accompanying legislative history of House Rule X changes contained in the resolution). While the House and Senate consolidated and reduced the number of committees in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and for the first time vested each committee with specific jurisdiction, the House did not adopt wide-ranging committee reorganizations in 1974 or 1994. Rather, the House on a number of occasions since 1946 has chosen incremental change in committee jurisdictional realignment. The House is expected to study its committee organization during the 109th Congress. Related CRS reports are as follows: CRS Report RL32711(pdf), Homeland Security Compendium of Recommendations Relevant to House Committee Organization and Analysis of Considerations for the House, by Michael L. Koempel, CRS Report RS21901(pdf), House Select Committee on Homeland Security: Possible Questions Raised If the Panel Were to Be Reconstituted as a Standing Committee, by Judy Schneider, CRS Report RL31835(pdf), Reorganization of the House of Representatives: Modern Reform Efforts, by Judy Schneider, Christopher M. Davis, and Betsy Palmer, and CRS Report RL31572, Appropriations Subcommittee Structure: History of Changes 1920-2005, by James V. Saturno. This report will not be updated.",55,55 "Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies: FY2015 Appropriations. The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for most of the Department of the Interior (DOI) and for agencies within other departments—including the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also provides funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), arts and cultural agencies, and numerous other entities. For FY2015, the President requested $30.69 billion for the approximately 30 agencies and entities typically funded in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations law. The President's request would have been an increase of $570.9 million (1.9%) over the total FY2014 enacted appropriations of $30.12 billion. On July 23, 2014, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 5171, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015, containing $30.28 billion for FY2015. The measure included $470.0 million in additional fire suppression funding for the Forest Service. On August 1, 2014, the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft measure and accompanying explanatory statement recommending $30.71 billion in total appropriations. The draft included $1.19 billion in emergency appropriations for Wildland Fire Management of DOI and the Forest Service. Neither measure saw subsequent legislative action. Regular appropriations for FY2015 were not enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2015. Accordingly, continuing appropriations were temporarily provided under continuing appropriations laws (originally P.L. 113-164). Agencies generally received funding at the FY2014 level minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.0554%, under the authority and conditions provided for FY2014. On December 16, 2014, regular, full-year appropriations were enacted for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies as part of P.L. 113-235, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015. The law included total appropriations of $30.48 billion for these agencies, primarily in Division F. For DOI agencies in Title I of the bill, appropriations were $11.09 billion, including $372.0 million for the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program. This was 36.4% of the total enacted. For the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), appropriations were $8.14 billion, or 26.7% of the total. For agencies and other entities in Title III of the bill, the total was $11.25 billion, or 36.9% of the total. Appropriations enacted for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies over the prior five fiscal years (FY2010-FY2014) peaked in FY2010 at $32.32 billion. Relative to FY2010, the FY2015 enacted appropriations decreased by $1.84 billion (-5.7%). However, the FY2015 appropriations were higher than the appropriations enacted for each of the other fiscal years during the five-year period. They were $358.0 million (1.2%) higher than the most recent (FY2014) appropriations.",59,59 "Medicaid and CHIP Maintenance of Effort (MOE): Requirements and Responses. State revenues declined during the recent economic recession (December 2007 through June 2009) and have not fully recovered. At the same time, the recession increased the number of individuals meeting Medicaid's income eligibility standards. States are faced with tough decisions about where to direct their increasingly limited funds. This state fiscal condition is a reason the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5, and subsequently extended in P.L. 111-226) included a temporary increase to Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) rates. As a condition of the receipt of the federal Medicaid matching funds made available under ARRA, states were required to maintain their Medicaid programs with the same eligibility standards, methodologies, or procedures for Medicaid through June 30, 2011. This provision is referred to as the ARRA Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirement. The ARRA MOE provisions were extended and expanded in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as modified by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as modified by P.L. 111-152). ACA's MOE provisions were designed to ensure that individuals eligible for Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) did not lose coverage in the period between the date of enactment of ACA (March 23, 2010) and the implementation of the state health insurance exchanges (expected in 2014). Because states are prohibited from curbing the cost of Medicaid through restricting eligibility standards due to the MOE requirements included in ARRA and ACA, states have focused cost containment strategies on reducing provider rates, making changes to their benefit packages, or implementing limitations on the use of benefits. However, states want greater flexibility to restrain their Medicaid expenditures through eligibility restrictions. This report summarizes the MOE requirements enacted under ARRA and ACA and what these requirements have meant for states in terms of their actions to restrict Medicaid and/or CHIP eligibility. It also summarizes recent legislative activity to repeal the MOE requirements.",70,70 "Compensating Farmers for the Tobacco Settlement. The legislative proposals designed to reduce smoking, primarily by teenagers, are likely to have negative economic consequences for tobacco growers and tobacco-dependent communities. This report discusses the possibility of some kind of compensation to farmers as part of the settlement package legislation.",3,3 "The FHA Modernization Act of 2008. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has been insuring lenders against loss on home loans since 1934, and has insured about 35 million homes at a mortgage volume of about $2 trillion. In past years, FHA was often the innovator in testing new mortgage products, but in recent years the private mortgage market has been offering mortgages that appealed to borrowers who otherwise may have sought FHA-insured home loans. As a result, the FHA share of the mortgage market declined. FHA reform measures were debated in previous sessions of Congress, but FHA reform proved controversial and these efforts stalled. Momentum for FHA reform grew as the downturn in the housing market worsened in 2008. Reform measures were introduced in the 110th Congress and some of the provisions were included in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, P.L. 110-289, enacted July 30, 2008. Title I of Division B of P.L. 110-289 is cited as the FHA Modernization Act of 2008, and it contains two subtitles. Subtitle A, the Building American Homeownership Act of 2008, makes several amendments to the FHA program that insures loans on single family homes under Title II of the National Housing Act. Subtitle B, the FHA Manufactured Housing Loan Modernization Act of 2008, makes several amendments to the FHA program that insures loans on manufactured housing loan program under Title I of the National Housing. This report discusses the provisions of these subtitles. The changes enacted in these subtitles affect the delivery of FHA-insured home loans in communities throughout the United States. This report may be updated as warranted by issues related to implementing the new law.",73,73 "Air Toxics: What Progress Has EPA Made in Regulating Hazardous Air Pollutants?. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 contained four programs to ensure that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would regulate hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) more quickly than the Agency had under the original act. The first program directed EPA to establish emission standards for stationary sources of HAPs based on maximum achievable control technology (MACT). The second program, known as the residual risk program, required EPA to examine the risk remaining from these sources after implementation of MACT standards. If warranted, EPA must promulgate additional standards to protect public health or the environment. Third, Congress instructed EPA to regulate HAPs that are a particular problem for urban areas. Fourth, Congress directed EPA to evaluate mobile sources, such as cars, to determine their HAP emissions and to regulate these sources. EPA has made progress in regulating HAPs under some of these programs, particularly in comparison to its pre-1990 record (when only 7 HAPs were regulated over a 20-year period). But the pace of regulation has fallen behind that envisioned in the 1990 Amendments. Under the MACT program, for example, the Agency originally named 174 source categories subject to regulation for their HAP emissions. In the statute, Congress specified that MACT standards for all of these categories were to be promulgated by November 15, 2000. By May 15, 2002, EPA still had not promulgated final standards for 56 source categories (a little less than one-third of those to be regulated), covering a combined total of 84,000 major emitting sources. Under the 1990 amendments, if EPA has not promulgated standards by 18 months after the deadline, states and industries must develop MACT standards themselves. Rather than allow this hammer"" to strike, however, EPA issued a rule in April 2002 that will give these sources until May 15, 2004 to develop MACT standards. The Sierra Club has filed suit challenging the deadline extension. The residual risk program, intended to examine whether risk remains after MACT standards are implemented, is also behind schedule. The first residual risk standards, for coke ovens, were due in 2001, 12 other categories are to be reviewed before the end of 2002. While EPA has developed a methodology for determining residual risk, the methodology and the availability of the data for conducting the analyses have been questioned by the Agency's Science Advisory Board. It is unlikely that EPA will meet deadlines for residual risk standards. Both the urban air toxics and mobile source air toxics programs have also been delayed. Questions have been raised regarding the adequacy of the mobile source air toxics standards, most standards for urban air toxics have yet to be promulgated. Issues for Congress include the adequacy of Agency resources for the HAPs programs, the feasibility of the residual risk program, given inadequacies of the available data and concerns over the risk assessment methodology, and whether the Agency is complying with congressional intent in key areas of the HAPs programs. This report will be updated as events warrant.",42,42 "Paris Attacks and ""Going Dark"": Intelligence-Related Issues to Consider. This report discusses intelligence efforts on tracking numerous individuals involved in the deadly assault in Paris on November 13, 2015.",27,86 "Energy and Water Development: FY2017 Appropriations. The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP), and the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's total funding. FY2017 funding for energy and water development programs was provided by Division D of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), an omnibus funding measure passed by Congress May 4, 2017, and signed into law the following day. (This followed a series of continuing resolutions.) Total funding for Division D was $38.89 billion, offset by $436 million in rescissions. That total was $1.27 billion above the Obama Administration request and $1.54 billion over the FY2016 level, excluding rescissions. The Obama Administration also proposed $2.26 billion in new mandatory funding for DOE, which was not approved. Proposed reductions for the Corps, Reclamation, and CUP were also rejected. The Senate approved its version of the FY2017 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill on May 12, 2016 (H.R. 2028, S.Rept. 114-236), which would have increased budget authority for energy and water programs by $261 million over the request (0.7%), including adjustments. The House Appropriations Committee completed action on April 19, 2016 (H.R. 5055, H.Rept. 114-532), but the bill was defeated on the House floor on May 26, 2016. As passed by the Appropriations Committee, the House version would have provided $4 million more than the request, after offsets and other adjustments. Major Energy and Water Development funding highlights for FY2017 include Definition of ""Fill Material"" Under the Clean Water Act. The Senate-passed bill included provisions to prohibit the Corps during FY2017 from changing the definition of ""fill material"" in relation to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The restriction was included in the enacted omnibus measure. 40% Requested Boost for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. The Obama Administration requested an increase of $829.2 million (40.1%) in discretionary funding for DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) for FY2017, which the House committee and the Senate did not approve. The omnibus measure provided a 0.9% funding increase. Nuclear Waste ""Consent-Based Siting."" The Obama Administration proposed to triple funding in FY2017 for DOE to develop a consent-based nuclear waste siting program, to $76.3 million. The House Appropriations Committee rejected the proposal, instead providing $170 million to pursue a waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. The Senate approved $61.0 million for consent-based siting. The omnibus measure provided $22.5 million for consent-based siting, $62.5 million for used fuel R&D, and no funds for Yucca Mountain. Surplus Plutonium Disposition. Construction of the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which would make fuel for nuclear reactors out of surplus weapons plutonium, would have been terminated beginning in FY2017 by the Obama Administration's budget request. The Senate approved the Administration halt, while the House panel voted to continue construction. The omnibus measure continued construction with a 1.5% funding cut from FY2016.",59,59 "The Distinction Between Monopoly and Monopolization in Antitrust Law. Antitrust law does not mandate either that markets be competitive, or that they contain some predetermined number of participants/competitors, it is concerned, rather, with the operation of markets, on the assumption that a properly functioning market (i.e., one in which there is an opportunity for viable competition, and is not skewed by the predatory actions of participants), will best protect consumers. ""Monopoly"" and ""monopolist"" are, therefore, merely descriptive terms, used to illustrate situations in which a single entity (or group of entities) possesses effective control of the market in which it operates, neither term implies anything about the lawfulness of the monopoly possessed. ""Monopolization,"" on the other hand, is the term used in antitrust law to characterize as unlawful a situation in which a monopolist—irrespective of whether his monopoly has been lawfully achieved—couples his monopoly status with behavior designed to unfairly exploit, maintain, or enhance his market position. Similarly, ""attempted monopolization""connotes a situation in which an entity unlawfully or unfairly attempts to secure a market monopoly. The long-standing, judicially created Rule of Reason, which involves balancing an anticompetitive action with any procompetitive results, underscores those facts. Whether a market participant who is a monopolist must deal with anyone who desires to deal with it continues to be largely governed by the so-called Colgate doctrine. In 1919, in United States v. Colgate & Co. (250 U.S. 300), the Supreme Court recognized the unfettered ""right"" of a private vendor ""to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal...."" Colgate notwithstanding, the existence of an ""essential facility"" (i.e., a necessary component of a potential competitor's business and which is both unavailable from any source other than the alleged monopolist and cannot be reasonably duplicated), once established, has generally been thought to impose a duty to deal with the actual or potential competitors of even a lawful monopolist. The continuing viability of the so-called ""essential facilities"" doctrine, however, was called into question by the Supreme Court's 2004 ruling in Verizon v. Trinko (540 U.S. 398). The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) each operate on the assumption that the monopoly status of competitors is antitrust-relevant only insofar as their actions may impact the operation or competitiveness of markets. This report—which explores the difference between monopoly and monopolization as those terms are used in antitrust law, and the differing enforcement consequences of each—will be updated if case law or legislation alters the concepts it discusses. It is based on several existing documents by the same author, including CRS Report RS20241, Monopoly and Monopolization - Fundamental But Separate Concepts in U.S. Antitrust Law, CRS Report RS21723, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Trinko: Telecommunications Consumers Cannot Use Antitrust Laws to Remedy Access Violations of Telecommunications Act, and Duty of a Monopolist to Deal, a general distribution memorandum.",10,10 "Internet Firearm and Ammunition Sales. As the Internet has become a significant venue for facilitating commercial transactions, concerns have arisen regarding the use of this medium to transfer firearms. This report discusses the sale of firearms and ammunition over the Internet, with a focus on the extent to which federal law regulates such activity. A review of the relevant factors indicates Internet-based firearm transactions are subject to the same regulatory scheme governing traditional firearm transactions. Over the years, this has raised concern about the possibility of increased violation of federal firearm laws, as well as challenges that law enforcement may face when attempting to investigate violations of these laws. A review of the relevant factors also indicates that the sale and transfer of ammunition are not as strictly regulated as firearms, and that these changes came into effect in 1986. Lastly, this report highlights recent legislative proposals, S. 3458 and H.R. 6241, companion measures introduced by Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Carolyn McCarthy in the 112th Congress that would affect online ammunition transactions.",97,110 "The Supreme Court Rediscovers Property Rights: Six Recent Decisions. In 2010, the Supreme Court ended a five-year period when it accepted no property rights cases, granting certiorari in no less than six such cases between 2010 and 2012. This large number of cases suggests a renewed interest by the Court in property rights, and particularly in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause at issue in four of the cases. The Takings Clause is the Constitution's principal protection of property rights, promising just compensation when property rights are ""taken"" by government for a ""public use."" The first case, decided in 2010, was Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection. There, a four-Justice plurality endorsed the idea that courts, just as other branches of government, could be subject to takings liability. This question of ""judicial takings"" often arises when courts articulate new principles of common law that extinguish existing property rights. The next two cases were decided during the Court's 2011-2012 term. In PPL Montana LLC v. Montana, the Court fleshed out its test for ""title navigability""—important because title to only streambeds under ""navigable"" waters passes to a state upon its admission to the Union. In Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, enforcement of the wetlands permitting program in the Clean Water Act was at issue. The holding was that when property owners receive an order from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the act, they have a right to ""pre-enforcement review""—that is, a right to judicially challenge the order right away, before EPA seeks to enforce it and impose potentially large penalties. The number of other federal programs that, due to this decision, must now afford pre-enforcement review of agency orders is unclear. Finally, the Court decided three takings cases during its 2012-2013 term. In Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, the Court jettisoned its long-standing rule that when a government project induces flooding of private property, only flooding that is continual or at least ""intermittent but inevitably recurring"" can result in takings liability. Temporary flooding, the Court now says, may also subject the government to such liability. In Horne v. Dep't of Agriculture, the Court held that penalties imposed under a Depression-era statute for the support of agricultural commodity prices may be challenged on the ground that they punish a person's refusal to accede to an unconstitutional taking. Broad issues radiate from this narrow ruling—such as the availability of takings defenses in enforcement actions generally when the compensation remedy has been withdrawn. In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, the Court addressed its previously announced test for when exaction conditions on land-development permits constitute takings. The Court clarified that this test—viewed as more favorable to property owners than the alternative—applies even when the landowner refuses the exaction conditions imposed and, as a result, the permit is denied. It also covers not only land-dedication exactions, the context in which the test was originally articulated, but purely monetary exactions as well. Typically, one can only speculate why the Supreme Court takes a case, the Court's reasons generally are not easily discerned. Still, an informed guess can be made that the six cases discussed in this report point to a reawakened interest by the Court in property rights. In all six cases, the decision below had been against the property owner, suggesting that the Justices (or some of them) are looking anew for circumstances where property rights are unfairly burdened. And indeed, in five of the six decisions rendered by the Court, the private property owners were vindicated. Decisions yet to be rendered on remand, however, may not necessarily go their way.",17,17 "The Changing Structure of Agriculture and Rural America: Emerging Opportunities and Challenges. When agricultural production and related businesses dominated rural economies, policies that strengthened and improved agriculture tended to strengthen and improve the well-being of most of America's small communities and rural residents. As the strength of this linkage declined over the past century, many have felt that rural policy has been left largely fragmented and unfocused comprising a patchwork of programs and initiatives rather than a coherent policy. Yet agriculture remains the primary policy framework for Congress's consideration of rural issues. Significant changes are occurring in the structure of the U.S. agro-food system. These changes are likely to pose important questions about the direction and coherence of current rural policy. Several significant trends in this evolving structure of agriculture are discussed in this report: (1) a continuation in the trend toward fewer and larger farms, (2) a potential acceleration of that trend as production shifts to more tightly integrated and vertically coordinated production through supply chains, (3) greater environmental pressures on conventional agricultural production practices stemming from urban and suburban interests, and (4) changing food consumption patterns. Conditions in rural America today are quite mixed. Some rural areas, such as those within commuting distances of metropolitan areas or blessed with environmental amenities and/or affluent retirees, are thriving. Other rural areas with little employment, few public services, persistent poverty, and fewer possibilities, are spiraling downward. Declines in farming and in many rural areas and opposition to industrializing trends in agriculture are compelling policymakers and rural areas to seek new sources of job growth, innovative ways of providing public services to sparse populations, as well as new ways of integrating agriculture into changing rural economies. Manufacturing, a major focus of rural economic development over the past 40 years, is also threatened by increasing low-wage international competition. Congress has expressed its concern with rural communities most directly through periodic omnibus farm bill legislation, most recently in the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (P.L. 104-127) and in its current deliberations over a new farm bill, the Farm Security Act of 2001 (H.R. 2646). The Farm Security Act, as recently passed by the House, has a rural development title. Questions have been raised about whether agriculture policy and rural policy are compatible given the large proportion of rural non-farm communities. There are questions about whether current rural policies tend to reinforce rural communities' past competitive advantage or whether they assist the creation of entrepreneurial capacity within rural areas to generate new competitive advantage. While significant debate exists over what elements might comprise a comprehensive, integrated rural policy, continuing along past policy paths seems increasingly less likely to produce the socioeconomic conditions that will assist rural America in developing vibrant competitive, and sustainable communities for the future.",2,2 "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000. This report is prepared annually to provide unclassified quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. The data in the report illustrate how global patterns of conventional arms transfers have changed in the post-Cold War and post-Persian Gulf War years.",28,28 "Offshoring of Airline Maintenance: Implications for Domestic Jobs and Aviation Safety. Airlines outsource maintenance to countries like China and El Salvador to achieve cost savings from the comparatively lower wages and from lower costs to build and maintain repair facilities. In some cases, particularly in China, government investment and other incentives, along with backing from national airlines, have spurred rapid expansion of the foreign aircraft maintenance industry over the past decade. While airline maintenance work outsourced to foreign repair facilities has increased considerably over the past decade, there are no conclusive data indicating that this has directly resulted in the loss of U.S. jobs. Despite increased maintenance outsourcing, the United States continues to maintain a positive trade balance for airline maintenance work, a trend that likely reflects the United States' advanced capabilities on high-value engine and aircraft component work. While investigative reports and labor union sponsored studies of airline outsourcing practices have been critical of foreign repair facilities, more detailed statistical analysis does not support conclusions that maintenance outsourcing or offshoring has had measurable negative impact on safety, quality control, or reliability. Although some experts believe that safety is being compromised and the regulation and oversight of foreign repair stations needs to be improved, analyses of recent trends do not provide obvious evidence that maintenance outsourcing has adversely affected airline safety. Specific concerns have been raised regarding the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) limited resources to oversee foreign repair stations, and FAA's extensive reliance on foreign regulators and the airlines to monitor these facilities. Additional concerns have been raised over worker training and qualifications at foreign facilities, the relatively low numbers of workers at these facilities with FAA certification, and the lack of English language skills necessary to read and comprehend maintenance manuals and instructions. Congress also has been concerned about the adequacy of drug and alcohol testing programs at foreign repair stations that work on U.S. aircraft. In the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95), it mandated drug and alcohol testing at those locations in a manner consistent with existing bilateral aviation safety agreements and the laws of countries where the repair stations are located. Additionally, the act directed FAA to ensure that foreign repair stations are subject to appropriate inspections consistent with existing U.S. requirements and bilateral air safety agreements, inspect foreign repair stations annually, and carry out independent inspections when warranted by safety concerns. The United States has continued to maintain a positive trade balance with respect to airline maintenance work. However, future foreign investment in advanced training and technical capabilities related to high-value engine and component repair and overhaul could lead to more direct foreign competition in these areas. While available data do not indicate that offshoring of maintenance work has negatively impacted safety, specific areas for potential improvement include the allocation of FAA inspectors and resources focused on the oversight of foreign repair stations, FAA certification and qualification standards for individuals assigned to supervisory roles at foreign repair stations, and standards or guidelines for English language proficiency and comprehension of written technical materials among foreign repair station mechanics.",119,119 "Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2019 Appropriations. The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and—in even-numbered fiscal years—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill's development, since mandatory amounts are generally set by authorizing laws such as the farm bill. The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), agricultural research, FDA, rural development, foreign food aid and trade, farm assistance programs, food safety inspection, conservation, and animal and plant health programs. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), child nutrition, crop insurance, and the farm commodity and conservation programs paid by the Commodity Credit Corporation. For FY2019, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported Agriculture appropriations bills (H.R. 5961, S. 2976) in May 2018. The Senate amended and passed its version as Division C of a four-bill minibus on August 1, 2018 (H.R. 6147). The Trump Administration requested $17 billion for discretionary-funded accounts within the jurisdiction of Agriculture appropriations, which would be a reduction of $6.2 billion from FY2018 (-27%). In general, both the House-reported and Senate-passed bills reject most of the Administration's proposed reductions. The discretionary total of the House-reported bill is $23.23 billion, which would be $14 million less than enacted in FY2018 (-0.1%). The discretionary total of the Senate-passed bill is also $23.23 billion. However, the Senate bill's total would be $229 million more than enacted in FY2018 (+1%) on a comparable basis that excludes the CFTC. The Senate-passed bill would provide about $250 million more than the House-passed bill on a comparable basis. The primary changes at the agency level that comprise the differences between the bills and from FY2018 include the following: Both the House and Senate bills would increase FDA appropriations (+$308 million in the House bill, +$159 million in the Senate bill). Both bills increase appropriations for animal and plant health programs (+$16 million to +$19 million). The House bill would provide more base funding for rural water and waste disposal (+$81 million), but none of the extra money that was provided separately in FY2018. The Senate bill would not change the base funding for rural water but continues $400 million of the extra funding from last year. For rural broadband, both the House and Senate bills would continue extra funding from a FY2018 pilot ($550 million in the House bill, $425 million in the Senate bill). The House bill would increase appropriations for agricultural research (+$79 million), and the Senate bill would increase Agricultural Research Service programming (+98 million) but would not provide any money for construction (-$141 million). Both bills provide less for WIC (-$175 million in the House bill, and -$25 million in the Senate bill), though the Senate bill has a larger rescission from prior-year WIC funds than does the House bill. The House bill would reduce base funding for the international Food for Peace program (-$100 million) and does not renew extra funding provided last year (-$116 million), while the Senate bill would keep it constant overall. The appropriations also carries mandatory spending—largely determined in separate authorizing laws—that would total $122 billion. Thus, the overall total of the both bills is about $145 billion. Both bills contain policy provisions affecting disaster programs, rural definitions, industrial hemp, animal products, nutrition programs, dietary guidelines, CFTC, and tobacco products.",2,2 "The ADA Amendments Act: P.L. 110-325. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a broad civil rights act prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. As stated in the act, its purpose is ""to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."" The threshold issue in any ADA case is whether the individual alleging discrimination is an individual with a disability. Several Supreme Court decisions, including those in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2004), have interpreted the definition of disability, generally limiting its application. Since these Supreme Court interpretations, lower court decisions also interpreted the definition of disability strictly. Congress responded to these decisions by enacting the ADA Amendments Act, P.L. 110-325, which rejects the Supreme Court and lower court interpretations and amends the ADA to provide broader coverage. On September 23, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued proposed regulations under the ADA Amendments Act.",18,18 "Presidential Review of Independent Regulatory Commission Rulemaking: Legal Issues. Federal agencies regularly adopt rules, which have the force of law, to implement the statutes and programs authorized by Congress. Unless a statute directs otherwise, agencies generally must follow the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act to promulgate rules. However, beginning with President Reagan, Presidents have maintained a centralized review process for ""significant regulatory actions."" Currently, Executive Order (E.O.) 12866, issued by President Clinton, imposes additional procedures agencies must follow before a rule can be finalized. This includes requiring agencies to submit proposed regulatory action to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. Although E.O. 12866 applies to executive agencies, independent regulatory commissions (IRCs) are not required to submit their rules to OIRA for review. Debates have arisen among scholars and legislators as to whether the President has the authority to require both executive agencies and IRCs to submit their regulations for review by OIRA. In the 112th Congress, Senator Rob Portman introduced S. 3468, the Independent Regulatory Agency Analysis Act of 2012. Under this bill, the President could issue an executive order establishing centralized review procedures for IRCs. This report discusses the constitutionality and the legal effects of extending centralized review of rulemaking to IRCs.",56,56 "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues. Even though the United States has reduced the number of warheads deployed on its long-range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the 2010 New START Treaty, it also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 10-30 years. The 115th Congress will continue to review these programs, and the funding requested for them, during the annual authorization and appropriations process. During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. With the implementation of New START completed in February 2018, the United States is limited to 1,550 accountable warheads on these delivery vehicles, a restriction that will remain in place at least through 2021, while New START Treaty remains in force. At the present time, the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs) consists of 400 land-based Minuteman III ICBMs, each deployed with one warhead, spread among a total of 450 operational launchers. This force is consistent with the New START Treaty. The Air Force is also modernizing the Minuteman missiles, replacing and upgrading their rocket motors, guidance systems, and other components, so that they can remain in the force through 2030. It plans to replace the missiles with a new Ground-based Strategic Deterrent around 2029. The U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet currently consists of 14 Trident submarines. Each has been modified to carry 20 Trident II (D-5) missiles—a reduction from 24 missiles per submarine—to meet the launcher limits in the New START Treaty. The Navy converted 4 of the original 18 Trident submarines to carry non-nuclear cruise missiles. Nine of the submarines are deployed in the Pacific Ocean and five are in the Atlantic. The Navy also has undertaken efforts to extend the life of the missiles and warheads so that they and the submarines can remain in the fleet past 2020. It is designing a new Columbia class submarine that will replace the existing fleet beginning in 2031. The U.S. fleet of heavy bombers includes 20 B-2 bombers and 40 nuclear-capable B-52 bombers. The B-1 bomber is no longer equipped for nuclear missions. This fleet of 60 nuclear-capable aircraft is consistent with the U.S. obligations under New START. The Air Force has also begun to retire the nuclear-armed cruise missiles carried by B-52 bombers, leaving only about half the B-52 fleet equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The Air Force plans to procure both a new long-range bomber, known as the B-21, and a new long-range standoff (LRSO) cruise missile during the 2020s. DOE is also modifying and extending the life of the B61 bomb carried on B-2 bombers and fighter aircraft and the W80 warhead for cruise missiles. The Obama Administration completed a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force, and a review of U.S. nuclear employment policy, in June 2013. This review has advised the force structure that the United States will deploy under the New START Treaty. The Trump Administration completed its review of U.S. nuclear forces in February 2018, and reaffirmed the basic contours of the current U.S. force structure and the ongoing modernization programs. The Trump Administration has also called for the development of a new low-yield warhead for deployment on Trident II (D-5) missiles. Congress will review the Administration's plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process, and as it assesses the costs of these plans in the current fiscal environment. This report will be updated as needed.",32,32 "GAO: Government Accountability Office and General Accounting Office. On July 7, 2004, an old congressional support agency was given a new name, while keeping the same initials (GAO): at that time, the General Accounting Office, established in 1921, was re-designated the Government Accountability Office (P.L. 108-271). The renaming, which came at the request of its head, the Comptroller General (CG) of the United States, was designed to reflect the agency's evolution and additional duties since its creation more than eight decades before. The Government Accountability Office is the largest of three agencies that provide staff support, research, review, and analysis for Congress. GAO operates under the control and direction of the Comptroller General, who is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a 15-year nonrenewable term. A unique arrangement begins the process with a special bicameral commission of legislators from both parties making recommendations to the President. The CG post is currently vacant, with the resignation of David Walker on March 12, 2008. GAO was established in 1921 as an independent auditor of government agencies and activities by the Budget and Accounting Act. The office was intended to be ""independent of the executive departments,"" the entities it would audit and review. Sometimes called ""Congress's watchdog"" and its ""investigative arm,"" GAO now provides a variety of services to Congress that extend beyond its original functions and duties, including oversight, investigation, review, and evaluation of executive programs, operations, and activities. Several proposals in the 110th Congress are seen as augmenting GAO's capabilities. These include clarifying its audit authority over the Intelligence Community (H.R. 978 and S. 82) and enhancing its powers to gain access to executive documents (H.R. 6388). In a separate matter, personnel flexibilities powers granted to the Comptroller General in 2004 have generated some controversy in Congress and among GAO employees. As an outgrowth of this and other considerations, GAO staff have set up a new bargaining unit, the first union in the office's history. Legislation has also been proposed that would, among other things, amend GAO's basic authority over personnel and pay matters for employees, provide pay adjustments and reimbursements for certain employees who had not received pay increases in 2006 and 2007, and establish an office of inspector general (H.R. 5683, which has passed the House and Senate and been sent to the President). Throughout much of its history, the office has experienced growth in its powers, duties, and resources. In the mid-1990s, however, it was the subject of congressional hearings, studies, and proposals for change, connected with its mission, roles, and capabilities, these reviews were generated in part by criticisms of its perceived orientation. As a result, GAO's budget and personnel levels were reduced and certain of the ""executive powers"" of the Comptroller General. In comparison to these earlier budget reductions, however, the office's funding has since risen, from $358 million in FY1998 to $507.2 million in FY2008. Nonetheless, GAO's staff size (at 3,100 in FY2008) has remained lower than in earlier years. This report will be updated as developments dictate.",56,56 "Security and Freedom Ensured Act (SAFE Act)(H.R. 1526) and Security and Freedom Enhancement Act (SAFE Act)(S. 737): Section By Section Analysis. Two SAFE Acts, S. 737 and H.R. 1526 address some of the issues raised by the USA PATRIOT Act. They amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to require that FISA surveillance orders particularly identify either the target or the facilities or places targeted. They limit delayed notification of sneak and peek searches to cases involving exigent circumstances (injury, flight, destruction of evidence, witness intimidation risks) and cap the extent of permissible delay. Both bills restrict FISA access orders to instances where there are specific and articulable reasons to believe that the records pertain to a foreign power or one or more of its agents. S. 737 alone provides that the order may be no more sweeping than a grand jury subpoena duces tecum issued in the context of an espionage or international terrorism investigation. It also adds: exceptions and time limits to the nondisclosure feature, a procedure to allow a recipient to quash or modify an order, and use provisions comparable to those that apply to the use of information generated by FISA surveillance and physical search orders. H.R. 1526 exempts libraries from the national security letter (nsl) coverage of 18 U.S.C. 2709, and adds section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act to the list of provisions that expire on December 31, 2005. S. 737 rewrites each of the four nsl statutes with enhanced standards, time limits, gag order restrictions, scope, and suppression features. Both bills incorporate the definition of federal crimes of terrorism into the definition of domestic terrorism. S. 737 expands the safeguards associated with the court approved use of pen registers and trap and trace devices. H.R. 1526 adds four sections to the inventory of expiring USA PATRIOT Act sections (213 (delayed notice of sneak and peek searches), 216 (trap and trace devices and pen registers for law enforcement purpose), 219 (boundless service of terrorism search warrants), and 505 (national security letters)). S. 737 amends FISA to require more extensive public reports concerning its use. This report appears in abridged form as CRS Report RS22140, The SAFE Acts of 2005: H.R. 1526 and S. 737 -- A Sketch.",22,22 "China-U.S. Trade Issues. U.S.-China economic ties have expanded substantially over the past several years. China is now the third largest U.S. trading partner, its second largest source of imports, and its fourth largest export market. However, U.S.-China commercial ties have been strained by a number of issues, including a surging U.S. trade deficit with China, China's refusal to float its currency, and failure to fully comply with its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments, especially its failure to provide protection for U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR). This report explores these issues in detail, especially concerning the lack of protection for U.S. IPR.",53,53 "Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts, but succeeded in negotiating only a few of its priority agreements. The Trump Administration has offered some support for existing agreements, but has argued that the United States lacks a ""willing partner"" in Russia and, therefore, will not pursue further agreements as long as Russia remains in violation of existing arms control treaties. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. Progress in negotiating and implementing these agreements was often slow, and subject to the tenor of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the pace of negotiations quickened, with the two sides signing treaties limiting intermediate-range and long-range weapons. But progress again slowed in the 1990s, as U.S. missile defense plans and a range of other policy conflicts intervened in the U.S.-Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Through these efforts, the United States has allocated more than $1 billion each year to threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union. These programs have recently reached their conclusion. The United States is also a prominent actor in an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. This regime, although suffering from some setbacks in recent years in Iran and North Korea, includes formal treaties, export control coordination and enforcement, U.N. resolutions, and organizational controls. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) serves as the cornerstone of this regime, with all but four nations participating in it. The International Atomic Energy Agency not only monitors nuclear programs to make sure they remain peaceful, but also helps nations develop and advance those programs. Other measures, such as sanctions, interdiction efforts, and informal cooperative endeavors, also seek to slow or stop the spread of nuclear materials and weapons. The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely. This report will be updated annually or as needed.",29,29 "Foreign and Defense Policy: Key Issues in the 106th Congress. When the 106th Congress comes to work in January, its first order of business will be to deal with the impeachment of the President of the United States. The 1998 congressional campaigns and elections suggested that the agenda of the 106th Congress also will be largely domestic in its focus: Social Security, health care, and education were the order of the day in campaigns across America and on post-election news programs. Indeed, of the issues discussed in this report, only increased defense spending to address military readiness and retention of trained military personnel has been reported on recently, as the President announced over New Year's weekend his proposal to ask for a substantial increase in the FY2000 budget for military pay and hardware development. Most immediately, the 106th Congress is expected to consider a supplemental appropriations bill to support the Wye River Memorandum, including increased assistance to Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians. Congress likely will quickly consider new assistance and trade benefits to Central American countries hit hardest by Hurricane Mitch. Development aid to countries severely affected by the global financial crisis, and more humanitarian assistance to Kosovo are another two issues that might find their way into a supplemental appropriations bill in the first few months of the new Congress. The United States also stands in arrears with the United Nations and the World Bank, but neither matter is expected to receive appropriators' attention in the supplemental. There are a few routine foreign affairs and defense issues to be addressed by the 106th Congress albeit with less urgency than the supplemental appropriations. The President will issue international narcotics control certifications before March 1st, as required by law. For any country found to be trafficking or producing narcotics, certification could jeopardize its receipt of U.S. foreign assistance, Congress might respond with legislation supporting or negating specific countries certification status. New authorizations and appropriations bills will be considered for departments and agencies. Authorization for some foreign assistance programs expires before the end of the first session, and reauthorizations are likely to be taken up. The President's authority to waive proliferation sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan last May must be renewed this year or be allowed to expire, which would require the reimposition of sanctions that many Members of Congress find counterproductive. Several laws remain in the United States Code that were shaped during the Cold War. The 106th Congress could turn its attention to these. Previous several Congresses have made some effort to amend, repeal, or replace the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Export Administration Act of 1979, consensus on new provisions, however, has not been reached. Congress has not enacted a foreign aid authorization bill since 1985, each year waiving the requirement to do so and relying on the annual appropriations measure to express its foreign policy interests and opinions. Export controls in the Export Administration Act expired in 1994 and since then have been left entirely to the executive branch to administer.",25,80 "Grants Work in a Congressional Office. Members of Congress often get requests from constituents for information and help in obtaining funds for projects. Many state and local governments, nonprofit social service and community action organizations, private research groups, small businesses, and individuals approach congressional offices to find out about funding, both from the federal government and from the private sector. The success rate in obtaining federal assistance is not high, given the competition for federal funds. A grants staff's effectiveness often depends on both an understanding of the grants process and on the relations it establishes with agency and other contacts. The following report does not constitute a blueprint for every office involved in grants and projects activity, nor does it present in-depth information about all aspects of staff activity in this area. The discussion is aimed at describing some basics about the grants process and some of the approaches and techniques used by congressional offices in dealing with this type of constituent service.",55,55 "The Loan Limits for Government-Backed Mortgages. The federal government supports homeownership in different ways. One of the main ways is through programs or quasi-government entities that promise lenders or investors that if a homeowner defaults on a covered mortgage, the lender or investor will still receive some—or all—of the amount it was owed. In some cases, the guarantees support homeownership by making private lenders more willing to offer certain types of mortgages. In other cases, the guarantees provided by these entities may increase the number of private investors who are willing to invest in mortgages, thereby increasing the amount of capital available for mortgage lending. The details of the programs differ, but most have maximum guarantee amounts that limit the size of mortgages that are eligible. This report contains brief program descriptions and discusses the maximum guarantee amounts for each. The government or quasi-government entities that insure or guarantee mortgages and are discussed in this report are the following Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Lenders sell mortgages to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are congressionally chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). These mortgages are called conforming loans because they conform to Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's credit rules and are less than the conforming loan limit. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The FHA insures mortgages that meet its standards, including a maximum mortgage amount. If a homeowner defaults, FHA pays the lender the remaining amount owed on the mortgage. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA guarantees mortgages made to eligible veterans who meet its standards. If a covered veteran defaults, the VA will pay the lender. Unlike the first two programs, the VA coverage is not always 100% of the unpaid balance. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service (RHS). RHS provides direct loans and loan guarantees for certain home mortgages in rural areas. RHS does not have a maximum mortgage size, but does have limits on income and the value of the home purchased. Mortgage guarantee programs transfer risk to the government from the private sector, but may also expand credit availability and lower rates for borrowers. Loan limits for mortgages that are eligible for the programs attempt to achieve a balance by limiting the size of the mortgages that are guaranteed or insured, in part to limit the amount of risk that is transferred from the lender to the federal government and also to tailor the programs to the borrowers to whom the government would like to provide assistance. The size of the loan limits may affect which homes, and by extension which prospective homebuyers, can qualify for these types of mortgages. To the extent that these types of mortgages represent the most affordable or only available mortgage option for some prospective homebuyers, any increase or decrease in the loan limits can affect access to mortgage credit for a subset of potential homebuyers.",73,7 "Appropriations for FY2002: Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of the President, and General Government. The Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of the President, and General Government FY2002 appropriation, P.L. 107-67, totals $32.4 billion. Congressional Budget Office scorekeeping puts the totals at $32.8 billion ($15.7 billion mandatory and $17.1 discretionary. The House passed an appropriation totaling $32.7 billion. The Senate-passed bill would have funded the accounts at $32.8 billion. The conference agreement would provide a 4.6% pay adjustment in January 2002 for federal civilian employees. Several of the accounts within the bill are also receiving funding through the Emergency Response Fund under P.L. 107-38 and P.L. 107-117. On April 9, 2001, President George W. Bush submitted his FY2002 budget to Congress. The budget documents show, for accounts funded through the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government appropriations bill, a proposed FY2002 discretionary budget authority of $16.6 billion and proposed outlays of $16.3 billion. This represents a $1 billion increase over the FY2001 enacted estimates (estimates do not reflect the enacted FY2001 supplemental). Realistically, the estimates which were offered earlier in the year are no longer current. Several of the covered accounts fund activities affected either directly by, or as a consequence of response to, the attacks of September 11. Accounts in the Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Secret Service, and the General Services Administration usually receive funding for functions related to countering terrorism. Emergency Response Fund allocations, as provided by P.L. 107-38, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, FY2001, have gone to accounts in the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President and the General Services Administration. To date, those accounts have been allocated $147.5 million from the Emergency Response Fund. Those allocations are not included in the totals above. Pursuant to recent negotiations, between the White House and Congress, on new overall funding levels, the October 9 House allocation for the spending allocations for the Treasury and General Government accounts remain at $17.022 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee allocated $17.118 billion on October 11.",59,59 "Forest Fire/Wildfire Protection. Congress continues to face questions about forestry practices, funding levels, and the federal role in wildfire protection. Recent fire seasons have been, by most standards, among the worst in the past half century. National attention began to focus on wildfires when a prescribed burn in May 2000 escaped control and burned 239 homes in Los Alamos, NM. President Clinton responded by requesting a doubling of wildfire management funds, and Congress enacted much of this proposal in the FY2001 Interior appropriations act (P.L. 106-291). President Bush responded to the severe 2002 fires by proposing a Healthy Forests Initiative to reduce fuel loads by expediting review processes. Many factors contribute to the threat of wildfire damages. Two major factors are the decline in forest and rangeland health and the expansion of residential areas into wildlands—the wildland-urban interface. Over the past century, aggressive wildfire suppression, as well as past grazing and logging practices, have altered many ecosystems, especially those where light, surface fires were frequent. Many areas now have unnaturally high fuel loads (e.g., dead trees and dense thickets) and an historically unnatural mix of plant species (e.g., exotic invaders). Fuel treatments have been proposed to reduce the wildfire threats. Prescribed burning—setting fires under specified conditions—can reduce the fine fuels that spread wildfires, but can escape and become catastrophic wildfires, especially if fuel ladders (small trees and dense undergrowth) and wind spread the fire into the forest canopy. Commercial timber harvesting is often proposed, and can reduce heavy fuels and fuel ladders, but exacerbates the threat unless and until the slash (tree tops and limbs) is properly disposed of. Other mechanical treatments (e.g., precommercial thinning, pruning) can reduce fuel ladders, but also temporarily increase fuels on the ground. Treatments can often be more effective if combined (e.g., prescribed burning after thinning). However, some fuel treatments are very expensive, and the benefit of treatments for reducing wildfire threats depends on many factors. It should also be recognized that, as long as biomass, drought, lightning, and high winds exist, catastrophic wildfires will occur. Only about 1% of wildfires become conflagrations (raging, destructive fires), but which fires will ""blow up"" into crown wildfires is unpredictable. It seems likely that management practices and policies, including fuel treatments, affect the probability of such events. However, past experiences with wildfires are of limited value for building predictive models, and research on fire behavior under various circumstances is difficult, at best. Thus, predictive tools for fire protection and control are often based on expert opinion and anecdotes, rather than on research evidence. Individuals who choose to build homes in the urban-wildland interface face some risk of loss from wildfires, but can take steps to protect their homes. Federal, state, and local governments can and do assist by protecting their own lands, by providing financial and technical assistance, and by providing relief after the fire.",107,107 "Current Social Security Issues. Social Security is the focus of intense public interest. Projected long-range funding problems, public skepticism about its future, and a growing perception that Social Security will not be as good a value for future retirees as it is today are fueling calls for reform. This report discusses a number of the major Social Security issues currently drawing congressional attention.",116,116 "State Children's Health Insurance Program: An Overview. The State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is a means-tested program that provides health coverage to targeted low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid eligibility levels but have no health insurance. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and states, and the states are responsible for administering CHIP. In FY2013, CHIP enrollment totaled 8.4 million individuals and CHIP expenditures totaled $13.2 billion. Under the CHIP program, the federal government sets basic requirements for CHIP, but states have the flexibility to design their own version of CHIP within the federal government's basic framework. As a result, there is significant variation across CHIP programs. Currently, state upper-income eligibility limits for children range from a low of 175% of the federal poverty level (FPL) to a high of 405% of FPL. States may also extend CHIP coverage to pregnant women when certain conditions are met. States may design their CHIP programs in three ways: a CHIP Medicaid expansion, a separate CHIP program, or a combination approach where the state operates a CHIP Medicaid expansion and one or more separate CHIP programs concurrently. CHIP benefit coverage and cost-sharing rules depend on program design. CHIP Medicaid expansions must follow the federal Medicaid rules for benefits and cost sharing, which entitles CHIP enrollees to Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) coverage (effectively eliminating any state-defined limits on the amount, duration, and scope of any benefit listed in Medicaid statute) and exempts the majority of children from any cost sharing. For separate CHIP programs, the benefits are permitted to look more like private health insurance, and states may impose cost sharing, such as premiums or enrollment fees, with a maximum allowable amount that is tied to annual family income. The federal government reimburses states for a portion of every dollar they spend on CHIP (including both CHIP Medicaid expansions and separate CHIP programs) up to state-specific annual limits called allotments. The federal share of FY2013 total expenditures was $9.2 billion and the state share was $4.0 billion. CHIP was enacted in 1997. Since that time, Congress has extended federal CHIP funding. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) extended CHIP funding through FY2015. On April 16, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA, P.L. 114-10). MACRA repeals the sustainable growth rate (SGR) mechanism (which overrides the reduction in the Medicare physician fee schedule that was set to begin in April 2015) and extends funding for CHIP, among other provisions. Specifically, MACRA extends CHIP funding for two additional years (i.e., through FY2017) and maintains the current allotment formula, including a 23 percentage point increase to the enhanced federal medical assistance percentage (E-FMAP). MACRA also extends the ""qualifying state"" option, the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, ""Express Lane"" eligibility, Outreach and Enrollment Grants, the Pediatric Quality Measures Program, and the Childhood Obesity Demonstration Project. Although MACRA adds two additional years to federal funding for CHIP (through FY2017), states still need to adhere to the ACA's maintenance of effort (MOE) requirements that are in effect through FY2019. The MOE requires states to maintain income eligibility levels for CHIP children through September 30, 2019, as a condition for receiving federal Medicaid payments (notwithstanding the lack of corresponding federal CHIP appropriations for FY2018 and FY2019). The MOE requirements impact CHIP Medicaid expansion programs and separate CHIP programs differently. For CHIP Medicaid expansion programs, when federal CHIP funding is exhausted, the CHIP-eligible children in these programs continue to be enrolled in Medicaid but financing switches from CHIP to Medicaid. For separate CHIP programs, states are provided a couple of exceptions to the MOE: (1) after September 1, 2015, states may enroll CHIP-eligible children into qualified health plans in the health insurance exchanges or (2) states may impose waiting lists or enrollment caps in order to limit CHIP expenditures. In addition, in the event that a state's CHIP allotment is insufficient to fund CHIP coverage for all eligible children, a state must establish procedures to screen children for Medicaid eligibility, and enroll those who are Medicaid-eligible. For children not eligible for Medicaid, the state must establish procedures to enroll CHIP children in qualified health plans in the health insurance exchanges that have been certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to be ""at least comparable"" to CHIP in terms of benefits and cost sharing. Congress will face a decision with regard to the future of CHIP when federal CHIP funding expires after FY2017. If Congress does not act and federal CHIP funding ends, some CHIP enrollees likely would continue to have coverage through Medicaid as a result of the MOE requirements, but others would need to find another source of health insurance coverage (e.g., employer-sponsored health insurance or through the health insurance exchanges), and some likely would be uninsured. Congress's action or inaction on the CHIP program may affect health insurance options and resulting coverage for targeted low-income children that are eligible for the current CHIP program. This report describes the basic elements of CHIP, focusing on how the program is designed, who is eligible, what services are covered, how enrollees share in the cost of care, and how the program is financed. The report ends with a brief discussion of the future of CHIP.",70,70 "Vietnam PNTR Status and WTO Accession: Issues and Implications for the United States. On December 8, 2006, the House passed legislation (212-184) to grant Vietnam permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status as part of a more comprehensive trade bill (H.R. 6406). Pursuant to H.Res. 1100, the bill was then coupled with a tax-extension bill (H.R. 6111) and sent to the Senate. The Senate passed the combined bills on December 8 (79-9). On December 20, 2006, President Bush signed the bill into law (P.L. 109-432) and, per the law, proclaimed PNTR for Vietnam on December 29, 2006. Congress considered PNTR in the context of Vietnam's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which Vietnam joined in January 2007. Although Congress had no direct role in Vietnam's accession to the WTO, congressional approval was necessary for the President to extend PNTR to Vietnam. The WTO requires its members to extend unconditional most-favored-nation status (MFN), called PNTR in the United States, in order to receive the full benefits of WTO membership in their bilateral trade relations. Until PNTR was granted, the United States had extended conditional NTR treatment to Vietnam under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, which includes the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment (section 402). Title IV prohibits the President from granting certain countries permanent NTR unless the country has met certain conditions. Vietnam's entry into the WTO does not establish any new obligations on the part of the United States, only on the part of Vietnam. However, Vietnam's WTO accession requires the United States and Vietnam to adhere to WTO rules in their bilateral trade relations, including not imposing unilateral measures, such as quotas on textile imports, that have not been sanctioned by the WTO. Accession to the WTO affords Vietnam the protection of the multilateral system of rules in its trade relations with other WTO members, including the United States. It could help the United States in that Vietnam would be obligated to apply WTO rules in its trade. PNTR status from the United States provides Vietnam more predictability its growing trade relations with the United States and sheds a legacy of the cold war. For the United States, PNTR is another in a series of steps the United States has taken in trade and foreign policy to normalize relations with Vietnam and place distance between current relations and the Vietnam War. During the congressional debate on PNTR, Members raised issues regarding the conditions for Vietnam's entry into the WTO, other issues pertaining to the U.S.-Vietnam economic relationship, and other aspects of the overall U.S.-Vietnam relationship.",53,53 "U.S. Nuclear Weapon ""Pit"" Production Options for Congress. A ""pit"" is the plutonium core of a nuclear weapon. Until 1989, the Rocky Flats Plant (CO) mass-produced pits. Since then, the United States has made at most 11 pits per year (ppy). U.S. policy is to maintain existing nuclear weapons. To do this, the Department of Defense states that it needs the Department of Energy (DOE), which maintains U.S. nuclear weapons, to produce 50-80 ppy by 2030. While some argue that few if any new pits are needed, at least for decades, this report focuses on options to reach 80 ppy. Pit production involves precisely forming plutonium—a hazardous, radioactive, physically quirky metal. Production requires supporting tasks, such as analytical chemistry (AC), which monitors the chemical composition of plutonium in each pit. With Rocky Flats closed, DOE established a small-scale pit manufacturing capability at PF-4, a building at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). DOE also proposed higher-capacity facilities, none came to fruition. In 2005, Congress rejected the Modern Pit Facility, viewing as excessive the capacity range DOE studied, 125-450 ppy. In 2012, the Administration ""deferred"" construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) on grounds of availability of interim alternatives and affordability. Nonetheless, options remain Build CMRR-NF. Congress mandated it in the FY2013 cycle, but provided no funds for it then, and permitted consideration of an alternative in the FY2014 cycle. Remove from PF-4 tasks not requiring high MAR and security. Casting pits uses much plutonium that an accident might release (""Material At Risk,"" MAR) and requires high security. Making 80 ppy would require freeing more MAR and floor space in PF-4 for casting. Provide regulatory relief so RLUOB could hold 1,000 grams of plutonium with few changes to the building. AC for 80 ppy needs much floor space but not high MAR or high security. Several options involve LANL's Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB). Regulations permit it to hold 26 grams of weapons-grade plutonium, the volume of two nickels, AC for 80 ppy would require 500 to 1,000 grams and perhaps space elsewhere. Augmenting RLUOB to hold the latter amounts within regulations would be costly even though the radiation dose if the building collapsed would be very low. Regulatory relief would save time and money, but would raise concerns about compliance with regulations. A complementary option is to perform some AC at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or Savannah River Site. Move plutonium-238 work to Idaho National Laboratory or Savannah River Site. Fabricating plutonium-238 into power sources for space probes entails high MAR, but not high security because it is not used in pits. Moving it would free MAR and floor space in PF-4. At issue is whether to conduct all plutonium work at LANL, the plutonium ""center of excellence."" Build concrete ""modules"" connected to PF-4. This would enable high-MAR work to move out of PF-4, so PF-4 and modules could do the needed pit work. At issue: are modules needed, at what cost, and when. Several options have the potential to produce 80 ppy and permit other plutonium activities at relatively modest cost, in a relatively short time, with no new buildings, and with minimal environmental impact. Determining their desirability and feasibility would require detailed study. Observations include Differing time horizons between Congress and DOE, and between political and technical imperatives, cause problems. Doing nothing entails costs and risks. Keeping a 1950s-era building open while options are explored exposes workers to a relatively high risk of death in an earthquake. Congress may wish to consider limiting a building's permitted plutonium quantity by estimated dose instead of MAR. A facility can be safe even if it is not compliant with regulations. The political system is more flexible than the regulatory system. Regulations derive their authority from statutes. Regulators, bound by these statutes, cannot make cost-benefit tradeoffs regarding compliance. In contrast, the political system has the authority, ability, and culture to decide which tradeoffs are worth making.",32,32 "The National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress. The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States may be susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the economic effects of such an attack, some animal pathogens could cause illness in humans. Diseases that can spread from animals to people are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against the introduction of non-native animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Some of this work is performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located off the coast of New York. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 and transferred ownership and operation of PIADC from USDA to DHS. The USDA and DHS cooperate to conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but they have identified PIADC as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, issued by President G.W. Bush, tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-biocontainment laboratories able to hold the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. The DHS has selected Manhattan, Kansas, as the NBAF site and plans to open the facility in 2015. The DHS estimates the final, total facility construction cost as $725 million, significantly exceeding earlier projections. Additional expenses, such as equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel and programs, and preparing the PIADC facility for disposition, are expected to add $190 million. Research with live foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus is allowed on the U.S. mainland only if explicitly permitted by the USDA Secretary. However, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246) instructs USDA to issue such a permit to DHS for possession of FMD virus at NBAF, subject to select agent rules. The DHS plans regarding the NBAF raise several policy issues. Concerns about safety and security, previously expressed about PIADC and other laboratories being built to study dangerous pathogens, are also being voiced about NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, as well as prioritization and investment in agricultural biodefense, may be reassessed if more high-containment laboratory space becomes available.",65,65 "Agricultural Issues in the 109th Congress. A number of issues affecting U.S. agriculture have been or are being addressed by the 109th Congress. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171), enacted in February 2006, included a net reduction in spending on U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) mandatory programs of $2.7 billion over five years, and the reauthorization of a dairy income support program. Other issues of importance to agriculture during the second session of the 109th Congress include the consideration of emergency farm disaster assistance, multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations, concerns about agroterrorism, food safety, and animal and plant diseases (e.g., ""mad cow"" disease and avian flu), high energy costs, environmental issues, agricultural marketing matters, the reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and farm labor issues.",2,2 "Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, P.L. 107-273. Congress enacted the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 as section 11020 of the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, P.L. 107-273 H.R. 2215. The Act allows the consolidation of causes of action growing out a single accident that involves the deaths of at least 75 individuals that might otherwise have been scattered in state and federal courts throughout the nation. Its provisions were gleaned almost entirely from section 3 of H.R. 860 the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001. H.R. 860 addressed two areas of concern. Both were designed to save the courts and litigants time and money. One was concerned with the consolidation of state and federal cases arising out of the same major accident. It dealt with the difficulties associated with avoiding multiple trials involving the same issues and many of the same parties. The other, omitted from the Act, involved the consolidation of federal (but not state) cases involving essentially the same issues and parties (but not limited to a major accident). It dealt with the question of who should decide where cases, transferred to a single court for pre-trial purposes, should ultimately be tried.",92,92 "The Alternative Minimum Tax for Individuals: In Brief. Suppress for publication In addition to raising revenue, the individual income tax has been used as a vehicle to promote various social and economic goals. This has been accomplished by according preferential tax treatment to certain items of income and expense. The net result, however, has been an erosion of the individual income tax base. By utilizing the preferences and incentives in the tax code, some individuals can substantially reduce their income taxes. To make sure that everyone paid at least some taxes and still preserve the economic and social incentives in the tax code, Congress, in 1969, enacted the predecessor to the current individual alternative minimum tax (AMT). Since then, the federal individual income tax has consisted of two parallel tax systems—the regular income tax and the AMT. Since its inception, the value and effectiveness of the minimum tax has been the subject of congressional debate, and it has been modified numerous times. This report provides a brief history and overview of the alternative minimum tax for individuals (AMT). While the AMT is not the subject of current legislative activity, that may change if efforts to reform the tax code move forward. The report will be updated as legislative action warrants.",102,102 "Bills of Attainder: The Constitutional Implications of Congress Legislating Narrowly. On occasion, Congress exercises its legislative authority regarding a specified individual, entity, or identifiable group in such a way as to raise constitutional concerns. In particular, the United States Constitution expressly prohibits the federal government from enacting bills of attainder, defined by the Supreme Court as a ""law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial."" The basis for the prohibition arises from the separation of powers concern that the enforcement of a bill of attainder would allow Congress to usurp the power of the judicial branch. For instance, in recent years, Congress proposed retroactive taxation of up to 90% of the value of bonuses paid to employees when an employer had received funds from Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Additionally, in response to allegations of election law and other legal violations by the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), Congress passed several appropriations bills that limited the provision of federal funds to ACORN and its affiliates. In both of these instances, suggestions were made that the legislation might be found by the courts to be prohibited bills of attainder. As regards the limitations imposed on the provision of funds to ACORN, such limitations were upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The two main criteria that the courts use to determine whether legislation is a bill of attainder are (1) whether ""specific"" individuals, groups, or entities are affected by the statute, and (2) whether the legislation inflicts a ""punishment"" on those individuals. The U.S. Supreme Court has also identified three types of legislation that would fulfill the ""punishment"" prong of the test: (1) where the burden is such as has ""traditionally"" been found to be punitive (historical test), (2) where the type and severity of burdens imposed are the ""functional equivalent"" of punishment because they cannot reasonably be said to further ""non-punitive legislative purposes"" (functional test), and (3) where the legislative record evinces a ""congressional intent to punish (motivational test)."" The Court has suggested that each bill of attainder case turns on its own highly particularized facts, and notably, since the signing of the Constitution, the Bill of Attainder Clause has been successfully invoked only five times in the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, there remain potential constitutional concerns when Congress proposes or passes legislation that imposes a burden on a specified individual, entity, or identifiable group.",55,55 "The World Trade Organization: The Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) Negotiations. Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha Round has emerged as a major stumbling block in the seven-year Doha Round negotiations. NAMA refers to the cutting of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTB) on industrial and primary products, basically all trade in goods which are not foodstuffs. While the agriculture negotiations have often overshadowed the NAMA talks, trade of industrial and primary products continues to make up the bulk of world trade. Average tariffs in developed countries have declined from 40% at the end of World War II to 6% today through successive rounds of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO trade negotiations. Developed countries seek the reduction of continuing high tariffs in the developing world, particularly from such countries as Brazil, India, and China. Developing countries seek special and differential treatment and tie their cuts in industrial tariffs to reductions in agricultural tariffs and subsidies. Several econometric studies have modeled the possible effect of industrial tariff liberalization on the global economy. The studies vary based on the assumptions and data used. All but one found a greater net welfare benefit from liberalization of manufacturing tariffs than from agriculture. The studies indicate that developing countries in the aggregate would gain the most from manufacturing liberalization, at least in relative terms, and that the single largest gainer in terms of net welfare benefit would be China. In response to the global economic crisis, the Group of 20 (G-20) leading economies have repeatedly called for conclusion of the Doha Round as a way to bolster economic confidence and recovery. WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy has referred to 2011 as a window of opportunity to conclude the round and announced an intensive work program to achieve this goal. The subject of the current NAMA negotiation is a draft text—revised several times since its initial release in 2007—that has been subject to much disagreement. The negotiation of the tariff reduction formula was initially the main stumbling block in the negotiations. Members agreed to a Swiss-formula non-linear tariff reduction formula approach at the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, one in which higher tariffs are decreased more than lower tariffs. However, disagreements persist about the size or amounts of the tariff cuts. The talks also seek to reduce the incidence of non-tariff barriers, which include import licensing, quotas and other quantitative import restrictions, conformity assessment procedures, and technical barriers to trade. The use of sectoral tariff elimination and special and differential treatment for developing countries has also proven controversial. Legislation to implement any agreement that results from the Doha Round negotiations would need to be passed by Congress. U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), under which Congress agreed to a time line for voting on implementing legislation with no amendments in return for consultation and adherence to congressional negotiating objectives, expired on July 1, 2007. Consequently, there may be attempts to revise or extend TPA in order to consider legislation resulting from a Doha agreement.",53,53 "India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests. India's growing energy needs and its relatively benign view of Iran's intentions will likely cause policy differences between New Delhi and Washington. India seeks positive ties with Iran and is unlikely to downgrade its relationship with Tehran at the behest of external powers, but it is unlikely that the two will develop a broad and deep strategic alliance. India-Iran relations are also unlikely to derail the further development of close and productive U.S.-India relations on a number of fronts. See also CRS Report RL33529, India-U.S. Relations, and CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses. This report will be updated as warranted by events.",85,85 "Guinea's New Transitional Government: Emerging Issues for U.S. Policy. A ""government of national unity"" was formed in Guinea on January 15, 2010, a year after a military junta, the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), took power in a coup d'état. While the CNDD has not been dissolved, it has agreed to share power with civilian opposition groups in the lead-up to presidential elections, scheduled for June 27, 2010. Defense Minister Sekouba Konate has assumed executive power as interim president, while opposition spokesman Jean-Marie Dore was named prime minister. The formation of a unity government followed six weeks of political uncertainty after CNDD President Capt. Moussa Dadis Camara was shot in December 2009 by a member of his personal guard and evacuated for medical treatment. The appointment of the unity government has temporarily stemmed international concerns over political instability in Guinea and its potential spillover into fragile neighboring countries, such as Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. However, concerns remain over the political will to hold elections, impunity and disorder among the security forces, and the potential for ""spoilers"" to disrupt Guinea's long-awaited transition to civilian rule. The United States, which had been highly critical of Dadis Camara's erratic leadership, has expressed support for Guinea's transitional government. At the same time, certain restrictions on U.S. bilateral assistance and targeted travel restrictions against CNDD members and others remain in place. As electoral preparations advance, a number of issues will confront U.S. policy. These include U.S. relations with the Guinean government, the status of U.S. assistance and travel restrictions on CNDD members, the monitoring of progress toward elections, U.S. policy toward a potential International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation of alleged CNDD human rights abuses, and potential U.S. support for security sector reform in Guinea. The 111th Congress continues to monitor events in Guinea and the potential for regional destabilization. Recent legislation includes H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen), a bill condemning the violent suppression of legitimate political dissent and gross human rights abuses in the Republic of Guinea, introduced on January 13, 2010, and passed by the House on January 20, 2010, and S.Res. 345 (Boxer), a resolution deploring the rape and assault of women in Guinea and the killing of political protesters on September 28, 2009, introduced on November 9, 2009, and passed by the Senate on February 22, 2010. For further background on Guinea and issues for U.S. policy, see CRS Report R40703, Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States, by Alexis Arieff and Nicolas Cook.",85,85 "Argentina Votes for Change in 2015 Presidential Election. This report briefly discusses the November 22, 2015 elections in Argentina. Mauricio Macri defeated Daniel Scioli. In a close race, Macri, the mayor of Buenos Aires, took 51.4% of the vote compared to 48.6% for Scioli, the governor of Buenos Aires province.",85,85 "Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and the 2014 Transition. Afghanistan is the world's primary source of opium poppy cultivation and opium and heroin production, as well as a major global source of cannabis (marijuana) and cannabis resin (hashish). Drug trafficking, a long-standing feature of Afghanistan's post-Taliban political economy, is linked to corruption and insecurity, and provides a source of illicit finance for non-state armed groups. Based on recent production and trafficking trends, the drug problem in Afghanistan appears to be worsening—just as the U.S. government finalizes plans for its future relationship with the government of Afghanistan in 2015 and beyond and reduces its counternarcotics operational presence in the country to Kabul, the national capital. As coalition combat operations in Afghanistan draw to a close in 2014, and as the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces is achieved, some Members of the 113th Congress have expressed concern regarding the future direction and policy prioritization of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in light of diminishing resources and an uncertain political and security environment in 2015 and beyond. According to the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, released in late 2012, the U.S. government envisions a counternarcotics policy future that results in ""two simultaneous and parallel transfers of responsibility."" Not only does it envision the transfer of security responsibility to Afghan forces, but also the transfer of counternarcotics programming responsibilities and law enforcement operational activities to the Afghan government. Assuming a reduced U.S. security presence and limited civilian mobility throughout the country, the U.S. government is also increasingly emphasizing a regional approach to combating Afghan drugs. Although some counternarcotics efforts, including eradication and alternative development programming, are already implemented by the government of Afghanistan or by local contractors, others may require a two- to five-year time horizon, or potentially longer, before a complete transition would be feasible, according to Administration officials. Some counternarcotics initiatives are only in their infancy, including the Defense Department's plans to establish a new Regional Narcotics Analysis and Illicit Trafficking Task Force (RNAIT-TF). Other activities, particularly those that required a significant presence at the local and provincial levels, are anticipated to be reduced or limited in scope. The 113th Congress continues to monitor drug trafficking trends in Afghanistan and evaluate U.S. policy responses. Both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives held hearings on the topic in early 2014 and included provisions in FY2014 appropriations (P.L. 113-76) that limit the scope of and resources devoted to future counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has also identified narcotics as a ""critical issue"" for policy makers. This report describes key U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan in the context of the 2014 transition and analyzes policy issues related to these programs for Congress to consider as policy makers examine the drug problem in Afghanistan. The report's Appendix contains historical figures and tables on trends in Afghan drug cultivation, production, and trafficking.",85,96 "527 Organizations: How the Differences in Tax and Election Laws Permit Certain Organizations to Engage in Issue Advocacy without Public Disclosure and Proposals for Change. Virtually all political organizations are ""section 527"" political organizations, which means that they are tax-exempt. 527 organizations are created to influence the election or defeat of public officials. This report compares the tax and election laws relating to political organizations and political committees prior to the enactment of P.L. 106-230 in an attempt to highlight the differences between them, and discusses some of the proposals in the 106th Congress to require additional reporting by organizations engaging in political activities. This report does not address the taxation of other tax-exempt organizations making political expenditures taxable under IRC § 527.",61,61 "The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Attorneys' Fees Provisions in Current Law and in H.R. 1350 as Passed by the House and Senate, 108th Congress. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE and includes a provision for attorneys’ fees. Congress is presently considering reauthorizing IDEA. H.R. 1350, 108th Congress, passed the House on April 30, 2003, by a vote of 251 to 171. On May 13, 2004, the Senate incorporated S. 1248 in H.R. 1350 and passed H.R. 1350 in lieu of S. 1248 by a vote of 95 to 3. This report will discuss current IDEA provisions on attorneys’ fees and the differing provisions in the House and Senate bills. This report will not be updated.",35,35 "Fourth Amendment Protections Against Student Strip Searches: Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. What a court determines to be ""reasonable"" depends on the nature of the search and its underlying governmental purpose. This report provides an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2009 decision, Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, which addressed the constitutionality of a strip search of a 13-year-old middle school student. Based on the facts of the case, the Court held that the school's search of a student's book bag and outer clothing was in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. However, as a result of a number of factual deficiencies, the search became constitutionally unreasonable when it went beyond the student's outerwear and ultimately led to the student being required to shake and pull out her bra and underwear. For a discussion of drug testing in public schools, see CRS Report RL34624, Governmental Drug Testing Programs: Legal and Constitutional Developments, by David H. Carpenter.",17,97 "Algae's Potential as a Transportation Biofuel. Congress continues to debate the federal role in biofuel research, biofuel tax incentives, and renewable fuel mandates. The debate touches on topics such as fuel imports and security, job creation, and environmental benefits, and is particularly significant for advanced biofuels, such as those produced by algae. Congress established the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2), a mandate requiring that the national fuel supply contain a minimum amount of fuel produced from renewable biomass. The RFS2 is essentially composed of two biofuel mandates—one for unspecified biofuel, which is being met largely with corn-starch ethanol, and one for advanced biofuels (or non-corn starch ethanol), which may not be met in coming years due to a lack of production. Within the advanced biofuels category, the RFS2 requirements for the cellulosic biofuels subcategory (e.g., ethanol from switchgrass) have not been met for the last few years, which could cause alarm among those required to purchase fuel or credits to satisfy the mandate, as this subcategory is slated to ramp up from roughly 3% of the requirement in the standard in 2012 to roughly 44% of the standard in 2022. Limited cellulosic biofuel production has occurred to date. As a result, as allowed under the RFS2, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has lowered the required cellulosic biofuels volume for 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 and has proposed to do the same for 2014. Currently, algae-based biofuel qualifies as an advanced biofuel under the RFS2, but not as a cellulosic biofuel. If algae were added as an eligible feedstock type under the RFS2 cellulosic biofuels mandate, and if an increase in production resulted, then a larger portion of the requirement might be achieved, although current production is minimal. Algae does qualify as a feedstock for the biomass-based diesel subcategory of the RFS2 advanced biofuel mandate. The RFS2 does not mandate rapid growth of biomass-based diesel, as it does for cellulosic biofuels. Algae can be converted into various types of energy for transportation, including biodiesel, jet fuel, electric power, and ethanol. The potential advantages of algae-based biofuel over other biofuel pathways include higher biomass yields per acre of cultivation, little to no competition for arable land, use of a wide variety of water sources, the opportunity to use carbon dioxide from stationary sources, and the potential to produce ""drop-in"" ready-to-use fuels. Potential drawbacks include the anticipated cost of production, the amount of resources (e.g., water and land) required to produce the biofuel, and the lack of commercial-scale production facilities. Algae-based biofuel research and development are in their infancy, although work has been conducted in this area for decades. At present, published research efforts offer policymakers little guidance on what algae types or conversion methods could be the front-runner for commercial production, or on when and for which biofuel. Congressional support for algae-based biofuel has consisted of congressionally directed projects and funding of programs and studies by the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD). Some algae industry advocates contend that Congress should encourage advances in algae-based biofuel production by extending the expiration date for eligible tax credits, appropriating additional federal funds for algae-related programs, and modifying the RFS2 to include algae in the cellulosic biofuels mandate, as was done recently for the cellulosic biofuels production tax credit. In contrast, some argue that Congress should reconsider its investment in biofuels because of the current federal budget crisis and the lack of any measurable progress in cellulosic biofuels production. Thus far in the 113th Congress, legislation pertaining to algae-based biofuels has not been introduced. Proposed legislation in the 112th Congress would have either expanded the cellulosic biofuels definition for the RFS2 to include algae by amending the Clean Air Act, and/or expanded the definition in the tax code for select tax credits to incorporate algae (e.g., H.R. 1149, S. 1185). The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA, P.L. 112-240) amended both the cellulosic biofuel production tax credit and the cellulosic biofuel depreciation allowance to include algae-based biofuels. Both tax incentives expired at the end of 2013, and it is not known if they will be extended.",37,37 "Land and Water Conservation Fund: Overview, Funding History, and Issues. The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) Act of 1965 was enacted to help preserve, develop, and ensure access to outdoor recreation facilities to strengthen the health of U.S. citizens. The law created the Land and Water Conservation Fund in the U.S. Treasury as a funding source to implement its outdoor recreation goals. The LWCF has been used for three general purposes. First, it has been the principal source of monies for land acquisition for outdoor recreation by four federal agencies—the National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Forest Service. Second, the LWCF also funds a matching grant program to assist states in recreational planning, acquiring recreational lands and waters, and developing outdoor recreational facilities. There are two aspects to this ""stateside"" program: the traditional state grants and the more recent competitive state grants. Under the traditional state grant program, a portion of the appropriation is divided equally among the states, with the remainder apportioned based on need. Each state awards its grant money based on its own outdoor recreation plan and priorities. The competitive state grant program, begun in FY2014, funds recreation projects in urbanized areas meeting certain criteria. Third, beginning in FY1998, LWCF has been used to fund other federal programs with related purposes, such as the Forest Legacy program of the Forest Service and grants under the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund of the Fish and Wildlife Service. Under the LWCF Act, the fund is authorized through September 30, 2018, to accrue $900 million annually from multiple sources. However, nearly all of the revenue is derived from oil and gas leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The LWCF receives additional money under more recent legislation (P.L. 109-432, ""GOMESA""). Throughout the history of the LWCF, $40.0 billion in revenues have accrued under both the LWCF Act and GOMESA. Congress determines the level of funding for the three LWCF purposes through the annual appropriations process. These discretionary appropriations have fluctuated widely since the origin of the program. In addition, any funds deposited under GOMESA are mandatory appropriations for the state grant program. Mandatory appropriations were relatively small from FY2009-FY2017. They increased substantially in FY2018, and are expected to remain relatively high at least over the next decade, due to additional revenues from leasing in the Gulf of Mexico. Less than half of the $40.0 billion in total revenues that have accrued in the LWCF have been appropriated ($18.4 billion). FY2001 marked the highest funding ever, with appropriations exceeding the authorized level by reaching nearly $1 billion. For FY2018, the most recent fiscal year, the total appropriation was $487.6 million (with $425.0 million in discretionary funds and $62.6 million in mandatory funds). The $18.4 billion appropriated through the history of the program has been allocated unevenly among federal land acquisition (61%), the state grant program (25%), and other purposes (14%). Similarly, federal land acquisition funds have been allocated unevenly among the four agencies. A variety of issues pertaining to the LWCF are the subject of legislation, hearings, and other debate. Some of them are being considered as part of deliberations over whether to reauthorize the LWCF beyond September 30, 2018. Issues include the optimal level of funding for LWCF overall and its individual components, whether to reauthorize provisions of the LWCF, and whether to retain discretionary appropriations or provide additional mandatory appropriations. Other issues involve whether LWCF funds should be used for additional purposes, such as maintenance, or set aside for particular priorities, such as securing additional access to federal lands for recreation. The priority of the state grant program vis-à-vis federal acquisition is being debated, as is the extent to which the fund should be used for other programs benefitting states.",43,107 "Overdraft/Bounced-Check Protection. Overdraft protection programs are an optional service offered by financial institutions to consumers. These programs are often referred to as ""bounced-check protection"" or ""courtesy overdraft protection"" to distinguish them from the more traditional overdraft lines of credit. Participating institutions cover checks drawn on accounts with insufficient funds and charge a fee. Financial institution representatives state that these programs offer a beneficial service to their customers by covering checks that would otherwise be returned unpaid. Consumer advocates argue that these programs are high-cost credit products that are marketed to vulnerable consumers, and that their main purpose is to increase fee income for banks. Federal regulators have monitored the development of overdraft protection programs to ensure that adequate consumer disclosure is being provided and to measure the risk exposure for financial institutions. Several actions have been taken. In February 2005, federal regulators of the banking industry issued guidance concerning bounced-check/overdraft protection services offered by insured depository institutions. The Federal Reserve amended its Regulation DD (Truth in Savings) in May 2005 to address concerns about the adequacy and uniformity of consumer disclosures relating to overdraft services offered by depository institutions, including the advertising of these services. On December 18, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced additional amendments to Regulation DD. The changes aim to facilitate consumer understanding of how overdraft services operate and the costs associated with these programs. On November 12, 2009, the Federal Reserve announced amendments to Regulation E (Electronic Fund Transfers) that provide consumers a choice regarding their institution's payment of overdrafts for automated teller machines (ATMs) and one-time debit transactions. Such payments would be prohibited unless the consumer affirmatively ""opts in"" or agrees to this type of overdraft protection. Legislation in the 111th Congress (H.R. 1487, H.R. 3904, and S. 1799) would provide enhanced consumer protections for overdraft protection programs. This report will be updated as events and legislation warrant.",5,7 "Homeland Emergency Preparedness and the National Exercise Program: Background, Policy Implications, and Issues for Congress. This report provides an overview of emergency preparedness authorities and guidance, development and management of the National Exercise Program (NEP), and current exercise planning, scheduling, and evaluation processes. Additionally, it provides analysis of national preparedness policy issues and exercise operations issues that Congress might wish to consider.",11,22 "Energy and Water Development: FY2019 Appropriations. The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's total funding. President Trump submitted his FY2019 budget proposal to Congress on February 12, 2018. The President's budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill totaled $36.341 billion (excluding rescissions)—$6.871 billion (15.9%) below the FY2018 appropriation. A $375 million increase (3.5%) was proposed for DOE nuclear weapons activities. In contrast, the two versions of the FY2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill passed by the House and Senate (Division A of H.R. 5895, H.Rept. 115-697, S.Rept. 115-258) would boost total appropriations above the FY2018 level. FY2018 Energy and Water Development funding was included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), signed by the President on March 23, 2018. Major Energy and Water Development funding issues for FY2019 include Water Agency Funding Reductions. The Trump Administration requested reductions of 29.9% for the Corps and 26.5% for Reclamation for FY2019. Those cuts were largely not followed by the House and Senate. Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants. DOE's Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy Program would be terminated under the FY2019 budget request. Congress did not eliminate the grants for FY2018 and the proposed cuts were not included in the FY2019 House and Senate bills. Reductions in Energy Research and Development. Under the FY2019 budget request, DOE research and development appropriations would be reduced for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE) by 65.5%, nuclear energy by 37.2%, and fossil energy by 30.9%. The House and Senate bills largely did not include the proposed reductions. Energy R&D funding was increased 12.9% from its FY2017 level by the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Nuclear Waste Repository. The Administration's budget request would provide new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. DOE would receive $110 million to seek an NRC license for the repository, and NRC would receive $47.7 million to consider DOE's application. DOE would also receive $10 million to develop interim nuclear waste storage facilities. The House bill would provide an additional $100 million to DOE for Yucca Mountain licensing above the request, while the Senate bill includes no Yucca Mountain funds. An Administration funding request for the Yucca Mountain project in FY2018 was not included in the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E). The Trump Administration proposed to eliminate funds for new research projects by ARPA-E in FY2019, and called for terminating the program after currently funded projects were completed. The House approved an 8.0% cut and the Senate voted for a 6.1% increase. A similar proposal to terminate ARPA-E in FY2018 was not followed by Congress, with the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act boosting funding for ARPA-E by 15.5%—to $353.3 million. Low-Yield Warhead. DOE's FY2019 budget documents proposed a low-yield version of the W76 LEP nuclear warhead. DOE's initial FY2019 budget request did not request any funding specifically allocated to this modification, but the White House included $65 million for it in a budget amendment package submitted to Congress on April 13, 2018. Plutonium Disposition Plant Termination. The Administration proposed in FY2018 and FY2019 to terminate construction of the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which would make fuel for nuclear reactors out of surplus weapons plutonium. The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act conforms to provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-91) that allow DOE to pursue an alternative plutonium disposal program if sufficient cost savings are projected. The FY2019 House bill includes a similar provision, while the Senate bill provides funding for termination. The Administration certified under P.L. 115-91 on May 10, 2018, that the cost-saving requirement for termination of MFFF would be met.",108,59 "U.S. Decision to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement. On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump announced that his Administration would cease implementing U.S. commitments under the 2015 multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and reimpose all U.S. sanctions that were in place prior to the JCPOA. His announcement made reference to his previous statements on the issue, including an October 13, 2017, announcement of U.S. strategy on Iran and a January 12, 2018, statement pledging to leave the agreement unless Congress and U.S. allies acted to address the full range of U.S. concerns on Iran. In his May 8 and earlier statements, President Trump asserted that the agreement does not address the full range of potential threats posed by Iran, or permanently ensure that Iran cannot develop a nuclear weapon. President Trump also again asserted that the JCPOA provided Iran with additional financial resources with which to pursue its ballistic missile program and support its regional ""malign activities."" In his May 8 statement, President Trump indicated that reimposed U.S. sanctions would succeed in pressuring Iran to renegotiate the JCPOA to accommodate Administration demands. President Trump's May 8 statement also implied that, based on an early May presentation by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Iran has not abandoned an intent to ultimately develop a nuclear weapon. International nuclear inspectors, as well as senior U.S. officials, have consistently indicated in their reports that Iran is complying with the provisions of the JCPOA. The President foreshadowed his May 8 announcement with his October 2017 and January and April 2018 refusal to certify to Congress, under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17), that continued U.S. sanctions relief to Iran under the JCPOA is ""appropriate and proportionate"" to the measures taken by Iran to terminate its illicit nuclear program. The withholding of that certification did not automatically reimpose any U.S. sanctions on Iran, but gave Congress the opportunity to use expedited procedures to do so. Congress did not act to reimpose the sanctions. The other powers that negotiated the accord with Iran—Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany—have consistently asserted that the JCPOA is succeeding in its core objectives and that its implementation should not be jeopardized. Several European countries have sought to address President Trump's demands in negotiations with U.S. officials. In late April 2018 visits to Washington, DC, the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany told President Trump they want to work with the United States to formulate joint action that would address his concerns, but they urged that he keep the United States in the accord as a foundation on which to build additional restrictions on Iran. The leaders of Britain, France, and Germany, as well as the European Union, expressed ""regret"" about the U.S. decision and pledged to work with Iran to continue implementing the JCPOA. Iran's President Hassan Rouhani immediately reacted to the May 8 U.S. decision by pledging to continue implementing the accord, provided Iran continues to receive the economic benefits of the agreement. This report analyzes the U.S. pullout from the JCPOA and its potential implications. For details on the JCPOA's provisions and related sanctions issues, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr, and CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.",29,29 "Sex Trafficking: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law. Sex trafficking is a state crime. Federal law, however, makes it a federal crime to conduct the activities of a sex trafficking enterprise in a way that affects interstate or foreign commerce or that involves travel in interstate or foreign commerce. Section 1591 of Title 18 of the United States Code outlaws sex trafficking activities that affect interstate or foreign commerce. The Mann Act outlaws sex trafficking activities that involve travel in interstate or foreign commerce. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (Victims Justice Act, P.L. 114-22/S. 178) amended both §1591 and the Mann Act. Section 1591 now provides in part the following: ""Whoever knowingly in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person, knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion..., or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act,"" shall be imprisoned not less than 15 years (not less than 10 years, if the victim is 14 years of age or older and the offender is less than 18 years of age). The Mann Act outlaws prostitution and unlawful sexual activities that involve interstate or foreign travel. It consists of three principal substantive sections. Section 2421 proscribes the interstate or foreign transportation of someone for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual activity, misconduct which is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years. Section 2422 condemns coercing or enticing another person to travel in interstate or foreign commerce to engage in prostitution or unlawful sexual activity, or using interstate communications to coerce or entice a child to engage in such conduct. The communications offense is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years, the travel offense by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Section 2423 outlaws four distinct offenses: (1) §2423(a)—transportation of a child in interstate or foreign commerce for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual purposes, (2) §2423(b)—interstate or foreign travel for purposes of unlawful sexual abuse of a child, (3) §2423(c)—foreign travel and subsequent unlawful sexual abuse of a child, and (4) §2423(d)—arranging, for profit, the travel outlawed in any of these offenses. The first is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years, each of the others by imprisonment for not more than 30 years. An offender also faces the prospect of a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for an organization), unless indigent, to a special assessment of $5,000, a term of supervised release of not less than five years, an order to pay the victim restitution, and the confiscation of any property derived from, or used to facilitate commission of, any of the offenses. This report is available in an abridged version without the footnotes and most of the citations to authority found here under the title CRS Report R43598, Sex Trafficking: An Abbreviated Overview of Federal Criminal Law.",93,93 "Water Rights Related to Oil Shale Development in the Upper Colorado River Basin. Concerns over fluctuating oil prices and declining petroleum production worldwide have revived interest in oil shale as a potential resource. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct, P.L. 109-58) identified oil shale as a strategically important domestic resource and directed the Department of the Interior to promote commercial development. Oil shale development would require significant amounts of water, however, and water supply in the Colorado River Basin, where several oil shale reserves are located, is limited. According to news reports, oil companies holding water rights in the region have not exercised those rights in decades, which has allowed other water rights holders to use the water for agricultural and municipal needs. Because of the nature of the water rights systems in the relevant states, these users might face significant limitations in their future use of water from the Colorado River Basin if the oil companies exercise their rights. This report will provide a brief overview of water rights in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming, including changes that may be made to currently held water rights and the possibility for abandonment of unused water rights.",40,40 "Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?. Some aspects of the humanitarian crisis many feared would take place in March 2003 with the initial military operation in Iraq unfolded later as a result of the ongoing insurgency and sectarian violence. It is estimated that in total (including those displaced prior to the war) there may be as many as 2 million Iraqi refugees who have fled to Jordan, Syria, and other neighboring states, and approximately 2.7 million Iraqis who have been displaced within Iraq itself. Between 2004-2007, the violence and insecurity resulting from the ongoing sectarian strife, terrorism, and insurgency in Iraq produced substantial civilian displacement in different parts of the country. There are continued concerns about the absorptive capacity of neighboring countries, whether they can provide adequately for the populations that have moved across borders, and the impact of refugee flows on stability in general. Many of Iraq's neighbors fear that they are being overwhelmed by refugees who have fled over Iraq's borders. While there is clear evidence of limited improvement in Iraq—decreasing violence, reduced levels of displacement, and some returns in a few governorates—the situation in general remains fragile and requires sustained attention. UNHCR estimates that the number of Iraqis displaced within Iraq who need food and shelter exceeds 1 million people. This report provides an analysis of the current crisis, including an overview of the conditions for those displaced in Iraq and the refugee situations in Syria, Jordan, and elsewhere. It also provides information on the U.S. and international response and examines refugee resettlement options in the United States. Aspects of this crisis that may be of particular interest to the111th Congress include a focus on an immediate response (providing humanitarian relief funding), examining resettlement policies, and developing a strategy to manage the displaced, particularly within Iraq. This report will be updated as events warrant. For more information on Iraq, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.",76,81 "The Housing Trust Fund: Background and Issues. The Housing Trust Fund (HTF) was established by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA, P.L. 110-289) to provide funds to states to use for affordable housing activities, with a focus on producing rental housing for extremely low-income households. It is administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and funded through contributions from two government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, rather than through appropriations. Due to concerns about Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's financial position, their contributions to the HTF were suspended for several years before the program had ever received any funding. More recently, however, their contributions to the HTF have begun. The first funding was transferred to the HTF in early 2016. In general, affordable housing trust funds provide dedicated, permanent sources of funding for affordable housing that do not require annual appropriations. Many states and localities across the United States have their own affordable housing trust funds, and for years affordable housing advocates had worked to get such a fund created on a national level. Opponents of a national affordable housing trust fund argued, among other things, that it would be duplicative of other affordable housing programs. The Housing Trust Fund created by HERA provides funding for formula-based grants to states to use for affordable housing activities. By statute, most of the funding must be used for rental housing, states can use up to 10% of their grants for certain homeownership activities. Furthermore, all of the funds must benefit very low- or extremely low-income households, with at least 75% of the funding for rental housing being used exclusively for the benefit of extremely low-income households (defined as households with incomes that do not exceed 30% of area median income) or households with incomes no greater than the federal poverty line. In the years since the HTF was established, supporters of the Housing Trust Fund have searched for additional sources of funding for the program, and have argued for the beginning of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's contributions to the Housing Trust Fund as those entities returned to profitability. (The contributions began in 2015, with the first funds transferred to the HTF in 2016.) At the same time, policymakers who oppose the Housing Trust Fund have made efforts to repeal it or to prevent Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from contributing to it while they remain in conservatorship. In recent Congresses, legislation has been introduced to fund the HTF through alternate sources, as well as to eliminate it entirely. The HTF has also been debated in the context of broader housing finance reform efforts, which are largely concerned with proposals for how to reform, eliminate, or replace Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. However, no legislation to either fund the HTF through a different source or to eliminate it entirely has been enacted to date.",75,75 "Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress. This report describes the statutory authority granted to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with regards to chemical facility security regulation and the interim final rule promulgated by DHS, and identifies select issues of contention related to the interim final rule. Finally, this report discusses several possible policy options for Congress.",46,46 "The Social Security Number: Legal Developments Affecting Its Collection, Disclosure, and Confidentiality. While the social security number (SSN) was first introduced as a device for keeping track of contributions to the Social Security program, its use has been expanded by government entities and the private sector to keep track of many other government and private sector records. Use of the SSN as a federal government identifier was based on Executive Order 9397, issued by President Franklin Roosevelt. Beginning in the 1960s, federal agencies started adopting the SSN as a governmental identifier, and its use for keeping track of government records, on both the federal and state levels, greatly increased. Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 provided some limits on compulsory divulgence of the social security number to government entities. However, exceptions in that statute and succeeding statutes resulted in only minimal restrictions on governmental usage of the SSN. Today, an individual needs an SSN to pay taxes, obtain a driver's license, and open a bank account, among other things. The continued use of, and reliance on, SSNs by public and private sector entities and the potential for SSN misuse, including identity theft concerns, has led to increasing efforts by governmental entities to limit the use and disclosure of SSNs. However, no single federal law comprehensively regulates SSN collection and confidentiality. Constitutional challenges to the collection of social security numbers by government agencies have, for the most part, been unsuccessful. Thus, various courts have held that requiring an SSN on a driver's license application is constitutional, as is the requirement that persons disclose their SSNs as a condition for receiving welfare benefits or food stamps. In cases where an individual's SSN is publicly displayed or disseminated, court challenges in recent years have been more successful, particularly where fundamental rights such as the right to vote or the right to free speech are involved. With regard to the display of SSNs in online public records, or in cases involving requests for SSNs under federal or state open records statutes, the courts have attempted to balance the public's interest in the transparency of government processes with the private individual's interest in the confidentiality of personal identification and security information. The chronology at the end of this report provides a comprehensive list of federal developments affecting use of the social security number from 1935 to the present. This list includes federal statutes regulating the collection and disclosure of SSNs, as well as specific authorizations for the use of SSNs, confidentiality provisions, and criminal provisions relating to SSN misuse.",116,116 "North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions. U.S. economic sanctions imposed on North Korea are instigated by that country's activities related to weapons proliferation, especially its tests since 2006 of nuclear weapons and missile technology, regional disruptions, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, undemocratic governance, and illicit activities in international markets, including money laundering, counterfeiting of goods and currency, and bulk cash smuggling. The sanctions have the following consequences for U.S.-North Korea relations Trade is limited to food, medicine, and other humanitarian-related goods, all of which require a license. Imports from North Korea are prohibited as of June 2011, exports to North Korea of most U.S.-origin goods, services, or technology are prohibited as of March 2016. Trade in luxury goods is banned. The Department of Commerce denies export licenses for reasons of nuclear proliferation, missile technology, U.N. Security Council requirements, and international terrorism. Arms sales and arms transfers are fully denied. Financial transactions are prohibited. U.S. persons are prohibited from providing financial services for the purpose of evading sanctions, or from providing financial services to a person or entity designated for sanctions. The President, in September 2017, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to designate for sanctions any foreign financial institution that conducts or facilitates ""any significant transaction on behalf of any [designated] person,"" or ""in connection with trade with North Korea."" North Korea is designated as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern by the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), effective December 9, 2016. U.S. new investment is prohibited, and investment in North Korea's transportation, mining, energy, or financial sectors is prohibited. North Korea is also ineligible to participate in any U.S. government program that makes credit, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees available. U.S. foreign aid is minimal and mostly limited to refugees fleeing North Korea, broadcasting into the country, nongovernmental organization programs dedicated to democracy promotion, human rights, and governance, and emergency food aid. In past years, aid related to disabling and dismantling the country's nuclear weapons program has been made available. By law, U.S. representatives in the international financial institutions (IFI) are required to vote against any support for North Korea due to its nuclear weapons ambitions and international terrorism. Human rights and environmental activities would also likely result in U.S. objections to North Korea's participation in the IFI. U.S.-based assets are blocked for North Korean individuals, entities, and vessels designated by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). U.S. persons are prohibited from entering into trade and transaction with these designees and, most recently, foreign financial institutions could become subject to U.S. sanctions for facilitating transactions for designated persons. Kim Jong-un, the Korean Workers' Party, and others—banks, shipping companies, seagoing vessels, state agencies, and other individuals affiliated with the state's security regime—are identified as being among those engaged in illicit and punishable activities, possibly including nuclear or ballistic missile programs, undermining cybersecurity, censorship, and sanctions evasion. As a result, effective March 15, 2016, any of their assets under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S. persons and entities are prohibited from entering into trade and transactions with the designees. U.S. travel requires a special validation passport issued by the State Department. Such passports are reserved only for travel in the U.S. national interest and are intended for professional reporters, officials with the American Red Cross or International Committee of the Red Cross, or those who have a ""compelling humanitarian"" justification. From the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States had imposed fairly comprehensive economic, diplomatic, and political restrictions on North Korea. In 1999, however, President Clinton announced the United States would lift many restrictions on U.S. exports to and imports from North Korea in areas other than those controlled for national security concerns, the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Transportation issued new regulations a year later that implemented the new policy. On June 26, 2008, President George W. Bush delisted North Korea as a state sponsor of international terrorism, and removed restrictions based on authorities in the Trading With the Enemy Act and the terrorism designation, replacing them with more circumscribed economic restrictions related to proliferation concerns. The U.S. sanctions are a result of requirements incorporated into U.S. law by Congress, decisions made in the executive branch to exercise discretionary authorities, and obligations placed on member states of the United Nations by the U.N. Security Council. Though the President, in accordance with the Constitution, leads the way in conducting foreign policy, Congress holds substantial power to shape foreign policy by authorizing and funding programs, advising on appointments, and specifically defining the terms of engagement in accordance with U.S. political and strategic interests. This report presents the legislative basis for U.S. sanctions policy toward North Korea. These sanctions are a critical tenet of the larger bilateral relationship, and this report highlights Congress's role and responsibility in determining the nature of U.S.-North Korea relations.",85,85 "Farm Commodity Payment Limits: Comparison of Proposals. This report discusses U.S. policy regard farm commodities. Greater public awareness of the size of commodity program payments reaching a comparatively small number of very large farms has focused the attention of Congress on payment limits. Limits on commodity program payments have been imposed since 1970. As part of the emergency economic assistance packages enacted each of the past three years, the payment limits have been doubled. In addition, a mechanism has been developed that allows farms to circumvent the limit on loan deficiency payments, namely commodity certificates",3,3 "U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations During the Obama Presidency: Midyear Analysis and Comparison with Recent Presidents. The nomination and confirmation process for U.S. circuit and district court judges is of ongoing interest to Congress. Recent Senate debates over judicial nominations have focused on issues such as the relative degree of success of President Barack Obama's nominees in gaining Senate confirmation compared with other recent Presidents, as well as the pace of confirmation of his nominees compared to the nominees of other recent Presidents, and the relative prevalence of vacant judgeships compared to years past. This report addresses these issues by providing a statistical analysis of nominations to U.S. circuit and district court judgeships from January 20 of President Obama's first year in office to June 30 of his sixth year, and by comparing statistics during this period of the Obama presidency to statistics from comparable periods of time during the presidencies of his two most recent predecessors. Some of the report's findings include the following Of President Obama's 59 circuit court nominees, 49 (83.1%) have, thus far, been confirmed. The 49 confirmed nominees and 83.1% confirmation rate represent the highest number and percentage of circuit court nominees confirmed, during the three most recent presidencies, from January 20 of a President's first year in office to June 30 of his sixth year. G.W. Bush had the lowest percentage of circuit court nominees confirmed (68.7%) during the comparable period of time of his presidency, while President Clinton had the lowest number confirmed (44). Of the 253 persons nominated by President Obama to U.S. district court judgeships, 219 (86.6%) have been confirmed. Of the three Presidents, this was both the second-highest number and percentage of district court nominees confirmed. Of the comparison group, President Clinton had the greatest number of district court nominees confirmed between January 20 of his first year and June 30 of his sixth year (222), while President G.W. Bush had the greatest percentage of district court nominees confirmed (91.3%). Overall, combining nominees to both circuit and district court judgeships, President Obama has had, as of June 30 of his sixth year in office, approximately the same percentage of nominees confirmed as President G.W. Bush (85.9% and 86.0%, respectively). President Obama, however, has had the greatest number of nominees confirmed (268), while President G.W. Bush had the fewest number of nominees confirmed (246). President Clinton had the second-highest number of nominees confirmed (266) and the lowest percentage confirmed (81.1%). During the Obama presidency the Senate has confirmed, on average, 4.5 circuit court nominees every six months. Of the comparison group, this is the highest number of circuit court nominees confirmed, on average, every six months. For Presidents G.W. Bush and Clinton, the number of circuit court nominees confirmed, on average, per six-month period was 4.2 and 4.0, respectively. During the Obama presidency, as of June 30, 2014, the Senate has confirmed, on average, 19.9 district court nominees every six months. Of the comparison group, this is the second-highest number of district court nominees confirmed, on average, every six months. For Presidents G.W. Bush and Clinton, the number of district court nominees confirmed, on average, per six-month period was 18.2 and 20.2, respectively. Overall, from January 20 of his first year to June 30 of his sixth year, President Obama had 24.4 circuit and district court nominees confirmed, on average, per six-month period. This was the highest number of nominees confirmed, on average, per six-month period during the three presidencies. The comparable statistics for Presidents G.W. Bush and Clinton were 22.4 and 24.2, respectively. The percentage of vacant circuit and district court judgeships declined from January 1 of President Obama's fifth year in office to June 30 of his sixth year. The percentage of vacant judgeships also declined over the same period during the Clinton presidency, while the percentage of vacancies increased during the same period of the G.W. Bush presidency.",54,54 "Overview of the Securities Act of 1933 as Applied to Private Label Mortgage-Backed Securities. Mortgage-backed securities that are packaged and issued by private industry participants are required to comply with the Securities Act of 1933. Issuers of so-called private label mortgage-backed securities must either register these securities pursuant to the rules the Securities and Exchange Commission has set forth, or obtain an exemption from registration. Failure to register or fall under an exemption could result in liability for the issuer and other parties involved in the offering. Furthermore, material misstatements or omissions in the offering materials may also result in liability under the Securities Act. This report will provide an overview of the Securities Act of 1933 as it may be applied to mortgage-backed securities issued by private industry participants.",12,12 "Industrial Competitiveness and Technological Advancement: Debate Over Government Policy. There is ongoing interest in the pace of U.S. technological advancement due to its influence on U.S. economic growth, productivity, and international competitiveness. Because technology can contribute to economic growth and productivity increases, congressional interest has focused on how to augment private-sector technological development. Congressional action has mandated specific technology development programs and obligations in federal agencies that did not initially support such efforts. Some legislative activity, beginning in the 104th Congress, has been directed at eliminating or significantly curtailing many of these federal efforts. Questions have been raised concerning the proper role of the federal government in technology development and the competitiveness of U.S. industry. As the 109th congress continues to develop its budget priorities, how the government encourages technological process in the private sector again may be explored and/or redefined.",111,111 "Status of a Member of the House Who Has Been Indicted for or Convicted of a Felony. There are no federal statutes or Rules of the House of Representatives that directly affect the status of a Member of Congress who has been indicted for a crime that constitutes a felony. No rights or privileges are forfeited under the Constitution, statutory law, or the Rules of the House merely upon an indictment for an offense, prior to an establishment of guilt under the judicial system. Under House Rules, therefore, an indicted Member may continue to participate in congressional proceedings and considerations. Under the Constitution, a person under indictment is not disqualified from being a Member of or a candidate for re-election to Congress. Internal party rules in the House, however, require an indicted chairman or ranking Member of a House committee, or a member of the House party leadership, to temporarily step aside from his or her leadership or chairmanship position. Additionally, a change in rules by the House requires the House Committee on Ethics to either initiate an inquiry by an investigative subcommittee of that Committee within 30 days of the time any Member of the House has been indicted or otherwise charged with criminal conduct in any state or federal court, or to report to the House the Committee's reasons for not moving forward. As to a conviction of a crime, Members of Congress do not automatically forfeit their offices upon conviction of a crime that constitutes a felony. No express constitutional disability or ""disqualification"" from Congress exists for the conviction of a crime, other than under the Fourteenth Amendment for certain treasonous conduct by someone who has taken an oath of office to support the Constitution. Members of the House are, however, instructed by House Rules not to vote in committee or on the House floor once they have been convicted of a crime for which the punishment may be two or more years' imprisonment. Furthermore, under party rules, Members may lose their chairmanships of committees or ranking member status upon conviction of a felony. Conviction of certain crimes may subject—and has subjected in the past—Members of the House to internal legislative disciplinary proceedings, including resolutions of reprimand or censure, as well as expulsion from the House upon approval of two-thirds of the Members. Conviction of certain crimes relating to national security offenses would result in the Member's forfeiture of his or her entire federal pension annuity under the provisions of the so-called ""Hiss Act"" and, under more recent provisions of law, conviction of particular crimes by Members relating to public corruption will result in the loss of the Member's entire ""creditable service"" as a Member for purposes of calculating their federal retirement annuities if the conduct underlying the conviction related to one's official duties.",55,55 "Sexual Harassment: Developments in Federal Law. Gender-based discrimination, sexual harassment, and violence against women in the workplace, schools, and society at large are continuing topics of legislative and judicial concern. Legal doctrines condemning the extortion of sexual favors as a condition of employment or job advancement and other sexually offensive workplace behaviors resulting in a ""hostile environment"" have evolved from judicial decisions under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other federal equal employment opportunity laws. The earlier judicial focus on economic detriment or quid pro quo harassment—that is, making submission to sexual demands a condition of job benefits—has largely given way to Title VII claims alleging harassment that creates an ""intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment."" Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, victims of sexual harassment that occurs in a public school setting may make similar quid pro quo or hostile environment claims. For more information on related laws regarding sex discrimination, see CRS Report RL30253, Sex Discrimination and the United States Supreme Court: Developments in the Law, by Jody Feder.",16,16 "The HOPE NOW Alliance/American Securitization Forum (ASF) Plan to Freeze Certain Mortgage Interest Rates. In response to the downturn in the U.S. mortgage market, the Bush Administration helped broker an alliance of mortgage lenders, servicers, counselors, and investors called the HOPE NOW Alliance, whose stated goals are to ""maximize outreach efforts to homeowners in distress to help them stay in their homes"" and to ""create a unified, coordinated plan to reach and help as many homeowners as possible."" One aspect of the alliance is the Statement of Principles, Recommendations and Guidelines for a Streamlined Foreclosure and Loss Avoidance Framework for Securitized Subprime Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loans (the Framework or ASF Plan), as proposed by the American Securitization Forum (ASF). Pursuant to the Framework, borrowers who meet certain requirements qualify for ""fast track"" loan modification, which may include an interest rate freeze at the rate prior to reset that, in most cases, lasts for five years. Because this type of modification is a deviation from the norm, servicers willing to perform loan workouts in accordance with the Framework's guidelines could worry that they would open themselves up to tax, accounting, and contract liability from secondary market investors and federal regulators of tax-exempt trusts. This potential liability could deter servicers from engaging in loss mitigation, even those measures outlined in the Framework. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a revenue procedure (Rev. Proc 2008-28) on May 16, 2008, to clarify certain tax issues relating to modification of securitized mortgage loans. The IRS said that it would not challenge the tax status of the trusts that hold securitized loans, nor would the IRS assert that anticipatory loan modifications create a tax liability on prohibited transactions, if: (1) the mortgage is for a single-family (one- to four-unit) dwelling, (2) the dwelling is owner-occupied, (3) overdue mortgages make up less than 10% of the trust's assets at start-up, (4) there is reasonable belief that the original loan will result in foreclosure, (5) the loan modification is less favorable to the holder of the loan than the original loan, and (6) there is reasonable belief that the loan modification reduces the risk of foreclosure. The data show that loan modifications and formal repayment plans have been increasing steadily in each successive quarter since the issuance of the Framework. However, it is difficult to identify which of these modifications were made pursuant to the ASF Plan and which occurred through alternative channels. The Framework only applies to certain mortgages that are current, which makes it distinct from Project Lifeline, a plan announced on February 12, 2008, for mortgages that are in serious default. On June 17, 2008, the HOPE NOW servicers announced common measures to expedite resolution of short sales and second mortgages, which can require third-party approval.",73,73 "Protecting Famous, Distinctive Marks: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA) amended section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 to provide a new federal cause of action for the dilution of famous, distinctive marks. ""Trademark dilution"" is statutorily defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 to mean ""the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of... (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."" Under the FTDA, the owner of a famous mark may seek an injunction against another person's commercial use of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. Since the FTDA was enacted, however, some trademark owners have sought to use the law in ways that arguably go beyond the statute's scope and purpose (e.g., owners of insufficiently famous marks attempting to sustain a FTDA action, or others trying to apply the FTDA to prohibit parody and criticism of their marks). In adjudicating these expansive claims, several federal courts have narrowly interpreted the FTDA (notably the United States Supreme Court in the 2003 case Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.), and protection against trademark dilution is said to be challenging if not impossible to obtain, according to many intellectual property scholars. There is a split among the regional federal circuit courts of appeal over the meaning and application of several central FTDA elements. For example, one federal circuit court has determined that the federal anti-dilution law does not apply to ""descriptive"" marks that have acquired distinctiveness over time, including famous ones such as MCDONALD'S or KRAFT, because they lack ""inherent distinctiveness."" The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (H.R. 683) is a legislative response to these issues, offering more precise definitions for key terms in the FTDA (such as ""famous,"" ""distinctive,"" ""blurring,"" and ""tarnishment"") and expressly clarifying standards of proof and other eligibility requirements to obtain relief under the FTDA. Critics of H.R. 683, however, raise concerns that the bill too heavily favors major corporations over small and future businesses. In addition, they worry that the bill could negatively affect free speech rights, small business commercial speech, and consumer interests. Finally, they believe that the bill amends federal trademark law in a manner that essentially confers to major corporations a monopoly over the use of famous marks that may contain common words and phrases. H.R. 683 was passed by the House on a vote of 411 to 8, on April 19, 2005. The Senate passed H.R. 683 with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by unanimous consent, on March 8, 2006. Among other things, the amendment added a non-commercial use liability exclusion to protect free speech interests, and addressed concerns raised by Internet service providers over secondary liability for trademark dilution by their end users. On September 25, 2006, the House, by unanimous consent, agreed to the Senate amendment. The President signed the bill into law on October 6, 2006, P.L. 109-312.",9,9 "Phthalates in Plastics and Possible Human Health Effects. Roughly a dozen chemicals known as phthalates are used to make the plastics found in thousands of consumer products, ranging from medical tubing to automotive dashboards to bath toys. These phthalates are not tightly held by the plastics and are released into the environment over time. Congress is concerned about possible human health effects from exposure to six of these chemicals: di-(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate (DEHP), dibutyl phthalate (DBP), benzyl butyl phthalate (BBP), diisononyl phthalate (DINP), diisodecyl phthalate (DIDP), and di-n-octyl phthalate (DnOP). DEHP, DBP, BBP, and (to less extent) DINP are known to be toxic to the reproductive systems of rodents. Recent rodent experiments demonstrate that pre-natal exposure at a sufficient level to these same phthalates disrupts the normal action of hormones and can cause malformations of the reproductive organs of offspring (especially males). Disruption of hormonal functions in humans is known to result in abnormal reproductive development. Many scientists believe that the phthalates toxic to rodents might be able to cause similar malformations in humans. However, human health effects of phthalate exposure have not been conclusively demonstrated. Very few studies have looked at possible effects in humans, but their results appear consistent with the results of rodent experiments. More research would be needed to test this hypothesis. Recent U.S. surveys have found almost universal human exposure to phthalates. Individuals may be exposed to high enough levels of phthalates to cause reproductive abnormalities. Scientists at the National Toxicology Program have expressed ""serious concern"" about human male infants undergoing intensive medical procedures, and ""concern"" about development of human males less than a year old who are exposed to DEHP. In light of these concerns, the National Academy of Sciences is evaluating the risk of aggregate human exposure to multiple phthalates. Federal agencies have taken several actions, some as early as the mid 1980s, to evaluate and regulate phthalates, but no consumer product to date has been banned outright. The agency responsible for regulating toys and most other child-care products is the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-314, enacted August 14, 2008) includes a provision intended to ensure protection of children from six phthalates by restricting their use in toys and child-care products. The scientific basis for concerns about human health risks appears to be strong in the case of some phthalates (such as DEHP), adequate with respect to others (perhaps DINP), and weak for the remaining chemicals (for example, DIDP and DnOP). The strongest evidence with respect to developmental effects has been produced since about the year 2000. The new law codifies voluntary agreements previously reached by CPSC with product manufacturers, and should reduce exposure to one particular phthalate. New formulations for toys and child-care products may pose greater or fewer risks than current formulations.",46,65 "Dark Web. The layers of the Internet go far beyond the surface content that many can easily access in their daily searches. The other content is that of the Deep Web, content that has not been indexed by traditional search engines such as Google. The furthest corners of the Deep Web, segments known as the Dark Web, contain content that has been intentionally concealed. The Dark Web may be used for legitimate purposes as well as to conceal criminal or otherwise malicious activities. It is the exploitation of the Dark Web for illegal practices that has garnered the interest of officials and policy makers. Individuals can access the Dark Web by using special software such as Tor (short for The Onion Router). Tor relies upon a network of volunteer computers to route users' web traffic through a series of other users' computers such that the traffic cannot be traced to the original user. Some developers have created tools—such as Tor2web—that may allow individuals access to Tor-hosted content without downloading and installing the Tor software, though accessing the Dark Web through these means does not anonymize activity. Once on the Dark Web, users often navigate it through directories such as the ""Hidden Wiki,"" which organizes sites by category, similar to Wikipedia. Individuals can also search the Dark Web with search engines, which may be broad, searching across the Deep Web, or more specific, searching for contraband like illicit drugs, guns, or counterfeit money. While on the Dark Web, individuals may communicate through means such as secure email, web chats, or personal messaging hosted on Tor. Though tools such as Tor aim to anonymize content and activity, researchers and security experts are constantly developing means by which certain hidden services or individuals could be identified or ""deanonymized."" Anonymizing services such as Tor have been used for legal and illegal activities ranging from maintaining privacy to selling illegal goods—mainly purchased with Bitcoin or other digital currencies. They may be used to circumvent censorship, access blocked content, or maintain the privacy of sensitive communications or business plans. However, a range of malicious actors, from criminals to terrorists to state-sponsored spies, can also leverage cyberspace and the Dark Web can serve as a forum for conversation, coordination, and action. It is unclear how much of the Dark Web is dedicated to serving a particular illicit market at any one time, and, because of the anonymity of services such as Tor, it is even further unclear how much traffic is actually flowing to any given site. Just as criminals can rely upon the anonymity of the Dark Web, so too can the law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities. They may, for example, use it to conduct online surveillance and sting operations and to maintain anonymous tip lines. Anonymity in the Dark Web can be used to shield officials from identification and hacking by adversaries. It can also be used to conduct a clandestine or covert computer network operation such as taking down a website or a denial of service attack, or to intercept communications. Reportedly, officials are continuously working on expanding techniques to deanonymize activity on the Dark Web and identify malicious actors online.",110,110 "Jamaica: Background and U.S. Relations. The Caribbean island-nation of Jamaica has had a relatively stable parliamentary political system stemming from its history of British colonial rule. Current Prime Minister Bruce Golding of the Jamaica Labour Party was elected in September 2007 when his party defeated the long-ruling People's National Party led by then-Prime Minister Portia Simpson. In late May 2010, however, Jamaica's stability was challenged after Prime Minister Golding agreed to extradite to the United States an at-large alleged drug kingpin and gang leader, Christopher Coke. The Jamaican government deployed police and soldiers seeking to execute a warrant for Coke, but his armed supporters erected barricades and roadblocks to battle the security forces. In the ensuing violence, 76 people were killed, including two policemen and a soldier. Human rights organizations have called on the government to conduct a thorough investigation into the killings, especially since Jamaica's police forces have been criticized for many years for extrajudicial killings and the indiscriminate use of force. Coke was ultimately captured and extradited to New York in late June 2010 to face drug and weapons trafficking charges. High rates of crime and violence have plagued Jamaica for many years. In the 1970s and 1980s there was a high level of politically motivated violence when political parties became allied with armed gangs to deliver votes at election time. Jamaica's gangs initially were involved in the trafficking of marijuana in the 1970s (Jamaica is the Caribbean's largest producer and exporter of marijuana), but in the mid-1980s became involved in cocaine trafficking, with Jamaica used as a transit country, as well as weapons trafficking. Since the 1990s, much of the violent crime in the country has been associated with this drug trafficking and related intra-gang and internal gang feuds. Jamaica's challenges include bringing down the high levels of gang violence, reforming the police and justice system to prevent extrajudicial killings by police and impunity, and breaking the linkages between the political parties and armed gangs. Jamaica's services-based economy has averaged only modest growth rates over the past two decades, and has been in recession since 2008 because of the global economic crisis, which hurt the tourism sector and reduced the price and demand for Jamaican bauxite/alumina exports. A difficult economic challenge for the government is dealing with a large external debt burden, which has limited the government's ability to respond to the effects of the global economic crisis. In February 2010, the International Monetary Fund approved a $1.27 billion stand-by arrangement to help the country deal with the consequences of the global economic downturn and support the government's fiscal, debt, and financial sector reforms. U.S. relations with Jamaica are close, and are characterized by significant economic and cultural linkages and cooperation on a range of bilateral and transnational issues, including cooperation on anti-drug trafficking efforts. Congress has regularly supported a variety of foreign assistance programs for Jamaica, and the country will likely receive funding under the Administration's new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. There had been increasing tension in U.S.-Jamaican relations in recent months because of the Golding government's reluctance to extradite Christopher Coke to the United States, but in the aftermath of the Jamaican government's extradition, U.S. officials commended the Golding government for its efforts. For additional information, see CRS Report RL33951, U.S. Trade Policy and the Caribbean: From Trade Preferences to Free Trade Agreements, and CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs.",85,85 Mandatory Flood Insurance Purchase in Remapped Residual Risk Areas Behind Levees. This report examines the amount of flood insurance that must be purchased (and retained) on loans secured by real property located in federally designated special flood hazard areas (SFHAs).,11,11 "Appropriations for FY2000: An Overview. Appropriations are one part of a complex federal budget process that includes budget resolutions, appropriations (regular, supplemental, and continuing) bills, rescissions, and budget reconciliation bills. This report is a guide to one of the 13 regular appropriations bills that Congress passes each year.",59,59 "Proposed Reform of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) in the 112th Congress: S. 847 Compared with Current Law. Thirty-five years of experience implementing and enforcing the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) have demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the law and led many to propose legislative changes to TSCA's core provisions. Stakeholders appear to agree that TSCA needs to be updated, although there is disagreement about the extent and nature of any proposed revisions. S. 847 in the 112th Congress legislation would amend core provisions of TSCA Title I. This report compares key provisions of S. 847, as introduced, with current law (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.). Generally, S. 847 would increase the amount of information about chemical toxicity and usage that chemical manufacturers and processors would be required to submit to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and would facilitate EPA regulation of toxic chemicals. The bill directs EPA to establish, by rule, varied or tiered minimum data set requirements for different chemical substances or categories of substances. Data would be required from chemical manufacturers and processors for all chemicals within five years of the date of enactment of S. 847, earlier for high-priority chemicals. All chemicals already in commerce are to be placed on a list and prioritized by EPA into three groups based on the need for risk management. A chemical must be included in the highest priority class if it ""is, or is degraded and metabolized into, a persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic substance with the potential for widespread exposure to humans or other organisms."" EPA is required to determine whether chemicals in the top two priority classes, as well as all new chemicals, meet a stringent new safety standard, given the imposition of any needed restrictions on manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal. The bill would prohibit any activities with respect to an evaluated chemical substance that the EPA had not specifically allowed in the safety standard determination. In contrast, current law authorizes data collection from manufacturers only if exposure is expected to be substantial or if EPA determines that a chemical may pose an unreasonable risk. TSCA as currently written allows all chemicals to enter and remain in commerce unless EPA can show that a chemical poses ""an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment."" EPA then must regulate to control unreasonable risk, but only to the extent necessary using the ""least burdensome"" means of available control. This TSCA standard has been interpreted to require cost-benefit balancing. S. 847 also would add new sections to TSCA. Of particular significance is a section authorizing actions that would allow U.S. implementation of three international agreements, which the United States has signed but not yet ratified. Other new sections would provide authority for EPA to support research in so-called ""green"" engineering and chemistry, promote alternatives to toxicity testing on animals, encourage research on children's environmental health, and require biomonitoring of pregnant women and infants. A ""hot spots"" provision would require EPA to identify locations where residents are disproportionately exposed to pollution and to develop strategies for reducing their risks. Key provisions of S. 847 are compared with current law in Tables 1 through 6.",46,46 "Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Corporate Attorney-Client Relations. The Justice Department enjoys prosecutorial discretion to bring criminal charges against a corporation, its culpable officers or employees, or both. For a corporation, indictment alone can be catastrophic, if not fatal, in some instances. The Thompson Memorandum, since replaced with guidelines in the U. S. Attorneys Manual, described the policy factors to be considered in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Two of the factors explicitly mentioned were whether a corporation had waived its privileges and whether it had cut off the payment of attorneys' fees for its officers and employees. Justice Department policies and practices under the Thompson Memorandum led to constitutional challenges based on the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, the Amendment's due process clause, and the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel clause. Due process and right to counsel concerns were enough for a federal district court in New York to throw out the indictments of thirteen former partners and employees of an accounting firm, charged with creating and marketing fraudulent tax shelters, United States v. Stein. The Second Circuit affirmed on right to counsel grounds and consequently found it necessary to address the merits of the due process argument. The House addressed the conflict in attorney-client protective legislation which it passed in the 110th Congress. Soon thereafter, the Department of Justice announced a revised policy concerning the circumstances under which a corporation's failure to waive its attorney-client privilege might influence the decision to prosecute it. The 110th Congress, which had previously amended the Federal Rules of Evidence relating to the inadvertent waiver of the attorney-client privilege, adjourned without taking further action on the House-passed legislation. Similar proposals, however, have been introduced in 111th Congress, H.R. 4326 (Representative Scott), S. 445 (Senator Specter). This report provides a brief discussion of the legislation, the legal background, and a chronology of related issues and events. Also available is an abridged report, stripped of its footnotes and most of its citations to authority (CRS Report RS22588, The McNulty Memorandum In Short: Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection, by Charles Doyle).",92,98 "FY2016 State Grants Under Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA, P.L. 114-95) on December 10, 2015. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and was funded at $14.9 billion for FY2016. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others. This report provides final FY2016 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest FY2016 Title I-A grant amount ($1.8 billion or 11.98% of total Title I-A grants). Wyoming received the smallest FY2016 Title I-A grant amount ($34.8 million or 0.24% of total Title I-A grants).",33,33 "Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan: Issues for Congress. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 ended South Asia's condition of ""existential"" deterrence. Both countries now have overt nuclear postures, and U.S. concerns in the region have focused on preservation of global nonproliferation regimes and related efforts, prevention of an arms race in South Asia, and movement toward reconciliation between India and Pakistan, especially on their mutual differences over the area of Kashmir. The ""benchmarks"" which provide a framework for U.S. policy in this area encompass key aspects of nonproliferation efforts. Progress toward stated goals has been limited. Neither India nor Pakistan is signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation or Comprehensive Test Ban treaties, and there are indications that both are continuing to produce fissile materials and perhaps even deploy nuclear weapons. The 1999 Kargil conflict had the effect of suspending the so-called Lahore process of reconciliation begun in February of that year. The October 1999 military coup in Pakistan and the November 1999 political victory of the Hindu nationalist party in India brought renewed fears of further conflict in the region, but the governments of both countries have thus far maintained fairly moderate external policies. There remain no confirmed reports of the actual deployment of nuclear weapons by India or Pakistan, but both governments have indicated that their militaries are prepared to make use of such weapons. In August 1999, a quasi-governmental Indian body released a Draft Nuclear Doctrine for India. This document calls for a ""minimum credible deterrent"" (MCD) based upon a triad of delivery systems and pledges that India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. It has been neither accepted nor rejected by New Delhi. Islamabad has made no comparable public declaration but it also seeks to maintain an MCD while rejecting a no-first-use pledge. Some observers consider the current situation of territorial contiguity and weak command and control structures in South Asia to be inherently unstable. Others believe that, in the absence of increased regional tensions, strategic stability will continue to be present. Given China's strategic complacency in relation to India, and Pakistan's largely reactive posture, New Delhi's nuclear deployment decisions are perhaps key to regional stability. At present, strategic, economic, and technological factors indicate that the growth of South Asian nuclear and missile forces likely will continue to be limited in the foreseeable future. In pursuit of its stated policy goals, the U.S. government may employ four broad approaches to proliferation in South Asia, each with its own potential strengths and weaknesses. These are increased pressure to compel greater cooperation, continuation of the approach currently in place increased incentives to encourage greater cooperation, and/or the provision of technological assistance to allow for better managed and, therefore, potentially safer nuclear arsenals.",29,29 "Key Historical Court Decisions Shaping EPA's Program Under the Clean Air Act. This report provides a selective overview of court decisions that historically have most shaped EPA's program under the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act). Court decisions described in the report deal with the following National ambient air quality standards (NAAQSs), holding that in setting the standards EPA is not to consider economic and technological feasibility. State implementation plans for achieving NAAQSs, holding that EPA may not consider economic and technological feasibility in approving or disapproving such plans, or that the state plan is more stringent than necessary, or does not require an EPA-preferred control method. Interstate air pollution, holding that EPA may consider costs in applying the CAA ""good neighbor"" provision, but any emissions trading program must assure some emission reduction in each upwind state. Nor does the CAA require that states be given a second opportunity to file an implementation plan after EPA has quantified the state emissions budget, EPA may promulgate its own plan for the state immediately. New source performance standards (NSPSs), holding that while the Act requires NSPSs to be based on ""adequately demonstrated"" technology, EPA is allowed to consider technologies that will be fairly projected in the future so long as the technology is not speculative. New source review in areas not subject to NAAQSs, holding that EPA may override a state's determination of the ""best available control technology"" required for new stationary sources. EPA may require new source review for greenhouse gas emitters only if the new source will emit certain pollutants above threshold amounts. The ""routine maintenance"" exemption from NSPSs and new source review, created by EPA and accepted by the courts despite statutory silence. Courts hold that whether the exemption applies depends on the increase in a plant's expected life due to the project, and the project's cost, nature, and magnitude. Expansive interpretation of the exemption has been judicially rejected. The ""bubble concept,"" an EPA approach that looks at net changes in the emissions of a pollutant from a facility, holding that its permissibility depends on statutory context. National standards for hazardous air pollutants, holding that EPA may determine if a facility triggers the Act's ""maximum achievable control technology"" requirement for such pollutants by aggregating emission sources in a contiguous plant under common control, not just sources within the same source category. EPA is not limited in setting emission standards to hazardous air pollutants currently controlled with technology. Greenhouse gas emissions, holding that the CAA generally covers them, and that EPA has to exercise that authority based on policy concerns. See, however, ""new source review"" above. Enforcement, holding that the recipient of an administrative compliance order must be allowed to seek pre-enforcement review of the order in court.",42,42 "Markup in Senate Committee: Considering Amendments. Senate rules pertaining to amending measures on the floor apply generally to a Senate committee markup as well. Within the confines of Senate rules, some committees have adopted their own rules governing the consideration of amendments during a markup. However, Senate committee markups can proceed informally, in accordance with a committee's particular needs and practices that have evolved over time. Senate and committee rules and committee practices governing the consideration of amendments during committee markup are summarized below. For more information on legislative process, see http://www.crs.gov/¬øproducts/¬øguides/¬øguidehome.shtml.",55,55 "Specialty Crop Issues in the 109th Congress. The U.S. specialty crop sector is comprised of producers, handlers, processors, and retailers of fruit, vegetable, tree nut, and nursery crops. The major U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) commodity price and income support programs do not include specialty crops, but the industry benefits generally from USDA programs related to trade, conservation, credit, protection from pests and diseases, domestic food assistance programs, crop insurance and disaster payments, research, and other areas. Certain programs of the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Labor also affect the specialty crop sector. The 108th Congress passed the first law intended to address selected issues of importance to the specialty crop industry as a whole (the Specialty Crops Competitiveness Act of 2004, P.L. 108-465). It is widely expected that this act will serve as the basis of more comprehensive debate on policies affecting the sector when the House and Senate Agriculture Committees begin consideration of the omnibus farm bill that would take effect when the current farm act (P.L. 107-171) expires in 2007. Another bill that might serve a similar purpose has been introduced in the 109th Congress. The Specialty Crops and Value-Added Agriculture Promotion Act (S. 1556) would amend the 2004 Act to make some of its authorities permanent, and to address issues related to trade, the revenue insurance program, and marketing opportunities for specialty crops. See CRS Report RL33520, Specialty Crops: 2008 Farm Bill Issues, by Renée Johnson for more information. Bills addressing a number of other industry-related issues were introduced in the 109th Congress. These include appropriations for the programs authorized in P.L. 108-465 (H.R. 2744), planting flexibility proposals that could have affected specialty crop supplies and prices (H.R. 2045/S. 1038, S. 194), and guest worker program reform (S. 359/H.R. 884, and others). This report summarizes the 109th Congress's activity on these bills and other specialty crop issues, and will not be updated.",3,3 "Terrorism Risk Insurance: Issue Analysis and Overview of Current Program. Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, coverage for losses from such attacks was normally included in general insurance policies without specific cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, such coverage became very expensive if offered at all. Because insurance is required for a variety of transactions, it was feared that the absence of insurance against terrorism loss would have a wider economic impact. Terrorism insurance was largely unavailable for most of 2002, and some have argued that this adversely affected parts of the economy. Congress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA, P.L. 107-297). TRIA created a temporary three-year Terrorism Insurance Program in which the government would share some of the losses with private insurers should a foreign terrorist attack occur. This program was extended in 2005 (P.L. 109-144) and 2007 (P.L. 110-160). The amount of government loss sharing depends on the size of the insured loss. In general terms, for a relatively small loss, private industry covers the entire loss. For a medium-sized loss, the federal role is to spread the loss over time and over the entire insurance industry, the government assists insurers initially but then recoups the payments through a broad levy on insurance policies afterwards. For a large loss, the federal government would cover most of the losses, although recoupment is possible in these circumstances as well. Insurers are required to make terrorism coverage available to commercial policyholders, but TRIA does not require policyholders to purchase the coverage. The prospective government share of losses has been reduced over time, but the 2007 reauthorization expanded the program to cover losses from acts of domestic terrorism. The TRIA program is currently slated to expire at the end of 2014. The specifics of the current program are as follows: (1) terrorist act must cause $5 million in insured losses to be certified for TRIA coverage, (2) the aggregate insured losses from a certified act of terrorism must be $100 million in a year for the government coverage to begin, and (3) an individual insurer must meet a deductible of 20% of its annual premiums for the government coverage to begin. Once these thresholds are passed, the government covers 85% of insured losses due to terrorism. If the insured losses are under $27.5 billion, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to recoup 133% of government outlays. As insured losses rise above $27.5 billion, the Secretary is required to recoup a progressively reduced amount of the outlays. At some high insured loss level, which will depend on the exact distribution of losses, the Secretary would no longer be required to recoup outlays, but retains the discretionary authority to do so. Since TRIA's passage, the private industry's willingness and ability to cover terrorism risk have increased. According to industry surveys, prices for terrorism coverage have generally trended downward, with approximately 60% of commercial policyholders purchasing coverage over the past few years. This relative market calm has been under the umbrella of TRIA coverage, and it is unclear how the insurance market would react to the expiration of the federal program. In the 113th Congress, five bills (H.R. 508, H.R. 1945, H.R. 2146, S. 2244, and H.R. 4871) have been introduced to amend the TRIA statute. S. 2244 passed the Senate on a vote of 93-4 on July 17, 2014. H.R. 4871 was reported by the House Financial Services Committee on July 16, 2014. Both bills would extend the TRIA program, but have a number of differences, particularly the length (seven years for S. 2244 vs. five years for H.R. 4871) and the program trigger (remaining at $100 million in S. 2244 vs. increasing to $500 million for non-Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, or Radiological [NCBR] terrorist events in H.R. 4871).",22,22 "Senate Prescription Drug Importation Legislation: A Side-by-Side Comparison of Current Law, S. 2307, S. 2328, and S. 2493. Senators Grassley, Dorgan, and Gregg have each introduced bills that address Congressional concerns with prescription drug importation that were not resolved by the provisions in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (the MMA, P.L. 108-173). S. 2307, the Reliable Entry for Medicines at Everyday Discounts through Importation with Effective Safeguards Act of 2004, introduced by Senator Grassley on April 8, 2004 [the Grassley bill] S. 2328, the Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2004, introduced by Senator Dorgan on April 21, 2004 [the Dorgan bill] and S. 2493, the Safe Importation of Medical Products and Other Rx Therapies Act of 2004, introduced by Senator Gregg on June 2, 2004 [the Gregg bill]. By continuing the major legal obstacle to importation -- the requirement that the Secretary of Health and Human Services first certify that imports are safe and offer cost savings to U.S. consumers, something no Secretary has been willing to do -- the MMA effectively does not allow the commercial or personal-use importation of prescription drugs. This report briefly discusses major differences among current law and the bills introduced in April and June 2004 and presents a side-by-side comparison of the provisions. Although all three bills seek to make lower-priced prescription drugs available to U.S. consumers by allowing importation while also ensuring that the drugs are safe and effective, they take different approaches. The three Senate bills use extensive registration, licensing, facility inspection, and records requirements to document an imported shipment's chain-of-custody requirements rather than the MMA's mandated laboratory testing of imported drugs to verify their content, potency, and labeling. Current law and the bills each have different lists of countries from which imports could be imported, and they provide the Secretary with different time frames and criteria for determining whether to permit commercial or personal-use importation. Secretarial reporting requirements vary as do mechanisms to fund the import activities: the MMA relies on appropriations, and the Senate bills each create specific user fee provisions. Only the Gregg bill requires the regulation of Internet pharmacies. The Grassley and Dorgan bills propose links to antitrust, patent, and internal revenue titles of the U.S. Code to influence industry behavior. The MMA does not specify when importation could begin. For commercial imports from Canada, the Grassley and Dorgan bills start 90 days from enactment, later for other countries, the Gregg bill allows imports from Canada only, beginning one year from enactment. The Grassley and Gregg bills allow personal-use imports from Canada upon enactment, with the Grassley bill's allowing other countries later, the Dorgan bill allows personal-use imports from Canada only, beginning 90 days after enactment.",66,66 "The State Role in the Federal Licensing of Hydropower Dams: S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection. On May 15, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection, unanimously holding that states, through water quality certification under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, can impose conditions on Federal Energy Regulatory Commission licensing (or relicensing) of hydropower facilities. The Court may have taken the case, involving a technical issue of statutory construction, to indulge its continuing interest in questions of federal-state allocation of authority under federal environmental statutes and elsewhere. States and environmental groups view Section 401 as an important tool for conditioning the construction and operation of federally licensed projects, and had feared that an adverse decision in S.D. Warren would hinder the ability of states to require measures to ameliorate the harmful effects of hydropower dams on water quality and aquatic life.",38,108 "The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010: Overview and Legal Analysis of Potential Interactions. Upon the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), as amended, certain questions have been raised about how the ACA might affect existing law. One such existing law, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), is a civil rights statute and has as its purpose the prohibition of discrimination against individuals on the basis of genetic information. In order to effectuate this prohibition, GINA not only contains certain requirements for health insurance and a general prohibition of employment discrimination provisions, but also has strong privacy protections. On the other hand, the ACA is comprehensive health care legislation that is intended to, among other things, enhance consumer protections in the private health insurance market. Both GINA and the ACA contain provisions affecting certain elements of health insurance, as well as employment-based wellness programs. The ACA, the more recent statute, does not specifically amend GINA and also does not reference GINA's requirements. The two laws serve different but complementary purposes, and there is no explicit conflict or contradiction in their terms. Still, the interaction of these two acts may be analyzed. This report provides a brief overview of GINA, an overview of relevant ACA and GINA provisions relating to the provision of health insurance through the private market and the implementation of employer wellness programs, and statutory analysis of the potential interactions between the related provisions in both laws.",19,19 "Geographical Indications and WTO Negotiations. The issue of expanding intellectual property protections for geographical indications for wines spirits, and agricultural products is being debated in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Geographical indications are important in international trade because they are commercially valuable. Some European and developing countries want to establish tougher restrictions and limits on the use of geographical names for products, while the United States and associated countries argue that the existing level of protection of such terms is adequate. Decisions about the future scope of protection of geographical indications will be made as the current (Doha) round of multilateral trade negotiations continues. Congress is monitoring the negotiations and their potential impacts on U.S. producers. This report will be updated as events warrant.",53,53 "President Bush's Proposed Medicare-Endorsed Drug Discount Card Initiative: Status and Issues. On July 12, 2001, President Bush announced a Medicare-endorsed prescription drug discount card program to help seniors lower their out-of-pocket drug costs. The President stated that the discount card program would be an interim measure until a broader Medicare prescription drug benefit for seniors can be created. Many seniors do not have adequate prescription drug coverage. In 1998, an estimated 10 million elderly people, or 27% of Medicare beneficiaries, did not have any form of prescription drug coverage. The Administration planned to implement the card program in January 2002, but it was put on hold because of a federal court order. Pharmacy groups successfully filed a lawsuit against CMS in 2001, asking a federal court to issue an injunction that would halt the card program on the grounds that the Administration had no statutory authority to establish the program. The Administration proceeded with plans to modify the program and use a formal rulemaking process for a new proposal. On August 30, 2002, CMS issued the final rule. Pharmacies continued to claim that the Administration lacked the statutory authority to implement the initiative. On January 29, 2003, a federal district court ruled that the Administration did not have the statutory authority to offer the card program. CMS issued a statement saying that it would be evaluating its options and it would likely appeal. In the 108th Congress, Representative Mark Foley introduced a bill (H.R. 513) in the House on January 31, 2003 to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to endorse prescription drug discount cards for use by Medicare beneficiaries. The proposed card program would be similar to prescription drug discount card programs that are currently available from a number of sources. The Administration's card would endorse and promote a number of qualified privately-administered prescription drug discount card plans which would have a one-time maximum enrollment rate of $25 per plan. Since the announcement of President Bush's proposal, several pharmaceutical companies have implemented their own senior discount card plans for low-income seniors beginning in early 2002. The Administration has stated that the Medicare-endorsed card plans would offer discounts in the range of 10% to 13%, and up to 15%, on retail prescription drug prices. The net overall effects of President Bush's proposed program would depend on the details of the individual card plans which are not yet available. Congressional critics of President Bush's proposal dispute the Administration's estimates of potential discounts. Some Members of Congress believe that the card program would not provide additional benefits for seniors. They cite a recent study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) on prescription drug discount prices available at retail pharmacies, Internet pharmacies, and existing drug discount card programs. The Members believe that the study indicates that seniors already have access to drug discount cards and that these programs offer little savings for seniors. This report will be updated as events warrant.",66,66 "The Family and Medical Leave Act: Background and U.S. Supreme Court Cases. This report provides background on the eligibility and notification requirements for taking leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (""FMLA""). The FMLA guarantees eligible employees 12 workweeks of unpaid leave for the birth or adoption of a child, for the placement of a foster child, for the care of a spouse, child, or parent suffering from a serious health condition, or for a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the employee's position. Since the FMLA's enactment in 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered two cases involving the statute. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. and Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs are discussed in this report. The report will be updated in response to the FMLA's amendment and relevant Supreme Court cases.",115,115 "The Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens: The Constitutionality of Congressional Term Limits and the Presidential Line Item Veto. Justice John Paul Stevens authored the majority opinions in both U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton and Clinton v. City of New York, which struck down term limits for federal legislators and the federal Line Item Veto Act, respectively. While the Supreme Court seems unlikely to address the constitutionality of term limits or the line-item veto in the future, Justice Stevens's conclusion that the absence of constitutional provisions expressly authorizing the exercise of certain powers constitutes a denial of these powers seems likely to influence the Court in the future, particularly in cases involving what Justice Kennedy and others have characterized as ""horizontal"" or ""vertical"" separation of powers. Horizontal separation of powers questions involve the relationship between the three branches of the federal government (i.e., legislative, executive, judicial), while vertical separation of powers questions involve the relationship between the federal government, state governments, and individual citizens. In Term Limits, the majority held that states lack the power to impose term limits on Members of Congress because the Constitution grants them no such power. Similarly, in Clinton, the majority held that a federal statute allowing the President to ""cancel"" certain provisions of law was unconstitutional because ""[t]here is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President"" to do so. Under these precedents, it would appear that a constitutional amendment would be necessary to allow for either congressional term limits or the presidential line-item veto. The opinions authored by Justice Stevens in Term Limits and Clinton are consistent with what commentators have characterized as his generally ""pro federalist"" approach to other issues, such as those involving the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. For a more in-depth discussion of his approach to federalism, see CRS Report R41244, The Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens: Selected Federalism Issues, by Kenneth R. Thomas.",55,92 "Publications of the U.S. Senate. The U.S. Senate produces several publications relating to the legislative functions of the Senate. They include, but are not limited to, publications dealing with rules and procedures, bills, anticipated and past legislative activities, committee matters, and chamber proceedings. This report provides a brief description of these publications.",55,55 "Federal White-Collar Pay: FY2005 Salary Adjustments. Federal white-collar employees are to receive an annual pay adjustment and a locality-based comparability payment, effective in January of each year, under Section 529 of P.L. 101-509, the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA) of 1990. The law has never been implemented as originally enacted, annual and locality payments have been reduced. In January 2005, they received a 2.5% annual pay adjustment and a 1.0% locality-based comparability payment under Executive Order 13368, issued by President George W. Bush on December 30, 2004. Although the federal pay adjustments are sometimes referred to as cost-of-living adjustments, neither the annual adjustment nor the locality payment is based on measures of the cost of living. The annual pay adjustment is based on the Employment Cost Index (ECI), which measures change in private-sector wages and salaries. The index showed that the annual across-the-board increase would be 2.5% in January 2005. The size of the locality payment is determined by the President, and is based on a comparison of non-federal and General Schedule (GS) salaries in 32 pay areas nationwide. By law, the disparity between non-federal and federal salaries was to be gradually reduced to 5% over the years 1994 through 2002, FEPCA requires that amounts payable may not be less than the full amount necessary to reduce the pay disparity to 5% in January 2005. The Federal Salary Council and the Pay Agent recommended that, to carry out FEPCA, the 2005 locality payments range from 18.14% in the ""Rest of the United States"" (RUS) pay area to 47.96% in the San Jose-San Francisco pay area. The payment recommended for the Washington, DC, pay area was 29.66%. Because the new locality rate replaces the existing locality rate, the change in locality rates is derived by comparing 2004 locality payments with those recommended for 2005. This comparison results in recommended net increases for 2005, if the ECI and locality-based comparability payments were granted as required by law, of 9.19% in the RUS pay area to 22.10% in the San Jose-San Francisco pay area, and 15.94% in the Washington, DC, pay area. The nationwide average net pay increase, if the ECI and locality-based comparability payments were granted as required by law, would have been 13.06% in 2005. President Bush's FY2005 budget proposed a 1.5% federal civilian pay adjustment. He proposed a 3.5% pay adjustment for the uniformed military, and a number of Members of Congress advocated the same pay adjustment for federal civilians. The Departments of Transportation and Treasury and Independent Agencies appropriations bill, 2005 -- H.R. 5025, as passed by the House of Representatives, and S. 2806, as reported in the Senate -- provides a 3.5% pay adjustment for federal civilian employees, including those in the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. This appropriations bill was incorporated as Division H of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818) which was signed by the President on December 8, 2004, and became P.L. 108-447. The President's budget for FY2006 proposes pay adjustments of 2.3% for federal civilian employees and 3.1% for the uniformed military. The same pay adjustment for both civilians and the military is advocated by several Members of Congress.",58,58 "Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Provisions in Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962). The 111th Congress has devoted considerable effort to health reform that seeks to increase health insurance coverage for more Americans and help to control costs, while improving quality and patient outcomes. The Affordable Health Choices for America Act (H.R. 3962) was introduced in the House of Representatives on October 29, 2009. H.R. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200, America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, originally introduced on July 14, 2009, and reported separately on October 14, 2009, by three House Committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means. H.R. 3962 was further modified by the manager's amendment posted on November 3, 2009. H.R. 3962, as passed by the House on November 7, 2009, proposes sweeping reforms of the health care delivery system, described in the three divisions. Division A, ""Affordable Health Care Choices,"" focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and small employers. Division B, ""Medicare and Medicaid Improvements,"" proposes modifications to the largest two public health insurance programs to make them consistent with provisions in Division A and to amend other provisions in existing federal statute. Division C, ""Public Health and Workforce Development,"" would amend and expand existing health professions and nursing workforce programs. A Republican alternative amendment in the nature of a substitute, dated November 3, 2009, is addressed in a separate CRS report. This report summarizes the major provisions affecting Medicaid and CHIP in H.R. 3962 (as passed), including modifications made by the manager's amendment. The report focuses primarily on provisions in Division B, Title VII—Medicaid and CHIP, plus selected provisions in Title IX—Miscellaneous Provisions. It also describes selected sections of Titles I and II of Division D, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act Amendments of 2009, related to improving access to Medicaid and CHIP for American Indians and Alaskan Natives. Due to the breadth of the changes proposed in H.R. 3962, some provisions of Divisions A and C also could affect Medicaid, but these are not Medicaid-specific. The Division B provisions would modify existing law and add new provisions affecting Medicaid eligibility, benefits, financing, waste, fraud, and abuse, payments to territories, demonstrations and pilot programs, and other miscellaneous Medicaid components. A major provision in Division B would expand Medicaid eligibility for traditional and non-traditional beneficiary categories up to 150% of the federal poverty level. The federal government would fully finance the costs for certain of these expanded beneficiary categories for periods before 2015, decreasing to 91% beginning in 2015. With respect to benefits, Medicaid programs would be required to cover preventive services, and would be allowed to cover nurse home visitation and birthing center services. There are a number of financing changes that would affect Medicaid under H.R. 3962, including reducing Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments by $10 billion by FY2019, increasing prescription drug rebates, and raising provider payments for certain primary care services. Additional waste, fraud, and abuse provisions affecting Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) include requirements to deny payment for health care acquired conditions, require new Medicaid Integrity Program evaluations and reports, and require states to implement a national correct coding initiative, similar to the Medicare program. Under H.R. 3962, spending caps for the territories would be increased, and a series of demonstrations would be approved, including a medical home program, an accountable care organization program, and a program for stabilization of emergency medical conditions by mental disease institutions.",70,70 "Selected Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions (""Tax Extenders""): In Brief. The Protecting Americans From Tax Hikes (PATH) Act, considered as an amendment to the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), was signed into law on December 18, 2015. That legislation made some tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2014 permanent, and extended others through the 2016 tax year. This report briefly summarizes and discusses selected items categorized as individual tax provisions. These and other temporary tax provisions that have been regularly extended for one or two years are often referred to as ""tax extenders."" Other bills in the 114th Congress would make provisions discussed in this report permanent, including the deduction for state and local sales taxes (H.R. 622) and the deduction for teacher's expenses (H.R. 2692 and H.R. 2940), both discussed in this report. Additional information on other extender provisions may be found in other CRS reports. These reports include CRS Report R43517, Recently Expired Charitable Tax Provisions (""Tax Extenders""): In Brief, by Jane G. Gravelle and Molly F. Sherlock, CRS Report R43510, Selected Recently Expired Business Tax Provisions (""Tax Extenders""), by Jane G. Gravelle, Donald J. Marples, and Molly F. Sherlock, CRS Report R43449, Recently Expired Housing Related Tax Provisions (""Tax Extenders""): In Brief, by Mark P. Keightley, and CRS Report R43541, Recently Expired Community Assistance-Related Tax Provisions (""Tax Extenders""): In Brief, by Sean Lowry. The four provisions discussed are Above-the-Line Deduction for Certain Expenses of Elementary and Secondary School Teachers, which the PATH Act modifies and makes permanent Deduction for State and Local Sales Taxes, which the PATH act makes permanent Above-the-Line Deduction for Qualified Tuition and Related Expenses, which the PATH Act extends through 2016, and Parity for Exclusion for Employer-Provided Mass Transit and Parking Benefits, which the PATH Act makes permanent. In terms of revenue, the most significant provision is the optional deduction for sales taxes, which is estimated to cost $42.4 billion over 10 years. The next largest is the classroom expense deduction at $2.9 billion, followed by the mass transit provision at $1.8 billion. The two-year extension for the deduction for tuition expenses is estimated to cost $0.6 billion.",102,102 "U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2015 Appropriations. Geographic proximity has forged strong linkages between the United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, with critical U.S. interests encompassing economic, political, and security concerns. U.S. policy makers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to advancing democracy and open markets since the 1990s. Current U.S. policy is designed to promote economic and social opportunity, ensure citizen security, strengthen effective democratic institutions, and secure a clean energy future. As part of broader efforts to advance these priorities, the United States provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with substantial amounts of foreign assistance. Trends in Assistance Since 1946, the United States has provided over $160 billion (constant 2012 dollars) in assistance to the region. Funding levels have fluctuated over time, however, according to regional trends and U.S. policy initiatives. U.S. assistance spiked during the 1960s under President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, and then declined in the 1970s before spiking again during the Central American conflicts of the 1980s. After another decline during the 1990s, assistance remained on a generally upward trajectory through the first decade of this century, reaching its most recent peak in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Aid levels for Latin America and the Caribbean have fallen in each of the past four fiscal years, however, as Congress has sought to trim the foreign aid budget and countries have been seen to require less assistance. FY2015 Obama Administration Request The Obama Administration's FY2015 foreign aid budget request would continue the recent downward trend in assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. The Administration requested some $1.3 billion to be provided through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which is 10% below the FY2014 estimate and 27% lower than the amount provided in FY2012—the last year before budget sequestration took effect. Under the request, the balance of U.S. assistance to the region would shift toward development aid and away from security aid, as each of the four major U.S. security initiatives would see cuts. Aid levels for Colombia, Haiti, and Mexico would decline, but they would continue to be the top three recipients in the region, accounting for 52% of all U.S. aid to Latin America and the Caribbean. Congressional Action In recent years, the annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measure has been the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews U.S. assistance. Although the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported out their respective bills (H.R. 5013 and S. 2499) in June 2014, no action was taken on those measures. After funding foreign aid programs through a series of continuing resolutions, Congress included foreign assistance appropriations in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), which the President signed into law on December 16, 2014. The legislation includes some $33.2 billion for bilateral economic assistance and international security assistance worldwide, this funding level is about 1.2% higher than the Administration's request (as amended), 9.6% higher than the House bill, and 5.7% higher than the Senate bill. It is unclear how much foreign assistance will be directed to each of the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, however, since, for the most part, appropriations levels for individual countries and programs are not specified in the legislation or the accompanying explanatory statement. Nevertheless, funding for a number of countries and programs will exceed the Administration's request. The legislation provides at least $24 million more than was requested for Colombia, $64 million more than was requested for Mexico, and $130 million more than was requested for the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).",79,79 "Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity. Congress's power to create rules governing the admission of non-U.S. nationals (aliens) has long been viewed as plenary. In the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, Congress has specified grounds for the exclusion or removal of aliens, including on account of criminal activity. Some criminal offenses, when committed by an alien who is present in the United States, may render that alien subject to removal from the country. And certain criminal offenses may preclude an alien outside the United States from being either admitted into the country or permitted to reenter following an initial departure. Further, criminal conduct may disqualify an alien from certain forms of relief from removal or prevent the alien from becoming a U.S. citizen. In some cases, the INA directly identifies particular offenses that carry immigration consequences, in other cases, federal immigration law provides that a general category of crimes, such as ""crimes involving moral turpitude"" or an offense defined by the INA as an ""aggravated felony,"" may render an alien ineligible for certain benefits and privileges under immigration law. The INA distinguishes between the treatment of aliens who have been lawfully admitted into the United States and those who are either seeking admission into the country or are physically present in the country without having been lawfully admitted. Aliens who have been lawfully admitted into the country may be removed if they engage in conduct that renders them deportable, whereas aliens who have not been legally admitted into the United States—including both aliens seeking initial entry into the United States as well as those who are physically present in the country but were never lawfully admitted—may be excluded or removed from the country if they have engaged in conduct rendering them inadmissible. Although the INA designates certain criminal activities and categories of criminal activities as grounds for inadmissibility or deportation, the respective grounds are not identical. Moreover, a conviction for a designated crime is not always required for an alien to be disqualified on criminal grounds from admission into the United States. But for nearly all criminal grounds for deportation, a ""conviction"" (as defined by the INA) for the underlying offense is necessary. Additionally, although certain criminal conduct may disqualify an alien from various immigration-related benefits or forms of relief, the scope of disqualifying conduct varies depending on the particular benefit or form of relief at issue. This report identifies the major criminal grounds that may bar an alien from being admitted into the United States or render an alien within the country removable. The report also discusses additional immigration consequences of criminal activity, including those that make an alien ineligible for certain relief from removal, including cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, withholding of removal, and asylum. The report also addresses the criminal grounds that render an alien ineligible to adjust to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, as well as those grounds barring LPRs from naturalizing as U.S. citizens. The report also discusses the scope of several general criminal categories referenced by the INA, including ""crimes involving moral turpitude,"" ""aggravated felonies,"" and ""crimes of violence.""",76,76 "Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO): Opportunities and Challenges. Debate over the creation of a federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) position has ebbed and flowed over the past five years as Congress has sought to address government information technology (IT) management issues. In private sector organizations, a CIO is often a senior decisionmaker providing leadership and direction for information resource development, procurement, and management, with a focus on improving efficiency and the quality of services delivered. Originally considered in an early draft of the Clinger-Cohen Act in 1995 (P.L. 104-106), the idea of a single federal CIO was dropped in favor of creating CIO positions within the executive agencies. The mixed results of agency-level CIOs, combined with a growing interest in better managing government IT resources has renewed attention in this issue. Efforts to coordinate electronic government (e-government) initiatives has also led some observers to call for an ""e-government czar"" or a federal CIO. During the 106th Congress a number of lawmakers made proposals to establish a federal CIO. In the House of Representatives one bill (H.R. 4670, Turner) would have established a federal CIO in an office outside of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). A second bill (H.R. 5024, Davis) had similar provisions but also provided a federal CIO with a broad mandate and budget authority to carry out federal IT projects, and the power to coordinate and execute government-wide information security efforts. Neither bill was passed in the last Congress. In May 2001 a Senate bill was introduced (S. 803, Lieberman), which included many of the House bills' provisions as well as new ones such the creation of a Federal IT Training Center. A companion House bill (H.R. 2458, Turner) was introduced in July 2001. On March 21, 2002, the Governmental Affairs Committee reported S. 803 (now renamed the E-Government Act of 2002) with an amendment. The Senate passed the bill unanimously on June 27, 2002. Although the Bush Administration has opposed creating a separate federal CIO, in June 2001 OMB announced the creation of a new position, the Associate Director of Information Technology and E-Government, who will report to the Deputy Director of Management (DDM) at OMB. The DDM, will be the federal CIO. Despite the OMB announcement, some policymakers suggest that many issues remain unresolved. One issue is the organizational placement of the position. There is disagreement over whether the federal CIO should be placed in OMB or if a new office should be established within the White House. A second issue is the scope of responsibility of the position. Some proponents suggest that the federal CIO should coordinate information security issues. Critics argue that individual agencies may believe they have a reduced obligation or will devote fewer resources to information security at a time when threats to information resources are climbing. Another area of concern is budgetary authority. Many observers consider some control over funding of IT projects critical to the success of a federal CIO, either by controlling a portion of the various agencies' budgets for IT projects or providing the federal CIO with a fund to support interagency projects.",58,56 "Congressional Action on FY2016 Appropriations Measures. This report provides information on the congressional consideration of the FY2016 regular appropriations bills and the FY2016 continuing resolution (CR). It also discusses the statutory and procedural budget enforcement framework for FY2016 appropriations. It will address the congressional consideration of FY2016 supplemental appropriations if any such consideration occurs. For all types of appropriations measures, discretionary spending budget enforcement under the congressional budget process has two primary sources. The first is the discretionary spending limits that are derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). The second source of budget enforcement is associated with the budget resolution. It imposes limits on both the total spending under the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committees (referred to as a ""302(a) allocation"") as well as spending under the jurisdiction of each of the Appropriations subcommittees (referred to as ""302(b) suballocations""). Certain spending is effectively not subject to these statutory and procedural limits, such as spending which is designated as ""Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism"" (OCO/GWOT) and ""disaster relief."" Disagreement over the appropriate level of discretionary spending—as well as its distribution between defense and nondefense activities—has significantly affected the focus of the FY2016 appropriations process. The FY2016 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 11) that was adopted by Congress provided a 302(a) allocation for the Appropriations Committees that was consistent with the statutory discretionary spending limits set in the Budget Control Act. However, the budget resolution also allowed for those funds to be supplemented by additional OCO/GWOT spending at a higher level than the amount requested by the President. On November 2, new levels for discretionary spending were established through the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015, H.R. 1314, P.L. 114-74). The BBA 2015 raises both the defense and nondefense statutory discretionary spending limits for FY2016 and FY2017 and specifies an expected level for the OCO/GWOT spending adjustment for each of those fiscal years. As of the date of this report, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have reported all 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2016. The House has passed six of these—Energy-Water (H.R. 2028), Military Construction-VA (H.R. 2029), Legislative Branch (H.R. 2250), Commerce-Justice-Science (H.R. 2578), Transportation-HUD (H.R. 2577), and Defense (H.R. 2685). The Senate has passed one regular appropriations bill—Military Construction-VA. Because none of the regular appropriations bills was expected to become law by the start of the fiscal year, a CR was enacted to provide temporary appropriations until December 11 (H.R. 719, P.L. 114-53). This report will be updated periodically during the FY2016 appropriations process. For information on the current status of FY2016 appropriations measures, see the CRS Appropriations Status Table: FY2016, at http://www.crs.gov/Pages/AppropriationsStatusTable.aspx.",59,59 "Western Water Resource Issues. For more than a century, the federal government has constructed water resource projects for a variety of purposes, including flood control, navigation, power generation, and irrigation. Growing population and changing values have increased demands on water supplies and river systems, resulting in water use and management conflicts throughout the country, particularly in the West, where the population is expected to increase 30% in the next 20-25 years. Debate over western water resources revolves around the issue of how best to plan for and manage the use of this renewable, yet sometimes scarce and increasingly sought after, resource. The 109th Congress is considering a number of bills on western water issues, including title transfer, water recycling, and rural water supply legislation, as well as Indian water rights settlement legislation.",108,43 "The World Trade Organization: The Hong Kong Ministerial. The World Trade Organization (WTO) held its 6th Ministerial summit in Hong Kong from December 13-18, 2005. WTO Ministerials are held every two years to bring together trade ministers from member states, often to make political decisions for the body. Although an original goal of the Ministerial was to agree on a package of modalities (methods by which the round is negotiated) for the ongoing Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round of trade negotiations, this aim was dropped in order to avoid a high-profile failure similar to previous Ministerials at Cancun and Seattle. Rather, members agreed to some modest advancements in agriculture, industrial tariffs, and duty and quota-free access for least developed countries. The final outcome of these negotiations could provide a substantial boost to the world economy, but if the round itself is not completed, there may be repercussions for the WTO as an institution and for the architecture of the world trading system.",53,53 "The ""Fiscal Cliff"": Macroeconomic Consequences of Tax Increases and Spending Cuts. A major policy concern for Congress has been when and whether to address the ""fiscal cliff,"" a set of tax increases and spending cuts that would have substantially reduced the deficit in 2013. In projections made in March 2012 by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), this fiscal restraint, constituting 5.1% of output in 2013, would have reduced growth to 0.5% from 4.4%. Unemployment would increase by 2 million. In August, updated estimates projected growth at a negative 0.5%. The American Taxpayer Relief Act (H.R. 8) eliminated part of the fiscal cliff. Policy choices with respect to the fiscal cliff are difficult because of the conflict between short-run and long-run economic and budgetary objectives. In the short run, the reduction in demand from the reduced budget deficits could damage an already fragile recovery. In the longer run, however, deficit reduction is needed to address a projected unsustainable debt level. For FY2013, compared with FY2012, the original policy-related fiscal cliff was projected at $502 billion, 80% reflecting tax increases, with an additional $105 billion from other changes. The expiration of the 2001, 2003, and 2009 tax cuts (extended in 2010) and the expiration of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) ""patch,"" which indexes the AMT exemption for inflation, accounted for 44% of the policy-related fiscal cliff. Other tax provisions included expiration of the temporary two percentage-point reduction in the employee's Social Security payroll tax (19%), the expiration of other tax cuts, including depreciation and the ""extenders"" (13%), and taxes scheduled to come into effect as a part of health reform (4%). Spending reductions included the automatic spending cuts under the Budget Control Act (13%), the expiration of extended unemployment insurance benefits (5%), and the ""doc fix"" that would have lowered Medicare payments (2%). Most changes would have taken effect after 2012, although the AMT and many of the extenders expired after 2011. CBO estimates were similar to those of other forecasters. Estimates are uncertain, CBO suggested a range of potential reductions in growth from 0.9% to 6.8% if the fiscal cliff occurred. Thus, the effects could have been much smaller, but they could also have been significantly larger, than CBO's mid-point estimate. Different parts of the cliff were projected to have different effects per dollar of budgetary effects, with larger effects from the automatic budget cuts and ending extended unemployment benefits than from ending tax cuts for higher-income individuals. H.R. 8 passed by the House on January 1, 2013 (after previous Senate approval) eliminated two-thirds of the policy-related fiscal cliff, and slightly over half of the total (including non-policy-related provisions). Thus about half of the contractionary effect remains, which would appear to reduce output by about 2%. H.R. 8 permanently extended the 2001 and 2003 income tax cuts, except for high-income taxpayers and the $5 million exemption for the estate taxes (but with a higher rate). It extended the 2009 cuts through 2017. It extended unemployment insurance benefits, the doc fix, and bonus depreciation and the ""extenders"" through 2013. It delayed the automatic spending cuts for two months. Elements of the fiscal cliff that will continue to reduce the deficit in 2013 compared with 2012, and potentially exert a contractionary effect, are the payroll tax reduction, which expired, some individual income tax cuts for high-income individuals, tax increases enacted in health reform, the remaining budget cuts, and non-policy-related effects.",99,101 "The Role of the President in Budget Development. The President is required to annually prepare and submit a comprehensive federal budget to Congress for the fiscal year that begins on October 1 (31 U.S.C. 1105). The President sets out his national priorities and proposes policy initiatives in the federal budget submitted to Congress soon after Congress convenes in January. The President’s budget submission provides him the opportunity to influence the agenda for the upcoming budget and policy debate in Congress. For more information on the budget process, see the CRS Guides to Congressional Processes at http://www.crs.gov/products/guides/guidehome.shtml.",55,101 "The ""1033 Program,"" Department of Defense Support to Law Enforcement. The United States has traditionally kept military action and civil law enforcement apart, codifying that separation in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. On the other hand, Congress has occasionally authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to undertake actions specifically intended to enhance the effectiveness of domestic law enforcement through direct or material support. One such effort is the so-called ""1033 Program,"" named for the section of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1997 that granted permanent authority to the Secretary of Defense to transfer defense material to federal and state agencies for use in law enforcement, particularly those associated with counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities. The 1997 act was preceded by 1988 legislation that expanded DOD's role in the interdiction of illicit drug trafficking. That was soon followed by temporary authority to transfer excess defense material, including small arms and ammunition, from excess DOD stocks to law enforcement agencies for use in counter-drug activities. This could be done at no cost to the receiving agency. The 1997 NDAA expanded that authority to include counter-terrorism activities and made it permanent. It is codified as 10 U.S.C. §2576a. The 1033 Program is administered by the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Under it, local and state law enforcement agencies may apply to DLA to participate. DLA requires the governor of the state to execute a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and appoint a state 1033 Program coordinator, who is responsible for ensuring that the program is properly administered within the state and that appropriate property records are maintained. Approved agencies may request material from DLA through their state coordinators. The LESO retains final approval authority over the types and quantities of material transferred from DOD excess stocks to the agencies. Any material requiring demilitarization before being released to the public must be returned to DLA when no longer needed by the receiving law enforcement agency. LESO states that 11,000 agencies nationwide are currently registered and that 8,000 of them use material provided through the 1033 Program.",97,97 "Tax Issues and the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: Legal Analysis of Payments and Tax Relief Policy Options. The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig and subsequent oil spill into the Gulf of Mexico has led to substantial damages, particularly in the form of lost wages and income. BP has begun to make interim payments to compensate for lost income resulting from the oil spill. Individuals and businesses impacted by the oil spill may file a claim with the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, an independent entity established to administer the claims, with payments coming from an escrow account funded by BP. The tax consequences of these payments to the recipients will depend on the nature of the underlying claim. Payments received for lost wages or income will generally be taxable, while payments for other types of claims, such as physical injury or damage of property, may qualify for exclusion or deferral. Given the magnitude of the economic disruption resulting from the spill, however, policymakers may consider exploring alternative mechanisms for providing relief to the affected region. In the past, Congress has used the tax code as a tool to provide relief to disaster victims. While the Gulf of Mexico oil spill has not been classified as a federally declared disaster, the tax code could be used as a mechanism for delivering additional relief. Tax policy options that could be explored include added casualty loss deductions, an extended net operating loss (NOL) period, employment incentives, enhanced access to retirement savings, and incentives for charitable relief. Similar policies were adopted following past disasters. However, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico presents lawmakers with unique challenges in using the tax code to provide relief. First, the oil spill is not a natural disaster. The oil spill is the result of human action where, unlike a natural disaster, compensation may be recovered from a financially responsible party. Second, the nature of the damages is different from those typically borne by victims of natural disasters. Specifically, damages may primarily be in the form of lost business income and employment, rather than direct property loss. Relief that has been awarded in the past, such as tax filing extensions to assist with the destruction of taxpayer records, is not likely to be an issue. Finally, if the goal is to provide relief or assistance to the poor, the tax code may not be the best policy instrument. Legislation has been introduced in the House and Senate that would provide tax relief to the Gulf Coast oil spill victims. The Oil Spill Tax Relief Act of 2010 (H.R. 5598) would require that any compensation provided by BP to an oil spill victim be treated as a qualified disaster payment, and thereby excluded from gross income for tax purposes. The Gulf Coast Access to Savings Act of 2010 (H.R. 5602) would allow for enhanced access to retirement savings. The Gulf Oil Spill Recovery Act of 2010 (H.R. 5699) would make various tax relief measures available to businesses and individuals. Similar to H.R. 5699, the Gulf Coast Oil Recovery Zone Tax Relief and Economic Recovery Act (S. 3934) would provide various forms of tax relief for businesses and individuals in the affected region.",41,41 "Is Biopower Carbon Neutral?. To promote energy diversity and improve energy security, Congress has expressed interest in biopower—electricity generated from biomass. Biopower, a baseload power source, can be produced from a large range of biomass feedstocks nationwide (e.g., urban, agricultural, and forestry wastes and residues). The two most common biopower processes are combustion (e.g., direct-fired or co-fired) and gasification, with the former being the most widely used. Proponents have stated that biopower has the potential to strengthen rural economies, enhance energy security, and minimize the environmental impacts of energy production. Challenges to biopower production include the need for a sufficient feedstock supply, concerns about potential health impacts to nearby communities from the combustion of biomass, and its higher generation costs relative to fossil fuel-based electricity. At present, biopower generally requires tax incentives to be competitive with conventional fossil fuel-fired electric generation. An energy production activity typically is classified as carbon neutral if it produces no net increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on a life-cycle basis. The legislative record shows minimal debate about the carbon status of biopower. The argument that biopower is carbon neutral has come under scrutiny in debate on its potential to help meet U.S. energy demands and reduce U.S. GHG emissions. Whether biopower is considered carbon neutral depends on many factors, including the definition of carbon neutrality, feedstock type, technology used, and time frame examined. Carbon flux (emission and sequestration) varies at each phase of the biopower pathway, given site- and operation-specific factors. A life-cycle assessment (LCA) is a common technique to calculate the environmental footprint, including the carbon flux, of a particular biopower pathway. However, past legislation would not have required a standardized LCA for biopower. The carbon-neutral status of biopower may be of concern to stakeholders, especially if Congress expands support for biopower. Questions such as where the feedstock supply for biopower originates, if it is managed in a sustainable manner, and whether the associated air-quality impacts from biopower generation are tolerable are part of the biopower carbon-neutrality debate. Congress may decide whether the current approach regarding the carbon status of biopower is acceptable or whether additional carbon accounting for biopower is warranted and what impact this accounting might have on renewable energy, agricultural, and environmental legislative goals. Two recent actions by the executive branch—the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Clean Power Plan (CPP), which addresses carbon dioxide (CO2) emission reductions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric power plants, and EPA's proposed framework to account for biogenic CO2 emissions from stationary sources—could focus attention on biopower's carbon neutrality. The CPP—which was granted a stay by the Supreme Court on February 9, 2016—requires states to devise a plan that allows them to reach a state-specific CO2 emission reduction goal by 2030, using various options, including renewable energy (e.g., biopower). In the CPP final rule, EPA specifies that ""qualified biomass"" may be included in a state plan given certain conditions. In November 2014, EPA released its second biogenic accounting framework. The framework addresses some of the EPA Science Advisory Board's recommendations from the first framework, released in 2011, including the finding that ""carbon neutrality cannot be assumed for all biomass energy a priori."" EPA acknowledges that the framework is an analytical methodology and that some stakeholders may consider it an example of how EPA may treat biogenic emissions in both the CPP and the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program. However, EPA reports that it ""has not yet determined how the framework might be applied in any particular regulatory or policy contexts or taken the steps needed for such implementation.""",37,37 "Older Unemployed Workers Following the Recent Economic Recession. Although the economic recession that began in December of 2007 has officially ended, unemployment rates still remain close to 10%. Especially hard hit have been older workers, aged 55 and older, for whom unemployment rates have reached historical highs. A combination of an increase in the number of older individuals re-entering the workforce and a limited number of job openings (i.e., weak demand for labor) is responsible for their historically high unemployment rate. Older unemployed workers face a unique set of challenges, distinct from those of their younger counterparts. The magnitude of these challenges will vary depending on individual circumstances. For example, although age discrimination laws may help older workers retain a job, these laws are less effective for older workers who have become unemployed and are searching for a new job as hiring discrimination cases may be harder to prove than termination cases. Following the recent economic recession, there is a significant number of job applicants for many positions, providing potential employers with a much broader pool of applicants from which to choose. In deciding whom to choose, many employers may view older workers as more costly in terms of both compensation and health care costs relative to younger workers. Furthermore, most public programs providing income support and health insurance for the unemployed are targeted toward those who have recently lost their jobs (regardless of age). For example, unemployment insurance generally does not provide assistance to the older unemployed who may be returning to the workforce after an extended absence (e.g., retirement). In many cases, their ability to access other resources will depend on their age. For example, some older workers may not be eligible for public programs such as Social Security and Medicare until they reach a certain age. In addition, restrictions on access to retirement savings and home equity under a reverse mortgage are also tied to age. Finally, although the enactment of health care reform will eventually improve access to health insurance coverage for the older unemployed under the age of 65, most of these provisions will not be effective until 2014. Unemployed older workers also experience longer durations of unemployment compared to younger cohorts. Older workers are unemployed, on average, over five weeks longer than their younger counterparts. About 41% of those aged 55 and older are unemployed for more than one year, compared with 34% of younger workers. Longer durations and less time to replenish lost income before retiring may lead to a less secure future retirement. This report first looks at historical trends in unemployment and labor force participation among older workers, the reasons for becoming unemployed, and the duration of their unemployment. It then identifies the challenges that certain subgroups of older workers may face and the availability of financial resources and health insurance coverage during their spell of unemployment.",103,103 "Recently Expired Housing Related Tax Provisions (""Tax Extenders""): In Brief. SUPRESS SUMMARY On December 18, 2015, a set of temporary tax provisions that are regularly extended and that are commonly known as ""tax extenders"" was retroactively extended by Division Q of P.L. 114-113—the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act (or ""PATH"" Act). Some of the extensions are permanent, others are temporary. This report briefly summarizes and discusses the economic impact of the four housing related tax provisions included in P.L. 114-113. These provisions include (1) the tax exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, (2) the deduction for qualified mortgage insurance premiums, (3) the so-called 4% and 9% low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) floors, and (4) the exclusion of military housing allowances for purposes of the LIHTC program. H.R. 2029",102,75 "Hydropower: Comparison of Selected Provisions in S. 2012, as Engrossed in the House, and S. 2012, as Engrossed in the Senate. In the 114th Congress, the House and Senate have passed energy legislation that addresses hydropower. Both the North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2016 (S. 2012, as engrossed in the House) and the Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2016 (S. 2012, as engrossed in the Senate) contain provisions that would alter the regulation and development of nonfederal hydropower, among other things. Both bills would establish a formal timeline for nonfederal hydropower project regulation, would appoint the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as the lead agency for nonfederal hydropower regulation, and would require FERC—and other agencies—to maintain and make publicly available more robust hydropower project data. There are similarities and differences between the bills. Both bills generally seek to modify regulation and development processes for nonfederal hydropower. However, the bills would modify the regulatory process in different ways. For instance, the bills would handle the delay of issuing a hydropower project license due to interagency disputes differently, the House version would resolve such a delay in a federal circuit court, whereas the Senate version would resolve such a delay by referring the issue to the chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality. Further, each bill would address some aspects of hydropower that the other bill would not address. For instance, the House version contains a provision that would address hydropower development at existing, non-powered dams, whereas the Senate version does not contain a similar provision. Lastly, both bills would modify the regulation process for specific projects (e.g., extends the time period to start construction for a specific project). Both the House and Senate versions contain hydropower provisions that could significantly impact nonfederal hydropower regulation and could be viewed as controversial. For example, both bills would make FERC the lead agency to coordinate the licensing process. This designation could be viewed by some as lessening the contribution of other involved agencies because these agencies would be required to abide by the schedule and decisions set by FERC. It could also be viewed as making the license issuance process timelier because one agency would have leadership authority for the process. This report provides a comparison of the hydropower provisions in each bill and analysis for certain provisions of the bills.",38,37 "Legal Issues Related to Proving ""Service Connection"" for VA Disability Compensation: Statutory Presumptions. This report provides a basic overview of various statutory presumptions that help veterans substantiate a service-connected claim for disability compensation.",30,30 """Regulatory Relief"" for Banking: Selected Legislation in the 114th Congress. The 114th Congress is considering legislation to provide ""regulatory relief"" for banks. The need for this relief, some argue, results from new regulations introduced in response to vulnerabilities that were identified during the financial crisis that began in 2007. Some have contended that the increased regulatory burden—the cost associated with government regulation and its implementation—is resulting in significant costs that restrain economic growth and consumers' access to credit. Others, however, believe the current regulatory structure strengthens financial stability and increases protections for consumers, and they are concerned that regulatory relief for banks could negatively affect consumers and market stability. Regulatory relief proposals, therefore, may involve a trade-off between reducing costs associated with regulatory burden and reducing benefits of regulation. This report discusses regulatory relief legislation for banks in the 114th Congress that, at the time this report was published, has seen legislative action. Many, but not all, of the bills would make changes to the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203), wide-ranging financial reform enacted in response to the financial crisis. The bills analyzed in this report would provide targeted regulatory relief in a number of different areas Safety and Soundness Regulations. Safety and soundness, or prudential, regulation is designed to ensure that a bank maintains profitability and avoids failure. After many banks failed during the financial crisis, the reforms implemented in the wake of the crisis were intended to make banks less likely to fail. While some view these efforts as essential to ensuring that the banking system is safe, others view the reforms as having gone too far and imposing excessive costs on banks. Examples of legislation include changes to the Volcker Rule, capital requirements, liquidity requirements applied to municipal bonds, and enhanced regulation for large banks. Mortgage and Consumer Protection Regulations. Several bills would modify regulations issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a regulator created by the Dodd-Frank Act to provide an increased regulatory emphasis on consumer protection. The Dodd-Frank Act gave the CFPB new authority and transferred existing authorities to it from the banking regulators. Many regulatory relief proposals could be viewed in light of a broader policy debate about whether the CFPB has struck the appropriate balance between consumer protection and regulatory burden. One legislative focus has been several mortgage-related CFPB rulemakings pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act. Supervision and Enforcement. Supervision refers to regulators' power to examine banks, instruct banks to modify their behaviors, and to impose reporting requirements on banks to ensure compliance with rules. Enforcement is the authority to take certain legal actions, such as impose fines, against an institution that fails to comply with rules and laws. Although regulators generally view their supervisory and enforcement actions as striking the appropriate balance between ensuring that institutions are well managed and minimizing the burden facing banks, others believe the regulators are overreaching and preventing banks from serving their customers. Examples of legislation include changes to call reports and bank exams, as well as legislation addressing ""Operation Chokepoint."" Capital Issuance. Banks are partly funded by issuing capital to investors. Disclosure requirements and investor protections may better inform investors about the risks that they are assuming but can make it more costly for institutions to raise capital. Whereas some view these existing regulatory requirements as important safeguards that ensure investors are making educated decisions, others see them as unnecessary red tape that stymies capital formation. The capital issuance legislative proposals discussed in this report are generally geared toward making it easier for financial institutions to raise funds. Congress faces the question of how much discretion to give regulators in granting relief. Some bills leave it up to the regulators to determine how much relief should be granted, whereas others make relief mandatory. Some bills provide relief in areas regulators have already reduced regulatory burden. Some of the legislation is focused on providing relief for small banks, whereas other bills provide relief to the entire industry.",5,5 "S. 2271: The Property Rights Implementation Act of 1998. On July 7, 1998, Senator Hatch introduced S. 2271, the ""Property Rights Implementation Act of 1998."" The bill appears to be the likely replacement on the Senate floor for H.R. 1534 as reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. S. 2271 retains the basic ""process"" approach of its predecessor, but makes numerous changes. Among these are a restriction of H.R. 1534 's takings-ripeness provisions to real property rather than all types of property, a new definition of ""futility,"" different restrictions on district court abstention and new provisions as to attorneys fees and prior notice applicable to parties suing local governments for takings under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.",17,17 "Africa Backgrounder: History, U.S. Policy, Principal Congressional Actions. Congress has dealt repeatedly with issues related to sub-Saharan Africa since the late 1950s. This report provides basic background on Africa and its history, U.S. policy, and congressional involvement, for the general congressional reader. The modern human species is believed to have emerged in Africa approximately 200,000 years ago. Perhaps 2,500 years ago, the Bantu people began to expand from a West African base gradually spreading a complex agricultural system over much of the continent. Africanists generally agree that loyalties to large ethnic groups, a key factor in African politics today, were largely absent in pre-colonial Africa. The Atlantic slave trade, which began about 1450 and lasted 400 years, removed millions of people in their most productive years from Africa and left the continent ill-prepared to cope with the European ""scramble for Africa."" From the 1870s through the early twentieth century, nearly the entire sub-Saharan region was divided among the European powers. The Europeans built a basic economic infrastructure, but imposed a bureaucratic system of government and strengthened traditional chiefs and other ""big men"" to help them rule. These patterns deepened divisions in African societies and strengthened anti-democratic patterns of government. After World War II, African nationalists organized political parties and began to demand independence. By the early 1960s, independence had come to most of eastern and western Africa but white minority rule persisted in southern Africa, ending only in 1994, when universal-suffrage elections were held in South Africa. In the first years of the 1960s, there were high hopes that the end of colonialism would bring rapid economic growth. Instead, Africa confronted a number of problems, including inefficient state-centered economic systems, frequent military coups, ethnic strife, and corruption. The Cold War contributed to Africa's difficulties, flooding the continent with arms and strengthening a number of repressive regimes that had superpower backing. French policy also tended to bolster authoritarian governments in former French colonies. In the early 1990s, hopes for Africa's future revived following widespread political and economic reforms and the end of the Cold War. Later in the decade, however, the pace of reforms slowed and central Africa fell into an era of violent conflict. ""Afro-pessimists"" believe that these developments have gravely damaged Africa's prospects, but others argue that they are temporary problems masking an underlying ""African Renaissance."" The Clinton Administration sided with the Afro-optimists,"" despite frustrations over the war in Congo (formerly Zaire) and other problems. The 106th Congress passed legislation to strengthen U.S.-African economic ties and to boost spending to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa and worldwide. Previous Congresses acted on a number of African issues, including African food security, apartheid in South Africa, and covert U.S. involvement in Angola.",85,85 "Conservation Reserve Program Payments: Self-Employment Income, Rental Income, or Something Else?. Under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), owners and operators of eligible land may enter into a contract with the Secretary of Agriculture to enroll land in the program and convert it to less intensive use under an approved conservation plan. In return, participants receive an annual payment that the statute refers to as ""rent."" Legislation establishing and extending the program has been silent as to the appropriate tax treatment of these payments. For many years, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) generally treated the payments as farming income when received by someone who was engaged in the trade or business of farming, but as rental income when received by others. The IRS's position appears to have changed to one that would treat all Conservation Reserve Program payments as farming income and, thus, subject to self-employment tax. Recently, the IRS published a proposed revenue ruling that explains its treatment of CRP payments as income from the trade or business of farming and, thus, subject to self-employment tax. Currently, case law provides some support for the IRS's position that the CRP's annual rental payments are not rent that is excludible from self-employment tax. This case law has not, however, considered CRP payments received by individuals who were not previously engaged in farming and who have purchased property and immediately enrolled it in the CRP (or agreed to continue the enrollment begun by the previous owner/operator). Neither have courts considered CRP payments to those who hire third parties to perform activities required by the CRP contract. The possibility that the payments may not constitute self-employment income even if they do not qualify as excludible rent has not been considered by either the courts or the IRS. Neither has yet considered the statutory requirement that all payments must be returned if the contract is terminated. The Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2007 (S. 2242), introduced in the 110th Congress, contained provisions that would exclude CRP payments from self-employment income for some taxpayers and would allow all recipients to choose to receive a tax credit in lieu of the payments. These provisions were incorporated into the 2007 Farm Bill (H.R. 2419), which is in conference. This report outlines the history of the program, the changing positions of the IRS, pertinent case law, and other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Several possible approaches to the taxation of CRP payments are discussed.",3,43 "U.S. - European Union Disputes in the World Trade Organization. U.S.-EU relations have been affected by a number of trade disputes in recent years. While the majority of trade disputes do get resolved, attempts to settle some of the disputes have been met with refusal or inability by one or another of the parties to comply in a timely manner with the World Trade Organization (WTO) panel rulings. The 108th Congress inherits several of these disputes where the WTO has ruled that U.S. laws violate trade obligations. Absent U.S. compliance through legislative action, the EU could in some cases decide to retaliate against U.S. exports this year or next. In the meantime, the EU remains in non-compliance with its WTO obligations to allow imports of beef treated with hormones. Beyond raising U.S.-EU trade tensions, non-compliance by a key WTO member arguably weakens the credibility and authority of the WTO and its dispute settlement process. The initiation and resolution of disputes under WTO agreements is carried out under the Uruguay Round Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), considered a cornerstone of the WTO system. The WTO dispute settlement process has a more quasi-judicial orientation than the quasi-diplomatic orientation of the prior GATT system, in which negotiation and conciliation generally prevailed over multilateral enforcement of rules. The DSU provides for virtually automatic establishment of panels, adoption of panel and appellate reports and, where requested, authorization to impose retaliatory measures, deadlines are set out for various stages of the process. These features ensure that complaints are heard and promote implementation of WTO rulings, thus making available to all WTO Members the means to clarify trade rules and redress trade injury. At the same time, the process continues to retain certain diplomatic elements in that its primary aim is to ""secure a positive solution to a dispute,"" with the preferred outcome being a ""solution mutually acceptable to the parties to the dispute and consistent with the covered agreements."" Opportunities for settlement are provided at a number of points in a procedure. U.S. and EU instances of longstanding non-compliance have for the most part not involved routine commercial disputes over trade or customs regulations, but rather tax policy and internal national regulation, particularly of social and health matters. While ambiguity in WTO agreements may give rise to disputes in these difficult areas, the automatic features of the DSU also allow parties to pursue such cases through the full dispute process, even though it may be evident from the outset that implementation of an adverse WTO ruling may be subject to overwhelming domestic opposition in the defending country. To deal with the problem of non-compliance in difficult cases, both Washington and Brussels may need to give greater attention to a number of concerns and policy considerations, including choice of cases initiated, limitations on panel decisions, role of mediation and conciliation, and adoption of remedies that are trade liberalizing. Assuming that some disputes are not well-suited for the DSU process, greater efforts may be needed to settle differences through bilateral negotiations and political compromises, through mediation, or by agreeing to arbitration from an outside (i.e., non-WTO) party. This report will be updated periodically. For more on the WTO dispute settlement process and U.S.-EU Trade Relations, see CRS Report RS20088 and CRS Issue Brief IB10087.",53,53 "Grassroots Lobbying: Constitutionality of Disclosure Requirements. The disclosure by professional lobbyists and commercial lobbying firms of expenditures or payments for ""grassroots"" lobbying campaigns continues to be an issue of importance to reformers both inside and outside of Congress. Legislative proposals, such as S. 1, 110th Congress and H.R. 4682, 109th Congress, had originally sought to extend public reporting requirements for some paid activities intended to stimulate ""grassroots"" lobbying. The lobbying and ethics reform legislation eventually enacted into law in 2007, the ""Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007"" (P.L. 110-81,121 Stat. 735 [S. 1, 110th Congress]) did not, however, include ""grassroots"" lobbying disclosure requirements. As to the constitutionality of requiring such disclosures, it should be noted that the activities involved in ""lobbying,"" including the stimulation of ""grassroots"" lobbying, clearly implicate and involve freedoms protected by the First Amendment, including speech, associational rights, and the right to petition the government. The courts have long found, however, that some burden on these fundamental rights may be tolerated when a law promotes significant governmental interests, when the burdens on such activities are, at the most, indirect (such as in disclosure laws), and when the statute is drawn with enough precision so that a correlation exists between the information required to be disclosed and the achievement of the interests asserted as the law's justification. Under such standards, the courts have upheld against facial First Amendment challenges required disclosures in the areas of lobbying activities and campaign financing to promote the interests of preventing corruption and limiting the undue influences of monied and powerful interests, as well as preventing merely the ""appearance"" of such influence, in basic governmental and democratic processes. The apparent trend in more recent judicial decisions seems to allow the legislatures some leeway in determining which activities are relevant to the goals of preserving the integrity of, for example, their own legislative process, and so to include also in required disclosures some activities that are more on the periphery and not necessarily themselves directly involved in such process, but are intended to result in direct contacts and to significantly influence a legislator. In both state and federal courts, state provisions that reach ""indirect"" or ""grassroots"" lobbying have increasingly been upheld against facial constitutional challenges. Courts have recognized the growth of importance of these efforts in the legislative process, and the increased need for legislators and others to be able to identify and assess pressures on legislators. Under the analysis applied in these cases, it would appear that a federal statute that requires only disclosure and reporting, and does not prohibit activity, and that reaches only those who are compensated to engage in a certain amount of the covered activity, would appear to fit within those types of provisions upheld in past cases when the statute is narrowly drafted to exclude groups, organizations, and citizens who do no more than advocate, analyze, and discuss public policy. Even with the probability of such a crafted statute withstanding a ""facial"" challenge, the law might still be subject to an ""as applied"" challenge if a particular group could show a reasonable probability that the disclosures required would result in harassment or reprisals against members.",61,61 Casework in a Congressional Office. This report and its appendices present a general overview of congressional office procedures associated with handling casework and the assistance provided by a Member of Congress to help constituents in their dealings with federal agencies. It discusses options for assisting Members' constituents and the role of Members and staff in providing casework services.,55,55 "Iraq Agriculture and Food Supply: Background and Issues. Iraq's agricultural sector represents a small but vital component of Iraq's economy. Over the past several decades agriculture's role in the economy has been heavily influenced by Iraq's involvement in military conflicts, particularly the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War, and by varying degrees of government effort to promote and/or control agricultural production. Rapid population growth coupled with limited arable land and a general stagnation in agricultural productivity has steadily increased dependence on imports to meet domestic food needs since the mid-1960s. Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq was a major trading partner with the U.S. Iraq benefitted from substantial USDA agricultural export credit during the 1980s to purchase large quantities of U.S. agricultural commodities. By the mid-1980s Iraq was the major destination for U.S. rice exports. Iraq was also an important purchaser of U.S. wheat, corn, soymeal, and cotton. After the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. agricultural export credit to Iraq was ended and USDA was left with $2 billion in unpaid credit. U.S. agricultural trade with Iraq remained negligible through 2002. Present-day Iraqi agriculture and trade have been heavily shaped by the 1990 U.N. sanctions and the Iraqi government's response to them. From 1991 to 1996, prior to the startup of the U.N.'s Oil-For-Food program (OFFP), Iraq's agricultural imports averaged $958 million or less than half of the pre-war level. Under the OFFP, the value of Iraq's agricultural imports rebounded to average $1.5 billion (during the 1997-2002 period). In early 2003, just prior to the U.S. -- Iraq War, the country's agricultural sector remained beset by the legacy of past mis-management, unresolved disputes over land and water rights, and the lingering effects of a severe drought during 1999-2001. Clearly, Iraq will be dependent on imports for fully meeting domestic food demand for several years to come. In the near term, food aid shipments are likely to play a major role in determining the share of Iraq's agricultural imports, and may influence the evolution of future commercial imports. This report is an extension of CRS Report RS21516, ""Iraq's Agriculture: Background and Status."" It provides a brief description of Iraq's agro-climatic setting and the history of agricultural policy, production, and trade leading up to the period just prior to the 2003 Gulf War, it reviews issues likely to affect the long-term outlook for Iraq's agricultural production and trade, and it provides several tables of historical data relevant to understanding the evolution of Iraq's agricultural production and trade. This report will be updated as events warrant. For detailed discussion on the status of humanitarian aid efforts, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance. For discussion on the U.N. Oil-For-Food Program and trade during the decade of the 1990s see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.",85,85 "The Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the 112th Congress: Conflicting Values and Difficult Choices. The Endangered Species Act (ESA, P.L. 93-205, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543) was enacted to increase protection for, and provide for the recovery of, vanishing wildlife and vegetation. Under ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) can be listed as endangered or threatened according to assessments of their risk of extinction. Habitat loss is the primary cause for listing species. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to aid its recovery and protect its habitat. Accordingly, when certain resources are associated with listed species—such as water in arid regions like California, old growth timber in national forests, or free-flowing rivers—ESA is seen as an obstacle to continued or greater human use of these resources. ESA may also be controversial because dwindling species are usually harbingers of broader ecosystem decline or conflicts. As a result, ESA is considered a primary driver of large-scale ecosystem restoration issues. Major issues concerning ESA in recent years have included the role of science in decision making, critical habitat (CH) designation, incentives for property owners, and appropriate protection for listed species, among others. Although many bills were introduced, little legislation related to ESA was enacted by the 112th Congress. Committees conducted oversight of the implementation of various federal programs and laws that address threatened and endangered species. P.L. 112-10 (final appropriations for FY2011) included a legislative delisting of a portion of the reintroduced Rocky Mountain gray wolf population. P.L. 112-74 provided slightly more than $237 million for FWS endangered species and related programs, this FY2012 funding for FWS core ESA programs was 0.5% more than the FY2011 enacted amount and 3.5% less than the FY2012 Administration request. P.L. 112-270 amended P.L. 106-392 to maintain annual base funding for the Upper Colorado and San Juan fish recovery programs through FY2019. The authorization for spending under ESA expired on October 1, 1992. The prohibitions and requirements of ESA remain in force, even in the absence of an authorization, and funds have been appropriated to implement the administrative provisions of ESA in each subsequent fiscal year. Proposals to reauthorize and extensively amend ESA were last considered in the 109th Congress, but none were enacted. No legislative proposals were introduced in the 110th, 111th, or 112th Congresses to reauthorize ESA. This report discusses oversight issues and legislation that was introduced in the 112th Congress to address ESA implementation and management of endangered and threatened species.",47,47 "China's Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S. Interests. The relatively shallow and resource-rich waters surrounding the People's Republic of China (PRC) are of growing economic and strategic importance, yet they often remain invisible in the American foreign policy process. The United States, along with most of the international community, regards these as international waters, through which approximately half of the world's sea-going commercial shipments pass each year. Consequently, a primary U.S. economic and strategic objective in the region has been the maintenance of freedom-of-navigation through these waters. But apart from their economic and strategic importance, the semi-enclosed South and East China Seas are filled with political and diplomatic complexities. Nine surrounding states have competing territorial claims to the hundreds of various islets, shoals, reefs, and maritime zones in these waters. The common claimant in all cases is the PRC, which increasingly has sought to define its sovereignty and economic exclusivity here in the broadest possible way hundreds of miles from its shores, to include the Spratly Islands, Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Senkaku Islands. Successful prosecution of these wide-ranging maritime claims by the PRC could greatly change the economic and strategic make-up of the region. Other claimants of these islands and maritime zones include countries with which the United States has defense commitments, such as Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines, making peaceful resolution of these claims an important U.S. interest. In addition to claims of sovereignty over the islands and reefs in these waters, the PRC increasingly is narrowly interpreting provisions of international law that govern activity in the 200-mile maritime zone -- the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) -- off its coast. As demonstrated by the April 2001 U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane incident, the PRC now appears to be arguing that its 200-mile maritime jurisdiction extends to the airspace over its EEZ. Moreover, the PRC is claiming that the freedom of navigation and overflight in EEZs provided under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) should be subordinate to the broad jurisdiction of the sovereign state -- not, as the LOS Convention is generally read, subject only to the economic and resource-related rights of the sovereign state. In addition to their economic implications, competing regional maritime claims and disagreements over provisions of international law have far-ranging security implications. The PRC views its southern coast as fairly vulnerable, particularly to U.S. naval forces. Although PRC military forces are still limited, the PRC is steadily expanding its presence in the South China Sea pre-positioning supplies and equipment and building up outposts on various islands. Some believe that over the longer term, continued PRC expansion and assertiveness in these maritime regions will put Beijing in a position to more effectively challenge U.S. economic, political, and security interests in the region.",84,85 "Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber. The Department of Defense is developing a new long-range bomber aircraft, the B-21 Raider (previously known as LRS-B), and proposes to acquire at least 100 of them. B-21s would initially replace aging B-1 and B-52 bombers, and would possibly replace B-2s in the future. B-21 development was highly classified until the summer of 2015, when the Air Force revealed initial details of the aircraft and the program. Although technical specifications and other data remain out of public view, many details of the budget, acquisition strategy, procurement quantities, and other aspects of the B-21 program are now in the public arena. The Administration's FY2018 budget request includes $2.0 billion for further development of the B-21. As a new and large defense program that involves issues of defense and nuclear policy, as well as substantial expenditures, the B-21 is likely to be subject to significant congressional interest.",31,31 "Issues in Klamath River Dam Relicensing. PacifiCorp, a large utility in the western United States, owns and operates seven hydroelectric dams in the Klamath River basin. The dams produce 151 megawatts of electricity but they have blocked fish passage in the river, which has led environmental and fishing interests to oppose the dams. The dams' operating license expired on March 1, 2006. As part of the new license application, under the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. §811) the Departments of Interior and Commerce submitted preliminary prescriptions on dam operations and fishway construction to allow upstream and downstream fish passage at four of the dams. However, as allowed by §241 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), PacifiCorp has proposed alternatives to the federal fishway preliminary prescriptions that include trapping and transporting fish around the dams. FERC will base its final licensing decision on the result of the §241 hearing and comments received on its draft environmental impact statement. This case was the first to go through the new hearing process under P.L. 109-58, §241. A judge ruled that the government's preliminary prescriptions would benefit species in the basin. The Departments of Commerce and the Interior have since issued final mandatory conditions requiring fishways at the Klamath dams. The 110th Congress may examine the results of this case, and might consider legislation on the §241 process and on Klamath River basin management.",38,108 "Efforts to Delay the Gradual Elimination of Flood Insurance Premium Subsidies. On July 6, 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Division F, Title II, P.L. 112-141, 126 Stat. 918) to reauthorize the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) through September 30, 2017, and make significant program changes designed to make the program more financially stable. To achieve long-term financial sustainability and ensure that flood insurance rates more accurately reflect the actuarial risk of flooding, the new law gradually phases out subsidized premiums and grandfathered policies for approximately 19% (or about 1.1 million policyholders) of the program's total number of policyholders. Under the Biggert-Waters Act, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) began imposing premium rates based on the property's ""elevation rate,"" which, in turn, is based on the property's lowest floor elevation relative to the Base Flood Elevation (BFE) for existing homes and businesses built prior to the community's initial Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM). Since 1973, these so-called pre-FIRM structures had been shielded from higher premium rates. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572) included a provision for subsidizing pre-FIRM structures by charging less than full risk-based premiums for flood insurance because their construction took place before the application of the NFIP construction standards. These structures are also exempt from the NFIP's mitigation requirements unless they become substantially damaged or substantially improved. Thus, with the elevation of the property now being a factor in the rating process, owners of certain properties—that is, those property owners with federally insured mortgages residing in government-designated, flood-prone areas—now face relatively larger flood insurance premium rate increases. Importantly, this transition toward full-risk premium rates for generally older and more risky properties has occurred before FEMA's completion of a congressionally mandated affordability study The impact of moving to full-risk premiums by eliminating the pre-FIRM premium subsidies, as required by the Biggert-Waters Act, is being felt in virtually all 21,000 NFIP communities across the nation. The impact of elimination of the subsidies on non-principle residential properties (i.e., second homes), business properties, and new or lapsed policies has been particularly felt in communities with a relatively high proportion of high-risk flood-prone pre-FIRM properties. In addition to its impact on property owners, the elimination of the subsidy affects local community economic development as well as debates concerning how to equitably distribute the burden of recovering from flood events. Opponents of eliminating subsidized rates argue that the Biggert-Waters Act does not explicitly address the affordability concerns of existing policyholders in high-risk flood zones and FEMA does not have sufficient data on policyholders' ability to pay, however, the agency has begun implementing sharply higher flood insurance rates for some policyholders. Proponents of eliminating subsidized rates maintain that Congress explicitly found that ensuring the long-term financial stability of the NFIP is in the public interest and the Biggert-Waters law seeks to further this goal by transitioning subsidized rates to actual risk-based rates. Removal of premium subsidies and grandfathered policies would reduce taxpayer costs associated with a fiscally unsound government insurance program while reducing the arguably hidden financial incentives that encourage building in flood-prone and environmental sensitive coastal areas. The key policy questions facing Congress with respect to the post-reform NFIP issues include addressing the affordability issue deciding whether, how, and when to privatize flood risk exploring options for improving flood risk analysis and maps, and finding innovative new approaches to financing the nation's increasing exposure to hurricane-induced catastrophic floods and coastal hazards. On January 17, 2014, President Barack Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (Division F, Title V, Section 572 of P.L. 113-76), that prohibits FEMA from implementing Section 100207 (the ""grandfather"" provision) of the Biggert-Waters Act, codified at Section 1308(h) of the 1968 Act, during FY2014. The Omnibus requires FEMA to cease any current planning and development for Section 100207. However, according to FEMA, because Section 100207 does not relate to changes to flood insurance rates that have already taken place, and the Omnibus does not roll back any rate increases that have already occurred, the effect of Section 572 of the Omnibus is that FEMA would not implement Section 100207 until 12 to 18 months after the start of FY2015. FEMA indicated that the agency will continue to map flood risk as authorized by current law. On January 31, 2014, the Senate passed S. 1926, the Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, to delay the increase in rates for six months after the later of the date on which FEMA proposes the draft affordability framework or the date on which FEMA certifies that the agency has implemented a flood mapping approach that employs sound scientific and engineering methodologies to determine varying levels of flood risk in all areas participating in the NFIP. The report to Congress would assess ""methods for establishing an affordability framework for [NFIP], including methods to aid individuals to afford risk-based premiums under [NFIP] through targeted assistance rather than generally subsidized rates, including means-tested vouchers."" Several other bills—H.Amdt. 121 (Cassidy) of H.R. 2217 (Carter), H.R. 2199 (Richmond), H.R. 3370 (Grimm), H.R. 3511 (Capuano), and S. 996 (Landrieu) have been introduced to delay implementation of the rate structure reform provisions of the new law and provide additional funding for the completion of the affordability study.",11,11 "Accelerated Vehicle Retirement for Fuel Economy: ""Cash for Clunkers"". This report outlines the key provisions of the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) program established by P.L. 111-32, which provide rebates to prospective purchasers toward the purchase of new, fuel-efficient vehicles, provided the trade-in vehicles are scrapped. It discusses the impact of the program on the economy and also summarizes similar programs in other industrial countries.",42,116 "U.S. Agricultural Trade: Trends, Composition, Direction, and Policy. U.S. agricultural exports, imports, and the agricultural trade surplus are expected by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to reach record levels in FY2011. FY2011 U.S. farm exports are forecast by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to reach $137 billion, while agricultural imports are expected to reach $93 billion. The agricultural trade surplus is projected to be $44 billion. Exports of high-value products (e.g., fruits, vegetables, meats, wine and beer) have increased since the early 1990s and now account for 60% of total U.S. agricultural exports. Exports of bulk commodities (e.g., soybeans, wheat, and feed grains) remain significant. Leading markets for U.S. agricultural exports are China, Canada, Mexico, Japan, the European Union (EU), South Korea, and Taiwan. The United States in 2011 is forecast to be the world's leading exporter of corn, wheat, soybeans, and cotton. The U.S. share of world beef exports, which declined after the 2003 discovery of a case of ""mad cow disease"" in the United States, is recovering as more countries have re-opened their markets to U.S. product. The United States, European Union, Australia, and New Zealand are dominant suppliers of dairy products in global agricultural trade. New Zealand and the United States are the main suppliers of nonfat dry milk to world markets, while the EU is the leading supplier of cheeses. China has been among the fastest-growing markets for U.S. agricultural exports. Agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico, both partners of the United States in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have also grown rapidly. Most U.S. agricultural imports are high-value products, including fruits, nuts, vegetables, wine, and beer. The biggest import suppliers are NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico, and the EU. Together these three are forecast to provide more than 50% of total U.S. agricultural imports in FY2011. Brazil, Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, and Colombia are also important suppliers of agricultural imports to the United States. According to estimates by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United States provides the third-lowest amount of government policy-generated support to its agricultural sector among OECD countries. The United States' average applied tariff for agricultural products is estimated by the World Trade Organization to be 8.9%, a little more than twice the average applied tariff for non-agricultural products. Export subsidies, export credit guarantees, and market development programs are among the programs used by the United States to promote U.S. agricultural exports. The United States also provides U.S. agricultural commodities to developing countries as food aid for emergency relief or use in nonemergency development activities.",4,4 "Nuclear Weapon ""Pit"" Production: Options to Help Meet a Congressional Requirement. A pit is the plutonium core of a thermonuclear weapon. Imploding it with conventional explosives provides the energy to detonate the rest of the weapon. The Rocky Flats Plant made up to 2,000 pits per year (ppy) through 1989, since then, the United States has made 29 pits for the stockpile. Yet the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act requires the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which manages the nuclear weapons program, to produce at a rate of 80 ppy for 90 days in 2027. How can that requirement be met? Pits are to be made at Los Alamos National Laboratory's main plutonium facility, PF-4. To manufacture pits, a facility must have enough laboratory floor space and a high enough limit for Material At Risk (MAR), the amount of radioactive material a worst-case accident could release. Producing 80 ppy requires enough ""margin,"" the space or MAR available to produce pits minus space or MAR required for that production rate. While space and MAR available have been calculated, amounts required to produce 80 ppy have never been calculated rigorously, leaving space and MAR needs undefined. Further, the report cannot address whether certain options could meet the 2027 date because time to implement them cannot be determined. Accordingly, this report presents 16 options that seek to increase the feasibility of producing 80 ppy by 2027, including The radiation dose an individual would receive from a worst-case accident determines MAR permitted in PF-4. A ten-factor equation calculates dose as a function of MAR. NNSA uses worst-case values in this equation, yet median values may provide sufficient conservatism. Median values reduce calculated dose by orders of magnitude, permitting a large increase in PF-4 MAR. Yet merely doubling permitted MAR might suffice for producing 80 ppy. Providing this increase through construction at PF-4 could be costly and take years. In determining MAR for PF-4, the closest offsite individual is at a nearby trailer park. Relocating it would place the next closest individual farther away. The added distance would reduce dose, permitting increased MAR in PF-4. Using a different meteorological model and different assumptions would greatly reduce the currently calculated dose, perhaps permitting doubling PF-4 MAR. Plutonium decays radioactively, creating elements that various processes remove to purify plutonium. One process generates byproducts, plutonium is recovered from them with processes that take space and MAR. Since the United States has tons of plutonium surplus to defense needs, byproducts could be dispositioned as waste. Pits use weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu). U.S. WGPu is about 50 years old. About nine-tenths of plutonium-241, a WGPu isotope, decays to americium-241 in that time. Since plutonium-241 is the source of americium-241 in WGPu, removing the current americium-241 would prevent WGPu from ever reaching its americium-241 limit, permitting reduction in equipment for that process and reducing worker radiation exposure. A plutonium isotope used in space probes, plutonium-238, is extremely radioactive. It accounts for a small quantity of PF-4 plutonium but a quarter of PF-4's MAR. Building a ""module"" near PF-4 for plutonium-238 work would free MAR and space in PF-4, so one module might suffice instead of two or three. To reduce risk of collapse, loss of life, and radiation release from an earthquake, NNSA increased the seismic resilience of PF-4. More steps are planned, more could be taken. Achieving the congressionally mandated capacity will probably require choosing among options to create a package. MAR margin could be increased by relocating a trailer park, using a new meteorological model, installing rugged containers in the PF-4 production line, increasing PF-4's seismic resilience, and using less conservative assumptions in the MAR-to-dose equation. Similar choices exist for other options. At issue for Congress: What are the risks, costs, and benefits of the options? What is the optimum combination of options? CRS Report R44047, In Brief: Options to Help Meet a Congressional Requirement for Nuclear Weapon ""Pit"" Production, by Jonathan E. Medalia, is a condensed version of this report.",29,32 "Immigration Fundamentals. This report describes the fundamentals of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which was enacted in 1952 and significantly amended since, most recently by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.",76,76 "Export-Import Bank: Financing Requirements and Restrictions. The Export-Import Bank is an independent U.S. government agency that is charged with financing and promoting exports of U.S. goods and services. The Bank operates under a renewable charter, the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, and has been authorized through September 30, 2006. Congress has amended the Bank's charter at times to meet various objectives, primarily U.S. foreign policy and international economic goals. These amendments restrict the Bank's activities relative to particular types of economic activities or have acted to advance other U.S. goals and objectives, such as improving workers' rights, protecting the environment, or protecting U.S. jobs.",49,49 "The Death Penalty: Capital Punishment Legislation in the 109th Congress. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act (Reauthorization Act), P.L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) contains a number of death penalty related provisions. Some create new federal capital offenses making certain death-resulting maritime offenses punishable by death. Some add the death penalty as a sentencing option in the case of pre-existing federal crimes such those outlawing attacks on mass transit. Some make procedural alterations such as those governing federal habeas corpus provisions for state death row petitioners. Other proposals offered during the 109th Congress would have followed the same pattern: some new crimes, some new penalties for old crimes, and some procedural adjustments. Other than the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, P.L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006), which makes a federal capital offense commit a murder in the course of any of several federal sex offenses, none of the other proposals were enacted. Several, however, passed in one House or the other. Among these, H.R. 1279 would have amended the venue provision for capital cases and would have made it a federal capital offense to use the facilities of interstate commerce to commit multiple murders and another to commit murder during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. As would have H.R. 4472. H.R. 1751, and H.R. 4472 would have made it a federal capital offense to murder a federally funded public safety officer. H.R. 3132 would have created special expedited habeas review of state child murder cases. And S. 2611 would have made evasion of immigration, customs or agricultural border inspections when death resulted a federal capital offense. Of other capital proposals pending on adjournment, H.R. 4923 and S. 122 would have abolished the death penalty as a federal sentencing alternative and H.R. 379 would have imposed a moratorium barring the states from imposing or carrying out the death penalty. The report is available in an abridged form—without footnotes, citations to most authorities and appendices—as CRS Report RS22433, The Death Penalty: An Abridged Look at Capital Punishment Legislation in the 109th Congress.",94,94 "The Section 8 Voucher Renewal Funding Formula: Changes in Appropriations Acts. Changes enacted by Congress during the appropriations process in each of the past several years have significantly altered the way that public housing authorities (PHAs) receive funding to administer the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program. Prior to FY2003, PHAs received funding for each voucher they were authorized to administer, based on their average costs from the previous year, plus inflation, referred to as ""unit-based"" funding. Most PHAs were not using all of their vouchers, due in part to rental market conditions, and each year the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was able to recapture unspent funds. In FY2001 and FY2002, some Members of Congress began expressing concern about the underutilization of vouchers and the amount of recaptures. Beginning in FY2003, and culminating in FY2006, Congress fundamentally changed the way PHAs received voucher funding. The changes were designed to limit the amount of unspent funds held by PHAs and limit the cost of vouchers, which had begun to grow rapidly in 2001 and 2002, due in part to market changes and in part to policy changes. In FY2006, PHAs were funded based on the amount of funding they had received in the previous year (regardless of changes in their costs and utilization), plus an inflation adjustment, prorated to fit within the amount appropriated. Under this formula, the funding needs of the program became more predictable, but some agencies received more funding than they were legally permitted to spend, while other agencies did not receive enough funding for all of the vouchers they were authorized to administer. The Bush Administration supported this conversion to a ""budget-based"" formula and requested that Congress enact permanent reforms to complement the new funding method. Low-income housing advocates and PHA industry groups generally opposed both the funding changes and the Bush Administration's proposed policy reforms. In FY2007, Congress again changed the funding formula through the appropriations process. PHA funding was based on what they were spending in the previous year (rather than what they had been allocated in the previous year). As a result, PHAs that had not been spending all of their funding in FY2006 saw a reduction in funding in FY2007. Nonetheless, the funding provided was sufficient so that all PHAs received more than 100% of their 2006 costs and utilization. In FY2008 and FY2009, Congress adopted a cost and utilization-based formula similar to FY2007, but with a reduction in funding for PHAs with excess unspent funding in reserve. In FY2009, concerns were raised about how the implementation of the FY2009 formula may have left some PHAs without sufficient funding to continue serving all eligible families. Ultimately, Congress provided HUD with access to additional funding to help address shortfalls that could have resulted in families losing assistance. In FY2010-FY2012, Congress again adopted a cost and utilization-based formula, a hybrid of the ""unit-based"" and ""budget-based"" models. While Congress did not include a reduction for excess reserves in FY2010-FY2011, they did in FY2012. During the period of solely ""budget-based"" funding formulas, utilization of both authorized vouchers and of available funding declined. Since the adoption of a cost and utilization-based funding model, utilization has begun to increase again. As utilization increases, the cost of the program to Congress increases. This presents a set of policy tradeoffs between the goal of cost containment and the goal of serving as many eligible families as possible. The Section 8 voucher renewal funding formula continues to be a source of debate in the annual appropriations cycle, as well as in Section 8 voucher reform bills, which have contained proposals for statutory formula changes. This report describes changes in the formula included in appropriations bills for FY2003 to the present.",75,75 "International Climate Change: What to Expect at the Durban Conference, December 2011. Delegations from more than 190 countries and regions meet from November 28 to December 9, 2011, in Durban, South Africa, to continue discussions of how to address climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The year 2012 will mark both the 20th anniversary of the opening for signature of the UNFCCC in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the end of the first ""commitment period"" (2008-2012) of the UNFCCC's subsidiary Kyoto Protocol. In 2010, the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC adopted a set of decisions referred to as the ""Cancun Agreements."" These embody pledges to abate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions made by all major emitting Parties, reporting and review systems to ensure ""transparency"" of implementation, a new Green Climate Fund and a Technology Mechanism, and restatement of pledges by the wealthiest countries to mobilize financing for adaptation, mitigation, technology, and capacity-building: pledges approaching $30 billion during 2010-2012, and a goal of approaching $100 billion annually by 2020. Parties agreed that funding would come from public and private, bilateral and multilateral, and alternative sources. The most vulnerable developing countries have priority for the 2010-2012 funds. Parties meeting in Durban, South Africa, will seek agreements that would clarify and carry out the Cancun Agreements. The dialogues particularly regard any second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, establishment of the Green Climate Fund and Technology Mechanism, and guidelines for the reporting and review mechanisms. This report provides context for the discussions that will ensue in the Durban conference, then outlines the main issues and expectations for decisions by the Parties. Many see agreement on a new commitment period for GHG abatement under the Kyoto Protocol as key to almost all other decisions. Notably, delegations from China, India, and some other middle-income countries say they will not discuss their own possible GHG abatement commitments until the highest-income ""Annex I"" Parties meet their existing commitments and sign up to further reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, Canada, Japan, and Russia have stated they will not offer GHG reductions except in an agreement that includes legally binding commitments from all major emitters (including China, the United States, and others). The United States, which declined to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, has no quantitative and binding GHG commitments. The absence of commitments from the top three global GHG emitters (China, the United States, and India) is a matter of consternation among many delegations. In Durban, the Parties may agree on rules to establish the Climate Green Fund, the Standing Committee on Finance, the Adaptation Committee, the Technology Committee, and Clean Technology Centre, and additional decisions to promote mitigation of greenhouse gases and adaptation to impacts of climate change. A proposal exists, but seems unlikely to be adopted, to set a mandate to negotiate by 2015 a new global agreement that would take effect by 2020.",42,42 "The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title VII, Derivatives. The financial crisis implicated the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market as a major source of systemic risk. A number of firms used derivatives to construct highly leveraged speculative positions, which generated enormous losses that threatened to bankrupt not only the firms themselves but also their creditors and trading partners. Hundreds of billions of dollars in government credit were needed to prevent such losses from cascading throughout the system. AIG was the best-known example, but by no means the only one. Equally troublesome was the fact that the OTC market depended on the financial stability of a dozen or so major dealers. Failure of a dealer would have resulted in the nullification of trillions of dollars worth of contracts and would have exposed derivatives counterparties to sudden risk and loss, exacerbating the cycle of deleveraging and withholding of credit that characterized the crisis. During the crisis, all the major dealers came under stress, and even though derivatives dealing was not generally the direct source of financial weakness, a collapse of the $600 trillion OTC derivatives market was imminent absent federal intervention. The first group of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients included nearly all the large derivatives dealers. The Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) sought to remake the OTC market in the image of the regulated futures exchanges. Crucial reforms include a requirement that swap contracts be cleared through a central counterparty regulated by one or more federal agencies. Clearinghouses require traders to put down cash (called initial margin) at the time they open a contract to cover potential losses, and require subsequent deposits (called maintenance margin) to cover actual losses to the position. The intended effect of margin requirements is to eliminate the possibility that any firm can build up an uncapitalized exposure so large that default would have systemic consequences (again, the AIG situation). The size of a cleared position is limited by the firm's ability to post capital to cover its losses. That capital protects its trading partners and the system as a whole. Swap dealers and major swap participants—firms with substantial derivatives positions—will be subject to margin and capital requirements above and beyond what the clearinghouses mandate. Swaps that are cleared will also be subject to trading on an exchange, or an exchange-like ""swap execution facility,"" regulated by either the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in the case of security-based swaps. All trades will be reported to data repositories, so that regulators will have complete information about all derivatives positions. Data on swap prices and trading volumes will be made public. The Dodd-Frank Act provides exceptions to the clearing and trading requirements for commercial end-users, or firms that use derivatives to hedge the risks of their nonfinancial business operations. Regulators may also provide exemptions for smaller financial institutions. Even trades that are exempt from the clearing and exchange-trading requirements, however, will have to be reported to data repositories or directly to regulators. This report describes some of the requirements placed on the derivatives market by the Dodd-Frank Act. It will be updated as events warrant.",8,12 "H.R. 399, the Secure Our Borders First Act of 2015: Report in Brief. This report provides a summary of select provisions in the Secure Our Borders First Act of 2015 (H.R. 399). An amendment in the nature of a substitute to the bill was favorably marked up and reported out of the House Homeland Security Committee on January 21, 2015. This report provides a summary of select provisions in the bill that fall under two major headings—Operational Control of the Borders and Biometric Entry and Exit System—and concludes with a brief description of additional provisions collected under a third heading—CBP Agents and Officers, and Federal Land. Figures provide brief sketches of two major components discussed in the report, and an Appendix lists the reporting requirements in the bill.",91,22 "High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program. Drug trafficking is a significant public health and safety threat facing the United States. The federal government has taken a variety of actions aimed at countering this threat. These have ranged from giving law enforcement more tools for combatting traffickers to establishing programs and initiatives to reduce the supply of and demand for illegal drugs. Within the larger framework of the federal government's efforts to counter drug trafficking is the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program. The program supports multiagency activities ranging from enforcement initiatives involving investigation, interdiction, and prosecution, to drug use prevention and treatment initiatives. Congress initially created the HIDTA program through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690) and permanently authorized it in the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-469). The HIDTA program provides assistance to law enforcement agencies—at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels—operating in areas of the United States that have been deemed as critical drug trafficking regions. The program is designed with the county as its geographic unit of inclusion. There are 29 designated HIDTAs in the United States, cutting across all 50 states, the District Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The HIDTA program is administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). However, each of the HIDTA regions is governed by its own Executive Board, which has the flexibility to design and implement initiatives that confront the specific drug trafficking threats in its region. For FY2018, Congress appropriated $280.0 million for the HIDTA program, a 10.2% increase over the FY2017 appropriation of $254.0 million. Each HIDTA receives a base amount of funding (ranging from approximately $3.1 million to $14.6 million in FY2017) to support initiatives in its region, and the remainder is allocated to support specific initiatives throughout the country. There are several issues that policymakers may consider when they debate the future of the HIDTA program. A prevailing issue will be how much funding to provide for the program. Congress may also choose to exercise oversight and evaluate related issues such as whether the county is still the appropriate unit of inclusion for the HIDTA, whether the criteria for inclusion remain adequate, whether the program is effective in accomplishing its goals, whether its tangential effects can be measured, whether the current bounds on the use of HIDTA funds are still appropriate, and which federal entity may be best suited to administer the program.",96,96 "North Korean Actions, 1950 - 2007: Controversy and Issues. This selective list of events provides information on instances of North Korean provocative actions between June 1950 and 2007. The purpose of this report is to place current provocations in the context of past actions to better judge their significance and to determine changes in trends. The term ""provocation"" is defined to include armed invasion, border violations, infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies, hijacking, kidnapping, terrorism (including assassination and bombing), threats/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, and institutions, incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean government, actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations, and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Information in this report was taken from South Korean and Western sources, but typically is denied by the North Korean government. The most intense phase of the provocations was in the latter half of the 1960s, when North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) staged a series of limited armed actions against South Korean and U.S. security interests. Infiltration of armed agents into South Korea was the most frequently mentioned type of provocation, followed by kidnapping and terrorism (actual and threatened). From 1954 to 1992, North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3,693 armed agents into South Korea, with 1967 and 1968 accounting for 20% of the total. Instances of terrorism were far fewer in number, but they seemed to have had a continuing negative impact on relations between the two Koreas. Not counting North Korea's invasion of South Korea that triggered the Korean War (1950-1953), North Korea's major terrorist involvement includes attempted assassinations of President Park Chung Hee in 1968 and 1974, a 1983 attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan's life in a bombing incident in Rangoon, Burma (Myanmar), and a mid-air sabotage bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane in 1987. Reported provocations have continued intermittently in recent years, in the form of armed incursions, kidnappings, and occasional threats to turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into ""a sea of fire"" and to silence or tame South Korean critics of North Korea. Then, in July 2006, North Korea launched seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, and in October 2006, it tested a nuclear bomb. For information on current U.S. policy and relations with North Korea, see CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Larry A. Niksch, CRS Report RL33590, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch, CRS Report RS21391, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments, by Sharon Squassoni, or CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.",85,85 "Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Overview of S. 1931 and H.R. 1658, 106th Congress. Difficulties still persist for the innocent-third-party who tries to justify his/her rights in seized property due to its association with criminal conduct. On May 4, 1999, Representative Henry Hyde introduced H.R. 1658 (Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act) which, among other purposes, is designed to provide a more uniform procedure for Federal civil forfeitures. As reported out of the House Committee on the Judiciary on June 18, 1999, the bill's main effect would provide greater safeguards for property owners and make the Government's job of justifying the seizure more difficult. Among other things, it would (1) provide several protections for people at risk of having their assets seized, (2) place the burden of proof in civil forfeiture proceedings upon the government (3) allow for the provision of counsel to the indigent, (4) allow for the pre-adjudication return of property to owners upon a showing of hardship, (5) eliminate the cost bond requirement, (6) creates a uniform innocent owner defense, (7) allow property owners adequate time to challenge a seizure and (8) allow property owners to sue the government for the negligent damage or destruction of their property. On June 24, 1999, the House passed H.R. 1658 (Hyde-Conyers civil forfeiture reform bill) by a vote of 375-48. On June 28, 1999, the measure was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Following the incorporation of some of the provisions in S. 1701, S. 1931 amended H.R. 1658 which passed the Senate Judiciary Committee by a voice vote on March 23, 2000. The full Senate passed the compromise version of H.R. 1658 by voice vote on March 27, 2000.",17,94 "U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia. U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia are part of the U.S.-initiated Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These operations cover a wide variety of combat and non-combat missions ranging from combating insurgents, to civil affairs and reconstruction operations, to training military forces of other nations in counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency tactics. Numbers of U.S. forces involved in these operations range from 19,000 to just a few hundred. Some have argued that U.S. military operations in these countries are achieving a degree of success and suggest that they may offer some lessons that might be applied in Iraq as well as for future GWOT operations. Potential issues for the second session of the 109th Congress include NATO assumption of responsibility for operations in Afghanistan, counterdrug operations in Afghanistan, a long-term strategy for Africa, and developments in Colombia and the Philippines. This report will not discuss the provision of equipment and weapons to countries where the U.S. military is conducting counterterrorism operations (1) nor will it address Foreign Military Sales (FMS), which are also aspects of the Administration's GWOT military strategy. This report will be updated on a periodic basis. For additional information see CRS Report RL30982(pdf), U.S. Defense Articles and Services Supplied to Foreign Recipients: Restrictions on Their Use, by Richard F. Grimmett.",24,24 "Payment Card Interchange Fees: An Economic Assessment. Interchange fees in the processing of credit and debit cards have become controversial. An interchange fee is paid by the merchant's bank to a cardholder's bank (that issued the card) after the cardholder purchases goods or services with a payment (credit or debit) card. Merchants and cardholders assert that they must accept excessive and increasing interchange fees set by the card associations such as Visa and MasterCard and member card-issuing banks. Interchange fees have been rising since the 1990s, despite diminishing fraud losses and technological advances in communications that lower the costs of accessing the electronic payment system. Merchants argue that the card associations have not negotiated these fees with them but instead present the fees as ""take it or leave it"" offers. Economists who have studied the payment card markets attribute the higher interchange fees to the nature and structure of the market. This is not the traditional market, they point out, but a two-sided market where suppliers compete for two types of customers with different demand responses, like a newspaper that must attract both readers and advertisers. In the payment card market, banks must attract cardholders and merchants, and a transfer of revenues is usually necessary to provide card-issuing banks an incentive to issue more cards, which provide more payment card users to merchants. This is similar to newspapers, where the lower the subscription rates, the higher the readership and the higher the advertiser revenues. For a payment card system that needs more cardholders to achieve the optimal benefits to cardholders and merchants, more revenue transfers may be needed to offset the cost of issuing more cards to cardholders. There could be cases, however, where the revenue transfers are excessive, which would mean that the interchange fees are providing excess profits to issuer banks. Even though interchange fees were not considered a contributing cause of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, S. 3217 as amended by the full Senate and incorporated into the Senate-passed version of H.R. 4173, which addresses the regulatory causes of the crisis, also contains provisions on interchange fees. The Durbin Amendment (S.Amdt. 3989) on interchange fees was adopted. The amendment mandated specific regulations to applied debit cards to ensure that small businesses and other entities that accept debit cards pay a reasonable and proportional price for the use of the payment card network, and limit the payment card network from imposing anti-competitive restrictions on small businesses and other entities that accept payment cards. The amendment does not address what some believe to be a critical part of the interchange fee issue that relates to legal or regulatory caps on the fees. Specifically, presently there is not a mechanism that could be used to ensure that merchants lower their prices to pass the excess revenues back to the cardholders. In countries where interchange fees are capped, the governments have been relying on merchants to voluntarily lower prices. Yet, there is no evidence that merchants have done so. This report examines the Visa and MasterCard card associations' systems. The report begins with a discussion of the nontraditional structure of the payment card market. The next section is an analysis of the problem of the optimum level of payment cards to achieve the highest social welfare benefit for cardholders and merchants. The third section discusses the provisions in Senator Durbin's amendment and other legislation in the House that was not acted upon by the full House of Representatives that would grant the payment card stakeholders limited antitrust immunity for negotiating access fees and terms for using electronic payment card system. The last section is a discussion of some implications of the analysis. This report will be updated as financial and legislative developments warrant.",7,7 "Who Earns Pass-Through Business Income? An Analysis of Individual Tax Return Data. Pass-through businesses—sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations—generate more than half of all business income in the United States. Pass-through income is, in general, taxed only once at the individual income tax rates when it is distributed to its owners. In contrast, the income of C corporations is taxed twice, once at the corporate level according to corporate tax rates, and then a second time at the individual tax rates when shareholders receive dividend payments or realize capital gains. This leads to the so-called ""double taxation"" of corporate profits. This report analyzes individual tax return data to determine who earns pass-through business income. The analysis finds that in 2011 over 82% of net pass-through income was earned by individuals with an adjusted gross income (AGI) over $100,000, although these taxpayers accounted for just 23% of individual returns with pass-through income. A significant fraction of pass-through income is concentrated among upper-income earners. Taxpayers with an AGI over $250,000, for example, received 62% of pass-through income, but accounted for just over 6% of returns with pass-through income. Individuals with an AGI in excess of $1 million earned about 32% of pass-through income, while filing roughly 1% of all returns with pass-through income The findings change slightly when the data for each organizational type are analyzed separately. Nearly half of sole proprietorship income was earned by individuals with an AGI of $100,000 or less. Taxpayers with an AGI between $100,000 and $500,000 earned 39% of sole proprietor income. Individuals with an AGI in excess of $1 million earned 6% of sole proprietor income. Partnership net income was more concentrated among upper-income individuals with nearly all of it accruing to taxpayers with AGI in excess of $100,000, including nearly 48% accruing to those with an AGI over $1 million. Nearly all of S corporation income was also earned by taxpayers with an AGI over $100,000, but a greater share of S corporation income than partnership income was earned by those with an AGI over $1 million—about 52%. Who earns pass-through income may have important implications for tax reform. Recent tax reform discussions have included taxing pass-through income at a lower rate than the current rate. While lowering the tax burden on pass-through income could potentially stimulate the economy, particularly in the short-run, it could also reduce the progressivity of the tax code given the share of pass-through income that is attributable to the upper end of the income distribution. Tax reform could also result in pass-through income being taxed at lower rates than labor income. This could lead some taxpayers to characterize labor income as business income to minimize taxes. Additionally, a tax rate reduction on pass-through (or corporate) income does little to simplify the tax treatment of businesses. The majority of the complexity in the tax system is the result of special tax incentives such as exclusions, credits, and deductions, formally known as ""tax expenditures."" Finally, reducing taxes on pass-through businesses could have important budgetary and revenue impacts.",102,102 "Improving Health Care Access for Veterans: H.R. 3230. This report provides a brief comparison of the Senate (""Senate Bill"") and House (""House Bill"") provisions that would provide expanded authority to the VA to provide care to veterans through non-VA health care providers and facilities. This report compares only major provisions contained in Title III of the Senate version and Sections 2 and 3 of the House Version of H.R. 3230.",70,70 "History of the Navy UCLASS Program Requirements: In Brief. During its development, the U.S. Navy's Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) aircraft and its predecessors have been proposed to fill a number of roles and operate in a variety of air defense environments. Over time, those requirements have evolved to encompass a less demanding set of capabilities than first envisioned. This report details the history of UCLASS requirements development through the program's evolution to its current stage.",32,31 "Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Actions and Issues. This report highlights actions taken and issues raised as a result of the April 20, 2010, explosion on the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig, and the resulting oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Readers can access more extensive discussions in various CRS reports, identified at the end of this report.",41,40 "Improper Payments and Recovery Audits: Legislation, Implementation, and Analysis. As Congress searches for ways to generate savings, reduce the deficit, and fund federal programs, it has held hearings and passed legislation to prevent and recover improper payments. Improper payments—which exceeded $115 billion in FY2011—are payments made in an incorrect amount, payments that should not have been made at all, or payments made to an ineligible recipient or for an ineligible purpose. The total amount of improper payments may be even higher than reported because several agencies have yet to determine improper payment amounts for many programs, including some with billions of dollars in annual expenditures. In 2002, Congress passed the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA, P.L. 107-300, 116 Stat. 2350), which established an initial framework for identifying, measuring, preventing, and reporting on improper payments at each agency. That same year, Congress also passed legislation, the Recovery Audit Act (P.L. 107-107, Section 831, 115 Stat. 1186), which required agencies that awarded more than $500 million annually in contracts to establish programs to recover overpayments to contractors. After five years of reporting, the data indicated that while many individual programs reduced their improper payment rates, the total amount of improper payments and the government-wide improper payment rate both increased. Since the IPIA reporting requirements took effect, agencies have expanded the number of programs reported each year. One potential consequence of this expansion is that the annual dollar amount of improper payments reported has more than doubled over time from $45 billion in FY2004 to $108 billion in FY2012. In response, Congress passed new legislation, the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA, P.L. 111-204, 124 Stat. 2224), which replaced and consolidated the requirements of both IPIA and the Recovery Audit Act. IPERA retained the core provisions of the IPIA while requiring improvements in agency improper payment estimation methodologies and improper payment reduction plans. It also significantly expanded the scope and reporting requirements of recovery audit programs. A subsequent statute, the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA, P.L. 112-248), signed into law on January 10, 2013, addresses some of the weaknesses in agency improper payment prevention controls and recovery audit programs. In particular, IPERIA requires agencies to improve the quality of oversight for high-dollar and high-risk programs, and it mandates that agencies share data regarding recipient eligibility and payment amounts. In addition, IPERIA requires the Office of Management and Budget to examine the rates and amounts of improper payments that agencies have recovered and establish targets for increasing those amounts. This report will be updated to reflect significant developments.",63,63 General Motors' Initial Public Offering: Review of Issues and Implications for TARP. This report analyzes the progress General Motors Company has made since it was created from the sale of the bankrupt Old GM in July 2009 and the major issues related to its anticipated 2010 initial public offering (IPO).,12,10 "Authorized Generic Pharmaceuticals: Effects on Innovation. The practice of ""authorized generics"" has recently been the subject of considerable attention by the pharmaceutical industry, regulators, and members of Congress alike. An ""authorized generic"" (sometimes termed a ""branded,"" ""flanking,"" or ""pseudo"" generic) is a pharmaceutical that is marketed by or on behalf of a brand-name drug company, but is sold under a generic name. Although the availability of an additional competitor in the generic drug market would appear to be favorable to consumers, authorized generics have nonetheless proven controversial. Some observers believe that authorized generics potentially discourage independent generic firms both from challenging drug patents and from selling their own products. These perceived disincentives result from the provisions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. Better known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, this legislation provides independent generic firms with a reward for challenging patents held by brand-name firms. That ""bounty"" consists of a 180-day generic drug exclusivity period awarded to the first patent challenger. During the 180-day period, the brand-name company and the first generic applicant are the only firms that receive authorization to sell that pharmaceutical. At the close of this period, other independent generic competitors may obtain marketing approval and enter the market, ordinarily resulting in lower prices for generic medicines. Some commentators view the 180-day exclusivity period as a crucial incentive for generic firms to challenge patents held by brand-name firms. Under this view, the launch of an authorized generic during the 180-day exclusivity period makes the recovery of litigation expenses more difficult. In turn, the possibility that a brand-name firm will sell an authorized generic during the 180-day exclusivity period may decrease the incentives of generic firms to challenge patents in the first instance. Other observers believe that authorized generics benefit consumers by increasing competition in the generic market. Because the authorized generic is manufactured by the brand-name firm and identical to its own product, consumers may be encouraged to switch to the lower-cost authorized generic alternative. Authorized generics may also facilitate the settlement of patent litigation between brand-name and independent generic firms. As an historical matter, certain of these settlement agreements have allowed authorized generics to enter the market, and therefore promoted competition, prior to the expiration of the relevant patent term. Recent judicial opinions have upheld FDA practices allowing authorized generics. If authorized generic practice is deemed appropriate, then no action need be taken. The approach taken by legislation introduced in the 112th Congress, H.R. 741 and S. 373, presented another option. Under these bills, authorized generics may not be sold during the term of the 180-day generic exclusivity. This legislation was not enacted.",67,67 "Appropriations for FY2005: Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education. This report tracks the legislative progress of the FY2005 appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED). This legislation provides discretionary funds for three major federal departments and related agencies. The report summarizes L-HHS-ED discretionary funding issues but not authorization or entitlement issues. On February 2, 2004, the President submitted the FY2005 budget request to the Congress, including $142.9 billion in discretionary L-HHS-ED funds, the comparable FY2004 appropriation was $139.8 billion, enacted primarily through P.L. 108-199. The House and Senate FY2004 proposals—H.R. 5006 (H.Rept. 108-636) and S. 2810 (S.Rept. 108-345), respectively—were combined in Division F of H.R. 4818 (H.Rept. 108-792), the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, to provide $144.0 billion of discretionary L-HHS-ED funds prior to a reduction (see page 8). Three continuing resolutions, beginning with P.L. 108-309, provided temporary FY2005 funding until H.R. 4818 was signed into law on December 8, 2004, as P.L. 108-447. Department of Labor (DOL): DOL discretionary appropriations were $11.8 billion in FY2004, $12.1 billion is provided for FY2005. Funding is increased by $217 million for the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs, $250 million is designated for a WIA Community College Initiative. Restrictions on new DOL overtime regulations were not included in P.L. 108-447. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): HHS discretionary appropriations were $62.2 billion in FY2004, $64.2 billion is provided for FY2005. Funding for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is increased by $800 million. The Community Health Centers, Health Care-related Facilities and Activities, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), and Head Start each receive increases of at least $100 million. Abortion restrictions are extended to protect funding for health care entities that do not provide abortion services, this additional restriction has been referred to as the ""Weldon Amendment."" Department of Education (ED): ED discretionary appropriations were $55.7 billion in FY2004, $57.0 billion is provided for FY2005. Funding is increased for Title I, Part A Grants to Local Educational Agencies by $500 million, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Part B Grants to States by $607 million, and Pell Grants by $458 million. Funding for Educational Technology State Grants is reduced by $192 million. Related Agencies: Discretionary appropriations for related agencies were $10.1 billion in FY2004, $10.6 billion is provided for FY2005. Administrative Expenses of the Social Security Administration (SSA) are increased by $467 million.",59,59 "North American Oil Sands: History of Development, Prospects for the Future. When it comes to future reliable oil supplies, Canada's oil sands will likely account for a greater share of U.S. oil imports. Oil sands account for about 46% of Canada's total oil production and oil sands production is increasing as conventional oil production declines. Since 2004, when a substantial portion of Canada's oil sands were deemed economic, Canada, with about 175 billion barrels of proved oil sands reserves, has ranked second behind Saudi Arabia in oil reserves. Canadian crude oil exports were about 1.82 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2006, of which 1.8 mbd or 99% went to the United States. Canadian crude oil accounts for about 18% of U.S. net imports and about 12% of all U.S. crude oil supply. Oil sands, a mixture of sand, bitumen (a heavy crude that does not flow naturally), and water, can be mined or the oil can be extracted in-situ using thermal recovery techniques. Typically, oil sands contain about 75% inorganic matter, 10% bitumen, 10% silt and clay, and 5% water. Oil sand is sold in two forms: (1) as a raw bitumen that must be blended with a diluent for transport and (2) as a synthetic crude oil (SCO) after being upgraded to constitute a light crude. Bitumen is a thick tar-like substance that must be upgraded by adding hydrogen or removing some of the carbon. Exploitation of oil sands in Canada began in 1967, after decades of research and development that began in the early 1900s. The Alberta Research Council (ARC), established by the provincial government in 1921, supported early research on separating bitumen from the sand and other materials. Demonstration projects continued through the 1940s and 1950s. The Great Canadian Oil Sands company (GCOS), established by U.S.-based Sunoco, later renamed Suncor, began commercial production in 1967 at 12,000 barrels per day. The U.S. experience with oil sands has been much different. The U.S. government collaborated with several major oil companies as early as the 1930s to demonstrate mining of and in-situ production from U.S. oil sand deposits. However, a number of obstacles, including the remote and difficult topography, scattered deposits, and lack of water, have resulted in an uneconomic oil resource base. Only modest amounts are being produced in Utah and California. U.S. oil sands would likely require significant R&D and capital investment over many years to be commercially viable. An issue for Congress might be the level of R&D investment in oil sands over the long term. As oil sands production in Canada is predicted to increase to 2.8 million barrels per day by 2015, environmental issues are a cause for concern. Air quality, land use, and water availability are all impacted. Socio-economic issues such as housing, skilled labor, traffic, and aboriginal concerns may also become a constraint on growth. Additionally, a royalty regime favorable to the industry has recently been modified to increase revenue to the Alberta government. However, despite these issues and potential constraints, investment in Canadian oil sands will likely continue to be an energy supply strategy for the major oil companies.",40,40 "U.S. Tree Planting for Carbon Sequestration. Climate change is a growing concern for Congress. ""Cap-and-trade"" and carbon tax proposals have been suggested to limit and reduce domestic emissions of greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide (CO2). Most cap-and-trade proposals would establish limits on emissions from many economic sectors, while allowing ""offsets""—reduced emissions or enhanced carbon sequestration—from uncapped sectors, such as forestry and agriculture. Alternatively, carbon tax proposals might include tax expenditures or credits for such ""offsets."" In the 111th Congress, a discussion draft of possible legislation from Representatives Markey and Waxman would allow offsets for up to 2 billion metric tons of CO2 emissions (or the equivalent thereof in other greenhouse gases), divided equally between domestic and international programs. In addition, the draft includes discounting for offsets—1.25 offset tons are required for each ton of emission allowance. Thus, under the proposal, domestic CO2 offsets would be about 1.25 billion tons. One of the widely discussed options for domestic CO2 offsets is tree planting. Tree planting aims to establish stands of trees that can grow for anywhere from 20 to 2,000 years, depending on the species, location, and intent of the planting. Two terms are generally used for tree planting reforestation, for planting trees or other activities to establish tree stands (such as assisting natural tree regeneration or preparing sites and sowing tree seeds) on areas recently cleared of forest through timber harvesting or natural disaster, and afforestation, for planting trees on sites that have long been cleared of forests, such as crop, pasture, and brush lands. Tree planting has greater carbon sequestration potential than other land use practices. Afforestation of crop or pasture land is estimated to have the potential to sequester between 2.2 and 9.5 metric tons of CO2 per acre per year. Reforestation is estimated at 1.1 to 7.7 metric tons of CO2 per acre per year. These estimates have a very wide range of possibilities because tree growth and forest soil carbon accumulation varies widely among species and locations. Because of its greater sequestration potential and various aspects of measuring and monitoring performance, afforestation is a widely discussed option for providing domestic CO2 offsets. The scale and cost of an afforestation program to provide a billion tons of carbon offsets are substantial. Several additional factors should also be recognized, including natural hazards to forests, the timing of forest carbon sequestration, the impacts of significant shifts in land use, and the capacity to achieve an afforestation program of this magnitude.",42,42 "Regional Trade Agreements: An Analysis of Trade-Related Impacts. The 107th Congress is currently debating regional trade agreements (RTAs) from two important perspectives directly and in connection with granting the Administration trade negotiating authority. The Congress is directly addressing RTAs via the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade agreement which has been approved in the House and is under consideration in the Senate. Also, the Bush Administration is negotiating agreements with Chile and Singapore that may be sent to Congress for consideration. In addition, Congress is weighing whether to grant the Administration trade promotion authority (TPA), also know as fast-track authority. The Administration has indicated it would use TPA to negotiate trade agreements at the multilateral level through the World Trade Organization and RTAs at the regional and bilateral level. While economic analysts are in general agreement that multilateral trade agreements yield improved social welfare, the picture is more clouded for RTAs. This report considers numerous factors employed in judging RTAs. These factors include: distinctions between multilateral and regional trade agreements, the gains the United States can expect from entering regional trade agreements, and the impact of the recent flurry of RTA activity on U.S. interests. By allowing production to shift from domestic producers to lower cost foreign producers, RTAs and multilateral agreements may result in trade creation, but RTAs may also cause trade diversion as trade shifts from lower cost non-RTA members to higher cost members because of the tariff preference extended to members. The potential for trade diversion is greater when the trade barriers facing non-RTA members are high. RTA opponents also argue that RTAs tend to exclude poor nations and distract attention from multilateral negotiations. Empirical analyses of RTA formation generally find the immediate economic impact on the United States to be small whether the United States is in the RTA or not. At the same time, the gains for U.S. RTA partners are considerably larger. However, numerous analysts believe that the United States solidifies foreign relationships and extends its influence over the trade agenda by forming RTAs, and the gains over an extended period are potentially much larger as the trade-restraining impacts of national borders are reduced. Separate sets of RTAs involving the EU and Mexico appear to be causing the most concern for the United States. EU trade with its RTA members (including intra-EU trade) is over three times U.S. trade with its RTA members, opening the possibility that it will become dominant in setting the trade agenda. Mexico's trade agreements with the EU and numerous Latin American countries raise a different concern. Mexico may be positioning itself as a trade hub with agreement members as spokes. This hub-and-spoke setup may encourage firms to locate in Mexico in order to have tariff- free access to member countries. Additionally, U.S. firms have to compete with firms from the other Mexican RTA countries for a share of the Mexican market.",53,53 "Previewing Dairy Policy Options for the Next Farm Bill. Financial stress encountered by dairy farmers in recent years has led Congress and the industry to reconsider how to deal with fluctuations in milk prices and financial prospects for dairy farmers. Some Members have voiced interest in alternatives to current federal programs (which expire in 2012). Alternative policies could either be incorporated into the next omnibus farm bill or enacted separately before expiration. The dairy industry is currently developing or advocating a variety of policy changes. All of the proposals discussed in this report—loosely categorized as either supply management, market-based, or tiered-pricing—have implications for U.S. dairy farmers, competitiveness of the U.S. dairy industry, and international trade. Supply management proposals such as H.R. 5288 and S. 3531, introduced in the 111th Congress, are designed to prevent depressed farm milk prices while reducing price volatility through supply management. The National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF) also has proposed a market stabilization component as part of its comprehensive package of suggested reforms to dairy policy. Supporters of price stabilization and supply management say that inherent incentives to overproduce need to be offset by a program to manage supplies in a measured way. Critics of supply management, including dairy processors, contend that such measures could reduce the competitiveness of the U.S. dairy industry, limit its incentive to innovate, and raise consumer prices, because, they argue, a pricing system based on supply control and/or cost of production potentially rewards inefficiency. The market-based approach, including a separate element of the NMPF package, represents an opposing view on how the federal government should address the problem of farm milk price volatility and periodic financial stress for dairy farmers. This approach contends that, because it is difficult to manage milk supplies and prices administratively, the best approach is to provide a government program that helps farmers manage risk associated with volatile prices of milk and feed. Specifically, a new ""safety net"" would be established to protect a dairy farmer's ""margin""—that is, the farm price of milk minus feed costs—regardless of current price levels. Critics expect that incentives to overproduce will aggravate the financial woes of the dairy industry indefinitely, and thus argue that controlling potential price variability and combating depressed farm prices with supply management is necessary for the long-term financial health of producers. The third area of potential policy change is to alter the current pricing approach used in federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs) to directly increase dairy farm revenue. For example, one potential change to base milk pricing in FMMOs on the cost of milk production (i.e., S. 1645, introduced in the 111th Congress) would imply higher prices received by dairy farmers. However, some are concerned that the long-run competitiveness and stability of the U.S. dairy industry could be at risk because of the unknown effectiveness of provisions to discourage overproduction. On March 3, 2011, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Dairy Industry Advisory Committee approved its final report to the Secretary, who established the committee to make recommendations on how USDA can best address dairy farm profitability and milk price volatility. Many of the group's 23 recommendations fall into the market-based approach, including a recommendation for margin insurance on quantities of milk that exceed the cap for the Milk Income Loss Contract Program (MILC) and a tax-deferred savings accounts for dairy farmers. The committee narrowly passed a recommendation for a supply management program.",3,3 "Tanzania: Current Issues and U.S. Policy. Tanzania is an East African country comprising a union of Tanganyika, the mainland territory, and the semiautonomous Zanzibar archipelago. The United States has long considered Tanzania a partner in economic development and, increasingly, in regional security efforts. With nearly 54 million people, Tanzania is one of the largest countries in Africa by population and is endowed with substantial natural resource wealth and agricultural potential. Over the past decade, it has experienced robust economic growth based largely on favorably high gold prices and tourism, growth has averaged nearly 7% annually. The ongoing development of large reserves of offshore natural gas discovered in 2010 has raised the prospect of substantial foreign investment inflows and export revenue. Nevertheless, corruption and poor service delivery have hindered efforts to curb widespread poverty, and extensive development challenges remain. Since 1977, Tanzanian politics have been dominated by the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Party of the Revolution), created through the merger that year of the single parties that had controlled the mainland and Zanzibar since 1964. Opposition parties face periodic harassment and de facto restrictions on their activities. President John Magufuli, who leads the CCM, was elected in late October 2015 and is serving his first five-year term in office. His predecessor, Jakaya Kikwete, also of the CCM, assumed power in 2005 and won reelection in 2010, but was constitutionally barred from running for a third term. The 2015 polls featured a close contest between the CCM and a coalition of the leading opposition parties. Tanzania is generally stable and peaceful, despite periodic threats to public safety. These include sporadic attacks on tourists in Zanzibar, several unattributed armed attacks on police, and occasional bombings of Christian churches and other targets. Tanzania has occasionally arrested suspected Islamic extremists, as in April 2015, when a group of 10 alleged members of the Somali Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group Al Shabaab were taken into custody. U.S.-Tanzanian relations are cordial, but have suffered tensions over the contentious 2015/2016 election in Zanzibar, restrictions on civil liberties, and other issues. President Kikwete was the first African head of state to meet with former President Obama after the latter took office, and President Obama stated that a ""shared commitment to the development and the dignity of the people of Tanzania"" underpins bilateral ties. Tanzania also maintains close economic and political ties with China. Under the Obama Administration, aid cooperation was generally robust. How ties and assistance cooperation may proceed under the Administration of President Donald Trump and during the 115th Congress has yet to be determined. U.S. aid for Tanzania has focused primarily on health, food security, agricultural development, and infrastructure, largely under multiple major presidential initiatives. U.S. assistance has also supported Tanzania's hosting of large numbers of refugees from the region. Tanzania is eligible for African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade benefits and in 2013 completed a $698 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact focused on poverty reduction and economic growth. The MCC has since suspended activity in support of a possible second compact, citing governance concerns. U.S. security assistance increased after the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania was one of six initial participants in the Obama Administration's African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP), which aims to build the peacekeeping capacity of African militaries. Tanzania is a troop contributor to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations in multiple African countries and Lebanon.",85,85 "The MS-13 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats?. This report provides an overview of the MS-13 and M-18 gangs,5 examines how MS-13 and M-18 gangs are different from other gangs and organized crime groups, and discusses what constitutes a transnational gang. The report also explores whether MS-13 and M-18 gangs are transnational gangs, and discusses the various federal responses to these gangs.",98,98 "The World Trade Organization: Background and Issues. The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on January 1, 1995 under an agreement reached during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The Uruguay Round was the last of a series of periodic trade negotiations held under the auspices of the WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Among the questions asked during debate on U.S. trade policy and the WTO are: To what extent should the United States meet its trade goals in theWTO versus other options? Can the United States maintain its sovereignty as a member of the WTO? Are U.S. interests served through the WTO dispute process? Should the WTO continue to cover traditional trade issues only, or should it be broadened to include nontraditional issues such as labor and the environment? What is the role of Congress in U.S. participation in the WTO?",53,53 "Israel's Disengagement from Gaza. In December 2003, Prime Minister Sharon announced that Israel would unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip, the evacuation of settlers began on August 17, 2005, and was completed on August 23. Disengagement was carried out efficiently, rapidly, and without major violence. Related issues coordinated with the Palestinians included disposition of settler assets and security. The implications of disengagement for the West Bank, the ""Road Map,"" and a future Palestinian state are uncertain. The total cost of disengagement exceeds $2 billion, and Congress may deal with a special Israeli aid request in the future. See also CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, and CRS Issue Brief IB82008, Israel: Background and Relations with the United States.",85,85 "The U.S. Postal Service and Six-Day Delivery: History, Issues, and Current Legislation. After running modest profits from FY2004 through FY2006, USPS lost $25.4 billion between FY2007 and FY2011. Were it not for congressional action, USPS would have lost an additional $9.5 billion. In the first three quarters of FY2012, USPS had an $11.5 billion operational loss. USPS leaders, Congress, and the public have suggested methods that may increase revenue or reduce expenses. Among these suggestions is reducing the number of days per week that USPS delivers mail from six to five. Members of the 112th Congress have introduced nine bills (H.R. 2309, H.R. 2434, H.R. 3591, H.R. 3744, S. 1625, S. 1010, S. 1573, S. 1789, and S. 1853) and one resolution (H.Res. 137) regarding six-day mail delivery. Companion bills H.R. 2309 (introduced by Representative Darrell Issa) and S. 1625 (introduced by Senator John McCain) would grant USPS the authority to move to five-day delivery. H.R. 2309, as ordered to be reported from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, would require USPS to wait six months after enactment to begin the process of eliminating a delivery day. S. 1010, introduced by Senator Thomas R. Carper, would also give USPS authority to move to five-day delivery. S. 1789, introduced by Senators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman, would allow USPS to eliminate a delivery day only after two years and the completion of a USPS study that identified customers ""for whom the change may have a disproportionate, negative impact,"" among other conditions. Companion bills H.R. 3591 and S. 1853 would prohibit a move to six-day delivery. H.R. 3744, the Rural Service Protection Act, would require USPS to maintain current levels of delivery in rural areas for five years following enactment of the bill. H.Res. 137 would express the sense of the House of Representatives that USPS should maintain six-day delivery. Both the House and Senate versions of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.R. 2434, S. 1573), include language that would require USPS to continue delivering mail six days per week. In The President's Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction, released in September 2011, the Office of Management and Budget supported authorizing USPS to eliminate a delivery day. Some lawmakers say the elimination of a delivery day could prompt further reductions in mail volume and lead to an economic ""death spiral"" for USPS. Other lawmakers argue that USPS should have the flexibility to eliminate six-day delivery if necessary to make USPS economically viable. Congress may choose to legislate the number of USPS delivery days or authorize USPS to determine its delivery schedule. The six-day delivery requirement ensures the delivery of mail to most U.S. residents on every day except Sunday—including delivery of infant formula, prescriptions, and periodicals. Authorizing USPS to eliminate a delivery day could reduce delivery costs and improve USPS's challenging economic condition. Studies that examined the elimination of a delivery day estimated that USPS could save between $3.5 billion (USPS study) and $1.7 billion (Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) study) annually. Such action, however, may reduce patronage, lead to job losses at USPS, or harm underserved communities that rely on mail delivery. Elimination of a delivery day alone will not solve USPS's budget troubles.",62,62 "House Office of Congressional Ethics: History, Authority, and Procedures. The House Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) was established on March 11, 2008, with the passage of H.Res. 895. It was most recently reauthorized by the House as part of the rules package (H.Res. 5) adopted by the 115th Congress on January 3, 2017. The office's establishment followed years of efforts by groups within and outside Congress to create an independent entity to investigate allegations of misconduct by Members, officers, and employees of Congress. During the 110th Congress (2007-2008), Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and Minority Leader John Boehner created the bipartisan Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement, chaired by Representative Michael Capuano, to consider whether the House should create an ""outside"" ethics-enforcement entity. The task force worked for nearly a year before issuing its recommendations for the creation of the OCE. The mandate of the OCE, which has jurisdiction only in the House, is to review information, and when appropriate, refer findings of fact to the House Committee on Ethics. Only this committee, pursuant to House rules, has the authority to recommend House discipline of Members and staff. Information of alleged wrongdoing by Members, officers, and employees of the House may be accepted by the OCE from the general public, but only the OCE board can initiate a review. The OCE is composed of six board members, and at least two alternates, each of whom serves a four-year term. The Speaker and the minority leader are each responsible for the appointment of three board members and one alternate. The chair is selected by the Speaker and a co-chair is selected by the minority leader. Current Members of the House, federal employees, and lobbyists are not eligible to serve on the board. OCE rules for the conduct of investigations and code of conduct can be found at their website, https://oce.house.gov. This report describes the history and rationale behind the creation of the OCE, its operations, its relationship with the House Committee on Ethics, and options potentially available for Congress if further amendments to the House ethics process are desired. For additional information, please refer to CRS Report RL30764, Enforcement of Congressional Rules of Conduct: A Historical Overview, by Jacob R. Straus, CRS Report RL30650, Senate Select Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, by Jacob R. Straus, and CRS Report 98-15, House Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, by Jacob R. Straus.",55,55 "U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues. This report examines three labor issues and arguments related to the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), signed on October 21, 2011 (P.L. 112-42): violence against trade unionists, impunity (accountability for or punishment of the perpetrators), and worker rights protections for Colombians. For general issues relating to the CFTA, see CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal. For background on Colombia and its political situation and context for the agreement, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by June S. Beittel. Opponents of the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA) argued against it on three points: (1) the high rate of violence against trade unionists in Colombia, (2) the lack of adequate punishment for the perpetrators of that violence, and (3) weak Colombian enforcement of International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards and Colombia's labor laws. Proponents of the agreement argued primarily for the Colombia FTA on the basis of economic and national security benefits. Accordingly, they argued, the CFTA would support increased exports, expand economic growth, create jobs, and open up investment opportunities for the United States. They also argued that it would reinforce the rule of law, spread values of capitalism in Colombia, and anchor hemispheric stability. Proponents specifically responded to labor complaints of the opponents, that (1) violence against trade unionists has declined dramatically since former President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002, (2) substantial progress is being made on the impunity issue as the government has undertaken great efforts to find perpetrators and bring them to justice, and (3) the Colombian government is taking steps to improve conditions for workers. The most recent steps are outlined in the ""Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights,"" released and jointly endorsed by President Obama and Colombian President Juan Manual Santos, on April 7, 2011. The Colombia FTA, along with FTAs for Panama and South Korea, are the second set of FTAs (after Peru) to have some labor enforcement ""teeth."" Labor provisions including the four basic ILO core labor principles are enforceable through the same dispute settlement procedures as for all other provisions (i.e., primarily those for commercial interests). Opponents argued that under CFTA, only the concepts of core labor principles, and not the details of the ILO conventions behind them, would be enforceable. Proponents pointed to recent Colombian progress in protecting workers on many fronts. They argued that approval of the FTA and the economic growth in Colombia that would result is the best way to protect Colombia's trade unionists. They also argued that not passing the agreement would not resolve Colombia's labor issues. In addition, they argued, the United States could lose jobs through trade diversion as Colombia continues to enter into regional trade agreements with other countries. Opponents argued that delaying approval of the CFTA further would give Colombia more time to keep improving protections for its workers. In fact, proponents point out, this has occurred in the five years between 2011 when Congress approved the implementing legislation, and 2006, when the agreement was first signed.",53,53 "Data Security Breaches: Context and Incident Summaries. Personal data security breaches are being reported with increasing regularity. Within the past few years, numerous examples of data such as Social Security, bank account, credit card, and driver's license numbers, as well as medical and student records have been compromised. A major reason for the increased awareness of these security breaches is a California law that requires notice of security breaches to the affected individuals. This law, implemented in July 2003, was the first of its kind in the nation. State data security breach notification laws require companies and other entities that have lost data to notify affected consumers. As of January 2007, 35 states have enacted legislation requiring companies or state agencies to disclose security breaches involving personal information. Congress is considering legislation to address personal data security breaches, following a series of high-profile data security breaches at major financial services firms, data brokers (including ChoicePoint and LexisNexis), and universities. In the past three years, multiple measures have been introduced, but to date, none have been enacted. This report will be updated regularly.",110,8 "DOD Leases of Foreign-Built Ships: Background for Congress. Prior to the enactment of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008), 10 U.S.C. §2401 stated DOD may not lease a vessel or aircraft for a period of more than five years unless it is specifically authorized by law to make such a lease. Operating under this provision, the Department of Defense (DOD) in recent years used lease options and renewals to lease some foreign-built cargo ships for total periods of almost 10 years—a length of time that some observers argue effectively circumvented a legal requirement that U.S. military ships be built in U.S. shipyards. These observers, particularly the American Shipbuilding Association (ASA), proposed reducing the current five-year legal limit on ship leases to two years for foreign-built ships. DOD opposed the idea, arguing that its ship leases are the most cost-effective way to meet its needs for the ships in question. Section 1011 of the FY2008 defense authorization act amended 10 U.S.C. §2401 to permit the Secretary of a military department to lease a vessel for a period of greater than two years, but less than five years, only if the Secretary provides a notification of the lease to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations committees (including a detailed description of its terms, a justification for entering it rather than purchasing the vessel, a determination that entering into it is the most cost-effective option, and a plan for meeting the requirement upon the lease's completion), and a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has expired. The explanatory statement on the final version of the FY2010 DOD appropriations act (H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118 of December 19, 2009) directed the Navy to update its March 2008 report on the leasing of foreign-built ships and address impacts on American seafarers, sealift capabilities, and naval shipbuilding.",31,31 "Outer Continental Shelf Moratoria on Oil and Gas Development. Moratoria measures for the outer continental shelf (OCS) establish bans or restrictions on oil and gas exploration and development in federal ocean areas. With some exceptions for marine sanctuaries and monuments, no portion of the federal OCS has a permanent moratorium on oil and gas leasing and development. While some areas are under temporary development bans, such as suspensions or moratoria directed by either legislative or executive powers, most of the OCS is free of such restrictions and is considered permissible for offshore leasing activity.",40,40 "Congress and the Budget: 2016 Actions and Events. The Constitution grants Congress the power of the purse, but does not dictate how Congress must fulfill this constitutional duty. Congress has, therefore, developed certain types of budgetary legislation, along with rules and practices that govern its content and consideration. This set of budgetary legislation, rules, and practices is often referred to as the congressional budget process. There is no prescribed congressional budget process that must be strictly followed each year, and Congress does not always consider budgetary measures in a linear or predictable pattern. Such dissimilarity can be the result of countless factors, such as a lack of consensus, competing budgetary priorities, the economy, natural disasters, military engagements, and other circumstances creating complications, obstacles, and interruptions within the policymaking process. Since the budget process will vary significantly each year, it is better understood not as a definite set of actions that must occur annually, but instead as an array of opportunities for affecting the federal budget. This report seeks to assist in (1) anticipating what budget-related actions might occur within the upcoming year, and (2) staying abreast of budget actions that occur this year. It provides a general description of the recurrent types of budgetary actions, and reflects on current events that unfold in each category during 2016. In addition, it includes information on certain events that may affect Congress's work on the budget, such as the President's budget request and the Congressional Budget Office's budget and economic outlook. The most-recent budget actions will be noted at the beginning of the report.",101,55 "Pages of the United States Congress: History, Background Information, and Proposals for Change. This report provides a brief history of the congressional page programs, including their duties, and background information about House and Senate pages. It also has an overview of changes and reforms from 1981-2001, and proposed changes, reforms, and various issues.",55,55 "North Korea: A Chronology of Events in 2005. This report provides a chronology of events relevant to U.S. relations with North Korea in 2005 and is a continuation of CRS Report RL32743, North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002-December 2004, by Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Helene Machart. The chronology includes significant meetings, events, and statements that shed light on the issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program. An introductory analysis highlights the key developments and notes other significant regional dynamics. Particular attention is paid to the Six-Party Talks, inter-Korean relations, key U.S. officials in charge of North Korean policy, China's leadership in the negotiations, Japan's relationship with its neighbors, and contact with North Korea outside of the executive branch, including a Congressional delegation. Information for this report came from a variety of news articles, scholarly publications, government materials, and other sources, the accuracy of which CRS has not verified. This report will not be updated.",85,85 "401(k) Plans and Retirement Savings: Issues for Congress. Over the past 25 years, defined contribution (DC) plans—including 401(k) plans—have become the most prevalent form of employer-sponsored retirement plan in the United States. The majority of assets held in these plans are invested in stocks and stock mutual funds, and the decline in the major stock market indices in 2008 greatly reduced the value of many families' retirement savings. The effect of stock market volatility on families' retirement savings is just one issue of concern to Congress with respect to defined contribution retirement plans. This report describes seven major policy issues with respect to defined contribution plans Access to employer-sponsored retirement plans. In 2007, only 61% of employees in the private sector were offered a retirement plan of any kind at work. Fifty-five percent were offered a DC plan. Only 45% of workers at establishments with fewer than 100 employees were offered a retirement plan of any kind in 2007. Forty-two percent were offered a defined contribution plan. Participation in employer-sponsored plans. Between 20% and 25% of workers whose employer offers a DC plan do not participate. Workers under age 35 are less likely than older workers to participate. Contribution rates. On average, participants in DC plans contributed 6% of pay to the plan in 2007. The median contribution by household heads who participated in a DC plan in 2007 was $3,360. This was just 22% of the maximum allowable contribution of $15,500 in that year. Investment choices. At year-end 2007, 78% of all DC plan assets were invested in stocks and stock mutual funds. This ratio varied little by age, indicating that many workers nearing retirement were heavily invested in stocks and risked substantial losses in a market downturn like that in 2008. Investment education and target date funds could help workers make better investment decisions. Fee disclosure. Retirement plans contract with service providers to provide investment management, record-keeping, and other services. There can be many service providers, each charging a fee that is ultimately paid by participants in 401(k) plans. The arrangements through which service providers are compensated can be very complicated and fees are often not clearly disclosed. Leakage from retirement savings. Pre-retirement withdrawals from retirement accounts are sometimes called ""leakages."" Current law represents a compromise between limiting leakages from retirement accounts and allowing people to have access to their retirement funds in times of great need. In general, borrowing from a 401(k) plan poses less risk to retirement security than a withdrawal. Pre-retirement withdrawals can have adverse long-term effects on retirement income. Converting retirement savings into income. Retirees face many financial risks, including living longer than they expected, investment losses, inflation, and possible large expenses for medical care and long-term care. Annuities can protect retirees from some of these risks, but few retirees purchase them. Developing polices that motivate retirees to convert assets into a reliable source of income will be a continuing challenge for Congress and other policymakers.",88,88 "Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): FY2016 Appropriations. Enacted on December 18, 2015, Title II of Division G of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113, H.R. 2029) provided $8.14 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for FY2016. The act appropriated funding for the full fiscal year through September 30, 2016, for the 12 regular appropriations acts, including ""Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies,"" under which EPA is funded. The total FY2016 enacted appropriations of $8.14 billion for EPA was the same as enacted for FY2015 but $451.8 million (5.3%) below the President's FY2016 request of $8.59 billion. No regular appropriations acts for FY2016—including the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies—were enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year. Instead, EPA and other federal departments and agencies operated under a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-53, H.R. 719) prior to the enactment of P.L. 114-113. Total discretionary appropriations enacted for FY2016 for all federal departments and agencies were based on increased limits on discretionary spending enacted November 2, 2015, in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74, H.R. 1314). Prior to the increased spending limits per the Bipartisan Budget Act, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 2822 on June 18, 2015, for the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies proposing $7.42 billion for EPA for FY2016. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 1645 on June 23, 2015, proposing $7.60 billion for EPA. With the exception of the State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) account, which represents almost 44% of the FY2016 total appropriations for EPA, the FY2016 appropriations were the same as the FY2015 enacted level for eight of the nine EPA appropriations accounts but were below the FY2016 requested levels for all nine accounts. The House and Senate committee-reported bills (H.R. 2822 and S. 1645) proposed decreases for all of the EPA appropriations accounts for FY2016 compared to the President's request and were generally less than or equal to FY2015 enacted appropriations for the nine accounts. There were both increases and decreases enacted for FY2016 across the individual program activities funded within the nine EPA appropriations accounts when compared to the FY2016 requested and FY2015 enacted appropriations. Congressional debate and hearings on EPA's FY2016 appropriations focused significantly on federal financial assistance to states for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects, various categorical grants to states to support general implementation and enforcement of federal environmental programs as delegated to the states, funding for the agency's implementation and research support for air pollution control regulations, EPA actions to address climate change and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and funding for environmental remediation. Funding levels for several geographic-specific initiatives, including the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative and efforts to restore the Chesapeake Bay, also garnered congressional interest. Additionally, similar to the debate regarding recent fiscal years appropriations for EPA, several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions received considerable attention during the consideration of EPA's FY2016 appropriations—most notably those that address GHG emissions and the definition of ""waters of the United States."" The general provisions in Title IV of Division G of P.L. 114-113 included provisions restricting the use of funds for certain EPA actions. Those provisions were similar to those contained in previous appropriations but represent only a subset of those included in the House and Senate committee-reported bills. Provisions included in P.L. 114-113 addressed EPA air quality regulation of livestock operations and reporting requirements for manure systems, use of U.S. iron and steel for drinking water infrastructure projects, and possible EPA regulation of lead in ammunition and fishing tackle. (EPA has not proposed such lead regulations.) Title IV of P.L. 114-113 also includes two provisions concerning the Great Lakes—one regarding public notice requirements for a combined sewer overflow discharge to the Great Lakes and another to amend the Clean Water Act to establish and authorize $300.0 million for the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative to carry out certain specified protection and restoration programs and projects. This CRS report provides an overview of FY2016 enacted appropriations for EPA accounts and certain program activities specified in P.L. 114-113 compared to H.R. 2822 and S. 1645 as reported, the President's FY2016 request, and FY2015 enacted appropriations. The report also highlights issues associated with a subset of accounts and programs that were prominent in the debate on EPA's FY2016 appropriations during the 114th Congress.",45,45 "U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2016 Appropriations. Geographic proximity has forged strong linkages between the United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, with critical U.S. interests encompassing economic, political, and security concerns. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to advancing democracy and open markets since the 1990s. Current U.S. policy is designed to promote economic and social opportunity, ensure the safety of the region's citizens, strengthen effective democratic institutions, and secure a clean energy future. As part of broader efforts to advance these priorities, the United States provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with substantial amounts of foreign assistance. Trends in Assistance Since 1946, the United States has provided more than $160 billion of assistance to the region in constant 2013 dollars (or nearly $78 billion in historical, non-inflation-adjusted, dollars). Funding levels have fluctuated over time, however, according to regional trends and U.S. policy initiatives. U.S. assistance spiked during the 1960s under President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, and then declined in the 1970s before spiking again during the Central American conflicts of the 1980s. After another decline during the 1990s, assistance remained on a generally upward trajectory through the first decade of this century, reaching its most recent peak in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Aid levels for Latin America and the Caribbean declined in each of the four fiscal years between FY2011 and FY2014 before increasingly slightly in FY2015. FY2016 Obama Administration Request The Obama Administration's FY2016 foreign aid budget request would increase assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean for a second consecutive year. The Administration requested nearly $2 billion to be provided through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which would be a 26% increase over the estimated FY2015 level. The requested increase in assistance is almost entirely the result of the Administration's proposal to provide over $1 billion in aid to Central America to promote prosperity, security, and good governance and to address the root causes of migration from the sub-region. Under the request, the balance of U.S. assistance would shift toward development aid and away from security aid, as three of the four major U.S. security initiatives in the region would see cuts. Aid levels for Colombia, Haiti, and Mexico would decline compared to FY2015, but those countries would continue to be among the top recipients in the region. Congressional Action In recent years, the annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measure has been the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews U.S. assistance and influences executive branch policy. Although the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported out their respective bills (H.R. 2772 and S. 1725) in June and July 2015, no action was taken on those measures. After funding foreign aid programs through a series of continuing resolutions, Congress included foreign assistance appropriations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), which the President signed into law on December 18, 2015. The legislation includes $32.9 billion for bilateral economic assistance and international security assistance worldwide, this funding level is 2.8% higher than the Administration's FY2016 request and about 1% lower than the FY2015 estimated level. It is currently unclear how much foreign assistance will be directed to Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2016, since, for the most part, appropriations levels for individual countries and programs are not specified in the legislation or the accompanying explanatory statement. The appropriations levels that are specified differ from the Administration's request in several respects. The legislation provides $250 million less than was requested for Central America and $50 million less than was requested for Haiti. It also appears to provide slightly more assistance than was requested for Colombia, Mexico, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Given these funding levels it appears as though the region will receive less assistance than the Administration requested for FY2016 but more than it received in FY2015.",79,79 "Basic Federal Budgeting Terminology. In its most elemental form, the federal budget is a comprehensive accounting of the government's spending, revenues, and borrowing. This fact sheet provides a brief overview of the basic terminology and concepts used in the federal budget process.",101,101 "Cyclone Nargis and Burma's Constitutional Referendum. Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Burma in the evening of May 2, 2008 and cut a path of destruction across the southern portion of the country. The storm left in its wake an official death toll of 84,537 and 53,836 more missing, and extensive damage to the nation's premier agricultural areas. Some have speculated that the final number of dead is actually more than 130,000. Vital infrastructure was destroyed by the storm, severely limiting the ability to assess the loss of life and provide assistance to the survivors for weeks following the cyclone. In addition, much of Burma's most productive agricultural land has been severely damaged, some experts expect that it will take up to two years for Burma's production of rice, seafood, pork and poultry to recover, and that the nation may face chronic food shortages and the need for international assistance for many months. Burma's ruling military junta quickly faced both domestic and international criticism for its response to Cyclone Nargis, including accusations that it failed to provide adequate warning, its slow emergency response, and its reluctance to allow international relief workers into the country. The United States has offered so far contributed $40.17 million in relief aid. Even before Cyclone Nargis struck, the junta was already facing a highly controversial referendum on a proposed constitution scheduled for May 10, 2008, that could shape U.S. and other countries' policies toward Burma. As a consequence, the evolution and implications of the humanitarian crisis became inextricably linked to Burma's political situation and its relations with the international community. In a widely criticized move, the military junta decided go ahead with the vote, holding the constitutional referendum in most of Burma on May 10, 2008, and in the more severely affected areas on May 24, 2008. The SPDC reported a heavy turnout on both days and few voting irregularities. Opposition groups state that the turnout was light, and there were many cases of voting fraud and voter intimidation. On May 29, 2008, the junta announced the promulgation of the new constitution, on the basis of on its approval by 90.7% of the eligible voters. According to the new constitution, elections to form a new government are to be held in 2010. Some experts are speculating that Cyclone Nargis may precipitate major political change in Burma, including the destabilization of Burma's military regime. The junta has already faced domestic and international pressure to cancel the constitutional referendum. Local dissatisfaction with the speed and quality of the junta's provision of emergency assistance may heighten domestic opposition to the junta and its proposed constitution. Also, rising food prices and food shortages may feed popular discontent, much like fuel price increases led to protests in Burma of September 2007. In addition, two days before announcing the official results of the constitutional referendum, the SPDC extended opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest for the sixth consecutive year. This report examines the scope of and response to the disaster, as well as its links to Burma's political situation and U.S. policy. The report will be updates as circumstances warrant.",85,85 "Provisions Supporting Ecosystem Services Markets in U.S. Farm Bill Legislation. Environmental goods and services are the benefits society obtains from the environment and ecosystems, both natural and managed, such as water filtration, flood control, provision of habitat, carbon storage, and many others. Farmers' participation in providing these types of goods and services began in earnest in the 1990s with the development of watershed approaches incorporating nutrient credit trading and wetlands mitigation banking, and continued with the more recent development of voluntary carbon credit markets. These efforts have triggered further interest in the possibility of developing market and trading opportunities for farmers and landowners as a source of environmental offsets. These services would be in addition to the food and fiber services traditionally supplied by the agriculture and forestry sectors. Congress is expressing growing interest in developing such market-based approaches to complement existing federally supported programs that promote conservation in the farm and forestry sectors, as well as to complement existing and/or emerging environmental regulations or natural resource requirements that may affect the agriculture and forestry sectors. The enacted 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008) contains a new conservation provision that seeks to facilitate the participation of farmers and landowners in environmental services markets by directing USDA to develop technical guidelines for measuring farm- and forestry-based environmental services. This provision focuses first on carbon storage and indirectly references various agriculture and forestry provisions in some legislative initiatives that are being considered as part of the broader climate change debate, which have highlighted the perceived need for uniform standards and ways of measuring emissions reduction and increases in carbon storage in the agriculture and forestry sectors. These types of provisions could expand the scope of existing land-based conservation programs and facilitate the development of private-sector markets for a range of environmental goods and services from farmers and landowners. Among the possible questions that may emerge as these agriculture and forestry provisions are either implemented as part of U.S. farm conservation policy, or considered as part of a broader climate change initiative, are the following: Can agricultural interests effectively provide environmental services along with traditional food and forestry services? How would uniform standards address differences within production areas, types of resources, and ecosystems? What is the role of USDA as the lead federal agency in establishing technical guidelines for the agriculture and forestry sectors? How would collaboration work between other participating federal agencies? How would the agreed-upon decisions and standards work within existing regulatory authorities, and within possible forthcoming regulatory authorities, such as proposed climate change options currently being debated in Congress? What role should federal agencies play in establishing environmental services markets?",2,43 "Harbor Maintenance Funding. The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) was instituted by the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986 (P.L. 99-662) to pay for the routine maintenance and operations costs of harbors. Numerous legal challenges to the HMT raise questions about its future and the issue of possible legislative changes. In March 1998, the Supreme Court struck down the application of the HMT with respect to exports, finding that it violated the Constitution's ban on export taxes. Cases regarding the constitutionality of the HMT on imports remain in litigation. The European Union sees the application of the HMT to imports as a discriminatory import tariff that violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The current Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund balance, in conjunction with the revenue stream from the remaining HMT collections and interest payments, are considered sufficient to cover expenditures for the foreseeable future. However, the results of the legal and trade challenges could reduce or halt incoming revenue. Harbor maintenance dredging requirements are expected to increase in the near-term over recent levels due to current deepening projects at many ports. Larger containerships appear to be the primary driving force behind current dredging activity. Issues for the 108th Congress include how to finance harbor maintenance in a manner that is both constitutional and not in violation of trade agreements, and how to finance the federal portion of harbor-deepening projects. Key policy questions include: Should the federal government return to using the general fund to finance harbor maintenance? Should a new user fee be established to pay for harbor maintenance? The larger issue that may need to be resolved before a funding solution can be found is: what should the role of the federal government be in port maintenance and dredging? The Water Resources Development Act of 2003 (H.R. 2557), which passed the House, would increase the role of the federal government by increasing its share of the cost in harbor deepening and maintenance projects. This report will be updated as warranted.",108,108 "Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues. Under the Administration's FY2006 foreign assistance request, U.S. aid to sub-Saharan Africa would continue to grow, due to sharp increases through the State Department's Global HIV/AIDS Initiative. Overall, non-food aid to Africa would total about $3.6 billion under the requst, compared with an estimated $3.4 billion being allocated in FY2005. U.S. assistance finds its way to Africa through a variety of channels, including the USAID-administered DA and Child Survival programs, food aid programs, and refugee assistance. The overall level of funding for aid to Africa remains a continuing subject of debate. Other issues include the eligibility of African countries for aid through the Millennium Challenge Account and U.S. support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), an African initiative linking increased aid with policy reform.",79,79 "Delaware Emergency Management and Homeland Security Statutory Authorities Summarized. This report is one of a series that profiles the emergency management and homeland security statutory authorities of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and three territories (American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). Each profile identifies the more significant elements of state statutes, generally as codified. This report focuses on the state of Delaware.",22,22 "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Services in Private Schools under P.L. 105-17. The 1997 amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), P.L. 105-17 changed previous statutory language regarding private school services for children with disabilities who are unilaterally placed in a private school by their parents. Three major additions were made to the statutory language on this issue: (1) requiring the states to spend a proportionate amount of IDEA funds on private school children with disabilities who are enrolled in the private school by their parents, (2) allowing school districts to provide special education related services on the premises of private schools, including parochial schools, and (3) applying the identification, child find, and evaluation provisions to children placed by their parents in private schools. Since enactment, several courts have interpreted these provisions and found public schools are not required to pay the costs of special education services for a particular child in a private school, rather, states are required to expend proportionate amounts of federal funds on special education services for such children. In addition, the Department of Education promulgated regulations implementing the statutory language. This report will be updated. For a general discussion of IDEA see Apling and Jones, ""Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Overview of Major Provisions,"" CRS Report RS20366.",35,35 "H.R. 23, the Gaining Responsibility on Water Act of 2017 (GROW Act). In recent years, parts of the American West (i.e., the 17 states west of the Mississippi River) have been subject to prolonged drought conditions, including a severe drought in California that lasted from 2012 to 2016. Dating to the 112th Congress, several bills were proposed to address these conditions. The 114th Congress saw significant drought-related legislation enacted in the form of Subtitle J of the Water Resources Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act, P.L. 114-322). The WIIN Act included a number of provisions generally related to the Bureau of Reclamation (or Reclamation, a bureau within the Department of the Interior), as well as several provisions specifically focusing on the operations of the Central Valley Project (CVP), a large federal water project in California. Some, but not all, of those provisions are scheduled to sunset after five years. Although by most metrics the drought in California has ended, debate continues regarding the possible detrimental effects of certain federal water supply-related authorities and the federal role in water resources development more broadly. Although some argue that rollback of existing environmental protections should be only a temporary measure taken during times of drought (if at all), others contend that the drought in California magnified an issue that needs to be addressed, regardless of hydrological conditions. In the 115th Congress, multiple proposals (including those that were previously proposed but were not enacted in the WIIN Act) have been consolidated in H.R. 23, the Gaining Responsibility on Water Act of 2017 (GROW Act). The House Rules Committee version of H.R. 23 included seven titles. Titles I-IV of the bill are for the most part specific to California and include directives for the operation of the CVP and amendments to the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA, Title XXIV of P.L. 102-575) and the San Joaquin River Restoration Act (Title X of P.L. 111-11, the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009), among other things. Titles V-VII would be West-wide in their application and would include changes related to water supply development on federal lands and Reclamation's project-development process. These titles also would include restrictions on the federal government's abilities to exercise reserved water rights. Supporters of the bill argue that these changes would provide more water to users from existing and new sources while safeguarding existing state water rights. Opponents believe that the bill goes too far in rolling back environmental protections, which, along with the effects of other parts of the legislation (e.g., potential new storage projects), could be detrimental to species and their habitat. Several of the bill's titles have been considered and/or passed by the House in the 115th or prior congresses. Other titles are new or altered compared to language that has been considered previously. Based on past congressional debates, some provisions (in particular those that would make major changes to CVP operations and the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement) may be controversial. In considering these provisions, Congress may consider the trade-offs involved in proposed changes. This report focuses on the most prominent provisions of H.R. 23. It provides relevant context and background for individual titles and sections, as well as a broad discussion of potential issues for Congress in considering this legislation.",43,43 "Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA): A Primer. Enacted in 1998, the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA) is the primary federal legislation that supports basic education for out-of-school adults. Commonly called ""adult education,"" the programs funded by AEFLA typically support educational services at the secondary level and below, as well as English language training. Actual services are typically provided by local entities using a combination of federal and non-federal funds. Specific curricula vary based on the needs and objectives of the local student population. In FY2013, approximately $575 million was appropriated for AEFLA. Of this sum, approximately $21 million was set aside for national activities and incentive grants. The remaining $554 million was allocated to the states via formula grants. To receive a federal grant, states are required to provide a match so that non-federal resources account for at least 25% of the total resources dedicated to adult education. Many states contribute well beyond their required match, though there is substantial variation among the states. The statute specifies that 82.5% of each state's grant must be subgranted to local providers of educational services. These local providers are most commonly local education agencies (typically school districts) or institutions of higher education (typically community, junior, or technical colleges). Nonprofit agencies, correctional institutions, and other entities may also receive grants. Adult education activities provided at the local level are divided into three broad categories Adult Basic Education (ABE), which includes instruction for adults whose literacy and numeracy skills are below the high school level Adult Secondary Education (ASE), which includes instruction for adults whose literacy skills are approximately at the high school level, including adults who are seeking to pass the General Education Development (GED) test, and English literacy (EL), which includes instruction for adults who are not proficient in the English language. In program year 2011-2012 (the most recent year for which complete data are available), approximately 1.8 million individuals participated in state adult education activities for an average of 124 hours each. A plurality of the students (47%) participated in ABE while a smaller share (40%) participated in EL activities. The remaining share of adult education students (13%) participated in ASE activities. Non-federal funds accounted for the majority of spending on these activities. The authorization of appropriations for AEFLA expired at the end of FY2003, though the programs it supports have continued to be funded through the annual appropriations process. AEFLA was enacted as Title II of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) and AEFLA reauthorization debate has also been part of broader efforts to reauthorize WIA.",36,36 "Russian Fighter Aircraft Industrial Base: Parallels with the United States?. There are many differences between the fighter aircraft industry in the United States and in Russia. The United States has traditionally produced its weaponry within a capitalist framework which allowed free enterprise and competition between companies in private industry. The former Soviet Union's economy, and its fighter aircraft industry was based on a Marxist, command economy, where the central government dictated the type and number of aircraft produced and allocated resources for construction. Once among the most glamorous components of the Soviet military industrial complex, the Russian military aircraft industry has been described by some analysts as being on the verge of collapse. Russia's civilian aircraft industry has faced similar pressures, which does not bode well for the military aviation infrastructure. It may be difficult for fighter aircraft companies to find employment in Russia's beleaguered civil aircraft sector. The Russian government has attempted to reform its fighter aircraft industrial base and make it more efficient and competitive with western industry. It has initiated several reforms aimed at reducing the stratification and compartmentalization of industrial processes, as well as improving access to financial resources. These reforms have had mixed success. While Russia's military aviation infrastructure has consolidated dramatically, the overall effectiveness of these reform efforts still remains to be seen. Russia's remaining fighter aircraft design and manufacturing enterprises, Sukhoi and Mikoyan appear to be struggling to stay alive. Both companies have sought to make up for decreased domestic demand by increasing their export of fighter aircraft and by winning contracts in the civilian aviation sector. Success in both areas has been limited, and many analysts doubt that Russia can support more than one fighter aircraft company for much longer. The potential for a merger between the two companies has been discussed for some time. Each company has its own strengths and weaknesses, and it is unclear which would survive a merger. As Russia reforms its fighter aircraft industrial base, there appear to be many parallels between their experience and what is happening in the United States in terms of declining domestic demand and pressure for consolidation. By examining the events in Russia's military aviation industrial base especially the experience of the Sukhoi and Mikoyan aircraft design bureaus, policy makers in the United States may gain insight into current and forthcoming domestic fighter aircraft industrial base issues.",85,85 "Preemption in Proposed Amendments to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA): Side-by-Side Analysis of S. 697 and H.R. 2576. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was enacted in 1976 to govern the regulation of chemical substances in U.S. commerce. Its core provisions have not been significantly amended since that time. Under TSCA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has implemented a chemicals management program over the past four decades. EPA has issued a very limited number of risk management rules under TSCA to restrict chemicals it has found to present unreasonable risks of injury to human health or the environment. Meanwhile, states and, in a few cases, local subdivisions of states have enacted an increasing number of their own chemical programs and restrictions. The federal preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that federal laws ""shall be the supreme Law of the Land."" Congress can expressly preempt state and local laws by statute, and the scope of preemption is determined by Congress's intent. Because TSCA preemption is based on EPA's issuance of certain types of rules and orders targeting particular chemicals (subject to exceptions), state and local chemical programs and restrictions—for the most part targeting chemicals not subject to EPA risk management rules—generally have not faced preemption under TSCA. As legislative proposals to amend TSCA have been discussed in recent years, one major topic of debate has been the extent to which the scope of TSCA's preemption of state chemical regulations should be preserved, expanded, or reduced. This report provides a brief background on preemption in current TSCA. The report then provides a side-by-side comparison of the preemption provisions of House and Senate bills in the 114th Congress to amend TSCA. S. 697, the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, was ordered to be reported out of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on April 28, 2015, on a 15-5 vote. It was reported, as amended, on June 17, 2015, and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar. H.R. 2576, the TSCA Modernization Act of 2015, was first released as a discussion draft on April 7, 2015. It was introduced as H.R. 2576 on May 26, 2015, and passed the House as amended on June 23, 2015, on a 398-1 vote. Both bills would expand EPA's authority to regulate chemicals in a number of ways, similar in some respects, although S. 697 is a longer and more detailed bill that would make more changes to TSCA's language than H.R. 2576. The preemption provisions of the two bills have many similarities as well, including in their overall structure, which retains TSCA's approach of only preempting state and local laws on a chemical-by-chemical basis after EPA action on a chemical. Both bills would also exclude from preemption state and some local chemical requirements in effect as of August 1, 2015, and any state or local requirements arising from long-standing state chemical laws such as California's Proposition 65. However, the bills have a number of differences with respect to preemption. For example, S. 697 would preempt new restrictions on a chemical while EPA prepared a safety assessment on that chemical, a period of up to several years, H.R. 2576 may impose somewhat broader preemption on the basis of EPA actions for new chemicals and new uses than S. 697. Various other similarities and differences between the two bills regarding preemptive EPA actions, exceptions, exemptions, and waivers are also compared. A third proposal to amend TSCA, S. 725, the Alan Reinstein and Trevor Schaefer Toxic Chemical Protection Act, would eliminate express TSCA preemption entirely. S. 725 is not included in this report's comparison.",46,46 "Violence Against Women Office: Background and Current Issues. This report discusses issues regarding the Violence Against Women Office (VAWO), which was created in 1995 to address legal and policy issues concerning violence against women.",95,16 "Japan-South Korea Relations: Converging Interests and Implications for the United States. Since South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung's historic October 1998 visit to Japan, relations between Seoul and Tokyo have improved dramatically, to a point where arguably the two countries are at their closest ever. The improvement in bilateral ties has been accompanied by an unprecedented degree of trilateral coordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea on policy toward North Korea. In the short term, the impetus for better relations has come from two regional crises: North Korea's August 1998 launch of the Taepodong medium-range missile over Japan and the near-collapse of the South Korean economy in late 1997. Additionally, over the longer term, warmer ties have been made possible by the gradual improvement in traditionally divisive issues, including Japan's chronic bilateral trade surpluses, South Korea's anti-Japanese trade barriers, Seoul's wariness of Tokyo's policy toward North Korea, and competing interpretations of Japan's occupation of Korea and behavior in World War II. The more cooperative relationship between South Korea and Japan enhances regional stability, a major U.S. objective, and augments U.S. efforts to improve trilateral coordination on policy toward the Korean peninsula. In the economic sphere, increased cooperation between the Japanese and South Korean governments will present the U.S. with opportunities and challenges. Shifts in Japan-South Korea relations affect activities and policies of concern to, among others Members and Committees with responsibilities or interests related to North Korean nuclear and missile proliferation issues, inter-Korean relations, U.S.-Japan security relations, China's emergence as a regional military and economic power, and the U.S. negotiating position in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Normally, the Japan-South Korea relationship per se generates little legislative impact, but Congress periodically holds hearings and expresses its views on issues that are affected directly by changes in Tokyo-Seoul relations.",85,85 "Pakistan Political Unrest: In Brief. Beginning on August 15, 2014, Pakistan's struggle to establish a sustainable democratic system has met with a new reversal in the form of major anti-government street protests in the capital. Crowds led by opposition figures have demanded the resignation of democratically elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The prime minister regards such demands to be inconsistent with the Pakistani Constitution, and the consensus view in Islamabad appears to support parliamentary processes. The strident and rigid nature of the protestors' demands, and their unwillingness to disperse from areas surrounding key government buildings has, however, created an impasse. After two weeks, the powerful Pakistan Army announced that it would act as ""facilitator"" in seeking resolution. This has led many analysts to anticipate a new round of military intervention in the country's governance. While few assess that Sharif's government now faces an imminent threat of ouster from office, many observers see the current unrest weakening Sharif and representing a setback to democratization in a country that has suffered three outright military coups in its 67 years of independence. To many analysts, it appears unlikely that Pakistan in the near future will alter any of its foreign or security policies of interest to the United States. However, the U.S. government has sought to help in fostering Pakistan's democratic system, and that effort has been disrupted by the current unrest. The Pakistan Army's more openly direct control of the country's foreign and security policies may, over time, shift Pakistan's approach toward Afghanistan further into a policy framework that seeks to counter Indian influence there. It could also present new challenges to the goal of improving India-Pakistan relations, and put a damper on hopes for effective regional cooperation and commerce in South Asia.",85,85 "Encryption and the ""Going Dark"" Debate. Changing technology presents opportunities and challenges for U.S. law enforcement. Some technological advances have arguably opened a treasure trove of information for investigators and analysts, others have presented unique hurdles. While some feel that law enforcement now has more information available to them than ever before, others contend that law enforcement is ""going dark"" as their investigative capabilities are outpaced by the speed of technological change. These hurdles for law enforcement include strong, end-to-end (or what law enforcement has sometimes called ""warrant-proof"") encryption, provider limits on data retention, bounds on companies' technological capabilities to provide specific data points to law enforcement, tools facilitating anonymity online, and a landscape of mixed wireless, cellular, and other networks through which individuals and information are constantly passing. As such, law enforcement cannot access certain information they otherwise may be authorized to obtain. Much of the current debate surrounds how strong encryption contributes to the going dark issue, and thus it is the focus of this report. The tension between law enforcement capabilities and technological change has received congressional attention for several decades. For instance, in the 1990s the ""crypto wars"" pitted the government against technology companies, and this tension was highlighted by proposals to build in back doors to certain encrypted communications devices as well as to restrict the export of strong encryption code. In addition, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, P.L. 103-414) in 1994 to help law enforcement maintain their ability to execute authorized electronic surveillance as telecommunications providers turned to digital and wireless technology. The going dark debate originally focused on data in motion, or law enforcement's ability to intercept real-time communications. However, more recent technology changes have impacted law enforcement capabilities to access not only communications but stored content, or data at rest. As such, a central element of the debate now involves determining what types of information law enforcement is able to access and under what circumstances. Cell phones have advanced from being purely cellular telecommunications devices into mobile computers that happen to have phone capabilities, concurrently, the scope of data produced by and saved on these devices has morphed. In addition to voice communications, this range of data can include call detail records, Global Positioning System (GPS) location points, data stored on the devices (including emails and photos), and data stored in the ""cloud."" Some of these data can be obtained directly from telecommunications providers or individuals, and some may be obtained without going through such a middle man. The Obama Administration took steps to urge the technology community to develop a means to assist law enforcement in accessing encrypted data and took steps to bolster law enforcement capabilities. In addition, policymakers have been evaluating whether legislation may be a necessary or appropriate element in the current debate on going dark—particularly on the encryption aspect. A range of legislative options exist that could impact law enforcement capabilities or resources. Legislation could also place certain requirements on technology companies or individuals utilizing certain communications systems and devices. In debating these options, policymakers may consider a number of questions, including the following How effective might mandating law enforcement access to products or services manufactured, sold, or otherwise used in the United States be, given the borderless nature of modern communications? Is it possible to create a system with sufficiently narrow and protected access points that these points can only be entered by authorized entities and not exploited by others? What is the appropriate balance for personal privacy and data security with public safety and national security? What precedents might be set for U.S. companies operating both domestically and internationally if the United States mandates the ability for law enforcement to access encrypted data and communications?",110,19 "Senate Committee Hearings: Arranging Witnesses. Selecting witnesses is one of the most important aspects of planning a Senate hearing. Committees and subcommittees pay careful attention to which viewpoints will be represented, who should testify, and the order and format for presenting witnesses. A witness must be invited by a committee in order to testify. Standing committees and their subcommittees may also subpoena reluctant witnesses.",55,55 "Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress. Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in 1991 authorizing the use of Defense Department funds to assist with the safe and secure transportation storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and other weapons in the former Soviet Union. Initially, many supported U.S. assistance as an emergency response to fears about a loss of control over nuclear weapons in the disintegrating Soviet Union. Now, many see the CTR program as a part of a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort. Congress has demonstrated continuing support for the CTR programs, providing between $300 million and $400 million in Defense Department funds each year between FY1992 and FY1998, and between $403 and $475 million each year between FY 1999 and FY2004. Congress has also increased its oversight efforts and added numerous reporting requirements. Many of these changes reflected congressional concern with the slow pace of implementation during the first few years and with the U.S. ability to account for its expenditures and progress on CTR projects. The Clinton Administration resolved most of the issues raised during the first few years of program, but the congressional debate over funding in recent years has revealed new concerns about the focus of some projects in the CTR program. The Clinton Administration credited the CTR program with significant achievements in reducing threats from the former Soviet Union. Some Members of Congress disagree and believe that the CTR programs have diminished U.S. national security by subsidizing the Russian defense establishment. Others have argued that Clinton Administration claims of success are exaggerated and that the programs have produced more limited results. On the other hand, some Members of Congress believe that the program could do much more to protect the United States from proliferation and terrorist threats. Congress added funds to the FY1997 budget to expand efforts to enhance the security of nuclear and other weapons materials in the former Soviet Union. But, in FY2000 and FY2001, it refused to authorize the use of CTR funds for the construction of a chemical weapons dismantlement facility. Members of Congress have also questioned the Administration's spending priorities for CTR programs. Most support efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons. However, Congress has prohibited the use of CTR funds for defense conversion projects, environmental restoration projects, and housing for retired officers, and, beginning in FY2000, in prohibited their use for the elimination of conventional weapons. Some Members of Congress have also argued that U.S. assistance to Russia should be linked to a number of areas of Russian military and foreign policy. Others, however, have argued that efforts to link CTR assistance to a wider range of Russian activities would backfire, with Russia forgoing the assistance and retaining its nuclear weapons while continuing the policies that brought U.S. objections. These issues were discussed at length during the House debate on FY1997 funding, but they were not included in the final legislation. In recent years, Congress has approved almost all of the Administration's request for CTR funding, but it continues to express concerns about the focus of some CTR projects.",29,22 "Distribution of Small Business Ownership and Income by Individual Tax Rates and Selected Policy Issues. Some lawmakers have expressed concern over several proposals being considered in the current Congress to raise the tax burden on high-income individuals. Of particular concern are a proposal by the Obama Administration to allow the top two individual marginal tax rates (currently 33% and 35%) to return to their pre-2001 levels of 36% and 39.6%, starting in 2011, and a provision in the health care reform bill passed by the House (H.R. 3962) to impose a 5.4% surtax on the modified adjusted gross incomes (MAGIs) of single filers above $500,000 and the MAGIs of joint filers above $1 million, also starting in 2011. Critics claim the proposed tax hikes would undermine the economic incentives for small business formation and investment. By contrast, backers of the Administration's proposal say it is needed to raise revenue during a time of large budget deficits, inject greater progressivity into the federal income tax in the wake of the sweeping tax cuts enacted during the Bush Administration, and promote a fairer distribution by income level of the cost of government services. A similar argument underlies support for the surtax in H.R. 3962. One approach to evaluating the contention that the proposed tax hikes would harm small business investment, formation, and growth is to examine the distribution of small business income and the tax returns of small business owners by tax bracket. Two critical considerations in undertaking such an evaluation are the definition of small business income and ownership and its compatibility with available federal income tax data. An analysis by the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center (TPC) of the distribution of small business income and tax filers reporting such income by tax bracket in 2007 and 2009 defines a small business owner as anyone who reports income or loss on Schedule C (self-employment income), Schedule E (income from rents, royalties, partnerships, limited liability companies, and S corporations), and Schedule F (income from farming). Such a broad definition arguably has more disadvantages than advantages, calling into question its usefulness for policy analysis. So any results based on such a definition should be seen as illustrative or suggestive rather than definitive or conclusive. The TPC analysis found that a small share of small business owners would likely be affected by the proposed tax hikes: an average of less than 2% of such individuals were subject to the 33% or 35% marginal tax rates in 2007 and 2009. At the same time, the results suggested that a significant share of small business income could be subject to the higher rates. In 2007 and 2009, small business income represented an average of 30% of adjusted gross income (AGI) for filers in the 33% tax bracket, and an average of 35% of AGI for filers in the 35% bracket, the average for all filers was 14%. Raising the marginal tax rates facing high-income individuals without changing the top corporate or capital gains tax rates in theory could increase the share of firms organized as C corporations rather than passthrough entities. A shift in the distribution of taxable income among the main forms of business organization might have a significant impact on business tax revenue. A rate hike also has the potential to harm the domestic climate for small business formation and investment. But current business tax benefits, if retained beyond 2010, would lessen a rate hike's dampening effect on investment, and its impact on the creation of new firms may be difficult to determine.",13,102 Aiding Israel after the Iran Nuclear Deal: Issues for Congress. This report discusses recent indications from the Obama administration that the United States may provide Israel with additional military aid during the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran.,28,29 "Radio Broadcasting Chips for Smartphones: A Status Report. The concurrent developments of digital radio broadcasting and digital cellular networks have enabled hybrid products that incorporate over-the-air broadcasting into cellphones. A recent introduction (2013) is a hybrid radio/smartphone with Internet connectivity, marketed in the United States as NextRadio. NextRadio uses a chip that receives analog FM and digital radio, with enhancements such as customized radio listening, the primary radio connection is over-the-air, not through Internet streaming. On the assumption that radio broadcasting is more accessible and reliable than communications over wireless networks with Internet connectivity, some broadcasting industry leaders have proposed that FM radio chips be required—or at least encouraged—for smartphones as part of the nation's emergency communications preparedness. To give perspective on the proposal for widespread deployment of FM radio chips in smartphones as an emergency preparedness measure, this report provides information on consumer and industry trends in radio and wireless network communications. It also provides a brief overview of the role of technology in disseminating emergency alerts and information.",109,109 "Veterans' Benefits: Current Life Insurance Programs. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers and supervises several life insurance programs for active servicemembers and veterans. The VA supervises the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI) and Veterans' Group Life Insurance (VGLI) programs, which are administered by the Office of Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (OSGLI), a division of Prudential Insurance Company of America. The Service-Disabled Veterans' Insurance (S-DVI) program, on the other hand, is administered entirely by the VA. Access to VA-administered life insurance programs gives servicemembers and veterans, who may not be eligible for private life insurance policies, the opportunity to carry group life insurance. This provides for their families in the event of the servicemember's or veteran's death. In September 1965, with the passage of P.L. 89-214, Congress established the SGLI program and mandated the VA to enter into an agreement with the private insurance industry to meet the insurance needs of Vietnam era servicemembers. As a result, VA established an agreement with Prudential Financial to administer its policies. When first enacted, the SGLI program provided up to $10,000 in coverage for policyholders. Today, servicemembers can receive a maximum of $400,000 insurance coverage under the program. On August 1, 1974, with the enactment of P.L. 93-289, VGLI became available to servicemembers. VGLI provides for the conversion of SGLI after separation from active military duty. VGLI is a five-year renewable term policy that, like SGLI, provides a maximum of $400,000 of coverage. Servicemembers may have their SGLI and VGLI proceeds paid either as a lump sum or over a period of 36 months. The lump sum payment may, at the beneficiary's election, be in the form of a single check via a retained asset account (called an Alliance Account). Free financial counseling is available to SGLI and VGLI beneficiaries. During the Korean War, before SGLI and VGLI were established, Congress passed the Insurance Act of 1951 (P.L. 82-23) and established the S-DVI program. S-DVI was created to meet the insurance needs of certain veterans with service-connected disabilities, many of whom would not be eligible for private life insurance due to their service-connected disabilities. Currently, policies are issued for a maximum face value of $10,000. Retained asset accounts are not offered under the S-DVI program. This report provides information on the current VA life insurance programs available for servicemembers and veterans, management and administration issues, and associated policy issues.",30,30 "Senate Select Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction. The United States Constitution provides each House of Congress with the sole authority to establish rules and punish and expel Members. From 1789 to 1964, the Senate dealt individually with cases of disciplinary action against Members, often forming ad hoc committees to investigate and make recommendations when acts of wrongdoing were brought to the chamber's attention. Events of the 1960s, including the investigation of Secretary to the Majority Robert G. ""Bobby"" Baker, for alleged corruption and influence peddling, prompted the creation of a permanent ethics committee and the writing of a Code of Conduct for Members, officers, and staff of the Senate. The Senate Select Committee on Ethics was first established in 1964. This bipartisan, six-member committee investigates alleged violations of the rules of the Senate and recommends disciplinary actions. In the 95th Congress (1977-1978), the Senate expanded the committee's jurisdiction and altered its procedures to implement revisions to the Senate Code of Official Conduct. Also, to reflect these changes the committee was renamed the Select Committee on Ethics. This report briefly outlines the background of ethics enforcement in the Senate, including the creation of the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct and the subsequent renaming of the committee as the Select Committee on Ethics. The report also provides a brief overview of the Senate Code of Conduct and on the Select Committee's current jurisdiction and procedures. For additional information on ethics in the Senate, please refer to CRS Report RL30764, Enforcement of Congressional Rules of Conduct: A Historical Overview, by Jacob R. Straus, CRS Report RL31126, Lobbying Congress: An Overview of Legal Provisions and Congressional Ethics Rules, by Jack Maskell, and CRS Report 93-875, Expulsion and Censure Actions Taken by the Full Senate Against Members, by Jack Maskell.",55,55 "Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Controlled Substances Act: Gonzales v. Oregon. The state of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA) is the first and only state law in the nation that legalizes physician-assisted suicide. The ODWDA permits Oregon physicians to prescribe a lethal dose of medication to mentally competent, terminally ill patients, who then may voluntarily elect to hasten their death. Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), a federal law that regulates the legal and illicit manufacture, distribution, and possession of drugs, a physician may prescribe controlled substances to patients only for a ""legitimate medical purpose."" In 2001, then-U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum in which he declared that physician-assisted suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose"" for prescribing federally controlled substances. The ""Ashcroft Directive"" potentially subjected Oregon doctors who prescribed drugs pursuant to the ODWDA to criminal prosecution for violating the CSA and to a loss of the privilege to prescribe controlled substances. On November 7, 2001, the state of Oregon, an Oregon physician and pharmacist, and several terminally ill patients filed a lawsuit to prevent the enforcement of the Ashcroft Directive. A federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the Directive invalid and unenforceable because Congress did not authorize the Attorney General to determine that physician-assisted suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose under the CSA. These courts determined that Congress did not intend for the CSA to override a state's traditional power to regulate the practice of medicine. Attorney General Ashcroft appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. Alberto Gonzales had replaced John Ashcroft as Attorney General by the time the Court agreed to review the case. On January 17, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Oregon affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, ruling that the Directive is not entitled to the traditional judicial deference customarily accorded to a federal agency's interpretation of a regulation or statute, and furthermore, that the Directive is unenforceable because the CSA does not authorize the Attorney General to prohibit the distribution of federally controlled substances for the purposes of facilitating an individual's suicide.",67,71 "German Elections of 2002: Aftermath and Implications for the United States. The German parliamentary elections of September 22, 2002, returned Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and his Red-Green coalition by the narrowest of margins. The Chancellor begins his second term weakened by the slimness of his coalition's majority in parliament and the lack of a clear mandate from the voters. He must deal with serious economic problems left over from his first term. He also faces the challenge of overcoming tensions with the United States brought on by his sharp campaign statements condemning U.S. Iraq policy that may have won him the election. Many now wonder whether Schroeder will exercise fiscal discipline and take unpopular steps needed to restructure the economy. The EU is at a critical stage in its further evolution and needs Germany's very active leadership to meet the challenges of enlargement and continued progress as an economic and political entity. Here, Germany's economic stagnation and domestic preoccupations could hurt. EU efforts to move forward on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) are also affected by a need for Germany's action. Germany supports ESDP but unless it increases its defense spending substantially, no serious European defense capability is likely. Germany is a primary supporter of the EU's further enlargement. For EU enlargement to move forward, some very difficult agreements need to be concluded on thorny issues such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The most serious immediate fallout from the election may be to U.S.-German relations. Some observers are confident that these incidents represent a relatively minor tiff that will soon blow over. Others are less certain about the impact, noting that this episode may reflect deeper underlying differences that have accumulated over time. Germany remains one of the most important U.S. allies. But differences on policy and principle, pushed aside by the events of September 11, 2001 and Germany's immediate offer of unprecedented support for the United States, have resurfaced. If differences continue to mount, some are concerned that they could begin to erode the foundations of the relationship. The consequences of such a trend could be serious for bilateral relations, the future of the EU, and for NATO. This report may be updated as warranted.",85,87 "Medicare: Private Contracts. This report discusses private contracting for medicare,which is the term used to describe situations where a physician and a patient agree not to submit a claim for a service which would otherwise be covered and paid for by Medicare.",70,70 "Energy and Water Development: FY2016 Appropriations. The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) civil works projects, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), and the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's total funding. President Obama's FY2016 budget request was released February 2, 2015. Including adjustments, the request for Energy and Water Development agencies totaled $36.04 billion, compared with a total of $34.78 billion appropriated for FY2015, an increase of 3.6%. The House approved its version of the FY2016 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill on May 1, 2015 (H.R. 2028, H.Rept. 114-91), and the Senate Appropriations Committee followed on May 21, 2015 (H.R. 2028, S.Rept. 114-54), both bills provided total budget authority of about $35.4 billion. After lengthy negotiations, Congress enacted an omnibus funding measure on December 18, 2015, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2029, P.L. 114-113). The omnibus measure provided a total of $37.3 billion for energy and water programs for FY2016, an increase of 7.3% over FY2015. Major Energy and Water Development funding highlights for FY2016 included Waters of the United States. Language to block a controversial rulemaking to define ""waters of the United States"" was considered but not adopted Energy Efficiency in Manufacturing and Vehicles. DOE's energy efficient manufacturing research would have more than doubled and research on energy efficient vehicles would have risen 59% under the FY2016 budget request, but smaller increases were approved Nuclear Waste Management. The House approved $175 million for the statutorily authorized candidate disposal site at Yucca Mountain, NV, while the Senate Appropriations Committee would have authorized and funded an interim storage pilot facility, but none of those provisions were adopted ITER Fusion Reactor. Cost, schedule, and management concerns were raised about the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Nuclear Weapons Activities. Congress approved the Administration's requested 10.7% increase for weapons activities and a proposal to combine and transfer two counterterrorism programs within DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Recovery. Efforts to resume operations at the WIPP defense transuranic waste repository in New Mexico are to continue in FY2016 with decreased total funding, and Surplus Plutonium Disposition. Level funding was approved, as requested, for a multibillion-dollar plant to convert surplus nuclear weapons plutonium into civilian nuclear reactor fuel. For FY2015, appropriations for Energy and Water Development programs were included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83, Division D). For details, see CRS Report R43567, Energy and Water Development: FY2015 Appropriations, coordinated by Mark Holt.",59,59 "Memorials: Creating National, State, and Local Memorials. This report provides information on the mandatory steps to building a memorial on federal property in the District of Columbia. It also provides information on creating memorials in Arlington National Cemetery, within the Department of Veterans Affairs National Cemetery System, and in state veterans' cemeteries. In addition, it discusses public and private initiatives at the state and local levels to create memorials including successful local fund-raising efforts.",106,106 "Defense: FY2007 Authorization and Appropriations. In the week before Congress adjourned for recess on September 30, the House and Senate passed conference agreements on both the FY2007 national defense authorization bill, H.R. 5122, and the FY2007 defense appropriations bill, H.R. 5631. The President signed the appropriations bill into law, P.L. 109-289, on September 29, and he signed the authorization bill into law, P.L. 109-364, on October 17. The conference agreement on the appropriations bill provides $436.6 billion for defense, including $366.6 billion in regular appropriations and $70 billion in additional appropriations, mainly as a ""bridge fund"" for operations abroad. The total of regular appropriations is $4 billion below the Administration request. The Senate-passed bill provided $9 billion less than the request, which freed that much to add to non-defense appropriations bills. The White House, however, threatened to veto the defense bill if reduced defense by more than $4 billion. In action on other key issues, the appropriations bill– rejected the Administration proposal to terminate C-17 cargo aircraft production after FY2007 and provided funds for 22 aircraft approved a Navy proposal to provide partial funding for 2 DDG-1000 destroyers—formerly the DD(X)—rather than providing full funding for just one ship as in the House bill included funds as requested for one T-AKE cargo ship and for 2 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), rather than eliminating T-AKE funds and procuring only one LCS, as in the Senate bill, and slowed F-35 Joint Strike Fighter procurement, with funds to buy 2 rather than the requested 5 aircraft, but did not eliminate FY2007 aircraft procurement funds as had the Senate bill. On key defense policy issues, the authorization bill provided a 2.2% pay raise, as requested, rather than or a 2.7% raise as in the House bill approved access for all reservists, except Federal employees with Federal health insurance, to the DOD TRICARE medical insurance program with a premium of 28% of the cost of the program rejected House language permitting chaplains to use denominational prayers according to each chaplain's conscience, but, instead, in report language, required the Army and Navy to rescind recent directives on prayer and return to earlier policies agreed to a substantially amended Senate change in the Buy American Act to allow use of foreign-supplied specialty metals in U.S.-built systems, and did not agree to a Senate provision giving the head of the National Guard four-star rank and the authority to make independent budget requests, but assigned these issues to a commission on the reserves.",25,25 "Immigration Policy for Intracompany Transfers (L Visa): Issues and Legislation. Concerns are growing that the visa category that allows executives and managers of multinational corporations to work temporarily in the United States is being misused. This visa category commonly referred to as the L visa, permits multinational firms to transfer top-level personnel to their locations in the United States for five to seven years. The number of L visas issued has increased by 363.5% over the past 25 years. The U.S. Department of State (DOS) issued only 26,535 L visas in FY1980. L visa issuances began increasing in the mid-1990s and peaked at 122,981 in FY2005. Some are now charging that firms are using the L visa to transfer ""rank and file"" professional employees rather than limiting these transfers to top-level personnel, thus circumventing immigration laws aimed at protecting U.S. employees from the potential adverse employment effects associated with an increase in the number of foreign workers. Proponents of current law maintain that any restrictions on L visas would prompt many multinational firms to leave the United States, as well as undermine reciprocal agreements that currently permit U.S. corporations to transfer their employees abroad. Title IV of P.L. 108-447, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005, renders ineligible for L visa status those aliens who serve in a capacity involving specialized knowledge at the worksite of an employer other than the petitioning employer or its affiliate if (1) the alien will be controlled principally by the unaffiliated employer, or (2) the placement with the unaffiliated employer is part of an arrangement merely to provide labor rather than to use the alien's specialized knowledge. It also requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to impose a fraud prevention and detection fee of $500 on H-1B (foreign temporary professional workers) and L (intracompany business personnel) petitioners. In the 109th Congress, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (S. 2611 / S. 2612) would add certain requirements for L visa applicants seeking to come to the United States to work in new or unopened facilities and would expand the staffing resources of DHS, DOS, and DOL to investigate abuses and enforce violations of the L visa. Other bills that would reform the L visa include H.R. 3322 and H.R. 3381. Earlier, the House Committee on the Judiciary reported H.R. 3648, which would impose additional fees with respect to immigration services for L visa intracompany transferees. The bill would require the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to each charge fees of $1,500 to employers filing certain visa applications and nonimmigrant petitions for L visas. These provisions were included in Title V of H.R. 4241, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which the House passed on November 18, 2005. The Senate version (S. 1932) would raise the minimum fee for L-1 visas by $750. The conference report on S. 1932 did not include these L visa provisions. This report tracks legislative activity and will be updated as action warrants.",76,76 "Youth Transitioning from Foster Care: Issues for Congress. Recent research has demonstrated that compared to their peers current and former foster youth are more likely to experience negative outcomes in adulthood. This research, along with the efforts of policy makers and child welfare advocates, has brought greater attention to the challenges facing older youth in care and those transitioning from foster care. In response, Congress has sought to improve existing services and provide additional supports for this population through legislation. The 110th Congress passed the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-351), which is arguably one of the most significant laws enacted in the past two decades that expands services and supports for older foster youth. The 113th Congress expanded on these efforts through the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (P.L. 113-183), enacted on September 30, 2014. The law adds requirements (effective one year after enactment) that are intended to engage older youth in case planning and provide them with certain protections. This report discusses issues affecting older youth as they transition from foster care into adulthood, particularly those that pertain to implementation of the two laws. P.L. 110-351 extended eligibility, beginning in FY2011, for federal foster care assistance to youth who remain in care after age 18 (at state option until 19, 20, or 21). The law additionally authorized this assistance on behalf of older youth eligible for federal foster care if they reside in an independent living setting (as well as foster family homes or other eligible settings). One possible challenge in extending care is that even with assistance from the federal government, states may be hesitant to extend care to older youth because of the cost. Further, child welfare stakeholders assert that states should ensure that youth who remain in care have opportunities to take on increasing responsibilities to prepare them for the transition from care. Despite federal protections to ensure that child welfare agencies help youth as they enter adulthood, stakeholders have called for additional policies to improve this transition by encouraging strong, long-term connections to adults. For example, some policy makers have articulated that child welfare agencies should ensure that all children in foster care have a permanency goal of reunification or other more permanent outcomes, and not a case goal of another planned permanent living arrangement (APPLA). Policy makers assert that APPLA is often used as a default option when a permanent option has not been identified. P.L. 113-183 requires that beginning one year after enactment only youth age 16 and older may have a case goal of APPLA and that additional court oversight is required for these youth. Another concern is that youth in foster care are vulnerable to child sex trafficking, which refers to adults sexually exploiting children under age 18 for commercial purposes. P.L. 113-183 requires, one year after enactment, that child welfare agencies have policies in place to serve child sex trafficking victims. Congress may wish to monitor how states are implementing these and related requirements, including how many victims have been reported by state child welfare agencies to the federal government and any best practices that have been identified for serving these victims. P.L. 113-183 further requires states to develop protocols for responding to children who run from foster care. This may prompt child welfare agencies to examine larger issues that may play a role in whether a child goes missing. A related consideration is how states define ""missing"" and whether to report all missing children to law enforcement. For background information about older foster youth and the current federal policies and programs for this population, see CRS Report RL34499, Youth Transitioning from Foster Care: Background and Federal Programs, by Adrienne L. Fernandes-Alcantara.",95,95 "Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer. In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for Section 123 agreements, the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which Congress may act on a proposed agreement.",29,29 "Medicare: Insolvency Projections. Medicare is the nation's health insurance program for persons aged 65 and older and certain disabled persons. Medicare consists of four distinct parts: Part A (Hospital Insurance, or HI), Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance, or SMI), Part C (Medicare Advantage, or MA), and Part D (the outpatient prescription drug benefit). The Part A program is financed primarily through payroll taxes levied on current workers and their employers, these taxes are credited to the HI Trust Fund. The Part B program is financed through a combination of monthly premiums paid by current enrollees and general revenues. Income from these sources is credited to the SMI Trust Fund. As an alternative, beneficiaries can choose to receive all their Medicare services through private health plans under the MA program, payment is made on beneficiaries' behalf in appropriate parts from the HI and SMI Trust Funds. The Part D drug benefit is funded through a separate account in the SMI Trust Fund and is financed through general revenues, state contributions, and beneficiary premiums. The HI and SMI Trust Funds are overseen by the Medicare Board of Trustees, which makes an annual report to Congress concerning the financial status of the funds. From its inception, the HI Trust Fund has faced a projected shortfall. The insolvency date has been postponed a number of times, primarily due to legislative changes that have had the effect of restraining growth in program spending. The 2018 Medicare Trustees Report projects that, under intermediate assumptions, the HI Trust Fund will become insolvent in 2026, three years earlier than estimated in the prior year's report.",70,70 "The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting U.S. Law Enforcement. Savvy criminals constantly develop new techniques to target U.S. persons, businesses, and interests. Individual criminals as well as broad criminal networks exploit geographic borders, criminal turf, cyberspace, and law enforcement jurisdiction to dodge law enforcement countermeasures. Further, the interplay of these realities can potentially encumber policing measures. In light of these interwoven realities, policy makers may question how to best design policies to help law enforcement combat ever-evolving criminal threats. Criminals routinely take advantage of geographic borders. They thrive on their ability to illicitly cross borders, subvert border security regimens, and provide illegal products or services. Many crimes—particularly those of a cyber nature—have become increasingly transnational. While criminals may operate across geographic borders and jurisdictional boundaries, law enforcement may not be able to do so with the same ease. Moreover, obstacles such as disparities between the legal regimens of nations (what is considered a crime in one country may not be in another) and differences in willingness to extradite suspected criminals can hamper prosecutions. The law enforcement community has, however, expanded its working relationships with both domestic and international agencies. Globalization and technological innovation have fostered the expansion of both legitimate and criminal operations across physical borders as well as throughout cyberspace. Advanced, rapid communication systems have made it easier for criminals to carry out their operations remotely from their victims and members of their illicit networks. In the largely borderless cyber domain, criminals can rely on relative anonymity and a rather seamless environment to conduct illicit business. Further, in the rapidly evolving digital age, law enforcement may not have the technological capabilities to keep up with the pace of criminals. Some criminal groups establish their own operational ""borders"" by defining and defending the ""turf"" or territories they control. Similarly, U.S. law enforcement often remains constrained by its own notions of ""turf""—partly defined in terms of competing agency-level priorities and jurisdictions. While some crimes are worked under the jurisdiction of a proprietary agency, others are not investigated under such clear lines. These investigative overlaps and a lack of data and information sharing can hinder law enforcement anti-crime efforts. U.S. law enforcement has, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increasingly relied on intelligence-led policing, enhanced interagency cooperation, and technological implementation to confront 21st century crime. For instance, enforcement agencies have used formal and informal interagency agreements as well as fusion centers and task forces to assimilate information and coordinate operations. Nonetheless, there have been notable impediments in implementing effective information sharing systems and relying on up-to-date technology. Congress may question how it can leverage its legislative and oversight roles to bolster U.S. law enforcement's abilities to confront modern-day crime. For instance, Congress may consider whether federal law enforcement has the existing authorities, technology, and resources—both monetary and manpower—to counter 21st century criminals. Congress may also examine whether federal law enforcement is utilizing existing mechanisms to effectively coordinate investigations and share information.",110,97 """Partial-Birth"" Abortion and the 2006 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (""PBABA"" or ""the act"") was signed into law on November 5, 2003. Within two days of its enactment, the PBABA was enjoined by federal district courts in Nebraska, California, and New York. Since that time, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have affirmed lower court decisions that have found the act unconstitutional. This report examines Gonzales v. Carhart and Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood, the partial-birth abortion decisions from the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. In spring 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the two decisions. This report provides background information on the PBABA and explores the arguments put forth by the parties.",16,16 "Postsecondary Education Issues in the 113th Congress. The 113th Congress may face an array of policy issues affecting postsecondary education. Many of these postsecondary education issues may be considered as part of efforts to reauthorize the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA). However, postsecondary education issues also may emerge as part of other legislative efforts such as comprehensive immigration reform (CIR), reform of the federal tax code, or the annual appropriations process. This report identifies and briefly examines several postsecondary education policy issue areas that may be of general interest. For each of these broader issue areas, the report provides a brief background summary and an introduction to and discussion of various aspects of the issue. Varied policy options are also identified for further consideration. The following postsecondary education issue areas are examined in this report. College costs and prices. What policy approaches are available that may help address concerns about ongoing increases in postsecondary education costs and the escalating prices colleges charge for tuition and fees? The Federal Pell Grant program. What options might be considered to help ensure sustained funding for the Pell Grant program at current or other levels deemed to be adequate? Should changes be made to Pell Grant eligibility or award criteria to contain costs or otherwise adjust the targeting of aid? Federal student loans. Are student loan terms and conditions and loan subsidy rates well aligned with program aims? Should policy options be considered that would affect the availability of loans, borrowing limits, interest rates, repayment relief, or the role of institutions of higher education in student borrowing? Student loans and personal bankruptcy. Should all student loans continue to be excepted from discharge in bankruptcy, except in cases of undue hardship? What should constitute ""undue hardship""? Noncitizens and federal student aid. Should beneficiaries of comprehensive immigration reform legislation be granted eligibility to participate in HEA federal student aid programs? Postsecondary education tax benefits. Are federal postsecondary education tax benefits appropriately targeted and effective in achieving their intended purposes? How do these benefits interact with traditional federal student aid? Institutional quality. Should new institutional or programmatic eligibility requirements be considered to help ensure that recipients of federal student aid are obtaining a quality education from the institutions they attend? What would be appropriate standards for measuring or assessing institutional accountability for educational or student outcomes? College completion. Are students completing college at desirable rates? Should new approaches be considered to further the aim of increasing college completion? Campus safety. How might efforts to promote safety on college campuses be best supported while balancing the reporting and disclosure of campus safety information with the protection of student privacy?",34,34 "United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Since 1950, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has provided relief and social services to registered Palestine refugees living mostly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Ninety-five percent of the UNRWA budget is funded through voluntary contributions from governments and the European Union. U.S. contributions to UNRWA come from the regular Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account and also through the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account. The U.S. contribution to UNRWA usually covers 22-25% of the UNRWA total budget. The current cycle of violence in the Middle East presents particular challenges to UNRWA, including security, funding, and the impact of deteriorating socio-economic conditions. Recent congressional attention has focused on the issues concerning the progress of refugee resettlement, use of UNRWA funds, and the content of educational materials. This report will be updated as developments warrant.",83,81 "The U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Trends and Current Issues. The end of the Cold War precipitated one of the greatest reductions in U.S. defense spending since the final months of World War II. The Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. defense industry have struggled coming to terms with smaller defense budgets and ill-defined threats to U.S. security. Cold War's end also transformed the defense business environment, marking the rapid worldwide globalization of economics and trade and changes in DOD policy toward the industry itself. Technological change, especially visible in the information processing and telecommunications industries, has forced convergence between civilian and military research and applications. Shrinking defense budgets worldwide have forced producers into heightened competition. These factors compelled DOD to reassess its half-century relationship with the U.S. defense industrial base. As a result, DOD policy has changed in two major ways. First, because the lead in some state-of-the-art product lines had passed from defense to the commercial sector of the economy DOD reformed the way it buys equipment. Second, DOD sought to reform structural aspects of the defense industrial base itself. Instead of continuing to support excess production capacity across the board, DOD focused on preserving ""defense-unique"" manufacturing capabilities, allowing other U.S. defense firms to more freely respond to conventional market forces. Congress has traditionally protected economically vulnerable parts of the defense industry that are critical to U.S. national security, but global changes in the economic and defense environments pose new issues. First, continued mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. defense industry raise questions about maintaining competition. Some maintain that surviving firms have emerged healthier and more competitive, but others worry about the potential loss of technological innovation and price competition from fewer companies. Second, defense acquisition reform has encouraged military use of commercial products in military systems. Proponents of this cite the advantages of rapid access to new technologies for DOD and the adoption of efficient business practices, while others question the inappropriateness of some products to military applications, and the ability of DOD to cope with the speed of obsolescence for commercial products. Third, globalization has increased cross-border flows of information and the availability of technology that could be used for military purposes. The result has been pressure for the United States to ease defense-related technology transfer restrictions that could increase exports of U.S. systems, and help the U.S. defense supplier base. Critics, however, worry about the extra vigilance needed to prevent the unauthorized transfer of U.S. defense technology, potentially increasing U.S. vulnerabilities. Fourth, some U.S. defense firms find it difficult to recruit and retain qualified designers and technical managers, presaging potential problems. Some analysts note a downturn in the number of recent U.S. science and engineering graduates and see strong competition for their talents from commercial high-technology firms as ominous. Others observe that perceived shortfalls seem concentrated in only some specialities, such as armored vehicle design, while other specialties, such as computer systems design, appear able to fill their requirements.",23,32 "The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): Congressional Issues. This report provides an overview of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and describes its background, objectives, and structure, including the role of the Convention's monitoring body, the CEDAW Committee. It examines U.S. policy and issues in the U.S. ratification debate, including the Convention's possible impact on U.S. sovereignty, its effectiveness in combating discrimination, and its role as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.",16,16 "Privileged Business on the House Floor. Privileged business is the legislative business of the House that Members have a right to call up for consideration on the floor when the House is not engaged in considering some other matter. Privileged business consists of various kinds of bills, resolutions, and other matters. (The concept and list of privileged motions, such as the motion to adjourn, are not discussed here.).",55,55 Nominations to the Supreme Court During Presidential Election Years (1900-Present). This report provides data and analysis related to nominations made to the Supreme Court during presidential election years from 1900 to the present.,54,54 "Status of a Senator Who Has Been Indicted for or Convicted of a Felony. There are no federal statutes or Rules of the Senate that directly affect the status of a Senator who has been indicted for a crime that constitutes a felony. No rights or privileges are forfeited under the Constitution, statutory law, nor the Rules of the Senate upon an indictment. Under the Rules of the Senate, therefore, an indicted Senator may continue to participate in congressional proceedings and considerations. Under the United States Constitution, a person under indictment is not disqualified from being a Member of or a candidate for reelection to Congress. Internal party rules in the Senate may, however, provide for certain steps to be taken by an indicted Senator. For example, the Senate Republican Conference Rules require an indicted chairman or ranking Member of a Senate committee, or a member of the party leadership, to temporarily step aside from his or her leadership or chairmanship position. Members of Congress do not automatically forfeit their offices upon conviction of a crime that constitutes a felony. No express constitutional disability or ""disqualification"" from Congress exists for the conviction of a crime, other than under the Fourteenth Amendment for certain treasonous conduct by someone who has taken an oath of office to support the Constitution. Unlike Members of the House, Senators are not instructed by internal Senate Rules to refrain from voting in committee or on the Senate floor once they have been convicted of a crime which carries a particular punishment. Internal party rules in the Senate may affect a Senator's position in committees. Under the Senate Republican Conference Rules, for example, Senators lose their chairmanships of committees or ranking Member status upon conviction of a felony. Conviction of certain crimes may subject—and has subjected in the past—Senators to internal legislative disciplinary proceedings, including resolutions of censure, as well as an expulsion from the Senate upon approval of two-thirds of the Members. Conviction of certain crimes relating to national security offenses would result in the Member's forfeiture of his or her entire federal pension annuity under the provisions of the so-called ""Hiss Act"" and, under more recent provisions of law, conviction of a number of crimes by Members relating to public corruption, fraud, or campaign finance law will result in the loss of the Member's entire ""creditable service"" as a Member for purposes of calculating his or her federal retirement annuities if the conduct underlying the conviction related to one's official duties. This report has been updated from an earlier version, and will be updated in the future as changes to law, congressional rules, or judicial and administrative decisions may warrant.",55,55 "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2011, a time when the global economy was struggling to recover from the financial crisis and slow economic growth. The OECD is an intergovernmental economic organization in which the 34 member countries discuss and develop key policy recommendations that often serve as the basis for international standards and practices. In addition, the OECD members analyze economic and social policy and share expertise and exchanges with more than 70 developing and emerging economies. The 34 member countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. While all of the member countries are considered to be economically advanced and collectively produce 60% of the world's goods and services, membership is limited only by a country's commitment to a market economy and a pluralistic democracy. The OECD also has extended an invitation to the Russian Federation for membership, which includes meeting rigorous best practices relative to anti-bribery and anti-corruption standards. Furthermore, the OECD works with other potential partners such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa with a view toward possible membership. The member countries rely on the OECD Secretariat in Paris to collect data, monitor trends, analyze and forecast economic developments, and research social changes and patterns in trade, environment, agriculture, society, innovation, corporate and public governance, taxation, sustainable development, and other areas to inform their discussions and to assist them in pursuing their efforts to develop common policies and practices. Following the financial crisis, the OECD played a major role in providing cross-country analyses of market reforms and programs to stimulate growth. The United States has sparred periodically with other OECD member countries over various issues, including U.S. antidumping laws and the size of the U.S. financial contribution. Daniel W. Yohannes was appointed in 2013 by President Obama to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the OECD. Key issues for Congress include OECD work on coordinating national approaches to curtailing bribery and the illicit use of tax havens. Congress appropriated about $82.2 million to the OECD in FY2013, the budget request for FY2014 was $83.2 million.",82,82 "Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy. Lebanons small geographic size and population belie the important role it has long played in the security, stability, and economy of the Levant and the broader Middle East. Congress and the executive branch have recognized Lebanons status as a venue for regional strategic competition and have engaged diplomatically, financially, and at times, militarily to influence events there. For most of its independent existence, Lebanon has been torn by periodic civil conflict and political battles between rival religious sects and ideological groups. External military intervention, occupation, and interference have exacerbated Lebanons political struggles in recent decades. Lebanon is an important factor in U.S. calculations regarding regional security, particularly regarding Israel and Iran. Congressional concerns have focused on the prominent role that Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shia Muslim militia, political party, and U.S.-designated terrorist organization, continues to play in Lebanon and beyond, including its recent armed intervention in Syria. Congress has appropriated more than $1 billion since the end of the brief Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 to support U.S. policies designed to extend Lebanese security forces control over the country and promote economic growth. The civil war in neighboring Syria is progressively destabilizing Lebanon. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 1 million predominantly Sunni Syrian refugees have fled to Lebanon, equivalent to close to one-quarter of Lebanons population. Regional supporters and opponents of Syrian President Bashar al Asad are using Lebanon as a transit point and staging ground in a wider regional conflict. Hezbollah has intervened in Syria in support of Asad, and Sunni extremist groups based in Syria are cooperating with Lebanese and Palestinian Sunni extremists in Lebanon to carry out retaliatory attacks against Hezbollah targets. The U.S. intelligence community told Congress in its 2014 Worldwide Threat Assessment that, Lebanon in 2014 probably will continue to experience sectarian violence among Lebanese and terrorist attacks by Sunni extremists and Hezbollah, which are targeting each-others interests.... Increased frequency and lethality of violence in Lebanon could erupt into sustained and widespread fighting. In January 2014, the U.S. State Department warned against all travel to Lebanon in light of growing terrorist threats. The question of how best to marginalize Hezbollah and other anti-U.S. Lebanese actors without provoking civil conflict among divided Lebanese sectarian political forces remains the underlying challenge for U.S. policy makers. Ongoing political deadlock and the prospect of executive, legislative, and security force leadership vacuums amplify this challenge. This report provides an overview of Lebanon and current issues of U.S. interest. It provides background information, analyzes recent developments and key legislative debates, and tracks legislation, U.S. assistance, and recent congressional action. It will be updated to reflect major events or policy changes. For more information on related issues, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard, CRS Report R43119, Syria: Overview of the Humanitarian Response, by Rhoda Margesson and Susan G. Chesser, and CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.",85,85 "Bail: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law. This is an overview of the federal law of bail. Bail is the release of an individual following his arrest upon his promise—secured or unsecured, conditioned or unconditioned—to appear at subsequent judicial criminal proceedings. An accused may be denied bail if he is unable to satisfy the conditions set for his release. He may also be denied bail if the committing judge or magistrate concludes that no amount of security or any set of conditions will suffice to ensure public safety or the individual's later appearance in court. The federal bail statute layers the committing judge's or magistrate's bail options after arrest and before trial. He may release the individual upon his promise to return—that is, on personal recognizance or under an unsecured appearance bond. Alternatively, the judge or magistrate may condition the individual's release on the least restrictive possible combination of individual or statutory conditions. The statute, however, creates a presumption against release when the individual has been charged with a serious drug, firearms, or terrorist offense. In the case of these and other serious offenses, the judge or magistrate may deny release on bail if he decides, after a hearing, that no set of conditions will guarantee public safety or the individual's return to court. The judge or magistrate may also deny the individual bail in order to transfer him for bail, parole, or supervised release revocation proceedings. Bail is available to a more limited extent after the individual has been convicted and is awaiting a pending appeal. Federal law also authorizes the arrest, bail, or detention of individuals with evidence material to the prosecution of a federal offense. With limited variations, federal bail laws apply to arrested material witnesses. Although not specifically mentioned in the federal bail statute, bail is available in extradition cases under a long-standing Supreme Court precedent which holds that ""bail should not ordinarily be granted in cases of foreign extradition"" except under ""special circumstances."" This report is available in an abridged version—without footnotes, appendixes, most of the citations to authority, and some of the discussion—as CRS Report R40222, Bail: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal Law, by Charles Doyle.",92,92 "U.S. Natural Gas Exports: New Opportunities, Uncertain Outcomes. As estimates for the amount of U.S. natural gas resources have grown, so have the prospects of rising U.S. natural gas exports. The United States is expected to go from a net importer of natural gas to a net exporter by 2016. With recent natural gas prices relatively low compared to global prices and historically low for the United States, producers are looking for new markets for their natural gas. Projects to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) by tanker ship have been proposed—cumulatively accounting for over 60% of current gross U.S. natural gas production. Pipeline exports, which accounted for 99% of all exports of U.S. natural gas in 2013, are also likely to continue rising. However, under the Natural Gas Act, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must authorize the export of the natural gas commodity and related facilities, respectively. This overarching federal role in the expansion of U.S. natural gas exports has been the subject of ongoing oversight and debate in Congress. What effect exporting natural gas will have on U.S. domestic prices is a central question in the debate over whether to export. A significant rise in U.S. natural gas exports would likely put upwards pressure on domestic prices, but the magnitude of any rise is uncertain. There are numerous factors that will affect prices: export volumes, economic growth, differences in local markets, and government regulations, among others. Producers contend that increased exports will not raise prices significantly as there is ample supply to meet domestic demand, and there will be the added benefits of increased revenues, trade, and jobs, and less flaring. Consumers of natural gas, who also benefit from the current low prices, fear prices will rise if natural gas is exported. The DOE's most recent price study concluded that greater LNG exports ""result in higher levels of real gross domestic product (GDP), which more than offsets the adverse impact of somewhat higher energy prices."" Export opponents have been critical of DOE's conclusions. Environmental groups are split regarding natural gas use, with some favoring increased use to curb emissions of certain pollutants, while others oppose expanded use of natural gas because it is not as clean as renewable forms of energy, such as wind or solar. The use of hydraulic fracturing to produce shale gas for export markets has also raised concerns among environmental groups particularly concerned with its possible impacts on groundwater quality. The possibility of a significant increase in U.S. natural gas exports will factor into ongoing debates on the economy, energy independence, climate change, and energy security. Congressional interest has focused on the DOE's process and criteria for approving LNG commodity exports to non-free trade agreement (FTA) countries. Several bills in the 114th Congress would facilitate the approval of such permits. Both the House and Senate versions of the LNG Permitting Certainty and Transparency Act (H.R. 351 and S. 33), the Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act (H.R. 89), and the Export American Natural Gas Act of 2015 (H.R. 428) would impose various deadlines on DOE export permit decisions. The American Job Creation and Strategic Alliances LNG Act (H.R. 287) would extend free trade treatment to World Trade Organization member nations with respect to LNG export permitting by DOE. The Crude Oil Export Act (H.R. 156) would repeal limitations on export of Outer Continental Shelf natural gas under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1354). Other bills have been introduced that would affect natural gas production and infrastructure.",40,40 "Overview of FY2017 Appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS). This report describes actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2017 appropriations for the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of FY2016 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as part of annual CJS appropriations. Division B of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), provided $66.000 billion for CJS, which included $9.246 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.090 billion for the Department of Justice (DOJ), $26.754 billion for the science agencies, and $910 million for the related agencies (e.g., the Legal Service Corporation and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative). For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested a total of $67.573 billion for CJS, which included $9.728 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.828 billion for DOJ, $26.995 billion for the science agencies, and $1.022 billion for the related agencies. The Obama Administration proposed supplementing discretionary appropriations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) with $763 million and $400 million, respectively, in new one-time mandatory funding. On April 21, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported their FY2017 CJS appropriations bill (S. 2837). The bill would have provided a total of $66.309 billion for CJS, including $9.316 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.246 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.821 billion for the science agencies, and $925 million for the related agencies. On June 7, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations reported their FY2017 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 5393). The bill would have provided a total of $66.296 billion for CJS, including $9.051 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.437 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.920 billion for the science agencies, and $887 million for the related agencies. On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31). The act provides a total of $66.360 billion (which includes $109 million in emergency funding) for CJS. Under the act, the Department of Commerce receives $9.237 billion, the Department of Justice receives $28.962 billion, the science agencies receive $27.240 billion, and the related agencies receive $921 million. Over the past 10 fiscal years, nominal appropriations for CJS have experienced annual increases and decreases. CJS appropriations increased from FY2007 to FY2010, but generally declined from FY2010 to FY2013. Nominal appropriations for CJS were relatively flat in FY2014 and FY2015. CJS appropriations increased again by approximately $4 billion from FY2015 to FY2016, largely due to Congress increasing the discretionary budget cap in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74). Increases in CJS appropriations in FY2009 and FY2010 were largely the result of Congress appropriating more funding for Commerce to support the 2010 decennial census. Although subsequent decreases in appropriations for Commerce account for much of the overall decrease in CJS appropriations between FY2010 and FY2013, cuts in funding for DOJ and NASA and sequestration in FY2013 also contributed to the decrease. The exception the trend of decreasing appropriations from FY2010 to FY2013 was the NSF. The NSF's appropriations generally increased each fiscal year since FY2007. Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce and Justice and for NASA have generally increased each fiscal year since FY2013.",59,59 "Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations. The President's FY2008 federal budget request, released February 5, 2007, included $647.2 billion in new budget authority for national defense including $483.2 billion for the regular operations of the Department of Defense (DOD), $141.8 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, $17.4 billion for the nuclear weapons and other defense-related programs of the Department of Energy, and $4.8 billion for defense-related activities of other agencies. On July 31, 2007, the President requested an additional $5.3 billion for war-fighting costs, and on October 22 he requested an additional $42.3 billion for that purpose, bringing his total request for FY2008 war costs to $189.3 billion and the total national defense request to $694.8 billion. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the cost of the President's proposal as $696.4 billion. The House passed on May 17 its version of the defense authorization bill, H.R. 1585, approving $1.2 billion more than the President's then-pending request. The Senate passed its version of the bill October 1. The conference report on the bill, authorizing $696.4 billion—$21 million less than the request—was adopted by the House on December 12 and by the Senate on December 14. On December 28, the White House announced that the President would ""pocket veto"" the authorization bill—a procedure that would preclude efforts by Congress to override the veto. The President objected to a provision of the bill that would allow lawsuits in U.S. courts against the current Iraqi government for damages resulting from acts of the Saddam Hussein regime. On January 16, the House passed H.R. 4986, a version of H.R. 1585 that was modified to allow the President to waive application to Iraq of the provision that he had cited as grounds for his veto. The new version of the bill also would make retroactive to January 1, 2008 a 3.5% pay raise for military personnel and the renewal of authorization for several types of bonuses, including enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses. The Senate passed the bill January 22. Reportedly, the President is expected to sign the bill. The House passed its version of the FY2008 defense appropriations bill on August 5. The bill, H.R. 3222, provided $448.7 billion in discretionary budget authority for DOD's ""base"" budget, $3.6 billion less in discretionary budget authority than the $452.2 billion the President requested for operations within the scope of that legislation. The Senate version of H.R. 3222, passed by voice vote on October 4, 2007, provided $449.5 billion in discretionary DOD budget authority plus $3 billion to better protect U.S. borders. Each version of the bill also included $10.9 billion required by a permanent appropriation for military retirees' medical care. House-Senate conferees on H.R. 3222 concluded on November 6 a conference report that would appropriate $448.7 billion plus $11.6 billion to acquire MRAPs. The House and Senate each adopted the conference report on November 8. On November 13, the President signed the appropriations bill into law (P.L. 110-116). This report will be updated as events warrant.",25,25 "Green Jobs, Education, and Workforce Training in S. 1733 and H.R. 2454. This report summarizes and compares provisions for green jobs training and worker adaptation assistance for climate change mitigation impacts in two recent bills: H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (also known as the Waxman-Markey bill), and S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009 (also known as the Kerry-Boxer bill). Under a two-part subtitle for ""Green Jobs & Worker Transition"" (Title IV Subtitle B of H.R. 2454, and Title III, Subtitle A of S. 1733), essentially identical provisions are focused (in Part I) on the development of programs to provide training and education in energy efficiency and renewable energy, and (in Part II) on providing retraining and financial assistance for workers made redundant (or whose earnings have been substantially reduced) by climate change mitigation measures. Since the provisions in both bills are so similar, this report will focus on the provisions as discussed in S. 1733. A ""Chairman's Mark"" of S. 1733 was released in October 2009. Any resulting modifications to applicable areas of the original Kerry-Boxer version are discussed in the report. The green jobs training provisions in Part 1 of S. 1733 focuses on the development of training programs in climate change mitigation, renewable energy and energy efficiency, the authorization of competitive grants to organizations and partnerships developed to provide relevant education, training, and an internet-based clearinghouse for general information on the programs and technologies. Part 2 of S. 1733 focuses on assisting workers impacted by climate change mitigation measures. If a group of workers can show how their current or prospective employment is impaired by climate change mitigation measures, then these workers would apply for climate change adjustment assistance. Assistance would include a monetary allowance while workers are retrained or otherwise seeking new jobs or seeking full employment if their work hours are reduced. Assistance may be provided for up to three years for eligible workers. Workers receiving assistance under Part 2 would not be eligible for any other form of unemployment insurance. The separate jobs retraining and assistance program envisioned by S. 1733 appears to be more comprehensive than existing workforce and apprenticeship programs, perhaps raising issues of equity for unemployed workers not eligible for Climate Change Worker Adjustment Assistance. More clarity may be sought with regard to the federal policies, oversight, and planning for the support or development of industries and businesses expected to absorb retrained workers. Growth in green industries and other sectors is assumed to provide future employment as companies look to climate change business opportunities. Coordination of government, education and retraining providers and potential employers on one hand, and corresponding efforts to create or rebuild competitive industrial sectors on the other hand, will likely be crucial if the desired economic growth and employment results are to be realized. ""Middle class careers"" and ""quality employment"" are described as goals of the Green Construction careers demonstration projects. But over the longer term, higher paying, less transient jobs are more likely to come from jobs in manufacturing companies rather than jobs in construction. Development of a competitive, domestic renewable energy industry which designs and produces the turbines, solar panels and related parts and components may provide these jobs, but may require a longer-term focus on the needs of future markets.",89,89 "Private Health Insurance Provisions of H.R. 3962. This report summarizes key provisions affecting private health insurance, including provisions to raise revenues, in Division A of H.R. 3962, the Affordable Health Care for America Act, as passed by the House of Representatives on November 7, 2009. H.R. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200, America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, which was originally introduced on July 14, 2009, and was reported separately on October 14, 2009, by three House Committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means. Division A of H.R. 3962 focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. In general, H.R. 3962 would require individuals to maintain health insurance and employers to either provide insurance or pay a payroll assessment, with some exceptions. Several insurance market reforms would be made, such as modified community rating and guaranteed issue and renewal. Both the individual and employer mandates would be linked to acceptable health insurance coverage, which would meet required minimum standards and incorporate the market reforms included in the bill. Acceptable coverage would include (1) coverage under a qualified health benefits plan (QHBP), which could be offered either through the newly created Health Insurance Exchange (the Exchange) or outside the Exchange through new employer plans, (2) grandfathered employment based plans, (3) grandfathered nongroup plans, and (4) other coverage, such as Medicare and Medicaid. The Exchange would offer private plans alongside a public option. Based on income, certain individuals could qualify for subsidies toward their premium costs and cost-sharing (deductibles and copayments), these subsidies would be available only through the Exchange. In the individual market (the nongroup market), a plan could be grandfathered indefinitely, but only if no changes were made to the terms and conditions of that plan, including benefits and cost-sharing, and premiums were only increased as allowed by statute. Most of these provisions would be effective beginning in 2013. The Exchange would not be an insurer, it would provide eligible individuals and small businesses with access to insurers' plans in a comparable way. The Exchange would consist of a selection of private plans as well as a public option. Individuals wanting to purchase the public option or a private health insurance not through an employer or a grandfathered nongroup plan could only obtain such coverage through the Exchange. They would only be eligible to enroll in an Exchange plan if they were not enrolled in Medicare, Medicaid, and acceptable employer coverage as a full-time employee. The public option would be established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), would offer three different cost-sharing options, and would vary premiums geographically. The Secretary would negotiate payment rates for medical providers, and items and services. The bill would also require that the Health Choices Commissioner to establish a Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program under which the Commissioner would make grants and loans for the establishment of not-for-profit, member-run health insurance cooperatives. These co-operatives would provide insurance through the Exchange. Only within the Exchange, credits would be available to limit the amount of money certain individuals would pay for premiums and for cost-sharing (deductibles and copayments). (Although Medicaid is beyond the scope of this report, H.R. 3962 would extend Medicaid coverage for most individuals under 150% of poverty, individuals would be ineligible for Exchange coverage if they were eligible for Medicaid.)",70,70 "Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy. Increasing militant activity in western Pakistan poses three key national security threats: an increased potential for major attacks against the United States itself, a growing threat to Pakistani stability, and a hindrance of U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. This report will be updated as events warrant. A U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials have praised Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although long-held doubts exist about Islamabad's commitment to some core U.S. interests. Pakistan is identified as a base for terrorist groups and their supporters operating in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan. Since 2003, Pakistan's army has conducted unprecedented and largely ineffectual counterterrorism operations in the country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda operatives and pro-Taliban insurgents are said to enjoy ""safe haven."" Militant groups have only grown stronger and more aggressive in 2008. Islamabad's new civilian-led government vows to combat militancy in the FATA through a combination of military force, negotiation with ""reconcilable"" elements, and economic development. The Pakistani military has in late 2008 undertaken major operations aimed at neutralizing armed extremism in the Bajaur agency, and the government is equipping local tribal militias in several FATA agencies with the hope that these can supplement efforts to bring the region under more effective state writ. The upsurge of militant activity on the Pakistan side of the border is harming the U.S.-led stabilization mission in Afghanistan, by all accounts. U.S. commanders in Afghanistan attribute much of the deterioration in security conditions in the south and east over the past year to increased militant infiltration from Pakistan. U.S. policymakers are putting in place a series of steps to try to address the deficiencies of the Afghan government and other causes of support for Afghan Taliban militants, but they are also undertaking substantial new security measures to stop the infiltration. A key, according to U.S. commanders, is to reduce militant infiltration into Afghanistan from Pakistan. To do so, U.S. General David McKiernan, the overall commander in Afghanistan, is ""redefining"" the Afghan battlefield to include the Pakistan border regions, and U.S. forces are becoming somewhat more aggressive in trying to disrupt, from the Afghan side of the border, militant operational preparations and encampments on the Pakistani side of the border. At the same time, Gen. McKiernan and other U.S. commanders are trying to rebuild a stalled Afghanistan-Pakistan-U.S./NATO military coordination process, building intelligence and information sharing centers, and attempting to build greater trust among the senior ranks of the Pakistani military.",86,86 "Appropriations for FY2001: Department of Transportation and Related Agencies. President Clinton signed the FY2001 Department of Transportation (DOT) Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-346, H.Rept. 106-940) on October 23, 2000. The agreement provides $57.978 billion for DOT. This is an increase of more than 14% over the enacted FY2000 level. The Act provides increases for all major DOT agencies except the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). On December 21 2000, President Clinton signed the FY2001 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-554). The Act provided for a government-wide rescission of 0.22%. This cut $125 million from the DOT budget for FY2001. Both houses of Congress had passed somewhat different versions of the FY2001 appropriations bill (H.R. 4475). The House of Representatives version would have provided total budgetary resources of $55.2 billion, the Senate version $54.7 billion. The roughly $500 million difference was partly an outgrowth of the lower budget cap that Senators had to work with. For the overall DOT budget, the Senate bill would have represented a 9.5% increase over the FY2000 budget, the House bill a nearly 10.5% increase. The FY2001 Act reflects the ongoing impact of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). It raises highway funding by 16% and mass transit funding by almost 8.5%. These spending levels meet or exceed TEA-21's requirements. The Administration had proposed increases of 5% for highways and roughly 9% for transit. The enacted version of H.R. 4475 appropriates additional funds not included in either the House or Senate-passed versions, such as: $1.37 billion for miscellaneous highway projects, $600 million for the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge, roughly $55 million for the Appalachian development highway system, and $720 million for the Emergency Relief Federal Aid Highway Program. The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (FAIR21) (P.L. 106-181)has also had a major impact on the FAA's funding for FY2001. H.R. 4475 in conformance with FAIR21, provides for an increase in the FAA's total budget of roughly 25%. The FY2001 Act includes language to strengthen state drunk driver blood alcohol standards to 0.08% but phases in the highway funds reduction penalties more gradually than in the Senate passed bill--at a rate of 2% annually beginning in FY2004 up to a maximum of 8%. It also permits the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to collect and analyze public comments and data on its proposed hours of service rules but prohibits FMCSA from taking final action during FY2001.",120,120 "Congressional Redistricting: Is At-Large Representation Permitted in the House of Representatives?. Section 2c of Title 2 of the U.S. Code requires members of the House of Representatives to be elected from single-member districts, however, Section 2a(c) requires Representatives to be elected at large if a state fails to create new districts after the reapportionment of seats following a decennial census. These apparently contradictory provisions raise questions about whether and under what circumstances federal law permits at-large representation in the House of Representatives. The legislative history of 2 U.S.C. § 2c is sparse because it was adopted as a Senate floor amendment to a House-passed private bill. In 1967, the same year that Section 2c was adopted, Congress had contemplated, but failed to pass, a more comprehensive bill that would have repealed Section 2a(c), thereby removing the apparent statutory inconsistencies. Addressing the tension between Section 2a(c) and Section 2c, as applied to a Mississippi redistricting plan, the Supreme Court in Branch v. Smith held that a federal district court was required to craft single-member districts. Although the issue remains unsettled, it appears that Section 2a(c) could provide options to the House of Representatives to seat an at-large delegation. H.R. 415 (108th Cong.), would establish a commission to make recommendations on the method by which Members of the House are elected, including examining alternatives to the current method. Such recommendations, if ultimately enacted, could affect current federal statutory provisions governing single-member and at-large representation in the House of Representatives.",61,55 "Using Business Tax Cuts to Stimulate the Economy. Business tax cuts were part of the economic stimulus, included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), provisions that were subsequently extended (in P.L. 111-240 and P.L. 111-315) by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, P.L. 112-240. The most important provision is bonus depreciation, which extends to the end of 2013. Bonus depreciations provisions were enacted in 2002, as increased interest in providing business tax cuts to stimulate the economy followed the terrorist attacks of 2001, which heightened concerns about an economic slowdown. Among the tax proposals discussed at that time were a corporate rate cut and an investment subsidy. A March 2002 tax cut contained temporary partial expensing (bonus depreciation) for equipment. Interest in this issue continued, including proposals by President Bush for reductions in taxes on corporations through temporary dividend relief, which were enacted in May 2003. The temporary bonus depreciation expired at the end of 2004. Dividend relief was extended through 2010 in legislation passed in 2006. Temporary bonus depreciation was also part of a recent fiscal stimulus package adopted in 2008 (P.L. 110-185) and 2009 (P.L. 111-5) and has subsequently been extended and expanded. Some economists doubt the efficacy of fiscal policy in general even when a stimulus is needed, especially in an open economy and given the difficulties of achieving proper timing. Also, deficit financing of a tax cut has potential negative long run effects because it crowds out investment, a stimulus designed to increase investment spending (rather than consumption spending) would, if successful, reduce that negative effect. Investment subsidies had largely been abandoned as counter-cyclical devices over the last two decades, in part because of lack of evidence from statistical studies relating investment spending to the cost of capital. Some recent empirical evidence has found some larger effects, at least with some studies, although not enough to suggest that all of the tax cut is spent (especially with corporate rate reductions). Moreover, the average behavioral response identified in these studies may be larger than responses during a downturn when many firms have excess capacities, and planning lags may make investment responses poorly timed. Recent studies of the 2002 temporary investment stimulus tended to find it a relatively ineffective stimulus measure. An investment subsidy has more ""bang-for-the-buck"" than a corporate rate cut (or dividend relief), since the latter benefits existing as well as new capital. A corporate rate cut is estimated to produce as little as two-thirds of the investment induced by an investment credit with an equivalent revenue loss. The historically most common investment subsidy is the investment credit, although the same effect could be achieved with accelerated depreciation or partial expensing. A temporary investment credit should be more effective than a permanent one, and a temporary investment credit could also be made incremental. (It is not possible to structure a permanent incremental credit.) One disadvantage of a permanent investment credit is that it distorts the allocation of investment and can easily produce negative tax rates. A 10% investment credit would produce negative tax rates in excess of 100% for short-lived assets. Arguments were made for a corporate tax rate cut because of estimated large effects on the stock market. These calculations are overstated because they do not account for the adjustment process and of interest rate increases. Given the uncertainty about the size of stock market effects or their beneficial effect on the economy, there is a case for not considering stock market effects an important factor in choosing an investment subsidy. This report will be updated to reflect major legislative developments.",102,102 "Government Information Technology Management: Past and Future Issues (The Clinger-Cohen Act). Government reform and improved management of public resources have been a common theme in congressional policymaking over the past decade. This report provides an overview of the Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA) of 1996, or as it is better known, the Clinger-Cohen Act. Although the Clinger Cohen Act is a combination of the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) and the ITMRA, this report focuses on the information technology procurement and management reforms only. At the time of its passage, ITMRA reflected a growing concern that the federal government was not prepared to successfully make the necessary information technology investments to streamline agencies and improve mission performance. The ITMRA repealed the Automatic Data Processing Act of 1965, or as it is better known, the Brooks Act. The goal of the Brooks Act was to reform federal information technology procurement by concentrating purchasing authority within the General Services Administration (GSA). However, prolonged acquisition cycles and rapid changes in technology eventually diminished the effectiveness of the ""one-size-fits-all"" approach of the Brooks Act. The major provisions of ITMRA include: eliminating GSA's role as the primary agency for setting policy and regulations for federal information technology procurement, mandating the creation of a chief information officer (CIO) in all of the major federal agencies, establishing goals and reporting requirements for the reduction of costs and increase in efficiency through improved information management, and creating two pilot programs (""Share-In-Savings"" and ""Solutions-Based Contracting"") to test alternative acquisition approaches. Several years later some of these issues still have not been completely resolved. Agency efforts to follow through on the CIO provisions have been mixed. Non-competitive salaries, high turnover organizational inertia, and budgetary control issues have been obstacles to implementation. The development of annual performance plans to evaluate the value of information management have been delayed due to measurement problems. In addition, little progress has been made to utilize the Share-In-Savings"" pilot program for information technology procurement. Some observers believe this is the result of an inability to measure baseline costs, poor project selection, and lack of agency incentives. Looking ahead, as Congress has become increasingly interested in the Internet and information technology issues, it is possible that some provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act and closely-related new concerns may receive attention in the 107th Congress. Some of these issues include the use of reverse auctions to lower procurement costs, the possibility of creating a position for a federal CIO and the potential need for chief technology officers (CTO) as interest in electronic government and the delivery of services to citizens via the Internet grows.",63,56 "Drug Certification/Designation Procedures for Illicit Narcotics Producing and Transit Countries. This report summarizes the congressionally-mandated presidential designation procedures on major illicit narcotics producing and transit countries in Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 (H.R. 1646 / P.L. 107-228) enacted in September 2002. To put the new procedures in perspective, the report also provides information on the past procedures, the congressional modifications, and recent presidential designations under the revised procedures. This report will not be updated. From the mid-1980s to 2001, Congress required the President to certify in early March that specified drug producing and drug transit countries were ""cooperating fully"" with the United States in counter-narcotics efforts in order to avoid a series of sanctions, including suspension of U.S. foreign assistance, and opposition to loans in the multilateral development banks. The sanctions would also apply if the Congress, within 30 calendar days, passed a joint resolution of disapproval to overturn the presidential certification. Spokesmen from many countries complained about the unilateral and non-cooperative nature of the drug certification requirements, and a movement to modify the process developed in Congress in 2000-2002. In 2001 (on a temporary, one-year basis) and in 2002 (on a permanent but initially transitional basis), a law with new procedures was enacted. This law requires the President to make a report in mid-September of each year that identifies the major drug producing or transit countries. At the same time, the President is required to designate and to withhold assistance from any of the named countries that has ""failed demonstrably,"" during the previous 12 months, to adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements. Under the legislation, the President may waive the withholding of assistance if he determines this to be in the national interest. Acting under this legislation President Bush made designations on a transitional basis for FY2002 and FY2003 and then made determinations on the designated date for FY2004, FY2005 and FY2006. On February 23, 2002, the President designated Afghanistan, Burma and Haiti as having ""failed demonstrably"" but granted national interest waivers to Haiti and Afghanistan under the new government. On January 31, 2003, the President designated Burma, Guatemala, and Haiti but granted national interest waivers to Guatemala and Haiti. On September 15, 2003, the President designated Burma and Haiti, but granted a national interest waiver to Haiti. On September 15, 2004, the President designated Burma as having ""failed demonstrably"" in counter-narcotics efforts. On September 15, 2005, the President designated Burma and Venezuela but granted a national interest waiver to Venezuela to permit a continuation of U.S. assistance.",96,96 "An Overview of Judicial Review of Immigration Matters. Congress has plenary or sovereign power over the conditions for admitting aliens into the United States and permitting them to remain. This power is so completely entrusted to the political branch to legislate and implement as to be largely free from judicial review. However, this power is still subject to constitutional limitations, including substantive and procedural due process protections. In immigration cases, due process may be a flexible concept and the particular procedures that may be constitutionally required depend on the relative interests involved. Historically, immigration policy has sought to encourage and enable the admission and integration of desirable immigrants (workers, family, refugees/asylees), while discouraging and preventing the entry of undesirable aliens (national security risks/terrorists, criminals, public charges). Accordingly, in deciding what degree of judicial review is appropriate in immigration matters, Congress has sought a balance between a system that is fair to desired immigrants, yet facilitates the removal of undesired aliens. Initially, a habeas corpus proceeding provided the primary avenue of judicial review of various immigration determinations. In the wake of Supreme Court decisions construing the Administrative Procedure Act as applying to and providing an avenue for judicial review of immigration adjudications, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 by adding a judicial review provision in 1961 that provided for review by federal courts of appeal for deportation orders, but only for habeas corpus review of exclusion orders by federal district courts. Beginning with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), legislation and administrative actions have focused on reducing immigration litigation by limiting and streamlining both administrative appeal and judicial review procedures regarding removal of aliens and by rendering aliens in certain categories ineligible for certain types of relief from removal. Even when an alien may be considered for discretionary relief, judicial review of denials of relief from removal is restricted, as is review of removal orders issued to criminal aliens or national security risks. Also, the REAL ID Act restricted habeas review and certain other non-direct judicial review in response to U.S. Supreme Court holdings that such review was still available after the 1996 acts. In the 113th Congress, S. 744 and H.R. 2278, among other bills, would generally continue the trend of limiting judicial review, however, S. 744 provides for judicial review of its legalization programs. This report will summarize judicial review for immigration matters, including visa denials and revocations, removal orders and detention, naturalization delays, denials, and revocations, expatriation, and legalization denials. Administrative adjudications such as removal proceedings or determination of immigration benefits such as naturalization are beyond the scope of this report.",76,76 "District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2003: Comparison of General Provisions of P.L. 107-96 and S. 2809. This report discusses the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2003, as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee, that does continue existing prohibitions and restrictions on the use of federal and District funds for abortions and medical marijuana.",57,57 "Perspectives on Federal Cybersecurity Spending. The federal government invests significant resources in cybersecurity across every agency through a variety of activities. Although a methodologically rigorous total for these investments has not been calculated and may not be possible, an understanding of how the federal government applies resources to protect U.S. public and private sector data and networks from cyberattacks is necessary for Congress to provide constructive oversight of those efforts. This report considers federal cybersecurity investments in three broad categories Agency spending to protect its own systems, networks, and data Agency spending to protect other governmental systems, networks, and data, and Agency spending to protect non-federal IT systems, networks, and data. Each department and agency has some level of participation in cybersecurity activities. However, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense have unique responsibilities established by statute—either for their role in assisting other departments and agencies, or, as in the case with the Department of Defense, for their unique responsibility for their own information technology. Each February the administration releases three sets of documents which describe some facets of the government's investments in cybersecurity The President's Budget Congressional Budget Justifications from each department or agency, and The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) report to Congress. These reports provide some valuable insights into how or why the government makes certain investments associated with promoting cybersecurity. However, on their own, none of these documents provides a complete and precise representation of how much the federal government is spending on cybersecurity. This is in part because of how they are developed, they are developed from agency submissions based on administration guidance that does not require methodologically consistent reporting on cybersecurity spending—or even provide a common definition for what cybersecurity is. Even if such an authoritative top-line figure for federal cybersecurity investments were available, without detail and context it would not effectively inform the Congressional decision-making process. Understanding the risks an individual agency faces, and what strategies they have for confronting those risks given their size, complexity, and mission is vital to determining the appropriate level of future cybersecurity investments for that agency. Armed with an understanding of those factors, Congress may choose to assess cybersecurity investments of a federal agency independently. Congress may alternatively choose to assess internal cybersecurity investments by an agency relative to similar federal agencies, and external investments relative to, and supporting, the non-"".gov"" sector.",110,110 "FEMA's Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (referred to as the Stafford Act—42 U.S.C. 5721 et seq.) authorizes the President to issue ""major disaster"" or ""emergency"" declarations before or after catastrophes occur. Emergency declarations trigger aid that protects property, public health, and safety and lessens or averts the threat of an incident becoming a catastrophic event. Given their purpose, the emergency declarations may precede an event. A major disaster declaration is generally issued after catastrophes occur, and constitutes broader authority for federal agencies to provide supplemental assistance to help state and local governments, families and individuals, and certain nonprofit organizations recover from the incident. The end result of a presidential disaster declaration is well known, if not entirely understood. Various forms of assistance are provided, including aid to families and individuals for uninsured needs, and assistance to state and local governments, and to certain non-profits for rebuilding or replacing damaged infrastructure. Over the last quarter century, the amount of federal assistance provided through presidential disaster declarations has exceeded $150 billion. Often, in recent years, Congress has enacted supplemental appropriations legislation to cover unanticipated costs. While the amounts spent by the federal government on different programs may be reported, and the progress of the recovery can be observed, much less is known about the process that initiates all of this activity. Yet, it is a process that has resulted in an average of more than one disaster declaration a week over the last decade. The disaster declaration procedure is foremost a process that preserves the discretion of the governor or tribal leader to request assistance and the President to decide to grant, or not to grant, supplemental help. The process employs some measurable criteria for evaluating disaster damage in two broad areas: Individual Assistance that aids families and individuals and Public Assistance that is mainly for emergency work such as debris removal and permanent repairs to infrastructure. The criteria, however, also consider many other factors, in each category of assistance, that help decision makers assess the impact of an event on communities and states. Under current law while a governor or a tribal leader may make a request, the decision to issue a declaration rests solely with the President. Congress has no formal role, but has taken actions to adjust the terms of the process. For example, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, P.L. 109-295, established an advocate to help small states with the declaration process. More recently, Congress passed the Hurricane Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, P.L. 113-2, which had two potentially major impacts on the declaration process. First, the act authorized Native American tribal groups to directly request disaster assistance from the President rather than only requesting through a state governor. The second potential major impact in the act was that FEMA was directed to update its criteria for considering whether to make a recommendation to the President for Individual Assistance declarations. Since the decision for a declaration is at the discretion of the President, there has been some speculation regarding the influence of political favor in these decisions. Some have posited various connections between the political party of the governor requesting or the prominence of some state's congressional delegation on committee's important to FEMA. While of interest, those theories are usually not connected to, or at least fail to consider, the natural events that were the impetus for both the request and the decision. Given the importance of the decision, and the size of the overall spending involved, hearings have been held to review the declaration process so as to ensure fairness and equity in the process and its results. Congress continues to examine the process and several pieces of legislation have been introduced during the 113th Congress to adjust the factors considered for a major disaster declaration. This report discusses the evolution of this process, how it is administered and recent changes enacted in law as well as amending legislation that has been introduced. This report will be updated as warranted by events.",11,11 "Public, Educational, and Governmental (PEG) Access Cable Television Channels: Issues for Congress. The environment for public, educational, and governmental (PEG) cable channels has been roiled by public policy and budgetary changes at the federal, state, and local levels and by technological changes in cable networks. More than 100 PEG access centers—which provide community groups and individuals free access to video production facilities and equipment, training, and programming time—have closed since 2005, and more may close when provisions in recently enacted state laws that eliminate requirements for cable companies to provide funding support take effect. Many PEG access centers, however, continue to have stable funding sources. When awarding franchises for the use of public rights of way to offer cable television service, many local jurisdictions required the cable companies to set aside some of their channel capacity for PEG use and to provide financial support for those PEG access channels. Those channels are not mandated by federal law. But the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 amended the Communications Act to explicitly allow franchising authorities to require cable operators to set aside channel capacity for PEG use and to provide adequate facilities or financial support for those channels. These PEG provisions have been a primary vehicle for fostering in cable systems the long-standing U.S. media policy goal of localism. Several recent developments are affecting the amount of financial support from cable providers and local governments for the PEG channels. In recent years, 21 states have enacted laws allowing cable systems to obtain statewide franchises. Some of these laws have abrogated or phased out PEG-related provisions in local franchise agreements requiring the franchisees to set aside channels, provide financial support, or provide studio facilities. In addition, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has adopted rules that may limit the amount of PEG financial support for non-capital costs that local franchise authorities can require of cable providers. Also, some local jurisdictions that have funded PEG operations are now facing budget deficits that are leading them to reduce or eliminate their PEG funding. Driven by technological changes, some cable operators have begun to offer PEG channels in a fashion that may reduce consumer access to, and the quality of, those channels, and may raise consumer costs to obtain PEG channels. As traditional cable providers are migrating from analog to digital transmission of programming, some subscribers must obtain set-top boxes to receive PEG programming. AT&T's U-verse service uses a different platform for PEG channels than for commercial channels. It is more difficult for subscribers, especially the visually impaired, to access the PEG channels, and PEG programming cannot be recorded on a DVR, leading some to claim the service does not meet requirements in franchise agreements or in the Communications Act. AT&T responds that it meets all requirements and it is inappropriate to require it to deploy its network inefficiently to meet rules developed for traditional cable architecture. One bill introduced in the 112th Congress, the Community Access Preservation (CAP) Act (H.R. 1746), would have allowed local jurisdictions in states that pass state franchise laws to require cable companies to provide PEG support equal to the greater of the amount required under the state law, the historical support required prior to enactment of the state law, or 2% of the gross cable revenues of the cable operator. That PEG support would not have been included in the statutory cap on franchise fees of 5% of revenues. The bill would have prohibited cable operators from charging subscribers for set-top boxes needed to receive PEG channels that are migrated from analog to digital tiers. The cable industry opposed the bill, claiming it would raise costs and rates and place cable operators at a competitive disadvantage with satellite television operators.",109,109 "Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV): Background and Issues for Congress. On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a ""more affordable and sustainable"" vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles were intended to play central roles in future Marine amphibious operations. On June 14, 2013, Marine leadership put the MPC program ""on ice"" due to budgetary pressures but suggested the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary resources might be more favorable. In what was described as a ""drastic shift,"" the Marines decided to ""resurrect"" the MPC in March 2014. The Marines designated the MPC as ACV Increment 1.1 and planned to acquire about 200 vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked, fully amphibious version, and to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 is to have a swim capability, another mode of transport (ship or aircraft) would be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore. The Marines are reportedly exploring the possibility of developing a high water speed ACV 2.0, which could accompany tanks and light armored vehicles into combat. On November 5, 2014, it was reported the Marines released a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for ACV Increment 1.1. The Marines were looking for information from industry regarding program milestones, delivery schedules, and where in the program cost savings can be achieved. On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE's contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC's for $121.5 million, and each company was to build 16 prototypes to be tested over the next two years. The Marines expect to down select to a single vendor in 2018. On December 7, 2015, General Dynamics Land Systems filed a protest to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) about the award of the contract to BAE and SAIC, and GAO had until March 16, 2016, to decide on the protest. In March 2016, it was reported that GAO had denied GDLS's protest, noting that ""the Marine Corps' evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the evaluation scheme identified in the solicitation."" The Marines reportedly stated that the protest put the ACV 1.1 program about 45 days behind schedule but anticipated that the ACV 1.1 would still be fielded on time. Both BAE and SAIC delivered their prototypes early, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) testing began mid- March 2017. In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1.1 down select request for proposals to BAE and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The Department of Defense's FY2019 budget request requests $265.7 million for 30 ACV 1.1s. A potential issue for Congress is how the possible adoption of the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations operational concept could affect the ACV 1.1 program.",32,32 "Animal Waste and Water Quality: EPA Regulation of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs). According to the Environmental Protection Agency, the release of waste from animal feedlots to surface water, groundwater, soil, and air is associated with a range of human health and ecological impacts and contributes to degradation of the nation's surface waters. The most dramatic ecological impacts are massive fish kills. A variety of pollutants in animal waste can affect human health, including causing infections of the skin, eye, ear, nose, and throat. Contaminants from manure can also affect human health by polluting drinking water sources. Although agricultural activities are generally not subject to requirements of environmental law, discharges of waste from large concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) into the nation's waters are regulated under the Clean Water Act. In the late 1990s, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated a review of the Clean Water Act rules that govern these discharges, which had not been revised since the 1970s, despite structural and technological changes in some components of the animal agriculture industry that have occurred during the last two decades. A proposal to revise the existing rules was released by the Clinton Administration in December 2000. The Bush Administration promulgated final revised regulations in December 2002, the rules took effect in February 2003. The final rules were generally viewed as less stringent than the proposal, a fact that strongly influenced how interest groups responded to them. Agriculture groups said that the final rules were workable, and they were pleased that some of the proposed requirements were scaled back, such as changes that would have made thousands more CAFOs subject to regulation. However, some continued to question EPA's authority to issue portions of the rules. Many states had been seeking more flexible approaches than EPA had initially proposed and welcomed the fact that the final rules retained the status quo to a large extent. Environmentalists contended that the rules relied too heavily on voluntary measures and failed to require improved technology. This report provides background on the 2002 rules, the previous Clean Water Act rules and the Clinton Administration proposal, and perspectives of key interest groups on the proposal and final regulations. It also identifies several issues that could be of congressional interest as implementation of the revised rules proceeds. Issues include adequacy of funding for implementing the rules, research needs, oversight of implementation of the rules, and possible need for legislation. The revised CAFO rules were challenged by multiple parties, and in February 2005, a federal court issued a ruling that upheld major parts of the rules, vacated other parts, and remanded still other parts to EPA for clarification. In October 2008, EPA issued revisions to the rules in response to the 2005 court decision, for information, see CRS Report RL33656, Animal Waste and Water Quality: EPA's Response to the Waterkeeper Alliance Court Decision on Regulation of CAFOs.",44,43 "Military Maternity and Parental Leave Policies. This report briefly discusses the U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) new policies for maternity and parental leave as part of the department's ""Force of the Future"" initiative.",30,30 "Iran's Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview. Iran has an active interest in developing, acquiring, and deploying a broad range of ballistic missiles, as well as developing a space launch capability. This was spotlighted several times since 2008. In mid-July 2008, Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles during military exercises, reportedly including the medium-range Shahab-3. At the time, a Pentagon spokesman said Iran was ""not testing new technologies or capabilities, but rather firing off old equipment in an attempt to intimidate their neighbors and escalate tension in the region."" Subsequent analysis of the July 2008 missile launches shows Iran apparently digitally altered images of those launches. Iran announced other missile and space launch tests in August and November 2008. In February 2009, Iran announced it launched a satellite into orbit and ""officially achieved a presence in space."" This short report seeks to provide an overview of the reported or suspected variety of Iranian ballistic missile programs. Because there remains widespread public divergence over particulars, however, this report does not provide specificity to what Iran may or may not have, or is in the process of developing. This report may be updated.",85,29 "The Pendulum Swings Back: Standing Doctrine After Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw. On January 12, 2000, the Supreme Court held in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw that plaintiffs had standing to pursue a Clean Water Act citizen suit, despite the fact that (1) the company-defendant had achieved compliance prior to the district court's decision, (2) plaintiffs sought only civil penalties payable to the U.S. Treasury, and (3) plaintiffs had demonstrated only reasonable concern not physical injury to the environment. In so holding, the Court appeared to retrench substantially from its environmental standing decisions of the 1990s, which had all gone against plaintiffs. In the wake of Laidlaw, environmental citizen suits will be easier to bring. This report will not be updated.",44,45 "Federal Research and Development Funding: Possible Impacts of Operating Under a Continuing Resolution. On September 30, 2008, President Bush signed into law the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. Division A of this law is a continuing resolution and provides funding for agencies and programs normally funded by nine of the 12 regular appropriations bills. This report explores the various aspects of this Act, including how the Act affects civilian research and development programs, as well as related pieces of legislation.",111,111 """First Day"" Proceedings and Procedural Change in the Senate. In the early weeks of the 112th Congress, the Senate considered proposals to change its Standing Rules, as well as proposals to alter other practices and procedures. Three resolutions that proposed to amend the Senate rules (S.Res. 8, S.Res. 10, as amended, and S.Res. 21, as amended) received votes, but none were agreed to. These three resolutions proposed a variety of changes, chiefly focused on the operation of the Senate's cloture rule (Rule XXII). However, the Senate did agree to two proposals to establish new Senate standing orders (S.Res. 28 and S.Res. 29). S.Res. 28 established new requirements in relation to so-called ""secret holds."" S.Res. 29 altered the requirements for the reading of amendments. The proceedings on these measures occurred in the context of a debate over whether or not the start of a new Congress presents a unique opportunity for the Senate to change its Standing Rules without certain constraints presented by its existing rules. The proceedings at the beginning of the 112th Congress, however, did not ultimately provide any conclusion concerning this principle. In the 113th Congress, there has been continued discussion of the potential significance of ""first day"" proceedings. This report is intended to provide context for understanding the issues raised by these proceedings, as well as an accounting of actions taken by the Senate at the start of the 112th Congress (with potential implications for actions the Senate may still take at the start of the 113th Congress).",55,55 Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Legislation in the 110th Congress. This report reviews the status of energy efficiency and renewable energy legislation introduced during the 110th Congress. Most action in the second session is focused on the FY2009 budget request and legislation that would extend or modify selected renewable energy and energy efficiency tax incentives.,37,37 "Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789 to the Present. Since 1789, Presidents have submitted 160 nominations to Supreme Court positions. Of these, 36 were not confirmed by the Senate. The 36 nominations represent 31 individuals whose names were sent forward to the Senate by Presidents (some individuals were nominated more than once). Of the 31 individuals who were not confirmed the first time they were nominated, however, six were later nominated again and confirmed. The Supreme Court nominations discussed here were not confirmed for a variety of reasons, including Senate opposition to the nominating President, nominee's views, or incumbent Court, senatorial courtesy, perceived political unreliability of the nominee, perceived lack of ability, interest group opposition, and fear of altering the balance of the Court. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has played an important role in the confirmation process, particularly since 1868. All but the most recent of these nominations have been the subject of extensive legal, historical, and political science writing, a selected list of which is included in this report. This report will be updated as warranted by events.",54,54 "U.S. Renewable Electricity: How Does the Production Tax Credit (PTC) Impact Wind Markets?. U.S. wind projects that use large turbines—greater than 100 kilowatts (kW)—are eligible to receive federal tax incentives in the form of production tax credits (PTC) and accelerated depreciation. Originally established in 1992, the PTC has played a role in the evolution and growth of the U.S. wind industry. Under existing law, wind projects placed in service on or after January 1, 2013, will not be eligible to receive the PTC incentive. Industry proponents are advocating for an extension of PTC availability, citing employment, economic development, and other considerations as justification for the extension. While a PTC extension may improve the prospects for U.S. wind development and manufacturing next year and beyond, the wind industry is influenced by a number of other factors. It is uncertain how the near- or long-term availability of the PTC incentive—in isolation of changes to other market factors—would either grow or sustain current wind development and manufacturing levels. For 2012, the pending expiration of the wind PTC is actually creating a short-term surge in wind project development and related investment and employment. Wind installations in 2012 are expected to range somewhere between 10 to 12 gigawatts (GW)—a record year for the industry. However, market estimates for new installations in 2013 range from 1-2 GW if the PTC expires and 2-4 GW if the PTC is extended. Limited market activity in 2013 is partially explained by the uncertain nature of the PTC, which results in reduced manufacturing orders and development activity as developers and investors wait for official policy direction. Wind installation projections for 2014 and beyond vary with the assumed availability, and duration, of PTC incentives. However, all projections reviewed for this report expect annual U.S. wind turbine demand to be less than the existing U.S. turbine manufacturing capacity—approximately 13 GW per year. Other factors that can affect wind development include (1) state renewable portfolio standards (RPS), (2) U.S. electricity demand growth, and (3) the price of natural gas. State RPS policies have been the primary demand creator for wind projects, in most cases, by requiring certain utilities to source a percentage of their retail electricity sales from renewable generators. Market analysis indicates that incremental RPS-driven demand for all sources of renewable power is estimated to be 4 GW-5 GW annually until 2025. Additionally, U.S. electricity demand growth is expected to be modest for the foreseeable future, meaning that there will likely be modest demand for new electric power capacity. Finally, the price of natural gas can also influence wind markets. Low natural gas prices can erode the economic competitiveness of wind electricity, while high natural gas prices can result in opportunities for wind to compete economically without the PTC. Current estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) project sustained low, but increasing, natural gas prices for the next several years. By the end of 2012, Congress will either allow the PTC incentive to expire or it may choose to extend or modify the incentive. Should Congress decide to extend the availability of wind PTC incentives, the duration (e.g., two years, four years, permanent) of such an extension will likely be part of the policy debate. Generally, the shorter the extension the greater the short-term economic and employment activity as developers and investors accelerate development plans in order to qualify for the PTC incentive. However, this development acceleration is likely to reduce future RPS-driven demand. A permanent PTC is also a policy option that may be considered, and EIA estimates indicate that such a policy may actually reduce near-term wind capacity additions, with annual installations peaking at 4 GW in the 2030 timeframe. Higher natural gas prices, more aggressive RPS policies, and increased U.S. electricity demand could change this outlook. The Family and Business Tax Cut Certainty Act of 2012 (S. 3521) was reported in the Senate on August 28, 2012. S. 3521 includes a one-year extension and modification of the wind PTC, making it available to projects that begin construction before January 1, 2014.",37,37 "Older Americans Act: Title III Nutrition Services Program. The elderly nutrition services program, authorized under Title III of the Older Americans Act (OAA), provides grants to state agencies on aging to support congregate and home-delivered meals (commonly referred to as ""meals on wheels"") programs for people aged 60 and older. The program is designed to address problems of food insecurity, promote socialization, and promote the health and well-being of older persons through nutrition and nutrition-related services. In 2012, a reported 8.8% of U.S. households with one elderly member were food insecure, defined as households reporting low or very low food security. As the largest Older Americans Act program, the Title III nutrition services program received $814.7 million in FY2014, accounting for 44% of the act's total funding ($1.871 billion). In 2006, Congress enacted the Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006 (P.L. 109-365), which extended the act's authorizations of appropriations through FY2011. However, Congress has continued to appropriate funding for OAA activities. The 113th Congress may consider comprehensive reauthorization of the OAA and as a result may modify existing authorities, including those related to nutrition services. The Administration on Aging (AOA) within the Administration for Community Living (ACL) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the nutrition services program, which includes (1) the Congregate Nutrition Services Program, (2) the Home-Delivered Nutrition Services Program, (3) and the Nutrition Services Incentive Program (NSIP). For the congregate and home-delivered programs, services must be targeted at older persons with the greatest social and economic need. Particular attention is paid to low-income older persons, including low-income minority older persons, older persons with limited English proficiency, older persons residing in rural areas, and those at risk for institutionalization. In FY2011, the most recent year for which data are available, more than 223 million meals were served to just under 2.5 million people, 61% were served to frail older people living at home, and 39% were served in congregate settings. Of the total $814.7 million appropriated for the nutrition services program in FY2014, $438.2 million was for congregate nutrition (54%), $216.4 million for home-delivered nutrition (27%), and $160.1 million for nutrition services incentive grants (19%). When adjusted for inflation, the total amount of funding appropriated for OAA nutrition services has decreased substantially over the past two decades ($814.7 million in FY2014 compared to $1,052.4 million in FY1990). This decline in relative funding has been experienced by the congregate nutrition and NSIP programs, while funding levels for the home-delivered nutrition programs have increased over the same time period. As a result, the number of home-delivered meals served has outpaced congregate meals, growing by 35% from FY1990 to FY2011, the number of congregate meals served declined by 40%. The faster growth in home-delivered meals is partially due to relatively higher growth in federal funding for home-delivered meals over that time period, as well as state decisions to focus funds on frail older people living at home. This report describes the nutrition services program authorized under OAA Title III, including the program's legislative history, purpose, and FY2014 funding level. It also provides information on service delivery requirements and program data regarding the number of meals served and program participation. The report briefly discusses former and more recent efforts to evaluate these programs. Finally, the report identifies selected issues for federal policymakers, including the status of Older Americans Act reauthorization, measuring unmet need for nutrition services, additional funding flexibility, and increased cost-sharing.",116,116 "Cloture Attempts on Nominations. Cloture is the only means by which the Senate can vote to limit debate on a matter, and thereby overcome a possible filibuster. Until 1949, cloture could not be invoked on nominations, and before 1980 this action was attempted only twice. From 1949 through 2002, cloture was sought on 35 nominations, and invoked on 21. Only three of the 35 nominees were not confirmed, all three were among those on whom the Senate rejected cloture. Except in the 103rd Congress (1993-1994), most of the nominations involved have been judicial. The 103rd and 107th Congress are the only ones in which cloture was sought on more than three nominations.",55,55 "Social Security: Calculation and History of Taxing Benefits. Social Security provides monthly cash benefits to retired or disabled workers and their family members and to the family members of deceased workers. Those benefits were exempt from federal income tax, but in 1983, Congress approved recommendations from the National Commission on Social Security Reform (also known as the Greenspan Commission) to tax the benefits of some higher-income Social Security beneficiaries. Beginning in 1984, up to 50% of Social Security and Railroad Retirement Tier I benefits became taxable for individuals whose provisional income exceeds $25,000. The threshold is $32,000 for married couples. Provisional income equals adjusted gross income (total income from all sources recognized for tax purposes) plus certain otherwise tax-exempt income, including half of Social Security and Railroad Retirement Tier I benefits. The proceeds from taxing Social Security and Railroad Retirement Tier I benefits at up to the 50% rate are credited to the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund, the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund, and the Railroad Retirement system, respectively, based on the source of the benefit taxed. In 1993, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) increased the share of some Social Security and Railroad Retirement Tier I benefits that are taxable. That law taxes up to 85% of benefits for individuals whose provisional income exceeds $34,000 and for married couples whose provisional income exceeds $44,000. The additional proceeds from that law are credited to the Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund. In 2016, the federal government received $51.8 billion in revenue from taxation of those benefits. Of that, $31.6 billion was credited to the Social Security trust funds, accounting for 3.4% of its total income. The remaining $20.2 billion was credited to the Medicare HI trust fund, which equaled 7.3% of its total income. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that 49% of Social Security beneficiaries (25.5 million people) were affected by the income taxation of Social Security benefits in tax year 2014. That share will grow over time because the income thresholds used to determine the share of benefits that is taxable are not indexed for inflation or wage growth. As a result, income taxes on benefits will become an increasingly important source of income for Social Security and Medicare.",116,116 "Congressional Budget Actions in 2004. During the second session of the 108th Congress, the House and Senate considered many different budgetary measures. Most of them pertained to FY2005 (referred to as the ""budget year"") and beyond. In addition, some made adjustments to the budget for FY2004 (referred to as the ""current year""). This report describes House and Senate action on major budgetary legislation within the framework of the congressional budget process and other procedural requirements.",101,101 "Iran: Profile of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad was elected June 24, 2005, to a four-year term, becoming the first non-cleric president in 24 years. He defeated former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in a run-off. Prior to his 2005 election to the presidency, Ahmadinejad did not hold an elected office and was a virtual unknown in the international arena. This report covers his background, his victory over the well-known former president Rafsanjani, his remarks about the West, including Israel, and recent visits to Iraq and Latin America.",85,85 "Appropriations for FY2003: Military Construction. The military construction (MilCon) appropriations bill provides funding for (1) military construction projects in the United States and overseas, (2) military family housing operations and construction (3) U.S. contributions to the NATO Security Investment Program, and (4) the bulk of base realignment and closure (BRAC)costs. On February 4, 2002, the Administration submitted a $379 billion FY2003 defense budget request. Of this, $9.0 billion was designated for accounts falling within the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committees' subcommittees on military construction. This request was approximately $1.7 billion less than that appropriated for FY2002. The decrease resulted from a $2.1 billion reduction in domestic military construction that was offset somewhat by increases for family housing and for building at military installations overseas. The Department of Defense stated that some projects were withheld anticipating the FY2005 base realignments and closures (BRAC) round. To offset the decrease, DOD increased its request to maintain and rehabilitate existing defense property (funded from other appropriations) by approximately $677 million above the amount enacted in FY2002. $4.2 billion of this year's request is devoted to military construction projects. According to the President's current national defense budget estimate, requests for these same accounts are expected to rise to $12.7 billion by FY2007. Amendments to the FY2003 military construction appropriation are included in H.J.Res. 2 of the 108th Congress. In a separate action for the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF), the Administration requested an additional $594 million (subsequently raised to $717 million) in military construction budget authority. This report contains information on how this has been apportioned between the services. For the current status of DERF legislation, see CRS Report RL31305, Authorization and Appropriations for FY2003: Defense, by Stephen Daggett and Amy Belasco. Authorization of military construction is included within the defense authorization bill. The House passed its version of the bill (H.R. 4546) on May 10. The Senate Armed Services Committee marked its authorization bill (S. 2514) and reported it on May 15. The Senate substituted the text of S. 2514 for that of H.R. 4546, passed the amended bill, and appointed conferees on June 27, 2002. The House further amended the bill and appointed conferees on July 26. Conferees began meeting on September 5, 2002, reporting the bill on November 12 (H.Rept. 107-772). The President enacted the bill as P.L. 107-314 on December 2. Military construction appropriations markup by the House Appropriations Committee occurred on June 24. The bill (H.R. 5011) was introduced on June 25 and passed on June 26. The Senate Appropriations Committee marked its version of the bill (S. 2709) on June 27. On July 17, the Senate substituted the language of S. 2709 for that of H.R. 5011, passed the amended bill on July 18, and appointed conferees. The House rejected the Senate amendment on September 10. The House and Senate adopted the conference report (H.Rept. 107-731) on October 10 and 11, respectively, and the bill was enacted by the President on October 23 as P.L. 107-249. This report will be updated as necessary.",26,26 "Preventing the Introduction and Spread of Ebola in the United States: Frequently Asked Questions. Throughout 2014, an outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) has outpaced the efforts of health workers trying to contain it in three West African countries: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. (These are often referred to as ""affected countries"" or ""countries with widespread transmission."" In mid-November, 2014, Ebola transmission also occurred for the second time in neighboring Mali. The extent of spread in Mali remains to be seen.) EVD cases have been imported to other countries, including the United States, where two nurses were infected while caring for a patient who had traveled from Liberia. Members of Congress and the public have considered ways to prevent the entry and spread of EVD in the United States. Official recommendations have seemed to conflict at times. In part this reflects the evolution of our understanding of this new threat and the scientific and technical aspects of its control. In addition, under the nation's federalist governance structure, the federal and state governments are empowered to take measures to control communicable diseases, and have addressed some aspects of the Ebola threat in varied ways. In the United States and abroad, public concern about the spread of Ebola also may have shaped policymakers' decisions as well. This CRS report answers common legal and policy questions about the potential introduction and spread of EVD in the United States. Questions and answers are presented in the following topical order Barring travelers from Ebola-stricken countries from coming to the United States: Immigration law and policy provide options to prevent the entry into the United States of foreign nationals who could spread communicable diseases. U.S. citizens are generally afforded the right to repatriate. Exit procedures upon departure from affected countries in Africa: The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have aided affected countries in West Africa in screening departing travelers to minimize the exportation of EVD to other countries. U.S. laws and procedures involving airlines and other conveyances: Several laws address the role of commercial carriers in preventing or detecting the spread of communicable diseases on their planes or vessels. Implementation of these laws involves a balance of public health and commercial considerations. Identification and screening of passengers arriving from Ebola-affected countries: The United States has routed most travelers originating from affected areas of West Africa to one of five U.S. airports, at which the travelers can be interviewed and examined to determine their risk of exposure to EVD, and referred for further monitoring. Domestic quarantine and isolation: legal authority and policies: Both the federal and state governments have authority to restrict the movement of persons who may pose a threat to others by transmitting disease. Public health officials at each level of government are involved in identifying and monitoring persons at risk of developing EVD, and developing protocols to assure that persons who develop symptoms are promptly isolated.",65,65 "Federal Proposals to Tax Marijuana: An Economic Analysis. The combination of state policy and general public opinion favoring the legalizing of marijuana has led some in Congress to advocate for legalization and taxation of marijuana at the federal level. The Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013 (H.R. 501) would impose a federal excise tax of 50% on the producer and importer price of marijuana. The National Commission on Federal Marijuana Policy Act of 2013 (H.R. 1635) proposes establishing a National Commission on Federal Marijuana Policy that would review the potential revenue generated by taxing marijuana, among other things. This report focuses solely on issues surrounding a potential federal marijuana tax. First, it provides a brief overview of marijuana production. Second, it presents possible justifications for taxes and, in some cases, estimates the level of tax suggested by that rationale. Third, it analyzes possible marijuana tax designs. The report also discusses various tax administration and enforcement issues, such as labeling and tracking. Economic theory suggests the efficient level of taxation is equal to marijuana's external cost to society. Studies conducted in the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada suggest that the costs of individual marijuana consumption to society are between 12% and 28% of the costs of an individual alcohol user, and total social costs are even lower after accounting for the smaller number of marijuana users in society. Based on an economic estimate of $30 billion of net external costs for alcohol, the result is an external cost of $0.5 billion to $1.6 billion annually for marijuana. These calculations imply that an upper limit to the economically efficient tax rate could be $0.30 per marijuana cigarette (containing an average of one half of a gram of marijuana) or $16.80 per ounce. An increased number of users in a legal market would raise total costs, but not necessarily costs per unit. Some could also view excise taxes as a means to curtail demand, particularly as the price of marijuana can be expected to drop from current retail prices of up $200-$300 per ounce to prices closer to the cost of production at $5-$18 per ounce, if broadly legalized. The demand for marijuana is estimated to be relatively price inelastic, meaning that consumer demand is relatively insensitive to price changes. Although previous studies of marijuana demand largely examine consumers willing to engage in illegal activities, it appears that higher tax rates would have a minor effect on reducing demand. With this said, tax policy, coupled with adequate law enforcement, could be an effective tool to limit marijuana consumption among youth, as empirical studies indicate that their demand is more sensitive to price than non-youth. Excise taxes on marijuana could also be levied primarily to raise revenue, as has been historically the case with tobacco and alcohol. As an illustration, assuming a total market size of $40 billion, a federal tax of $50 per ounce is estimated to raise about $6.8 billion annually, after accounting for behavioral effects associated with price decreases following legalization. The choices in administrative design could affect consumer behavior, production methods, evasion rates, or the tax base of a federal marijuana excise tax. Some of the more significant choices include whether to exempt medicinal uses or homegrown marijuana from tax.",68,68 "Syrian Refugee Admissions to the United States. This report discusses the U.S.'s plans to admit Syrian and other refugees in FY2016 and beyond. The Obama Administration initially proposed an overall refugee ceiling of 75,000 for FY2016 and held consultations with Congress on that proposal, as required by law.",76,76 "Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile Defense: A Status Overview. For some time, U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs have focused primarily on developing kinetic energy interceptors to destroy attacking ballistic missiles. These efforts have evolved over 30 years and have produced a significant amount of test data from which much can be learned. This report provides a broad overview of the U.S. investment in this approach to BMD. The data on the U.S. flight test effort to develop a national missile defense (NMD) system remains mixed and ambiguous. There is no recognizable pattern to explain this record nor is there conclusive evidence of a learning curve over more than two decades of developmental testing. In addition, the test scenarios are considered by some not to be operational tests and could be more realistic in nature, they see these tests as more of a laboratory or developmental effort. Success and failure rates (and their technical causes) have shown relative consistency through this period. The U.S. flight test effort to develop theater missile defense (TMD) systems appears more promising. In relative terms, developmental and operational testing of TMD systems has been more successful than the NMD effort. Nonetheless, TMD systems that evolved from mature, existing ground and sea-based air-defense systems have demonstrated greater test success than other TMD programs. How effective has the U.S. investment been in developing kinetic energy BMD systems? Observers could make any number of arguments as to what the record means and what could be done to improve the effectiveness of systems under development and of those deployed. Some observers have suggested that the 110th Congress might review the U.S. investment in the kinetic energy concept to date to determine how best to proceed with the U.S. BMD effort in the coming years. This report will be updated as events warrant.",32,32 "Interstate Travel: Constitutional Challenges to the Identification Requirement and Other Transportation Security Regulations. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, security measures in and around our nation's transportation facilities have dramatically increased. Nowhere has the increase been more noticeable than with respect to air transportation. New federal statutes and agency regulations have been implemented, each with the purpose of ensuring the safety and security of passengers, facilities, and workers of our national transportation systems. Not all of these security measures, however, have been publically disclosed. In fact, pursuant to its statutory authority, the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) has issued a series of regulations relating to transportation security in which a majority of the information, including rules, orders, and directives has been classified as ""sensitive security information"" (SSI), and thus, withheld from public scrutiny. For example, the regulation requiring that all passengers produce photo identification before being allowed to enter the airport gate area or board an aircraft, bus, or train has been classified as SSI, and consequently, cannot be disclosed to the general public. In addition, the standards utilized for creating, maintaining and requiring airlines to screen passengers against government-provided ""watch lists"" and ""no-fly lists do not appear to have been made publicly available. Recently, news reports have noted that at least two members of Congress have been delayed because of concerns relating to similar names appearing on such lists. Moreover, a California resident has brought a suit against the government alleging that the secret nature of these laws violates established rights under the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, as well as the constitutionally protected right to travel and the First Amendment. In addition, there is pending federal litigation with respect to the constitutionality of both the ""watch"" and ""no-fly lists,"" as well as pending state litigation regarding the scope of TSA's authority to seize evidence obtained during a routine search of a passenger's luggage. While it is unclear precisely what the courts will decide these lawsuits raise constitutional questions not only about the scope of the federal government's authority to prescribe regulations that impact the ability of citizens to freely move within our country's borders, but also about the government's ability to keep those regulations from public scrutiny. This report examines the legal basis for the transportation security measures, including the SSI regulations, and analyzes the constitutional provisions under which these measures are currently being challenged. This report will be updated as events require.",119,122 "The ""Son of Sam"" Case: Legislative Implications. In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the new York State Crime Victims Board, the U.S. Supreme Court held that New York State's ""Son of Sam"" law was inconsistent with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and press. This report examines the Supreme Court decision and then considers whether its rationale renders the federal law unconstitutional. Concluding that it likely does, the report considers whether it would be possible to enact a constitutional Son-of-Sam statute. Finally, the report takes note of some state Son-of-Sam statutes that have been enacted since the Supreme Court decision.",15,15 "Mandatory Student Fees and the First Amendment: Background and Analysis of Issues in Southworth v. Grebe. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that ""Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."" The Supreme Court of the United States has established that the First Amendment's free speech guarantee contains, as necessary corollaries, the right not to speak, and the right not to be compelled to support the speech of others. Based on these principles, students of the University of Wisconsin filed suit against the school's Board of Regents, asserting that the use of objecting students' mandatory student activity fees to support political and ideological groups violated their First Amendment rights of free speech, free exercise, and free association. This assertion by the plaintiffs raised a conflict between the general principle that academic institutions may provide a neutral, non-discriminatory forum for the expression of diverse ideas and the maxim that individuals cannot be required to support political or ideological viewpoints to which they are opposed. In considering this conflict, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit looked to Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, where the Supreme Court ruled that disbursement of student fees must be made on a viewpoint neutral basis. While the Court did not address the issue of whether such fees were violative of the First Amendment in Rosenberger, it did state that the analysis of the question would be controlled by standards established in two of its earlier decisions, Keller v. State Bar of California and Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. In those cases, dealing with bar and teacher's union dues respectively, the Court ruled that members of such organizations could be required to fund activities which are germane to the purpose for which the organization was established, but could not be compelled to fund activities of a political or ideological nature. Applying this germaneness standard to the academic context, the court of appeals determined that the allocation of student fees to political and ideological groups was unconstitutional. Specifically, the court explained that a university's interest in providing for diverse expression was not sufficiently germane to the educational process to justify such forced funding. A key factor in the court's decision was its conclusion that the disbursements placed too great a burden on the First Amendment rights of objecting students, effectively forcing them to subsidize speech that was anathemic to their personal beliefs. While the Seventh Circuit employed established precedent in its analysis, its conclusion conflicts with the decisions of other courts. Because of this difference among the circuit courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether such fee disbursements offend First Amendment principles. A decision in Board of Regents v. Southworth is expected this term.",15,15 U.S. Secret Service Protection Mission Funding and Staffing: Fact Sheet. U.S. Secret Service Presidential protection White House Security U.S. Secret Service appropriations U.S. Secret Service staffing U.S. Secret Service Police U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division,91,91 "Veterans' Medical Care: FY2016 Appropriations. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). This report focuses on funding for the VHA. The President submitted his FY2016 budget request to Congress on February 2, 2015. The President's request for the VHA is approximately $60.6 billion (without collections), an additional $1.3 billion (for the three medical care accounts) above the enacted 2016 advance appropriations for VHA, which was $58.7 billion. When the $622 million request for the medical and prosthetic research account is taken into consideration, the total amount requested for VHA is a $1.9 billion increase over the FY2015 amount. The House Appropriations Committee approved the FY2016 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs appropriations bill (MILCON-VA appropriations bill) on April 22, 2015. The House passed the measure (H.R. 2029, H.Rept. 114-92) on April 30. The House-passed bill provides approximately $60.3 billion for the VHA (without collections). Because none of the FY2016 regular appropriations bills were enacted by October 1, 2015, on September 30 Congress passed and the President signed into law a continuing resolution (CR) for the period October 1, 2015, through December 11, 2015. The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-53), funds most VA programs through a formula using the FY2015 level of appropriations minus an across-the-board rescission of 0.2108%. Although the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the MILCON-VA appropriations bill (H.R. 2029, S.Rept. 114-57) on May 21, 2015, the Senate did not consider the measure until November. On November 10, 2015, the Senate passed the MILCON-VA appropriation bill, 2016, as amended by S.Amdt. 2763, as amended, in the nature of a substitute, to H.R. 2029. For the VHA, the Senate-passed version of the MILCON-VA appropriations bill provides $62.4 billion (without collections), which is $1.8 billion more than the Administration's request for FY2016. On December 18, 2015, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2029, P.L. 114-113). Division J of the act contained the FY2016 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act. The enacted measure provides $162.7 billion for the VA for FY2016 as whole. Of this amount, the MILCON-VA Appropriations Act provides $61.8 billion for VHA (without collections). This includes $2.5 billion in addition to the enacted FY2016 advance appropriations for VHA, which was $58.7 billion, and approximately $631 million for the medical and prosthetic research account. In total, the FY2016-enacted amount for VHA is $1.2 billion above the President's request for FY2016, and $5.3 billion above the FY2015-enacted amount of $56.4 billion (without collections). The appendixes of this report provide funding levels for all VA accounts from FY1995 to FY2015 (including rescissions and supplements).",70,70 "Cybercrime: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. 1030 and Related Federal Criminal Laws. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030, outlaws conduct that victimizes computer systems. It is a cyber security law. It protects federal computers, bank computers, and computers connected to the Internet. It shields them from trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from being corruptly used as instruments of fraud. It is not a comprehensive provision, but instead it fills cracks and gaps in the protection afforded by other federal criminal laws. This is a brief sketch of CFAA and some of its federal statutory companions, including the amendments found in the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act, P.L. 110-326, 122 Stat. 3560 (2008). In their present form, the seven paragraphs of subsection 1030(a) outlaw computer trespassing (e.g., hacking) in a government computer, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(3) computer trespassing (e.g., hacking) resulting in exposure to certain governmental, credit, financial, or computer-housed information, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2) damaging a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce (e.g., a worm, computer virus, Trojan horse, time bomb, a denial of service attack, and other forms of cyber attack, cyber crime, or cyber terrorism), 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5) committing fraud an integral part of which involves unauthorized access to a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(4) threatening to damage a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(7) trafficking in passwords for a government computer, or when the trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(6), and accessing a computer to commit espionage, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1). Subsection 1030(b) makes it a crime to attempt or conspire to commit any of these offenses. Subsection 1030(c) catalogs the penalties for committing them, penalties that range from imprisonment for not more than a year for simple cyberspace trespassing to a maximum of life imprisonment when death results from intentional computer damage. Subsection 1030(d) preserves the investigative authority of the Secret Service. Subsection 1030(e) supplies common definitions. Subsection 1030(f) disclaims any application to otherwise permissible law enforcement activities. Subsection 1030(g) creates a civil cause of action for victims of these crimes. Subsections 1030(i) and (j) authorize forfeiture of tainted property. This report is an abridged version of CRS Report 97-1025, Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws, by Charles Doyle, stripped of the authorities and footnotes found there.",110,110 "Financial Performance of the Major Oil Companies, 2007-2011. Periods of rising oil prices can result in reduced economic growth, rising prices, and reduced disposable incomes for consumers, as well as a deteriorating trade balance. For the oil industry, periods of high oil prices generally imply increasing cash flows and higher profits. While some view the improvement in the industries' finances under these conditions as a business return no different than those earned in other industries, others view it as a windfall, a direct transfer from consumers, without any significant additional activity attributable to the industry. Although the U.S. oil industry is composed of many firms, to many the face of the oil industry is represented by the five major firms operating extensively in the U.S. market. These firms are ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP plc, Royal Dutch Shell plc, and ConocoPhillips. Over the period 2007 to 2011, oil prices were volatile. They increased to a record peak in 2008, declined rapidly at the end of 2008 and early 2009, and increased through 2010, and remained high during 2011. The total revenues and net incomes of the five major oil companies followed a similar pattern. However, the companies' production of both crude oil and natural gas, their two key products, remained largely unchanged in the face of volatile prices, suggesting that for these firms, market price and the production of key products are not closely related. During the period 2007 to 2011, the five major companies' upstream activities of exploration and production contributed more to the total profitability of the firms than the downstream activities of refining and marketing. During the period, capital budgets were more stable than the price of oil, and the companies' exploration and production activities did little to increase their ability to produce oil or natural gas. The companies used their profits to carry out a number of activities, to include the distribution of dividends to shareholders, the repurchase of shares on the market to enhance investor holdings, and to carry out business strategies.",40,40 "Federal Food Assistance in Disasters: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Food Stamp program, child nutrition programs, and federally donated food commodities delivered through relief organizations provide major support in disasters like Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Existing laws authorize the Agriculture Department to change eligibility and benefit rules to facilitate emergency aid, and, in the short term, funding and federally provided food commodities are available without the need for additional appropriations. With regard to the Katrina and Rita hurricanes, numerous food assistance program rules were waived -- e.g., granting one to three months of food stamp benefits to affected households authorizing free school meals to affected children, and greatly easing eligibility documentation requirements. However, Congress faced a number of issues with regard to the longer term -- e.g., who should pay for extra administrative costs, whether to extend the application of disaster rules beyond one to three months, costs associated with replenishing commodity stocks used to help hurricane victims additional funding for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (the WIC program) in affected areas, how to deal with those made temporarily eligible (like some noncitizens normally barred from participation in food stamps), and whether to increase normal benefits and further loosen eligibility rules for those affected. Several bills were introduced in response to the hurricanes (S. 1695 and H.R. 3809 were the most prominent). They were intended to expand on the steps already taken by the Administration. For example, they would have lengthened the period during which disaster rules apply, further eased eligibility and benefit rules for food stamps, and mandated extra money to support the distribution of food commodities and the WIC program. But in the end, no significant action was taken, other than (1) small one-time increases in appropriations (totaling to $10 million) to replenish some commodity stocks used for hurricane-relief purposes and pay for commodity distribution costs, and (2) a $120 million transfer of funding from food stamp appropriations to support extra child nutrition costs. This version is the final report on food assistance related to the 2005 hurricanes, and will not be updated.",11,11 House Voting Procedures: Forms and Requirements. This report discusses the procedural considerations suffuse voting and the methods of voting in both the House and in the Committee of the Whole.,55,55 "The November 2015 Terrorist Siege in Mali. On November 20, 2015, gunmen laid siege to the Radisson Blu, a hotel popular with foreigners in Mali's capital, Bamako. This report discusses issues for Congress in the wake of the attack.",86,86 "Fact Sheet: The FY2013 State and Foreign Operations Budget Request. On February 13, 2012, the Obama Administration submitted to Congress its FY2013 budget request for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs totaling $54.7 billion, $8.2 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. Of the total request, $18.6 billion is for State Department Operations and related agencies (a 4.6% increase over FY2012 funding) and $36.1 billion is for Foreign Operations (an increase of 0.1% over the FY2012 level). This fact sheet provides a brief overview of that request. A full report on FY2013 State and Foreign Operations budget and appropriations issues will follow initial congressional consideration of appropriations legislation.",80,80 "National Flood Insurance Program: Selected Issues and Legislation in the 115th Congress. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA, 42 U.S.C. §4001 et seq.), and was most recently reauthorized until November 30, 2018 (P.L. 115-225). The general purpose of the NFIP is both to offer primary flood insurance to properties with significant flood risk, and to reduce flood risk through the adoption of floodplain management standards. A longer-term objective of the NFIP is to reduce federal expenditure on disaster assistance after floods. The NFIP also engages in many ""non-insurance"" activities in the public interest: it disseminates flood risk information through flood maps, requires community land use and building code standards, and offers grants and incentive programs for household- and community-level investments in flood risk reduction. Unless reauthorized or amended by Congress, the following will occur on November 30, 2018: (1) the authority to provide new flood insurance contracts will expire and (2) the authority for NFIP to borrow funds from the Treasury will be reduced from $30.425 billion to $1 billion. The House passed H.R. 2874, the 21st Century Flood Reform Act, on November 14, 2017, on a vote of 237-189. H.R. 2874 would authorize the NFIP until September 30, 2022. Three bills have been introduced in the Senate to reauthorize the NFIP: S. 1313 (Flood Insurance Affordability and Sustainability Act of 2017), S. 1368 (Sustainable, Affordable, Fair, and Efficient [SAFE] National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2017), and S. 1571 (National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2017). None of these bills have yet been taken up by the committee of jurisdiction. Issues which Congress may consider in the context of reauthorization include (1) NFIP solvency and debt, (2) premium rates and surcharges, (3) affordability, (4) increasing participation in the NFIP, (5) the role of private insurance and barriers to private sector involvement, (6) recurrent flooding and properties with multiple losses, (7) administrative reforms, (8) non-insurance functions of the NFIP such as floodplain mapping and flood mitigation, and (9) future flood risks, including future catastrophic events. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has identified the need to increase flood insurance coverage across the nation as a major priority for the current reauthorization and beyond, with a goal of doubling flood insurance coverage by 2023 through the increased sale of both NFIP and private policies. The NFIP's premium rates do not reflect the full risk of loss because of various legislative requirements, which may exacerbate the program's fiscal exposure. The categories of properties which pay less than the full risk-based rate are determined by the date when the structure was built relative to the date of adoption of the Flood Insurance Rate Map, rather than the flood risk or the ability of the policyholder to pay. A reformed NFIP rate structure could have the effect of encouraging more private insurers to enter the primary flood market, however, full risk-based premiums could be unaffordable for some households. Although the NFIP has always had borrowing authority from Congress, an approach has not been developed by which the NFIP can repay catastrophic flood losses. To ensure the future financial solvency of the NFIP after catastrophic events, FEMA has suggested that a systematic analysis may consider the costs and benefits of using the reserve fund, borrowing authority, reinsurance, other forms of risk transfer, and perhaps a Treasury backstop at some catastrophic loss level. This report summarizes key insurance reform provisions in recent legislation, identifies issues for congressional consideration as part of the possible reauthorization of the NFIP, and describes selected provisions which relate to the issues listed above in the bill to reauthorize the NFIP passed by the House (H.R. 2874, the 21st Century Flood Reform Act) and the bills yet to be considered by the Senate (S. 1313, S. 1368, and S. 1571).",11,11 "Attempt: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal Law. It is not a crime to attempt to commit most federal offenses. Unlike state law, federal law has no generally applicable crime of attempt. Congress, however, has outlawed the attempt to commit a substantial number of federal crimes on an individual basis. In doing so, it has proscribed the attempt, set its punishment, and left to the federal courts the task of further developing the law in the area. The courts have identified two elements in the crime of attempt: an intent to commit the underlying substantive offense and some substantial step towards that end. The point at which a step may be substantial is not easily discerned, but it seems that the more serious and reprehensible the substantive offense, the less substantial the step need be. Ordinarily, the federal courts accept neither impossibility nor abandonment as an effective defense to a charge of attempt. Attempt and the substantive offense carry the same penalties in most instances. A defendant may not be convicted of both the substantive offense and the attempt to commit it. Commission of the substantive offense, however, is neither a prerequisite for, nor a defense against, an attempt conviction. Whether a defendant may be guilty of an attempt to attempt to commit a federal offense is often a matter of statutory construction. Attempts to conspire and attempts to aid and abet generally present less perplexing questions. This is an abridged version of CRS Report R42001, Attempt: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law, by Charles Doyle, without the footnotes, attributions, citations to authority, or appendix found in the longer report.",94,94 "High-Deductible Health Plans and Health Savings Accounts: An Empirical Review. Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), as authorized by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (P.L. 108-173, MMA) of 2003, are tax-preferred savings accounts used to pay for unreimbursed qualified medical expenses such as health insurance deductibles, copayments, and services not covered by insurance. To contribute to an HSA, the insured must have a high-deductible health plan (HDHP), and generally no other health insurance coverage. One of a number of the stated goals of the 2003 legislation is to encourage workers to better save for their health care in retirement. Moreover, the HDHP/HSA combination is thought to provide incentives for the consumers to be more active in their care, and purchase the best possible medical services for the lowest possible price. This report analyzes existing data and reviews the current literature to discuss whether HDHPs and HSAs have begun to meet some of these objectives. Enrollment in HDHPs has been increasing since HSAs were introduced in 2004. Nevertheless, the HDHP enrollment growth rate is slowing. Individuals who have an HDHP may or may not open an HSA, it is estimated that between 51% and 58% of HDHP holders go on to open an HSA. Whether opening an HDHP/HSA is financially advantageous is a complicated issue. In fact, those at many levels of the health spending distribution might save money by opening an HDHP/HSA instead of enrolling in a standard preferred provider organization (PPO) plan (the most common type of health insurance plan). A review of the literature on HDHPs and HSAs suggests the following HSAs are designed to change consumer behavior by providing incentives for consumers to be more concerned with the cost and quality of their health care. Although a few studies suggest this is happening, the literature in this area reports mixed and inconclusive results. HSAs could encourage individuals to save for their health expenses in retirement. However, because only about half of HDHP plan holders open an HSA, the remaining half are not saving for their health expenses in this tax-preferred account. Among those with HSAs, some may be using the account as a tax benefit and not saving for health care in retirement. The uninsurance rate could potentially decrease with the advent of HDHPs as previously uninsured individuals purchased these plans because of their relatively low premiums. There is little evidence, however, that the currently uninsured are transitioning into HDHPs. Some hoped that a change from standard PPO plans to HDHP/HSA plans would lower aggregate health expenditures. They maintain that expenditures would fall if most of those insured in a standard PPO plan actually moved to an HDHP/HSA. The empirical evidence backing many of these results is weak or limited, and much remains unknown about the effects of HDHPs and HSAs on uninsurance, the utilization of health care, and aggregate health expenditures.",70,70 "Trade Issues in the 109th Congress: Policy Challenges and Opportunities. The second session of the 109th Congress is expected to face an extensive trade agenda consisting of a wide range of issues. In some respects these issues are distinct, each with its own policy and economic implications. In other respects the issues are interrelated. They have emerged from common sets of domestic political, foreign policy, and economic factors and affect or are affected by the concerns of Members of Congress, of other policymakers and of many interest groups. These issues and how policymakers deal with them will define overall U.S. trade policy. During the first session, the 109th Congress dealt with a number of critical trade issues. The Bush Administration requested and received a two-year extension of its trade promotion authority. The Congress also debated U.S. participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as it considered, but did not pass, a congressional resolution to withdraw from the WTO. In addition, the Administration sent and the Congress passed legislation to implement a free trade agreement with five Central American countries plus the Dominican Republic, the DR-CAFTA, and passed implementing legislation for a free trade agreement with Bahrain. Furthermore, the 109th Congress repealed two trade programs that had been declared illegal by the WTO. During the second session the 109th Congress may be called on to debate more free trade agreements, trade relations with China and tariff preferences for developing countries, among other issues. The Congress might also continue to monitor the Doha Development Agenda negotiations proceeding in the WTO. Each issue or set of trade issues bears its own implications as Members of Congress weigh the merits and disadvantages. In most cases, the 109th Congress will be considering and debating each issue separately. However, the trade issues as a whole have implications for a wider debate on U.S. trade policy. As the 109th Congress addresses these issues, its decisions will have implications for key questions that help define U.S. trade policy in the long-term. This report will generally cover the trade issues as they unfold. However, it will not track legislation per se. The report will be updated as events warrant.",50,53 "Corporate Tax Reform: Issues for Congress. Interest in corporate tax reform that lowers the rate and broadens the base has developed in the past several years. Some discussions by economists in opinion pieces have suggested there is an urgent need to lower the corporate tax rate, but not necessarily to broaden the tax base, an approach that presents some difficulties given current budget pressures. Others see the corporate tax as a potential source of revenue. Arguments for lowering the corporate tax rate include the traditional concerns about economic distortions arising from the corporate tax and newer concerns arising from the increasingly global nature of the economy. Some claims have been made that lowering the corporate tax rate would raise revenue because of the behavioral responses, an effect that is linked to an open economy. Although the corporate tax has generally been viewed as contributing to a more progressive tax system because the burden falls on capital income and thus on higher-income individuals, claims have also been made that the burden falls not on owners of capital, but on labor income—an effect also linked to an open economy. The analysis in this report suggests that many of the concerns expressed about the corporate tax are not supported by empirical evidence. Claims that behavioral responses could cause revenues to rise if rates were cut do not hold up on either a theoretical or an empirical basis. Studies that purport to show a revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate of 30% (a rate lower than the current statutory tax rate) contain econometric errors that lead to biased and inconsistent results, when those problems are corrected the results disappear. Cross-country studies to provide direct evidence showing that the burden of the corporate tax actually falls on labor yield unreasonable results and prove to suffer from econometric flaws that also lead to a disappearance of the results when corrected, in those cases where data were obtained and the results replicated. Many studies that have been cited are not relevant to the United States because they reflect wage bargaining approaches and unions have virtually disappeared from the private sector in the United States. Overall, the evidence suggests that the tax is largely borne by capital. Similarly, claims that high U.S. tax rates will create problems for the United States in a global economy suffer from a misrepresentation of the U.S. tax rate compared with other countries and are less important when capital is imperfectly mobile, as it appears to be. Although these new arguments appear to rely on questionable methods, the traditional concerns about the corporate tax appear valid. While an argument may be made that the tax is still needed as a backstop to individual tax collections, it does result in some economic distortions. These economic distortions, however, have declined substantially over time as corporate rates and shares of output have fallen. Moreover, it is difficult to lower the corporate tax without creating a way of sheltering individual income given the low tax rates on dividends and capital gains. A number of revenue-neutral changes are available that could reduce these distortions, allow for a lower corporate statutory tax rate, and lead to a more efficient corporate tax system. These changes include base broadening, reducing the benefits of debt finance through inflation indexing, taxing large pass-through firms as corporations, and reducing the tax at the firm level offset by an increase at the individual level. Nevertheless, the scope for reducing the tax rate in a revenue-neutral way may be limited.",102,102 "District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Program. This report discusses the District of Columbia (DC) Tuition Assistance Program, which provides scholarships for undergraduate education to DC residents ranging from $2,500 to $10,000. Originally, the program was limited to providing scholarships for attending public higher education institutions in Maryland and Virginia, but it was expanded to include public institutions nationwide in May 2000.",57,57 """Terrorism"" and Related Terms in Statute and Regulation: Selected Language. Congress has used the term ""terrorism"" often in legislation. Hundreds of federal statutes and regulations already refer to ""terrorism"" and related terms in a variety of other contexts. However, these statutes and regulations ultimately refer to an extremely small set of statutory definitions, current criminal law and immigration definitions among them. This report provides the current text of a few of the fundamental definitions.",22,22 "Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State and the Department of Defense (DOD) have long shared responsibility for U.S. assistance to train, equip, and otherwise engage with foreign military and other security forces. The legal framework for such assistance emerged soon after World War II, when Congress charged the Secretary of State with responsibility for overseeing and providing general direction for military and other security assistance programs and the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for administering such programs. Over the years, congressional directives and executive actions have modified, shaped, and refined State Department and DOD roles and responsibilities. Changes in the legal framework through which security assistance to foreign forces—weapons, training, lethal and nonlethal military assistance, and military education and training—is provided have responded to a wide array of factors. Legal Authorization and Funding For most of the past half-century, Congress has authorized U.S. security assistance programs through Title 22 of the U.S. Code (Foreign Relations) and appropriated the bulk of security assistance funds through State Department accounts. DOD administers programs funded through several of these accounts under the Secretary of State's direction and oversight. Beginning in the 1980s, however, and increasingly after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11), some policymakers have come to view the State Department authorities, or the funding allocated to them, as insufficient and too inflexible to respond to evolving and emerging security threats. As a result, Congress has increasingly provided DOD with the means to offer security assistance under authorities in either Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed Services) or the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), both funded as part of the DOD budget. (These are collectively known as ""Title 10"" authorities and referred to by DOD as ""security cooperation."") DOD security assistance and other security cooperation programs conducted under Title 10 authority and established prior to 9/11 include counternarcotics, counter-proliferation, humanitarian assistance, and assistance for training and equipping NATO forces. Title 10 statutes also provide authority for DOD to pay the expenses of foreign forces to enable them to participate in exercises, exchanges, and other military-to-military contacts. Post-9/11 DOD security cooperation authorities focus on counterterrorism assistance, and assistance to foreign forces in areas of conflict. Much of this assistance is for ""building partner capacity"" (BPC) to enable foreign forces to take greater responsibility for their own defense and for achieving mutual security goals in order to reduce U.S. costs. As part of the BPC effort, recent legislation provides DOD with authority to help strengthen foreign Ministries of Defense and related defense institutions. (Some of these DOD authorities require the concurrence [i.e., approval] of the Secretary of State.) Post-9/11 innovations include Congress's establishment through NDAA authority of two joint State Department-DOD authorities with a lead role for the Secretary of State: (1) an Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund established in FY2011 and (2) the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), a pilot project established in FY2012 to address emerging threats. In FY2006, Congress created a DOD ""joint formulation"" BPC authority to address emerging counterterrorism threats, with DOD in the lead. To some analysts, the increase of Title 10 authorities and funding to DOD for BPC support to foreign military and other security forces contributes to the perceived ""militarization"" of U.S. foreign policy. For others, the increase of Title 10 authorities emerged from perceived gaps in existing authorities but has resulted in a confusing, inefficient ""patchwork"" of authorities and coordination arrangements that are not sufficient to meet all needs. Issues Covered in This Report Since the late 1940s, Congress has played an active role in shaping the legal and institutional construct for security assistance activities. As Congress continues to consider legislation governing security assistance and cooperation, and to conduct oversight of such programs, some Members may seek new ways to improve program effectiveness and address inefficiencies in planning and implementation. This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to and engagement with foreign military and other security forces, focusing on Department of State and DOD roles. It lays out the historical evolution and current framework of the Department of State-DOD shared responsibility. It concludes with a brief overview of salient issues how to assess effectiveness whether and how to modify or change the statutory and institutional framework how to reconcile institutional roles and available resources how to provide appropriate transparency for oversight. This discussion is relevant to current FY2017 NDAA proposals. S. 2943, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) version of the FY2017 NDAA, contains broad proposals to consolidate many DOD security cooperation authorities under a new Title 10 chapter dedicated to security cooperation authorities, expanding some, and codifying some NDAA statutes. The House-passed version of that Act, H.R. 4909, would also consolidate a number of existing Title 10 and NDAA statutes under a new Title 10 chapter, but it does not expand existing nor propose new authority. The appendixes provide information on the history of the State-DOD shared responsibility, as well as details of selected State Department and DOD security assistance and cooperation statutes. Additional information on the DOD ""Building Partner Capacity"" programs and activities may be found in CRS Report R44313, What Is ""Building Partner Capacity?"" Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kathleen J. McInnis.",21,21 "Legislative Powers of Congress: A Brief Reference Guide. A House rule now requires that committee reports identify the constitutional source of power to enact the reported bill. This report is designed to assist in identification of Congress' legislative powers. It lists legislative powers, sets forth the constitutional text for each power, and provides brief commentary. Powers are grouped in the following broad subject matter categories: power to tax and spend, commercial powers, citizenship, civil rights and voting rights, elections, property and territory, war and related powers, federal-state relations, and checks on other branches. An introductory section is devoted to the scope of congressional powers.",55,55 "Omnibus Energy Legislation, 108th Congress: Comparison of Non-Tax Provisions in the H.R. 6 Conference Report and S. 2095. House and Senate conferees approved an omnibus energy bill (H.R. 6, H.Rept. 108-375) on November 17, 2003, and the House approved the measure the following day (246-180). However on November 21, 2003, a cloture motion to limit Senate debate on the conference report failed (57-40). On February 12, 2004, Senator Domenici introduced a revised version of the bill (S. 2095) with a lower estimated cost and without a controversial provision on the fuel additive MTBE. Major non-tax provisions in the conference measure and S. 2095 include Ethanol. An increase in ethanol production to 3.1 billion gallons annually by 2005 and 5 billion gallons by 2012 would be mandated. However, states could petition for a waiver if the mandate would have severe economic or environmental repercussions, other than loss of revenue to the highway trust fund. MTBE. Methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), a gasoline additive widely used to meet Clean Air Act requirements, has caused water contamination. The conference bill would ban the use of MTBE by 2015 with some possible exceptions, provide funds for MTBE cleanup, and provide protection for fuel producers and blenders of renewable fuels and MTBE from defective product lawsuits. The liability protection was not included in S. 2095. Electricity. In part, the electricity section would repeal the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) and establish mandatory standards for interstate transmission. Standard market design (SMD) would be remanded to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), no rule would be allowed before the end of FY2006. Alaska Gas Pipeline. The bill would provide $18 billion in loan guarantees for construction of a natural gas pipeline from Alaska to Alberta, where it would connect to the existing midwestern pipeline system. Energy Efficiency Standards. New statutory efficiency standards would be established for several consumer and commercial products and appliances. For certain other products and appliances, DOE would be empowered to set new standards. For motor vehicles, funding would be authorized for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to set Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) levels as provided in current law. Energy Production on Federal Lands. Royalty reductions would be provided for marginal oil and gas wells on federal lands and the outer continental shelf. Provisions are also included to increase access by energy projects to federal lands. For a discussion of the tax provisions in the bills, see CRS Issue Brief IB10054, Energy Tax Policy. This report will not be updated.",39,39 "Brief History of the Gold Standard in the United States. The U.S. monetary system is based on paper money backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. The currency is neither valued in, backed by, nor officially convertible into gold or silver. Through much of its history, however, the United States was on a metallic standard of one sort or another. On occasion, there are calls for Congress to return to such a system. Such calls are usually accompanied by claims that gold or silver backing has provided considerable economic benefits in the past. This report briefly reviews the history of the gold standard in the United States. It is intended to clarify the dates during which the standard was used, the type of gold standard in operation at the various times, and the statutory changes used to alter the standard and eventually end it. It is not a discussion of the merits of such a system. The United States began with a bimetallic standard in which the dollar was defined in terms of both gold or silver at weights and fineness such that gold and silver were set in value to each other at a ratio of 15 to 1. Because world markets valued them at a 15¬Ω to 1 ratio, much of the gold left the country and silver was the de facto standard. In 1834, the gold content of the dollar was reduced to make the ratio 16 to 1. As a result, silver left the country and gold became the de facto standard. In addition, gold discoveries drove down the value of gold even more, so that even small silver coins disappeared from circulation. In 1853, the silver content of small coins was reduced below their official face value so that the public could have the coins needed to make change. During the Civil War, the government issued legal tender paper money that was not redeemable in gold or silver, effectively placing the country on a fiat paper system. In 1879, the country was returned to a metallic standard, this time a single one: gold. Throughout the late 19th century, there were efforts to remonetize silver. A quantity of silver money was issued, however, its intrinsic value did not equal the face value of the money, nor was silver freely convertible into money. In 1900, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the gold standard and relegated silver to small denomination money. Throughout the period under which the United States had a metallic standard, paper money was extensively used. A variety of bank notes circulated, even without being legal tender. Various notes issued by the Treasury also circulated without being legal tender. This use of paper money is entirely consistent with a gold standard. Much of the money used under a gold standard is not gold, but promises to pay gold. To help ensure that the paper notes theretofore issued by banks were honored, the government created the national bank system in 1863. In 1913, it created the Federal Reserve System to help ensure that checks were similarly honored. The creation of the Federal Reserve did not end the gold standard. The gold standard ended in 1933 when the federal government halted convertibility of notes into gold and nationalized the private gold stock. The dollar was devalued in terms of its gold content, and made convertible into gold for official international transactions only. Even this quasi-gold standard became difficult to maintain in the 1960s. Over the period 1967-1973, the United States abandoned its commitment to covert dollars into gold in official transactions and stopped trying to maintain its value relative to foreign exchange. Despite several attempts to retain some link to gold, all official links of the dollar to gold were severed in 1976.",100,100 "Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies: FY2015 Appropriations. This report tracks and describes actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2015 appropriations for the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of FY2014 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS. The annual CJS appropriations act provides funding for the Departments of Commerce and Justice, the science agencies, and several related agencies. Appropriations for the Department of Commerce include funding for agencies such as the Census Bureau, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Appropriations for the Department of Justice (DOJ) provide funding for agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshals, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, along with funding for a variety of grant programs for state, local, and tribal governments. Funding for the science agencies goes to the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). The annual appropriation for the related agencies includes funding for agencies such as the Legal Services Corporation and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Over the past 10 fiscal years, appropriations for CJS increased from FY2005 to FY2010, and they have generally declined since. After adjusting for inflation, FY2013 and FY2014 appropriations for CJS were generally at the same level as in FY2005. The peak in CJS appropriations around FY2010 was the result of increased appropriations for the Department of Commerce to support the 2010 decennial census. Since FY2010, total appropriations for CJS have been around $60 billion, with the exception of FY2013 when sequestration cut nearly $4 billion out of the total FY2013 CJS appropriations. While decreased appropriations for the Department of Commerce mostly explain the overall decrease in CJS appropriations since FY2010, there have also been cuts in funding for DOJ and NASA. Recent reductions to NASA's appropriation have brought it more in-line with what the agency received in FY2005. In addition, despite recent cuts to DOJ's appropriation, Congress still appropriated $6.883 billion more for DOJ in FY2014 than it did in FY2005. For FY2014, through P.L. 113-76, Congress appropriated a total of $61.623 billion for CJS, of which $8.181 billion was for the Department of Commerce, $27.737 billion was for the Department of Justice, $24.824 billion was for the science agencies, and $881.8 million was for the related agencies. For FY2015, the Administration requested a total of $62.397 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual CJS bill. The Administration's request included $8.746 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.974 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.721 billion for the science agencies, and $956.1 million for the related agencies. The House-passed CJS bill (H.R. 4660) would have provided $62.559 billion for the CJS departments and agencies. The House-passed bill included $8.231 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.162 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.296 billion for the science agencies, and $870.9 million for the related agencies. On June 5, 2014, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the FY2015 CJS appropriations bill (S. 2437). The bill reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations would have provided a total of $62.636 billion for CJS. The bill included $8.556 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.997 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.161 billion for the science agencies, and $923.0 million for the related agencies. On December 16, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235). The act provides a total of $61.753 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded by the annual CJS appropriations act. The act provides $8.467 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.030 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.360 billion for the science agencies, and $895.9 million for the related agencies. Policy makers considered several issues while debating the FY2015 funding levels for CJS agencies and bureaus, including the following Whether the Census Bureau would receive the funds requested to complete the research and testing necessary for a cost-effective 2020 census design, and to restore 12-month interviewing and the full American Community Survey sample size after a one-month break in data collection that was caused by the October 2013 federal government shutdown. Whether to fund the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) core laboratory and construction accounts at a level consistent with the goal of doubling funding for these and other targeted accounts, as proposed previously by President Obama and adopted implicitly in the America COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69) and the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-358). Whether Congress should have provided the $147.0 million in gun- and school violence-related grant funding under the State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance the Administration requests as a part of its ""Now is the Time"" initiative, which is the Administration's effort to combat gun violence. Whether the Bureau of Prisons has adequate resources to properly manage the growing number of inmates held in federal prisons. Whether the current direction for the U.S. human spaceflight program, established in October 2010 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267), can be implemented successfully in a period of increased budgetary constraint, as well as what the potential impact of human spaceflight's funding needs will be on the availability of funding for other NASA programs, such as science, aeronautics, and education. Whether Congress should have adopted the Administration's proposed government-wide science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education program reorganization and consolidation, including proposed changes at NSF, NASA, and the Department of Commerce.",59,59 "Airport Passenger Screening: Background and Issues for Congress. Over the next several years, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will likely face continuing challenges to address projected growth in passenger airline travel while maintaining and improving upon the efficiency and effectiveness of passenger screening operations. New initiatives to expand the role of TSA personnel beyond screening operations, as well as initiatives to improve screening efficiency and effectiveness through the deployment of new technologies, will likely require additional investment. In addition to annual appropriations of $250 million in FY2008 and FY2009, a portion of the $1 billion identified for aviation security in the stimulus measure (P.L. 111-5) has been designated for acquiring and deploying technologies to screen passengers for explosives. However, policymakers and aviation security planners have not yet agreed upon a well-defined strategy and plan for evolving airline passenger and baggage screening functions to incorporate new technologies, capabilities, and procedures to more effectively and efficiently detect potential threats to aviation security. Ongoing challenges to maintaining and improving upon screening functions include: addressing the potential impacts of projected airline passenger traffic growth on screening operations, optimizing screening efficiency and minimizing passenger wait times, addressing potential airport space constraints for screening checkpoints and equipment, improving the capability to detect explosives at passenger checkpoints, optimizing inline explosives detection systems for checked baggage, developing strategic plans for addressing screening technology and human factors needs, and defining the funding requirements to implement these strategic plans. A number of initiatives related to passenger and baggage screening are currently being evaluated by the TSA. These include tests of new passenger checkpoint layouts and field testing of next-generation checkpoint technologies for detecting explosives, including explosives chemical trace detection devices, whole body imaging systems, and advanced technology (AT) X-ray capabilities.",119,119 "Consideration of the Budget Resolution. Consideration of a concurrent budget resolution is governed by special procedures in the House and Senate. Although the procedures of each chamber differ, they serve generally to expedite consideration of the budget resolution. For more information on the budget process, see http://www.crs.gov/¬øproducts/¬øguides/¬øguidehome.shtml.",101,101 "Current Legal Status of the FCC's Media Ownership Rules. The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) media ownership regulations place limits on the number of broadcast radio and television outlets one owner can possess in a given market and place cross-ownership restrictions on these outlets and on the cross-ownership of broadcast properties and newspapers. The FCC is under a statutory obligation to review these rules every four years to determine whether the restrictions on ownership remain necessary in the public interest as the result of competition. These media ownership regulation reviews have often been controversial. Since the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Commission has had little success in relaxing its media ownership rules. The results of the FCC's 2002 review of the rules was largely invalidated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC and remanded to the FCC for further consideration. The FCC responded by folding the Third Circuit's remand order into its 2006 Quadrennial Review of the Media Ownership Rules. This review sparked its own controversy, as well, and the resulting rule changes have been appealed to the Third Circuit. In conjunction with this appeal, the FCC has commenced its 2010 Quadrennial Review of its Media Ownership Rules. This report will discuss each of these events in greater detail.",109,109 "Class Actions and Proposed Reform in the 107th Congress: Class Action Fairness Act of 2002. This report discusses the Class Action Fairness Act of 2002. The bill reflects a preference for class actions to be adjudicated in federal courts and would enlarge U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over class actions with claims aggregating $2,000,000 or more (even if each of the members of the class had not sustained damages in excess of $75,000 as is now required).",92,94 "High Frequency Trading: Overview of Recent Developments. High-frequency trading (HFT) generally refers to trading in financial instruments, such as securities and derivatives, transacted through supercomputers executing trades within microseconds or milliseconds (or, in the technical jargon, with extremely low latency). There is no universal or legal definition of HFT, however. Neither the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which oversees securities markets, nor the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which regulates most derivatives trading, have specifically defined the term. By most accounts, high frequency trading has grown substantially over the past 10 years: estimates hold that it accounts for roughly 55% of trading volume in U.S. equity markets and about 40% in European equity markets. Likewise, HFT has grown in futures markets—to roughly 80% of foreign exchange futures volume and two-thirds of both interest rate futures and Treasury 10-year futures volumes. The CFTC oversees any HFT, along with other types of trading, in the derivatives markets it regulates. These include futures, swaps and options on commodities, and most financial instruments or indices, such as interest rates. The SEC oversees HFT and other trading in the securities markets and the more limited securities-related derivatives markets which it regulates. In general, traders that employ HFT strategies are attempting to earn small amounts of profit per trade. Broadly speaking, these strategies can be categorized as passive or aggressive strategies. Passive strategies include arbitrage trading—attempts to profit from price differentials for the same stocks or their derivatives traded on different trading venues, and passive market making, in which profits are generated by spreads between bid and ask prices. Aggressive strategies include those known as order anticipation or momentum ignition strategies. Various observers, including SEC staff, have said that these aggressive strategies should be a central focus of public policy concerns. This may be because such strategies can share some similarities to practices such as front-running and spoofing, which are generally illegal. In addition, regulators have expressed concern over whether certain aggressive HFT strategies may be associated with increased market fragility and volatility, such as that demonstrated in the ""Flash Crash"" of May 6, 2010, the October 15, 2014, extreme volatility in Treasury markets, and the August 24, 2015, market crash in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by more than 1,000 points in early trading. The SEC and CFTC have taken recent steps to bring some HFT under closer scrutiny, both through recent regulatory proposals and enforcement actions. The SEC has proposed requiring certain HFT broker-dealers to register with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which oversees broker-dealers. In January 2016, the SEC announced settlements with Barclays and Credit Suisse totaling more than $150 million, over allegations that Barclays had misled its investors on HFT practices permitted on its private trading platforms known as dark pools, and that Credit Suisse failed to operate its trading systems as advertised. The CFTC has cracked down on spoofing, using the anti-spoofing authority granted in the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) in a number of recent enforcement actions involving algorithmic trading. On November 24, 2015, the CFTC released a proposed rule, Regulation Automated Trading (Reg AT), governing certain HFT practices. The purpose of Reg AT broadly is to update the CFTC's rules on trading practices in response to the evolution from pit trading to electronic trading. Reg AT mandates risk controls for the exchanges, large financial firms called ""clearing members"" of the exchanges, and firms that trade heavily on the exchanges for their own accounts. The rule also proposes requiring the registration of proprietary traders engaging in algorithmic trading on regulated exchanges through what is called ""direct electronic access."" Although no legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress directly impacting the regulation or oversight of HFT, several bills have been introduced imposing a tax on a broad array of financial transactions that could impact HFT. These bills include S. 1371, S. 1373, and H.R. 1464. Congress has also held hearings in the 114th Congress touching on HFT issues as part of its oversight of the SEC and CFTC. This report provides background on various HFT strategies and some associated policy issues, recent regulatory developments and selected enforcement actions by the SEC and CFTC on HFT, and congressional action such as proposed legislation and hearings related to HFT.",12,12 "Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012. Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and the Latin American and Caribbean region, with diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political and security concerns. U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration has focused on four priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity, ensuring citizen security, strengthening effective democratic institutions, and securing a clean energy future. There has been substantial continuity in U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration, which has pursued some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has made several significant policy changes, including an overall emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility. U.S. policy toward the region must also contend with a Latin America that is becoming increasingly independent from the United States. Strong economic growth has increased Latin America's confidence in its ability to solve its own problems. The region has also diversified its economic and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region. Over the past few years, several Latin American regional organization organizations have been established that do not include the United States. Congress plays an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Legislative and oversight attention to the region during the 112th Congress focused on the continued increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico and U.S. assistance to Mexico under the Mérida Initiative, efforts to help Central American and Caribbean countries contend with drug trafficking and violent crime, as well as continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia. The January 2010 earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince, Haiti, continued to focus congressional attention on the enormous task of disaster recovery and reconstruction. As in past years, U.S. sanctions on Cuba, particularly restrictions on travel and remittances, remained a contentious issue in the debate over how to support change in one of the world's last remaining communist nations. Another area of congressional oversight was the deterioration of democracy in several Latin American countries, especially Nicaragua and Venezuela. Congressional concern also increased about Iran's growing relations in the region, especially with Venezuela, and about the activities of Hezbollah. This report provides an overview of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in 2012, including the Obama Administration's priorities for U.S. policy and a brief comparison of policies under the Obama and Bush Administrations. It then examines congressional interest in Latin America, first providing an overview, and then looking at selected countries and regional issues and key policy issues faced by Congress in 2012. The final section of the report analyzes several key events in the region that took place in 2012: the Pope's trip to Cuba in March, the sixth Summit of the Americas in April, Mexico's elections in July, and Venezuela's upcoming elections in October. An appendix provides a listing of hearings in the 112th Congress focused on Latin America. For additional information and access to over 30 CRS reports on the region, see the CRS Issues in Focus webpage on ""Latin America and the Caribbean.""",85,85 """Hatch Act"" and Other Restrictions in Federal Law on Political Activities of Government Employees. Most federal officers and employees are now generally free to engage in a broad range of partisan political activities on their own ""free time"" or ""off-duty"" hours. The provisions of the ""Hatch Act Amendments of 1993"" removed most of the restrictions on voluntary, free-time activities by federal employees in the executive branch of Government for or on behalf of partisan candidates or political parties, while providing more express prohibitions regarding on-the-job politics in federal offices. Employees in the executive branch of the Federal Government are, however, still restricted by the Hatch Act"" provisions in several specific activities. All officers and employees in the executive branch, other than the President and Vice President, are still generally restricted in the following ways (1) They may not use their ""official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election. (2) They are generally restricted from soliciting, accepting or receiving political campaign contributions from any person. (3) They may not run for elective office in most ""partisan"" elections. (4) They are prohibited from soliciting or discouraging participation in any political activities by a person who has an application for a grant, contract or other funds pending before their agencies, or is the subject of an ongoing audit or investigation by their agencies. (5) They are generally prohibited from engaging in partisan campaign activity on federal property, on official duty time, while wearing a uniform or insignia identifying them as federal officials or employees, or while using a government vehicle. Certain federal employees in specified executive agencies, generally those dealing with law enforcement or national security, are still subject to more restrictive provisions, similar to the old Hatch Act, which broadly bar such employees from taking an active part in partisan political activities even on their own, off-duty hours. The Hatch Act statute applies only to civilian officers and employees of the executive branch of the Federal Government. Members of the uniformed services are subject to the military's own restrictions issued as a Department of Defense Directive No. 1344.10. Employees of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government do not come within the restrictions of the Hatch Act, although some other provisions of federal law, such as the criminal restrictions on campaign contributions and solicitations, generally apply to all federal officers and employees. Rules and rulings governing congressional employees are discussed in another C.R.S. Report, No. 96-184, ""Campaign Activities by Congressional Employees. State or local governmental employees whose principal employment ""is in connection with an activity which is financed in whole or in part"" by federal funds, come within a particular part of the Hatch Act."" Such State and local employees are prohibited from running for office in a partisan election, using their official authority to influence an election, or attempting to coerce a state or local employee to make a political contribution.",61,61 "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends. The United States has long recognized the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and missiles. This report, which analyzes NBC weapons programs potential threat patterns around the globe, is updated as needed. The total number of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the world is shrinking as the major powers scale back their inventories through unilateral reductions and arms control, but other countries and groups still try to acquire these weapons. There are five established nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). India and Pakistan declared their nuclear weapons capability with nuclear tests in 1998, as did North Korea in 2006. Israel is also widely believed to have a nuclear weapon arsenal. About a dozen countries have offensive biological weapons (BW) programs, and the same number have chemical weapons (CW) programs. That number could grow, as new technologies are developed and the international flow of information, goods, expertise, and technology continues. While the United States and Russia eliminated intermediate-range missiles and are reducing their intercontinental missile inventories, China is modernizing and expanding its missile force. North Korea, Iran, Israel, India, and Pakistan are building short- and medium-range missiles and are developing longer-range missiles. Dozens of countries have or are developing short-range ballistic missiles and more are likely to buy them. Over 80 countries have cruise missiles, about 40 manufacture or have the ability to manufacture them. And terrorists continue their efforts to acquire NBC capabilities. Elements in North Korea, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and other countries continue to export weapons technology. The potential for secondary proliferation markets has grown, and concern about the ability of individual actors like the Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, to peddle nuclear technology has grown considerably. The number of countries or groups that will acquire or produce NBC weapons may decrease if diplomacy, arms control treaties, nonproliferation regimes, and security and assistance strategies are effective. NBC weapons and missiles will remain a potential threat for the foreseeable future, but most observers readily agree that, even if nonproliferation policies alone are insufficient to halt NBC programs, such measures can slow those programs until states are persuaded that NBC weapons are not in their national security interest.",22,29 "Air Force Next-Generation Bomber: Background and Issues for Congress. As part of its proposed FY2010 defense budget, the Administration proposed deferring the start of a program to develop a next-generation bomber (NGB) for the Air Force, pending the completion of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and associated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and in light of strategic arms control negotiations with Russia. The Administration's proposed FY2010 budget requested no funding specifically identified in public budget documents as being for an NGB program. Prior to the submission of the FY2010 budget, the Air Force was conducting research and development work aimed at fielding a next-generation bomber by 2018. Although the proposed FY2010 defense budget proposed deferring the start of an NGB program, the Secretary of Defense and Air Force officials in 2009 have expressed support for the need to eventually start such a program. The Air Force's FY2010 unfunded requirements list (URL)—a list of programs desired by the Air Force but not funded in the Air Force's proposed FY2010 budget—includes a classified $140-million item that some press accounts have identified as being for continued work on a next-generation bomber. FY2010 defense authorization bill: The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) authorizes no FY2010 funding in the Air Force research and development line item (PE0604015F) that is explicitly identified in public budget documents as being for a next-generation bomber. The conference report authorizes $182 million in additional funding in the Air Force research and development account for a line item identified as ""Other Programs,"" but it is not clear whether any of this funding is related to a next-generation bomber. Section 255 of the act makes a series of findings regarding long-range strike capability and bombers, and makes it U.S. policy to support a development program for next-generation bomber aircraft technologies. FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. 3326. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118. The explanatory statement appropriates no FY2010 funding in the Air Force research and development line item (PE0604015F) that is explicitly identified in public budget documents as being for a next-generation bomber. Classified AIR Force R&D programs are increased by $24.1 million overall, with one unidentified classified program receiving an increase of $160.0 million.",31,32 "U.S. Army's Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress. In what the Army describes as the ""most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years,"" it is redesigning its current active duty division force to a 48 brigade combat team (BCT) force. The Army National Guard and Army Reserves will also redesign their forces in a similar fashion. The planned addition of active duty brigades and the conversion of Army National Guard brigades could provide a larger force pool of deployable combat units to ease the burden on units presently deployed, and possibly to shorten the length of time that units are deployed on operations. The Army has three other concurrent initiatives underway that it considers inextricably linked to its brigade-centric redesign: rebalancing to create new ""high demand"" units, stabilizing the force to foster unit cohesion and enhance predictability for soldiers and their families, and cyclical readiness to better manage resources and to ensure a ready force for operations. These initiatives involve substantial cultural, policy, organizational, and personnel changes. Some experts believe that modular redesign, selective rebalancing, stabilizing, and cyclical readiness are prudent actions that should provide the Army with additional deployable units and also eventually bring stability to soldiers and their families. As long as no additional significant long term troop commitments arise, many feel that these initiatives could help ease the stress on both the active and reserve forces. As the Army continues its modular conversion, it may have to contend with budget, personnel, and equipment shortages which could impede plans to build this new force as intended. Some also question if the Army can afford both its Future Combat System (FCS) program and its modularity program. The 110th Congress might decide to examine these and other concerns in greater detail. This report will be updated.",32,30 "Federal Conspiracy Law: A Sketch. Zacarias Moussaoui, members of the Colombian drug cartels, members of organized crime, and some of the former Enron executives have at least one thing in common: they all have federal conspiracy convictions. The essence of conspiracy is an agreement of two or more persons to engage in some form of prohibited conduct. The crime is complete upon agreement, although some statutes require prosecutors to show that at least one of the conspirators has taken some concrete step or committed some overt act in furtherance of the scheme. There are dozens of federal conspiracy statutes. One, 18 U.S.C. 371, outlaws conspiracy to commit some other federal crime. The others outlaw conspiracy to engage in various specific forms of proscribed conduct. General Section 371 conspiracies are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, drug trafficking, terrorist, and racketeering conspiracies all carry the same penalties as their underlying substantive offenses, and thus are punished more severely than are Section 371 conspiracies. All are subject to fines of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations), most may serve as the basis for a restitution order, and some for a forfeiture order. The law makes several exceptions for conspiracy because of its unusual nature. Because many united in crime pose a greater danger than the isolated offender, conspirators may be punished for the conspiracy, any completed substantive offense which is the object of the plot, and any foreseeable other offenses which one of the conspirators commits in furtherance of the scheme. Since conspiracy is an omnipresent crime, it may be prosecuted wherever an overt act is committed in its furtherance. Because conspiracy is a continuing crime, its statute of limitations does not begin to run until the last overt act committed for its benefit. Since conspiracy is a separate crime, it may be prosecuted following conviction for the underlying substantive offense, without offending constitutional double jeopardy principles, because conspiracy is a continuing offense, it may be punished when it straddles enactment of the prohibiting statute, without offending constitutional ex post facto principles. Accused conspirators are likely to be tried together, and the statements of one may often be admitted in evidence against all. In some respects, conspiracy is similar to attempt, to solicitation, and to aiding and abetting. Unlike aiding and abetting, however, it does not require commission of the underlying offense. Unlike attempt and solicitation, conspiracy does not merge with the substantive offense, a conspirator may be punished for both. This is an abridged version of a longer report, without the footnotes and citations to authority found there, CRS Report R41223, Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview, by Charles Doyle.",94,98 "Internet Firearm Sales. With the increasing utilization of the internet to facilitate commercial transactions, concerns have arisen regarding the use of this medium to transfer firearms. This report discusses the sale of firearms over the internet, with a focus on the extent to which federal law regulates such activity. A review of the relevant factors indicates that while firearms transferred in an illegal manner via the internet may pose special investigatory problems for law enforcement, internet firearm sales are subject to the same regulatory scheme as traditional firearm transactions.",97,97 "Bank and Thrift Deposit Insurance Premiums: The Record from 1934-2004. Since federal deposit insurance first came into being in the mid-1930s, commercial banks and savings associations (thrifts) have paid premiums into government insurance reserves to cover losses due to financial institution failures. Banks and thrifts have come to offer similar services and the government has standardized insurance premiums for the two institutions to reflect their competition. Deposit insurance premiums have been the subject of legislation several times over recent years including measures passed by the House. Most banks and thrifts pay essentially no premiums, but the potential for future assessments continues to drive ""reform"" legislation. This report provides the rationale and amounts of assessments since federal deposit insurance began and will be updated annually.",5,5 "The International Monetary Fund: An Overview of Its Mission and Operations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the institution designed to support global trade and economic growth by helping maintain stability in the international financial system. Originally created to finance short-term balance of payments deficits during the Bretton Woods era of gold/dollar fixed exchange rates (1944-1971), in the current world where flexible exchange rates dominate in the industrial economies, it has focused on developing countries where ever larger financial crises have erupted. As part of the periodic IMF quota review process, the U.S. Congress in October 1998 appropriated funds to increase the IMF quota at a time when many challenged the IMF's abilities to help resolve these financial crises. Congress attached a number of conditions including a call for major reevaluation of the IMF. This report supports congressional interest in the IMF by providing a basic understanding of its mission and operations, and how they may have evolved. The permanent assets of the IMF used for lending ($283 billion) are provided by the member countries, which join the Fund by making a capital subscription (quota) and agreeing to abide by rules of the charter. The quota also determines a country's voting power and borrowing capacity. The IMF also maintains two borrowing arrangements with selected member countries for times when the Fund may not be sufficiently liquid to meet all borrowing needs. The General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) is a $23 billion credit line established with 11 industrialized countries in 1962. The New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) was established following the 1994-95 Mexican peso crisis as a supplemental line of credit with 25 member countries, adding another $23 billion of borrowing authority. The IMF provides hard currencies to member countries with balance of payments problems based on need, willingness to adjust economic policies, and ability to repay. Under the general resources account there are three types of financing facilities: 1) stand-by arrangements, 2) extended arrangements (these two constitute most IMF assistance), and 3) special facilities. Two programs created since December 1997, the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) and the Contingent Credit Line (CCL), amount to special access policies and limits to stand-by and extended arrangements under extenuating circumstances. As part of the IMF's evolving sense of mission, it has developed lending facilities to address the needs of the poorest developing countries: the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) -- renamed in November 1999 from the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Many view events in the 1990s as evidence of the IMF's limitations to predict and ameliorate financial panics. The central question remains, what role should or can the IMF play in reducing instability in an increasingly liberalized and, at times, volatile international financial system. The debate has at least two key focal points: 1) rethinking what should be expected from national policies and institutions, particularly financial market regulation and oversight in developing countries, to help reduce the frequency and extremity of financial panics, and 2) rethinking how the IMF should operate in numerous functional areas.",82,82 "Child Custody and Support: Frequently Asked Questions. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has little direct authority to legislate in the field of domestic relations. Generally, state policy guides these decisions. Despite the lack of direct authority to legislate domestic relations issues, Congress continues to enact federal laws that indirectly affect family law questions concerning child custody and support. This report answers questions frequently asked regarding the interplay between federal and state laws governing these areas.",95,95 "Definition of Income for Certain Medicaid Provisions and Premium Credits in ACA. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended), the definition of income for eligibility for certain Medicaid populations and premium credits in the exchanges is based on modified adjusted gross income (MAGI). The initial intent of using MAGI was to standardize the definition of income for Medicaid eligibility purposes to reduce some of the variability and complexity that exists under the current program and to provide consistency between Medicaid and the health insurance exchange. The use of MAGI, however, raised some concerns among Congress and the Obama Administration, as the definition in ACA excluded some types of income either partially or altogether. Of particular interest was the potential impact on eligibility for Medicaid and premium credits for early retirees (aged 62 through 64) receiving Social Security benefits, as some or all of their Social Security income may have been excluded from the MAGI definition of income. By excluding some types of income from the ACA definition, individuals and families with a higher percentage of total income relative to the federal poverty level may qualify for Medicaid and premium credits. To address these concerns, P.L. 112-56 was enacted into law on November 21, 2011, which among other things, amended the definition of income for these programs and included non-taxable Social Security in the definition of MAGI. The new law, however, does not address other forms of non-taxable income that are not currently in the MAGI definition (e.g., retirement plan contributions, gifts and inheritance). In evaluating the definition of MAGI, a number of issues might be considered. First, an alternative definition may add complexity compared with the use of MAGI. Specifically, because adjusted gross income (on which MAGI is based) can be computed largely from information on an individual's federal tax return, verification of income is streamlined. If an alternative definition is used that is not based on tax return information, the administrative complexity of verifying nontaxable income from different sources comes into play. Second, the definition was developed to ensure coordination between Medicaid and premium credits in the health insurance exchange. A change in the definition of income for Medicaid also would be necessary for premium credits to ensure consistency between Medicaid and the premium credit offered to selected individuals who purchase private health insurance through the exchanges. Finally, the enactment of P.L. 112-56 focused largely on the inclusion of Social Security benefits in income definitions for eligibility purposes. However, most other low-income programs include other types of income (e.g., nontaxable pensions) and asset holdings that are also excluded from MAGI.",70,70 "The Internet and the USA PATRIOT Act: Potential Implications for Electronic Privacy, Security, Commerce, and Government. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks prompted congressional action on many fronts including passage of the United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, P.L. 107-56. The Act is broadly scoped and some of its provisions may affect Internet usage, computer security, and critical infrastructure protection. In the area of computer security, the Act creates a definition of ""computer trespasser"" and makes such activities a terrorist act in certain circumstances. The Act enables law enforcement officials to intercept the communications of computer trespassers and improves their ability to track computer trespasser activities. It also codifies some elements of U.S. critical infrastructure policy articulated by both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations to ensure that any disruptions to the nation's critical infrastructures are minimally detrimental. Although the Act does not explicitly address electronic commerce (e-commerce), many of the law's provisions may impact it. In particular, Title III responds to concerns that more can be done to prevent, detect, and prosecute international money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Over time, these provisions may affect e-commerce broadly, and electronic fund transfers specifically. Electronic government (e-government) could be affected by the Act in both positive and negative ways. The intense focus on improving data collection and information sharing practices and systems may contribute to the establishment of government-wide technical standards and best practices that could facilitate the implementation of new and existing e-government initiatives. It could also promote the utilization of secure Web portals to help ensure the data integrity of transactions between the government and citizens and business. However, concern about potential abuses of data collection provisions could dampen citizen enthusiasm for carrying out electronic transactions with the government. The Act provides law enforcement officials with greater authority to monitor Internet activity such as electronic mail (e-mail) and Web site visits. While law enforcement officials laud their new authorities as enabling them to better track terrorist and other criminal activity, privacy rights advocates worry that, in an attempt to track down and punish the terrorists who threaten American democracy, one of the fundamental tenets of that democracy--privacy--may itself be threatened. Because of the controversial aspects of some provisions in the Act, particularly regarding privacy, Congress and other groups are expected to monitor closely how the Act is implemented.",19,110 "Ex-Im Bank's General Statutory Authority Expires. This report discusses the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank), a wholly owned federal government corporation which seeks to provide direct loans, loan guarantees, and export credit insurance to: (1) support exports that the private sector is unwilling or unable to finance alone at commercially viable terms, and/or (2) counter government-backed financing offered by foreign countries through their export credit agency (ECA).",49,49 "Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Overview of Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal. On February 21, 2006, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV), a case addressing the use of an hallucinogenic tea in the context of religious ceremonies conducted by a religious sect in New Mexico. In its decision, the Court determined that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the federal government could not prohibit the sect's use of the tea absent a compelling government interest in doing so, and that the federal government had failed to establish a compelling interest. This report provides an overview of RFRA and the O Centro Espirita case.",15,15 "Overview of the Appeal Process for Veterans' Claims. Congress, through the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), provides a variety of benefits and services to veterans and to certain members of their families. These benefits include disability compensation and pensions, education benefits, survivor benefits, medical treatment, life insurance, vocational rehabilitation, and burial and memorial benefits. In order to receive these benefits, a veteran (or an eligible family member) must apply for them by submitting the necessary information to a local VA office. The local VA office will make an initial determination on the application for benefits. Any veteran who is not satisfied with the local VA's determination is permitted to appeal the decision. This report provides a step-by-step breakdown of the appeal process for veterans' claims. When making an appeal on an initial determination, the claimant may choose to proceed with the traditional review process or may choose to have a Decision Review Officer (DRO) at the local VA office review the case. In the event the veteran opts for a DRO review and is not satisfied with the result, the claimant may still avail himself/herself of the traditional process and appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA). The local VA office will prepare the claim file for the appeal and provide the claimant with a blank VA Form 9—a form that must be completed to make an appeal to the BVA. Claimants must follow specific procedures to request the appeal and must meet certain deadlines for submitting the proper information. The claimant may choose to have a hearing with the BVA during the appeal process. There are three different types of hearings that the claimant may choose (1) an in-person hearing with a BVA member, held in Washington, DC, (2) an in-person hearing with a BVA member, held at a local VA office, or (3) a teleconference hearing. The hearings with the BVA are informal and nonadversarial in nature. The claimant will be given the opportunity to explain the reasons for the appeal and to submit additional evidence during the hearing. The claimant may be represented during the appeal process. After the BVA reaches a decision on the appeal, there are further options the claimant may pursue if he or she is still not satisfied with the BVA decision. A claimant may file a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC). The CAVC, an Article I court, has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the BVA. A claimant must submit a notice of appeal within 120 days of receiving the decision from the BVA. However, the Supreme Court in Henderson v. Shinseki clarified that the 120-day deadline is not a ""jurisdictional"" deadline. Therefore, an appeal to the CAVC will not necessarily be dismissed for missing the deadline. However, the claimant must have a good reason for filing late, such as an inability to meet the deadline due to mental incapacity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from a CAVC decision. The Federal Circuit provides the last appeal of right during the appeal process. If either party is dissatisfied with the ruling from the Federal Circuit, an appeal may be made to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court does not have to hear the case and may deny certiorari. If the Supreme Court decides to hear the case, any decision reached by the Court is final.",30,30 "Bitcoin: Questions, Answers, and Analysis of Legal Issues. Bitcoin first appeared in January 2009, the creation of a computer programmer using the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. His invention is an open-source (its controlling computer code is open to public view), peer-to-peer (transactions do not require a third-party intermediary such as PayPal or Visa) digital currency (being electronic with no physical manifestation). The Bitcoin system is private, with no traditional financial institutions involved in transactions. Unlike earlier digital currencies that had some central controlling person or entity, the Bitcoin network is completely decentralized, with all parts of transactions performed by the users of the system. With a Bitcoin transaction there is no third-party intermediary. The buyer and seller interact directly (peer to peer), but their identities are encrypted and no personal information is transferred from one to the other. However, unlike a fully anonymous transaction, there is a transaction record. A full transaction record of every Bitcoin and every Bitcoin user's encrypted identity is maintained on the public ledger. For this reason, Bitcoin transactions are thought to be pseudonymous, not anonymous. Although the scale of Bitcoin use has increased substantially, it still remains small in comparison to traditional electronic payments systems, such as credit cards, and the use of dollars as a circulating currency. Congress is interested in Bitcoin because of concerns about its use in illegal money transfers, concerns about its effect on the ability of the Federal Reserve to meet its objectives (of stable prices, maximum employment, and financial stability), and concerns about the protection of consumers and investors who might use Bitcoin. Bitcoin offers users the advantages of lower transaction costs, increased privacy, and long-term protection of loss of purchasing power from inflation. However, it also has a number of disadvantages that could hinder wider use. These include sizable volatility of the price of Bitcoins, uncertain security from theft and fraud, and a long-term deflationary bias that encourages the hoarding of Bitcoins. In addition, Bitcoin raises a number of legal and regulatory concerns, including its potential for facilitating money laundering, its treatment under federal securities law, and its status in the regulation of foreign exchange trading.",110,82 "Pass-Throughs, Corporations, and Small Businesses: A Look at Firm Size. In tax policy discussions it is not uncommon for the terms pass-through and small business to be interchanged, or, similarly, for the terms corporation and large business to be interchanged. This report uses 2015 U.S. Census data to investigate how the size of businesses varies by legal form (corporate versus pass-through). For this report, firm size is based on employment. The analysis finds that the majority of both corporations and pass-throughs in 2015 had fewer than five employees (55% of C corporations and 64% of pass-throughs). Nearly 99% of both corporations and pass-throughs had fewer than 500 employees, the most common employment-based threshold used by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Thus, when using an employment-based measure of size, the majority of all businesses can be considered small, with the exact share depending on the chosen definition of small. Analysis of the data also reveals that while the majority of firms were small, the largest firms accounted for the majority of employment. About 53% of all employees worked at firms (corporate and pass-through) with 500 or more employees in 2015. Looking at this statistic separately for corporations and pass-throughs, 76% of corporate employees worked at firms with more than 500 employees, while 25% of pass-through employees worked at firms with more than 500 employees. Thus, while a greater proportion of workers in the corporate sector were employed by the largest firms, the proportion of pass-through employees employed at the largest firms was not small. The average number of employees at large firms (more than 500 employees) was computed to gain insight into how large the largest firms were in 2015. There was a substantial difference in the average number of employees at large firms that were corporations as opposed to pass-throughs. The average number of employees at the largest C corporations (500 or more employees) was 4,143, while the average number of employees for pass-throughs was 1,141. Among large pass-throughs, partnerships tended to have the most employees on average with 1,203, S-corporations fall in the middle with 1,102 employees on average, and sole proprietorships have the fewest with 1,086 employees on average. Understanding the data presented in this report may help policymakers when considering tax and nontax policies. Specifically, it may help to better target policies that are geared toward affecting businesses of a particular size.",10,10 "Iraq: Oil and Gas Sector, Revenue Sharing, and U.S. Policy. Development in Iraq's oil and natural gas sector is proceeding, amid ongoing debates. Iraqis differ strongly on a number of key issues, including the proper role and powers of federal and regional authorities in regulating oil and gas development, the terms and extent of potential foreign participation in the oil and gas sectors, and proposed formulas and mechanisms for equitably sharing oil and gas revenue. Concurrent, related discussions about the administrative status of the city of Kirkuk and proposed amendments to articles of Iraq's constitution that outline federal and regional oil and gas rights also are highly contentious. Both the Bush Administration and the 110th Congress considered the passage of oil and gas sector framework and revenue-sharing legislation as important benchmarks that would indicate the Iraqi government's commitment to promoting political reconciliation and providing a solid foundation for long-term economic development in Iraq. Obama Administration officials and some Members of the 111th Congress have expressed similar views. In the absence of new comprehensive legislation to manage the energy sector and distribute energy export revenues, interim revenue-sharing mechanisms have been implemented, while both the national government and the Kurdistan Regional Government have signed oil and natural gas contracts with foreign firms. The central importance of oil and gas revenue for the Iraqi economy is widely recognized by Iraqis, and most groups accept the need to create new legal and policy guidelines for the development of the country's oil and natural gas resources. However, Iraq's current Council of Representatives (parliament) did not take action to consider proposed energy sector reform legislation because of broader political disputes. Observers and U.S. officials remain focused on the outcome of the March 2010 Iraqi national election as an indicator of future trends. In January 2010, the Council of Representatives adopted Iraq's 2010 budget, which includes a deficit of more than $19 billion because of increased spending and stagnant oil production and export levels in Iraq. The budget also includes a controversial revenue distribution mechanism that will reward specific energy resource producing governorates. Iraq has secured a $3.6 billion stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a total of $500 million in loans from the World Bank to cover a portion of the expected 2010 deficit, as U.S. officials continue to warn that reduced revenues and spending may jeopardize Iraqi investments in infrastructure and security forces needed to fully stabilize the country. The military strategy employed by U.S. forces in Iraq has sought to create a secure environment in which Iraqis can resolve core political differences as a means of ensuring national stability and security. However, it remains to be seen whether proposed oil and gas legislation and ongoing interim efforts to develop Iraq's energy resources will promote reconciliation or contribute to deeper political tension. U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress thus face difficult choices with regard to engaging Iraqis on various policy proposals, related constitutional reforms, and oil and natural gas development contracts, while encouraging Iraqi counterparts to ensure that the content of proposed laws, amendments, and contracts reflects acceptable political compromises. This report reviews policy proposals and interim contracts, analyzes the positions of various Iraqi political actors, and discusses potential implications for U.S. foreign policy goals in Iraq. See also CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.",85,85 "Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping. On December 2, 2004, NATO formally concluded its Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and handed over peace stabilization duties to a European Union force (EUFOR). The mission of the EU's Operation Althea has been to ensure continued compliance with the 1995 Dayton peace agreement and contribute to a secure environment and Bosnia's efforts towards European integration. In 2007, the EU carried out a reconfiguration of EUFOR that reduced its strength from 6,500 to around 2,500 troops. NATO retains a small headquarters presence in Sarajevo to provide advice on defense reforms and to support counterterrorism efforts and the apprehension of wanted war crimes suspects believed to be hiding in or transiting through Bosnia. In November 2007, the U.N. Security Council extended the EU and NATO mandates in Bosnia for another year. This report will no longer be updated. See also CRS Report RS22324, Bosnia: Overview of Current Issues, by Julie Kim.",87,21 "Functional Categories of the Federal Budget. This report presents a list of the 20 functional categories currently included in the federal budget, as well as the sub-functions.",101,101 "Clean Water Act: 110th Congress Legislation on Discharges from Recreational Boats. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to develop a regulatory response to a 2006 federal court ruling that vacated a long-standing EPA rule. That rule had exempted discharges associated with the normal operation of vessels from permit requirements of the Clean Water Act. Concern that this ruling could require millions of recreational boaters to obtain permits led to the introduction of legislation in the 110th Congress to exempt these and other types of vessels from water quality regulation. This report discusses background to the issue and bills introduced in the 110th Congress in response, two of which were passed by Congress in July 2008 (S. 2766 and S. 3298). The enacted measures exempted recreational vessels from permit requirements (P.L. 110-288) and delayed permit requirements for many other but not all vessels (P.L. 110-299). EPA finalized a permit for the remaining vessels on December 18, 2008.",41,44 "Telehealth and Telemedicine: Description and Issues. Telehealth is the use of electronic information and telecommunications technologies to support remote clinical health care, patient and professional health-related education, public health, and other health care delivery functions. A narrower concept, telemedicine, refers to clinical services that are provided remotely via telecommunications technologies. Some sources use the two terms interchangeably, and there is no consensus among federal programs and among health care providers on the definition of either term. Federal involvement in telehealth is varied. As of 2014, more than 20 federal agencies were engaged in some aspect of telehealth. For example, in FY2015, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was the largest telehealth provider in the federal government, providing 2.1 million telehealth consultations to some 677,000 veterans. In contrast, the Medicare (Part B) program, covering more than 52 million beneficiaries, the number of telehealth visits increased fivefold from 38,000 telehealth consultations (or visits) in 2009 to 192,692 in 2015. The VA, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Institute of Medicine, and other stakeholders have identified barriers associated with the use of telehealth, notably that some telehealth modalities have a stronger evidence base than others. Furthermore, according to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), key issues requiring additional research are the impact of telehealth on individual and population health, and on moving away from traditional fee structures toward rewarding clinicians for value versus volume of care. Telehealth has been an active legislative issue thus far in the 114th Congress. For example, in February 2016, bipartisan legislation was introduced to expand telehealth reimbursement for remote patient monitoring under the Medicare program. In December 2015, the Senate Committee on Finance published options for expanding telehealth utilization for Medicare beneficiaries with chronic conditions. H.R. 6, the 21st Century Cures Act (as passed by the House), would require CMS and the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission to submit programmatic information to Congress on telehealth. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA, P.L. 114-10) includes a provision that encourages the use of telehealth as an element in the new Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and requires the Government Accountability Office to study telehealth and its use under the Medicare program. This report identifies telehealth activities at select federal agencies along with an assessment of the evidence regarding the potential impact of telehealth on health care access, cost, and quality.",65,65 "Federal Tort Reform Legislation: Constitutionality and Summaries of Selected Statutes. This report considers the constitutionality of federal tort reform legislation, such as the products liability and medical malpractice reform proposals that have been introduced for the last several Congresses. Tort law at present is almost exclusively state law rather than federal law, although, as noted in the appendix to this report, Congress has enacted a number of tort reform statutes. Part I of this report concludes that Congress has the authority to enact tort reform legislation generally, under its power to regulate interstate commerce, and to make such legislation applicable to intrastate torts, because tort suits generally affect interstate commerce. However, it may be unconstitutional for tort reform legislation to be applied to particular intrastate torts that do not substantially affect interstate commerce. In concluding that Congress has the authority to enact tort reform ""generally,"" we refer to reforms that have been widely implemented at the state level, such as caps on damages and limitations on joint and several liability and on the collateral source rule. More specialized types of reforms are not necessarily immune from constitutional challenge. For example, some state courts have struck down statutes that provide that a portion of punitive damages awards must be paid to state funds (although other state courts have upheld such statutes). Part I also concludes that there would appear to be no due process or federalism (or any other constitutional) impediments to Congress's limiting a state common law right of recovery. The only exception concerns requiring alternative dispute resolution that limits the right to a jury trial. Part II considers alternative dispute resolution alternatives, some of which could have constitutional problems. The Seventh Amendment would preclude Congress from eliminating the right to a jury trial in common law tort actions brought in federal court. Congress may, however, eliminate the right to bring common law tort actions in federal court, or eliminate common law tort actions themselves. Congress apparently may create Article I tribunals, such as arbitration panels, to hear tort claims, if it alters tort claims so that they are no longer traditional common law actions (but rather are like no-fault workers' compensation claims), or if it allows de novo review by an Article III court, with the right to a jury trial, of traditional common law tort actions (rather than allow merely traditional appellate review). It apparently may also opt for a middle ground by altering the common law cause of action somewhat but not wholly, and by providing for something less than de novo review by an Article III court, provided that the Article III court is not required to be too deferential to the findings of the Article I tribunal. Finally, a strong argument may be made that Congress has the power to eliminate jury trials in tort actions brought in state court, but this is uncertain.",94,94 "Fish and Wildlife Service: FY2012 Appropriations and Policy. The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriation funds agencies and programs in three federal departments, as well as numerous related agencies and bureaus. Among the agencies represented is the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior. Many of its programs are among the more controversial of those funded in the bill. For FY2012, the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74, Division E, H.Rept. 112-331) provided $1.48 billion for FWS, down 2% from the FY2011 level of $1.50 billion. (This measure also provided appropriations for most federal government operations for the remainder of FY2012.) For FWS, most accounts were reduced to some degree relative to the FY2011 level. This report analyzes the FWS funding levels contained in the FY2012 appropriations bill. Emphasis is on FWS funding for programs that have generated congressional debate or particular constituent interest, now or in recent years. Several controversies arose during the appropriations cycle over funding levels or restrictions on funding The Administration proposed limitations on funds that could be used to respond to petitions to list new species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), arguing that petitions diverted the agency from listing species with higher conservation priority, others argued that without petitions FWS would list fewer species. The Administration also proposed to limit spending on listing foreign species. Both limits were accepted. The House bill proposed to limit judicial review of FWS decisions concerning the delisting of gray wolves under ESA. This provision was eliminated from the final bill. The Administration proposed cutbacks in funding for certain fish hatcheries involved in mitigation of the effects of federal water projects. FWS argued that the mitigation burden belonged on the shoulders of the agencies responsible for the projects. Congress did cut some of the program, but also specified a transfer of funds to FWS to support hatchery mitigation. The Administration proposed elimination of annual appropriations for payments to counties for lost revenues due to the presence of non-taxable FWS lands. Congress continued the appropriation, with small reductions from previous appropriations. The House bill proposed to eliminate nearly all funding for FWS land acquisition. Congress reduced but did not eliminate the program. All of these issues are discussed in more detail below, along with funding levels for other programs.",47,47 "Questioning Judicial Nominees: Legal Limitations and Practice. The U.S. Constitution vests the Senate with the role of providing ""advice"" and affording or withholding ""consent"" when a President nominates a candidate to be an Article III judge—that is, a federal judge entitled to life tenure, such as a Supreme Court Justice. To carry out this ""advice and consent"" role, the Senate typically holds a hearing at which Members question the nominee. After conducting this hearing, the Senate generally either ""consents"" to the nomination by voting to confirm the nominee or instead rejects the nominee. Notably, many prior judicial nominees have refrained from answering certain questions during their confirmation hearings on the ground that responding to those questions would contravene norms of judicial ethics or the Constitution. Various ""canons"" of judicial conduct—that is, self-enforcing aspirational norms intended to promote the independence and integrity of the judiciary—may potentially discourage nominees from fully answering certain questions that Senators may pose to them in the confirmation context. However, although these canons squarely prohibit some forms of conduct during the judicial confirmation process—such as pledging to reach specified results in future cases if confirmed—it is less clear whether or to what extent the canons constrain judges from providing Senators with more general information regarding their jurisprudential views. As a result, disagreement exists regarding the extent to which applicable ethical rules prohibit nominees from answering certain questions. Beyond the judicial ethics rules, broader constitutional values, such as due process and the separation of powers, have informed the Senate's questioning of judicial nominees. As a result, historical practice can help illuminate which questions a judicial nominee may or should refuse to answer during his or her confirmation. Recent Supreme Court nominees, for instance, have invoked the so-called ""Ginsburg Rule"" to decline to discuss any cases that are currently pending before the Court or any issues that are likely to come before the Court. Senators and nominees have disagreed about whether any given response would improperly prejudge an issue that is likely to be contested at the Supreme Court. Although nominees have reached varied conclusions regarding which responses are permissible or impermissible, nominees have commonly answered general questions regarding their judicial philosophy, their prior statements, and judicial procedure. Nominees have been more hesitant, however, to answer specific questions about prior Supreme Court precedent, especially cases presenting issues that are likely to recur in the future. Ultimately, however, there are few available remedies when a nominee refuses to answer a particular question. Although a Senator may vote against a nominee who is not sufficiently forthcoming, as a matter of historical practice the Senate has rarely viewed lack of candor during confirmation hearings as disqualifying, and it does not appear that the Senate has ever rejected a Supreme Court nominee solely on the basis of evasiveness.",54,54 "Private Bills: Procedure in the House. A private bill is one that provides benefits to specified individuals (including corporate bodies). Individuals sometimes request relief through private law when administrative or legal remedies are exhausted, but Congress seems more often to view private legislation as appropriate when no other remedy is available and when enactment would, in a broad sense, afford equity. From 1817 through 1971, most Congresses enacted hundreds of private laws, but since then, the number has declined significantly as Congress has expanded administrative discretion to deal with many of the situations that tended to give rise to private bills. Since 2007, four private laws have been enacted. Private provisions are also occasionally included in public legislation. The Senate considers private bills using the same procedures that are used to consider other legislation.",55,55 "International Convention Against Doping in Sport: Issues for Congress. The International Convention Against Doping in Sport seeks to harmonize anti-doping commitments for non-professional sports at the international level. This Convention, adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2005, entered into force on February 1, 2007. On July 21, 2008, the Senate approved the treaty for ratification (Treaty Doc 110-14), subject to an understanding, a declaration, and a condition. President George W. Bush signed the instrument of ratification for the treaty on August 4, 2008. Issues that may continue to arise as policymakers evaluate the treaty include its relationship to anti-doping regulations in professional sports and the legitimacy and effectiveness of current international anti-doping activities. U.S. ratification does not require changes to current federal laws.",14,14 "The Open Skies Treaty: Observation Overflights of Military Activities. On March 24, 1992, the United States, Canada, and 22 European nations signed the Treaty on Open Skies. The United States officially ratified the treaty on November 3, 1993. The treaty has not yet entered into force, however, because Russia and Belarus have not yet ratified it. President Bush revived the Open Skies concept in May 1989. At the time, the United States believed that the Open Skies concept would reduce the chances of military confrontation and build confidence in Europe by providing participants with the ability to collect information about the military forces and activities of others in the treaty. In addition, even though the United States and Russia can collect this type of information with sophisticated observation satellites, Open Skies observation flights will provide nations who do not have their own satellites with a way to participate in the data collection and confidence-building process. The parties to the Treaty on Open Skies have agreed to permit unarmed aircraft to conduct observation flights over their entire territories. The United States Air Force has modified three C- 135 aircraft for this purpose. Open Skies aircraft can be equipped with four types of sensors: optical panoramic and framing cameras, video cameras, infrared line-scanning devices, and sideways- looking synthetic aperture radars. These sensors must be based on off-the-shelf technology that is available to all participants in the treaty. The treaty includes quotas that specify maximum numbers of observation flights that can occur within each nation each year and the maximum number of observation flights each nation can conduct each year. For the United States, these quotas are 42 flights per year, however, only 4 flights will occur over U.S. territory in the first year that the treaty is in force. In addition, the United States will conduct only 9 observation flights during the first year of treaty implementation, 8 over Russia and Belarus and one, in conjunction with Canada, over Ukraine. When the Senate reviewed the Open Skies Treaty in 1992 and 1993, Members raised several concerns about the implications of the treaty for the United States. For example, some were concerned that the costs of outfitting and operating the U.S. Open Skies aircraft would outweigh the benefits that the United States would receive by participating in the treaty. As a result, the Senate suggested that the United States restrict its participation, conducting fewer than the 42 permitted observation flights per year. Some were also concerned about potential risks to U.S. security from observation flights that would gather information on U.S. military forces and activities. If the Open Skies Treaty remains in force for many years, the United States could host dozens of visits by other participants, with foreign military aircraft equipped with sensors flying over U.S. territory. Virtually all observers agree, however, that these flights will pose no security threat to the United States.",21,21 "Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement. The 110th Congress may well face several decisions regarding the preparation of U.S. military forces for stability missions, a major subset of which is peace operations. A November 28, 2005, Department of Defense (DOD) directive that designates stability operations as ""core missions"" of the U.S. military marks a major shift in attitudes regarding peacekeeping and related stability operations (also known as stabilization and reconstruction operations). Since then, DOD has worked to define specific changes that must be made to better accomplish such missions, some of which the U.S. military could implement on its own, while others would require Congressional approval. For well over a decade, some Members of Congress expressed reservations about U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping operations. The Bush Administration initially opposed such missions and took steps to reduce the commitment of U.S. troops to international peacekeeping. This action reflected a major concern of the 1990s: that peacekeeping duties had overtaxed the shrinking U.S. military force and were detrimental to military ""readiness"" (i.e., the ability of U.S. troops to defend the nation). Many perceived these tasks as an inefficient use of U.S. forces, better left to other nations while the U.S. military concentrated on operations requiring high-intensity combat skills. Others thought that the United States should adjust force size and structure to accommodate the missions. The events of September 11, 2001, brought new concerns to the fore and highlighted the value to U.S. national security of ensuring stability around the world. The 9/11 Commission report, which cited Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorists, pointed to the dangers of allowing actual and potential terrorist sanctuaries to exist. In 2003, the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, often referred to as a ""stabilization and reconstruction"" operation (which manifests some characteristics of a peace operation), reinforced the argument. Thousands of U.S. military personnel currently serve in or support peacekeeping operations, although the number of troops serving in U.N. operations has decreased dramatically since the mid-1990s to some 26 in five operations under U.N. control. In the Balkans, some 1,700 U.S. troops serve with the NATO Kosova Force (KFOR). About 35,000 more serve in or support peacekeeping operations in South Korea, and roughly 700 serve in the Sinai. In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. troops are involved in a variety of stability tasks, including ""nation-building"" activities that have been undertaken in some peacekeeping operations as well as combat operations. A major issue Congress continues to face is what, if any, adjustments should be made in order for the U.S. military to perform peacekeeping and stability missions—in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere—with less strain on the force, particularly the reserves. Of particular interest is whether the size and configuration of U.S. forces, especially the Army, should be further modified. Additional issues are whether to augment civilian and international capabilities in order to take on more of the burden.",21,21 "Aung San Suu Kyi's Party Takes Control of Parliament in Burma. This report discusses politics and government in Burma following elections in November 2015. Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) has now assumed control of Burma's Union Parliament. The lower chamber (People's Assembly) and the upper chamber (National Assembly) took office on February 1 and 3, 2016, respectively.",85,85 "Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 112th Congress. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress has extended this authority through March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority. Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to address this homeland security issue. Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the current reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and efforts, the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities, the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight, the range of chemical facilities identified by DHS, and the ability of inherently safer technologies to achieve security goals. The 112th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the statutory authority to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulations in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This would leave regulation of chemical facility security to state and local governments. Both appropriation and authorization legislation in the 112th Congress address chemical facility security. P.L. 112-175 extended the existing authority until March 27, 2013. Both FY2013 homeland security appropriations bills (S. 3216 and H.R. 5855, as passed by the House) would extend the existing authority until October 4, 2013. Authorizing legislation includes H.R. 225, H.R. 901, reported as amended by the House Committee on Homeland Security and referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R. 908, reported as amended by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R. 916, H.R. 2890, S. 473, reported as amended by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, S. 709, and S. 711.",46,46 """Bunker Busters"": Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005-FY2007. Earth penetrator weapons, often called ""bunker busters,"" burrow into the ground some tens of feet before detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy buried targets. The United States has several types of conventional earth penetrators. The current U.S. nuclear earth penetrator, the B61-11 bomb, cannot penetrate certain types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities may be located, so the Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are studying a more effective penetrator, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). While Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in 2003 that RNEP was a study, NNSA's FY2005 budget document showed a five-year total of $484.7 million if RNEP were to proceed beyond the study phase. NNSA said no decision had been made to proceed, and out-year figures were shown to meet congressionally-mandated budgeting requirements and were not a request. RNEP requests are, of course, subject to congressional approval, rejection, or modification. The five-year figure sparked congressional debate. The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act contained the full RNEP request, $27.6 million. The House and Senate both rejected amendments to that bill that would have eliminated RNEP funds. However, P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, appropriated no funds for RNEP. As a result, NNSA could not work on RNEP in FY2005. The FY2006 RNEP request was $4.0 million for NNSA for studies, and $4.5 million for the Department of Defense (DOD) to study integrating RNEP onto the B-2 bomber. The House passed the FY2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, H.R. 2419, with no NNSA RNEP funds. The House passed the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Bill H.R. 1815, providing the requested DOD funds and transferring the NNSA funds to DOD. The House Appropriations Committee's mark of H.R. 2863, the FY2006 DOD Appropriations Bill, provided $4.0 million for a conventional (nonnuclear) penetrator study. Committee staff indicated that the bill included the $4.5 million for DOD, and that the committee's intent was that DOD use the money to study integration of a conventional penetrator onto the B-2. The bill as passed by the House retained these provisions. The Senate Armed Services Committee's mark of S. 1042, the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Bill, recommended providing the NNSA funds as requested but denying the DOD funds on grounds that the DOD program should await completion of NNSA's feasibility study. The Senate provided $4.0 million for NNSA for RNEP in H.R. 2419, rejecting an amendment by Senator Feinstein to delete the funds. The Senate Appropriations Committee's mark of H.R. 2863 recommended eliminating DOD funds requested for RNEP. On October 25, Senator Domenici said that NNSA had dropped its RNEP request and planned to focus earth penetration on conventional weapons technology, so, he said, energy and water conferees agreed to drop funding for RNEP. H.R. 1815 as signed into law (P.L. 109-360) provided no funds for RNEP, but $4.0 million for DOD for a conventional penetrator study. For FY2007, NNSA requested no funds for RNEP, and has closed out the project. Accordingly this report will not be updated further.",32,32 "Free Exercise of Religion by Secular Organizations and Their Owners: Implications for the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The Supreme Court's grant of review in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Hobby Lobby Stores v. Sebelius, along with recent federal court decisions, has highlighted the ongoing controversy over the scope of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) contraceptive coverage requirement, which requires an employer to provide certain contraceptive coverage to its employees under its group health plan. Some employers have objected to the requirement, citing objections to the facilitation of the use of contraceptives in conflict with the religious tenets by which their businesses operate. An analogous issue has arisen in state courts in the context of same-sex weddings. Several private businesses that qualify as public accommodations have objected to state requirements that they provide services without discriminating based on sexual orientation despite the owners' religious objections to same-sex marriage. These issues have raised a novel legal question for the courts: What rights do secular businesses that operate for profit have to pursue legal claims to protect their religious exercise? Although a number of statutory exemptions exist to protect individuals and organizations' religious beliefs and objections (e.g., employment discrimination under Title VII, disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, etc.), courts have applied those exemptions only to individuals and nonprofit, religious organizations. A number of legal challenges to the contraceptive coverage requirement have examined a range of questions related to the rights of these businesses. As a threshold question, courts have had to analyze whether the business itself is eligible for protection under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and Free Exercise jurisprudence. The businesses have asserted that they qualify as ""persons"" under RFRA and, in the alternative, that they are entitled to pursue their claims on behalf of their owners under what is known as the ""pass-through"" theory of corporate rights. Courts have also considered whether the business owners may pursue independent legal claims asserting their objections, or if their individual rights are forfeited at the time of the company's incorporation. If a court determines that the business or its owners are eligible for free exercise protection, it may then consider the merits of the case, including whether the mandate constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise, whether the government has a compelling interest to do so, and whether the government used the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. Five federal circuit courts have considered these questions in the context of the contraceptive coverage requirement, and have reached different conclusions on the range of questions raised. This report examines the constitutional and statutory protections related to free exercise of religion, including current Supreme Court interpretations, as well as judicial and legislative avoidance of defining the parameters of religious belief. It also discusses significant examples of existing religious exemptions in current law, including employment nondiscrimination, health care, and public accommodations law. Finally, it analyzes recent federal judicial decisions that have considered the religious freedom rights of commercial entities whose owners have religious objections to the contraceptive coverage requirement.",15,15 "The Use of Discretionary Authority in the Housing Choice Voucher Program: A CRS Study. The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program is the federal government's largest needs-based housing assistance program, in terms of both the number of families served and the cost to the federal budget. Under the program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides funds to local public housing authorities (PHAs), which, in turn, provide subsidies to low-income households to use to rent private market apartments. Although the basic structure of the program is governed by federal law and regulations, PHAs have discretion to determine many important elements. How PHAs use their discretion has implications for how families experience the program, how local communities perceive the program, and the program's cost. Little comprehensive information is available about how PHAs use their discretion under the HCV program. Thus, to gain insight that might be useful to Congress, CRS conducted a study that looked at a representative sample of PHAs. Data for the study were taken from the administrative plans that PHAs are required to produce. To supplement information from the plans, interviews were conducted with a subsample of PHA officials. Where possible, results of the CRS study were compared to a study conducted by HUD in 2000. The findings of this study may be relevant to policymakers as they consider HCV reform proposals. Major Findings Almost all PHAs (96%) use local preferences (i.e., specified categories of families) to rank families on waiting lists for assistance. This is a change from 2000, when only about 59% of PHAs used local preferences. All PHAs have policies that consider a family's prior criminal activity and most consider a family's prior unmet financial obligations when evaluating eligibility for assistance. The policies vary in terms of what PHAs look for (types of crime, evidence) and how far back they look. Most PHAs have also adopted policies that allow them to evaluate families on a case-by-case basis. PHAs use similar policies to terminate assistance for criminal activity. Most PHAs (79%) have adopted a minimum rent of more than $0 per month, and the majority (70%) have adopted the maximum allowable minimum rent ($50). Some PHA officials said they saw minimum rents as promoting fairness, cost savings were not generally mentioned. Most PHAs require families to report all changes in income between annual recertfications, but most PHAs do not adjust families' subsidies at that time unless the income increase is above a certain threshold. In interviews, some PHA officials said that the administrative hassle of recalculating subsidies was not worth the savings, but some noted that a recent verification system required by HUD had led them to recertify more frequently than they had been previously. It is commonly understood that most PHAs have long waiting lists and many PHAs have closed their waiting lists to new applicants. When opening their waiting lists, the majority of PHAs (77%) determine who is added based on the date and time the application was submitted. About 18% of PHAs use a random selection method. In interviews, several PHA officials noted that they found it challenging to manage the process of opening their waiting lists because of an overwhelming demand for vouchers. Once a family is selected from the waiting list, it has a limited time in which to use its voucher. Most PHAs provide families with the statutory minimum of 60 days of initial search time, although most also allow families an extension to 120 days without requiring the families to meet other conditions (such as being elderly or having a disability). While PHA administrative plans must be made publicly available, it was difficult for CRS to obtain copies of the plans in several cases. Most PHA officials who were interviewed saw their plans as program guidebooks, which is a different purpose than that envisioned by HUD. It appears that many PHAs have purchased their administrative plans from private companies. Based on CRS interviews with PHA officials, it seems that some PHAs perceive their discretionary authority as being limited to the options provided in the purchased plans, or they are unaware of the full discretionary authority that they have.",75,75 "Selected Products Liability Issues: A 50-State Survey. This report examines the laws of the 50 states and the District of Columbia in the following areas of products liability: (1) product seller liability, (2) contributory fault, (3) punitive damages, (4) joint and several liability, (5) statutes of limitations, and (6) statutes of repose. This 50-state survey is intended as a quick guide to statutes that deal with these six issues, not as a full description of the relevant laws. Thus, exceptions and details, such as when statutes of limitations may be tolled, are not generally noted, and case law has not been checked systematically. Also not usually noted is whether a provision applies only to products liability actions or to other tort actions as well. In each of the six areas of products liability law covered, many states have altered the common law in recent years. Some have (1) made product sellers other than manufacturers not strictly liable, (2) adopted comparative fault, (3) placed caps on punitive damages or raised the burden of proof with respect to a plaintiff's entitlement to punitive damages, (4) limited joint and several liability, (5) adopted discovery statutes of limitations, and (6) adopted statutes of repose. These terms are all explained in an introduction to each of the areas.",8,8 "Supreme Court Opinions October 1998 Term. This report contains synopses of Supreme Court decisions issued from the beginning of the October 1998 Term through the end of the Term on June 23, 1999. The purpose is to provide a quick reference guide for identification of cases of interest. These synopses are created throughout the Term and entered into the CRS Home Page on the Internet, and into the Scorpio database. The report supersedes an earlier cumulation issued as a general distribution memorandum dated March 12, 1999. Included are all cases decided by signed opinion and selected cases decided per curiam. Not included are other cases receiving summary disposition and the many cases in which the Court denied review. Each synopsis contains a summary of the Court's holding, and most contain a brief statement of the Court's rationale. In addition, the date of decision is indicated, and cites to United States Law Week and West's Supreme Court Reporter are provided if available. Following each synopsis the vote on the Court's holding is indicated in bold typeface, and authors of the Court's opinion and of any concurring and dissenting opinions, along with the Justices who joined those opinions, are identified. Cases are listed alphabetically, and a subject index is appended.",92,92 "How Changes in the Economics of Broadcast Television Are Affecting News and Sports Programming and the Policy Goals of Localism, Diversity of Voices, and Competition. Market and technological changes are creating challenges to the long-standing business models employed by broadcast television networks and local television stations, but at the same time generating potential opportunities. The changes also may be affecting the three pillars of U.S. government media policy—localism, diversity of voices, and competition—and damping the effectiveness of existing regulations intended to foster them. These changes generally are strengthening the position of parties that own or control popular content in their negotiations with distributors of video programming. Broadcast networks and stations, alike, both own content and distribute programming, so they have been strengthened and weakened by these changes. The successful entry of hundreds of cable networks and the proliferation of social networking and video Internet websites have fragmented audiences and provided advertisers with alternative avenues for reaching consumers. This presents a significant challenge to broadcast networks and stations, which traditionally have relied on advertising for more than 90% of their revenues. As audiences have declined for both national and local news programming, networks and stations alike have reduced costs by sharing the fixed costs of newsgathering over multiple platforms and undertaking cooperative newsgathering with other outlets. Some broadcasters have sought to generate additional cost savings or revenue by combining with other newsgathering organizations, and urge modifications to the Federal Communications Commission's broadcast media ownership rules that restrict such combinations. Policymakers will have to weigh whether allowing such consolidation will, on net, benefit the public by improving the financial viability of newsgathering firms or harm the public by reducing diversity of voices and competition. At the same time, competition has developed among the companies that deliver multiple channels of video programming to subscribers—cable operators, satellite operators, and some telephone companies. If a multichannel video distributor fails to obtain the retransmission rights to popular national and local broadcast television programs, it risks losing subscribers to a competitor that does offer the programming. As a result, broadcast networks and stations are able to demand higher payments from these multichannel video distributors for the retransmission rights. This has created a second revenue stream for broadcasters that is projected to reach $2.6 billion in 2016. It also occasionally results in subscribers losing access to broadcast programming when their video provider and the broadcaster reach an impasse in retransmission negotiations. A coalition of video distributors and consumer organizations has petitioned the FCC to modify its retransmission consent rules by adding dispute resolution mechanisms and mandatory interim carriage. The amount of local broadcast news programming has been increasing despite declining audiences and does not appear to be threatened by stations' revenue declines. Many stations are broadcasting more news because local news programs can be cheaper to provide than purchased programming. In addition, local news provides a way for stations to develop strong brand identities as they compete for local advertising dollars. The production and distribution of major sports programming is largely controlled by the sports entities that control the events. If it benefits them to distribute their programming through pay venues, such as cable networks that they own, rather than over-the-air broadcast, they will do so. This is likely to result in more events being televised, though many will only be available to subscribers to pay television services.",109,109 "Thirty-Five Years of Water Policy: The 1973 National Water Commission and Present Challenges. Concern about the availability and use of water to support the nation's people, economy, and environment has bolstered interest in establishing a national water commission. The commission structure proposed in recent legislation (e.g., H.R. 135) is similar to that of the 1968-1973 National Water Commission (NWC or Commission). As proposed in H.R. 135, the commission would assess future water demands, study current management programs, and develop recommendations for a comprehensive water strategy. Questions about a commission as an effective model and which topics a commission might consider have raised interest in assessing what the NWC recommended in its 1973 report, Water Policies for the Future, and how the issues that it identified have evolved. The NWC recommended addressing the interconnection between water development and the natural environment, implementing a ""users pay"" or ""beneficiary pays"" approach, accomplishing water quality improvements, and adapting governance and organizations to meet water challenges. Since 1973, progress has been made in some of these areas, however, few actions can be traced directly to the NWC's recommendations. Nonetheless, the influence of the NWC on the evolution of water policy cannot be dismissed. Many of the problems that the Commission identified remain today, and some actions since 1973 have moved water policy toward alignment with NWC recommendations, others have moved it in the opposite direction of NWC recommendations. Shifts in institutional arrangements in general have reduced coordination of federal water agency activities and in many ways have moved away from NWC-recommended multi-objective or river basin planning. State-federal tensions over proper and respective roles continue to cloud resolution of difficult water resource issues and complicate coordination efforts. While many support better coordination of federal water activities and a clearer national ""vision"" for water management, Congress has not enacted overarching water policy legislation since the 1965 Water Resources Planning Act. Instead, water policy has largely evolved through executive and judicial actions, in many cases in response to piecemeal legislation. Congress continually modifies federal water projects through amendments to existing projects and programs through Water Resources Development Acts (WRDAs), Reclamation acts, water quality legislation, and appropriations decisions. Incremental and ad hoc evolution of water policy, however, is not surprising. Water management is complicated by past decisions and investments affecting a wide range of stakeholders pursuing different goals. Specifically, federal and state laws and regulations, local ordinances, tribal treaties, contractual obligations, and economies dependent on existing water use patterns and infrastructure all affect water management. Attempts to untangle such complexities involve many constituencies with differing interests, and success is difficult to achieve. Expectations for a commission to achieve change in a complex system resistant to transformation may be unreasonable, instead, the influence of a commission may lie in how its recommendations combine with other drivers to support policy evolution. This CRS report presents the NWC's recommendations and analyzes how issues targeted by the recommendations have evolved during the intervening years. The report focuses on key federal-level recommendations, thereby targeting what has been accomplished since 1973, what issues remain unresolved, and what additional concerns have developed.",44,43 "Iraq Crisis: CRS Experts. The table below provides names and contact information for CRS experts on various policy concerns of interest to Congress relating to the ongoing crisis in Iraq. Policy areas identified include the conflict in Iraq, al Qaeda affiliates, embassy security, military operations, war powers, sanctions, energy security, humanitarian issues and displaced persons, issues in the Middle East region, the United Nations, and other international actors.",85,85 "Retirement and Survivor Annuities for Former Spouses of Federal Employees. A former spouse of a federal employee may be entitled to a share of the employees retirement annuity under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) or the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) if this has been authorized by a state court decree of divorce, annulment, or legal separation. An employee also may voluntarily elect a survivor annuity for a former spouse. A state court can award a former spouse a share of the employees retirement annuity, a survivor annuity, or both. A court also can award a former spouse of a federal employee a portion of the employees Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account balance as part of a divorce settlement.",58,58 "Conference Committee and Related Procedures: An Introduction. The House and Senate must pass the same bill or joint resolution in precisely the same form before it can be presented to the President. Once both houses have passed the same measure, they can resolve their differences over the text of that measure either through an exchange of amendments between the houses or through the creation of a conference committee. The House and Senate each have an opportunity to amend the other chamber’s amendments to a bill, thus, there can be House amendments to Senate amendments to House amendments to a Senate bill. If either chamber accepts the other’s amendments, the legislative process is complete. Alternatively, each house may reach the stage of disagreement at any time by insisting on its own position or by disagreeing to the position of the other chamber. Having decided to disagree, they then typically agree to create a conference committee to propose a single negotiated settlement of all their differences. Conference committees are generally free to conduct their negotiations as they choose, but under the formal rules they are expected to address only the matters on which the House and Senate have disagreed. Moreover, they are to propose settlements that represent compromises between the positions of the two houses. When they have completed their work, they submit a conference report and joint explanatory statement, and the House and Senate vote on accepting the report without amendments. Only after the two houses have reached complete agreement on all provisions of a bill can it be sent to the President for his approval or veto.",55,55 "Pension Issues: Lump-Sum Distributions and Retirement Income Security. This report covers several issues regarding pensions. Forty-seven percent of all workers aged 21 and older participated in employer-sponsored retirement plans in 2006, but not all of these workers will receive a pension or other income from these plans when they retire.",88,88 "The Fair Labor Standards Act: Continuing Issues in the Debate. On May 25, 2007, the President signed into law changes in the minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): P.L. 110-28. Although the wage issue may now have been momentary settled, the act includes other provisions that have been subject to legislation through the years and may again become the focus of legislative consideration. Examples include the following issues. A youth sub-minimum wage, instituted in 1996, was not included in the 2007 amendments, and is $4.25 per hour. The cash wage employers of ‘tipped employees' must pay, last updated in 1996, is $2.13 per hour. In 1989, the ‘small business exemption' was restructured to exempt from minimum wage requirements qualifying firms with an income of under $500,000, but, as administered, exemptions have only been available for employees not involved in interstate commerce. In 2001, the Clinton Administration proposed restructuring of the ‘companionship exemption' under the FLSA, in 2002, the measure was withdrawn. The issue has recently been the subject of a Supreme Court ruling (2007) and of proposed legislation (H.R. 3582 and S. 2061). Through nearly a century, some economists (and, later, some Members of Congress) have proposed, in various formats, indexation of the federal minimum wage—an issue that still sometimes arises. In 1986, Section 14(c) of the act was amended to remove any specific minimum wage floor for handicapped workers, replacing it with a negotiated wage ‘commensurate' with the worker's productivity. It has been contested through the years. In 2003, a proposal was issued dealing with overtime pay for persons classified as ‘executive, administrative, or professional' employees under Section 13(a)(1) of the act. At that time, the issue was extremely contentious. How has it worked out in practice? Industry has threatened to leave American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands were the full FLSA to be made applicable there, as it would be under P.L. 110-28. What will be the impact upon those islands? Increasingly, the states (now 34 in number) have moved to provide minimum wage rates higher than the federal rate. What implications can be expected, both in economic and political terms? This report will be updated as the need may arise.",90,90 "Disposal of Unneeded Federal Buildings: Legislative Proposals in the 113th Congress. Real property disposal is the process by which federal agencies identify and then transfer, donate, or sell real property they no longer need. Disposition is an important asset management function because the costs of maintaining unneeded properties can be substantial, consuming financial resources that might be applied to long-standing real property needs, such as repairing existing facilities, or other pressing policy issues, such as reducing the national debt. Despite the expense, federal agencies hold thousands of unneeded and underutilized properties. Agencies have argued that they are unable to dispose of these properties for several reasons. First, there are statutorily prescribed steps in the disposal process that can take months to complete. Second, agencies are often required to complete major repairs or environmental remediation before properties are ready for disposal—steps for which agencies lack funding. Third, key stakeholders in the disposal process—including local governments, non-profit organizations, and businesses—are often at odds over how to dispose of properties. In addition, Congress may be limited in its capacity to conduct oversight of the disposal process because it currently lacks access to reliable, comprehensive real property data. Four bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress that propose significant changes to the existing real property disposal system. The Federal Real Property Asset Management Reform Act of 2013 (S. 1398), would establish an expedited disposal program under which 200 properties would be exempt from time-consuming, statutory disposal requirements. In addition, S. 1398 would expand the role of an interagency workgroup, the Federal Real Property Council, to set disposal goals for agencies and monitor their progress in meeting those goals. The bill would also increase oversight of agency disposal activities by requiring the Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) to establish a real property database available to the public at no cost. The Excess Federal Building and Property Disposal Act of 2013 (H.R. 328) would establish an expedited disposal program under which the 15 unneeded federal properties with the highest fair market value would bypass statutory disposal requirements and be offered for sale immediately. H.R. 328 would also require the GSA Administrator to establish a real property database available to the public at no cost and provide a report to Congress on the progress each landholding agency has made in reducing its unneeded property. Two similar, but not identical, versions of the Civilian Property Realignment Act (H.R. 695, S. 1715) have been introduced. Both bills would have the same overarching structure. They would centralize the disposal process by establishing a Civilian Property Realignment Commission, which would work with agencies to develop a list of disposal recommendations to the President. If the President approved the recommendations, then they would be sent to Congress. If Congress passed a joint resolution of approval, then agencies would be required to implement the recommendations, if a joint resolution of approval was not passed, then the realignment process would end for the fiscal year.",64,64 "The Oregon and California Railroad Lands (O&C Lands): Issues for Congress. The Oregon and California Railroad (O&C) lands consist of 2.6 million acres of timberland in western Oregon. The majority of these lands (2.5 million acres) were originally granted to the Oregon & California Railroad Company in 1866 for constructing approximately 300 miles of the Oregon portion of a railroad from Portland, OR, to Sacramento, CA. However, in 1915 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the railroad company violated the terms of the grant. The disposition of these lands was eventually resolved with the O&C Act of 1937, which revested the lands back into federal ownership to be managed by the Department of the Interior ""for permanent forest production"" with the purpose of providing a supply of timber, protecting watersheds, providing recreational opportunities, and contributing to the economic stability of the local communities. The O&C Act of 1937 established a revenue-sharing system with the 18 counties in Oregon that contain O&C lands. Currently at issue for Congress are payments to the counties that contain O&C land, and the applicability of various land management and environmental laws. The O&C lands are managed under the Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP). The NWFP is a series of administrative policies and forest management directives adopted in the 1990s. The NWFP covers 24 million acres of public land, including 19 national forests managed by the Forest Service and 7 Bureau of Land Management (BLM) districts in California, Oregon, and Washington. The O&C lands make up 11% of the NWFP management area by acreage, and 37% of Oregon's NWFP management area by acreage. The 1937 O&C Act established a revenue sharing system to compensate for the loss of property tax revenue when the O&C lands were revested back to the federal government. When timber sales and revenues began to decline in the Pacific Northwest in the 1990s, Congress established alternative compensation systems for the county payments: first, the safety net payments specifically for the Pacific Northwest, and then, the broader Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (SRS, P.L. 106-393, as amended). After several reauthorizations and extensions—including the most recent one-year reauthorization for FY2013 (P.L. 113-40)—SRS expired after the FY2013 payment was issued in early 2014. Therefore, the O&C counties will not receive an SRS payment for FY2014 (to be made in 2015), but the payments will return to 50% of receipts, unless Congress acts to extend, modify, or replace SRS. These payments would likely be significantly lower than previous years' SRS payments. The 113th Congress considered legislation to address the management of the O&C lands and federal payment programs to the O&C counties. A House-passed bill (H.R. 1526, the Restoring Healthy Forests for Healthy Communities Act) would have transferred management authority of much of the O&C lands to a governor-appointed panel and established a trust with fiduciary responsibility to the counties, among other provisions related to the management and applicability of federal environmental laws. A Senate bill reported out of committee, S. 1784, would have retained management authority within the BLM, but would have designated portions of the O&C lands as forestry emphasis areas, and other portions as conservation emphasis areas, each with different management prescriptions. Neither proposal was enacted. Management of the O&C lands and federal payments to the O&C counties may continue to be issues for the 114th Congress. For example, The Oregon and California Land Grant Act of 2015, S. 132, was introduced on January 8, 2015, and is very similar to S. 1784 from the 113th Congress.",107,107 "The Liability Exemptions in the Senate Brownfields Bill (S. 350). This report deals solely with the liability provisions of S. 350, found in Title II of the bill. (The manager's amendment does not concern these.) These provisions cover three types of innocent parties: (1) owners of properties contaminated from contiguous properties, (2) prospective purchasers, and (3) innocent landowners.",46,17 "American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics. This report provides U.S. war casualty statistics. It includes data tables containing the number of casualties among American military personnel who served in principal wars and combat operations from 1775 to the present. It also includes data on those wounded in action and information such as race and ethnicity, gender, branch of service, and cause of death. The tables are compiled from various Department of Defense (DOD) sources. Wars covered include the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam Conflict, and the Persian Gulf War. Military operations covered include the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission, Lebanon Peacekeeping, Urgent Fury in Grenada, Just Cause in Panama, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Restore Hope in Somalia, Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation New Dawn (OND), Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). Starting with the Korean War and the more recent conflicts, this report includes additional detailed information on types of casualties and, when available, demographics. It also cites a number of resources for further information, including sources of historical statistics on active duty military deaths, published lists of military personnel killed in combat actions, data on demographic indicators among U.S. military personnel, related websites, and relevant Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports.",24,30 "Campaign Finance and Prohibiting Contributions by Tax-Exempt Corporations: FEC v. Beaumont. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibits corporations, including tax-exempt, advocacy corporations, from using treasury funds to make direct contributions and expenditures in connection with federal elections. Corporations seeking to make such contributions and expenditures may legally do so only through a political action committee or PAC, 2 U.S.C. § 441b. The Supreme Court has long upheld the ban on corporate contributions, including those made by corporations that are tax-exempt under the Internal Revenue Code. However, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), the Court created an exception for independent expenditures made by such entities that do not accept significant corporate or labor union money finding that restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification under the First Amendment than restrictions on independent expenditures. In FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003), North Carolina Right to Life (NCRL), a tax-exempt corporation, unsuccessfully attempted to extend the MCFL exception to contributions by tax-exempt corporations. Finding that limits on contributions are more clearly justified under the First Amendment than limits on expenditures, the Court reaffirmed the prohibition on all corporations making direct treasury contributions in connection with federal elections and upheld the ban on corporate contributions as applied to NCRL. This report provides an analysis of the Court's decision, including a brief discussion of possible implications for a pending Supreme Court case, McConnell v. FEC, which involves the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), also known as McCain-Feingold, P.L. 107-155 (H.R. 2356, 107th Cong.). Related CRS reports include CRS Report RS21551, Campaign Finance: Issues Before the U.S. Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC, and CRS Report RL30669, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Buckley v. Valeo and Its Supreme Court Progeny.",61,61 "Copyright Cases in the Courts: Napster, MP3 Digital Music, and DVD Motion Picture Encryption Technology. This report discusses copyright cases in the courts, including Napster, MP3 digital music, and DVD motion picture.",9,9 "Human Rights, Civil Unrest, and Political Reform in Burma in 2013. Report that examines the current situation in Burma from the implicit perspective shaped by U.S. policy decisions.",81,81 501(c)(4)s and the Gift Tax: Legal Analysis. This report discusses whether substantial donations to tax-exempt 501(c)(4) organizations are subject to the federal gift tax.,61,102 "Trends in Poverty in the United States. This report discusses trends in poverty in the United States. In 2004, 37 million people were found poor under the official poverty definition — a 1.1 million increase from 2003. The poverty rate, or percent of the population considered poor, increased for the fourth straight year, to 12.7% in 2004 — up from 12.5% in 2003, and 11.3% in 2000, its most recent low.",117,117 "America COMPETES Acts: FY2008 to FY2013 Funding Tables. Changing economic, social, and political conditions at home and abroad have led some analysts to question whether the United States will remain globally competitive in the coming decades. In response to these and closely related concerns, Congress enacted the 2007 America COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69), as well as its successor, the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-358). These acts were broadly designed to invest in innovation through research and development and to improve U.S. competitiveness. More specifically, the acts authorized increased funding for certain physical science and engineering research accounts and STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) education activities. Congressional debate about the COMPETES Acts focuses closely on authorized and appropriated funding levels. To aid this debate, this CRS report tracks accounts and activities authorized by the 2007 and 2010 COMPETES Acts during each act's authorization period. It includes only those accounts and activities for which the acts provide a defined (i.e., specific) appropriations authorization. Table 1 includes FY2008 to FY2010 authorizations and final funding for accounts in the 2007 COMPETES Act, Table 2 includes FY2011 to FY2013 authorizations and final funding for accounts in the 2010 COMPETES Act.",48,48 "International Military Education and Training Program. This report provides background on the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). It discusses the program's main features and purposes, perspectives of the IMET's supporters and critics, and recent issues surrounding the program and its implementation. The United States in recent years has trained annually, on average, over 10,000 students from approximately 130 countries. Formal instruction under IMET involves over 2,000 courses, nearly all of which are taught in the United States at approximately 150 military schools and installations. As the size of the United States foreign assistance program has declined, the IMET program has attracted greater attention as an instrument for serving broad U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. At the same time the program, and placement of restrictions on its participants, has also been an instrument for expressing concerns about the human rights practices of certain nations that have been IMET program participants. This report will be revised should major changes occur in the IMET program.",21,21 "Underground Carbon Dioxide Sequestration: Frequently Asked Questions. This report answers frequently asked questions about the geologic sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO2). The questions are broadly representative of typical inquiries regarding the process and mechanics of storing CO2 underground, how much might be stored, and what might happen to CO2 once it is injected underground.",42,42 "The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress. The U.S. government has implemented a series of programs to protect the nation against terrorist nuclear attack. Some of these programs predate September 11, 2001, while others were established since then. Most programs are within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, and agencies that became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) upon its creation, and they are focused on detecting the illicit acquisition and shipment of nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and securing nuclear weapons. These disparate programs have historically been viewed as lacking coordination and centralized oversight. In 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal response to an unconventional nuclear threat. The office was codified in 2006 through the passage of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) and given specific statutory responsibilities to protect the United States against radiological and nuclear attack, including the responsibility to develop a ""global nuclear detection architecture."" Determining the range of existing federal efforts protecting against nuclear attack, coordinating the outcomes of these efforts, identifying overlaps and gaps between them, and integrating the results into a single architecture are likely to be evolving, ongoing tasks. The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack. Among its components are existing programs in nuclear detection operated by other federal agencies and new programs put into place by DNDO. The global nuclear detection architecture is developed by DNDO in coordination with other federal agencies implementing nuclear detection efforts and this coordination is essential to the success of the architecture. This architecture is a complicated system of systems. Measuring the success of the architecture relative to its individual components and the effectiveness of additional investments are challenges. The DNDO is developing risk and cost methodologies to be applied to the architecture in order to understand and prioritize the various nuclear detection programs and activities in multiple federal agencies. Congress, in its oversight capacity, has shown interest in the development and implementation of the global nuclear detection architecture and in the decision-making process attendant to investments in it. Other issues that may be foci of congressional attention include the balance between investment in near-term and long-term solutions for architecture gaps, the degree and efficacy of federal agency coordination, the mechanism for setting agency investment priorities in the architecture, and the efforts DNDO has undertaken to retain institutional knowledge regarding this sustained architecture effort.",22,22 "Sex Discrimination and the United States Supreme Court: Developments in the Law. In its sex discrimination decisions, the United States Supreme Court not only has defined the applicability of the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution and the nondiscriminatory policies of federal statutes, but also has rejected the use of gender stereotypes and has continued to recognize the discriminatory effect of gender hostility in the workplace and in schools. This report focuses on sex discrimination challenges based on: the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, the prohibition against employment discrimination contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the prohibition against sex discrimination in education contained in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Although this report focuses on recent legal developments in each of these areas, this report also provides historical context by discussing selected landmark sex discrimination cases. Despite the fact that the Court's analysis of sex discrimination challenges under the Constitution differs from its analysis of sex discrimination under the two federal statutes discussed in this report, it is apparent that the Court is willing to refine its standards of review under both schemes to accommodate the novel claims presented by these cases. The Court's decisions in cases involving Title VII and Title IX are particularly noteworthy because they illustrate the Court's recognition of sexual harassment in both the workplace and the classroom. During the 2015 term, the Court issued a ruling in a high-profile case involving a claim of pregnancy discrimination in employment. In Young v. United Parcel Service, an employee challenged her employer's refusal to grant her a light-duty work assignment while she was pregnant, claiming that the employer's actions violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), a federal law that prohibits pregnancy discrimination in employment. In a highly anticipated ruling, the Justices fashioned a new test for determining when an employer's refusal to provide accommodations for a pregnant worker constitutes a violation of the PDA, and the Court sent the case back to the lower court for reconsideration in light of these new standards.",16,16 "Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999. This chronology outlines major events in U.S.-Cuban relations from Fidel Castro's rise to power in 1959 through 1999. The chronology provides more detailed information on events since 1994 including U.S. legislative action and congressional hearings and significant economic and political events in Cuba. In the 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated quickly as the Castro government espoused Communism and aligned itself with the Soviet Union. After Cuba began expropriating U.S. property in 1960, the United States began imposing economic sanctions. In 1961, diplomatic relations were broken in January, and in April the United States sponsored the failed Bay of Pigs invasion led by Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro. President Kennedy imposed a near total embargo on Cuba in February 1962. In the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States confronted the Soviet Union over the introduction of nuclear missiles in Cuba. In the 1970s, there were some efforts toward normalizing relations, but these were undermined by Cuba's policy of supporting revolutionary movements abroad. The U.S. embargo was modified in 1975 to allow U.S. foreign subsidiaries to trade with Cuba. Under the Carter Administration, the United States essentially lifted its ban on travel with Cuba and ""interests sections"" were established in Havana and Washington in 1977. In the late 1970s, prospects for normalized relations dimmed with Cuba's increased military role in Africa and its support for revolutionary movements in Central America and the Caribbean. The 1980s began with the Mariel boatlift in which some 125,000 Cubans were allowed to leave their island nation for the United States by boat. The Reagan Administration adopted a harder line policy toward Cuba. In 1982, it reimposed restrictions on travel to Cuba, although certain categories of travel were permitted. The 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada ended Cuban support for the revolutionary government of that country. U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting to Cuba, Radio Marti, began operations in 1985. In the 1990s, U.S. sanctions were strengthened, while a policy of providing support to the Cuban people gained momentum. In 1992, the United States tightened its embargo on Cuba with the Cuban Democracy Act, which again banned U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba. The act also included measures of support for the Cuban people such as the establishment of direct telephone service. With the loss of backing from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Cuba experienced rapid economic decline. In the summer of 1994, thousands of Cubans began fleeing to the United States by boat. This led to two U.S.-Cuban migration accords. In February 1996, Cuban military jets shot down two U.S. civilian planes, killing four Americans. The action led to approval of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which strengthened U.S. sanctions. In the aftermath of Pope John Paul's visit to Cuba in January 1998, the Clinton Administration has taken policy initiatives to support the Cuban people, including an expansion of direct flights and increased exchanges.",85,85 "Zimbabwe: Election Chronology. This chronology, which begins in January 2002, covers events surrounding the March 2002 presidential election that took place in Zimbabwe. It will not be updated. For further information on Zimbabwe, see CRS Report RL31229(pdf), Zimbabwe Backgrounder.",85,85 "War Funding and the Budget Control Act: In Brief. In the FY2016 debate on the level of defense spending, Congress is considering how to stay within the spending limits, or caps, set by the Budget Control Act (BCA). Under the BCA, all defense spending for the defense base budget—excluding amounts designated for ""Overseas Contingency Operations"" (OCO) or emergencies—is subject to annual BCA caps. For funds to be counted as OCO funding that is essentially exempt from BCA caps, Congress must first designate funds in law on an account-by-account basis, and the President must subsequently do the same. The OCO designation therefore requires a consensus between the legislative and executive branches on the designation and is independent of any particular criteria about the types of expenses that would be covered. The President, some Members of Congress, and military leaders have voiced concerns that the FY2016-FY2021 BCA defense spending caps—set at $2 billion above FY2015 spending caps in FY2016 and increasing by $11 billion annually after that—are insufficient to meet defense needs. Others have suggested that Department of Defense (DOD) planning has largely accommodated BCA caps. The President's budget request plan exceeds BCA caps by $182 billion, or 5%, for FY2016-FY2021 rather than the trillion dollars in savings originally needed. BCA caps are slated to rise from $523 billion in FY2016 to $590 billion in FY2021, setting defense spending at a real freeze (i.e., the same level adjusted for inflation) in later years. The President's national defense request of $561 billion for the base budget, including $534 billion for the DOD, exceeds the FY2016 BCA cap by $38 billion. To meet the cap, Congress would need to cut DOD's base budget request for defense spending by 6.8% in FY2016. The FY2016 annual budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 11), the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) as passed by the House (H.R. 1735) and by the Senate, and the appropriations bills funding DOD (H.R. 2685 as reported by the House and H.R. 2029 as passed by the House) all propose to transfer about $38.5 billion from the defense base budget to OCO-designated funding. If the President also designates these as OCO, they would not breach BCA caps and would not require offsets as in previous BCA amendments. If signed by the President, these bills would increase defense spending but stay within BCA caps. This would bring OCO-designated spending to $89 billion, 75% above the request at a time U.S. troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan are projected to fall from 15,700 in FY2015 to below 10,000 in FY2016 and to 1,000 in FY2017. In response to congressional action, the Administration has threatened a veto, characterizing the transfer as ""budget gimmickry,"" and calling instead for raising BCA caps for both defense and non-defense spending, with alternate savings from raising revenues and reducing mandatory spending. DOD officials have also opposed the transfer, arguing that it would complicate defense budgeting by setting up a one-year spike in funding that might not necessarily be sustained. If the President does not designate the transfers as OCO, they would revert to base-budget status, BCA caps would be breached, and OMB would implement a sequester to ensure that BCA spending limits are met. This would entail largely across-the-board cuts in total defense resources. Some policymakers have called for increasing BCA caps, as was done by the Ryan-Murray compromise in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-67). If no agreement is reached, a continuing resolution (CR) and government shutdown could be possible.",24,25 "Preparation for Senate Committee Markup. Markup is the legislative stage during which a committee chooses the language of a measure it expects to report to the Senate. Markups are carefully planned in advance to insure that the requirements of Senate rules have been met, political decisions have been made, and administrative issues have been addressed. For more information on legislative process, see http://www.crs.gov/¬øproducts/¬øguides/¬øguidehome.shtml.",55,55 "The Market for Retirement Annuities. A retirement annuity allows an individual to purchase a regular payment stream from an insurance company to last his lifetime. Despite the ability of the product to eliminate the risk that a retiree will outlive his assets, few retirement annuities have been sold in the individual market. In addition, the number of individuals who annuitize their defined contribution retirement plan balances remains small. New products are emerging that would offer alternate annuity designs and make annuity prices more attractive. This report discusses legislation has been proposed in the 109th Congress that would enhance the tax treatment of annuities and encourage the growth of stand-alone annuity and combined annuity and long-term care products.",88,88 "China-North Korea Relations. The People's Republic of China (PRC) plays a key role in U.S. policy toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). The PRC is North Korea's closest ally, largest provider of food, fuel, and industrial machinery, and arguably the country most able to wield influence in Pyongyang. China also is the host of the Six-Party Talks (involving the United States, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia) over North Korea's nuclear program. The close PRC-DPRK relationship is of interest to U.S. policymakers because China plays a pivotal role in the success of U.S. efforts to halt the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, to prevent nuclear proliferation, to enforce economic sanctions, and to ensure that North Korean refugees that cross into China receive humane treatment. Since late 2008, China has been not just the largest, but also the dominant, provider of aid and partner in trade with North Korea. This report provides a brief survey of China-North Korea relations, assesses PRC objectives and actions, and raises policy issues for the United States. While Beijing still maintains its military alliance and continues its substantial economic assistance to Pyongyang, in recent years many PRC and North Korean interests and goals appear to have grown increasingly incompatible. Increasingly, many Chinese officials and scholars appear to regard North Korea as more of a burden than a benefit. However, Beijing's shared interest with Pyongyang in preserving North Korean stability generally has trumped these other considerations. The Obama Administration's public statements have emphasized common interests rather than differences in its policy toward China regarding North Korea. The United States also has been encouraging China to use its influence in Pyongyang to rein in the more provocative actions by North Korea. China's interests both overlap and coincide with those of the United States, but China's primary interest of stability on the Korean peninsula is often at odds with U.S. interest in denuclearization and the provision of basic human rights for the North Korean people. Moreover, North Korean leaders appear to have used this interest to neutralize their country's growing economic dependence on China, the greater North Korea's dependency, the more fearful Chinese leaders may be that a sharp withdrawal of PRC economic support could destabilize North Korea. Since the late 1990s, as long as North Korea has been able to convince Beijing's senior leadership that regime stability is synonymous with North Korea's overall stability, the Kim government has been able to count on a minimum level of China's economic and diplomatic support, as well as some cooperation along their border region to ensure that the number and activities of North Korean border-crossers do not spiral out of control. Beijing and Pyongyang are currently going through a period of amicable but strained diplomatic and economic relations following the negative response by Beijing to the DPRK's nuclear and missile tests in 2009 and China's support of new United Nations Security Council sanctions directed at North Korea. China also has been concerned that military provocations by the DPRK could trigger a shooting war on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing's proposed solution to DPRK provocations has been more diplomacy and talks. China's enforcement of U.N. sanctions against North Korea is unclear. China has implemented some aspects of the sanctions that relate directly to North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear programs, but Beijing has been less strict on controlling exports of dual use products. Chinese shipments of banned luxury goods to the DPRK continue to increase.",85,85 "Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress. Within the past two decades, prominent foreign policy organizations and foreign policy experts have perceived serious deficiencies in the authorities, organizations, and personnel used to conduct interagency missions that prevent the United States from exercising its power to full advantage. For the 112th Congress, proposals to address these problems may be of interest for their perceived potential not only to enhance performance, but also to save money by streamlining processes, encouraging interagency cooperation, and reducing duplication. These proposals also provide context for current and recent legislation, including the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 (S. 1268 and H.R. 2314) and the Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011 (H.R. 3660), as well as the new Global Security Contingency Fund contained in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1207, H.R. 1540, P.L. 112-81, signed into law December 31, 2011). The FY2012 NDAA requires the President to submit to Congress a ""whole-of-government"" implementation plan. Despite a growing perception during the 1990s that reforms were needed to foster interagency cooperation in missions abroad, it was not until the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, during the presidency of George W. Bush, and subsequent U.S. military interventions that the need became urgent enough to result in significant changes. The earlier first steps of the Clinton Administration toward interagency reform were in short order embraced and then expanded by the Bush Administration, which also implemented reforms of its own. The Barack H. Obama Administration has endorsed these changes and undertaken some of its own. Three problems with the current interagency cooperation system are most commonly cited. These are (1) a government-wide lack of strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities among civilian agencies, (2) a variety of structural deficiencies in the U.S. government for conducting missions abroad that lead to a tendency for ""stove-piping"" responses, with each agency operating independently, and to civilian agencies' reluctance to divert scarce resources, including personnel, from their core missions to interagency missions, and (3) personnel who are not trained for interagency missions and often unfamiliar with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies. This report draws on over three dozen studies with recommendations to improve the current national security system. The studies surveyed include three prepared by the Project on National Security Reform, with comprehensive recommendations, four prepared or co-sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and two by RAND in conjunction with the American Academy of Diplomats, as well as reports by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Defense Science Board, the National Defense University, and others. This report draws from these studies, as well as a few articles, for recommendations to improve strategy-making, planning, and budgeting, to improve institutional authorities, structures, and arrangements, and to create interagency personnel policies and mechanisms. As the breadth and variety of the recommendations indicate, there is no consensus on how to fix the perceived problems. Nor is there agreement among policymakers on a number of overarching questions: whether interagency reform is necessary for missions abroad, which proposals are considered highest priority, whether reforms would save money, and whether reform of congressional organization or procedures must accompany other national security reform measures.",78,80 "Detainee Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Bills. The House and Senate bills competing to become the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 contain a subtitle addressing issues related to detainees at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and more broadly, hostilities against Al Qaeda and other entities. At the heart of both bills' detainee provisions appears to be an effort to confirm or, as some observers view it, expand the detention authority that Congress implicitly granted the President via the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40) in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. H.R. 1540, as passed by the House of Representatives on May 26, 2011, contains provisions that would reaffirm the conflict and define its scope, impose specific restrictions on the transfer of any non-citizen wartime detainee into the United States, place stringent conditions on the transfer or release of any Guantanamo detainee to a foreign country, and require that any foreign national who has engaged in an offense related to a terrorist attack be tried by military commission if jurisdiction exists. In June, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its initial version of the bill, S. 1253, which included many provisions similar to the House bill, but also included a provision requiring the military detention of certain terrorist suspects. Consideration of the bill was delayed after the the White House and the chairs of other Senate committees objected to some of the provisions. The Senate Armed Services Committee reported a second version of the authorization bill, addressing some, but not all of the concerns. The new bill, S. 1867, would authorize the detention of certain categories of persons and require the military detention of a subset of them, regulate status determinations for persons held pursuant to the AUMF, regardless of location, regulate periodic review proceedings concerning the continued detention of Guantanamo detainees, and continue current funding restrictions that relate to Guantanamo detainee transfers to foreign countries. Unlike the House bill, the Senate bill would not bar the transfer of detainees into the United States for trial or perhaps for other purposes. On December 1, 2011, the Senate passed S. 1867. During floor debate, significant attention centered on the extent to which the bill and existing law permit the military detention of U.S. citizens believed to be enemy belligerents. A single amendment was made to the detainee provisions to clarify that the bill's affirmation of detention authority under the AUMF was not intended to affect any existing authorities relating to the detention of U.S. citizens or lawful resident aliens, or any other persons captured or arrested in the United States. The Senate subsequently passed H.R. 1540, with the Senate bill's language inserted in place of the original provisions. Differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions of the bill will be considered in conference. The White House has been critical of aspects of each bill, and has threatened to veto any legislation ""that challenges or constrains the President's critical authorities to collect intelligence, incapacitate dangerous terrorists, and protect the Nation."" In particular, the Administration has expressed strong opposition to any provision which mandates the military detention of certain categories of persons, limits executive discretion as to the appropriate forum to prosecute terrorist suspects, or constrains its ability to transfer detainees from U.S. custody. This report offers a brief background of the salient issues raised by H.R. 1540 and S. 1867 regarding detention matters, provides a section-by-section analysis of the relevant subdivision of each bill, and compares the bills' approaches with respect to the major issues they address.",26,24 "Energy and Water Development: FY2013 Appropriations. The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), for the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the Department of Energy (DOE), and for a number of independent agencies. President Obama's FY2013 budget request for Energy and Water Development was released in February 2012. For FY2013 the level of overall spending has been a major issue. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25) contained an overall discretionary spending cap for FY2013 of $1.047 trillion. On March 29, 2012, the House passed a budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 112) that caps spending at a lower level, $1.028 trillion. The Senate has not passed a budget resolution, but on April 19, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee allotted subcommittee funding levels that totaled the $1.047 trillion cap in the BCA. The difference between overall spending caps is reflected in differences in spending proposals for Energy and Water Development programs. The Administration's request for FY2013 was $33.684 billion. On April 25, the House Appropriations Committee reported out H.R. 5325 (H.Rept. 112-462), with a total of $32.156 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out S. 2465 (S.Rept. 112-164) on April 26, funding Energy and Water Development programs at $33.432 billion. On June 6 the House passed H.R. 5325 by a vote of 255-165, with some amendments. On September 28, 2012, President Obama signed into law the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013 (P.L. 112-175). The act continues appropriations until March 27, 2013, for Energy and Water Development programs at 0.612% above the FY2012-enacted levels, with several exceptions. On March 26, 2013, the President signed H.R. 933, the FY2013 Defense and Military Construction/VA, Full Year Continuing Resolution (P.L. 113-6). The act funds Energy and Water Development accounts at the FY2012 enacted level for the rest of FY2013, with some exceptions, and subject to the sequestration requirements of the Budget Control Act which went into effect March 1, 2013. In addition, issues specific to Energy and Water Development programs included the distribution of appropriations for Corps (Title I) and Reclamation (Title II) projects that have historically received congressional appropriations above Administration requests alternatives to the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, which the Administration has abandoned (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal), and proposed FY2013 spending levels for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs (Title III) that are 25% higher in the Administration's request than the amount appropriated for FY2012.",59,59 "Patent Quality and Public Policy: Issues for Innovative Firms in Domestic Markets. The administration of United States Patent and Trademark Office (""USPTO"") concerns issues of resource availability and management, as well as need to identify and prioritize the goals of federal patent examination procedures. This report focuses upon this latter issue. There are currently at least three competing views concerning USPTO priorities. One position is that the USPTO should aim to achieve a high level of patent quality. Government, industry, academia and the patent bar alike have traditionally agreed that the USPTO approve only those patent applications that fully describe and clearly claim an inventive advance. High quality patents fully disclose and distinctly claim a new, useful and unobvious invention, thereby meeting each of the statutory requirements under the Patent Act. Some commentators have challenged the notion that high patent quality should be a priority goal. They believe that interested private parties are often able to assess the robustness and value of individual patents more easily than the USPTO, making a USPTO ""hard look"" during its examination procedures economically inefficient. Moreover, because relatively few patents are ultimately licensed or the subject of litigation, other observers have argued that it may be inefficient to conduct rigorous examination proceedings for all patents. These varying perspectives hold implications for the administration of the patent system. Each of three views possesses its merits and shortcomings. Uniformly high levels of patent quality may be difficult for the USPTO to maintain in light of budget constraints and increasing workloads. However, improvidently granted patents may lead to certain social costs. Stringent patent grant proceedings could potentially limit some of these costs. Legislation introduced before the 107th Congress bears upon the patent quality issue. In the event that Congress further considers this issue, USPTO administrative practices may be reviewed with an eye towards their capability for maintaining high levels of patent quality within current resource constraints. Congress may wish to consider whether patent examiners have appropriate resources and training that will allow them to conduct a rigorous review of patent applications. The responsibilities of patent applicants to contribute to quality patent examination may also be weighed. Finally, Congress might choose to assess the contributions members of the general public might make within an optimal patent examination regime, for example, by encouraging interested third parties to comment upon pending patent applications.",9,9 "Gun Control, Veterans Benefits, and Mental Incompetency Determinations. On March 16, 2017, the House of Representatives passed the Veterans 2nd Amendment Protection Act (H.R. 1181) by a roll call vote (240-175). Under H.R. 1181, the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) would be prohibited from determining any beneficiary for whom a fiduciary is appointed, because he or she ""lacks the capacity to contract or handle his or her own affairs,"" as ""adjudicated as a mental defective"" for the purposes of gun control, unless a magistrate or judicial authority also rules that the beneficiary is a danger to himself or herself or others. Pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 1993 (Brady Act, P.L. 103-159), since 1998, the VA has provided records on beneficiaries for whom a fiduciary has been appointed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for inclusion in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Pursuant to the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA, P.L. 110-180), the VA was required to notify beneficiaries of the ramifications of mental incompetency determinations and a potential loss of their gun rights, as well as provide those beneficiaries with an avenue of administrative relief, by which they could appeal such determinations and have their rights restored. In the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255), Congress included a provision that codified certain VA procedures related to mental incompetency determinations and potential loss of gun rights. Since 2008, however, the legislative history also shows that some Members of Congress have viewed those VA procedures, even after the implementation of NIAA provisions, as inadequate. From the 110th through the 113th Congresses, proposals similar to H.R. 1181 were reported from committee, passed either the House or Senate, or both. In the 114th Congress, related amendments were considered, but not passed, on the Senate floor in the wake of mass shooting incidents in December 2015 in San Bernardino, CA, and in June 2016 in Orlando, FL. In the 115th Congress, moreover, a measure was passed that vacated a final rule issued by the Social Security Administration (SSA) in December 2016 that would have established parallel but different procedures for Social Security disability programs and NICS referrals (P.L. 115-8). Under the vacated rule, SSA disability beneficiaries who were appointed a ""representative payee"" to handle their day-to-day affairs and whose disability could be tied to a mental impairment would have been referred to the FBI for inclusion in NICS. According to the FBI, as of December 31, 2016, federal departments and agencies had contributed 173,083 records in the NICS index ""adjudicated mental health"" file, of which the VA contributed 167,815 (98.1%). Supporters of H.R. 1181 view the existing VA procedures as an incongruity in the law. They ask why the VA is the only federal department or agency that has made substantial numbers of NICS referrals to the FBI based on mental incompetency determinations, even though other federal agencies that provide similar disability and income security benefits have not done so. In their opinion, this seeming incongruity calls into question whether the VA benefit claims and disability rating procedures are substantive enough on their own to justify the taking of a constitutionally enumerated right like the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. Opponents of H.R. 1181 contend that the VA has complied with the Brady Act and NIAA and that public safety is enhanced by its NICS referrals to the FBI. They contend further that the VA procedures act to protect VA beneficiaries from the harm that might result if they acquired firearms and used them improperly due to reasons possibly related to their mental incompetency. In their view, moreover, Congress seconded the VA procedures by codifying them in P.L. 114-255.",97,97 "China-U.S. Trade Issues. U.S.-China economic ties have expanded substantially since China began reforming its economy and liberalizing its trade regime in the late 1970s. Total U.S.-China merchandise trade rose from $2 billion in 1979 (when China's economic reforms began) to $636 billion in 2017. China is currently the United States' largest merchandise trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its biggest source of imports. In 2015, sales by U.S. foreign affiliates in China totaled $482 billion. Many U.S. firms view participation in China's market as critical to their global competitiveness. U.S. imports of lower-cost goods from China greatly benefit U.S. consumers. U.S. firms that use China as the final point of assembly for their products, or use Chinese-made inputs for production in the United States, are able to lower costs. China is also the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities (at $1.2 trillion as of April 2018). China's purchases of U.S. debt securities help keep U.S. interest rates low. Despite growing commercial ties, the bilateral economic relationship has become increasingly complex and often fraught with tension. From the U.S. perspective, many trade tensions stem from China's incomplete transition to a free market economy. While China has significantly liberalized its economic and trade regimes over the past three decades, it continues to maintain (or has recently imposed) a number of state-directed policies that appear to distort trade and investment flows. Major areas of concern expressed by U.S. policymakers and stakeholders include China's alleged widespread cyber economic espionage against U.S. firms, relatively ineffective record of enforcing intellectual property rights (IPR), discriminatory innovation policies, mixed record on implementing its World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, extensive use of industrial policies (such as subsidies and trade and investment barriers) to promote and protect industries favored by the government, and interventionist policies to influence the value of its currency. Many U.S. policymakers argue that such policies adversely impact U.S. economic interests and have contributed to U.S. job losses in some sectors. The Trump Administration has pledged to take a more aggressive stance to reduce U.S. bilateral trade deficits, enforce U.S. trade laws and agreements, and promote ""free and fair trade,"" including in regard to China. On March 8, 2018, President Trump announced a proclamation imposing additional tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%), based on Section 232 national security justifications (China is the world's largest producer of both of these commodities). On April 1, China announced that it had retaliated against the U.S. action by raising tariffs (from 15% to 25%) on various U.S. products, which together totaled $3 billion in 2017. On March 22, President Trump announced that action would be taken against China under Section 301 over its IPR policies deemed harmful to U.S. stakeholders. In addition, he stated that he would seek commitments from China to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance and to achieve ""reciprocity"" on tariff levels. On June 15, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced a two-stage plan to impose 25% ad valorem tariffs on $50 billion worth of Chinese imports. Under the first stage, U.S. tariffs would be increased on $34 billion worth of Chinese products and effective July 6. For the second stage, the USTR proposed increasing tariffs on $16 billion worth of Chinese imports, mainly targeting China's industrial policies. China released its own two-stage list of counter-retaliation of equal magnitude. President Trump then threatened 10% ad valorem tariffs on another $400 billion worth of Chinese products. On July 6, the Trump Administration implemented the first round of tariff increases and China retaliated in kind. These tit-for-tat actions threaten to sharply reduce U.S.-China commercial ties, disrupt global supply chains, raise import prices for U.S. consumers and importers of Chinese inputs, and diminish economic growth in the United States and abroad.",53,53 "Health Coverage Tax Credit. The report describes the expired eligibility criteria, as well as the types of health insurance to which the tax credit may have been applied. It discusses past federal and state roles in administering the HCTC program, and it summarizes analyses on the credit's effectiveness in reaching targeted populations and related equity and efficiency issues. In addition, the report includes a short discussion of relevant current law and summarizes statutory history of the HCTC program.",70,70 "Filling Advice and Consent Positions at the Outset of Recent Administrations, 1981-2009. The length of the appointment processes during presidential transitions has been of concern to observers for more than 30 years. The process is likely to develop a bottleneck during this time due to the large number of candidates who must be selected, vetted, and, in the case of positions filled through appointment by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions), considered by that body. The appointment process has three stages: selection and vetting, nomination and Senate consideration, and presidential appointment. Congress has taken steps to accelerate appointments during presidential transitions. In recent decades, Senate committees have provided for pre-nomination consideration of Cabinet-level nominations, examples of such actions are provided in this report. In addition, recently adopted statutory provisions appear designed to facilitate faster processing of appointments during presidential transitions. Among the new statutory provisions were those enacted by Congress in response to certain 9/11 Commission recommendations, mainly in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Also part of this act was a sense of the Senate resolution stating that nominations to national security positions should be submitted by the President-elect to the Senate by Inauguration Day, and that Senate consideration of all such nominations should be completed within 30 days of submission. The President has certain powers—constitutional recess appointment authority and statutory authority under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998—that he or she could, under certain circumstances, use unilaterally to fill PAS positions on a temporary basis. Analyses of data related to Cabinet and selected subcabinet appointments during the last five transitions from 1981 through 2009 suggest the following: In general, transition-period Cabinet-level nominees were selected, vetted, considered, and confirmed expeditiously, they generally took office shortly after the new President's inauguration. Comparisons among the five transitions suggest that some Presidents announced their Cabinet-position selections sooner than did others, but that this did not appear to affect the pace of the overall appointment process. On average, the interval between election day and final disposition of nominations to selected subcabinet positions was more than twice as long as that of nominations to Cabinet-level positions, though nominees to subcabinet positions in some departments were faster than others. Comparisons among the median intervals for the five transitions suggest that (1) the time required for selection and vetting of nominees for these positions has grown longer, (2) the period of Senate consideration has also grown longer, (3) Senate consideration of nominations is generally faster than the selection and vetting process that precedes it, and (4) the median durations of the appointment process for the George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama transitions were notably longer than for the Reagan transition.",54,54 "Child Care: The Federal Role During World War II. During World War II, the federal government supported a nationwide program of child care centers intended to boost war production by freeing mothers to work. Labor force participation of women grew significantly during the war, and children of working mothers were eligible for the child care service. The centers had a peak enrollment near 130,000 children in 1944. After the federal subsidy ended in February 1946, California, New York City and Philadelphia were the only locations to use public funds to continue child care programs indefinitely. This report describes federal child care initiatives during World War II, and briefly traces the evolution of federal child care policy from the postwar period until today. This report will not be updated.",95,115 Taiwan: Overall Developments and Policy Issues in the 109th Congress. This report discusses the U.S. relations with Taiwan as especially troubled during the 109th Congress in 2005-2006. Two developments concerning Taiwan were particularly nettlesome to U.S. policymakers in 2005-2006.,85,85 "501(c)(3) Organizations: What Qualifies as ""Educational""?. Concern is sometimes expressed that certain entities which qualify for tax-exempt 501(c)(3) status as ""educational"" organizations have abused their exemption by advocating a policy viewpoint. The argument is that these entities should have to present information on both sides of an issue equally and neutrally, without opinion. The term ""educational"" is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). It is defined by regulation to encompass individual instruction, as well as public instruction ""on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community."" The question here is how far can the term ""educational"" be extended? Can a group espousing a viewpoint (i.e., only one side of an issue) be characterized as educational? If so, does the group have to provide factual information to support its statements? Is there some standard for truthfulness and accuracy? The answers are rooted in a Treasury regulation, which provides that an organization that advocates a position or viewpoint can qualify as educational if it presents ""a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts"" so that people can form their own opinions or conclusions. To supplement the regulation's ""full and fair exposition"" standard, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has developed the ""methodology test."" Under it, a method is not ""educational"" if it fails to provide a ""factual foundation"" for the position or viewpoint or ""a development from the relevant facts that would materially aid a listener or reader in a learning process."" There are constitutional implications in how the term ""educational"" is defined. In particular, the denial of tax-exempt status on the basis of an organization's speech could raise issues under the First Amendment. While there is no constitutional requirement that the term ""educational"" encompass every communication protected by the First Amendment, courts will examine the IRS's denial of a tax exemption or other benefit when it is based on the content of the taxpayer's speech in order to ensure the denial was not done for an impermissible reason. Groups that promote controversial positions may be particularly vulnerable to an interpretation of ""educational"" that permits a subjective determination by the IRS as to whether a group's methods of presenting its views are educational. Concern over these issues has led to questions about whether the ""educational"" standard is unconstitutionally vague. While the IRS's methodology test was held to be unconstitutionally vague by a federal appellate court, subsequent court decisions have suggested that the test passes constitutional muster.",102,57 "Social Security Survivors Benefits. Social Security is formally known as the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. This report focuses on the Survivors Insurance component of Social Security. When workers die, their spouses, former spouses, and dependents may qualify for Social Security survivors benefits. This report describes how a worker becomes covered by Survivors Insurance and outlines the types and amounts of benefits available to survivors and eligibility for those benefits. This report also provides current data on survivor beneficiaries and benefits.",116,116 "Senate Rules Restricting the Content of Conference Reports. Two Senate rules affect the authority of conferees to include in their report matter that was not passed by the House or Senate before the conference committee was appointed. Colloquially, such provisions are sometimes said to have been ""airdropped"" into the conference report. First, Rule XXVIII precludes conference agreements from including policy provisions that were not sufficiently related to either the House or the Senate version of the legislation sent to conference. Such provisions are considered to be ""out of scope"" under long-standing Senate rules and precedents. Second, Paragraph 8 of Rule XLIV establishes a point of order that can be raised against ""new directed spending provisions,"" or provisions in a conference report that provide specific items of appropriations or direct spending that were not committed to the conference committee in either the House or Senate versions of the legislation. Both of these restrictions can be enforced on the Senate floor if any Senator chooses to raise a point of order against one or more provisions in a conference report. The process for disposing of either a Rule XXVIII or a Rule XLIV point of order allows the Senate to strike ""out of scope matter"" or ""new directed spending provisions"" from the conference report but agree to the rest of the terms of the compromise. It is not in order, however, for either chamber to alter the text of a conference report, and therefore the process converts the text of the conference compromise minus the ""new matter"" or ""new directed spending provisions"" into an amendment. If the Senate agrees to this amendment, it is then sent to the House for consideration in that chamber. The points of order under Rule XXVIII and Paragraph 8 of Rule XLIV can be waived with the support of three-fifths of all Senators duly chosen and sworn (60 Senators if there is no more than one vacancy). A figure at the end of the report outlines the procedural steps for disposing of these points of order when they are raised against conference reports.",55,55 "Overview of Health Care Changes in the FY2013 Budget Proposal Offered by House Budget Committee Chairman Ryan. On March 20, 2012, House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan released the Chairman's mark of the FY2013 House budget resolution together with his report entitled ""The Path to Prosperity: A Blueprint for American Renewal,"" which outlines his budgetary objectives. On the same day, CBO issued an analysis of the long-term budgetary impact of Chairman Ryan's budget proposal based on specifications provided by House Budget Committee staff. The House Budget Committee considered and amended the Chairman's mark on March 21, 2012, and voted to report the budget resolution to the full House. H.Con.Res. 112 was introduced in the House March 23, 2012, and was accompanied by the committee report H.Rept. 112-421. H.Con.Res. 112 was agreed to by the House on March 29, 2012. A budget resolution provides general budgetary parameters, however, it is not a law. Changes to programs that are assumed or suggested by the budget resolution would still need to be passed by separate legislation. Chairman Ryan's budget proposal, as outlined in his report and in the CBO analysis, suggests short-term and long-term changes to federal health care programs including Medicare, Medicaid, and the health insurance exchanges established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as amended (ACA, P.L. 111-148, P.L. 111-152). Within the 10-year budget window (FY2013-FY2022), the budget proposal assumes that certain ACA provisions would be repealed, including those that expand Medicaid coverage to the non-elderly with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level, and those provisions that establish health insurance exchanges. The proposal would also restructure Medicaid from an individual entitlement program to a block grant program. Beyond the 10-year budget window, beginning in 2023, the budget proposal assumes an increase in the age of eligibility for Medicare and the conversion of Medicare to a fixed federal contribution program. This report summarizes the proposed changes to Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurance as described in H.Con.Res. 112, the accompanying committee report, Chairman Ryan's ""Path to Prosperity"" report, and the CBO analysis. Additionally, it briefly examines the potential impact of the proposed changes on health care spending and coverage.",70,70 "Upcoming Rules Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act: Fall 2010 Unified Agenda. Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agencies for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203, July 21, 2010, hereafter the ""Dodd-Frank Act"") is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified more than 300 provisions in the act that require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation. One way for Congress to identify upcoming Dodd-Frank Act rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, which is published twice each year (spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration, for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The Unified Agenda lists upcoming activities, by agency, in five separate categories or stages of the rulemaking process: the prerule stage, the proposed rule stage, the final rule stage, long-term actions, and completed actions. All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date for the next regulatory action. Each entry also contains an element indicating the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered ""economically significant"" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a ""major"" rule under the Congressional Review Act). This report examines the most recent edition of the Unified Agenda, published on December 20, 2010 (the first edition that RISC compiled and issued after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act). The report identifies upcoming proposed and final rules listed in the Unified Agenda that are expected to be issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act. The Appendix lists these upcoming proposed and final rules in a table. The report also briefly discusses the long-term actions listed in the Unified Agenda, as well as some options for congressional oversight over the Dodd-Frank Act rules.",8,8 "Monuments and Memorials Authorized and Completed Under the Commemorative Works Act in the District of Columbia. Since the enactment of the Commemorative Works Act (CWA) in 1986, Congress has authorized 35 commemorative works to be placed in the District of Columbia or its environs. Nineteen of these works have been completed and dedicated. This report contains a catalog of the 19 authorized works that have been completed and dedicated since 1986. For each memorial, the report provides a rationale for each authorized work, as expressed by a Member of Congress, as well as the statutory authority for its creation, and identifies the group or groups which sponsored the commemoration, the memorial's location, and the dedication date. A picture of each work is also included. The Appendix includes a map showing each completed memorial's location. For more information on the Commemorative Works Act, see CRS Report R41658, Commemorative Works in the District of Columbia: Background and Practice, by Jacob R. Straus, CRS Report R43241, Monuments and Memorials in the District of Columbia: Analysis and Options for Proposed Exemptions to the Commemorative Works Act, by Jacob R. Straus, and CRS Report R43744, Monuments and Memorials Authorized Under the Commemorative Works Act in the District of Columbia: Current Development of In-Progress and Lapsed Works, by Jacob R. Straus.",106,106 "Reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is a small, independent agency with responsibility for investigating transportation accidents, conducting transportation safety studies, issuing safety recommendations, aiding victim's families in aviation disasters, and promoting transportation safety. Near the conclusion of the 109th Congress, a two-year NTSB reauthorization measure, covering fiscal years 2007 and 2008, was enacted (P.L. 109-443). During the 109th Congress, legislation to reauthorize the NTSB for fiscal years 2007-2009 was ordered reported in the House (H.R. 5076) seeking a three-year funding reauthorization for FY2007 through FY2009, that included a 22% increase to authorized funding levels in FY2008 compared to FY2007 requested levels, largely to support a proposed staffing increase of about 19%. In contrast, the Senate initially passed a two-year reauthorization bill (S. 3679) in September, 2006, covering FY2007 and FY2008, that paralleled the administration's FY2007 funding request, but did not provide the increase sought in FY2008, instead proposing to maintain staffing at current levels through FY2008. The NTSB indicated in reauthorization hearing testimony that a staffing increase was needed to effectively carry out its mission. P.L. 109-443 authorizes funding in FY2007 slightly above the President's requested appropriation level, and authorizes a 13.5% increase in the authorized level in FY2008, compared to FY2007. Actual funding levels, however, are dependent on amounts specified in appropriations legislation. In addition to setting funding authorization levels, P.L. 109-443 extends and expands provisions that relax certain contracting requirements for investigation-related services, establishes various reimbursements to the NTSB as offsetting collections that are available until expended, and authorizes reimbursable payment from the NTSB for Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG) investigations and audits of the NTSB. The act also requires the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to submit a report explaining why it has not implemented NTSB's most wanted aviation-related transportation safety improvements, and charges the GAO with the responsibility of evaluating and auditing NTSB programs, operations, and activities on an annual basis, or more frequently if determined necessary. The act also directs the DOT OIG to conduct oversight and investigations related to the Boston Central Artery Tunnel project. While not formally addressed during reauthorization debate, two other prominent issues involving the NTSB may come under congressional scrutiny: concerns over industry stakeholders lobbying NTSB officials in attempts to influence the scope or language of NTSB investigative findings, and the NTSB's heavy reliance on experts from transportation entities with a vested interest in the outcome of an investigation for fact gathering and data analysis. Some experts argue that the NTSB should instead create stronger ties with government laboratories and academic institutions for expertise to lessen the chances that bias, or the perception of bias, could creep into the accident-investigation process. This report will not be updated.",120,120 "Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues. News reports in the late 1990s and early 2000s drew attention to a phenomenon sometimes called corporate ""inversions"" or ""expatriations"": instances where U.S. firms reorganize their structure so that the ""parent"" element of the group is a foreign corporation rather than a corporation chartered in the United States. The main objective of these transactions was tax savings and they involved little to no shift in actual economic activity. Bermuda and the Cayman Islands (countries with no corporate income tax) were the location of many of the newly created parent corporations. These types of inversions largely ended with the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (JOBS Act, P.L. 108-357), which denied the tax benefits of an inversion if the original U.S. stockholders owned 80% or more of the new firm. The act effectively ended shifts to tax havens where no real business activity took place. However, two avenues for inverting remained. The act allowed a firm to invert if it has substantial business operations in the country where the new parent was to be located, the regulations at one point set a 10% level of these business operations. Several inversions using the business activity test resulted in Treasury regulations in 2012 that increased the activity requirement to 25%, effectively closing off this method. Firms could also invert by merging with a foreign company if the original U.S. stockholders owned less than 80% of the new firm. Two features made a country an attractive destination: a low corporate tax rate and a territorial tax system that did not tax foreign source income. Recently, the UK joined countries such as Ireland, Switzerland, and Canada as targets for inverting when it adopted a territorial tax. At the same time the UK also lowered its rate (from 25% to 20% by 2015). Several high-profile companies had more recently indicated an interest in merging with a non-U.S. headquartered company, including Pfizer, Chiquita, AbbVie, and Burger King. This ""second wave"" of inversions again raises concerns about an erosion of the U.S. tax base. Chiquita and AbbVie have canceled their plans in the wake of new Treasury regulations, but Burger King and other firms are continuing merger plans. Pfizer subsequently terminated its planned merger with Allergan after Treasury regulations issued in 2016. Two policy options have been discussed in response: a general reform of the U.S. corporate tax and specific provisions to deal with tax-motivated international mergers. Some have suggested that lowering the corporate tax rate as part of broader tax reform would slow the rate of inversions. Although a lower rate would reduce the incentives to invert, it would be difficult to reduce the rate to the level needed to stop inversions, especially given the effect of the revenue loss on the budget. Other tax reform proposals suggest that if the United States moved to a territorial tax, the incentive to invert would be eliminated. There are concerns that a territorial tax could worsen the profit-shifting that already exists among multinational firms. The second option is to directly target inversions: H.R. 1931, H.R. 3434, and S. 1636 would treat all mergers as U.S. firms if the U.S. shareholders maintain control of the merged company, as well as impose other restrictions. S. 1673 would tax accumulated earnings of inverting firms. H.R. 1932 and S. 851 would include anti-inversion provisions as part of a broader proposal to address tax havens and deferral. H.R. 3603 would address earnings-stripping of inverted corporations. H.R. 3424 would disallow federal contracts for inverted firms. H.R. 1451 and S. 586 would make major changes in the tax treatment of foreign source income and tighten existing anti-inversion rules. On September 22, 2014, the Treasury announced regulatory measures to limit some of the benefits of inversions. Additional regulatory measures were announced on November 19, 2015, and April 4, 2016. Evidence from news accounts and statistical data suggest that inversions have declined.",102,10 "H.R. 1 Full-Year FY2011 Continuing Resolution: Overview of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Provisions. P.L. 112-10, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1473), enacted April 15, 2011, provided $8.70 billion for EPA for FY2011 prior to a 0.2% across-the-board rescission. None of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2011, including the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies bill that includes funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), were enacted before the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2010. Prior to the enactment of P.L. 112-10, a series of temporary continuing resolutions (CRs) were enacted that sequentially extended funding from October 1, 2010, through April 15, 2011 (P.L. 112-8). Passed by the House on February 19, 2011, Division B of H.R. 1 would have funded 11 of the 12 regular FY2011 appropriations bills in the form of a full-year continuing resolution (CR) (Division A separately would have provided FY2011 appropriations for the Department of Defense, the 12th bill). Several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions were the focus of considerable attention during committee hearings and floor debate on EPA FY2011 appropriations, and were reflected in a number of provisions and amendments included in House-passed H.R. 1. These EPA actions cut across the various environmental pollution control statutes' programs and initiatives, such as those that address greenhouse gas emissions, hazardous air pollutants (including mercury), mountaintop mining regulation, management of coal ash, particulate matter emissions, and water quality management including geographical ecosystems (notably Chesapeake Bay and the Great Lakes). Although Congress did not include the provisions in P.L. 112-10, these environmental regulatory issues remain a prominent topic of debate as Congress deliberates on the FY2012 appropriations and other proposed legislation regarding EPA's authorities. Title VII of Division B in H.R. 1, as passed by the House, included specified funding levels for certain EPA accounts. Title VII of Division B, as well as Division D of the House-passed bill, combined contained more than 20 provisions that would have restricted or prohibited the use of appropriated funds to implement various regulatory activities under the EPA's jurisdiction. On March 9, 2011, the Senate did not pass the House version of H.R. 1 and did not agree to a subsequent Senate substitute amendment (S.Amdt. 149) containing different funding levels and generally omitting the EPA provisions included in the House-passed H.R. 1. This report provides a summary of funding levels for EPA accounts and program activities specified in P.L. 112-10, H.R. 1 as passed by the House and as proposed in the Senate amendment, compared to the President's FY2011 Budget Request and the FY2010 enacted levels in P.L. 111-88. The report also briefly highlights a number of the provisions regarding EPA program activities as presented in H.R. 1, as passed by the House. Only those provisions that are clearly identifiable by specific language or references contained in the bill are included. Nearly all of these EPA provisions were omitted from the Senate amendment (S.Amdt. 149) and P.L. 112-10 as enacted. The information presented throughout this report is primarily an extraction of the bill language for purposes of reference and is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of all provisions in H.R. 1 that may have directly or indirectly affected EPA programs.",45,45 "The Southwest Pacific: U.S. Interests and China's Growing Influence. This report focuses on the 14 sovereign nations of the Southwest Pacific, or Pacific Islands region, and the major external powers (the United States, Australia, New Zealand, France, Japan, and China). It provides an explanation of the region's main geographical, political, and economic characteristics and discusses United States interests in the Pacific and the increased influence of China, which has become a growing force in the region. The report describes policy options as considered at the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders, held in Washington, DC, in March 2007. Although small in total population (approximately 8 million) and relatively low in economic development, the Southwest Pacific is strategically important. The United States plays an overarching security role in the region, but it is not the only provider of security, nor the principal source of foreign aid. It has relied upon Australia and New Zealand to help promote development and maintain political stability in the region. Key components of U.S. engagement in the Pacific include its territories (Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa), the Freely Associated States (Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau), military bases on Guam and Kwajalein atoll (Marshall Islands), and relatively limited aid and economic programs. Some experts argue that U.S. involvement in the Southwest Pacific has waned since the end of the Cold War, leaving a power vacuum, and that the United States should pay greater attention to the region and its problems. They contend that in some Pacific Island countries, weak political and legal institutions, corruption, civil unrest, and economic scarcity could lead to the creation of failed states or allow for foreign terrorist activity within their borders. According to some observers, unconditional and unregulated foreign aid and business investment from China and Taiwan, which may be attractive to some Pacific Island states, may exacerbate underlying political, social, and economic tensions in the region. While China's influence is largely limited to diplomatic and economic ""soft power,"" many analysts disagree about the PRC's long-term intentions. In 2007, the Bush Administration pledged to ""re-engage"" with the region and declared 2007 the ""Year of the Pacific."" Among the main topics, aims, and initiatives under discussion at the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders were: expanding U.S. public diplomacy efforts and foreign aid activities, strengthening U.S.-Pacific trade and preferential trade programs for Pacific Island countries, addressing global warming and other environmental concerns in the region, and enhancing educational and cultural exchanges. Several bills to increase U.S. foreign aid to the region have been introduced in the 110th Congress. This report will be updated as warranted.",85,85 "WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), finalized in December 2013, is the newest international trade agreement in the World Trade Organization (WTO), having entered into force on February 22, 2017, when two-thirds of WTO members, including the United States, ratified the multilateral agreement. Congress has an interest in the TFA since it may affect U.S. trade flows, the U.S. economy, and international capacity building efforts. Trade facilitation measures aim to simplify and streamline international trade procedures to allow the easier flow of trade across borders and thereby reduce the costs of trade. There is no precise definition of trade facilitation, even in the WTO agreements. Trade facilitation can be defined narrowly as improving administrative procedures at the border or more broadly to also encompass behind-the-border measures and regulations. The TFA aims to address multiple trade barriers confronted by exporters and importers, whether small and medium-sized enterprises engaged in e-commerce or large multinational firms managing complex global supply chains. These barriers include the lack of transparency on process and documentation requirements for exporting to a given country. According to WTO estimates, global export gains from full implementation of the TFA could range from $750 billion to more than $3.6 trillion dollars per year. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) finds that TFA implementation could lower trade costs as much as 12.5%-17.5% globally. Different sets of indicators and indices by various international organizations exist to measure levels of trade facilitation and could be used to monitor TFA effects. The TFA has three sections. The first section is the heart of the agreement, containing the provisions, of which many, but not all, are binding and enforceable. The second section provides for special and differential treatment for developing country members and least-developed country members, allowing them more time and assistance to implement the agreement. The TFA is the first WTO agreement in which members determine their own implementation schedules and in which progress in implementation is explicitly linked to technical and financial capacity. The TFA requires that ""donor members,"" including the United States, provide the needed capacity building and support to developing and least-developed members. Finally, the third section of the agreement contains the institutional arrangements for administering the TFA. Existing and proposed U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) include trade facilitation commitments. While the WTO TFA and U.S. FTAs share common features, there are also differences. U.S. FTAs generally include more enforceable provisions and specific time frames, and do not include special and differential treatment for developing country participants. U.S. implementation of the TFA does not require changes from current processes, including planned efforts to update U.S. systems. In the United States, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) seeks to balance its overarching objectives of promoting efficient trade flows with enforcing trade laws designed to protect consumers from dangerous and unlawful imports, and collecting customs duties. The CBP uses several instruments to collect information aimed at knowing who is importing and what types of goods are being imported, including the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), and the International Trade Data System (ITDS). This report provides an overview of the TFA, its provisions, and the United States' implementation and role in capacity building, and provides options for Congress to consider in relation to the TFA.",53,53 "Senate Committee Funding: Description of Process and Analysis of Disbursements. Funding for Senate committees (except for the Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on Ethics) follows a two-step process of authorization and appropriation. Operating budgets for all standing and select committees of the Senate (except for the Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on Ethics) are authorized pursuant to a simple resolution, and funding is provided in the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill and other appropriation acts. On February 28, 2017, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to S.Res. 62, which authorized a total of $198.2 million for committee expenses, including $57.8 million for the March 2017-September 2017 period, $99.1 million for the October 2017-September 2018 period, and $41.3 million for the October 2018-February 2019 period. Additionally, the resolution authorized up to 7% of the total appropriation for committees to be available as special reserves. The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration has jurisdiction over committee funding resolutions and issues regulations governing committee expenditures and staff. Committee expenditures and staff are also regulated by Senate rules, especially Rule XXVI, paragraph 9, and Rule XXVII, as well as by statute. Information on individual committees' spending is published semi-annually in the Report of the Secretary of the Senate. This report is organized in three sections. The first provides an overview of the committee funding process in the Senate and analyzes funding levels since 2001. The second reviews Senate floor and committee action on committee funding in the 115th Congress. The final section analyzes committee expenditure patterns during five previous Congresses.",55,55 "Sources for Frequently Requested Immigration Statistics. Multiple federal agencies play a role in administering immigration policies and enforcing immigration laws. These agencies make available various statistics related to their immigration work. This report provides guidance in identifying frequently requested immigration data from federal government sources, most of which are publicly available. This report is not a comprehensive listing of all federal immigration statistics. The statistical sources included in this report are organized into five major categories: (1) the foreign-born population in the United States, (2) lawful admissions, (3) naturalization, (4) immigration enforcement, and (5) special populations. A brief overview is given for each category, including definitions of key terms, relevant federal agencies, and examples of common data-related questions. A table listing selected statistical sources follows each overview. In addition, there is an appendix with a glossary of acronyms and abbreviations.",76,76 "Outer Continental Shelf Leasing: Side-by-Side Comparison of Five Legislative Proposals. This report provides a side-by-side comparison of three bills and two proposals, each of which addresses oil and gas development in the outer continental shelf (OCS). None of the bills has passed its respective chamber. One of the proposals, H.R. 6899, the ""Comprehensive American Energy Security and Taxpayer Protection Act,"" is expected to come to the House floor the week of September 15, 2008. The moratoria on oil and gas leasing in much of the OCS has become a major issue in Congress and also in the Presidential campaign. This report describes the background of OCS leasing and the various positions taken by proponents and opponents of leasing. It then compares the provisions of three bills that have been introduced with reported summaries of the House proposal and the Senate proposal, the ""New Energy Reform Act of 2008."" On September 16, 2008, the House passed H.R. 6899 by a vote of 236-189 and defeated an alternative bill, H.R. 6709, by a vote of 191-226.",40,40 "Child Nutrition and WIC Programs: A Brief Overview. Federally supported child nutrition programs and initiatives, along with the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (the WIC program) reach more than 40 million children and some 2 million lower-income pregnant/post-partum women. In FY2007, federal spending on these programs totaled over $19 billion. The basic goals of federal child nutrition programs are to improve children's nutrition, increase lower-income children's access to nutritious meals and snacks, and help support the agricultural economy. Child nutrition programs are ""entitlements."" Federal cash funding and commodity support is ""guaranteed"" to schools and other providers based on the number of meals/snacks served, who is served (e.g., free meals for poor children get higher subsidies), and legislatively established (and inflation-indexed) per-meal subsidy rates. On the other hand, the WIC program is a ""discretionary"" grant program where specific annual appropriations to pay for benefits and nutrition services and administration are distributed by formula. In addition to the WIC program (and its ancillary farmers' market program), the child nutrition programs covered in this report include the School Lunch and Breakfast programs (providing federal subsidies for meals served in schools), day-care, summer and other outside-of-school programs assisting sponsors in providing meals/snacks, and payments to states covering administrative oversight costs, expenses for a Fresh Fruit and Vegetable program, the Special Milk program, and various support activities (e.g., various administrative oversight and nutrition education activities). The underlying laws covering child nutrition and WIC programs were last reauthorized in 2004 in the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-265). The next reauthorization is scheduled for 2009. The Administration's FY2010 budget calls for increased funding of approximately $1 billion a year for child nutrition programs (for ""program reforms aimed at improving program access, enhancing the nutritional quality of school meals, expanding nutrition research and evaluation, and improving program oversight""). This report will be updated as warranted by significant changes in the programs covered and major legislative initiatives.",114,114 "Compensatory Time and the Working Families Flexibility Act of 2013. On May 8, 2013, the House passed H.R. 1406, the Working Families Flexibility Act of 2013. If enacted, this bill would amend the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to allow private sector employers to provide future paid leave (compensatory time or comp time) in lieu of overtime wages. Under current law, the FLSA requires employers to pay covered, nonexempt employees one and one-half times their regular hourly wage (""time and a half"") for any hours worked in excess of 40 in a single work week. If enacted, H.R. 1406 would give employers and employees the option to agree to replace overtime wages with one and one-half hours of paid time off for each hour of overtime worked. H.R. 1406 would not affect workers who are not presently covered by, or are exempt from, the overtime provisions of the FLSA such as many executive, administrative, and professional employees. Under H.R. 1406, the replacement of overtime wages with comp time would be optional for both employers and employees. If an employer and an employee (or the representative of the employee) enter into a comp time agreement, either party may terminate the agreement. If such an agreement is terminated, any unused comp time would be converted to a cash payment to the employee. Under a comp time agreement, employees would be permitted to accrue up to 160 hours of comp time. Once a year, employers would be required to convert all unused comp time to a monetary payment. Accrued comp time would also be converted to a monetary payment upon the voluntary or involuntary termination of an employee. If enacted, the comp time provisions of H.R. 1406 would expire five years after enactment. In October 2013, a Senate version of the Working Families Flexibility Act (S. 1623) was introduced. The bill's language was identical to the House-passed version of H.R. 1406. S. 1623 was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions but, as of this writing, has seen no further action.",88,90 "Boumediene v. Bush: Guantanamo Detainees' Right to Habeas Corpus. In the consolidated cases of Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, decided June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion that aliens designated as enemy combatants and detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus. The Court also found that § 7 of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which limited judicial review of executive determinations of the petitioners' enemy combatant status, did not provide an adequate habeas substitute and therefore acted as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas. The immediate impact of the Boumediene decision is that detainees at Guantanamo may petition a federal district court for habeas review of the circumstances of their detention. This report summarizes the Boumediene decision and analyzes several of its major implications for the U.S. detention of alien enemy combatants and legislation that limits detainees' access to judicial review. For discussion of litigation challenging detention policy, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Kenneth R. Thomas, and Michael John Garcia.",94,24 "Trade Promotion Authority and the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement. On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean officials signed the Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. It is one of three free trade agreements currently awaiting submission to Congress for approval and implementing legislation. In June 2010, the Obama Administration announced plans to seek Congress's approval for the KORUS FTA after first engaging in talks with South Korea over U.S. concerns with the agreement as signed, particularly over its provisions involving market access for U.S. autos. The results of these talks are memorialized in three February 10, 2011, documents, which have been collectively referred to as the ""supplemental agreement"" or ""supplementary deal"" to the 2007 KORUS FTA. The Executive, in consultation with Congress, is expected to draft legislation approving and implementing the KORUS FTA and submit the resulting ""implementing bill"" to Congress during the first session of the 112th Congress. This legislation will be entitled to consideration in Congress under expedited (""fast track"") legislative procedures if it satisfies the requirements of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (Trade Act of 2002). In particular, the implementing bill must: (1) approve the agreement ""entered into"" in 2007, and (2) include provisions enacting, amending, or repealing existing U.S. laws only to the extent that the provisions are ""necessary or appropriate"" for the implementation of the agreement ""entered into"" in 2007. Each chamber of Congress, acting independently of the other, has the authority to determine for itself whether the KORUS FTA implementing bill conforms with these requirements. To the extent either the House or the Senate finds that the bill satisfies the terms of the Trade Act of 2002, the bill will be entitled to receive an up-or-down vote without amendment and with limited debate in that chamber. It is difficult to predict with certainty how the 2010 changes might affect Congress's decision to consider the KORUS FTA implementing bill under the fast track procedures. However, the effect of side agreements on the fast track eligibility of the implementing legislation for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may be instructive. In that case, the Executive concluded supplemental agreements to the trade agreement after the agreement was signed and trade promotion authority had expired. These agreements were treated as executive agreements, circumventing the need for their express approval by Congress, but the implementing bill nevertheless authorized U.S. participation in the two agreements. Arguably, the NAFTA supplemental agreements may be characterized as having received congressional approval. Although Members expressed concern about the use of the fast track procedures to consider the NAFTA implementing bill, no Member formally challenged the bill's eligibility for fast track consideration. To challenge the use of the fast track procedures to consider the KORUS FTA implementing bill, a Member must raise an objection. The bill's eligibility for fast track consideration will then be resolved by the chamber in which the objection was raised. Either chamber may also decide, as an exercise of its rulemaking power, to waive, suspend, or repeal its grant of fast track authority. If the KORUS FTA implementing bill is deemed ineligible for—or otherwise denied—fast track consideration, the bill, in its entirety, may be considered under the regular procedures of each chamber. Under these procedures, the bill, like other pieces of legislation, might not be brought up for a vote or might be passed with amendments. The Jordan Free Trade Agreement was statutorily implemented under regular procedures.",53,53 "The Budget Reconciliation Process: Stages of Consideration. The purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress’s ability to bring existing spending, revenue, and debt limit laws into compliance with current fiscal priorities and goals established in the annual budget resolution. In adopting a budget resolution, Congress is agreeing upon its budgetary goals for the upcoming fiscal year. Because it is in the form of a concurrent resolution, however, it is not presented to the President or enacted into law. As a consequence, any statutory changes concerning spending or revenues that are necessary to implement these policies must be enacted in separate legislation. Budget reconciliation is an optional congressional process that operates as an adjunct to the budget resolution process and occurs only if reconciliation instructions are included in the budget resolution. Reconciliation instructions are the means by which Congress can establish the roles that specific committees will play in achieving these budgetary goals. Reconciliation consists of several different stages, which are described in this report. For more information on budget reconciliation bills enacted into law, please see CRS Report R40480, Budget Reconciliation Measures Enacted Into Law: 1980-2010, by Megan S. Lynch.",55,101 "Class Actions and Proposed Reform in the 107th Congress: Class Action Fairness Act of 2002. On March 13, 2002, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2002 (H.R. 2341) passed the House by a vote of 233-190. Similar legislation is pending in the Senate (S. 1712). Both bills allow defendants to move certain class action cases from state to federal court on diversity grounds (plaintiffs from different states than defendants) even in the absence of the complete diversity. Proponents contend that existing law permits unfair forum shopping for friendly state courts. Opponents argue that the change works to the disadvantage of consumers. Both bills afford consumers and other class action plaintiffs greater protection which includes: (1) notices to class members in ""Plain English,"" (2) judicial scrutiny of settlements in which class members receive minimal benefits or actually incur losses, (3) elimination of inequitable discrimination in favor of class agents at the expense of other class members, (4) prompt consideration of interstate class actions, and (5) application of the principles of federal diversity jurisdiction to interstate class actions. H.R. 2341 requires (1) plaintiffs' attorneys to disclose their fees in any class action settlement or final judgment favoring plaintiffs, (2) prevents judges from sealing records in class action settlements except for orders consistent with the public interest and narrowly drawn, (3) directs the Judicial Conference to study ways to improve class action attorney's fee arrangements and (4) authorizes pre-trial appeals of district court decisions to grant or deny certification to a class. S. 1712 insists on none of these things, but unlike H.R. 2341, it does postpone the effective date of any class action settlement until 90 days after federal and state authorities have been notified of its provisions.",92,94 "Chesapeake Bay Restoration: Background and Issues for Congress. The Chesapeake Bay (the Bay) is the largest estuary in the United States. It is recognized as a ""Wetlands of International Importance"" by the Ramsar Convention, a 1971 treaty about the increasing loss and degradation of wetland habitat for migratory waterbirds. The Chesapeake Bay estuary resides in a more than 64,000-square-mile watershed that extends across parts of Delaware, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The Bay's watershed is home to more than 18 million people and thousands of species of plants and animals. A combination of factors has caused the ecosystem functions and natural habitat of the Chesapeake Bay and its watershed to deteriorate over time. These factors include centuries of land-use changes, increased sediment loads and nutrient pollution, overfishing and overharvesting, the introduction of invasive species, and the spread of toxic contaminants. In response, the Bay has experienced reductions in economically important fisheries, such as oysters and crabs, the loss of habitat, such as underwater vegetation and sea grass, annual dead zones, as nutrient-driven algal blooms die and decompose, and potential impacts to tourism, recreation, and real estate values. Congress began to address ecosystem degradation in the Chesapeake Bay in 1965, when it authorized the first wide-scale study of water resources of the Bay. Since then, federal restoration activities, conducted by multiple agencies, have focused on reducing pollution entering the Chesapeake Bay, restoring habitat, managing fisheries, protecting sub-watersheds within the larger Bay watershed, and fostering public access and stewardship of the Bay. Congress has authorized various programs and activities to restore the Chesapeake Bay, including the Chesapeake Bay Program (CBP), created in 1983. The CBP implements the Chesapeake Bay Agreement, a periodically renewed agreement between executives in the watershed states, a joint Bay state legislative body, and select federal agencies that aims to coordinate Bay restoration efforts. The most recent agreement was signed in 2014 (known as the 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement) and set a series of restoration goals and actions to be completed by 2025. The 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement, like others in the past, is not binding. Other restoration plans—including the 2010 Chesapeake Bay Strategy for Protecting and Restoring the Chesapeake Bay Watershed (pursuant to President Obama's 2009 Executive Order 13508), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's 2010 Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load, and a draft Comprehensive Plan from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—harmonize with the goals of the 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement and contain objectives for federal agencies and states. As work continues toward the 2025 restoration goals set by state and federal plans, Congress may consider what role the federal government plays in Chesapeake Bay restoration, if any. In considering the federal role in Chesapeake Bay restoration, Congress may weigh issues related to coordination of federal activities and federal agency authority, funding and total cost of activities, and the rate of progress toward restoration.",41,41 "China's Auto Sector Development and Policies: Issues and Implications. The automobile industry, a key sector in China's industrialization and modernization efforts, has been developing rapidly since the 1990s. In recent years, China has become the world's largest automotive producer, with annual vehicle output of over 18 million units in 2011. China is now also the world's biggest market for automobile sales. Meanwhile, China's auto sector development and policies have caused concerns in the United States, from automotive trade, China's failure to effectively enforce trade agreements and laws, to market barriers and government policies that increasingly favor Chinese manufacturers, which could affect business operations and prospects of international companies doing business in (or with) China. China's auto industry has developed extensively through foreign direct investment, which has come in the form of alliances and joint ventures between international automobile manufacturers and Chinese partners. These international automobile manufacturers, who generally dominate the higher end of the Chinese market, have focused on making cars for China's large and fast-growing market. The domestic Chinese automakers, who occupy the lower end of the market, struggle to improve design and quality to expand sales overseas. China exports and imports relatively few vehicles. Most of the cars produced in China stay in China and its vehicle exports are mostly light trucks and passenger cars shipped to developing country markets. Automotive trade between the United States and China has increased in recent years, primarily in auto parts. In 2011, the United States imported over $12 billion in auto parts from China, making it the second-largest source of auto parts for U.S. imports (behind only Japan). Many of these imported parts are aimed at the aftermarket, as most of what China exports to the U.S. market now are standard products such as brake parts and electrical parts. But with high rates of investment and growth in China by the leading U.S. manufacturers of both cars and parts, major motor vehicle companies are increasingly sourcing parts from China. There have been a number of auto sector trade disputes between the United States and China, addressing issues such as China's implementation of its WTO obligations, failure to implement an effective IPR enforcement regime, market barriers such as high tariffs on vehicle imports, export restrictions of raw materials such as rare earths, and various forms of government assistance to domestic auto and parts companies, such as tire producers. An emerging issue is that the Chinese government's policies and measures are becoming increasingly restrictive towards foreign auto companies, while at the same time giving preferential support to its domestic car makers. As the central government designates clean-energy vehicles and their components as one of the seven ""strategic and emerging"" industries (in which it aspires to become a world leader), foreign companies, such as GM, reportedly have been pressured to transfer technology and/or help their Chinese partners to develop these new technologies. These new restrictions and conditions imposed by the Chinese government have caused concerns among global auto companies regarding the business environment in China and how these measures may affect their business operations, growth plans, and competitiveness. This report provides an overview of China's auto sector development: vehicle production, sales, market drivers, foreign and domestic manufacturers, and automotive trade. It examines how the Chinese government policies and measures guide and often direct China's auto sector development. In addition, this report discusses the prospects and implications for global automakers operating in China.",48,53 "Vietnam: Economic Reforms and Commercial Relations with the United States. Vietnam has made considerable progress in implementing economic reforms since 1986. The reforms have nudged Vietnam to a more market-oriented economy and have facilitated higher rates of economic growth, particularly during 1988-1996. Momentum for deepening the reforms, however has stalled in recent years, and since 1997, there has been a significant decline in foreign investment as well as a deterioration in the underlying performance of the economy. To address these problems multilateral institutions and U.S. officials have urged Vietnam's leaders to initiate a second wave of economic reforms that will make its economy more market-oriented and efficient. Vietnam's leaders have moved cautiously in adopting additional economic reforms. Following President Clinton's recommendation of June 3, 1999, to renew Vietnam's Jackson-Vanik waiver for a year, joint resolutions (S.J.Res. 28 and H.J.Res. 58) were introduced to disapprove the renewal. On July 20, 1999, the Senate rejected a motion to discharge S.J.Res. 28 from committee by a vote 5-94, and the House on August 3 voted down H.J.Res 58 by a vote of 130-297. Although the United States and Vietnam on July 25, 1999 reached an ""agreement in principle"" on the terms of a bilateral trade agreement, Vietnam has postponed signing the agreement. The trade agreement is a necessary pre-requisite for the restoration of full normal commercial ties between the two countries. This report will be updated periodically.",85,85 "An Abridged Sketch of Extradition To and From the United States. ""Extradition"" is the formal surrender of a person by a State to another State for prosecution or punishment. Extradition to or from the United States is a creature of treaty. The United States has extradition treaties with over a hundred nations, although there are many countries with which it has no extradition treaty. International terrorism and drug trafficking have made extradition an increasingly important law enforcement tool. Extradition treaties are in the nature of a contract and generate the most controversy with respect to those matters for which extradition may not be had. In addition to an explicit list of crimes for which extradition may be granted, most modern extradition treaties also identify various classes of offenses for which extradition may or must be denied. Common among these are provisions excluding political offenses, capital offenses, crimes that are punishable under only the laws of one of the parties to the treaty, crimes committed outside the country seeking extradition, crimes where the fugitive is a national of the country of refuge, and crimes barred by double jeopardy or a statute of limitations. Extradition is triggered by a request submitted through diplomatic channels. In this country, it proceeds through the Departments of Justice and State and may be presented to a federal magistrate to order a hearing to determine whether the request is in compliance with an applicable treaty, whether it provides sufficient evidence to satisfy probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the identified treaty offense(s), and whether other treaty requirements have been met. If so, the magistrate certifies the case for extradition at the discretion of the Secretary of State. Except as provided by treaty, the magistrate does not inquire into the nature of foreign proceedings likely to follow extradition. The laws of the country of refuge and the applicable extradition treaty govern extradition back to the United States of a fugitive located overseas. Requests travel through diplomatic channels, and the treaty issue most likely to arise after extradition to this country is whether the extraditee has been tried for crimes other than those for which he or she was extradited. The fact that extradition was ignored and a fugitive forcibly returned to the United States for trial constitutes no jurisdictional impediment to trial or punishment. Federal and foreign immigration laws sometimes serve as an alternative to extradition to and from the United States. This is an abbreviated version of CRS Report 98-958, Extradition To and From the United States: Overview of the Law and Contemporary Treaties, by Michael John Garcia and Charles Doyle, without the appendices, footnotes, and citations to authority found in the longer report.",94,92 "The Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve and the National Oilheat Research Alliance. This report discusses the price of home heating oil in the Northeast. The Northeast demand for home heating oil has declined by 47% since 2000, from nearly 7 billion gallons to 3.6 billion gallons in 2011. The report provides detailed information regarding northeast home heating oil reserve and national Oilheat Research Alliance.",40,40 "The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Improvements Act of 2010, As Enacted. This report identifies and examines selected changes that the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 makes to the Post-9/11 GI Bill and other GI Bills, including expanded eligibility.",34,30 "Renewable Energy Policy: Tax Credit, Budget, and Regulatory Issues. High gasoline and natural gas prices have rekindled interest in the role that renewable energy may play in producing electricity, displacing fossil fuel use, and curbing demand for power transmission equipment. Also, worldwide emphasis on environmental problems of air and water pollution and global climate change, the related development of clean-energy technologies in western Europe and Japan, and technology competitiveness may remain important influences on renewable energy policymaking. The Bush Administration's FY2007 budget request for the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Renewable Energy Program seeks $359.2 million, which is $84.0 million, or 30.5%, more than the FY2006 appropriation. In support of the President's proposal for an Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI), the request includes major funding increases for solar energy (to support the Solar America initiative) and biomass (to support the Biorefinery Initiative). The main increases are for Solar Photovoltaics ($79.5 million) and Biomass ($59.0 million). Some significant cuts were also proposed, and the request sought to eliminate earmarks. Appropriations actions by the House and the Senate Appropriations Committee have approved most of the requested FY2007 funding increases for AEI and greatly reduced earmark funding. Compared with House-passed funding, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommendation seeks an increase of $66.1 million (5%). Table 3 shows other differences, most notably those for Biomass & Biorefinery, Geothermal, Hydro, and Weatherization programs. Important regulatory issues have surfaced for wind energy. A major debate has erupted over the safety and economic and environmental aspects of a proposal by Cape Wind Associates to develop an offshore wind farm near Cape Cod, Massachusetts. The parties to the debate are waiting for the results of a Department of Interior (DOI) environmental impact statement and a Coast Guard study of navigational safety aspects. Also, concern that large wind turbines may disrupt radar systems led to federal actions to halt several wind farm developments, pending the results of a study by the Department of Defense (DOD) that was due in early May 2006. In late June 2006, the Sierra Club filed suit to compel completion of the DOD radar study. An agency of the United Kingdom has studied modifications to turbines and radar systems that may help solve the problem. Also, high gasoline prices have stimulated a DOE proposal for aggressive development of cellulosic ethanol as an alternative to gasoline and corn-based ethanol. The focus is on using biotechnology to simplify processes and reduce costs. This report will be updated as events warrant.",37,37 "Japan's Banking ""Crisis"". The Japanese economy is burdened by an overhang of nonperforming bank loans that are officially recognized to total $367.5 billion but could exceed a trillion dollars if all problem loans are taken into account and economic conditions worsen significantly. These bad loans have weakened Japan's already sluggish economy, undermined the strength of the yen, and are exacerbating the slowdown in Asia's economies. In recent years, Japan has averted a replay of the crisis conditions that accompanied earlier failures of financial institutions, but the problem is immense, and restoring health to the balance sheets of Japanese banks remains a top economic policy concern both in Tokyo and in international financial circles. After nearly a decade of repeated attempts to resolve the problem, the current Koizumi government has set a new deadline for banks to write off the worst of the loans within three years even if this causes as many as 200,000 lost jobs and numerous bankruptcies. The United States and Japan have initiated a Financial Dialogue led by the U.S. Treasury to discuss various financial issues - including the bad loan problem - and the Bush Administration has said it would assist Japan in pursuing its economic reforms in any way it can.",85,85 "The Role of HUD Housing Programs in Response to Hurricane Katrina. The catastrophic devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina in late August 2005, and to a lesser degree, Hurricanes Wilma and Rita, led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of families. Following the storm, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) took primary responsibility for meeting the emergency housing needs of displaced families. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the nation's housing agency, also played a role. HUD modified its existing grant programs—primarily through waivers—to make them more flexible for communities wishing to serve displaced families. The department also took steps to aid displaced families that had been homeless or receiving HUD assistance prior to the storm by developing a new voucher program, and by issuing guidance to lenders offering protections for homeowners with FHA-insured mortgages. Finally, Congress has used HUD programs, particularly the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, as a conduit for providing relief and recovery funds to devastated communities. This report details HUD's efforts to provide assistance to affected families and communities immediately after the storm and in the initial rebuilding stages. It will not track HUD's role in the longer-term rebuilding of the devastated areas.",74,11 "Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes. Federal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes limit the discretion of a sentencing court to impose a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment or the death penalty. They have a long history and come in several varieties: the not-less-than, the flat sentence, and piggyback versions. Federal courts may refrain from imposing an otherwise required statutory mandatory minimum sentence when requested by the prosecution on the basis of substantial assistance toward the prosecution of others. First-time, low-level, non-violent offenders may be able to avoid the mandatory minimums under the Controlled Substances Acts, if they are completely forthcoming. The most common imposed federal mandatory minimum sentences arise under the Controlled Substance and Controlled Substance Import and Export Acts, the provisions punishing the presence of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense, the Armed Career Criminal Act, various sex crimes including child pornography, and aggravated identity theft. Critics argue that mandatory minimums undermine the rationale and operation of the federal sentencing guidelines which are designed to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparity. Counter arguments suggest that the guidelines themselves operate to undermine individual sentencing discretion and that the ills attributed to other mandatory minimums are more appropriately assigned to prosecutorial discretion or other sources. State and federal mandatory minimums have come under constitutional attack on several grounds over the years, and have generally survived. The Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause does bar mandatory capital punishment, and apparently bans any term of imprisonment that is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime for which it is imposed. The Supreme Court, however, has declined to overturn sentences imposed under the California three strikes law and challenged as cruel and unusual. Double jeopardy, ex post facto, due process, separation of powers, and equal protection challenges have been generally unavailing. The United States Sentencing Commission's Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (2011) recommends consideration of amendments to several of the statutes under which federal mandatory minimum sentences are most often imposed. Lists of the various federal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are appended, as is a bibliography of legal materials. This report is available in an abridged version as CRS Report RS21598, Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes: An Abbreviated Overview, without the citations to authority, footnotes, or appendixes that appear here.",94,94 "The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established in 2004 to ensure that information from any source about potential terrorist acts against the U.S. could be made available to analysts and that appropriate responses could be planned. Investigations of the 9/11 attacks had demonstrated that information possessed by different agencies had not been shared and thus that disparate indications of the looming threat had not been connected and warning had not been provided. As a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the NCTC is composed of analysts with backgrounds in many government agencies and has access to various agency databases. It prepares studies ranging from strategic assessments of potential terrorist threats to daily briefings and situation reports. It is also responsible, directly to the President, for planning (but not directing) counterterrorism efforts. The NCTC received a statutory charter in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), it currently operates with a staff of more than 500 personnel from its headquarters in northern Virginia. The NCTC Director is appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. Although there have been a number of arrests of individuals suspected of planning terrorist attacks in the U.S., two incidents in 2009—the assassination by an Army Major of some 13 individuals at Fort Hood Army Base on November 5, 2009, and the failed attempt to trigger a bomb on an airliner approaching Detroit on December 25, 2009—contributed to increased concern about counterterrorism capabilities domestically and internationally. An Executive Branch assessment of the December 2009 bombing attempt concluded that, whereas information sharing had been adequate, analysts had failed to ""connect the dots"" and achieve an understanding of an ongoing plot. Attention has focused on the NCTC which is responsible for ensuring both the sharing of information and for all-source analysis of terrorist issues. A review by the Senate Intelligence Committee released in May 2010 found there were systemic failures across the Intelligence Community and, in particular, that the NCTC was inadequately organized and resourced for its missions. In addition, the committee concluded that intelligence analysts (not only those in NCTC) tended to focus more on threats to U.S. interests in Yemen than on domestic threats.",22,22 "Selected Legal and Policy Issues Related to Coalbed Methane Development. Coalbed methane (CBM) has rapidly become a significant source of natural gas in the United States. With growing consumer demand, high natural gas prices, and significant political support for development, the CBM production industry has grown exponentially. Pending legislation, such as the omnibus energy bills, S. 2095 and H.R. 6, would provide additional production incentives. Increased CBM interest has had significant consequences, leading to frequent disputes over CBM ownership, the adequacy of federal leasing process, and federal and local environmental regulation. The federal government owns significant amounts of the economically recoverable CBM mineral estate. Portions of this federally owned resource are, however, contained within ""split estates,"" where a non-federal entity owns the rights to the surface estate. Additionally, the federal land disposal statutes that created these split ownership situations did not always retain all mineral rights. Thus, determining if the federal government owns CBM can be a complicated issue with significant ramifications. Even when ownership is clear, development rights may conflict. Several proposed federal laws, including H.R. 3698, would address many of these issues. When the federal government owns CBM, it is generally available for leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act. These laws establish a complex decision making process that must be accommodated before drilling of federally owned CBM can take place. These laws require a several stage planning and decision making process, which is also subject to the environmental review procedures required by the National Environmental Policy Act. Recent lawsuits have challenged the adequacy of the BLM's compliance with federal leasing requirements, although the few that have reached decision have found BLM's practices to be sound. Environmental impacts attendant to CBM production have received the most widespread attention. CBM production results in extraction of large quantities of water. By depleting underground aquifers, CBM production could have significant impacts on regional water supplies and state water rights law would not appear to currently require the safeguards some argue are necessary. The disposal of produced water is also controversial. It is typically of low quality and has recently been held to constitute a pollutant that must be regulated under the Clean Water Act. Other activities associated with CBM production are equally contentious. In particular, the extraction process known as hydraulic fracturing has been claimed by some to pollute water supplies. At least one federal court has held that the process must be regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act, although proposed federal legislation would exempt the process from coverage. This report will address the major legal issues outlined above as well as the recent cases and pending legislation that may impact CBM development. It will be updated as necessary.",40,40 "Border and Transportation Security: Overview of Congressional Issues. Enhancing border and transportation security (BTS) are essential strategies for improving and maintaining homeland security. Border security entails regulating the flow of traffic across the nation's borders so that dangerous and unwanted goods and people are detected and denied entry. This requires a sophisticated border management system that balances the need for securing the nation's borders with facilitating the essential free flow of legitimate commerce, citizens, and authorized visitors. Transportation security involves securing the flow of people and goods along the nation's highways, railways, airways, and waterways. (For more information on the complexity of the BTS challenge, see CRS Report RL32839, Border and Transportation Security: The Complexity of the Challenge, by Jennifer E. Lake.) While in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 efforts primarily concentrated on an expanded federal role in aviation security (in particular on the heightened screening of passengers and baggage), increasingly attention is being turned towards other modes of transportation. The effective implementation of border and transportation security measures requires the participation of numerous agencies. Federal responsibility for border and transportation security efforts is primarily contained within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS's Border and Transportation Security Directorate houses: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which has responsibility for security at and between ports-of-entry along the border, the Bureau of Customs and Immigration Enforcement (ICE), which has responsibility for investigating and enforcing the nation's customs and immigration laws, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is responsible for the security of the nation's transportation systems. The U.S. Coast Guard is a stand-alone agency within DHS, and has primary responsibility for the maritime components of homeland security (U.S. ports, coastal and inland waterways, and territorial waters). DHS's Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau (USCIS) is charged with approving immigrant petitions. In addition, the Department of State's (DOS) Bureau of Consular Affairs is responsible for issuing visas, and the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has a significant policy role through its adjudicatory decisions on specific immigration cases. For more information on border agencies, see CRS Report RS21899 Border Security: Key Agencies and Their Missions, by Blas Nunez-Neto. For more information on current BTS programs and policies, see CRS Report RL32840, Border and Transportation Security Selected Programs and Policies, by Lisa Seghetti et al. This report provides a summary of the roles and responsibilities of various federal agencies engaged in border and transportation security activities, describes selected concepts and terms prominent in border and transportation security debates, and discusses selected issues that might be of interest to the 109th Congress. For more information on BTS policy options, see CRS Report RL32841, Border and Transportation Security: Possible New Directions and Policy Options, by William Robinson et al. This report will be updated as significant developments occur.",91,91 "Government Assistance for GMAC/Ally Financial: Unwinding the Government Stake. Ally Financial, formerly known as General Motors Acceptance Corporation or GMAC, provides auto financing, insurance, online banking, and mortgage and commercial financing. For most of its history, it was a subsidiary of General Motors Corporation. Like some of the automakers, it faced serious financial difficulties due to a downturn in the market for automobiles during the 2008-2009 financial crisis and recession, while also suffering from large losses in the mortgage markets. With more than 90% of all U.S. passenger vehicles financed or leased, GMAC's inability to lend was particularly threatening to GM's retail sales and dealer-financing capabilities. The Bush and Obama Administrations used the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to provide assistance for the U.S. auto industry, concluding that the failure of one or two large U.S. automakers would cause additional layoffs at a time of already high unemployment, prompt difficulties and failures in other parts of the economy, and disrupt other markets. The decision to aid the auto industry was not without controversy, with questions raised as to the legal basis for the assistance and the manner in which it was carried out. The nearly $80 billion in TARP assistance for the auto industry included approximately $17.2 billion for GMAC, which changed its name to Ally Financial in 2010. The government's aid for GMAC was accomplished primarily through U.S. Treasury purchases of the company's preferred shares. Many of these preferred shares were later converted into common equity, resulting in the federal government acquiring a 73.8% ownership stake. This conversion from preferred to common equity significantly changed the outlook for the future government recoupment of the TARP assistance. After such a conversion, if the government's common equity were to end up being worth less than the assistance provided, the company would have no responsibility to compensate the government for the difference. Conversely, if the common equity were to be worth more than the assistance, the gain from this difference would accrue to the U.S. Treasury (and be used to pay down the national debt, as specified in the TARP statute). Beginning in November 2013, the government's stake in Ally Financial began dropping due to share dilution and the sale of the government's stock through both private placements and open market sales. The final sale of the government's Ally stock was completed in December 2014. With the completion of the sale, the government received a total of $14.7 billion in repayment for its assistance, leading the Treasury to recognize a loss of $2.5 billion. However, the government also received $4.9 billion in dividends and other income due to the TARP assistance to GMAC/Ally Financial. In addition to TARP assistance, during the financial crisis in 2008, GMAC converted from an industrial loan company into a bank holding company, an expedited conversion that was permitted by the Federal Reserve (Fed) due to prevailing emergency conditions in the financial markets. This change increased access to government assistance, including Fed lending facilities and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) guarantees, and also increased regulatory oversight of the company.",5,118 "Water Quality Issues in the 111th Congress: Oversight and Implementation. Although much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established more than 35 years ago in the Clean Water Act (CWA) to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or ""nonpoint"" sources, to toxic substances discharged from factories and sewage treatment plants. There is little agreement among stakeholders about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required to address the nation's remaining water pollution problems. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the CWA have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. Congress has instead focused legislative attention on enacting narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, but not any comprehensive proposals. For several years, the most prominent legislative water quality issue has concerned financial assistance for municipal wastewater treatment projects. House and Senate committees have approved bills on several occasions, but, for various reasons, no legislation has been enacted. At issue has been how the federal government will assist states and cities in meeting needs to rebuild, repair, and upgrade wastewater treatment plants, especially in light of capital costs that are projected to be as much as $390 billion. In the 111th Congress, interest in increased investment in public works infrastructure—including wastewater—in order to stimulate the faltering U.S. economy brought greater attention to water infrastructure issues. Acting quickly, in February 2009, Congress passed and the President signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5). Among its provisions, the legislation appropriated $4.0 billion in additional CWA assistance for wastewater projects. In addition, in March 2009, the House passed legislation to reauthorize the CWA's State Revolving Fund (SRF) program to finance wastewater infrastructure and several related provisions of the act (H.R. 1262). A companion bill was approved by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee (S. 1005). No legislation was enacted. Programs that regulate activities in wetlands also have been of interest, especially CWA Section 404, which has been criticized by landowners for intruding on private land-use decisions and imposing excessive economic burdens. Environmentalists view this regulatory program as essential for maintaining the health of wetland ecosystems, and they are concerned about court rulings that narrowed regulatory protection of wetlands and about related administrative actions. Many stakeholders desire clarification of the act's regulatory jurisdiction, but they differ on what solutions are appropriate. In the 111th Congress, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved a bill that sought to clarify but not expand the CWA's geographic scope (the Clean Water Restoration Act, S. 787). A companion bill was introduced in the House (H.R. 5088). Because some stakeholders believe that the bills would expand federal jurisdiction—not simply clarify it—the bills were controversial, and no legislation was enacted. The 111th Congress considered a number of water quality issues through oversight and legislation. Two bills amending the CWA were enacted and are discussed. One dealt with extending a moratorium for CWA permitting of certain vessels (P.L. 111-215), and the other dealt with ensuring that federal agencies and departments pay localities for reasonable costs associated with managing stormwater pollution from federal properties (P.L. 111-378).",43,44 "The Environmental Protection Agency's FY2004 Budget. For FY2004, the President's budget requested $7.6 billion in budget authority for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), $448 million (or 6%) less than the $8.1 billion current funding level. The House approved $8.0 billion in H.R. 2861 (H.Rept. 108-235) on July 25. Senate action is anticipated in September. The request consisted of $3.1 billion for EPA operating expenses, $3.1 billion for assisting state and local governments, and $1.4 billion for cleaning up Superfund toxic waste sites. Wastewater infrastructure needs and the future of Superfund are prominent topics.",45,45 "Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response. The United States government has implemented a range of programs to counter violent extremist threats in East Africa in response to Al Qaeda's bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and subsequent transnational terrorist activity in the region. These programs include regional and bilateral efforts, both military and civilian. The programs seek to build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities, strengthen aviation, port, and border security, stem the flow of terrorist financing, and counter the spread of extremist ideologies. Current U.S.-led regional counterterrorism efforts include the State Department's East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) and the U.S. military's Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), part of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). The United States has also provided significant assistance in support of the African Union's (AU) peace operations in Somalia, where the country's nascent security forces and AU peacekeepers face a complex insurgency waged by, among others, Al Shabaab, a local group linked to Al Qaeda that often resorts to terrorist tactics. The State Department reports that both Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab pose serious terrorist threats to the United States and U.S. interests in the region. Evidence of linkages between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, highlight another regional dimension of the threat posed by violent extremists in the area. Congress has appropriated increasing counterterrorism assistance for Africa over the past decade, and has demonstrated continued interest in both the nature of the terrorist threat and efforts to counter it through hearings, investigations, and legislation. Questions have been raised regarding the level of U.S. funding and personnel dedicated to these efforts the underlying assumptions on which these programs have been developed cooperation between implementing agencies, and the extent to which U.S. programs actually prevent or mitigate radicalization, recruitment, and support for violent extremist organizations. This report provides an overview of current U.S. counterterrorism assistance programs and influence operations in East Africa and explores some of the strategies underpinning them. It also provides a brief description of the evolving terrorist threat in the region. The security cooperation and civil affairs activities of the U.S. military in the region have grown substantially in the past decade, primarily in response to these threats, and the report explores the various roles of the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, among other agencies, in implementing counterterrorism and counter-extremism programs in the region. The report does not address covert or clandestine operations to collect intelligence or capture or eliminate terrorist targets in the region. Related legislation includes several bills introduced in the aftermath of the July 2010 Kampala bombings: H.Con.Res. 303, H.Res. 1538, and H.Res. 1596, as well as S.Res. 573, on Somalia, S. 3757, on Ethiopia, and H.Res. 1708, on Eritrea. For further information, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins, CRS Report RL33911, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, by Ted Dagne, and CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.",21,86 "Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Issues in Innovation and Competitiveness. Although brand-name pharmaceutical companies routinely procure patents on their innovative medications, such rights are not self-enforcing. Brand-name firms that wish to enforce their patents against generic competitors must therefore commence litigation in the federal courts. Such litigation ordinarily terminates in either a judgment of infringement, which typically blocks generic competition until such time as the patent expires, or a judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed, which typically opens the market to generic entry. As with other sorts of commercial litigation, however, the parties to pharmaceutical patent litigation may choose to settle their case. Certain of these settlements have called for the generic firm to neither challenge the brand-name company's patents nor sell a generic version of the patented drug for a period of time. In exchange, the brand-name drug company agrees to compensate the generic firm, often with substantial monetary payments over a number of years. Because the payment flows counterintuitively, from the patent owner to the accused infringer, this compensation has been termed a ""reverse"" payment. Since 2003, Congress has required that litigants notify federal antitrust authorities of their pharmaceutical patent settlements. That legislation did not dictate substantive standards for assessing the validity of these agreements under the antitrust law, however. That determination was left to judicial application of general antitrust principles. Facing different factual patterns, some lower courts had concluded that a particular reverse payment settlement constituted an antitrust violation, while others have upheld the agreement. The June 17, 2013, decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. resolved this disagreement by holding that the legality of reverse payment settlements should be evaluated under the ""rule of reason"" approach. However, the Court declined to hold that such settlements should be presumptively illegal under a ""quick look"" analysis. The lower courts now face the potentially complex task of applying the rule of reason to reverse payment settlements going forward. Congress possesses a number of alternatives for addressing reverse payment settlements. One possibility is to await further judicial developments. Another option is to regulate the settlement of pharmaceutical patent litigation in some manner. In the 113th Congress, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act (S. 214) would establish a presumption of either legality or illegality under the antitrust laws, along with consideration of relevant factors to be weighed by the courts. Another proposal, the FAIR Generics Act (S. 504), would introduce reforms to the food and drug laws that would reduce incentives for generic firms to settle with brand-name companies.",67,67 "The New Vacancies Act: Congress Acts to Protect the Senate's Confirmation Prerogative. Since at least 1973, the Justice Department (DOJ) has taken the position that any executive department or agency whose authorizing legislation vests all powers and functions of the agency in its head and allows the head to delegate such powers and functions to subordinates in her discretion, does not have to comply with the Vacancies Act, which limits the time during which advice and consent positions may be filled by temporary designees before a nomination is forwarded to the Senate. All executive departments have such provisions. As a consequence, during 1998 some 20% of the 320 advice and consent positions in the departments were being filled by temporary designees, most of whom had served beyond the 120-day limitation period of the Act without presidential submissions of nominations. The designation by the Attorney General of an acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in December 1997 in apparent contravention of the Vacancies Act precipitated congressional hearings and the introduction of legislation in both Houses to remedy the perceived noncompliance. Also, a federal appeals court ruling in March 1998 narrowly construing the Vacancies Act further piqued congressional concerns. On July 15, 1998, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee reported S. 2176, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. Although the bill failed to survive a cloture vote on the floor, a compromise version was included in the FY 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which became law on October 21, 1998 (P.L. 105-277). The new Vacancies Act rejects the DOJ position and makes it the exclusive vehicle for temporarily filling vacant advice and consent positions and provides substantial incentives for the President to send forth timely nominations for Senate consideration.",55,54 "Total Information Awareness Programs: Funding, Composition, and Oversight Issues. Late last year controversy erupted about a Department of Defense (DOD) R&D effort called Total Information Awareness (TIA) under an office headed by retired Admiral John D. Poindexter within the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). By integrating various new tools designed to detect, anticipate, train for, and provide warnings about potential terrorist attacks DARPA hopes to develop a prototype Total Information Awareness system. This system would integrate a number of ongoing R&D efforts, referred to in this paper as Total Information Awareness programs. While concern has centered primarily on privacy issues, accounts of the program's funding have also differed. This report covers the funding, composition, oversight, and technical feasibility of TIA programs. The privacy implications are addressed in CRS Report RL31730 Privacy: Total Information Awareness Programs and Related Information Access, Collection and Protection Laws, by Gina Marie Stevens. In a press interview, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Edward C. ""Pete"" Aldridge, stated that the Total Information Awareness project is funded at $10 million in FY2003 and $20 million in FY2004. Other reports indicated higher funding levels of over $100 million in FY2003 and over $200 million for the three-year period, FY2001 - FY2003. Different accounts of funding levels reflect the fact that DARPA is funding both an integrative effort called the TIA system, as well as 16 individual R&D efforts or TIA programs that could be combined to create that system. In FY2003, DARPA is dedicating $10 million to integrate various R&D efforts into a prototype TIA system, and $137.5 million for the various R&D programs that could make up that system and that are managed by the Information Awareness Office (IAO) headed by Poindexter. Funding for these programs total $137.5 million in FY2003 and $317.0 million for FY2001-FY2003. DOD is requesting $169.2 million for TIA programs in FY2004 and $170.3 in FY2005, and $20 million in FY2004 and $24.5 million in FY2005 for the TIA system integration. These TIA programs are ongoing. In response to concerns about TIA programs, Congress included special oversight provisions -- known as the Wyden amendment -- in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7) requiring that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General submit a detailed joint report on TIA programs by May 20, 2003, or face a cutoff in funding. Senator Feingold, Senator Grassley and other Members also proposed restrictions on data mining in the DOD and the new Department of Homeland Security. In light of the report required by P.L. 108-7, hearings on TIA programs are likely in the 108th Congress. In addition to privacy concerns, Congress may also address several oversight issues for TIA programs including monitoring collaboration between DARPA and potential users in the law enforcement and intelligence communities and assessing the technical feasibility of the project. This report will be updated as necessary.",27,32 "Sex Trafficking of Children in the United States: Overview and Issues for Congress. The trafficking of individuals within U.S borders is commonly referred to as domestic human trafficking, and it occurs in every state of the nation. One form of domestic human trafficking is sex trafficking. Research indicates that most victims of sex trafficking into and within the United States are women and children, and the victims include U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike. Recently, Congress has focused attention on domestic sex trafficking, including the prostitution of children, which is the focus of this report. Federal law does not define sex trafficking per se. However, the term ""severe forms of trafficking in persons,"" as defined in the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386) encompasses sex trafficking. ""Severe forms of trafficking in persons"" refers, in part, to ""[s]ex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age.... "" Experts generally agree that the trafficking term applies to minors whether the child's actions were forced or appear to be voluntary. The exact number of child victims of sex trafficking in the United States is unknown because comprehensive research and scientific data are lacking. Sex trafficking of children appears to be fueled by a variety of environmental and situational variables ranging from poverty or the use of prostitution by runaway and ""thrown-away"" children to provide for their subsistence needs to the recruitment of children by organized crime units for prostitution. The TVPA has been the primary vehicle authorizing services to victims of trafficking. Several agencies have programs or administer grants to other entities to provide specific services to trafficking victims. Despite language that authorizes services for citizen, lawful permanent resident, and noncitizen victims, appropriations for trafficking victims' services have primarily been used to serve noncitizen victims. U.S. citizen victims are also eligible for certain crime victim benefits and public benefit entitlement programs, though these services are not tailored to trafficking victims. Of note, specialized services and support for minor victims of sex trafficking are limited. Organizations specializing in support for these victims may have fewer beds than might be needed to serve all victims. Other facilities, such as runaway and homeless youth shelters and foster care homes, may not be able to adequately meet the needs of victims or keep them from pimps/traffickers and other abusers. In addition, it has been suggested that minor victims of sex trafficking—while too young to consent to sexual activity with adults—may at times be labeled as prostitutes or juvenile delinquents and treated as criminals rather than being identified and treated as trafficking victims. These children who are arrested may be placed in juvenile detention facilities instead of environments where they can receive needed social and protective services. Finally, experts widely agree that any efforts to reduce the prevalence of child sex trafficking—as well as other forms of trafficking—should address not only the supply, but also the demand. Congress may consider demand reduction strategies such as increasing public awareness and prevention as well as bolstering investigations and prosecutions of those who buy illegal commercial sex (""johns""). In addition, policy makers may deliberate enhancing services for victims of trafficking. The most recent reauthorization of the TVPA, in March 2013, reauthorized some existing provisions, created a new grant program to combat child sex trafficking, and authorized appropriations through FY2017.",93,93 "The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA): Workers' Compensation for Federal Employees. The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) is the workers' compensation program for federal employees. Like all workers' compensation programs, FECA pays disability, survivors, and medical benefits, without fault, to employees who are injured or become ill in the course of their federal employment and the survivors of employees killed on the job. The FECA program is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL) and the costs of benefits are paid by each employee's host agency. U.S. Postal Service (USPS) employees currently comprise the largest group of FECA beneficiaries and are responsible for the largest share of FECA benefits. Elements of the FECA program include basic disability benefits equal to two-thirds of an injured worker's pre-disability wage, which rises to 75% of the pre-disability wage if the worker has any dependents disability benefits that continue for the duration of disability or the life of the beneficiary and in cases of traumatic injuries, beneficiaries can receive a continuation of their full pay for the first 45 days disability benefits for persons with specific permanent partial disabilities, such as the loss of a limb, for a set number of weeks provided by schedules set by statute and regulation all medical costs associated with covered conditions without any copayments, cost-sharing, or use of private insurance by the beneficiaries cash benefits for the survivors of employees killed on the job based on the worker's wages and a modest benefit for funeral costs, and vocational rehabilitation services to assist beneficiaries in returning to work. This report also focuses on several key policy issues facing the program, including the disproportionate share of claims and program costs attributed to postal workers, the payment of FECA benefits after retirement age, the overall level of FECA disability benefits as compared with those offered by the states, the administration of the FECA program, and the costs associated with prescriptions for compounded medications. The modern FECA program can trace its roots to 1916 but has not been significantly amended since 1974. A legislative history of the FECA program is provided in Appendix B.",58,58 "Superfund Fact Book. The Superfund program is the principal federal effort for cleaning up hazardous waste sites and protecting public health and the environment from releases of hazardous substances. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) established the program, and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) amended it. This report is a compendium of data and other pertinent information about CERCLA and the Superfund program, followed by a glossary. The law's strict, joint and several, and retroactive liability regime requires responsible parties to pay for cleaning up a site. However, CERCLA established the Hazardous Substance Superfund Trust Fund to pay for cleanups where a financially viable party cannot be found. The trust fund has raised about $1.5 billion per year for cleanup activities, primarily from excise taxes on petroleum and specified chemical feedstocks, and from a corporate environmental income tax, all of which expired on December 31, 1995. The trust fund also pays for the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) enforcement, management activities, and research and development. For FY1999, Congress enacted appropriations of $1.5 billion for the Superfund program (P.L. 105-276). The National Priorities List (NPL) tracks the sites that most seriously threaten public health and the environment. As of September 29, 1998, the NPL contained a total of 1,260 final and proposed sites, of which 162 were federal facilities and 1,098 were non-federal sites. The Construction Completion List (CCL) catalogs NPL sites where physical construction is complete for all necessary cleanup and removal actions. As of September 29, 1998, there were 535 sites on the CCL. EPA has deleted a total of 176 sites from the NPL because response actions are complete. In addition to being responsible for cleanup costs, polluters also must pay to restore natural resource damages at Superfund sites. As of July 1996, federal agencies had completed settlements for natural resource damage claims with responsible parties at 67 sites for a total of $117.6 million. In March 1996, the federal government filed the largest natural resource damage claim to date for a total of $970 million against several mining companies for contamination in the Coeur d'Alene River Basin in Idaho. Negotiations over the claim are continuing. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry assesses the impact of hazardous substance releases on public health. As of February 1997, the agency had completed 1,776 public health assessments at Superfund sites. The number of state programs that clean up hazardous waste sites has increased in recent years and each state has enacted its own enforcement authority. At the end of 1997, the states reported nearly 24,000 potentially hazardous sites warranting attention. All states, except for Nebraska and the District of Columbia, have established their own funds to pay for cleanup activities. The total balance of all state funds at the end of FY1997 was roughly $1.4 billion, of which states spent about $565 million for cleanup activities in FY1997.",46,46 "Bosnia: Civil Implementation of the Peace Agreement. Since Dayton Peace Accords, the civilian side of peace implementation has been challenged by the scope of the tasks, and by the lack of commitment demonstrated by the Bosnian parties to various aspects of the peace agreement. In addition, issues such as International Framework for peace implementation, formation of governmental institution, election, civil police task force and displaced persons are discussed in this report.",85,85 "Inflation and the Real Minimum Wage: A Fact Sheet. The Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 established the hourly minimum wage rate at 25 cents for covered workers. Since then, it has been raised 22 separate times, in part to keep up with rising prices. Most recently, in July 2009, it was increased to $7.25 an hour. Because there have been some extended periods between these adjustments while inflation generally has increased, the real value (purchasing power) of the minimum wage has decreased substantially over time.",90,90 "Clean Air Act Issues in the 109th Congress. The courts and the executive branch face major decisions on clean air issues in 2006, with Congress more likely playing an oversight role. One focus is EPA's Jan. 17 2006 proposal to strengthen air quality standards for fine particles, which are estimated to cause tens of thousands of premature deaths annually. Whether the proposal is supported by the available science and what impact its implementation would have likely issues of concern. Other issues of continuing interest are EPA's 2005 decisions limiting interstate transport of air pollution and establishing cap-and-trade systems for emissions from coal-fired power plants, and the agency's proposed changes to New Source Review.",42,42 "The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress. The Department of Defense (DOD) has long played a role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The use of DOD to provide foreign assistance stems in general from the perception that DOD can contribute unique or vital capabilities and resources because it possesses the manpower, materiel, and organizational assets to respond to international needs. Over the years, Congress has helped shape the DOD role by providing DOD with its mandate for such activities through a wide variety of authorities. The historical DOD role in foreign assistance can be regarded as serving three purposes: responding to humanitarian and basic needs, building foreign military capacity and capabilities, and strengthening foreign governments' ability to deal with internal and international threats through state-building measures. The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DOD foreign assistance activities in several ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military's capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, enhancing the U.S. image as a humanitarian actor. Humanitarian assistance, military training, and other forms of assistance also provide opportunities to cultivate good relations with foreign populations, militaries, and governments. U.S. military personnel have long viewed such activities as opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their professional development. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, DOD training of military forces and provision of security assistance have been an important means to enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations and to support coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD's perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has evolved over time. Within the past few years, the perceptions of DOD officials, military officers, and defense analysts have coalesced around a post-9/11 strategy that calls for the use of the U.S. military in preventive, deterrent, and preemptive activities. This strategy involves DOD in the creation of extensive international and interagency ""partnerships,"" as well as an expanded DOD role in foreign assistance activities. Critics point to a number of problems with an expanded DOD role in many activities. Indeed, a key DOD document acknowledges that state-building tasks may be ""best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals."" Nevertheless, although reluctant to divert personnel from combat functions, DOD officials believe that the U.S. military must develop its own capacity to carry out such activities in the absence of appropriate civilian forces. In the second session of the 110th Congress, Members have faced several choices regarding the DOD role in foreign assistance. The Bush Administration has proposed legislation to make permanent two controversial DOD authorities. It has also proposed legislation to enable U.S. government civilian personnel to perform some of the tasks currently carried out by the U.S. military, as well as to form a civilian reserve corps for that purpose. Congress may also consider options to improve DOD coordination with civilian agencies on foreign assistance activities.",21,79 "Emergency Preparedness and Hazard Mitigation: CRS Experts. This report includes a table that provides access to names and contact information for CRS experts on policy concerns relating to emergency preparedness and hazard mitigation. Includes a number of policy areas, such as: emergency preparedness and protection missions, functions, and structures, emergency authorities, preparedness plans, communications networks, warning systems, and state and local homeland security funding, training, and standards.",11,11 "Fischer-Tropsch Fuels from Coal, Natural Gas, and Biomass: Background and Policy. This report provides background information and policy analysis regarding the ways to develop that directly and indirectly convert coal into liquid fuel.",39,40 "Deficient Bridge Count Drops Again. This report briefly discusses overall decline in the number of deficient bridges in 2014 and the long-term downward trend, particularly among bridges posing structural safety concerns.",121,121 "Botswana: The San (Bushmen) Rights Case. In November 2004, the San people of Botswana are expected to continue their court case against the government of Botswana. The San argue that they were illegally removed from their ancestral land within the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR). International human rights groups contend that the manner in which the San were removed violated international human rights laws. The discovery of diamond reserves within the CKGR has led advocacy groups to argue that the San have been removed to allow diamond mining to go ahead in the CKGR. Both the government of Botswana and leading diamond mining companies deny this accusation. How the court case is resolved could potentially have regional and global implications for disputes involving other ""first peoples"" of the world. The case is an issue of concern to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, which held a Members' briefing on it in September 2004. This report (1) will be updated. 1. This report was prepared under the supervision of Nicolas Cook, specialist in African Affairs.",81,81 "Gold: Uses of U.S. Official Holdings. For centuries nations have accumulated gold as a symbol of wealth and power. Gold was once also of practical value as a medium of exchange and until recent times provided a commodity backing to most paper currency. Recent decades have seen a steady erosion of gold's economic significance. Nevertheless, the U.S. government continues to hold a sizable stock of gold. What is this stock used for? Although there continues to be some confusion about the role of government agencies and other institutions with relation to the gold stock, gold is little used. The U.S. Mint, the principal custodian of the government's gold holdings, engages in minor gold transactions associated with producing and selling commemorative coins. The Federal Reserve Bank does not own or have market transactions in gold, but it does facilitate the ""monetization"" of U.S. gold holdings, through its gold certificate account. The Exchange Stabilization Fund, an agency of the Treasury Department, no longer undertakes actions that use gold, and gold is not used as the basis of the Treasury's Special Drawing Rights. The ""gold standard"" that established a gold backing for the dollar ceased for domestic purposes in the 1930s and for international purposes in the 1970s. The continued willingness of the U.S. government to hold a large underutilized stock of gold is, perhaps, best understood as a hedge against times of severe economic crisis when paper assets could be useless. This report will not be updated.",100,51 "North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options. North Koreans have been crossing the border into China, many in search of refuge, since the height of North Korea's famine in the 1990s. The State Department estimates that 30,000-50,000 North Korean refugees currently live in China (some non-governmental organizations estimate the number is closer to 300,000) and believes those who are repatriated may face punishment ranging from a few months of ""labor correction"" to execution. A number of reports also document the difficult conditions faced by North Koreans who remain in China. The plight of the North Koreans focuses attention not only on those seeking refuge and their refugee status, but also points to the factors driving their decision to leave, primarily food shortages, deteriorating humanitarian conditions, and human rights violations. North Korea is generally characterized as one of the world's worst violators of human rights and religious freedom, an issue that some Members of Congress and interest groups say should assume greater importance in the formation of U.S. priorities towards North Korea. Congressional concern about human rights in North Korea and conditions faced by North Korean refugees led to the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA) in 2004. North Korean refugees in China and human rights issues are frequently raised simultaneously, particularly in a congressional context. Although the situation for North Koreans seeking to leave their country and for those who remain inside its borders pose different questions and may call for separate responses, both focus on the nature of the regime in Pyongyang. Critics of the North Korean government have raised both issues together to put pressure on the regime, particularly when nuclear weapons program negotiations stalled. Some advocates do not want to link refugee and human rights issues, claiming that the former calls for a quieter, cooperative approach, while the latter requires a more outspoken response to the North Korean government's practices. Although some policy experts insist that the United States has a moral imperative to stand up for the oppressed, others say that this creates obstacles in the nuclear disarmament negotiations. In 2007, the Bush Administration entered into bilateral talks with North Korea and linked the prospect of diplomatic relations and Pyongyang's re-entry into the international community with only the nuclear issue, leaving out human rights and refugee concerns. Nevertheless, North Korean human rights and refugee issues remain significant concerns and also have broader regional importance. China and South Korea want to avoid a massive outflow of refugees, which they believe could trigger the instability or collapse of North Korea. North Korean refugees seeking resettlement often transit through other Asian countries, raising diplomatic, refugee, and security concerns for those governments. South Korea, as the final destination of the vast majority of North Koreans, struggles to accommodate new arrivals and does not want to damage its relations with North Korea. This report will be updated as events warrant.",81,81 "Hurricane Events: CRS Experts. The following table provides access to names and contact information for CRS experts on policy concerns related to hurricane events in the United States. Policy areas identified include disaster assistance and recovery matters extending to impacts such as displaced residents and business, disruptions in the energy sector and transportation, problems with water treatment and supply, responses and recovery operations such as disaster declarations and federal assistance, public health provisions, federal flood insurance, agricultural disaster relief and assistance, tax relief, environmental cleanup, and mitigation efforts including emergency planning, floodplain mapping, and flood control and storm protection. Supporting agencies include FEMA and its operations under the Federal Stafford Act and Small Business Administration (SBA) and its disaster loan program. Hurricane Florence, Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Isaac, hurricanes, Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita, Hurricane Isabel, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Wilmington, Myrtle Beach, Miami, Louisiana, Gulf of Mexico, New Orleans, wind damage, evacuation, disaster, Florida Flooding, Mississippi, Mobile, Destin, Alabama, Mississippi River, national flood insurance, disaster assistance hurricane, Mississippi Flooding, flood insurance, flood, flooding, national flood insurance, disaster assistance flooding, hurricane convention, hurricane science, hurricane frequency, energy disruption, gulf oil, disaster recovery, disaster response, hurricane medical, medical evacuation, health hurricane, hurricane disruption, hurricane railroads, hurricane barge, hurricane tanker, hurricane highway, hurricane displaced, hurricane economics, hurricane levees, hurricane floodwalls, hurricane business, hurricane federal assistance, natural disaster, hurricane federal response plan, displaced residents, temporary housing, temporary shelter, hurricane drinking water, hurricane gas prices, hurricane gas, hurricane oil, hurricane production, hurricane highways and bridges, hurricane environment, hurricane spill, hurricane critical infrastructure, federal flood insurance, hurricane housing, hurricane debris removal, hurricane community and economic development, hurricane public facilities, hurricane agricultural relief, hazard mitigation, hazard planning, hurricane climate change, hurricane science, extreme weather, coastal zone planning, flood damage reduction, levees, hurricane science, supplemental disaster appropriations, hurricane tax relief, disaster tax relief, international response hurricane, Hurricane Florence, Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Isaac, hurricanes, Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana, Gulf of Mexico, New Orleans, wind damage, evacuation, disaster, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Wilmington, Myrtle Beach, Florida Flooding, Mississippi, Mobile, Destin, Alabama, Mississippi River, national flood insurance, disaster assistance hurricane, Mississippi Flooding, flood insurance, national flood insurance, disaster assistance flooding, hurricane convention, energy disruption, gulf oil, disaster recovery, disaster response, hurricane medical, medical evacuation, health hurricane, hurricane disruption, hurricane railroads, hurricane barge, hurricane tanker, hurricane highway, hurricane displaced, hurricane economics, hurricane levees, hurricane floodwalls, hurricane business, hurricane federal assistance, natural disaster, hurricane federal response plan, displaced residents, temporary housing, temporary shelter, hurricane drinking water, hurricane gas prices, hurricane gas, hurricane oil, hurricane production, hurricane highways and bridges, hurricane environment, hurricane spill, hurricane critical infrastructure, federal flood insurance, hurricane housing, hurricane debris removal, hurricane community and economic development, hurricane",11,11 "Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns. Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic. Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. Economic and social stability improved considerably, and many analysts believed Haiti was turning a corner toward sustainable development when it was set back by a massive earthquake in January 2010 that devastated much of the capital of Port-au-Prince. Although it is recovering, poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide: Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Throughout President Michel Martelly's five-year term, Haiti has found itself in a prolonged political crisis due to the government's failure to hold a series of elections that were long overdue. The government failed to hold elections by the end of 2012, leaving the Senate without one-third of its members. Thousands of Haitians took to the streets to protest the lack of elections. When the terms for another third of the Senate as well as the entire 99-seat Chamber of Deputies expired on January 12, the legislature was immediately dissolved, and Martelly began ruling by decree. A new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) organized legislative elections in August, which were marred by violence, and runoff legislative, presidential, and local elections in October 2015. Some presidential candidates have led protests alleging fraud but have failed to file legal complaints. Runoff presidential elections scheduled for December 27 have been postponed while an independent commission makes recommendations. No new date has been set. Haiti is a key foreign assistance priority for the Obama Administration in Latin American and the Caribbean. Haiti's developmental needs and priorities are many. The Haitian government and the international donor community are implementing a 10-year recovery plan focusing on territorial, economic, social, and institutional rebuilding. An outbreak of cholera in late 2010 has swept across most of the country and further complicated assistance efforts. Progress has been made in developing democratic institutions, although, as evident in the current crisis, they remain weak. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore order since 2004. The mission has helped facilitate elections, combated gangs and drug trafficking with the Haitian National Police, and responded to natural disasters. MINUSTAH has been criticized because of sexual abuse by some of its forces and scientific findings that its troops apparently introduced cholera to the country. The U.N. says it will not compensate cholera victims, citing diplomatic immunity. As of June 30, 2015, MINUSTAH had decreased its military troops from 5,021 to 2,338, leaving peacekeeping troops in only 4 of Haiti's 10 departments. The Haitian National Police had primary responsibility for election security. The Dominican Republic ended its ""immigrant regularization"" process in June 2015. Since then tens of thousands of Dominican-born people of Haitian descent have relocated to Haiti, some out of fear of or intimidation by Dominican communities or authorities, increasing bilateral tensions. The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes, continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other concerns include the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid, protecting human rights, combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking, and alleviating poverty. Congress shares these concerns. The immediate priorities are that free and fair elections be held as quickly as possible and a new administration takes office, with hopes that that will reduce political tensions and instability. Current legislation related to Haiti includes P.L. 114-113, P.L. 113-76, P.L. 113-162, P.L. 113-235, H.R. 52, H.R. 1295, H.R. 1891, H.Res. 25, S. 503, S. 1009, and S. 1267.",85,85 "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments. On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test, with a yield of under 1 kiloton (vice the anticipated 4-kiloton yield). The United States and other countries condemned the test and the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1718 on October 14, which requires North Korea to refrain from nuclear or missile tests, rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and dismantle its WMD programs. The test is the latest provocative act of many since 2002, when North Korea ended an eight-year freeze on its plutonium production program, expelled international inspectors and restarted facilities. North Korea may now have enough Pu for eight to ten weapons. On February 13, 2007, North Korea reached an agreement with other members of the Six-Party talks to begin the initial phase (60 days) of implementing the Joint Statement from September 2005 on denuclearization. Key components include halting production at Yongbyon and delivery of heavy fuel oil. Many other aspects are yet to be decided. This report will be updated as needed.",29,29 "Pipelines for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Control: Network Needs and Cost Uncertainties. Congress is considering policies promoting the capture and sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO2) from sources such as electric power plants. Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is a process involving a CO2 source facility, a long-term CO2 sequestration site, and CO2 pipelines. There is an increasing perception in Congress that a national CCS program could require the construction of a substantial network of interstate CO2 pipelines. However, divergent views on CO2 pipeline requirements introduce significant uncertainty into overall CCS cost estimates and may complicate the federal role, if any, in CO2 pipeline development. S. 2144 and S. 2191 would require the Secretary of Energy to study the feasibility of constructing and operating such a network of pipelines. S. 2323 would require carbon sequestration projects to evaluate the most cost-efficient ways to integrate CO2 sequestration, capture, and transportation. P.L. 110-140, signed by President Bush on December 19, 2007, requires the Secretary of the Interior to recommend legislation to clarify the issuance of CO2 pipeline rights-of-way on public land. The cost of CO2 transportation is a function of pipeline length and other factors. This report examines key uncertainties in CO2 pipeline requirements for CCS by contrasting hypothetical pipeline scenarios for 11 major coal-fired power plants in the Midwest Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership region. The scenarios illustrate how different assumptions about sequestration site viability can lead to a 20-fold difference in CO2 pipeline lengths, and, therefore, similarly large differences in capital costs. From the perspective of individual power plants, or other CO2 sources, variable costs for CO2 pipelines may have significant ramifications. If CO2 pipeline costs for specific regions reach tens, or even hundreds, of millions of dollars per plant, then power companies may have difficulty securing the capital financing or regulatory approval needed to construct or retrofit fossil fuel-powered plants in these regions. High CO2 transportation costs also could increase electricity prices in ""sequestration-poor"" regions relative to regions able to sequester CO2 more locally. As CO2 pipelines get longer, the state-by-state siting approval process may become complex and protracted, and may face public opposition. Because CO2 pipeline requirements in a CCS scheme are driven by the relative locations of CO2 sources and sequestration sites, identification and validation of such sites must explicitly account for CO2 pipeline costs if the economics of those sites are to be fully understood. Since transporting CO2 to distant locations can impose significant additional costs to a facility's carbon control infrastructure, facility owners may seek regulatory approval for as many sequestration sites as possible and near to as many facilities as possible. If CCS moves to widespread implementation, government agencies and private companies may face challenges in identifying, permitting, developing, and monitoring the large number of localized sequestration reservoirs that may be proposed. However, even as viable sequestration reservoirs are being identified, it is unclear which CO2 source facilities will have access to them, under what time frame, and under what conditions. Given the potential size of a national CO2 pipelines network, many billions of dollars of capital investment may be affected by policy decisions made today.",42,42 "Cuomo v. The Clearing House Association, L.L.C.: National Banks Are Subject to State Lawsuits to Enforce Non-Preempted State Laws. On June 29, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the National Bank Act (NBA) does not preempt states from bringing judicial actions against national banks to enforce non-preempted state anti-discrimination laws, and by implication state consumer protection laws, as long as the state authorities do not encroach on the visitorial powers of the national bank regulator, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The Court ruled that administrative subpoenas or other forms of administrative oversight or examination are included in visitorial powers and, thus, are not available as state enforcement tools. The case, Cuomo v. The Clearing House Association, L.L.C.,___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2710 (2009), involves a challenge by national banks and OCC to an attempt by the New York State Attorney General (AG) to investigate possible discrimination in real estate lending by certain national banks and their subsidiaries. In response to a request that these banks provide non-public information about their real estate policies and loans in New York, a banking association to which these banks belong, The Clearing House Association, L.L.C., and OCC obtained trial and appellate court orders enjoining the state investigation and enforcement efforts. The Supreme Court decision invalidated an OCC regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000, to the extent that it preempted state officials from ""prosecuting enforcement actions"" against national banks. That regulation reflected OCC's interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 484, a provision of the NBA which proclaims that ""no national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice, or such as shall be, or have been exercised or directed by Congress."" The Court's opinion analyzed the OCC regulation on the basis of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). It recognized that the term ""visitorial powers"" is ambiguous and that judicial deference should be accorded to a reasonable interpretation of the term by the agency charged with interpreting it, OCC. The Court, however, found that OCC's interpretation did not meet the reasonableness standard. The Court's opinion concluded that OCC had no reasonable basis for equating visitorial power delegated to OCC by the NBA and a state's sovereign power to enforce its own non-preempted state laws with respect to national banks. Dissenting on this point, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Alito, would have upheld the OCC regulation and the breadth of OCC's interpretation of visitorial power as a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute and, therefore, falling within Chevron and worthy of judicial deference. Subtitle D of Title X, the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), P.L. 111-203, contains a provision designed to codify the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cuomo that federal visitorial clause provisions do not prohibit state enforcement actions. There is also a provision authorizing state attorneys general and state regulators to bring actions against national banks and federal savings associations for violations of Title X and any implementing regulations. The legislation also defines a standard and some procedural requirements for OCC to follow in preempting the applicability of state consumer protection laws to national banks or federal savings associations. These provisions in Dodd-Frank follow other efforts in the 111th Congress to deal with the issue of federal preemption of state efforts to enforce financial consumer protection laws. The 112th Congress may be presented with legislation to amend the Dodd-Frank provisions and/or opportunities to evaluate how the interaction between state and federal consumer protection laws and enforcement efforts is protecting consumers without unduly burdening nationwide banking concerns.",5,5 "What's on Television? The Intersection of Communications and Copyright Policies. In the 1940s and 1950s, watching television meant tuning into one of a few broadcast television stations, with the help of an antenna, to watch a program at a prescheduled time. Over subsequent decades, cable and satellite operators emerged to enable households unable to receive over-the-air signals to watch the retransmitted signals of broadcast television stations. More recently, some viewers have taken to watching TV programming on their computers, tablets, mobile phones, and other Internet-connected devices at times of their own choosing, dispensing with television stations and cable and satellite operators altogether. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Congress, and the courts have overseen this evolution by applying a combination of communications and copyright laws to regulate the distribution of television programming. These laws are intended to achieve three policy goals protecting the property rights of content owners to encourage the production of television programs promoting competition among distributors of video programming, and enabling broadcast television stations to serve the local communities to which they are licensed by the FCC. The regulatory structure intended to accomplish these goals was established in copyright and communications laws and regulations adopted by Congress and the FCC in the 1970s. These laws and regulations grant broadcast stations exclusive rights to carry programming under certain conditions, allow content owners to control the use of copyrighted content except in certain circumstances, and assign cable and satellite operators both obligations and rights with respect to the stations whose signals they retransmit. This structure has come under increasing stress as firms offer alternative ways to watch television programming, upsetting established relationships and raising questions about whether the key public policy goals defined by Congress can still be achieved. In particular, firms offering television programming to consumers over the Internet, known as online video distributors (OVDs), are not covered by some of the laws and regulations governing video distribution by providers that rely on their own facilities, such as cable and satellite operators. Station owners, meanwhile, are concerned that relationships between OVDs and broadcast networks could adversely affect stations' revenues. Both the House Judiciary Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee have announced plans to review and update copyright and communications laws, respectively, while the FCC is considering how and whether to apply its regulations governing the distribution of television signals to a new era. At the same time, federal courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to how copyright laws apply to video programming in the new world of online video distribution. Because of the intertwined relationship between copyright and communications laws, major reform of the regulatory structure governing the distribution of television signals is likely to require Congress or the courts to consider how these two bodies of law intersect.",109,9 "Search and Seizure in the Vehicular Context: Fourth Amendment Issues. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that ""The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."" The Supreme Court has interpreted this language as imposing a presumptive warrant requirement on all searches and seizures predicated upon governmental authority, and has ruled that any violations of this standard will result in the suppression of any material or information derived therefrom. However, the Court has also recognized that certain circumstances render the obtainment of a warrant impractical or unnecessary, and, accordingly, has crafted exceptions to an otherwise inflexible constitutional standard. Among the various exceptions established by the Court are warrantless searches based on exigent circumstances, plain view seizures, searches incident to a valid arrest, and searches where law enforcement needs surpass the warrant requirement. Some of the most pervasive and controversial exceptions recognized by the Court have centered on law enforcement authority to conduct warrantless searches and investigatory detentions in the vehicular context. Recent Court decisions in this area have imbued law enforcement officers with greater authority to act without a warrant during traffic stops, based upon the previously established automobile exception and the need for adequate protective measures to ensure police safety. This apparent expansion of police power has led many commentators to assert that Fourth Amendment protections have been essentially eviscerated in the automobile and traffic stop setting. Upon examining the scope of law enforcement authority subsequent to these decisions, however, it appears that basic Fourth Amendment privacy strictures still pertain to traffic detentions, with the recent Court rulings simply applying previously established rationales to new factual scenarios.",17,94 "Health and Safety Concerns Over U.S. Imports of Chinese Products: An Overview. China is the largest source for U.S. imports, accounting for a 16% of total U.S. imports in 2008. China is a dominant supplier of many imported consumer products. For example, 90% of U.S. toy imports come from China. Numerous reports of unsafe products from China over the past few years, including seafood, pet food, toys, tires, drywall, and medicines have raised concern in the United States over the health, safety, and quality of imported Chinese products. The United States and China have sought to boost cooperation on health and safety issues. For example, China agreed to boost efforts to ensure that its toy exports to the United States did not violate U.S. regulations on lead content. This report provides an overview of U.S. concerns over the health and safety of Chinese products, identifies challenges China faces to develop an effective health and safety enforcement regime, summarizes U.S.-China cooperative efforts, and analyzes how this issue could impact China's economy and U.S.-China trade relations. This report will be updated as events warrant.",8,53 "CONTOMS (Counter Narcotics and Terrorism Operational Medical Support Program). Since the September 11th terrorist attack, greater attention has focused on federal, state, and local readiness to respond to situations involving terrorism or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One such federal program that provided federal support to local law enforcement and first responders is CONTOMS (Counter Narcotics and Terrorism Operational Medical Support).",22,22 "Intelligence Authorization Legislation for FY2016: Selected Provisions. This report briefly highlights key provisions of H.R. 2596, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (IAA for FY2016), which provides guidance to, and authorizes appropriations for, components of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).",27,27 "Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States: A Case of Statutory Interpretation and Its Implications for Federal Contracting. On Monday, February 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, a case that raises the question of whether the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is legally required to make certain purchases through a ""set aside"" for veteran-owned small businesses (VOSBs). A set-aside is a competition in which only eligible small businesses may generally participate. Congress amended the Small Business Act in 1999 to establish goals for the percentage of federal contract dollars awarded to one type of VOSBs: service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs). Then, in 2003, it further amended the Small Business Act to grant executive branch agencies—including VA—discretionary authority to set aside contracts for SDVOSBs. However, these enactments were widely seen as ineffective in increasing government contracting with VOSBs, and, in 2006, Congress enacted legislation that required VA specifically to take steps to promote awards to VOSBs. It is VA's obligations under this 2006 measure, as amended, that are at issue in Kingdomware, not the provisions of the Small Business Act. In particular, the Kingdomware case raises the question of how to construe language in the 2006 act which states that, ""[f]or purposes of meeting"" certain goals for contracting with VOSBs that VA is required to establish under the act (separate and apart from the goals under the 1999 act), VA ""shall"" set aside contracts for VOSBs whenever the contracting officer reasonably expects offers from at least two VOSBs and the award can be made at a fair market price. The latter conditions are commonly known as the ""Rule of Two"" because of the focus on there being at least two small businesses. VA has taken the position that the statutory language does not preclude it from placing orders through the Federal Supply Schedules (FSS)—which is a simplified method for purchasing commercial items—although its rationale for this position has changed over time. However, many VOSBs have disagreed, arguing that the use of the word shall in the 2006 act means that VA is legally required to set aside contracts for VOSBs whenever the Rule of Two is satisfied. The three administrative and judicial tribunals to have reviewed Kingdomware's challenge to VA's continued use of the FSS despite the alleged requirements of the 2006 act reached differing conclusions or relied upon differing logic. Initially, the Government Accountability Office found that the statute unambiguously requires VA to set aside contracts whenever the Rule of Two is satisfied and that VA's contrary interpretation of the 2006 act is, thus, not entitled to deference. However, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims disagreed, finding that the 2006 act is ambiguous, and VA's interpretation of the act as not applying to orders placed through the FSS is entitled to deference. A majority of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court but on different grounds. The majority found that the 2006 act unambiguously requires VA to use set-asides for VOSBs only for purposes of meeting its goals for contracting with VOSBs. Once these goals are met, in the Federal Circuit's view, VA has discretion as to whether to use set-asides for VOSBs. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of VA's obligations under the 2006 act. In doing so, the Court could help clarify the application of certain principles of statutory interpretation relied upon by the lower tribunals and the parties, including principles regarding prefatory language, veterans benefits, and judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. The Supreme Court's decision could also have practical implications for the manner in which VA conducts certain procurements as well as for VOSBs seeking to do business with VA pursuant to a small business set-aside.",63,63 The Family and Medical Leave Act: Current Legislative Activity. This report offers a brief overview of the major features of the Family and Medical Leave Act(FMLA) and its regulations. The various proposals made to amend the Act since its inception are then categorized and discussed. It closes with a review of legislative activity.,115,115 "U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 2003-2010. This report provides background data on U.S. arms sales agreements with and deliveries to its major purchasers during calendar years 2003-2010, made through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. In a series of data tables, it lists the total dollar values of U.S. government-to-government arms sales agreements with its top five purchasers, and the total dollar values of U.S. arms deliveries to those purchasers, in five specific regions of the world for three specific periods: 2003-2006, 2007-2010, and 2010 alone. In addition, the report provides data tables listing the total dollar values of U.S. government-to-government arms agreements with and deliveries to its top 10 purchasers worldwide for the periods 2003-2006, 2007-2010, and for 2010 alone. This report is prepared in conjunction with CRS Report R42017, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2003-2010, by Richard F. Grimmett. That annual report details both U.S. and foreign arms transfer activities globally and provides analysis of arms trade trends. The intent here is to complement that elaborate worldwide treatment of the international arms trade by focusing exclusively on U.S. arms sales and deliveries, and providing the names of the major U.S. arms customers, by region, together with the total dollar values of their arms purchases or deliveries for the calendar years 2003-2006, 2007-2010, and 2010.",28,28 "Permissible Securities Activities of Commercial Banks Under the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). In the wake of the recession of 2008, there have been calls to reexamine 1999's landmark financial services legislation, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA, P.L. 106-102), which repealed certain provisions of the Banking Act of 1933, commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA, 48 Stat. 162 §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32), which separated, to a certain degree, commercial banking (i.e., the activities engaged in by depository institutions with a bank charter, which this report generally will refer to as ""banks"" or ""commercial banks"") from investment banking (i.e., activities engaged in by securities firms). This report explains the extent to which commercial banks, their subsidiaries, and affiliates were able to engage in securities activities, including securities underwriting, dealing, and brokerage, under the authorities of the GSA and other pre-GLBA banking laws, most notably the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA, 70 Stat. 133), how the volume and scope of these securities activities expanded over time, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, and how the GLBA changed the GSA construct by facilitating affiliations among commercial banks and securities firms, which paved the way for full-service financial companies like CitiGroup to offer deposit taking and full-scale securities dealing, securities underwriting, investment advising, and brokerage activities within a single holding company structure. To do this, the report first examines the historical differences between the regulatory structure of commercial and investment banks. It then provides a legal overview of the GSA's restrictions on securities activities and the evolution of how the federal agencies regulating commercial banks interpreted those restrictions over the course of approximately seven decades prior to enactment of the GLBA. The report then analyzes how the GLBA modified the GSA and the BHCA's securities restrictions and the resulting effect on the structure and activities of commercial banking companies. The GLBA transformed the financial services regulatory system and structure by repealing certain provisions of the GSA and the BHCA and by establishing the financial holding company structure, which permits commercial banks and full-service investment banks (as well as insurance companies) to coexist under common control. However, GLBA's changes came after two decades of agency and judicial interpretations of the GSA and the BHCA, which significantly broadened the activities and presence of banks in the securities arena.",12,12 "International Agreements on Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) opened for signature in 1992 and soon thereafter was ratified by the United States. The UNFCCC does not set greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets, and during ratification hearings, the George H.W. Bush Administration represented that any protocol or amendment to the UNFCCC creating binding GHG emissions targets would be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. The Kyoto Protocol (the Protocol) to the UNFCCC was intended as a first step towards implementing the UNFCCC. To that end, it sets quantitative emission reduction targets for the high income countries listed in its Annex B. The Protocol's goal is to reduce each parties' overall emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels by 2012. Although the United States signed the Protocol in 1998, it did not submit the Protocol to the Senate. The George W. Bush Administration announced in 2001 that it would not pursue U.S. accession to the Protocol. The Obama Administration has followed this policy. In 2007, the UN Climate Change Conference in Bali adopted a framework for negotiations over the post-2012 climate regime. It established two tracks for negotiation: (1) a track by which Kyoto Protocol parties would pursue an amendment to the Protocol for a ""second round"" of emission targets for its Annex B parties, and (2) a track by which UNFCCC parties would set GHG mitigation targets or actions for all parties. However, consensus under either track proved difficult to achieve at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties. The outcome, the Copenhagen Accord (the Accord), is consequently considered a non-binding political agreement. The Accord allows each high income party listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC to define its own GHG emissions target level. ""Non-Annex I"" parties wishing to associate with the Accord must identify and commit to undertaking ""nationally appropriate mitigation actions,"" which may receive international support subject to certain international reporting requirements. The labels ""convention,"" ""protocol,"" and ""accord"" are not clear indicators of whether these three climate change agreements are binding internationally and/or domestically. Under international law, an agreement is considered binding only if it conveys the intention of its parties to create legally binding relationships and has entered into force. However, some have suggested that enforceability, rather than intentions, should govern whether an agreement is ""legally binding."" Under U.S. law, a legally binding international agreement may take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. In order for the United States to enter a treaty, the agreement must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate and subsequently be ratified by the President. An executive agreement does not require the Senate's advice and consent in order to be legally binding. Historically, executive agreements have arisen in a limited set of circumstances, and certain subjects, including significant global environmental issues, have traditionally been handled as treaties that require the Senate's approval. Of the three agreements discussed, only the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are considered legally binding agreements under international law, and the United States is bound only by the former. The United States has, however, indicated its intent to associate with the Copenhagen Accord. In doing so, it voluntarily committed to reduce U.S. emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020. The Accord does not implicate the treaty power of Congress, which will likely shape the domestic effect of the Copenhagen Accord through appropriations and lawmaking. The Accord does not appear to empower the Executive to implement it solely by agency actions.",42,42 "Fees for Maintenance and Evaluation of Pesticide Registrations: Current Law and Legislation in the 115th Congress. Division G of Title II of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) extended U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to collect fees from the pesticide industry for the maintenance and evaluation of pesticide registrations under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. 136 et seq.) until the end of FY2018. Two types of industry-paid fees supplement annual appropriations from the General Fund to support EPA's pesticide regulatory program. Without the extension, the authority to collect maintenance fees would have expired at the end of FY2017 under the Pesticide Registration Improvement Extension Act of 2012 (PRIA 3, P.L. 112-177). Maintenance fees are paid by pesticide registrants to retain existing pesticide registrations, which govern the terms and conditions for lawful pesticide distribution and use. Additionally, without the extension, PRIA 3 would have gradually phased out the authority to collect registration service fees by the end of FY2019. Registration service fees are paid by applicants who seek EPA review of applications associated with pesticide registrations (e.g., new registrations, amendments to existing registrations). If these fee authorities are not reauthorized or extended after FY2018, pursuant to PRIA 3, the authority to collect maintenance fees would expire and the authority to collect registration service fees would be phased out by the end of FY2019. Since FY2004, total maintenance fees collected by EPA have ranged from $21.4 million to $28.7 million per fiscal year and total registration service fees have ranged from $10.6 million to $18.6 million per fiscal year. Maintenance and registration service fees collected each fiscal year have provided approximately one-fourth of the total appropriation for EPA's pesticide program activities. In the 115th Congress, the House-passed H.R. 1029, the Pesticide Registration Enhancement Act of 2017, and the Senate amendment to H.R. 1029, the Pesticide Registration Improvement Extension Act of 2018, would reauthorize the collection of maintenance fees until the end of FY2023 and registration service fees until the end of FY2025. The amount that EPA may collect in registration service fees would be reduced by 40% for FY2024 and 70% for FY2025 in a phase out. Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 1029 would increase the cap on annual maintenance fees per registrant by 12% and the aggregate for all maintenance fees from $27.8 million per fiscal year to an average amount of $31.0 million per fiscal year. Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 1029 would revise registration service fee amounts for different actions the applicant may request the agency to conduct and certain time frames in which EPA is required to complete review of a requested action. The Senate amendment to H.R. 1029 would require EPA to implement without revision two final rules promulgated during the previous administration before October 1, 2021. The two EPA rules address standards for the protection of agricultural workers from pesticide exposures and the certification of applicators that use restricted use pesticides. The Senate amendment to H.R. 1029 would also direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to publish a report on the use of designated representatives and their effect on the availability of pesticide application and hazard information. On June 21, 2018, the House passed H.R. 2, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018, which includes a provision that would enact House-passed H.R. 1029. The Senate amendment to H.R. 2, the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, does not include a similar provision. On July 18, 2018, the House requested a conference with the Senate to resolve differences between the House and Senate versions of H.R. 2.",46,46 "POWs and MIAs: Status and Accounting Issues. There has been a long-running controversy about the fate of certain U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) and servicemembers missing in action (MIAs) as a result of various U.S. military operations. While few people familiar with the issue feel that any Americans are still being held against their will in communist countries associated with the Cold War, more feel that some may have been so held in the past in the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, or North Vietnam. Similarly, few believe there has been a ""conspiracy"" to cover up the existence of live POWs, but many would maintain that there was, at least during the 1970s, U.S. government mismanagement of the issue. Normalization of relations with Vietnam exacerbated this longstanding debate. Normalization's supporters contend that Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue has greatly increased. Opponents argue that cooperation has in fact been much less than supporters say, and that the Vietnamese can only be induced to cooperate by firmness rather than conciliation. Those who believe Americans are now held, or were after the war ended, feel that even if no specific report of live Americans has thus far met rigorous proofs, the mass of information about live Americans is compelling. Those who doubt live Americans are still held, or were after the war ended, argue that despite vast efforts, only one live American military prisoner remained in Indochina after the war (a defector who returned in 1979). The U.S. government indicates the possibility that Americans are still being held in Indochina cannot be ruled out. Some say Americans may have been kept by the Vietnamese after the war but killed later. Increased U.S. access to Vietnam has not yet led to a large reduction in the number of Americans still listed as unaccounted for, although this may be due to some U.S. policies as well as the level of Vietnamese cooperation. There is considerable evidence that prisoners from the end of World War II, the Korean War, and ""Cold War shootdowns"" of U.S. military aircraft may have been taken to the USSR and not returned. The evidence about POWs from Vietnam being taken to the Soviet Union is more questionable. There is evidence that Navy pilot Scott Speicher, shot down on the first night of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and until recently listed as ""killed in action"" rather than ""missing in action,"" was almost certainly captured by the Iraqis. Information about his fate has not yet been discovered by U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. All American POWs captured by the Iraqis during the initial stage of the current war were returned to U.S. control, the remains of all others listed as MIA have been recovered. One U.S. Army soldier, captured by Iraqi insurgents, on April 9, 2004, is currently listed as a POW, there has been no word about his fate since his POW status was confirmed by DOD on April 23, 2004. This report replaces Issue Brief IB92101 of the same name. This report will be updated as needed.",30,24 "The United States and Europe: Current Issues. Due to extensive cooperation on a wide range of issues, the relationship between the United States and Europe is often called the transatlantic partnership. The two sides have many common values and concerns, and have grown increasingly interdependent in terms of security and prosperity. The transatlantic relationship and the main areas of U.S.-European cooperation and shared interest are likely to have continuing implications for U.S. policy during the 114th Congress. Members of Congress may have an interest in considering the dimensions and dynamics of current issues in U.S.-European relations in the course of oversight or legislative activities, or in the context of direct interactions with European legislators and officials. According to most observers, the overall tone of transatlantic relations during the Obama Administration has been largely positive. At the same time, a constructive tone does not necessarily translate into tangible results with regard to foreign policy objectives or other goals. With respect to certain issues, U.S. and European policies have been at odds and have generated friction in the relationship from time to time. This report summarizes key issues that both illustrate the nature of U.S.-European cooperation based on shared interests and present challenges in terms of the efficacy of such cooperation U.S. and European relations with Russia have become more adversarial in the context of Russia's annexation of Crimea and its actions destabilizing Ukraine. The United States and the European Union (EU) have imposed sanctions that, combined with low oil prices, have harmed the Russian economy. Rising tensions with Russia have altered previous assumptions about European security and affected debates about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European energy security. The United States and European countries have been cooperating in efforts to counter the Islamic State and seek a political solution to the conflict in Syria. Recent estimates suggest that upward of 3,000 European citizens have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join groups involved in the conflict, and the potential threat posed by returning ""foreign fighters"" has become a central concern. U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation has been strong since 9/11, although differences regarding data privacy have posed some key information-sharing challenges. The United States and Europe remain central actors in negotiations seeking to reach an agreement that ensures that Iran's nuclear program can be used solely for peaceful purposes. While an extensive array of U.S. and EU sanctions have worked to isolate and pressure Iran, the final outcome of talks remains uncertain. The United States and EU share broad objectives with regard to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Increased European support for recognizing Palestinian statehood, however, has diverged from the approach taken by the United States and strained Europe's relationship with Israel. The United States and the EU have the largest trade and investment relationship in the world. The two sides have been negotiating a free trade agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) aimed at boosting jobs and growth on both sides, but obstacles could make it difficult to conclude a deal by the end of 2015. While the conditions that fueled the Eurozone crisis from 2010-2012 appear to have stabilized, there is considerable doubt that underlying economic problems in Europe have been fully resolved. Allegations of U.S. spying and surveillance programs in Europe have caused a sharp backlash and damaged transatlantic trust. Although tensions appear to have proven manageable and U.S. intelligence cooperation with European governments continues, data privacy concerns could complicate future talks on U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements. The United States takes over the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in May 2015. The Artic is increasingly viewed as a region of potential economic and geopolitical importance. As the United States and Europe face a changing geopolitical environment, some observers assert that the global influence of the Euro-Atlantic partnership is in decline. In addition, the Obama Administration's announced intention of ""re-balancing"" U.S. foreign policy toward Asia has caused some anxiety among Europeans. Overall, however, most analysts maintain that the United States and Europe are likely to remain one another's closest partner, and that U.S.-European cooperation is likely to remain the foundation of international action on a wide range of critical issues.",87,87 "Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic Movements in Central and South Asia and Southern Russia. After several years of relative peace in Central Asia and southern Russia, Islamic extremist movements have become more active in Russia and in Central and South Asia, threatening stability in the region. Although numerous factors might account for the upsurge in activity, several of these movements appear to have connections to the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These linkages raise questions about whether the United States, as part of a broader effort to promote peace and stability in the region, should continue to engage the Taliban regime, or strongly confront it. This report will be updated as events warrant. See also CRS Report RS20358, Chechnya Conflict: Recent Developments, CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia's Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, CRS Report 98-106, Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns, and CRS Issue Brief 94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations.",86,86 "Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children: ICPC. The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (""ICPC"") provides a uniform legal framework for the placement of children across State lines in foster homes and/or adoptive homes. At the present time, all fifty States, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands have enacted the provisions of the ICPC in their individual laws. This report examines the ICPC, the regulations which implement the ICPC, and various federal laws which impact the ICPC.",95,95 "How Large is China's Economy? Does it Matter?. China's rapid economic growth since 1979 has transformed it into a major economic power. Over the past few years, many analysts have contended that China could soon overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy, based on estimates of China's economy on a ""purchasing power parity"" (PPP) basis, which attempts to factor in price differences across countries when estimating the size of a foreign economy in U.S. dollars. However, in December 2007, the World Bank issued a study that lowered its previous 2005 PPP estimate of the size of China's economy by 40%. If these new estimates are accurate, it will likely be many years before China's economy reaches U.S. levels. The new PPP data could also have an impact on U.S. and international perceptions over other aspects of China's economy, including its living standards, poverty levels, and government expenditures, such as on the military. This report will not be updated.",85,99 "U.S. International HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Spending: FY2004-FY2008. On January 28, 2003, during his State of the Union Address, President George Bush proposed that the United States spend $15 billion over five years to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The President proposed that most of the spending on PEPFAR programs be concentrated in 15 countries. Of the $15 billion, the President suggested spending $9 billion on prevention, treatment, and care services in the 15 Focus Countries, where the Administration estimated 50% of all HIV-positive people lived. The President also proposed that $5 billion of the funds be spent on existing bilateral HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs and research, and $1 billion of PEFPAR funds be reserved for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund). Between FY2004 and FY2008, PEPFAR aims to have supported care for 10 million people affected by HIV/AIDS, including children orphaned by AIDS, prevented 7 million new HIV infections, and supported efforts to provide anti-retroviral medication (ARV) to 2 million HIV-infected people. From FY2004 through FY2008 Congress provided almost $20 billion to fighting the global spread of HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, some $5 billion more than the President proposed. The President's FY2008 budget request included about $5.8 billion for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria efforts. The Administration proposed that the bulk of the funds, about $5.0 billion, be provided through Foreign Operations appropriations and that about $800 million be provided through Labor/HHS appropriations, of which $300 million would be reserved for a U.S. contribution to the Global Fund. Congress exceeded the President's request by some $560 million, providing $6.3 billion for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria efforts, including some $840 million for a U.S. contribution to the Global Fund. This report reviews U.S. appropriations for treatment and prevention of the three diseases from FY2004 through FY2008. The report will not be updated, PEPFAR authorization expires in FY2008. Subsequent reports will analyze additional funding should the initiative be reauthorized.",79,79 "Gulf Coast Hurricanes: Addressing Survivors' Mental Health and Substance Abuse Treatment Needs. Major disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, which struck Gulf Coast states in 2005, have the potential not only to cause mental health problems for individuals, but also to weaken or disable the systems designed to address those individuals' needs. Striking an appropriate balance of responsiveness, fiscal responsibility, and accountability in the provision of federal assistance programs during and following a disaster remains a difficult goal. Federal leadership for mental health and substance abuse programs resides in the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). SAMHSA carries out numerous activities to address mental health and substance abuse problems following disasters, including the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP), which is authorized in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) and implemented jointly by SAMHSA and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The response to the 2005 hurricanes has prompted a re-examination of CCP and other federal assistance programs that address disaster mental health. Concerns include the timeliness and effectiveness of services provided, the appropriate scope and duration of these services, and matters of cost and accountability. In particular, the respective roles and responsibilities of SAMHSA (which provides technical expertise for CCP programs), FEMA (which funds them), and states and their contractors (which implement them), are not always clear. Following a news investigation, some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about Project H.O.P.E., the CCP program implemented in Florida in response to Hurricane Wilma. Others have sought to expand CCP to provide substance abuse services, and to require that SAMHSA, other federal agencies, and state and local governments conduct resource assessments and develop strategies to address mental health and substance abuse service needs following disasters. (See S. 3721, reported in the Senate.) This report describes federal assistance programs in HHS that address mental health and substance abuse problems following disasters. In addition, relevant policy issues are presented in the context of the 2005 hurricanes, and several prior disasters. Three appendices provide information on CCP awards made to states in response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and on the scope of services that constitute mental health treatment. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.",11,11 "The U.S.-EU Beef Hormone Dispute. The United States and the European Union (EU) have engaged in a long-standing and acrimonious trade dispute over the EU's decision to ban hormone-treated meat. Despite an ongoing series of dispute settlement proceedings and decisions by the World Trade Organization (WTO), there is continued disagreement between the United States and the EU on a range of legal and procedural issues, as well as the scientific evidence and consensus concerning the safety of hormone-treated beef. To date, the EU continues to ban imports of hormone-treated meat and restricts most meat exports to the European Union to a limited quantity of beef imports that are certified as produced without the use of hormones. Starting in 1981, the EU adopted restrictions on livestock production limiting the use of natural hormones to therapeutic purposes, banning the use of synthetic hormones, and prohibiting imports of animals and meat from animals that have been administered the hormones. In 1989, the EU fully implemented its ban on imports of meat and meat products from animals treated with growth promotants. Initially the ban covered six growth promotants that are approved for use and administered in the United States. The EU amended its ban in 2003, permanently banning one hormone—estradiol-17—while provisionally banning the use of the five other hormones. As part of this dispute, the United States suspended trade concessions with the EU by imposing higher import tariffs on EU products. The first U.S. action in 1989 imposed retaliatory tariffs of 100% ad valorem duty on selected food products, and remained in effect until 1996. The second U.S. action in 1999 again imposed a 100% ad valorem duty on selected foods from EU countries. Over the years, the United States and the EU have attempted to resolve this dispute through a series of WTO dispute consultations, settlement panels, arbitration proceedings, and formal appeals. One of the earlier WTO panel decisions in 1997 ruled against the EU on the grounds that the ban is inconsistent with the EU's WTO obligations under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement because the EU had not conducted a risk assessment. In response, the EU commissioned studies and reviews to address the scientific basis of its ban on hormone-treated meat. Following each of these reviews, the EU reaffirmed its position that there are possible risks to human health associated with hormone-treated meat, given the available scientific data. The EU claims it has complied with its WTO obligations and has challenged the United States for maintaining its prohibitive import tariffs on EU products. The United States disputes whether the EU has conducted an adequate risk assessment to support its position and maintains there is a clear worldwide scientific consensus supporting the safety to consumers of eating hormone-treated meat. In October 2008, the WTO issued a mixed ruling allowing the United States to continue its trade sanctions, but allowing the EU to maintain its ban. In January 2009, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced its intent to make changes to the list of EU products subject to increased tariffs under the dispute, including changes to the EU countries and products affected, and higher tariffs on some products. The EU claimed this action constituted an ""escalation"" of the dispute. In May 2009, following a series of negotiations, the United States and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which phased in certain changes over the next several years. As part of this MOU, the EU granted new market access to U.S. exports of beef raised without the use of growth promotants, and the United States suspended its retaliatory tariffs on certain EU products. However, in December 2016, USTR took steps to reinstate retaliatory tariffs on the list of EU products under the dispute given continued concerns about U.S. beef access to the EU market. This issue has also been raised in ongoing trade negotiations between the United States and the EU to establish a free trade area as part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP).",53,0 "Supplemental Appropriations for FY2002: Combating Terrorism and Other Issues. On March 21, 2002, President Bush requested $27.1 billion in emergency supplemental funding to continue the war on terrorism and provide additional assistance for New York City and aviation security as well as other homeland security needs. With the $1.3 billion FY2002 supplemental request for Pell grants in the President's February budget, the Administration's request was $28.4 billion. Although there was broad congressional support for the new supplemental, Congress debated the total spending level, the amount for homeland security, and inclusion of budget ceilings for FY2003, as well as other issues from the time that the bill was submitted in the spring to its final passage in late July. Resolving differences between the two houses and between Congress and the Administration proved to be difficult. The initial draft conference version developed by the appropriators was rejected by the White House. A compromise package designed by Senate appropriators was then rejected by the House. House appropriators then put together a final $28.9 billion spending package that was acceptable to both houses and the Administration. That package, the conference version of H.R. 4775 (H.Rept. 107-593), passed the House by 397 to 32 on July 23, and the Senate by 92 to 7 on July 24, 2002. The President signed the bill on August 2, 2002 (P.L. 107-206). As cleared by both houses, the bill includes $14.5 billion for DOD, $6.7 billion for homeland security, $5.5 billion for assistance to New York, $2.1 billion for foreign assistance and embassy security, $1 billion for Pell grants, and $400 million for election administration reform. As enacted, P.L. 107-206 includes $25 billion in emergency spending and $5.1 billion in contingent emergency spending. The President had thirty days after enactment (September 1) to decide whether to submit a budget amendment to Congress that designates either all or none of that $5.1 billion of contingent spending as emergency funding. The $5.1 billion portion includes about $1 billion in additional DOD funding, $275 million for veterans' medical care, $250 million in aid to Israel and the Palestinians, $200 million in HIV/AIDS funding, and $450 million for election reform. The funding designated as contingent emergency spending was either not requested by the President or reflects higher levels than included in the Administration's request. On August 13, the President announced that he would not utilize the $5.1 billion contingent emergency spending. White House officials said, however, that the Administration would seek about $1 billion of that amount as an amended FY2003 appropriation request, including funds for Israel the Palestinians, international HIV/AIDS, and the Transportation Security Agency. Based on this action, the total funding dedicated to combating terrorism since September 11 is $63.9 billion including $40 billion that was appropriated immediately after the terrorist attacks and $24 billion in the FY2002 supplemental.",22,22 "Native American Issues in the 109th Congress. Native American issues before Congress are numerous and diverse, covering such areas as federal recognition of tribes, trust land acquisition, gambling regulation, education, jails, economic development, welfare reform, homeland security, tribal jurisdiction, highway construction, taxation, and many more. This report focuses on four Native American issues currently of great salience before Congress: health care, energy, trust fund management reform, and Native Hawaiian recognition. This report will be updated as developments warrant.",105,105 "National Commission on Terrorism Report: Background and Issues for Congress. On June 5, 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism (NTC), a congressionally mandated bi-partisan body, issued a report providing a blueprint for U.S. counter- terrorism policy with both policy and legislative recommendations. The report could be significant in shaping the direction of U.S. policy and the debate in Congress. It generally argues for a more aggressive U.S. strategy in combating terrorism. Critics, however, argue that NTC conclusions and recommendations ignore competing U.S. goals and interests, i.e that a proactive strategy might lead to the curbing of individual rights and liberties, damage important commercial interests, and widen disagreements between the U.S. and its allies over using the ""stick"" as opposed to the ""carrot"" approach in dealing with states that actively support or countenance terrorism. The NTC report is likely to stimulate strong congressional interest in counterterrorism policy in the 107th Congress. Likely areas of focus are (1) a more proactive counterterrorism policy, (2) a stronger state sanctions policy, and (3) a more cohesive/better coordinated U.S. federal counterterrorism response. January 23, 2001 press reports indicate that Rep. J.C. Watts (R-Okla) has urged House Speaker Dennis Hastert to create a House Select Committee on Domestic Terrorism. In the 106th Congress, H.R. 4210, which passed the House, would also give added attention to domestic terrorism by establishing a President's Council on Domestic Preparedness in the White House. Moreover, in the 106th Congress, S. 3205, the (Kyl-Feinstein) Counteterrrorism Act of 2000, which passed the Senate, incorporated a number of recommendations of the NTC including measures to ensure (1) enhanced policy emphasis on control of biological pathogens and terrorist funding raising, (2) better sharing of FBI intelligence, (3) easier recruitment of CIA counter-terrorism informants, and (4) maintaining Syria and Iran on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism. This report will not be updated.",22,22 "East Timor: Humanitarian Emergency and International Assistance. Following a vote for independence from Indonesia on August 30, violence and property destruction by anti-independence militias forced many East Timorese from their homes. (1) Failure by the Indonesian military to contain the violence finally forced the Indonesian government to allow international intervention. INTERFET, the U.N. international force for East Timor began arriving the weekend of September 18 and humanitarian workers came with them. The humanitarian programs are still evolving as the population begins to return, and reconstruction needs are still being assessed. This short report provides background on the crisis, looks at the assistance needs, and the U.S. response. It will be updated as the situation develops. (2) 1. For information on this crisis, see CRS report RS20332 East Timor Crisis: U.S. Policy and Options. For information on the U.S. military role, see CRS Issue Brief 94040, Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement. 2. This report draws on information from several web sites which provide daily updates on the situation in East Timor. These include web sites of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (www.unhcr.ch/news/media/timor/latest.htm) and the United Nation's Relief Web (www.reliefweb.int). U.S. Assistance reports, voluntary agency activities, press coverage, and U.N. situation reports are all available on the Reliefweb site.",81,79 "FY2011 Budget Documents: Internet and GPO Availability. This report provides brief descriptions of the budget volumes and related documents, together with Internet addresses, Government Printing Office (GPO) stock numbers, and prices to obtain these publications. It also tells how to find locations of government depository libraries, which can provide both printed copies for reference use and Internet access to the text.",101,101 "Congressional Membership and Appointment Authority to Advisory Commissions, Boards, and Groups. Over the past several decades, Congress, by statute, has established a wide array of commissions, boards, and advisory bodies to provide it with assistance in meeting various legislative, investigative, and administrative responsibilities. Some of these entities are temporary and created to serve specific functions, such as studying a discrete policy area or performing one-time tasks. Others are permanent, serving an ongoing purpose, such as overseeing an institution or performing a regular administrative function. The majority of these congressional bodies provide that Members of Congress, particularly the leadership, be intimately involved in the appointment process, either through direct service on a commission, or by appointing or recommending candidates for membership. The choice of a particular mechanism for membership appointment may have implications for the ability of these entities to fulfill their congressional mandates. Examination of the statutory language creating these bodies reveals several common approaches to membership selection. Each alternative schema has its advantages. A commission or board composed entirely of Members permits a high degree of congressional control over the entity's operations. Bodies composed mainly of qualified private citizens or executive branch appointees may provide a broader expertise than Member-only bodies. Assemblages of mixed membership provide some of the advantages of both Member and citizen-only appointment schemes. This report contains a compilation of existing commissions and boards that demonstrates the range of alternative membership-appointment structures. It includes any statutorily created advisory entity (boards, advisory panels, etc.) whose membership scheme mandates the participation of Members of Congress either as potential members or as participants in the process of appointing the membership. For each entity, information on the purpose, duration, appointment structure, and term of appointment is provided. Finally, information on the involvement of Members of Congress in the appointment process is presented in a series of tables.",55,55 "Instability and Humanitarian Conditions in Chad. As the Sahel region weathers another year of drought and poor harvests, the political and security situation in Chad remains volatile, compounding a worsening humanitarian situation in which some 2 million Chadians are at risk of hunger. In the western Sahelian region of the country, the World Food Program warns that an estimated 60% of households, some 1.6 million people, are currently food insecure. Aid organizations warn that the situation is critical, particularly for remote areas in the west with little international aid presence, and that the upcoming rainy season is likely to further complicate the delivery of assistance. In the east, ethnic clashes, banditry, and fighting between government forces and rebel groups, both Chadian and Sudanese, have contributed to a fragile security situation. The instability has forced over 200,000 Chadians from their homes in recent years. In addition to the internal displacement, over 340,000 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan's Darfur region have fled violence in their own countries and now live in refugee camps in east and southern Chad, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With Chadian security forces stretched thin, the threat of bandit attacks on the camps and on aid workers has escalated. The instability has also impacted some 700,000 Chadians whose communities have been disrupted by fighting and strained by the presence of the displaced. The United Nations and the European Union (EU) began deployment of a multidimensional presence in Chad and the CAR in late 2007 to improve regional security so as to facilitate the safe and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons. The U.N. mission, known as MINURCAT, assumed peacekeeping operations from the EU force in March 2009, but it faced logistical challenges in its deployment and a shortage of troops. In January 2010, the Chadian government requested that the mission's mandate not be renewed. After consultations between the government and the U.N. Secretariat, the U.N. Security Council resolved in May 2010 to begin a reduction in MINURCAT's presence in Chad, to be completed by December 31, 2010. The Chadian government has expressed a commitment to protecting civilians and humanitarian workers, but some observers question the capacity of its security forces to fulfill this mandate. A January 2010 agreement between the governments of Chad and Sudan has led to improved relations between the two countries, and they have allegedly ceased to provide support for each other's respective rebel groups. Legislative elections, postponed since 2007, are scheduled for November 10, 2010, and presidential elections are to be held in April 2011. This report will be updated as events warrant.",77,85 "H.R. 1628: The American Health Care Act (AHCA). In January 2017, the House and Senate adopted a budget resolution for FY2017 (S.Con.Res. 3), which reflects an agreement between the chambers on the budget for FY2017 and sets forth budgetary levels for FY2018-FY2026. S.Con.Res. 3 also includes reconciliation instructions directing specific committees to develop and report legislation that would change laws within their respective jurisdictions to reduce the deficit. These instructions trigger the budget reconciliation process, which may allow certain legislation to be considered under expedited procedures. The reconciliation instructions included in S.Con.Res. 3 direct two committees in each chamber to report legislation within their jurisdictions that would reduce the deficit by $1 billion over the period FY2017-FY2026. In the House, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Energy and Commerce Committee are directed to report. In the Senate, the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions are directed to report. In response to the reconciliation instructions, there was activity in four different House committees—Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Budget, and Rules—during the first quarter of 2017. The result of this activity was H.R. 1628, the American Health Care Act (AHCA) of 2017. The version of the AHCA as passed by the House on May 4, 2017 (which incorporated eight amendments referenced in H.Res. 228 and H.Res. 308), is the topic of this report. The bill includes a number of provisions that would repeal or modify parts of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended). For example, the bill would repeal the ACA's cost-sharing subsidies for lower-income individuals who purchase health insurance through the exchanges, and it would substitute the ACA's premium tax credit for a tax credit with different eligibility rules and calculation requirements. The bill also would repeal some of the ACA's Medicaid provisions, such as the changes the ACA made to presumptive eligibility and the state option to provide Medicaid coverage to non-elderly individuals with income above 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL). The AHCA also includes a number of provisions that do not specifically relate to aspects of the ACA. For example, the bill would establish a late-enrollment penalty for certain individuals who do not maintain health insurance coverage, and it would create a new fund to provide funding to states for specified activities intended to improve access to health insurance and health care in the state. The bill would convert Medicaid financing to a per capita cap model (i.e., per enrollee limits on federal payments to states) starting in FY2020, and states would have the option to receive block grant funding (i.e., a predetermined fixed amount of federal funding) instead of per capita cap funding for non-elderly, nondisabled, non-expansion adults and children starting in FY2020. This report contains three tables that, together, provide an overview of all the AHCA provisions. Table 1 includes provisions that apply to the private health insurance market, Table 2 includes provisions that affect the Medicaid program, and Table 3 includes provisions related to public health and taxes. Each table contains a column identifying whether the AHCA provision is related to an ACA provision (e.g., whether the AHCA provision repeals an ACA-related provision). In addition to the three tables, the report includes more detailed summaries of each AHCA provision and two graphics showing the effective dates of AHCA provisions. Figure 1 covers AHCA provisions related to the private health insurance market, public health, and taxes. Figure 2 covers AHCA provisions related to the Medicaid program. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) issued a cost estimate for the AHCA, as passed by the House on May 4, 2017. According to the estimate, the AHCA would reduce federal deficits by $119 billion over the period FY2017-FY2026. With respect to effects on health insurance coverage, CBO and JCT project that, in CY2018, 14 million more people would be uninsured under the AHCA than under current law, and in CY2026, 23 million more people would be uninsured than under current law.",69,70 "Do Not Mail Initiatives and Their Potential Effects: Possible Issues for Congress. Since 2007, at least 19 state legislatures have introduced legislation that would require the creation of state Do Not Mail (DNM) registries. In 2008, 12 states had pending DNM legislation. Although each state's DNM initiative is unique, all attempt to curb the delivery of unsolicited advertising mail—often referred to as ""junk mail or ""direct mail marketing."" Each state's bill would permit a resident to submit his or her name and address to a state agency or department, which would compile all the names and addresses into a registry that would then be distributed to direct mail marketers. Marketers who knowingly ignored the registry and sent unsolicited direct mail advertisements to individuals on a state's registry could be charged a fine for each infraction. While no federal DNM legislation is currently pending, some Members have expressed an interest in the subject, and constituents regularly request information about junk mail. Proponents of DNM policies have claimed that advertising mail harms the environment, renders recipients more susceptible to identity theft and consumer fraud, and is a time-wasting nuisance. The United States Postal Service (USPS) and direct mail marketers, however, argue that the environmental impact from advertising is minimal, fraud or identity theft linked to mailings is rare, and ""time-wasting"" is in the eye of the beholder. While environmental and consumer protection groups have advocated the creation of the DNM registries, direct mail marketers and the USPS have offered alternative solutions to legislation, including Do Not Mail initiatives managed by direct mail marketers themselves. Estimates suggest $60 billion—or 21% of all advertising dollars in the United States—is spent on advertising mail. In 2007, USPS generated more than a quarter of its revenue—$20.7 billion—from Standard Mail, the service's categorization for most advertising mail. The Direct Marketing Association estimates that nearly 460,000 people were directly employed by direct mail marketing—including printers, graphic designers, and catalog creators in 2007. An additional 3.1 million people were indirectly employed in jobs affected by direct mail marketing—including manufacturers, customer service employees, mail deliverers, and warehouse workers. USPS estimates it could lose between $4 billion and $10 billion in revenue if all states passed a DNM registry and all consumers registered for it. This report examines the state level initiatives to create Do Not Mail registries, and analyzes their potential effects on the environment and the economy should they be implemented. It also notes, but does not exhaustively analyze, possible constitutional impediments to state DNM registries. In addition, the report reviews existing methods to reduce or eliminate the delivery of unsolicited advertising mail. This report concludes with federal legislative options that could affect direct mail marketing. This report will be updated when events warrant.",62,8 "Master Limited Partnerships: A Policy Option for the Renewable Energy Industry. Expanded investment in clean and renewable energy resources continues to be a policy priority of the Obama Administration and an area of interest to the 112th Congress. In recent years, the primary policy vehicle for promoting investment in renewable energy has been tax credits, particularly the renewable energy investment and production tax credits. A lack of tax liability, however, has limited the renewable energy sector's ability to fully take advantage of these and other tax benefits. The result has been an increased interest in exploring other options for promoting investment in renewable energy. One option might be to allow renewable energy entities access to the master limited partnership (MLP) business organizational form. An MLP is a type of business structure that is taxed as a partnership, but whose ownership interests are traded on financial markets like corporate stock. Being treated as a partnership for tax purposes implies that MLP income is generally subject to only one layer of taxation in contrast to publically traded C corporations, which are subject to two layers of taxation. The ability to access equity markets in a manner similar to corporations allows MLP to obtain greater amounts of capital. Access to a greater pool of capital, when combined with the favorable partnership tax treatment, may allow MLPs to secure capital at a lower cost than similar businesses operating under a different organizational structure. The lower cost of capital, in turn, could increase investment in the renewable energy sector. Congress first established rules relating to MLPs in the 1980s. At that time, the MLP structure was limited to businesses deriving 90% of their income from primary sources, which included dividends, interest, rents, capital gains, and mining and natural resources income. Effectively, this definition allowed oil and gas extraction and transportation activities access to the MLP structure, while renewable energy resources were generally excluded. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343) expanded the definition of income from qualifying sources to include transportation of certain renewable and alternative fuels, such as ethanol and biodiesel. Provisions enacted under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) enhanced the value of certain renewable energy tax credits for many renewable energy projects. By transforming existing tax credits into cash grants, the Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credits program enhanced access to capital for many in the renewable energy sector. The Section 1603 grant program is scheduled to expire at the end of 2011. As Congress evaluates other policies to attract additional capital to the renewable energy sector, allowing renewable energy entities to structure as MLPs might be one option. Extending the MLP structure to renewables could possibly attract additional capital to and stimulate investment in the renewable energy sector. There are, however, a number of potential policy concerns to consider. First, expanding access to the MLP structure could narrow the corporate tax base, which is one of the reasons access to this structure was limited in the first place. Second, if changes to the tax code allowing renewable entities to access the MLP structure are enacted alongside changes to current passive activity loss rules, there may be concerns about the possibility of renewable energy investments being used as a tax shelter. Finally, if the concern is that renewable entities are disadvantaged relative to fossil fuels currently able to use the MLP structure, one option would be to prevent other energy entities from structuring as MLPs.",37,37 "Congressional Budget Resolutions: Consideration and Amending in the Senate. Title III of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344, 2 U.S.C. 601-688) (""the Budget Act""), as amended, provides for the adoption of an annual concurrent resolution on the budget (""budget resolution"") by Congress. The Budget Act includes provisions governing the consideration and amending process of the budget resolution, such as establishing points of order, setting time limits on certain motions, amendments, and the budget resolution itself, and restricting the content of amendments. This report highlights some of the Budget Act's budget resolution provisions, and how they play out on the Senate floor during consideration and amending. One notable subject that this report addresses is the ""vote-arama,"" or the period when the Senate disposes of amendments after the time for debate on the resolution has expired. In addition to Budget Act provisions, this report also includes examples of when the Senate has utilized unanimous consent agreements to further structure floor procedure.",101,55 "FY2006 Appropriations for the Department of Transportation. The Department of Transportation (DOT) is funded through annual appropriations acts. For FY2006, the Administration requested $58.3 billion for the Department of Transportation. This is $1.4 billion (2%) less than the $59.7 billion provided for FY2005. The major proposed reductions were the Administration's zeroing out of Amtrak (down from $1.2 billion in FY2005) and a reduction in funding for the Airport Improvement Program (to $3.0 billion, $500 million (14%) below FY2005's $3.5 billion). The FY2006 budget also reflected a statutory change to one of the DOT's operating administrations. The Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act (P.L. 108-426, 118 Stat. 2423) created two new operating administrations in place of the former Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA): the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA). On June 30, 2005, the House passed H.R. 3058, the FY2006 appropriations bill funding the Department of Transportation (and several other agencies). The House provided $63.5 billion for the Department, $3.7 billion over FY2005's enacted level and $5.2 billion over the Administration request. The bill increased funding (beyond the requested levels) for the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Transit Administration and Amtrak. The House approved two amendments relating to Amtrak, one added $626 million to the $550 million recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations, bringing Amtrak's FY2006 funding to $1.2 billion, the other eliminated the prohibition on federal funding for routes with a per-passenger subsidy of $30 or more proposed by the Appropriations Committee. On October 20, 2005, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 3058. The Senate provided $64.2 billion for the Department of Transportation, $4.3 billion over FY2005 and $770 million over the House-passed figure. The Senate bill provided more funding than the House approved for highway programs and Amtrak, and less for aviation and transit programs. The Senate also passed several provisions affecting Amtrak operations. The conference version of H.R. 3058 was passed by Congress on November 18 2005, the President signed the bill into law on November 30, 2005 (P.L. 109-115). The conference bill provided $60.7 billion for the Department of Transportation, less than either the House or Senate version, but $1.0 billion over FY2005 funding and $2.4 billion more than requested. On December 30, 2005, the President signed the FY2006 Department of Defense appropriations bill (P.L. 109-148), which included a one percent across-the-board rescission of non-emergency federal discretionary funding for FY2006 and $2.8 billion in supplemental funding to DOT for response to the consequences of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. This report will not be updated.",120,120 "The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): Statutory Language and Recent Issues. This report summarizes the major provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and also discusses selected recent issues, including ten ADA Supreme Court cases.",18,18 "Omnibus Energy Legislation, 109th Congress: Side-by-Side Assessment of House and Senate Versions of H.R. 6. The House approved an omnibus energy bill (H.R. 6) on April 21, 2005, that would open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil and gas leasing, substantially change oversight of electric utilities, increase the use of alternative motor fuels, provide $8.1 billion in energy tax incentives, and authorize numerous energy R&D programs. The Senate passed its version of H.R. 6 on June 28 without ANWR provisions but with $14.1 billion in tax incentives -- including a nuclear energy production credit -- and provisions on global climate change. Highlights of the bills include Electricity. Both the House and the Senate versions of the bill would repeal the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), but the Senate bill has provisions for more stringent oversight of utility mergers than the House version. Standard market design (SMD) would be remanded to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) by the House bill, while the Senate version would terminate the rulemaking altogether. Renewable Energy. An increase in renewable fuel and ethanol consumption to 5 billion gallons annually by 2012 would be mandated by the House bill, as opposed to 8 billion gallons in the Senate bill. The Senate bill includes a ""renewable portfolio standard"" (RPS) -- rejected in the House -- requiring utilities to generate at least 10% of their electricity from renewable energy sources by 2020. MTBE. Methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), a gasoline additive widely used to meet Clean Air Act requirements, has caused water contamination. The House and Senate bills would phase out the use of MTBE with some possible exceptions and provide funds for MTBE cleanup, with some differences. The House version would provide protection for fuel producers and blenders of renewable fuels and MTBE from defective product lawsuits, while the Senate bill would cover renewable fuels but not MTBE. Energy Taxes. The House bill would reduce energy taxes by about $8.1 billion over 11 years as compared with $14.1 billion in the Senate version. A nuclear energy production tax credit is included among the Senate incentives. ANWR. The House-passed bill would authorize oil and gas exploration, development and production in ANWR, with a 2,000-acre limit on production and support facilities. No ANWR provisions are included in the Senate version. Energy Production on Federal Lands. Both bills include numerous provisions to increase energy production on federal lands. The Senate version of H.R. 6 would require an inventory of oil and natural gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), while the House version would not. This report will not be updated.",39,39 "Drug Certification of Mexico in 1999: Arguments For and Against Congressional Resolutions of Disapproval. This report presents arguments for and against congressional resolutions to disapprove President Clinton's February 26, 1999 certification of Mexico as a fully cooperative country in efforts to control illicit narcotics. (1) These resolutions (H.J.Res. 35 Bachus, and H.J.Res. 43 Mica and Gilman) would disapprove the President's certification, but would permit him to avoid withholding of assistance to Mexico if he determined that vital national interests required such assistance. While the drug certification legislation requires that Congress act within 30 calendar days after the President's certification, H.J.Res. 43 contains a rule of construction providing that congressional approval would be deemed to have been enacted within the 30-day period. Supporters of the resolutions might argue that Mexico's performance does not justify certification, that Mexico has failed to take adequate action against corruption and drug traffickers, and that passage would send a message of seriousness that would encourage greater Mexican efforts. Opponents might argue that the action would be seen as a unilateral and punitive approach, that disapproval of Mexico might have negative effects within the United States and might fail to encourage greater Mexican cooperation in counter-narcotics efforts, and that disapproval may negatively affect other areas of bilateral cooperation. Intr 1. This report draws from Drug Certification of Mexico in 1998: Arguments For and Against Congressional Resolutions of Disapproval, CRS Report 98-272(pdf), March 20, 1998, by K. Larry Storrs. For tracking legislative action, see Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986- 1999, CRS Report 98-174, by K. Larry Storrs. For details on the certification process, sanctions, and waivers see Mexico and Drug Certification in 1999: Consequences of Decertification, CRS Report RL30080(pdf), March 4 1999, by K. Larry Storrs. For details on Mexican counter-narcotics efforts in Zedillo's presidency see Mexico's Counter-Narcotics Efforts Under Zedillo, December 1994 to March 1999 CRS Report RL30098 March 18, 1999, by K. Larry Storrs.",96,96 "Brazil's and Canada's WTO Cases Against U.S. Agricultural Direct Payments. In 2007, Brazil and Canada, independently of each other, requested consultations with the United States under the auspices of the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Dispute Settlement process concerning similar grievances regarding U.S. domestic agricultural support programs and the U.S. export credit guarantee program. After consultations failed to resolve their concerns, both countries (again acting independently) requested the establishment of a WTO panel to rule on their complaints. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, on December 17, 2007, established a single panel to consider both cases. In late April 2008, Brazil and Canada informally agreed to postpone proceeding with their joint World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement case challenging certain U.S. agricultural subsidies. At the time of the postponement, the three parties involved in the dispute had been unable to agree on panel membership. The postponement was thought to be provisional based on success in achieving further disciplines on domestic support in the current Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations. However, the Doha Round negotiations failed to complete an agreement in 2009. As of early 2010 there are no prospects for revival of Doha Round negotiations. Nor have Brazil and Canada given any indication that they will revive their pursuit of their joint case. It is not clear how long the postponement will persist. If resumed, the first order of business will be the formation of a panel. The joint case combines two separate but similar cases: DS357, brought by Canada, and DS365, brought by Brazil. Both cases make two charges against U.S. farm programs—first, that the United States has exceeded its annual WTO commitment levels for total aggregate measurement of support (AMS) for agriculture in each of the years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005, and second, that the U.S. export credit guarantee program for agricultural commodities operates as a WTO-illegal export subsidy. Both charges stem, in large part, from a previous negative ruling against U.S. farm programs in a case (DS267) brought by Brazil against the U.S. cotton program. In that case, a WTO panel ruled (the ruling subsequently was upheld by a WTO Appellate Body), first, that direct payments made under U.S. farm programs do not qualify for green box exemption status because of a restriction prohibiting the planting of fruits, vegetables, or wild rice on payment acres, and second, that the U.S. export credit guarantee program operates as a prohibited export subsidy program because the financial benefits returned by these programs failed to cover their long-run operating costs. As a result of the ruling, U.S. export credit guarantees became subject to previously scheduled export subsidy commitments. For more information, see CRS Report RL32571, Brazil's WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program, by Randy Schnepf. Canada and Brazil claim that, since they fail to qualify for inclusion in the green box, U.S. direct payments should be added to its AMS when calculating total domestic support. In addition, they also charge that the United States has improperly notified several of its farm support programs as exempt from the AMS limit, while several other programs were improperly excluded from U.S. notifications. Canada and Brazil claim that when all of the outlays from these allegedly misnotified programs are included, then the U.S. AMS total exceeds its WTO commitment level. Should a panel be formed and eventually rule on this case, any changes in U.S. farm policy needed to comply with a WTO ruling against the United States would likely involve action by Congress to produce new legislation.This report provides background and details, as well as the current status of the two WTO dispute settlement cases. In addition, it discusses the role of Congress in responding to developments.",4,53 Syria's Chemical Weapons: Progress and Continuing Challenges. This report briefly covers the formal declaration and subsequent destruction of Syria's chemical weapons program. The report also mentions newer allegations of further use of chemical weapons that did not fall under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) ban.,29,29 "Advanced Vehicle Technologies: Energy, Environment, and Development Issues. Research and development of cleaner and more efficient vehicle technologies has been ongoing for the past few decades. Much of this research started in response to the oil shocks of the 1970s, which triggered concerns about rising fuel costs and growing dependence on imported fuel. The urgency of those concerns was lost as fuel prices declined in the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, however, rising concerns about vehicle contributions to air pollution and global climate change added a new dimension to the issue. Recently, instability in world oil prices and political concerns have reawakened the energy dependence concerns of the 1970s. Meanwhile, research on new technologies continues, with a particular focus on commercialization. Despite widespread agreement in principle on the benefits of decreased dependence on petroleum and the internal combustion engine, the practical challenges posed by a transition to advanced vehicle technologies are formidable. Nonetheless, significant research and development progress has been made since the 1970s. These new technologies have sparked more interest as some major auto manufacturers have introduced high-efficiency production vehicles to the American market, and others have plans to introduce similar vehicles in the future. Furthermore, interest has grown recently as a result of higher petroleum prices, and the announcement of new emission regulations for passenger vehicles. In January 2002, the Bush Administration announced the FreedomCAR initiative, which focuses federal research on fuel cell vehicles. In conjunction with FreedomCAR, in January 2003, President Bush announced the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, which focuses federal research on hydrogen fuel and fuel cells for stationary applications. The goal of these initiatives is to improve the competitiveness of hydrogen fuel cell vehicle technologies. However, fuel cell vehicles share many components with hybrid and pure electric vehicles. Thus, this research will likely promote advanced vehicle technologies in general. This report discusses four major vehicle technologies—electric vehicles, hybrid electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and fuel cell vehicles—as well as advanced component technologies. Each technology is discussed in terms of cost, fueling and maintenance infrastructure, and performance.",42,118 "Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Expiring on December 15, 2019. Two amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) were enacted as part of the USA PATRIOT Act. Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to permit multipoint, or ""roving,"" wiretaps by adding flexibility to the degree of specificity with which the location or facility subject to electronic surveillance under FISA must be identified. Section 215 enlarged the scope of materials that could be sought under FISA to include ""any tangible thing."" It also lowered the standard required before a court order may be issued to compel their production. A third amendment to FISA was enacted in 2004, as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). Section 6001(a) of the IRTPA changed the rules regarding the types of individuals who may be targets of FISA-authorized searches. Also known as the ""lone wolf"" provision, it permits surveillance of non-U.S. persons engaged in international terrorism without requiring evidence linking those persons to an identifiable foreign power or terrorist organization. In summer 2013, media began reporting on several foreign intelligence activities conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA), including the bulk collection of telephone metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. After a one-day lapse in the expiring authorities, Congress enacted the USA FREEDOM Act, which placed new limitations on the scope of the government's foreign intelligence activities, while simultaneously extending the expired provisions through December 15, 2019. Although these provisions are set to sunset at the end of 2019, grandfather clauses permit them to remain effective with respect to investigations that began, or potential offenses that took place, before the sunset date.",27,27 "Stock Options: The Accounting Issue and Its Consequences. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has issued a long-anticipated rule that stock options must be recognized as an expense on corporation income statements. The previous accounting rule permitted but did not require recognition, corporations that elected to omit the cost of options, as most did, have been able to report higher earnings. This report examines the debate surrounding the issue and discusses the potential consequences.",12,12 "Terrorism Risk Insurance Legislation in the 113th Congress: Issue Summary and Side-by-Side Analysis. Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, insurance covering terrorism losses was normally included in commercial insurance policies without additional cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, this ceased to be the case as insurers and reinsurers pulled back from offering terrorism coverage. It was feared that a lack of insurance against terrorism loss would have a wider economic impact, particularly because insurance coverage can be a significant factor in lending decisions. Congress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA, P.L. 107-297). TRIA created a temporary program, expiring at the end of 2005, to calm the insurance markets through a government reinsurance backstop sharing in terrorism losses. The intent was that this would give the industry time to gather the data and create the structures and capacity necessary for private insurance to cover terrorism risk. TRIA did not require premiums to be paid for the government coverage. Instead, TRIA required private insurers to offer commercial insurance for terrorism risk with the government then recouping some or all federal payments under the act in the years following government coverage of insurer losses. Under TRIA, terrorism insurance became widely available and largely affordable, and the insurance industry greatly expanded its financial capacity. There has been, however, little apparent success on developing a longer-term private solution, and fears have persisted about wider economic consequences if insurance were not available. Congress passed two extensions to the program, in 2005 (P.L. 109-144) and 2007 (P.L. 110-160). The 2005 extension was primarily focused on reducing the government's upfront financial exposure under the act, whereas the 2007 extension left most of the upfront aspect of the TRIA program unchanged, while accelerating the post-event recoupment provisions. The 2007 legislation also included the only expansion of the TRIA program since initial enactment, it extended the program to cover any acts of terrorism, as opposed to only foreign acts of terrorism. The current TRIA program expires at the end of 2014. Although insurance industry capacity has increased since 2002, terrorism is still seen by many as essentially uninsurable. Without TRIA, the insurance industry has indicated that terrorism insurance will again become unavailable or unaffordable and fears are again being expressed that lack of terrorism insurance may slow down other sectors of the economy. Several bills (H.R. 508, H.R. 1945, H.R. 2146, S. 2244, and H.R. 4871) were introduced to extend TRIA and change different aspects of the program. The House and the Senate adjourned on December 16, 2014, without passing legislation to extend TRIA. This report briefly outlines the issues involved with terrorism insurance, summarizes extension legislation in the 113th Congress, and includes a side-by-side of TRIA law and bills that were passed by the Senate (S. 2244), reported by the House Committee on Financial Services (H.R. 4871), and passed by the House (S. 2244 with a substitute amendment). For more a more in-depth treatment of the issues surrounding TRIA, please see CRS Report R42716, Terrorism Risk Insurance: Issue Analysis and Overview of Current Program, by Baird Webel.",22,22 "How FDA Approves Drugs and Regulates Their Safety and Effectiveness. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a regulatory agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, regulates the safety and effectiveness of drugs sold in the United States. FDA divides that responsibility into two phases. In the preapproval (premarket) phase, FDA reviews manufacturers' applications to market drugs in the United States, a drug may not be sold unless it has FDA approval. Once a drug is on the market, FDA continues its oversight of drug safety and effectiveness. That postapproval (postmarket) phase lasts as long as the drug is on the market. Beginning with the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Congress and the President have incrementally refined and expanded FDA's responsibilities regarding drug approval and regulation. The progression to drug approval begins before FDA involvement. First, basic scientists work in the laboratory and with animals, second, a drug or biotechnology company develops a prototype drug. That company must seek and receive FDA approval, by way of an investigational new drug (IND) application, to test the product with human subjects. It carries out those tests, called clinical trials, sequentially in Phase I, II, and III studies, which involve increasing numbers of subjects. The manufacturer then compiles the resulting data and analysis in a new drug application (NDA). At that point, FDA reviews the NDA with three major concerns: (1) safety and effectiveness in the drug's proposed use, (2) appropriateness of the proposed labeling, and (3) adequacy of manufacturing methods to assure the drug's identity, strength, quality, and purity. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) and associated regulations detail the requirements for each step. FDA uses a few special mechanisms to expedite drug development and the review process when a drug might address an unmet need or a serious disease or condition. Those mechanisms include accelerated approval, animal efficacy approval, fast track designation, breakthrough therapy designation, and priority review. Once FDA has approved an NDA, the drug may enter the U.S. market, but FDA continues to address drug production, distribution, and use. Its activities, based on ensuring drug safety and effectiveness, address product integrity, labeling, reporting of research and adverse events, surveillance, drug studies, risk management, information dissemination, off-label use, and direct-to-consumer advertising, all topics in which Congress has traditionally been interested. FDA seeks to ensure product integrity through product and facility registration, inspections, chain-of-custody documentation, and technologies to protect against counterfeit, diverted, subpotent, adulterated, misbranded, and expired drugs. FDA's approval of an NDA includes the drug's labeling, the agency may require changes once a drug is on the market based on new information. It also prohibits manufacturer promotion of uses that are not specified in the labeling. The FFDCA requires that manufacturers report to FDA adverse events related to its drugs, clinicians and other members of the public may report adverse events to FDA. The agency's surveillance of drug-related problems, which had primarily focused on analyses of various adverse-event databases, is now expanding to more active uses of evolving computer technology and links to other public and private information sources. The FFDCA allows FDA to require a manufacturer to conduct postapproval studies of drugs. The law specifies when FDA must attach that requirement to the NDA approval and when FDA may issue the requirement after a drug is on the market. To manage exceptional risks of drugs, FDA may also require patient or clinician guides and restrictions on distribution. The agency publicly disseminates information about drug safety and effectiveness, and regulates the industry promotion of products to clinicians and the public.",67,67 "Animal Identification and Meat Traceability. Many animal producers support establishment of a nationwide identification (ID) system capable of quickly tracking animals from birth to slaughter. While they believe such a system is needed to better deal with animal diseases or meet foreign market specifications, some consumer groups and others believe it also would be useful for food safety or retail informational purposes—and that the program should be able to trace meat products through processing and consumption. However, despite years of effort on at least an animal ID program for disease purposes, many contentious issues remain unresolved. For example, should it be mandatory or voluntary? What types of information should be collected, on what animal species, and who should hold it, government or private entities? How much will it cost, and who should pay? Following the first U.S. report of a cow with BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or ""mad cow disease"") in late December 2003, the Secretary of Agriculture promised to take the lead in implementing an animal ID program capable of identifying all animals of interest within 48 hours of a disease discovery (BSE or other). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has committed, through FY2006, $85 million to this effort, and all states now have systems for registering animal premises. Some industry groups and lawmakers have criticized USDA for moving too slowly and/or not providing a clearer path toward a universal ID program. Others believe that USDA's progress to date simply reflects the deep divisions among producers and other interests over the many unresolved questions. A few livestock producers oppose any effort to establish broader programs, fearing they will be costly and intrusive. The 109th Congress was asked to address these issues. A provision in the House-passed USDA appropriation for FY2007 (H.R. 5384) would have conditioned another $33 million in spending for animal ID on publication in the Federal Register of a ""complete and detailed plan"" for the program, ""including, but not limited to, proposed legislative changes, cost estimates, and means of program evaluation."" However, a House floor amendment to prohibit all ID program funding was defeated by a wide margin. A final FY2007 appropriation had not been passed by mid-January 2007, and USDA programs were operating under a continuing resolution. Other bills included H.R. 1254, the National Farm Animal Identification and Records Act, H.R. 1256, to limit animal ID information disclosure, and H.R. 3170, creating a private Livestock Identification Board to oversee the program. The continuing differences over animal ID make it more likely that the topic will be part of the 2007 debate over a new omnibus farm bill. This CRS report will be updated if events warrant.",2,0 "SNAP and Related Nutrition Provisions of the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79). After action to reauthorize the 2008 farm bill in both the 112th and 113th Congresses, the Agriculture Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79, 2014 farm bill) was enacted on February 7, 2014. In addition to farm programs and other agricultural policies, this newest omnibus farm bill reauthorizes the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and other related nutrition programs. Farm bills since 1973 have included reauthorization of the Food Stamp Program (now called SNAP). The enacted 2014 law reconciles differences between the House-passed bill (H.R. 2642, as combined with H.R. 3102, Nutrition Reform and Work Opportunity Act) and the Senate-passed bill (S. 954). The Nutrition Title reauthorizes SNAP and related programs for five years, and CBO estimates that the Nutrition Title will reduce spending by $8.0 billion over 10 years (FY2014-FY2023). The SNAP provisions alone are estimated to reduce spending by slightly more than $8.6 billion over 10 years. Certain other Nutrition provisions are estimated to increase spending, which together result in the total estimated reduction of $8.0 billion. Farm bill conferees were faced with significant differences in the SNAP provisions in the Senate- and House-passed bills. Over the 10-year budget window (FY2014-FY2023), CBO estimated that the Senates Nutrition Title would have reduced spending by approximately $4 billion and the Houses Nutrition Title would have reduced spending by approximately $39 billion. The House bill would have reauthorized SNAP and related programs for three years, while the Senate would have reauthorized the programs for five years. Although the Nutrition Title of the 2014 law contains a number of provisions that change aspects of SNAP and related nutrition programs, conferees largely retained the provisions in the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 and other nutrition program authorizing statutes. The budgetary impact of the 2014 farm bills Nutrition Title is largely the result of changes to SNAP eligibility and benefit calculation rules. The laws treatment of major issues in households eligibility and benefit amounts include the following The 2014 farm bill amends how Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) payments are treated in the calculation of SNAP benefits. According to information from June 2012, this change to benefit calculation is expected to reduce household benefit amounts in approximately 17 states. The 2014 farm bill disqualifies from SNAP certain ex-offenders who are not complying with the terms of their sentence. This is a narrower disqualification than that proposed in the House and Senate bills. The law includes policies related to the SNAP Employment and Training (E&T) program, including a pilot project authority and related funding ($200 million over FY2014 and FY2015) for states to implement and USDA to evaluate a variety of work programs for SNAP participants. The law includes the House bills provisions that would expand reporting measures for all E&T programs. The law makes no changes to broad-based categorical eligibility. The law does not give states the option to administer drug testing as part of their eligibility determination processes (as had been proposed in the House bill). Since SNAP provides benefits redeemable for SNAP-eligible foods at SNAP-eligible retailers, much of SNAP law pertains to retailer authorization and benefit issuance and redemption. The 2014 farm bill includes the changes to retailer and redemption provisions that had been included in both the House and Senate bills. The law now requires stores to stock more fresh foods, requires retailers to pay for their electronic benefit transfer (EBT) machines, and provides additional funding for combatting trafficking (the sale of SNAP benefits). The 2014 farm bill also includes $100 million in mandatory funding (over 10 years) for Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive grants, which will support organizations that offer bonus incentives for SNAP purchases of fruits and vegetables. The law increases funding for the Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), the program that provides USDA foods and federal support to emergency feeding organizations (e.g., food banks and food pantries). Taking into account CBOs estimates of inflation, the conference agreement is estimated to provide an additional $205 million for TEFAP over 10 years, $125 million of which is provided in the first five years. The laws Nutrition Title includes many other changes to SNAP and related program policy. These changes include amendments to the nutrition programs operated by tribes and territories, the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), and the distribution of USDA foods to schools. The 2010 child nutrition reauthorization (Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, P.L. 111-296) has already reauthorized WIC and the child nutrition programs through FY2015, but the 2014 farm bill does include related policies, such as farm-to-school efforts.",114,114 "Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA): Selected Regulatory and Legislative Issues. Much progress has been made in assuring the quality of public water supplies since the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) was first enacted in 1974. Public water systems must meet extensive regulations, and water utility management has become a much more complex and professional endeavor. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has regulated some 91 drinking water contaminants, and more regulations are pending. In 2007, the number of community water systems reporting no violations of drinking water standards was 89.5%. Despite nationwide progress in providing safe drinking water, an array of issues and challenges remain. Recent issues have involved infrastructure funding needs, regulatory compliance, and concerns caused by detections of unregulated contaminants in drinking water, such as perchlorate, and pharmaceuticals and personal care products (PPCPs). Another issue involves the adequacy of existing regulations (such as the lead rule) and EPA's pace in reviewing and potentially revising older standards (such as the chromium standard). Congress last reauthorized SDWA in 1996. Although funding authority for most SDWA programs expired in FY2003, Congress continues to appropriate funds annually for these ongoing programs, while EPA, states, and water systems continue efforts to meet current statutory requirements. The 111th Congress made one amendment to SDWA, P.L. 111-380, which reduces the amount of lead allowed in water pipes and plumbing fittings and fixtures. An overarching SDWA issue concerns the cumulative cost and complexity of drinking water standards and the ability of water systems, especially small systems, to comply with standards. The issue of the affordability of drinking water regulations has merged with the larger debate over what is the appropriate federal role in assisting communities with financing drinking water projects needed for SDWA compliance, and for water infrastructure improvements generally. Water infrastructure financing legislation has been offered repeatedly in recent Congresses to authorize higher funding levels for the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) program, and/or to provide grants and other compliance assistance to small communities. In the 111th Congress, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) included $2 billion for the DWSRF program, and the EPA appropriations act for FY2011 (P.L. 111-88) included another $1.387 billion. Two bills to revise and reauthorize the DWSRF received action: House-passed H.R. 5320 and Senate-reported S. 1005. Taking an alternative financing approach, H.R. 3202 proposed to create a water infrastructure trust fund supported by fees and taxes. The SDWA also mandates regulation of underground injection activities to protect drinking water sources. An issue in this area concerns the underground injection of carbon dioxide (CO2) for long-term storage as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) specified that sequestration activities shall be subject to SDWA underground injection control provisions. In 2010, EPA issued a SDWA rule to provide a national permitting framework for managing the underground injection of CO2 for commercial-scale sequestration projects. Another underground injection issue concerns the growing reliance on hydraulic fracturing to produce natural gas and oil from unconventional geologic formations. Two bills (H.R. 2766 and S. 1215, the FRAC Act) were introduced to authorize EPA regulation of this practice under the SDWA underground injection control program, in contrast, H.R. 2300 expressed opposition to federal regulation of gas and oil production wells under SDWA.",44,44 "The President's Reorganization Authority: Review and Analysis. Among the initiatives being promoted with the beginning of the Administration of President George W. Bush is that of renewing the President's lapsed authority to submit reorganization plans to Congress. The general rationale offered for renewing this authority is that it would provide additional flexibility and discretion to the President in organizing the executive branch to promote economy and efficiency"" as well as his political priorities. The regular legislative route for considering presidential proposals involving organizational changes is deemed by reorganization authority supporters as being unduly slow and cumbersome. Thus, the proposal to permit the President to submit reorganization plans subject to mandatory congressional consideration with ""fast track"" procedures is viewed by the reorganization proposal's proponents as a necessary reform for good government. Critics of the reorganization plan authority reject the arguments and assumptions behind the proposal and defend the efficacy and legitimacy of the regular legislative process for executive reorganization proposals. This report addresses three specific issues: (1) the historical basis and use of the President's reorganization authority, (2) the factors contributing to the lapse of the President's reorganization authority in 1984, (1) and (3) thoughts on the future of reorganization in the executive branch. 1. It is worth noting that the Reorganization Act of 1977, as amended, remains ""on the books,"" but is not presently operative for execution as it expired on December 31, 1984. See Appendix for Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, 98 Stat. 3192, and Appendix 2 for Executive Reorganization, chapter 9 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code.",55,55 "Social Security: The Chilean Approach to Retirement. Over the past few years, there has been intense debate about Social Security reform in the United States. A number of options, ranging from changing the benefit formula to adding individual accounts, has been discussed. The policy debate takes place against the backdrop of an aging population, rising longevity, and relatively low fertility rates, which pose long-range financial challenges to the Social Security system. According to the 2007 Social Security Trustees Report's intermediate assumptions, the Social Security trust funds are projected to experience cash-flow deficits in 2017 and to become exhausted in 2041. As policymakers consider how to address Social Security's financing challenges, efforts of Social Security reform across the world have gained attention. One of the most oft-cited international cases of reform is Chile. Chile initiated sweeping retirement reforms in 1981 that replaced a state-run, pay-as-you-go defined benefit retirement system with a private, mandatory system of individual retirement accounts where benefits are dependent on the account balance. As a pioneer of individual retirement accounts, Chile has become a case study of pension reform around the world. Although Chile's experience is not directly comparable to the situation in the United States because of large differences between the countries, knowledge of the case may be useful for American policymakers. This CRS report focuses on the Chilean individual retirement accounts system. It begins with a description of the U.S. Social Security policy debate, along with a brief comparison of Chile and the United States. Next, the report explains what Chile's individual retirement accounts system is and how it works. The pension reform bill sent to the Chilean Congress for debate in 2007 is also discussed. The report does not address other components of Chile's social security system, such as maternity, work injury, and unemployment. The final section provides an assessment of Chile's now 26-year-old individual retirement accounts system. Pension reforms have contributed to the rapid growth in the Chilean economy over the past two decades and returns on pension fund investments have been greater than expected. Administrative costs, however, have been high and participation rates have been modest at best. There is concern that the system does not cover the entire labor force and provides inadequate benefits to low income workers. This report will not be updated.",116,116 "Public Health, Workforce, Quality, and Related Provisions in H.R. 3962. Health care reform is at the top of the domestic policy agenda for the 111th Congress, driven by concerns about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable growth in spending on health care and health insurance. Improving access to care and controlling rising costs are seen to require changes to both the financing and delivery of health care. Experts point to a growing body of evidence of the health care system's failure to consistently provide high-quality care to all Americans. The health reform debate has encompassed a number of proposals to address these challenges and improve the delivery of health care services. They include initiatives to encourage individuals to adopt healthier lifestyles, and to change the way that physicians and other providers treat and manage disease. Delivery reform proposals focus on expanding the primary care workforce, encouraging the use of clinical preventive services, and strengthening the role of chronic care management. Health care delivery reform relies on putting mechanisms in place to drive change in the systems of care. Key drivers include performance measurement and the public dissemination of performance information, comparative effectiveness research, adoption of health information technology, and, most important, the alignment of payment incentives with high-quality care. In February 2009, Congress enacted the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act to promote the widespread adoption of electronic health records for sharing of clinical data among hospitals, physicians, and other health care stakeholders. On November 7, 2009, by a vote of 220-215, the House passed a comprehensive health reform bill, the Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962). The legislation, introduced by Representative Dingell on October 29, 2009, is based on an earlier measure, the America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 (H.R. 3200), which was jointly developed and reported by the House Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Education and Labor. This report, one of a series of CRS products on H.R. 3962, summarizes the bill's workforce, prevention, quality, and related provisions. H.R. 3962 includes numerous provisions intended to increase the primary care and public health workforce, promote preventive services, and strengthen quality measurement, among other things. The legislation would amend and expand on many of the existing health workforce programs authorized under Title VII (health professions) and Title VIII (nursing) of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). It would create a Public Health Workforce Corps and establish a new loan repayment program, modeled on the National Health Service Corps (NHSC), for individuals who agree to practice in medically underserved areas with unmet health care needs. The bill also would make a number of changes to the Medicare graduate medical education (GME) payments to teaching hospitals, in part to encourage the training of more primary care physicians. In addition, H.R. 3962 would bolster quality improvement activities, including performance measurement, and broaden Medicare and Medicaid coverage of clinical preventive services. The legislation would establish a multi-billion dollar Public Health Investment Fund to provide additional funding for these and other new programs and activities.",69,69 Government Contract Bid Protests In Brief: Analysis of Legal Processes and Recent Developments. Suppressed Summary –Terms for CRS Search Engine Procurement Government contract Bid protest Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) U.S. Court of Federal Claims (COFC) Government Accountability Office (GAO) Automatic stay Procuring agency,63,60 "Agriculture and Greenhouse Gases. This report examines the implications for agriculture of the ongoing but inconclusive debate about global climate change. In that debate, agriculture's role is multifaceted. Agriculture is both a source of several greenhouse gases (GHGs) and a ""sink"" for absorbing carbon dioxide, the most common GHG, thereby partly offsetting emissions. Overall, agriculture is a comparatively modest source of U.S. GHG emissions: it accounts for approximately 7% of U.S. emissions, while sectors such as transportation and electricity generation account for much larger shares. Agriculture's GHG emissions are principally in the form of methane and nitrous oxides emissions. Whatever the current or future Congresses may do regarding climate legislation, interest in existing and prospective responses by government and others will continue. Administration efforts to develop policies and strategies to address GHGs and climate change have been underway for some time. Two actions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have drawn the attention of the agriculture industry. One is regulating emissions of GHGs under the Clean Air Act (CAA) and subsequent GHG emission standards for new motor vehicles which, in turn, trigger certain CAA permitting requirements. A second, related action is a rule to require reporting of GHG emissions by certain facilities. Regarding both, EPA took steps to focus on the largest emitters and ensure that few agricultural sources would be subject to new GHG requirements. Still, EPA's overall initiatives have been widely criticized, and the 111th Congress intervened through a funding bill to largely exclude agriculture from EPA's regulatory requirements. During the 111th Congress, the House passed a comprehensive climate change bill (H.R. 2454), and a Senate committee reported a companion (S. 1733). Although no legislation was enacted, both bills included provisions excluding agriculture from regulatory requirements and promoting agricultural practices to reduce or offset emissions from regulated sources. Traditionally, practices such as conservation tillage have been used for soil conservation and water quality improvement, but their value for climate change abatement or mitigation is receiving increased attention. A number of strategies, technologies, and practices exist to reduce methane and nitrous oxides emissions at the farm level, but implementation faces financial and monitoring challenges. Programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provide financial incentives and technical assistance to encourage implementation of certain farming practices. While the focus of most programs is not on GHG emission reduction, USDA is giving greater attention to GHGs in administering its suite of existing programs. Results of the 2010 congressional elections have altered political dynamics in Congress on many issues, and leadership of both political parties have indicated that neither currently plans to pursue comprehensive approaches to addressing climate change in the 112th Congress, although some elements of previous proposals may move through the legislative process. How agriculture fits in these discussions—both as a source of GHG emissions and contributions that the sector can make to mitigating climate change—has drawn interest in the past and likely will do so again.",42,42 "Family Law: Congress's Authority to Legislate on Domestic Relations Questions. Under the United States Constitution, Congress has little direct authority to legislate in the field of domestic relations. The primary authority and responsibility to legislate in the domestic relations arena lies with the individual states. The rationale behind this approach is the lack of overriding national considerations in the family law area. However, states' freedom to legislate has led to substantial variation between the individual states on many topics including incidents of marriage, divorce and child welfare. As such, Congress continues to utilize a number of indirect approaches to enact numerous federal laws which impact on family law questions. This report discusses the extent to which Congress is constitutionally authorized to legislate on family law questions, and includes examples of present laws utilizing the various approaches available in this area.",95,95 "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy. The U.S. government considers its relationship with Nigeria, Africa's largest producer of oil and its largest economy, to be among the most important on the continent. The country is Africa's most populous, with more than 180 million people, roughly evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. Nigeria, which transitioned from military to civilian rule in 1999, ranked until recently among the top suppliers of U.S. oil imports, and is a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid. It is an influential actor in African politics and a major troop contributor to U.N. peacekeeping missions. Nigeria is a country of significant promise, but it also faces serious social, economic, and security challenges, some of which pose potential threats to state and regional stability. The country has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crises since gaining independence in 1960. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, geographic, and religious lines, and corruption and misrule have undermined the state's authority and legitimacy. Despite extensive petroleum resources, Nigeria's human development indicators are among the world's lowest, and a majority of the population faces extreme poverty. Thousands have been killed in periodic ethno-religious clashes. In the south, years of social unrest, criminality, and corruption in the oil-producing Niger Delta have hindered oil production, delayed the Delta's economic development, and contributed to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Perceived government neglect and economic marginalization have also fueled resentment in the predominately Muslim north. The attempted terrorist attack on an American airliner by a Nigerian in 2009 and the subsequent rise of a militant Islamist group, Boko Haram, have heightened concerns about extremist recruitment in Nigeria, which has one of the world's largest Muslim populations. Boko Haram has focused on a wide range of targets, but civilians in Nigeria's impoverished, predominately Muslim northeast have borne the brunt of the violence. The group has also staged attacks in neighboring countries, notably Cameroon, and poses a threat to international targets in the region, including Western citizens. While the group appears primarily focused on the Lake Chad basin region, its March 2015 pledge to the Islamic State (IS) and potential ties with other violent Islamist groups, notably Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are of concern. The State Department designated Boko Haram and a splinter faction, Ansaru, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in November 2013. Domestic criticism of the Nigerian government's response to the Boko Haram threat, and in particular to the group's April 2014 kidnapping of almost 300 schoolgirls, contributed to the election in March 2015 of former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari to the presidency. The elections were Nigeria's most competitive contest to date and were viewed as a critical test for its leaders, its security forces, and its people. They have been widely hailed as historic, with the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) and its president, Goodluck Jonathan, losing to Buhari's All Progressives Congress (APC), marking Nigeria's first democratic transfer of power. President Buhari's administration has thus far been largely focused on curbing rampant corruption and stemming insecurity in Nigeria's northeast—two key pillars of his presidential campaign. The Obama Administration has been supportive of reform initiatives in Nigeria, including anti-corruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs to promote peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Administration established the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, a strategic dialogue to address issues of mutual concern. Congress regularly monitors Nigerian political developments, and some Members have expressed concern with corruption, human rights abuses, and the threat of violent extremism in Nigeria. Congress oversees more than $600 million in U.S. foreign aid programs in Nigeria—one of the largest U.S. bilateral assistance packages in Africa.",85,85 "The Federal Excise Tax on Motor Fuels and the Highway Trust Fund: Current Law and Legislative History. The federal government levies an excise tax on various motor fuels. Under current law, the tax rate is 18.3 cents per gallon on gasoline and 24.3 cents per gallon on diesel fuel. A 0.1 cents per gallon tax is also levied on top of these fuel tax rates to help fund expenses associated with fuel regulation. These rates are not automatically adjusted for inflation. Specific tax rates also apply to special motor fuels. Under current law, federal motor fuels excise tax collections are credited to two federal spending accounts: the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) and the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Trust Fund. On December 4, 2015, President Obama signed the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act (P.L. 114-94). The FAST Act reauthorized federal highway and public transportation programs for five years (FY2016-FY2020) and reauthorized current gas tax and LUST tax levels through FY2022. Spending levels in the FAST Act are funded by HTF revenues and a $70 billion transfer from the general fund to the HTF and $300 million in scheduled transfers from the LUST Fund. The transfers from the general fund were offset by non-transportation-related provisions. A major policy debate surrounding the motor fuels excise tax relates to the ability of the HTF to be self-sustaining. Approximately 90% of HTF receipts are composed of annual tax collections on gasoline and diesel fuels. Since 2008, HTF spending obligations have exceeded receipts and $139.9 billion (after sequestration) has been transferred from the Treasury's general fund (as well as $3.7 billion from the LUST Trust Fund) to address these projected shortfalls. Tax collections have declined over time because of inflation's effect on the value of the tax rates, among other factors. Future declines in tax collections are anticipated because of scheduled increases in corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards. Although left unaddressed by the FAST Act, federal motor fuels excise tax rates could be a major subject of debate as Congress considers longer-term sources of funding for the HTF. In the 114th Congress, multiple bills (H.R. 680, H.R. 2971, S. 1994) propose an increase in the federal motor fuels excise tax. Some bills also contain provisions linking the excise tax rate to increases in inflation (H.R. 680, H.R. 2971, H.R. 1846, S. 1994). Alternatively, other proposals in the 114th Congress would link funding for the HTF with international tax policy changes, or would cut the federal motor fuels tax and devolve authority for transportation projects to the states. The President's FY2017 budget also proposes funding a ""21st Century Clean Transportation System"" initiative partly with revenue raised from a fee on U.S. crude oil consumption. This report provides an overview of current law and a recent legislative history of federal motor fuels excise tax rates (with an emphasis on gasoline and diesel fuel for highway use) and the HTF. State motor fuels tax rates are mentioned in brief. The report also includes a summary of the history of the gas tax and funding for the HTF. Issues related to HTF spending programs and infrastructure financing, more broadly, are beyond the scope of this report, but are discussed in CRS Report R42877, Funding and Financing Highways and Public Transportation, by Robert S. Kirk and William J. Mallett.",121,121 "Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views. This report focuses on the foreign policy of Turkey, a long-time valued U.S. NATO ally, and examines the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) recalculation of the country's approach to foreign affairs and its possible effects on relations with the United States. This report surveys Turkish foreign policy issues that are of critical interest to U.S. officials and Members of Congress.",85,85 "Formulation and Content of the Budget Resolution. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297-332) established the concurrent budget resolution as the centerpiece of the congressional budget process. The annual budget resolution is an agreement between the House and Senate on a budget plan for the upcoming fiscal year and at least the following four fiscal years. As a concurrent resolution, it is not sent to the President for his signature and thus does not become law. The budget resolution, however, provides the framework for subsequent legislative action on the annual appropriations bills, revenue measures, debt-limit legislation, reconciliation legislation (if required), and any other budgetary legislation. Consequently, the President may be drawn into negotiations with Congress on the budget resolution. For more information on the budget process, see http://www.crs.gov/¬øproducts/¬øguides/¬øguidehome.shtml.",101,101 "Mineral Royalties on Federal Lands: Issues for Congress. Three royalty debates may be revived in the 114th Congress: (1) whether to increase the statutory minimum rate for onshore federal oil and gas leases from 12.5% to 18.75%, (2) whether to enact revenue sharing laws for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) leases to include all coastal states, and (3) whether to charge a royalty on hardrock locatable minerals produced on federal public domain lands. House and Senate bills in the 113th Congress proposed to raise the minimum rate from 12.5% to 18.75% on oil and gas produced on federal leases, provide for revenue sharing of OCS revenues, and establish a ""gross proceeds"" royalty on federally owned locatable mineral production. Raising the Onshore Oil and Gas Royalty Rate A mineral royalty is a payment to the resource owner for the extraction of the mineral. Typically, in the mining industry the royalty is based on production ($/ton) or income (percent of gross or net income). For federal oil and gas leases, royalties are assessed on the gross value of production minus allowable deductions. There is precedent for raising federal oil and gas lease royalty rates. Under the Bush Administration in 2008, Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne raised the deepwater rate for new leases from 12.5% to 16.67%. Then, in 2009, Secretary Ken Salazar of the Obama Administration increased the royalty rates for new offshore leases to 18.75%. The lower federal onshore royalty rate (12.5%) for oil and gas may be viewed as an incentive rate to encourage bidding on federal lands. Revenue Sharing The largely decentralized revenue sharing system for onshore federal energy and mineral resources under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 provides states generally with a 50% share of revenues collected (rents, bonuses, and royalties), less 2% for administrative costs, Alaska, however, receives 90% of all revenues collected on federal onshore leases (less administrative costs). These onshore receipts are intended to maintain or establish infrastructure, and mitigate environmental, social, and other impacts from the development of mineral resources. This is different from the much more centralized system used for offshore revenue, which has much less revenue sharing. Establish a Locatable Minerals Royalty The Mining Law continues to provide the structure for much of the western mineral development on public domain lands. Western mining, although not as extensive as it once was, is still a major economic activity. Industry officials argue that the current claim-patent system enhances a company's ability to bring an economic deposit into production. They contend that restrictions on free access and security of tenure would curtail exploration. Mining Law critics consider the claim-patent system a giveaway of publicly owned resources because of the absence of royalties and the small charges associated with keeping a claim active and obtaining a patent.",107,107 "U.S.-EU Poultry Dispute on the Use of Pathogen Reduction Treatments (PRTs). In January 2009, the United States escalated a long-running dispute with the European Union (EU) over its refusal to accept imports of U.S. poultry treated with certain pathogen reduction treatments (PRTs) by requesting World Trade Organization (WTO) consultations with the EU on the matter, a prerequisite first step toward the establishment of a formal WTO dispute settlement panel. This dispute dates back to 1997, when the EU first banned the use of PRTs on poultry, effectively shutting out virtually all imports from the United States since then. This WTO case has not moved forward. PRTs are antimicrobial rinses—including chlorine dioxide, acidified sodium chlorite, trisodium phosphate, and peroxyacids, among others—that have been approved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for use in poultry processing to reduce the amount of microbes on meat. Meat and poultry products processed with PRTs are judged safe by the United States and also by European food safety authorities. Nevertheless, the EU prohibits the use of PRTs and the importation of poultry treated with these substances. The EU generally opposes such chemical interventions and believes that stronger sanitary practices during production and processing are more appropriate for pathogen control than what it views as U.S. overreliance on PRTs. As PRTs are widely used in U.S. poultry processing, the EU's ban on their use effectively prohibits U.S. poultry meat from entering EU countries. Although the United States is the second largest global exporter of poultry (broiler and turkey) meat, virtually no U.S. poultry meat is being purchased for consumption in the EU, according to USDA. As the EU is a major importer of poultry products, some estimate that the combined effects of the ban and the growth of the EU market may have led to $200 million to $300 million in lost U.S. sales annually. To date, the United States and EU have not been able to reach agreement on a number of issues related to veterinary equivalency, and the EU continues to maintain measures that prohibit the use of any substance other than water to remove contamination from animal products unless the substance has been approved by the European Commission, which has rejected USDA's applications to the EU's health agencies requesting approval to use certain poultry treatments. The United States is seeking approval of four PRTs: peroxyacetic acid, chlorine dioxide, acidified sodium chlorite, and trisodium. The U.S. poultry industry and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) remain actively engaged in this case. This issue also continues to be raised in ongoing trade negotiations between the United States and EU to establish a free trade area as part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). The U.S. poultry industry has indicated that it is unlikely to support a T-TIP agreement that does not provide for better access to the EU of U.S. poultry products.",1,0 "Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): Controversies for the 109th Congress. One part of the energy debate is whether to approve energy development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in northeastern Alaska, and if so, under what conditions, or whether to continue to prohibit development to protect the area's biological, recreational, and subsistence values. ANWR is rich in fauna, flora, and oil potential. Its development has been debated for over 40 years but sharp increases in energy prices from late 2000 to early 2001, terrorist attacks, more price increases in 2004-2006, and energy infrastructure damage from hurricanes have intensified debate. Few onshore U.S. areas stir as much industry interest as ANWR. At the same time, few areas are considered more worthy of protection in the eyes of conservation and some Native groups. Current law prohibits oil and gas leasing in the Refuge. In the first session of the 109th Congress, development advocates added ANWR development to the conference report for the Defense appropriations bill (H.R. 2863). The House passed the conference report with the ANWR provision, but the ANWR title was removed from the bill (P.L. 109-148) after failure of a cloture motion in the Senate. In the second session, on March 16, 2006, the Senate passed S.Con.Res. 83, the FY2007 budget resolution. Its sole reconciliation instruction was to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and it assumed revenues from leasing in ANWR. On May 25, 2006 the House passed the American-Made Energy and Good Jobs Act (H.R. 5429), which would open ANWR to development. Development advocates argue that ANWR oil would reduce U.S. energy markets' exposure to Middle East crises, lower oil prices, extend the economic life of the Trans Alaska Pipeline, and create jobs in Alaska and elsewhere in the United States. They maintain that ANWR oil could be developed with minimal environmental harm, and that the footprint of development could be limited to a total of 2,000 acres. Opponents argue that intrusion on such a remarkable ecosystem cannot be justified on any terms, that economically recoverable oil found (if any) would provide little energy security and could be replaced by cost-effective alternatives, including conservation, and that job claims are exaggerated. They maintain that development's footprints would have a greater impact than is implied by a limit on total acreage. They also argue that limits on footprints have not been worded to apply to extensive Native lands in the Refuge, which could be developed if the Refuge were opened. This report will be updated as events warrant.",47,47 "Veterans Affairs: Historical Budget Authority, FY1940-FY2012. Budget authority—the amount of money a federal department or agency can spend or obligate to spend by law—for veterans' benefits and services has increased significantly since FY1940. In FY1940, the budget authority for veterans' benefits and services was $561.1 million, and in FY2012 the budget authority was $125.3 billion, or more than 200 times the FY1940 budget authority. In constant 2011 dollars (i.e., inflation-adjusted), the FY2012 budget authority is 14 times the FY1940 budget authority. The increases over time have reflected the impact of increases in the number of veterans as the result of wars and other conflicts, the aging of the veteran population, and changes in benefits and services provided for veterans. This report provides information on the historical budget authority of the Department of Veterans Affairs (formerly the Veterans Administration) for FY1940 through FY2012. Budget authority is presented in both current dollars and constant 2011 dollars. This report will be updated as additional information becomes available.",30,30 "The Executive Budget Process Timetable. The executive budget process is a complex set of activities that includes (1) development of the President's budget proposal, (2) submission and justification of the President's budget proposal, and (3) execution of enacted appropriations and other budgetary legislation. While some of the activities are required by specific dates, many follow a more flexible schedule established by formal and informal rules and procedures. Under Title 31 of the U.S. Code, the President is responsible for developing and submitting a consolidated budget to Congress no later than the first Monday in February prior to the start of the fiscal year. The President is also required to submit a supplemental summary of the budget, commonly referred to as the mid-session review (or MSR), on or before July 15 each year. Development of the President's Budget Proposal. Generally, development of the President's budget proposal begins approximately 10 months before the President must submit the proposal to Congress, which is about 18 months prior to the start of the fiscal year that the budget will cover. Early in the development phase, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issues a budget planning guidance memorandum, also referred to as the ""Spring Guidance."" In accordance with this guidance, executive agencies submit their budget requests and supporting materials to OMB for review, culminating in final approval by the OMB Director and the President. Submission and Justification of the President's Budget Proposal. Early in the congressional budget process, shortly after the President submits the budget proposal to Congress, agencies submit written justifications of their budget requests to each chamber's appropriations committee and subcommittees of jurisdiction. In addition, Administration and agency officials may be called before the appropriations subcommittees to justify and explain the budget requests to Congress. Execution of Enacted Appropriations and Other Budgetary Legislation. Once appropriations and other budgetary legislation have been enacted, OMB apportions available funds to executive agencies by time period, program, project, or activity. Throughout the fiscal year, agencies allocate, obligate, and expend funds. If necessary, agencies may request supplemental appropriations, and the President may propose supplemental appropriations or other budgetary adjustments to Congress.",55,55 "A Sunset Commission for the Federal Government: Recent Developments. The sunset concept provides for programs and agencies to terminate automatically on a periodic basis unless explicitly renewed by law. In the last ten years, bills to create a federal sunset commission, modeled on the sunset review process in Texas, have been introduced in each Congress. President Bush called for creation of a federal sunset commission in his FY2006 budget submission. This report discusses this issue and relevant pieces of legislation.",55,56 "Title X of H.R. 146: San Joaquin River Restoration. Historically, the San Joaquin River in Central California has supported large Chinook salmon populations. Since the Bureau of Reclamation's Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River became fully operational in the 1940s, much of the river's water has been diverted for off-stream agricultural uses. As a result, approximately 60 miles of the river bed is dry in most years. Thus, the river no longer supports Chinook salmon populations in its upper reaches. In 1988, a coalition of conservation and fishing groups sued Reclamation (Natural Resources Defense Council v. Rodgers). A U.S. District Court judge ruled in 2004 that operation of Friant Dam violates state law because of its destruction of downstream fisheries. Faced with mounting legal fees, uncertainty, and the possibility of dramatic cuts to water diversions, parties negotiated a settlement instead of proceeding to trial. The Settlement reached calls for new releases of water from Friant Dam to restore fisheries, potential river channel modifications to accommodate increased flows, and efforts to mitigate reductions in off-stream deliveries lost to restoration flows. Congressional authorization and appropriations are required for full Settlement implementation. Legislation based on the Settlement (H.R. 4074, H.R. 24 and S. 27) was considered in the 110th Congress, a new version of the legislation has been introduced in the 111th Congress—Title X of S. 22, an omnibus public lands bill, which became Title X of H.R. 146 and passed the Senate on March 19, 2009. A key legislative issue is how to finance the Settlement, specifically how to resolve direct spending and related congressional pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) issues. Other challenges have been how to achieve the Settlement's dual goals of fisheries restoration and water management, and how to address concerns of stakeholders not party to the Settlement, without disrupting the negotiated agreement. The region may benefit from increased recreational expenditures and investment in river restoration activities under the Settlement. For example, some communities and interests believe restoration will bring other benefits to the river and river communities, such as improved surface water quality in lower San Joaquin River reaches and enhanced recreation benefits. On the other hand, some studies suggest the Settlement would have a negative economic impact on the agriculture industry, at least in the short term. In addition, downstream interests not party to the Settlement have been concerned about increased flooding, groundwater infiltration, and competition with existing federal financial commitments. Nearby communities fear harm to groundwater quantity and quality. Some of these concerns have been addressed in the newest version of the legislation, but some may remain.",43,43 "State Minimum Wage Ballot Measures: In Brief. On November 8, 2016, five states introduced ballot measures related to state minimum wages. These and previous ballot measures provide states one way of establishing minimum wage provisions different from those required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA, P.L. 75-718).",90,90 "Medicare: Supplementary ""Medigap"" Coverage. Medicare is a nationwide health insurance program for the aged and certain disabled persons. Although the program provides broad protection against the costs of many, primarily acute care services, it covers only about one-half of beneficiaries' total health care expenses. Most individuals have some coverage in addition to basic Medicare benefits. Some persons have additional benefits through a managed care plan. Most other individuals have some supplementary coverage through private insurers or public programs such as Medicaid. Private supplementary coverage can be obtained through an individually purchased policy, commonly referred to as a ""Medigap"" policy. It can also be obtained through a current or former employer. Some persons have both types of coverage. Beneficiaries with Medigap insurance typically have coverage for Medicare's deductibles and coinsurance, they may also have coverage for some items and services not covered by Medicare. Individuals generally select from one of 10 standardized plans, though not all 10 plans are offered in all states. The 10 plans are known as Plans A through Plan J. Plan A covers a basic package of benefits. Each of the other nine plans includes the basic benefits plus a different combination of additional benefits. Plan J is the most comprehensive. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA, P.L. 108-73) added a new voluntary prescription drug benefit under a new Medicare Part D. It also made a number of changes to the Medigap requirements. The first significant change was the addition of two new standardized plan types, Plan K and Plan L. There are two key differences between the benefits included under these options and those offered under Plans A-H. First, Plans K and L eliminate first-dollar coverage for most Medicare cost-sharing. Second, both Plans K and L include an annual out-of-pocket limit on Medicare cost-sharing charges. The second major MMA change was the prohibition, beginning January 1, 2006, on the sale of Medigap policies with prescription drug coverage. Individuals who had such policies could renew them provided they did not enroll in a prescription drug plan under the new Part D. Alternatively if they enrolled under Part D, they could continue to enroll in a Medigap plan, but without drug coverage. MMA also required the Secretary of the Health and Human Services to request the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to review and revise the Medigap benefit packages taking into account changes made by the new law. The NAIC announced its recommendations in March 2007. The Children's Health and Medicare Protection Act of 2007 (CHAMP), as passed by the House on August 1, 2007, incorporates these recommendations, as well as making additional Medigap changes. This report will be revised as circumstances warrant.",70,70 "The Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act: Reauthorization and Appropriations. The No Child Left Behind Act (P.L. 107-110) amended and reauthorized through FY2007 the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (SDFSCA) within the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) as Part A of Title IV, 21st Century Schools. The act is likely to be considered for reauthorization by the 110th Congress. Funds are authorized for the SDFSC program, which is the federal government's primary initiative to prevent drug abuse and violence in and around schools. Through the program, state educational agencies, local educational agencies, and outlying areas are awarded grants by formula to create programs deterring drug abuse and violence among elementary and secondary students. Discretionary funds support national programs for various national leadership projects to prevent drug abuse and violence among students from preschool through postsecondary educational levels. For FY2006, Congress appropriated $568.8 million for the program. For FY2007, the President requested $216.0 million for national programs only, and proposed no funding for state grant programs. The House Appropriations Committee, however, recommended $526.0 million for the SDFSC program, and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $492.5 million (both including $310 million for state grants). For FY2008, the President has requested $323.2 million for the program, which includes $100 million for state grants and $224.2 million for national programs. The SDFSC program continues to operate at FY2006 levels under a continuing resolution through February 15, 2007. In the 109th Congress, several bills were introduced related to school safety and violence prevention. All of the bills were referred to the appropriate committee, but died at the end of the 109th Congress, except one (H.R. 3010). H.R. 3010, the Department of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-149), was amended by the Senate to require the Secretary of Education to conduct a study evaluating the effectiveness of violence prevention programs that receive funding under SDFSCA. This amendment, however, was not included in the conference agreement and did not become law. Another amendment to H.R. 3010 was introduced on the Senate floor to increase funding for the SDFSC program, but was ruled out of order by the chairman. One bill has been introduced thus far in the 110th Congress related to SDFSCA. H.R. 354, the Safe Schools Against Violence in Education Act (SAVE Act), would amend the ESEA by requiring states to allow a student attending a persistently dangerous public school, who has been a violent-crime victim on school property, while riding a school bus, or attending a school function, to transfer to a safe public school within the school district. The bill was referred to the House Education and Labor Committee, but no further action has occurred. This report discusses the 107th Congress SDFSCA reauthorization and appropriations to fund the SDFSC program, and possible 110th Congress reauthorization issues.",33,33 "The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP). This report discusses the Special Inspector General provisions in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), which was enacted as P.L. 110-343 on October 3, 2008. This act created a Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP). Under EESA, TARP funds may be used by the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase ""troubled assets,"" defined to include both mortgage-related financial instruments and ""any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market stability."" The broad authorities provided to the SIGTARP by EESA have not changed even though the Secretary of the Treasury has modified the approach to stabilize the financial industry through the TARP. The 111th Congress has passed two bills containing provisions related to SIGTARP. P.L. 111-15 (S. 383/H.R. 1341), the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program Act of 2009, was enacted on April 24, 2009, and addresses the SIGTARP's auditing, investigative, and hiring authorities. P.L. 111-22, the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (H.R. 1106/S. 895/S. 896), was enacted on May 20, 2009, and contains provisions concerning SIGTARP in the context of public-private investment funds. Other bills addressing the SIGTARP include H.R. 384 (which passed the House on January 21, 2009), H.R. 1242, H.R. 3179, S. 910, and S. 976. This report will compare the duties and authorities of the SIGTARP to those of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), as well as statutory IGs under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act). The report will also cover the authority that Inspectors General possess to conduct audits and investigations. Finally, the report will provide an overview of the SIGTARP's request to TARP recipients regarding their use or expected use of TARP funds, as well as their plans for following executive compensation limitations, and possible issues raised by the Paperwork Reduction Act.",56,5 "Methamphetamine Lab Clean-Up and Remediation Issues. Methamphetamine (meth), a drug with limited medical use and high potential for abuse and addiction, is a subject of widespread concern. Once associated mainly with the West Coast and white, male, blue-collar workers, illicit meth is now used by diverse population groups nationwide with concentrations in the West, Southwest, and Midwest. Meth is supplied primarily by clandestine labs in California and Mexico. The drug is relatively simple to make from easily obtained recipes but access to certain ingredients has become more difficult. Meth production in small, toxic labs (STLs) increased initially due to the successful closure of some ""super-labs"" (labs capable of making more than 10 pounds of meth in a 24-hour cycle), relative ease of making meth, continuing demand for the drug, and desire for potential wealth and involvement in a criminal underground social activity. Although the greater fraction of meth used and distributed across the nation comes from super-labs, the sheer number of STLs, their geographic diffusion, and their residual impacts have prompted concern in Congress, state and local governments, law enforcement agencies, and real estate and other groups. Meth labs have many significant and widespread residual impacts. According to the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), there were 9,092 STLs and related meth sites in 2000 and 17,356 in 2003, the number has been declining since. These sites can be found in a wide range of places, such as apartments, motel rooms, abandoned buildings, and packed in car trunks in parks and other locations. Meth makers can use common items such as mason jars, coffee filters hot plates, over-the-counter medications containing pseudoephedrine or ephedrine (e.g., Sudafed and some other nonprescription decongestants), acetone, hydrochloric acid, and anhydrous ammonia. Making meth can result in eye and respiratory irritations, chemical burns, explosions and fires, toxic wastes, and contaminated surroundings. Some residual impacts of meth production threaten the health and welfare of children removed from meth sites. This report focuses on the residual environmental impacts of STLs. Cleaning and remediating a meth site can cost more than $200,000, depending on the magnitude of contamination. State and local governments that incur expenses cleaning a site can apply to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for reimbursement, up to $25,000 per incident. Alternatively, rather than incur costs and apply for a capped reimbursement, state and local governments can notify DEA of a site, and DEA will perform and pay for cleaning. In addition funds have been available from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to redevelop a former meth production site. No uniform federal guidelines or standards exist governing the process or the endpoint for cleaning or remediating STLs. Across various states, acceptable levels of meth residue, after remediation, range from 0.05 to 0.1 micrograms of meth per 100 square centimeters of surface. Twelve congressional bills, one enacted into law in March, relate broadly to meth site cleaning or remediation. This report will be updated as warranted.",96,68 "Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD): FY2010 Appropriations. President Obama requested a total of $123.1 billion for the agencies included in H.R. 3288, the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations (THUD) bill for FY2010. This request represented an increase of approximately $14.1 billion (12.9%) over the $109.1 billion provided in the FY2009 THUD appropriations act (Division I of P.L. 111-8). The enacted legislation provided $122.1 billion, less than 1% ($977 million) below the President's request and 12% ($13.4 billion) more than the comparable FY2009 funding (not including the FY2009 emergency funding). The single largest new item in the budget request was $5 billion for a new independent federal agency—a national infrastructure bank—that would provide federal funding for, and promote investment from other sources in, infrastructure projects of national or regional significance. Neither the House nor the Senate funded this request, the conference report encourages the administration to pursue the creation of such a program through the regular authorization process. The FY2010 request for DOT totaled $72.4 billion, $5.2 billion (7.7%) more than the total of $67.2 billion in funding provided in the FY2009 THUD appropriations act (the House and Senate both reported the request as $77.4 billion, as they considered the $5 billion request for an infrastructure bank as part of the DOT request). The actual requested increase is somewhat less, as the reported funding level for FY2009 was reduced by a $3.5 billion rescission of contract authority which did not actually reduce the level of funding provided. The House-passed bill provides a total of $75.8 billion in funding for DOT, $3.4 billion (8%) more than the requested level. The Senate-passed bill provided $75.8 billion. The enacted legislation provided $75.7 billion, $3.3 billion (5%) more than the original DOT request. The FY2010 request for HUD totaled $45.5 billion, $4.0 billion (7.7%) more than the comparable amount of new funding provided in the regular annual appropriation for FY2009. The House-passed bill provided $47.1 billion, the Senate-passed bill provided $45.8, and the enacted legislation provided $46.1 billion,1% more than the requested amount. Throughout this report, the amounts being considered for FY2010 are compared to the amounts provided in the FY2009 THUD appropriations act. However, DOT and HUD also received significant amounts of supplemental funding in FY2009 through the economic stimulus act (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, P.L. 111-5/H.R. 1), which Congress passed in February of 2009. That act provided $48.1 billion in emergency supplemental funding for DOT and $13.7 billion for HUD, a total of $61.8 billion in additional funding. That represented an increase of 52% to the total new funding provided in the FY2009 THUD appropriations act. Not every office and program in the THUD bill received funding from that supplement, and not all of that additional funding was expended in FY2009.",59,59 "Justice Department Ethics and the McDade-Murtha Citizens Protection Act. This is an abridged version of Justice Department Ethics and Section 801 of the Omnibus Appropriations Law for Fiscal Year 1999, CRS Report RL30060(pdf), without the citations footnotes authorities and appendices found in the more detailed presentation. Section 801 of the omnibus appropriations law, a proposal originally offered by Congressmen McDade and Murtha and passed in October of 1998, P.L. 105-277, requires federal prosecutors to follow state and federal rules of professional ethics in effect in the states where they conduct their activities. It also continues in place the sixty year old directive that federal prosecutors follow the ethics rules promulgated by the states in which they are licensed to practice. Proponents claim the change will confirm that federal prosecutors must follow the same ethical rules as other lawyers and will enhance the prospect of some protection against wayward federal prosecutors. Opponents charge that it will implicitly undermine the Attorney General's authority to preempt state laws that conflict with federal law enforcement interests and that in doing so it will jeopardize the use of undercover techniques against terrorists, drug kingpins and child predators. Sec",91,91 "Alternative Transportation Fuels and Vehicles: Energy, Environment, and Development Issues. The sharp increase in petroleum prices beginning in mid-1999, experiences with tighter supply and international instability have renewed concern about our dependence on petroleum imports. One of the strategies for reducing this dependence is to produce vehicles that run on alternatives to gasoline and diesel fuel. These alternatives include alcohols, gaseous fuels, renewable fuels, electricity, and fuels derived from coal. The push to develop alternative fuels, although driven by energy security concerns, has been aided by concerns over the environment, because many alternative fuels lead to reductions in emissions of toxic chemicals, ozone-forming compounds, and other pollutants, as well as greenhouse gases. Each fuel (and associated vehicle) has various advantages and drawbacks. The key drawback of all alternative fuels is that because of higher fuel and/or vehicle prices, alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) are generally more expensive to own than conventional vehicles. And while many AFVs have superior environmental performance compared to conventional vehicles, their performance in terms of range, cargo capacity, and ease of fueling may not compare favorably with conventional vehicles. Furthermore, because there is little fueling infrastructure (as compared to gasoline and diesel fuel), fueling an AFV can be inconvenient. Any policy to support AFVs must address the performance and cost concerns, as well as the issue of fueling infrastructure. Within this context, a ""chicken and egg"" dilemma stands out: The vehicles will not become popular without the fueling infrastructure, and the fueling infrastructure will not expand if there are no customers to serve. Three key laws, the Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-494), the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (P.L. 101-549), and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486), as well as three Executive Orders, support the development and commercialization of alternative fuels and alternative fuel vehicles. These legislative acts and administrative actions provide tax incentives to purchase AFVs, promote the expansion of alternative fueling infrastructure, and require the use of AFVs by various public and private entities. The 108th Congress considered comprehensive energy legislation, but a final bill was not submitted to the President for signature. H.R. 6 would have promoted the development of renewable fuels, especially ethanol and hydrogen. Further, it would have provided incentives for the development and purchase of alternative fuel and advanced technology vehicles. In addition to the energy bill, other bills were introduced to create vehicle purchase tax credits, promote research and development of fuels, and require the use of alternative fuels. It is likely that similar legislation will be introduced in the 109th Congress. This report reviews these issues. It will be updated as events warrant.",37,37 "Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2015. President Obama's budget request for FY2015 included $135.352 billion for research and development (R&D), a $1.670 billion (1.2%) increase from the FY2014 level of $133.682 billion. Funding for R&D is concentrated in a few departments and agencies. Under President Obama's FY2015 budget request, seven federal agencies would have received 95.4% of total federal R&D funding, with the Department of Defense (DOD, 47.6%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, 23.0%) accounting for more than two-thirds of all federal R&D funding. In addition to the FY2015 base budget request, the President proposed an Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative (OGSI) that sought, together with funding for other purposes, $5.3 billion for R&D at certain agencies, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, $2.515 billion), National Institutes of Health ($970 million), NASA ($874 million), National Science Foundation (NSF, $552 million), Department of Agriculture ($277 million), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ($180 million). Of the NIST funding, $2.4 billion would have supported the establishment of a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation. The R&D budgets of NIST, NSF, and the DOE Office of Science were targeted for doubling over 7 years, from their FY2006 levels, by the America COMPETES Act, and over 11 years by the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. Although the President's FY2015 budget requested increases for these accounts, it departed, as did the FY2014 request, from earlier Obama and Bush Administration budgets that explicitly stated the doubling goal. The President's FY2015 request continued support for three multi-agency R&D initiatives, as it proposed $1.537 billion for the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), $3.786 billion for the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) program, and $2.501 billion for the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP). The request also proposed approximately $200 million in FY2015 for a Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) initiative, as well as funding for the Materials Genome Initiative and the National Robotics Initiative. Congress completed appropriations action for most federal agencies through enactment of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), which was signed into law on December 16, 2014. The measure provides FY2015 appropriations for agencies covered by 11 regular appropriations bills, and provides continuing appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security through February 27, 2015. Appropriations made under this act providing R&D funding for federal agencies are discussed throughout this report where it is possible to identify the levels of R&&D funding some appropriations accounts include both R&D and non-R&D funding and the final level of R&D funding will not be known until agencies with such accounts identify how these funds will be allocated. Previously, Congress provided FY2015 appropriations to federal agencies through a series of continuing resolutions. In recent years, continuing resolutions and sequestration have resulted in the annual appropriations process being completed after the start of the fiscal year. This can affect agencies' execution of their R&D budgets, including the delay or cancellation of planned R&D activities and acquisition of R&D-related equipment.",111,111 "Shadow Banking: Background and Policy Issues. Shadow banking refers to financial firms and activities that perform similar functions to those of depository banks. Although the term is used to describe dissimilar firms and activities, a general policy concern is that a component of shadow banking could be a source of financial instability, even though that component might not be subject to regulations designed to prevent a crisis, or be eligible for emergency facilities designed to mitigate financial turmoil once it has begun. This concern is magnified by the experience of 2007-2009, during which financial problems among nonbank lenders, and disruption to securitization (in which both banks and nonbanks participated), contributed to the magnitude of the financial crisis. This report provides a framework for understanding shadow banking, discusses several fundamental problems of financial intermediation, and describes the experiences of several specific sectors of shadow banking during the financial crisis and related policy concerns. Shadow banking is contrasted with luminated banking, a term which the report uses to describe chartered banks that gather funds from depositors in order to offer loans that the chartered bank holds itself. Luminated banking, like all forms of financial intermediation, is subject to well-known risks, including credit risk, interest rate risk, maturity mismatch, and the potential for runs. Each sector of shadow banking is generally subject to the same problem of financial intermediation to which the sector is analogous. For example, if a sector of shadow banking such as money market funds (MMF) has investors that are analogous to depositors in luminated banking, then the potential for runs may be similar. Or, if the sector relies on collateralized loans, such as asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), then disruptions in the market for the underlying collateral can cause fire sales that may reinforce and magnify price declines. The regulatory regime and eligibility for emergency financial assistance for shadow banking varies from sector to sector and type of firm to type of firm. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act subjects certain large nonbank firms funded by repurchase agreements (repos) to safety and soundness regulation similar to banks. The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits emergency assistance to individual firms as was done in 2008 for Bear Stearns or AIG, but preserves the ability of the Federal Reserve to provide more generally eligible assistance to shadow banking sectors such as ABCP through the Term Asset Backed Liquidity Facility (TALF). Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act allows the FDIC to resolve the failure of any firm, including shadow banking firms, whose failure may pose a threat to financial stability. Several components of shadow banking rely on securities markets to fund debt. These securities regulations are typically activity based, applying to all securities market participants if there is no explicit exemption. Securities regulation requires disclosure of material risks, but often does not attempt to limit the risks of firms funded through securities markets. In contrast, banking regulation sometimes applies only to firms with specific charters. Furthermore, banking regulators oversee linkages between banks, such as the payment system. Thus, debt funded through securities markets is likely to be subject to regulation no matter who does it, but that regulation is unlikely to be risk-based or to incorporate linkages between firms. Banking regulation is likely to be risk based, but to miss debt funded through securities markets. Some policy options for shadow banking firms and markets are often analogous to policy options for depository banking or securities markets. Firms that engage in shadow banking could be subjected to safety and soundness regulation and capital requirements in order to limit risk and encourage resilience. Providers of short-term credit to shadow banks could be offered guarantees analogous to deposit insurance in order to minimize runs. Non-bank firms that rely on short-term credit to fund lending (or the holding of debt) can be made eligible for emergency lending facilities from a lender of last resort in order to address liquidity problems. There are alternatives to the banking approach. Banks and other firms that fund themselves with substitute for deposits could be assessed higher fees to account for potential systemic costs that current market prices might not incorporate. More financial regulation could be made activity based, rather than charter based, in order to lessen regulatory arbitrage. Differences in banking regulation and securities regulation for the funding of debt could be preserved, but each separate category of regulation could be addressed where it applies. The report analyzes five sectors of shadow banking. These sectors include (1) repos, (2) non-bank intermediaries, (3) ABCP, (4) securitization, and (5) MMFs. For each of these sectors, the report briefly defines the sector, recounts the sector's experience during the financial crisis, and outlines some related policy concerns. Each policy problem is described in the context of the general problems of financial intermediation introduced earlier in the report.",5,5 "Laws Affecting the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program. For more than 50 years, the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program has been providing health insurance coverage to federal employees, retirees, and their dependents. It is the largest employer-sponsored health insurance program in the country, covering about 8.2 million enrollees each year. The program was created by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA, P.L. 86-382). FEHBA and its subsequent amendments established the parameters for eligibility, election of coverage, the types of health plans and benefits that may be offered, and the level of the government's share of premiums. They also established an Employees Health Benefits Fund to pay for program expenses and put forth provisions for studies, reports, and audits. In addition, FEHBA outlined the role of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in FEHB. By law, OPM has the authority to contract with insurers and to prescribe regulations to manage the program, among other duties. FEHB's general model has not changed since its inception. The program has always allowed competing private insurers to offer numerous types of coverage to enrollees within broad federal guidelines. The federal government and the employee or retiree have always shared the cost of the premium, and generally employees and retirees have had access to the same plans at the same cost. However, specific features of FEHB have been modified—in some cases, multiple times—by statutory changes, administrative actions, and judicial decisions. For example, through legislation, Congress has modified the formula for determining the government's share of premiums, and both Congress and OPM have broadened the types of health benefits FEHB plans must provide. Additionally, a Supreme Court decision in 2013 expanded FEHB eligibility to include same-sex spouses of FEHB enrollees and the children of same-sex marriages. Congress has financial and administrative interests in the program, as the government pays for a share of FEHB premiums and Congress has the legislative authority to modify FEHB. Congressional interest in the program also extends to FEHB's potential applicability as a model for other health care programs or as an avenue to provide coverage, such as by extending aspects of FEHB to Medicare. This report tracks legislative changes to FEHB. The report includes brief discussions of how Congress has changed FEHB through legislative action, including by restricting the use of federal funds, changing the formula for determining the government's share of FEHB premiums, expanding eligibility for the program, and implementing policies that affect the relationship between Medicare and FEHB. The Appendix includes detailed summaries of selected laws or provisions of laws that have amended or changed FEHB.",58,58 "Joint Negotiation by Health-Care Professionals: H.R. 1304, ""Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000"". H.R. 1304, ""Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999,"" amended and passed by the House on June 30, 276-136, would enable health-care professionals to negotiate jointly with non-federally affiliated health plans concerning ""the terms of any contract under which the professionals provide health care items or services for which benefits are provided under such plan (except that discussions about requiring abortion coverage are exempt from the negotiation exemption), thus altering existing antitrust law so that joint negotiation by health-care entities that but for their joint activity, would normally be competitors, would no longer be considered unlawful. A sense of Congress amendment states that medical decisions should be made by health care professionals and patients. This report will set out, briefly: the present antitrust law and some relevant exemptions from it, some pertinent parts of the ""Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care,"" (1) and the major provisions of H.R. 1304. It will be updated to reflect changes in the legislative status of H.R. 1304. Issued jointly by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), August 28, 1996 (hereinafter, Health Care Guidelines, or Guidelines).",70,70 "In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress. On May 1, 2012, President Obama gave a speech from Bagram Air Field in which he laid out U.S. government approaches for ""winding down"" the war in Afghanistan. While a number of observers have challenged the logical plausibility of a unilateral decision to ""wind down"" a war, the Administration's commitment to decreasing U.S. involvement in the war in Afghanistan is clear. Many observers point to a coalescing vision of the way forward—shared by the governments of the United States, Afghanistan, and other international partners—that includes bringing the current campaign to a close by the end of 2014, and pursuing a political settlement among the parties in conflict, while extending U.S. and other international commitments to Afghanistan beyond 2014. In evaluating this emerging vision, some observers emphasize that the overall level of ambition has been lowered, while others stress that the timeline for international engagement has been extended. For the U.S. government, the broad strategic issues at stake in the war in Afghanistan include What fundamental national security interests does the United States have in Afghanistan and the region? What minimum conditions—political, economic, security—would need to pertain in Afghanistan in order for those U.S. interests to be protected? How appropriate are current and projected future U.S. approaches, until and after 2014, for helping Afghans establish those conditions? When and to what extent are Afghans likely to be able to sustain those conditions with relatively limited support from the international community? Ultimately, how important is this overall effort—given its likely timeline, risks, and costs—compared to other U.S. government priorities? At this apparent turning point in both strategic thinking and activity on the ground, this short report considers issues that may be of interest to Congress as it considers the strength and duration of further U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, to 2014 and beyond.",24,24 "Department of Defense Implementation of the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative: Implications for Federal Information Technology Reform Management. The Department of Defense (DOD) is the single largest energy consumer in the nation. As the largest owner of federal data centers, with 772, the DOD has more than twice as many centers as any other agency. By consolidating some of its data centers, DOD could have a significant positive impact on energy savings for the federal government. DOD has instituted a number of policy directives, as have all federal agencies, that influence energy use in its data centers. Data centers are facilities—buildings or parts of buildings—used to store, manage, and disseminate electronic information for a computer network. They house servers, which are computers used to perform network-management functions such as data storage and processing, and communications equipment and devices to connect the servers with the network. Data centers usually draw their power from the electric grid, but they may also contain specialized power conversion and backup equipment to maintain reliable power. Power consumption varies greatly among data centers but is typically many times higher than for other kinds of buildings. Within the context of the FDCCI, DOD's efforts are intended to address concerns about rising energy demands and costs of data centers, associated increases in carbon emissions, expanding real-estate footprints of data centers, and rising real-estate costs. According to DOD, the Department plans to reduce the number of its data centers by about 30% by 2013, and the number of servers by 25%. DOD intends to use savings generated from consolidation to pay the consolidation costs. DOD also plans to use cloud computing as part of its savings effort. As with any endeavor being implemented across so many departments and agencies, proper management of the initiative will be crucial to its success and, in turn, to achieving the projected savings. Unlike many programs that are overseen by a single committee, implementation of the FDCCI may require oversight by any committee with legislative jurisdiction over a department or agency. Understanding the management challenges and policy considerations involved with data center consolidation (e.g., balancing up-front costs with ongoing savings, maintaining data security, and maximizing energy savings through facilities design) as well as being aware of the issues specific to implementing the FDCCI are important steps to achieving effective congressional oversight of the FDCCI. In conducting oversight, Congress may wish to conduct hearings to monitor the activities of OMB as it manages the FDCCI or the progress of individual departments and agencies as they implement the FDCCI review FDCCI plans and status reports created internally by the individual department or agency, or externally by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) or the committee of jurisdiction. Finally, Congress may wish to examine the current ""reach"" of the FDCCI and consider whether expanding the initiative to include other agencies, as GAO has recommended, is appropriate.",27,31 "General Policy Statements: Legal Overview. Agencies frequently use guidance documents to set regulatory policy. While ""legislative rules"" carry the force of law and are required to undergo the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), guidance documents are exempt from these constraints and can be issued more swiftly than legislative rules. The issuance of such guidance documents, however, has not escaped criticism. Some have argued that agencies use guidance documents to effectively change the law or expand the scope of their delegated regulatory authorities. This report focuses on agency use and judicial review of one type of guidance document: general statements of policy. Judicial review of challenges to agency policy statements often turns on whether the agency document is actually a legislative rule. Pursuant to congressionally delegated authority, agencies promulgate legislative rules that carry the force and effect of law. General statements of policy are not legally binding, rather, they are issued in order to advise the public about the manner in which the agency intends to exercise its discretionary authority. While these analytical categories might seem relatively clear, distinguishing between the two in practice can be difficult. Courts often frame the inquiry as to whether the agency has established a binding norm on the public or itself, although a variety of heuristics are applied, ranging from a somewhat formalistic analysis of relevant legal consequences to a more functional focus on a statement's practical effects. In addition, the question of whether a given agency document is properly identified as a legislative rule or policy statement has a significant impact on a federal court's willingness to engage in judicial review of the agency action. Unlike legislative rules, which may be immediately reviewable once they are finalized, policy statements often cannot be challenged until the agency takes further action to implement or enforce the policy. The Supreme Court, however, has provided only limited guidance in determining whether and when policy statements are reviewable, and as a result, lower courts have not adopted a uniform approach to the reviewability question. In light of the difficulty in distinguishing between legislative rules and policy statements, questions have been raised concerning whether some judicial tests to make this determination are consistent with Supreme Court doctrine. The Court has made clear that the judiciary may not impose procedural requirements on agencies beyond the text of the APA. The applicable legal test governing agency use of policy statements, whether imposed by courts or Congress, has important implications for the executive branch and the public. One approach might grant agencies flexibility to issue policy statements in order to increase public knowledge of agency priorities, but risks permitting agencies to effectively bind the public without going through notice and comment procedures. An alternative might be to require heightened procedures when agencies issue policy statements, but this approach risks less overall notice to the public about agency intentions. Finally, although the relevant Supreme Court tests do not entirely preclude federal courts from deferring to an agency's statutory interpretation contained in statements of policy, such documents usually do not receive Chevron deference. The weight that a reviewing court is willing to give to an agency's interpretation of the law is an important aspect of judicial review. Indeed, the level of deference accorded to an agency interpretation can sometimes determine the outcome of a challenge to agency action. Interpretations reached through formal processes that have the force and effect of law are most likely to qualify for Chevron deference. In contrast, interpretations reached through informal processes, and which are neither binding nor precedential, are unlikely to be eligible for Chevron deference.",56,56 "Appropriations for FY2000: District of Columbia. On November 29, 1999, President Clinton signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000 formerly H.R. 3194, into law as P.L. 106-113. The Act appropriates funds for the District of Columbia, Division A of the act, and four other appropriation measures, Division B of the act, including: Commerce, Justice, State, Judiciary, Foreign Operation Appropriations, Interior Appropriations, and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations for FY2000. Division B of P.L. 106-113, also includes a section governing Miscellaneous Appropriations, and provisions amending the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, State Department authorization, milk supports, and intellectual properties. As originally forwarded to the conference committee H.R. 3194 provided appropriations for FY2000 solely for the District of Columbia. The House approved the conference measure on November 18, 1999, and the Senate approved the measure on November 19, 1999. Division A of P.L. 106-113 is the third District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2000 considered by Congress. The Act includes $436 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. This is slightly higher than the amount included in the vetoed version of H.R. 3064 ($429 million) and H.R. 2587 ($430 million). The difference is $6.7 million in federal funds for the environmental cleanup of the Lorton Correctional Facility. On November 3, 1999, President Clinton vetoed H.R. 3064, which included funds for the District of Columbia and the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education for FY2000. On September 28, 1999, the President vetoed H.R. 2587 Congress' first attempt to appropriate funds for the District of Columbia for FY2000. District officials urged the President to veto H.R. 2587, because of the inclusion of several so called ""social rider"" provisions. They characterized the provisions as assaults on the city's limited home rule. P.L. 106-113 includes many of the social riders contained in H.R. 2587 and H.R. 3064. The Act includes provisions that prohibit the use of federal or local funds to establish and maintain a needle exchange program, but would allow the private financing of needle exchange programs the District from decriminalizing the use of marijuana and implementing Initiative 59 governing medical marijuana the use of federal or District funds to finance a court challenge aimed at securing congressional voting representation in the House and Senate for District residents, but would allow the city's corporation counsel to review and comment on private lawsuits filed on behalf of citizens of the District of Columbia the use of federal or District funds for abortions except in cases or rape, incest or the mother's health is endangered, and the implementation of a domestic partners act passed in 1992 that would extend health employment, and other benefits and protections to unmarried, cohabiting, heterosexual or homosexual couples.",57,57 "Accounting and Auditing Regulatory Structure: U.S. and International. Accounting and auditing standards in the United States are promulgated and regulated by various federal, state, and self-regulatory organizations (SROs). Accounting and auditing standards are also influenced by practitioners from businesses, nonprofits, and government entities. Congress has allowed financial accounting and auditing practitioners to remain largely self-regulated while retaining oversight responsibility. At certain times, Congress has sought to achieve specific accounting- and auditing-based policy objectives by enacting legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX, P.L. 107-204) and the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA, P.L. 101-508). The informational needs of stakeholders differ between the different sectors of the economy—the private sector, the federal government, and state and local governments. As a consequence, different accounting and auditing standards have evolved in these sectors. In the private sector, financial statements communicate to stakeholders how the company used its resources to generate profit and expand its business, or how the company incurred loss and the chances the business will survive over the long run. In comparison, public-sector entities such as the federal, state, and local governments issue reports to communicate how tax revenues were used to benefit citizens. State and local governments have standards distinct from those of the federal government. As such, accounting and auditing standards can be classified into three areas: (1) private industry standards, (2) federal government standards, and (3) state and local government standards. The accounting and auditing standards created for publicly traded companies are subject to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) oversight. Congress has oversight over the SEC and annually appropriates its funding. Throughout its history, the SEC has relied on SROs to establish financial reporting standards for the private sector, these are known as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Currently, the SEC recognizes the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the designated authority for establishing GAAP. SOX created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the auditing profession for the private sector. The SEC has oversight responsibility over FASB and PCAOB. The Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) was created to establish the financial reporting and accounting standards for the federal government. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has responsibility for establishing auditing standards for federal government agencies, including federal grant recipients in state and local governments. A counterpart to FASAB for state and local governments is the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB). Many of the underlying principles between FASAB and GASB are the same, but each state or territory is allowed to choose whether it follows GASB standards in full or modifies the standards to fit local needs. Auditing standards vary by state and local governments. Two policy issues might be of particular interest to Congress and investors. The first is the relationship between accounting and auditing standards in the United States and in other countries. In particular, there is debate over whether or to what degree international accounting and auditing standards should influence U.S. GAAP and U.S. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (U.S. GAAS), respectively. The second is to what degree business risk should be evaluated based on sustainability issues. Increasingly, investors expect firms to respond to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues. The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has created a series of provisional standards for the private sector. SASB is an independent organization that is not recognized by Congress or the SEC as an official standard-setting body.",10,12 "The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction. Congress annually considers several appropriations measures, which provide discretionary funding for numerous activities—for example, national defense, education, and homeland security—as well as general government operations. Congress has developed certain rules and practices for the consideration of appropriations measures, referred to as the congressional appropriations process. The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of this process. Appropriations measures are under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. In recent years these measures have provided approximately 35% to 39% of total federal spending. The remainder of federal spending comprises direct (or mandatory) spending, controlled by House and Senate legislative committees, and net interest on the public debt. The annual appropriations cycle is initiated with the President's budget submission, which is due on the first Monday in February. This is followed by congressional consideration of a budget resolution that, in part, sets spending ceilings for the upcoming fiscal year. The target date for completion of the budget resolution is April 15. Committee and floor consideration of the annual appropriations bills occurs during the spring and summer months and may continue through the fall and winter until annual appropriations are enacted. Floor consideration of appropriations measures is subject to procedural rules that may limit the content of those measures and any amendments thereto. Congress has established a process that provides for two separate types of measures associated with discretionary spending: authorization bills and appropriation bills. These measures perform different functions. Authorization bills establish, continue, or modify agencies or programs. Appropriations measures subsequently provide funding for the agencies and programs authorized. There are three types of appropriations measures. Regular appropriations bills provide most of the funding that is provided in all appropriations measures for a fiscal year and must be enacted by October 1, the beginning of the fiscal year. If regular bills are not enacted by the beginning of the new fiscal year, Congress adopts continuing resolutions to continue funding, generally until regular bills are enacted. Supplemental appropriations bills provide additional appropriations to become available during a fiscal year. Budget enforcement for appropriations measures under the congressional budget process has both statutory and procedural elements. The statutory elements are derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011, which imposes limits on discretionary spending for each of the fiscal years between FY2012 and FY2021. The procedural elements generally stem from requirements under the Congressional Budget Act that are normally associated with the budget resolution. Through this Budget Act process, the Appropriations Committee in each chamber, as well as each of their subcommittees, receives procedural limits on the total amount of budget authority for the upcoming fiscal year (referred to as 302(a) and 302(b) allocations). Enforcement of the statutory limits occurs primarily through sequestration, while enforcement of the procedural limits occurs through points of order. Discretionary appropriations may be designated or otherwise provided so that they are effectively exempt from statutory and procedural budget enforcement. Such designations include ""emergency requirements,"" ""overseas contingency operations/global war on terrorism,"" and for ""disaster relief."" Rescissions are provisions of law that cancel previously enacted budget authority. As budget authority providing the funding must be enacted into law, so too a rescission cancelling the budget authority must be enacted into law. Rescissions can be included either in separate rescission measures or any of the three types of appropriations measures.",55,55 "Coup in Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and Implications. This report examines the ouster of Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze in the wake of a legislative election that many Georgians viewed as not free and fair. Implications for Georgia and U.S. interests are discussed. This report may be updated as events warrant. See also CRS Report 97-727, Georgia, and CRS Issue Brief IB95024, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, updated regularly.",85,85 "Freight Infrastructure Issues in Surface Transportation Reauthorization. Goods movement has increased substantially over the past few decades as the economy and global trade have expanded. Freight transportation demand in tandem with passenger-side demand has caused congestion in many parts of the transportation system, resulting in slower and less reliable freight movement. Also, the condition and performance of freight infrastructure play considerable roles in the efficiency of the freight system and, therefore, are likely to be of significant congressional concern in the reauthorization of the surface transportation program that is currently authorized through May 31, 2015. There is no specific federal freight transportation program. Instead, the federal government supports freight infrastructure through several programs that promote both passenger and freight mobility. The most important of these are four of the five ""core"" programs of the federal-aid highway program, which together account for roughly 90% of highway spending. One of those five programs, the Surface Transportation Program, also provides limited support for freight rail projects. Federal assistance to ports and inland navigation, waterborne shipping, and air freight are beyond the scope of this report. There is significant disagreement about the best way to accomplish improvements in freight system infrastructure. Among the most important points of contention are The magnitude of the investments required and related policies to manage demand for existing transportation infrastructure as an alternative to increasing capacity. How to cover the cost. Most federal freight investments are currently funded through the highway trust fund, whose main source of revenue is taxes on motor fuels. These taxes no longer raise sufficient revenue to fund existing federal surface transportation programs, and proposals to increase federal spending on freight infrastructure are often linked to other fees or taxes that have not gained support in Congress. How to set priorities. Most federal highway funding is distributed by formula to state departments of transportation, which determine spending priorities in cooperation with metropolitan planning organizations. This process forces freight projects to compete with passenger-oriented projects, which may have greater support—especially when a proposed freight project primarily benefits so-called through trucks (rather than trucks making local pick-ups and deliveries). Changes in the law to establish priority for freight infrastructure would run contrary to the trend in recent reauthorization acts to give states greater discretion over their spending of federal highway funds. The role of the federal government in the planning process. The 2012 surface transportation reauthorization, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21, P.L. 112-141), established a performance measurement system for state departments of transportation and metropolitan planning organizations. However, these provisions have yet to be fully implemented. Eventually, they are intended to lead to federal evaluation of state and local decision-making, which is likely to prove controversial.",123,120 "Reporting Foreign Financial Assets Under Titles 26 and 31: FATCA and FBAR. All citizens of the United States as well as U.S. resident aliens are required to report their world-wide income for U.S. federal income tax purposes. However, where foreign assets are involved, this is an area in which taxpayers, knowingly or unknowingly, may fail to comply with the law. There are numerous information reporting requirements involving foreign assets that may assist the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in recognizing a failure to report foreign income, however, both taxpayers and tax preparers may not be fully compliant with filing these forms. Again, this may be more a matter of ignorance of the requirements than any intent to skirt the law. Neither the reporting requirement imposed by the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) nor the Foreign Bank Account Reporting (FBAR) imposed by the older Bank Secrecy Act directly involves reporting income for tax purposes. Instead, each involves reporting the existence of financial assets or accounts located outside of the United States. Although in some cases the same accounts or assets may be reported on each information-reporting form, both forms may be required. Failure to file either form if required may result in significant penalties, in some cases amounting to the entire balance of the unreported account or more. Tax evasion through offshore accounts can be facilitated by foreign financial institutions (FFIs) or other financial intermediaries. Although they may not be complicit in the tax evasion, these entities can play a part in curbing offshore tax evasion by reporting information on assets owned or controlled by entities subject to U.S. income tax. FATCA imposes reporting requirements on FFIs regarding their U.S. account holders, as well as obligations on non-financial foreign entities (NFFEs) regarding their U.S. owners. If the requirements are not met, then any withholdable payment to the entity is subject to withholding of tax at a rate of 30%. Since FATCA's passage, there has been criticism of the FFI and NFFE provisions and how they relate to other countries, including whether FATCA's requirements are inconsistent with existing U.S. treaty obligations and what happens when the requirements conflict with another country's domestic (e.g., banking or privacy) laws. The Treasury Department and IRS have reached out to other countries and entered into bilateral intergovernmental agreements with 24 of them. In general, these provide that the other country's FFIs will be deemed compliant with FATCA's requirements if they comply with the agreement. FATCA's requirements have also been criticized as overly burdensome and stakeholders have indicated they have insufficient time to prepare for them. The IRS has responded by extending various deadlines under FATCA—while the 2010 law enacting FATCA provides that, in general, its provisions ""apply to payments made after December 31, 2012,"" the IRS has on several occasions extended various deadlines, with many provisions scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 2014. Finally, legislation has been introduced in the 113th Congress that would repeal much of FATCA (S. 887), modify FATCA with the intent of ""strengthening"" it (H.R. 1554, H.R. 3666, S. 1533, and S. 268), or require that its effects on U.S. citizens living abroad be studied (H.R. 597).",102,102 "U.S.-Chinese Motor Vehicle Trade: Overview and Issues. The U.S. auto industry employs nearly 800,000 workers and is a major employer in certain parts of the country. International competition is fierce, with many automakers and thousands of parts makers vying for market share. Because of the industry's importance to the U.S. economy, the rapid rise of China's auto assembly and auto parts industries in recent years has raised concerns among some Members of Congress. In 2009, China overtook the United States to become both the world's largest producer of and market for motor vehicles. In 2012, assemblers in China sold 19 million vehicles, and forecasts project more than 30 million vehicles will be sold there in 2020. China's increasing importance in this industry presents a unique set of opportunities and challenges for the United States. On the one hand, China is in some respects a relatively open market, it was the third -largest export market for U.S. autos and auto parts in the first six months of 2013 at $5.1 billion ($4.2 billion for autos and $ 0.9billion for auto parts), and has welcomed foreign direct investment by U.S.-based auto and auto parts manufacturers. Every year since 2010, General Motors has sold more cars in China (through exports and its joint ventures there) than in the United States. On the other hand, China maintains a number of trade and investment barriers that affect trade flows in autos and auto parts. Foreign automakers can produce autos in China only through 50/50 joint ventures with Chinese partners. In addition, U.S. and other foreign auto firms have reportedly faced pressures relating to transfer of technology, export performance, and domestic content requirements, even though China's commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibit the Chinese government from enforcing such policies on foreign firms. Although the United States imports few vehicles from China, China has become the fourth-largest source of U.S. auto parts imports, with shipments totaling $14.5 billion in 2012. The Chinese government has made the development of its auto and auto parts industries, including ""new energy vehicles,"" a major economic priority, and has implemented a number of industrial policies to promote and protect Chinese auto firms with the long-term goal of making them globally competitive. As a result, auto and auto parts trade has become a source of conflict between the United States and China, most recently in 2012, when the Obama Administration asked the World Trade Organization (WTO) to consider whether alleged Chinese subsidies of auto and auto parts manufacturers violate international rules. China's demand for motor vehicles is likely to continue growing rapidly because its population of 1.3 billion is just beginning to have the financial resources to purchase automobiles. For the United States, this will mean many new opportunities and challenges. Unlike some other markets, such as Korea, China's large internal demand may well shape the industry for many years, with exporting a secondary interest. China's rising investments in U.S. parts makers such as Nexteer and B456 Systems may help develop a U.S. technology lead in fuel-efficient, low-emission vehicles. But the prevalence of state and municipal ownership of many Chinese auto and auto parts companies may also cause friction. Many in Congress have called on the Obama Administration to take a tougher stand against China's industrial policies that may favor Chinese automakers over foreign automakers.",52,53 "Presidential Travel: Policy and Costs. For security and other reasons, the President, Vice President, and First Lady use military aircraft when they travel. The White House generally categorizes the trips as fulfilling either official or political functions. Often, a trip involves both official and political, or unofficial, activities. When a trip is for an official function, the government pays all costs, including per diem (food and lodging), car rentals, and other incidental expenses. When a trip is for political or unofficial purposes, those involved must pay for their own food and lodging and other related expenses, and they must also reimburse the government with the equivalent of the airfare that they would have paid had they used a commercial airline. When a trip involves both official and political activities, a formula determines the amount to be reimbursed for that part of the trip involving political activities. Whether a trip is for official or political purposes, the Air Force pays all operational and other costs incurred by the use of the aircraft. While the travel policies of specific Administrations concerning the reimbursement of expenses for unofficial travel generally are not publicly available, it appears that policy guidelines developed by the Reagan White House have served as a basis for the travel policies of subsequent Administrations. This report will be updated as new information becomes available.",58,78 "Tax Benefits for Health Insurance and Expenses: Overview of Current Law. How tax policy affects health insurance and health care spending is a perennial subject of discussion in Washington. The issue is prompted by the size of the tax benefits, by their effect on the cost and allocation of health care resources, and by interest in comprehensive tax reform. Current law contains significant tax benefits for health insurance and expenses. By far the largest is the exclusion for employer-paid coverage, which employees may omit from their individual income taxes. The exclusion also applies to employment taxes and to health benefits in cafeteria plans. (The exclusion should be distinguished from the deduction employers may take for the payments they make and other costs they incur.) Other important tax benefits include the following Self-employed taxpayers may deduct 100% of their health insurance, even if they do not itemize deductions, and taxpayers who itemize may deduct insurance payments and other unreimbursed medical expenses to the extent they exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income Some workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance or receiving a pension paid by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation can receive the Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) to purchase certain types of insurance Four tax-advantaged accounts are available to help taxpayers pay their health care expenses: Flexible Spending Accounts, Health Reimbursement Accounts, Health Savings Accounts, and Medical Savings Accounts Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association plans (VEBAs) are vehicles for prefunding retiree health benefits on a tax-advantaged basis for certain groups of workers, particularly unionized workers, and Coverage under Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and military and veterans health care programs is not considered taxable income. By lowering the after-tax cost of insurance, these tax benefits generally help extend coverage to more people, they also lead some people to obtain more coverage than they otherwise would. The incentives influence how coverage is acquired: the uncapped exclusion for employer-paid insurance is partly responsible for the predominance of employment-based insurance in the United States. In addition, the tax benefits increase the demand for health care by enabling insured people to obtain services at discounted prices, this in turn contributes to rising health care costs. When insurance is viewed as a form of personal consumption, most tax benefits appear to be inequitable because taxpayers' savings depend on marginal tax rates. When viewed as spreading catastrophic economic risk over multiple years, however, basing those savings on marginal rates might be justified as the proper treatment for losses under a progressive tax system. This report details the current law for various tax benefits for health insurance coverage and identifies changes in certain provisions affected by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148) as amended.",70,70 "Lobbying Registration and Disclosure: The Role of the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate. On September 14, 2007, President George W. Bush signed S. 1, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-81), into law. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) amended the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 (P.L. 104-65, as amended) to provide, among other changes to federal law and House and Senate rules, additional and more frequent disclosures of lobbying contacts and activities. This report explains the role of the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate in implementing lobbying registration and disclosure requirements and summarizes the guidance documents they have jointly issued. Under the HLOGA and predecessor lobbying laws, the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate manage the registration, filing, and the collection of documents submitted by the lobbyists and lobbying firms. Prior to the HLOGA, lobbyists were required to file paper documents with both the Clerk and the Secretary. These forms are now filed electronically and jointly with the Clerk and the Secretary. In addition, the Clerk and the Secretary are responsible for making documents publicly available and reporting incorrect or false filings to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia. Beginning in December 2007, the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate issued joint guidance documents for HLOGA implementation. The guidance document identified eight substantive changes to the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act, and discussed how the Clerk and Secretary interpret and implement the HLOGA's provisions. In addition, the guidance document provided direction on successful completion of quarterly registration and disclosure documents, the new semi-annual reporting requirement, and interpretation of the Clerk and Secretary's role in referring non-compliance to the U.S. attorney. Since issuing an initial guidance document in 2007, the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §1605, have conducted periodic reviews of existing guidance and have issued multiple updates. Most recently, the document was updated on January 31, 2017, to update registration thresholds pursuant to changes in the Consumer Price Index, provide additional clarifications on identifying clients and covered officials, provide additional examples for filing by outside lobbyists, clarify that all income and expenditure reporting should be rounded to the nearest $10,000, clarify that all ""sole proprietors"" are required to file two LD-203 disclosure forms—one for the registrant [firm] and one for the individual lobbyist, and encourage filers to use the online public database for compliance purposes. For further analysis on the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act and the Lobbying Disclosure Act, see CRS Report R40245, Lobbying Registration and Disclosure: Before and After the Enactment of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, by Jacob R. Straus, and CRS Report R44292, The Lobbying Disclosure Act at 20: Analysis and Issues for Congress, by Jacob R. Straus.",61,61 "California's Proposition 187: A Brief Overview. On September 13, 1999, a U.S. district judge approved an agreement to end litigation challenging California's Proposition 187, a 1994 ballot initiative to deny illegal aliens state benefits and to require reporting of illegal alien applicants for benefits to federal immigration officials. This agreement effectively continues earlier court-imposed restraints on implementing Prop 187. Meanwhile, federal law enacted in 1996 denies illegal aliens most state-provided benefits funded in part by the federal government and authorizes California to deny illegal aliens many other benefits that would have been denied had Prop 187 been implemented. In a reversal of policy, however California has now restored state-financed prenatal care for illegal aliens and is also considering easing other restrictions that it had imposed after the 1996 law.",76,76 "Asylum and Gang Violence: Legal Overview. The recent increase in the number of unaccompanied alien children (UACs) apprehended at the border between Mexico and the United States has raised questions about the role that gang-related violence in Central America may play in determining whether such children are eligible for refugee status and asylum. Only aliens who are ""refugees,"" as that term is defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), qualify for potential refugee status or asylum (two forms of discretionary relief that could enable UACs to enter or remain in the United States). The INA's definition, in turn, generally encompasses individuals outside their home country who are unable or unwilling to return to that country because of ""persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."" However, key terms within this definition—including persecution and particular social group—are not defined by statute or regulation. Instead, they have been construed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative tribunal for interpreting and applying immigration law, through a process of case-by-case adjudication, with the federal courts generally deferring to the BIA's interpretation insofar as it is based on a ""permissible construction"" of the INA. These cases center upon eligibility for asylum, because denials of applications for refugee status cannot be appealed. Denials of asylum by immigration judges in the course of formal removal proceedings, in contrast, may be appealed to the BIA and the federal courts of appeals. Persecution has been construed to mean the infliction of harm by the government, or an entity the government is unable or unwilling to control, ""upon persons who differ in a way regarded as offensive..., in a manner condemned by civilized governments."" A showing of past persecution establishes a rebuttable presumption that the alien has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Otherwise, aliens must prove they subjectively fear persecution, and there is a ""reasonable possibility"" they would suffer persecution if returned to their home country. Such a ""reasonable possibility"" can exist when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place. This persecution must also be ""on account of"" a protected ground (e.g., race). The REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13) amended the INA to require that a protected ground ""was or will be at least one central reason"" for the persecution. However, central reason has been construed to mean a reason that is more than ""incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason,"" not as the only or primary reason. Most protected grounds (i.e., race, religion, nationality, political opinion) are fairly straightforward in their definition, if not in their application in specific cases. Particular social group, however, has been construed in various ways by the BIA over the years. When considered by the BIA or appellate courts in light of how the INA's definition of refugee is construed, claims to asylum based on gang-related violence frequently (although not inevitably) fail. In some cases, this is because the harm experienced or feared by the alien is seen not as persecution, but as generalized lawlessness or criminal activity. In other cases, persecution has been found to be lacking because governmental ineffectiveness in controlling the gangs is distinguished from inability or unwillingness to control them. In yet other cases, any persecution that is found is seen as lacking the requisite connection to a protected ground, and instead arising from activities ""typical"" to gangs, such as extortion and recruitment of new members. The particular social group articulated by the alien (e.g., former gang members, recruits) may also been seen as lacking a ""common, immutable characteristic,"" social visibility (now, social distinction), or particularity.",76,76 "National Flood Insurance Program: Treasury Borrowing in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. In 2008, Hurricanes Ike, Gustav, and Dolly made landfall in the United States, causing widespread flood damage. Exactly three years earlier, claims and expenses related to the massive flooding caused by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma had financially overwhelmed the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimates that the NFIP will need about $3 billion in additional borrowing authority to cover the claims currently outstanding and a yet to be determined amount for the 2008 Hurricanes. Congress is currently working to reform the NFIP while retaining its original intent to keep rates affordable for people to buy the insurance.",11,11 "Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Enforcement: Legal Issues. The term prosecutorial discretion is commonly used to describe the wide latitude that prosecutors have in determining when, whom, how, and even whether to prosecute apparent violations of the law. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and, later, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components have historically described themselves as exercising prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement. Some commentators have recently challenged this characterization on the grounds that DHS enforces primarily civil violations, and some of its components cannot be said to engage in ""law enforcement,"" as that term is conventionally understood. However, even agencies that do not prosecute or engage in law enforcement have been recognized as having discretion (sometimes referred to as enforcement discretion) in determining whether to enforce particular violations. Federal regulation of immigration is commonly said to arise from various powers enumerated in the Constitution (e.g., naturalization, commerce), as well as the federal government's inherent power to control and conduct foreign relations. Some, although not all, of these powers belong exclusively to Congress, and courts have sometimes described Congress as having ""plenary power"" over immigration. However, few courts or commentators have addressed the separation of powers between Congress and the President in the field of immigration, and the executive has sometimes been said to share plenary power over immigration with Congress as one of the ""political branches."" Moreover, the authority to exercise prosecutorial or enforcement discretion has traditionally been understood to arise from the Constitution, not from any congressional delegation of power. Certain decisions have been widely recognized as within the prosecutorial discretion of immigration officers. These include deciding whether to initiate removal proceedings and what charges to lodge against the respondent, canceling a Notice to Appear or other charging document before jurisdiction vests with an immigration judge, granting deferred action or extended voluntary departure to an alien otherwise subject to removal (deportation), appealing particular decisions or orders, and imposing fines for particular offenses, among other things. Enforcement priorities and resources, as well as humanitarian concerns, have typically played a role in determining whether to exercise discretion in individual cases. For example, the George W. Bush Administration temporarily suspended employer sanctions in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina, and the Obama Administration recently began granting deferred action to certain unauthorized aliens brought to the United States as children. While the executive branch's prosecutorial or enforcement discretion is broad, it is not unfettered, and particular exercises of discretion could potentially be checked by the Constitution, statute, or agency directives. Selective prosecution, or prosecution based on race, religion, or the exercise of constitutional rights, is prohibited, although aliens generally cannot assert selective prosecution as a defense to removal. A policy of non-enforcement that amounts to an abdication of an agency's statutory responsibilities could potentially be said to violate the Take Care Clause. However, standing to challenge alleged violations of the Take Care Clause may be limited, and no court appears to have invalidated a policy of non-enforcement founded upon prosecutorial discretion on the grounds that the policy violated the Take Care Clause. Non-enforcement of particular laws could also potentially be challenged under the Administrative Procedure Act if a statute provides specific guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers. In addition, an agency could potentially be found to have constrained its own discretion, as some courts found that the INS had done in the 1970s with its operating instruction on deferred action.",76,91 "Medicaid's Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), FY2013. Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term care. Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal government and the states. The federal government's share of a state's expenditures is called the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rate. The remainder is referred to as the nonfederal share, or state share. Generally determined annually, the FMAP formula is designed so that the federal government pays a larger portion of Medicaid costs in states with lower per capita incomes relative to the national average (and vice versa for states with higher per capita incomes). For FY2013, regular FMAP rates range from 50.00% to 74.43%. The FMAP rate is used to reimburse states for the federal share of most Medicaid expenditures, but exceptions to the regular FMAP rate have been made for certain states, situations, populations, providers, and services. Some recent issues related to FMAP include state fiscal conditions, the disaster-related FMAP adjustment, and the exclusion of certain employer contributions from the FMAP calculation. While the fiscal environment for states is improving, states continue to face fiscal challenges, which makes it difficult for states to finance the state share of Medicaid expenditures. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended) included a provision providing a disaster-recovery FMAP adjustment for states that have experienced a major, statewide disaster. The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA, P.L. 111-3) included a provision allowing a state's FMAP rate to be adjusted if the state had significantly disproportionate employer pension and insurance fund contributions in any calendar year since 2003. Legislation was enacted during the 111th Congress that impacts the FMAP rate. First, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) provided assistance to states through a temporary FMAP rate increase that was later extended by P.L. 111-226. Also, ACA contains a number of provisions affecting FMAP rates. Most notably, ACA provides initial FMAP rates of up to 100% for certain ""newly eligible"" individuals. During the 112th Congress, there has been a focus on reducing the federal deficit, controlling federal Medicaid spending is often discussed as a means to reduce federal expenditures. For this reason, the FY2012 House budget resolution proposed restructuring Medicaid from an entitlement program to a block grant, and most federal deficit reduction proposals include Medicaid provisions. This report describes the FMAP calculation used to reimburse states for most Medicaid expenditures, and it lists the statutory exceptions to the regular FMAP rate. In addition, this report discusses other FMAP-related issues, including state fiscal conditions, the temporary FMAP rate increase, the exclusion of certain employer contributions, FMAP changes in ACA, the Medicaid proposal included in the House budget resolution, and other federal deficit reduction proposals.",70,70 "Homestead Exemptions in Bankruptcy After the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). When debtors file for bankruptcy protection under Title 11 of the U.S. Code, they may exempt the value of certain property, in many cases, this includes their homestead. In practical terms, to the extent that the property's value does not exceed the allowed exemption amount, the debtor may keep the property rather than its becoming part of the bankruptcy estate and thereby being available to satisfy creditors. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) introduced additional limitations on the extent to which debtors could exempt value in their residences when filing for bankruptcy protection. This report surveys the homestead exemption laws of the 50 states and the District of Columbia with an emphasis on the amount of the exemptions and the extent to which debtors may choose between federal and state exemptions. It also describes the limitations on state homestead exemptions in 11 U.S.C. § 522(o)-(q) that were imposed by BAPCPA. The amounts states allow debtors to exempt in bankruptcy run the gamut. A few states (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) have no specific homestead exemption. Several jurisdictions allow debtors to exempt unlimited value in their homestead (the District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas), but some states allow an unlimited homestead exemption only in specific circumstances (Kentucky, Louisiana, Nevada, and Washington). In states with a specific dollar amount that is allowed as a homestead exemption, the majority of states allow an exemption that is more than $10,000, but less than $200,000. However, more than 10% of the states with a limited homestead exemption allow no more than $10,000. Only 10% allow $200,000 or more without imposing restrictions not related to residency. In some states, the amount of the available exemption is dependent upon age or disability. In others, marital status affects the available exemption. Some allow additional exemption amounts if there are dependent children in the home. In a few states, the exemption is lower for a mobile home than for a residence that is real property. In New York, the maximum available exemption is determined by the county in which the homestead is located. Massachusetts recently changed its laws to create two classes of homestead exemption—an automatic homestead exemption and a declared homestead exemption. The declared homestead exemption requires written formalities and is of greater maximum value than is the automatic exemption. Some states appear to use their homestead exemptions to address issues not directly related to the home. West Virginia generally allows debtors to exempt up to $25,000. That amount increases to $250,000 if the debtor is a physician with malpractice insurance coverage for at least $1 million per occurrence and the bankruptcy is, at least in part, a response to a medical malpractice verdict or judgment. Washington State generally limits debtors to exempting $125,000 for their homestead, however, if another state has gotten a judgment against the debtor for income taxes due to that other state on retirement benefits that were paid to the debtor while the debtor was a resident of Washington, the homestead exemption is unlimited. This report will not be routinely updated.",6,6 "Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008: P.L. 110-314. Public alarm about the spate of recent product recalls throughout 2007, particularly of toys and other products used by children, has focused attention on the Consumer Product Safety Commission (the CPSC or the Commission). This scrutiny led to consideration of major amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), which established and authorized the CPSC in 1972 in response to growing concerns about protecting the public from unsafe, defective consumer products. Jurisdiction over the administration and enforcement of several existing consumer safety statutes was transferred from other agencies to and consolidated under the CPSC. However, in the years since its establishment, the staff and resources of the CPSC have been considerably reduced, leading many observers to doubt its ability to fulfill its mission effectively. Consequently, Congress considered major reform legislation to address organizational and systemic deficiencies. Legislative proposals in the 110th Congress included provisions targeting specific consumer product defects and hazards. On July 29, 2008, H.Rept. 110-787, the Conference Report for H.R. 4040, the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA), was released after several months of negotiations in the conference committee to reconcile differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bill passed the House of Representatives and the Senate on July 30, 2008 (424-1) and July 31, 2008 (89-3), respectively. On August 14, 2008, President Bush signed the bill into law as P.L. 110-314. CPSC Chairman Nord and Commissioner Moore each expressed approval of the final legislation, with Chairman Nord expressing a desire for Congress to appropriate further funding to carry out the new mandates of the legislation. This report provides an overview of the prior authority of the CPSC to establish consumer product safety standards and to inspect and recall unsafe consumer products, and discusses P.L. 110-314, the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, reforming the CPSC and strengthening enforcement of consumer product safety standards. It supersedes CRS Report RL34399, Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008: H.R. 4040, by Margaret Mikyung Lee (out of print but available from author). For an overview of issues regarding safety of consumer products imported from China, see CRS Report RS22713, Health and Safety Concerns Over U.S. Imports of Chinese Products: An Overview, by Wayne M. Morrison. For an overview of the issue of phthalates in children's products, see CRS Report RL34572, Phthalates in Plastics and Possible Human Health Effects, by Linda-Jo Schierow and Margaret Mikyung Lee.",8,8 "India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views. On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the creation of a ""global partnership,"" which would include ""full"" civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. This is at odds with nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice. President Bush promised India he would persuade Congress to amend the pertinent laws to approve the agreement, as well as persuade U.S. allies to create an exception to multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines for India. India committed to, among other things separating its civilian nuclear facilities from its military nuclear facilities, declaring civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards, and signing an Additional Protocol. See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India Issues for Congress, by Sharon Squassoni, for further details on the agreement. The separation plan announced by Prime Minister Singh and President Bush on March 2, 2006 and further elaborated on May 11, 2006, would place 8 power reactors under inspection, bringing the total up to 14 out of a possible 22 under inspection. Several fuel fabrication and spent fuel storage facilities were declared, as well as 3 heavy water plants that were described as safeguards-irrelevant."" The plan excludes from international inspection 8 indigenous power reactors, enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except as currently safeguarded), military production reactors and other military nuclear plants and 3 heavy water plants. Administration officials have defended the separation plan as credible and defensible because it covers more than just a token number of Indian facilities, provides for safeguards in perpetuity, and includes upstream and downstream facilities. U.S. officials acknowledge the importance of a credible separation plan to ensuring that the United States complies with its Article I obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) -- to not in any way assist a nuclear weapons program in a non-nuclear weapon state. For almost 30 years, the U.S. legal standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activities in a state provides adequate assurances. The Administration is apparently asking Congress to back a lower level of assurance by proposing that the separation plan take the place of comprehensive safeguards. Congress is likely to consider this issue as well as others when the Administration eventually submits its cooperation agreement with India for approval by both chambers. P.L. 109-401, signed on December 18, 2006, provides waivers for a nuclear cooperation agreement with India from relevant Atomic Energy Act provisions, and requires detailed information on the separation plan and resultant safeguards. This report, which will be updated as necessary, provides background on India's nuclear fuel cycle, a discussion of various issues involved in separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and potential concerns for Congress as it considers whether the United States has adequate assurances that its nuclear cooperation does not assist, encourage, or induce India's nuclear weapons development, production, or proliferation.",29,29 "Increased Department of Defense Role in U.S. Ebola Response. On September 16, 2014, President Obama announced a major increase in the United States response to the current Ebola outbreak in West Africa. The Department of Defense (DOD) submitted requests to Congress to make excess Overseas Contingency Operations funds appropriated for FY2014 available to support this effort. This report briefly outlines these requests.",79,65 "Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations. The Trump Administration submitted to Congress its FY2019 budget request on February 12, 2018. The proposal includes $41.86 billion for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). Of that amount, $13.26 billion would be for State Department operations, international broadcasting, and related agencies, and $28.60 billion for foreign operations. With the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA, P.L. 115-123, February 9, 2018), which raised discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25), the Administration's FY2019 foreign affairs funding request is entirely within enduring (base) funds, no Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding is in the SFOPS request for the first time since FY2012. Comparing the request with the FY2018-enacted funding levels, the FY2019 request represents a 22.7% decrease in SFOPS funding. The proposed State and related agency funding would be 18.2% below FY2018 enacted and the foreign operations funding would be reduced by 24.7%. In the State and related programs budget, cuts are proposed for the diplomatic security accounts (the Worldwide Security Protection programmatic allocation within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account and, separately, the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account), contributions to international organizations, and contributions for international peacekeeping activities. In the foreign operations budget, cuts would be applied across all accounts, with disproportionately large cuts proposed for humanitarian assistance, multilateral assistance, and funding for bilateral development programs focused on agriculture, education, and democracy promotion. Both the House and Senate appropriations committees have approved FY2019 SFOPS bills that include funding at higher levels than the Administration requested and equal to or greater than FY2018 enacted funding. H.R. 6385, approved by committee on June 20, 2018, would fund SFOPS accounts at $54.177 billion. S. 3108, approved by the full committee on June 21, 2018, would provide $54.602 billion for SFOPS accounts. Both bills await floor consideration in their respective chamber. This report provides an account-by-account comparison of the FY2019 SFOPS request and pending House and Senate SFOPS legislation (H.R. 6385 and S. 3108) to the FY2018-enacted funding in Appendix A. The International Affairs (function 150) budget in Appendix B provides a similar comparison. This report will be updated to reflect congressional activity on FY2019 appropriations.",80,80 "SBA Veterans Assistance Programs: An Analysis of Contemporary Issues. Several federal agencies, including the Small Business Administration (SBA), provide training and other assistance to veterans seeking civilian employment. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD), in cooperation with the SBA, Department of Labor, Department of Veterans Affairs, and several other federal agencies, operates the Transition Goals Plans Success program (Transition GPS), which provides employment information and entrepreneurship training to exiting military servicemembers to assist them in transitioning from the military to the civilian labor force. In recent years, the unemployment rate among veterans as a whole has generally been similar to or lower than the unemployment rate for nonveterans 18 years and older. However, veterans who have left the military since September 2001 have experienced higher unemployment than other veterans and, in some years, higher unemployment than nonveterans. As a result, Congress has focused much of its attention on finding ways to assist veterans who have left the military since September 2001. The SBA provides management and technical assistance services to more than 100,000 veterans each year through its various management and technical assistance training partners (e.g., Small Business Development Centers, Women's Business Centers [WBCs], Service Corps of Retired Executives [SCORE], and Veterans Business Outreach Centers [VBOCs]). The SBA's Office of Veterans Business Development (OVBD) also administers several programs to assist veterans, including the Operation Boots to Business: From Service to Startup initiative which is part of DOD's Transition GPS program. The expansion of federal employment training programs targeted at specific populations, such as women and veterans, has led some Members and organizations to ask if these programs should be consolidated. In their view, eliminating program duplication among federal business assistance programs across federal agencies, and within the SBA, would result in lower costs and improved services. Others argue that keeping these business assistance programs separate enables them to offer services that match the unique needs of various underserved populations, such as veterans. In their view, instead of considering program consolidation as a policy option, the focus should be on improving communication and cooperation among the federal agencies providing assistance to entrepreneurs. This report opens with an examination of the economic circumstances of veteran-owned businesses drawn from the Bureau of the Census's 2012 Survey of Business Owners (SBO). It then provides a brief overview of veterans' employment experiences, comparing unemployment and labor force participation rates for veterans, veterans who have left the military since September 2001, and nonveterans. The report also describes employment assistance programs offered by several federal agencies to assist veterans in their transition from the military to the civilian labor force and examines, in greater detail, the SBA's veteran business development programs, the SBA's efforts to assist veterans' access to capital, and the SBA's veteran contracting programs. It also discusses the SBA's Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loan program and P.L. 114-38, the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, which authorized and made permanent the SBA's recent practice of waiving the SBAExpress loan program's one time, up-front loan guarantee fee for veterans (and their spouse).",89,89 "Bankruptcy Reform Legislation in the 107th Congress: A Comparison of H.R. 333 As Passed by the House and the Senate. H.R. 333, 107th Congress, 1st Sess. (2001), the ""Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001"" and its counterpart in the Senate, S. 220, 107th Congress, 1st Sess. (2001), the ""Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001"" were introduced on January 31, 2001. So far, the 107th Congress has demonstrated widespread support for the bills evidenced by the votes. Although President Bush is expected to sign bankruptcy reform into law, the White House has indicated that a bankruptcy bill that contains a federal homestead cap may be unacceptable. This report surveys the bills and the major amendments that have been adopted. It provides a sectional analysis comparing selected provisions, with an emphasis on consumer bankruptcy.",6,6 "Holocaust-Related Legislation of the 105th Congress. Over 30 bills and resolutions related in some way to the Nazi-era Holocaust were introduced in the 105th Congress. Five of these were enacted or adopted S. 1564 (P.L. 105-158), the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, authorizes $25 million for Holocaust survivors and $5 million for archival research on Holocaust-era issues. It also urges the 15 European states receiving gold from the final disbursement of the Tripartite Gold Commission to donate those proceeds to Holocaust-related charities. S. 1900 (P.L. 105-186), establishes the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States. S. 1379 (P.L. 105-246), the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, amends the Freedom of Information Act to facilitate access to U.S. government records concerning Nazi war crimes. H.R. 4193 / S. 2237 / H.R. 4328 (P.L. 105-277), the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, includes funding for the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. H.Res. 557, a House Resolution, expresses support for U. S. government efforts to identify Holocaust-era assets and urges the restitution of individual and communal property by Central and East European governments. Among the pieces of legislation that were not adopted were H.R. 3121 and H.R. 3143, which addressed issues of Holocaust victims' claims against European insurance companies. H.R. 4138 dealt with stolen art works, including those looted during the Holocaust. H.R. 4563 sought to amend the Internal Revenue Code to exclude income received for settlement of claims of Holocaust victims. These or similar bills may be introduced in the 106th Congress in 1999.",81,81 "Iraq's Trade with the World: Data and Analysis. This report provides detailed trade information and statistics on Iraq's trade with the world from 2001 to 2003, highlighting its major trading partners. Data on U.S. trade with Iraq from 2002 to 2004 are also provided.",53,85 "Teacher Quality Enhancement Grants (Title II, Part A of the Higher Education Act): Overview and Reauthorization Issues. The Teacher Quality Enhancement Grants program (Title II, Part A of the Higher Education Act, or HEA) seeks to improve K-12 teacher preparation programs at higher education institutions. Title II Part A authorizes three types of competitively awarded grants—state grants, partnership grants, and recruitment grants—with the annual appropriation divided 45%, 45%, and 10% respectively among these kinds of grants. State grants are one-time, three-year grants for such activities as holding teacher preparation programs accountable for the quality of their graduates or reforming teacher certification requirements. Partnership grants are one-time, five-year grants to partnerships that must include at least three entities: an institution with a high performing teacher preparation program, a school of arts and sciences, and a high need school district. Among required uses are teacher preparation program accountability and professional development. Recruitment grants are one-time, three-year grants to states or partnerships, supporting scholarships with a teaching service requirement or activities to recruit highly qualified teachers for high need districts and schools. States receiving HEA funds must report annually on the quality of teacher preparation, including information on the pass rates of graduates on initial certification assessments. Higher education institutions enrolling HEA-aided students in their teacher preparation program must report annually detailing, among other things, the certification exam pass rates of graduates. States must establish procedures for identifying low-performing teacher preparation programs. If states withdraw approval or funding due to this designation, the affected programs cannot enroll students receiving HEA Title IV federal student aid. During the HEA reauthorization process, grant-related issues may include program effectiveness, mandated division of the annual appropriation when most states have received these one-time only grants, and the mix of kinds of grants and activities. Accountability issues may include inconsistency across states in standards for identifying low-performing teacher preparation programs, effectiveness of pass rate-based accountability for teacher preparation programs, reporting by states and institutions of 100% pass rates, and possible alternatives to the current framework. This report will be updated as events warrant.",33,33 "The Power to Regulate Commerce: Limits on Congressional Power. The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. The plain meaning of this language might indicate a limited power to regulate commercial trade between persons in one state and persons outside of that state. However, the Commerce Clause has never been construed quite so narrowly. Rather, the clause, along with the economy of the United States, has grown and become more complex. In addition, when Congress began to address national social problems, the Commerce Clause was often cited as the constitutional basis for such legislation. As a result, the Commerce Clause has become the constitutional basis for a significant portion of the laws passed by Congress over the last 50 years, and it currently represents one of the broadest bases for the exercise of congressional powers. An examination of the United States Code shows that more than 700 statutory provisions, covering a range of issues, are explicitly based on regulation of either ""interstate"" or ""foreign"" commerce. Over the last two decades, however, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison held that a gun possession law and a law regarding sexual violence were, respectively, beyond Congress's authority to regulate commerce. The effect of these cases, however, has so far been relatively modest in scope. For instance, a later case, Gonzales v. Raich, confirmed the authority of Congress to regulate medical marijuana, suggesting that the effect of the prior cases will be limited. Yet, in the case of National Federation of Business v. Sebelius, considering a challenge to an individual mandate to buy health insurance, the Court found that the Commerce Clause did not provide authority for such mandate. In Sebelius, the Court limited the use of the Commerce Clause to instances where individuals have already chosen to engage in a commercial activity (although it did find that such mandate could be enforced under Congress's power to tax).",55,8 "The National Trails System: A Brief Overview. The National Trails System was created in 1968 by the National Trails System Act (16 U.S.C. §§1241-1251). The system includes four types of trails: (1) national scenic trails (NSTs), which display significant physical characteristics of U.S. regions, (2) national historic trails (NHTs), which follow travel routes of national historical significance, (3) national recreation trails (NRTs), which provide outdoor recreation accessible to urban areas, and (4) connecting or side trails, which provide access to the other types of trails. As defined in the act, NSTs and NHTs are long-distance trails designated by acts of Congress. NRTs and connecting and side trails may be designated by the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture with the consent of the federal agency, state, or political subdivision with jurisdiction over the lands involved. Congress plays an ongoing role in shaping the National Trails System through legislation and oversight. Broad issues for Congress include, among others whether and where to establish new trails in the system whether to establish new categories of trails (such as ""national discovery trails""), and how much funding to provide to agencies for trail management. When designating individual trails, Congress has considered issues such as how to balance trail designation with other potential land uses how to address federal land acquisition, and whether to make specific provisions for trail use that may differ from those in the overall act. Congress has established 11 NSTs and 19 NHTs, as well as several NRTs (although recreation trails are more typically designated administratively). In addition, the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture have designated more than 1,200 NRTs and 6 connecting or side trails. The scenic, historic, and connecting trails are federally administered by either the National Park Service (NPS) and/or the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior, or the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture, with cooperation from states and other entities to operate nonfederal trail segments. The roughly 1,200 national recreation trails are typically managed by states, localities, and private organizations, except where they cross federal lands. The act limits federal land acquisition for the trails system, with specific provisions for different trail types. Each federal agency with management authority over national trails has its own budget for trail administration and management. Trails have also received funding from federal transportation programs, private donations, permits and fees, and local excise taxes, among other sources. Uses of the national trails may include, but are not limited to, bicycling, cross-country skiing, day hiking, equestrian activities, jogging or similar fitness activities, overnight and long-distance backpacking, snowmobiling, and surface water and underwater activities. Provisions for motorized vehicle use vary among the different types of trails. Legislation in the 114th Congress would designate a new national recreation trail (H.R. 1865 and S. 1423), direct a study of one trail route for potential addition to the system as a national historic trail (H.R. 984 and S. 479), and make other changes. As in earlier Congresses, a bill (H.R. 2661) has also been introduced to add a new type of trail—national discovery trails—to the system.",106,106 "Proposals to Reform ""Holds"" in the Senate. ""Holds"" are an informal senatorial custom unrecognized in Senate rules or precedents. They allow Senators to give notice to their respective party leader that certain measures or matters should not be brought up on the floor. This report examines, over a more than three-decade period, a wide range of proposals to reform holds.",55,55 "Genetic Information: Legal Issues Relating to Discrimination and Privacy. In April 2003, the sequence of the human genome was deposited into public databases. This milestone, which has been compared to the discoveries of Galileo, and other advances in genetics have created novel legal issues relating to genetic information. The Human Genome Project produced detailed maps of the 23 pairs of human chromosomes and sequenced 99% of the three billion nucleotide bases that make up the human genome. The sequence information should aid in the identification of genes underlying disease, raising hope for genetic therapies to cure disease, but this scientific accomplishment is not without potential problems. For instance, the presence of a specific genetic variation may indicate a predisposition to disease but does not guarantee that the person will manifest the disease: How should an employer or insurer respond? The ethical, social and legal implications of these technological advances have been the subject of significant scrutiny and concern. The legal implications of such information have been addressed in various ways largely by states, but also by Congress. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, P.L. 104-191, is the first federal law to specifically address discrimination and insurance issues relating to genetic discrimination. Congress is currently considering genetic discrimination legislation. H.R. 493, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007 (GINA), was introduced in the 110th Congress by Representative Slaughter and 143 cosponsors on January 16, 2007. It passed the House on April 25, 2007. A companion bill, S. 358, 110th Congress, was introduced by Senator Snowe and 22 cosponsors on January 22, 2007, and has been reported out of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. On March 5, 2008, the text of H.R. 493 as passed by the House was added to the end of the Paul Wellstone Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act of 2007 (H.R. 1424) in the engrossment of H.R. 1424. On April 24, 2008, the Senate took up H.R. 493, replaced the existing language with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and passed the measure, as amended, by a vote of 95-0. The House is expected to pass H.R. 493 (as amended) during the week of April 28, 2008. In the 109th Congress, S. 306, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005, was passed on February 17, 2005, by a vote of 98-0. A companion bill, H.R. 1227, was introduced on March 10, 2005, and another bill, H.R. 6125 was introduced on September 20, 2006. In the 108th Congress, the Senate passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, S. 1053. H.R. 1910 was introduced in the House and hearings were held, but the bill was not passed in the 108th Congress. This report discusses current federal law, state statutes, and legislation. It will be updated as needed.",18,18 "Creation of Executive Departments: Highlights from the Legislative History of Modern Precedents. On November 25, 2002, President George W. Bush signed legislation to establish a Department of Homeland Security (P.L. 107-296, 106 Stat. 2135). In the period from World War II until the establishment of this latest department, Congress also created or implemented major reorganizations of seven other Cabinet departments. This report provides a brief legislative history of the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and for the purpose of comparison describes the principal elements of the legislative process that established the Departments of Defense, Health, Education, and Welfare (now, in part, Health and Human Services), Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, Energy, Education, and Veterans Affairs. The legislative process surrounding the consideration of legislation to establish the Department of Homeland Security varied in some ways from the procedures that were generally associated with the creation of the other modern Cabinet departments. Responding to the need to strengthen homeland defense in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress passed legislation creating the department less than six months after receiving the President's formal legislative proposal. Congressional consideration of legislation establishing earlier Cabinet departments generally exhibited certain common procedural elements A formal presidential endorsement generally preceded congressional action. The predominant committees considering the legislation were the Government Operations (now Government Reform) Committee in the House and the Governmental Affairs Committee in the Senate, or their predecessors. With few exceptions, departmental creation proposals were considered under an open rule in the House, they were most often brought up for Senate consideration by unanimous consent. Votes on passage were generally by comfortable majorities. All bills but one went to conference to resolve House-Senate differences except in two instances, conferees were drawn exclusively from the reporting committees,. Additional information on the history of creating Cabinet departments appears in CRS Report RL31472(pdf), Departmental Organization, 1947-2003. CRS Report RL30673(pdf), The President's Cabinet Evolution, Alternatives, and Proposals for Change, analyzes the role of the Cabinet.",55,56 "Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act. On December 30, 2012, President Obama signed H.R. 5949, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, which extends Title VII of FISA until December 31, 2017. Reauthorizations of expiring provisions of FISA have been an annual occurrence in Congress since 2009. Prior to 2012, the legislative debate and reauthorizations largely dealt with three amendments to FISA that are commonly linked to the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act). Most recently, in 2011, these three provisions were extended until June 1, 2015. For a more detailed discussion of these three provisions, see CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015, by Edward C. Liu. In contrast, the reauthorization debated and passed in 2012 deals with Title VII of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Title VII is only tangentially related to the subjects of the previous years' debates in that they are amendments to the same statute. Therefore, the legislative activity in prior years should be conceptually separated from the current debate and legislation that would address the expiration of Title VII of FISA at the end of this year. Title VII of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, created new separate procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons and U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States. While some provisions of Title VII could be characterized as relaxing FISA's traditional standards for electronic surveillance and access to stored communications, other provisions of Title VII have expanded FISA's scope to require judicial approval of activities, such as surveillance of U.S. persons on foreign soil, that were previously unregulated by the statute. Upon enactment of Title VII, a number of organizations brought suit challenging newly enacted procedures for surveillance of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be abroad. The suit alleged that this authority violated the targets' Fourth Amendment rights, because it permitted acquisition of international communications without requiring an individualized court order supported by probable cause. However, on February 26, 2013, in Clapper v. Amnesty International, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the suit because the plaintiffs had not suffered a sufficiently concrete injury to have legal standing to challenge Title VII. Therefore, the Court did not decide the merits of the Fourth Amendment question.",27,27 "Changes in the Purposes and Frequency of Authorizations of Appropriations. The congressional budget process distinguishes between ""authorizations,"" which establish or define the activities of the federal government, and ""appropriations,"" which finance those activities. The purpose of this report is to discuss the changes in the form and frequency of authorization laws that have occurred over the past century. As the congressional approach to authorizations and appropriations developed over the nineteenth century, distinct roles for these types of laws were established. However, that approach began to shift in the early twentieth century as the size and scope of federal government activities increased, and the legislative committees began to explore new methods of influencing budgetary outcomes, both with respect to the action of the appropriators and for the agencies under their jurisdiction. Toward that end, those committees began to include provisions that explicitly authorized appropriations in authorization acts. In addition, these committees began to use these provisions to establish periodic schedules of review for revisions to authorization laws for certain agencies and departments, instead of enacting such laws on an as-needed basis. The types of provisions periodically authorizing appropriations that were developed during the mid-twentieth century have continued to be in use through the present day. Such provisions can generally be divided into two schedules of review: ""annual"" and ""multiyear."" Annual authorizations of appropriations explicitly authorize appropriations for a single fiscal year. Multiyear authorizations of appropriations explicitly authorize appropriations for more than one fiscal year at a time, typically between two and five of them. The evolution of the form and frequency of authorizations since the 1920s have been characterized by a number of general themes. Annual reauthorization schedules were often adopted due to the legislative committee's desire for increased involvement in agency and congressional budgetary decisions. Annual authorizations tended to be characterized by more incremental program changes, whereas multiyear authorizations tended to involve more widespread policy changes. Over the past thirty years many agencies on annual schedules have been transitioned to multiyear or long-term schedules. These transitions have often been motivated by delays in the enactment of annual authorizations each year, or the legislative committee's decision to conduct more extensive reviews of agency programs and policies on a less frequent schedule. The amounts annually authorized have tended to be more similar to the amount eventually appropriated when compared to multiyear authorizations. In particular, the outyears of multiyear authorizations have tended to be characterized by a growing gap between the amount authorized and amount appropriated. To illustrate the themes identified in the first section of the report, the second section describes aspects of the authorization histories of the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Peace Corps. In general, all three of these agencies experienced eras of annual reauthorization, and then most recently transitioned to a more long-term or intermittent schedule.",55,55 "Speculation, Fundamentals, and Oil Prices. High oil prices affect nearly every household and business in the United States. During the course of 2008, oil prices doubled to more than $145 per barrel and then fell by 80%. In early 2011, there was a run-up of about 20%, sending gasoline prices to near 2008 highs. Few would rule out the possibility of similar price swings in the months to come. What explains oil price volatility? Some consider price movements such as those of 2008 and early 2011 to be more extreme than warranted by the fundamentals of supply and demand. Their explanation for unstable commodity prices focuses on financial markets for derivatives contracts linked to the price of oil—futures, options, and swaps. Many market participants are pure financial speculators, who never deal in physical oil, but earn large profits if they can correctly forecast price trends. Critics claim that such traders can drive oil prices above fundamental levels, resulting in a ""speculative premium"" that imposes unjustified costs on consumers. Although the relationship between speculation and commodity prices has been studied extensively, consensus has not emerged as to whether speculative trading causes unusual oil price volatility. An examination of Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) data reveals a strong correlation between weekly changes in positions held by ""money managers"" (a category of speculators that includes hedge funds) and weekly changes in the price of oil. Price falls, conversely, have tended to coincide with reductions in money managers' long positions. This statistical relationship is weaker for other classes of speculators and for commercial hedgers. However, the existence of a correlation does not imply causation—money managers could be price-followers rather than price-setters. Another explanation for oil price volatility looks to the fundamentals of oil production and energy consumption. Rapid global economic growth led to rising demand for oil, and supply could not keep up at previous oil prices. Because oil supply and demand do not respond much to price changes, at least in the short-term, some argue that relatively small changes in supply or demand can trigger significant price movements. An interagency task force led by the CFTC found that the 2003-2008 increase in oil prices was largely due to fundamental supply and demand factors. The role of speculators in oil and other commodity markets has attracted congressional interest. Staff reports by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs found that excessive speculation has had ""undue"" influence on wheat price movements and in the natural gas market. A 2011 report by the minority staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform argues that ""addressing excessive speculation offers the single most significant opportunity to reduce the price of gas for American consumers."" Legislation before the 112th Congress (S. 1200 and H.R. 2328) would authorize and direct the CFTC to take certain actions to reduce the volume of speculation in oil and related energy commodities. Another bill, H.R. 2003, would impose a tax on oil futures, swaps, and options that were not used for hedging commercial risk. This report provides background on financial speculation in oil, the workings of oil derivatives markets, and the different types of firms that trade in those markets. It reviews the concepts of manipulation and excessive speculation, and it briefly describes the fundamental factors that affect oil prices. This report will be updated as events warrant.",40,40 Genetic Testing: Scientific Background and Nondiscrimination Legislation. Issues surrounding genetic discrimination and privacy in health insurance and employment are currently being debated in the 109th Congress. This report provides a comprehensive overview of the status of genetic testing in the United States.,18,18 "FY2019 Appropriations for the Department of Energy. Overview The Department of Energy (DOE) is funded through the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill. The President's FY2019 budget request is $30.4 billion for the DOE, approximately $4.2 billion (12%) less than the FY2018 enacted level of $34.6 billion (see P.L. 115-141 and Title III of Division D, Explanatory Statement on page H2481). Conference report H.Rept. 115-929 to accompany H.R. 5895, which includes the FY2019 Energy and Water appropriations bill in a three-bill ""minibus"" funding bill, was filed on September 10, 2018. According to the joint explanatory statement, the report would fund DOE at $35.7 billion—$1.1 billion above the FY2018 enacted level and $5.3 billion above the request. Proposed changes to the DOE budget are illustrated in Figure 1, which compares the FY2018 enacted levels to the FY2019 request and FY2019 conference report. Funding Proposed in the Request The President's request would increase overall funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and reduce funding to other programs. The request would reduce funding for the Offices of Environmental Management (EM), Science, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), Nuclear Energy (NE), and Fossil Energy (FE, including the FE Research and Development [R&D] program). It would also split the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) into two accounts—grid reliability (Electricity Delivery, OE) and cybersecurity (Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, CESER)—and reduce total combined funding to these offices. It would eliminate funding for the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP), State Energy Program (SEP), Energy Policy and Systems Analysis, and programs within the Loan Programs Office. Funding Proposed by the Conference Committee The FY2019 conference report would fund NNSA at $15.2 billion (a 4% increase over the FY2018 level of $14.7 billion). In line with the request, the bill would replace the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability account with two accounts: OE and CESER. Most offices would see funding increases with the exception of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Departmental Administration, the Power Marketing Authorities, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), and the Title XVII Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program (Title XVII Loan Program). Figure 1. Department of Energy Budget Comparison billions of current dollars / Sources: FY2018 Enacted, FY2019 Request, and FY2019 Conference from Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference. Notes: ""Other"" refers to programs and funding not within the specified categories. ""Energy"" refers to the Offices of EERE, NE, OE (and the newly proposed OE and CESER), and FE, which includes FE R&D. ARPA-E funding is shown as a black line. Table 1 presents the FY2019 appropriations at each stage and the enacted levels for FY2017 and FY2018. Table 1. Appropriations Summary for Selected DOE Offices and Programs dollars in millions Office/ Program FY2017 Enacted FY2018 Enacted FY2019 Request FY2019 H. Passed FY2019 S. Passed FY2019 Conference NNSA $12,938 $14,669 $15,091 $15,313 $14,780 $15,229 EM 6,420 7,126 6,601 6,869 7,182 7,175 Nuclear Waste Disposal 0 0 90 190 0 0 Science 5,392 6,260 5,391 6,600 6,650 6,585 Energy Programs 4,249 4,774 2,007 4,818 4,719 4,986 EERE 2,090 2,322 696 2,082 2,322 2,379 Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliabilitya 230 248 0 0 0 0 OEa 0 0 61 176 0 156 CESERa 0 0 96 147 260 120 NE 1,017 1,205 757 1,346 1,206 1,326 FE 913 999 397b 1,067 931 1,005 FE R&D 668 727 502 785 727 740 ARPA-E 306 353 0 325 375 366 Credit Programs 12 29 -4,980c 23 24 24 Source: FY2017 Enacted from P.L. 115-141 and Division D, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018, Explanatory Statement. FY2018 Enacted, FY2019 request, FY2019 House Passed, FY2019 Senate Passed, and FY2019 Conference from Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference. Notes: ""Credit Programs"" refers collectively to the Title XVII Loan Program, Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing (ATVM) Loan Program, and the Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program. In FY2019, the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability account is proposed to be divided into two new offices (OE and CESER). The FY2019 request for the SPR accounts for the sale of crude oil (-$300 million) and not the use of sale proceeds. The FY2019 request for Credit Programs reflects emergency rescissions. Key Changes Several issues may be of interest during congressional consideration of DOE appropriations for FY2019. The FY2019 request would reduce funding for energy programs by 58%, with the majority of the proposed reductions in EERE to ""[focus] DOE resources toward early-stage R&D."" The FY2019 request would reduce funding for the Office of Science by 14% (compared to FY2018) and would change funding levels for individual Science programs ""to focus on its core mission of conducting cutting edge, early-stage research."" In contrast, according to the explanatory statement for the FY2019 conference report, the report would direct DOE ""throughout all of its programs to maintain a diverse portfolio of early-, mid-, and late-stage research, development, and market transformation activities."" The FY2019 conference report would increase funding for energy programs by approximately 4% (compared to FY2018 enacted levels), and it would increase funding to the Office of Science by 5% (compared to FY2018 enacted levels). The request would eliminate funding for the WAP, SEP, Title XVII Loan Program, and ATVM Loan Program. The conference report would continue to support operations of these programs. The FY2019 request would provide funding for nuclear waste disposal including to restart licensing activities for the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository. The conference report would not provide funding for Yucca Mountain. The FY2019 request would eliminate ARPA-E. The conference report would fund the program at $366 million, an increase of approximately 4% compared to FY2018 funding levels. For additional information on DOE FY2019 appropriations, see CRS Report R45258, Energy and Water Development: FY2019 Appropriations, by Mark Holt and Corrie E. Clark.",39,39 "The Supreme Court Allows Pre-enforcement Review of Clean Water Act Section 404 Compliance Orders: Sackett v. EPA. On March 21, 2012, the Supreme Court resolved a long-simmering issue of federal environmental enforcement. The issue in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency involved the ""administrative compliance order"" (ACO), frequently used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to enforce statutes it administers. The Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act makes available ""pre-enforcement review"" of ACOs under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which establishes the federal wetlands permitting program. Recipients of Section 404 ACOs no longer have to wait, while penalties accrue, until EPA files an action to enforce the ACO before they can have jurisdictional objections to the order heard by a court. In an ACO, EPA directs the recipient to comply with a statutory, regulatory, or permit requirement and recites the penalties that noncompliance may entail should EPA file an enforcement action in court. ACOs are often described as a quick, flexible enforcement tool that serves as an advance warning allowing the recipient to sit down with EPA to negotiate a reasonable settlement that generally avoids penalties. From the recipient's vantage point, however, there is a distinct downside: for ACOs issued under CWA Section 404, the lower courts had barred pre-enforcement review. Thus, if the recipient disagreed with the facts or legal conclusions on which the ACO was based, the recipient faced a dilemma. The recipient could do nothing, challenging the order only later when EPA brought an enforcement action. If so and the challenge failed, the recipient faced the prospect of large civil penalties—up to $75,000 per day. Or, the recipient could comply with the order at sometimes substantial cost, even though disagreeing with it, then apply for a permit later and challenge any denial thereof. This was the dilemma faced by the petitioners in Sackett. The Sacketts filled in a lot to prepare it for house construction. EPA then claimed they should have first obtained a wetlands fill permit and so issued an ACO ordering them to restore the lot to its pre-fill condition, even if they intended at some point to apply for a permit. EPA denied the Sacketts' request for a hearing as to whether their land was a wetland covered by the CWA. The couple then sued, but the lower courts found that pre-enforcement review of ACOs issued under Section 404 was unavailable. The Supreme Court reversed unanimously, holding as described above. Though the Sackett decision was written narrowly to apply only to ACOs under CWA Section 404, it has wider implications. First and most importantly, it may serve as precedent for establishing the availability of pre-enforcement review under other CWA sections, or outside the CWA entirely. Second, EPA would seem to have at least three enforcement options following Sackett. It may simply prepare fuller administrative records supporting each jurisdictional determination, a course involving a trade-off between ensuring the defensibility of its ACOs and the number of ACOs it can issue. Or it might forego ACOs occasionally and proceed directly to civil enforcement actions seeking money penalties, an option offering less opportunity for landowners to sit down and negotiate with the agency, avoiding penalties in many cases. Or EPA could turn increasingly to sending out nonbinding noncompliance letters. Unlike an ACO, these would have no direct legal consequences and thus likely would be deemed unreviewable. Third, Sackett might lead to a reappraisal of the current allocation of Section 404 enforcement responsibility between EPA and the Corps of Engineers. And finally, it may prompt litigation efforts to reverse current case law under which jurisdictional determinations by the Corps under Section 404 are deemed nonfinal, hence unreviewable in the courts.",44,44 "Forest Service Appropriations: Five-Year Data and Trends and FY2017 Budget Request. The Forest Service (FS) is responsible for managing 193 million acres of the National Forest System, as well as for conducting forestry research and providing assistance to state, local, private, and international forest owners. Funding to complete such work is provided through both discretionary and mandatory appropriations. For FY2016, the FS received $7.065 billion in discretionary and mandatory appropriations. This figure includes funding provided under a $700 million emergency supplemental appropriation for wildfire suppression activities from FY2015. The FY2016 discretionary appropriation was $6.364 billion, more than $1 billion above the five-year average of $5.334 billion. Much of this increase is due to the wildfire supplemental, as well as additional funds provided for FY2016 wildland fire management activities. FS discretionary appropriations are primarily divided among six main accounts: Forest and Rangeland Research (FRR), State and Private Forestry (S&&PF) National Forest System (NFS), Capital Improvement and Maintenance (CI&&M) Wildland Fire Management (WFM), and the FLAME Wildfire Suppression Reserve account established under the Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-88). The agency then allocates the appropriations from these accounts among the nine FS regions, five research stations, two service stations and laboratories, and national headquarters. Discretionary appropriations account for an average of 88% of the agency's total FY2012-FY2016 appropriations. The FS has more than 20 permanent appropriations accounts and 4 trust funds that are mandatory spending. Together, they account, on average, for about 12% of total agency appropriations. Budget authority for these accounts is provided for in authorizing statutes, and for several of the accounts it is dependent on the level of revenue generated by specific activities on the national forests. The FS estimates that FY2016 mandatory spending will be $700.8 million. For FY2017, the Administration is requesting $5.757 billion in discretionary appropriations for the FS. The request continues a proposal from FY2015 to change wildfire suppression funding by providing access to nearly $1 billion outside of the statutory discretionary limits for emergency purposes. Funding for wildfire management activities in general and suppression activities specifically accounts for an increasing percentage of agency appropriations, which may raise questions about the amount of resources necessary to adequately address wildland fire management issues or about the extent to which wildfire management activities direct agency resources—financial and otherwise—away from other FS statutory obligations.",107,107 "Financing Natural Catastrophe Exposure: Issues and Options for Improving Risk Transfer Markets. This report opens with an examination of the current role of private insurers in managing disaster risk and their capacity and willingness to deal with the rising cost of financing recovery and reconstruction following natural disasters. The report then examines the current role of federal, state, and local governments in managing disaster risk.",11,11 "The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice. This report discusses and assesses the War Powers Resolution and its application since enactment in 1973, providing detailed background on various cases in which it was used, as well as cases in which issues of its applicability were raised. It will be revised biannually. In the post-Cold War world, Presidents have continued to commit U.S. Armed Forces into potential hostilities, sometimes without a specific authorization from Congress. Thus the War Powers Resolution and its purposes continue to be a potential subject of controversy. On June 7, 1995, the House defeated, by a vote of 217-201, an amendment to repeal the central features of the War Powers Resolution that have been deemed unconstitutional by every President since the law's enactment in 1973. In 1999, after the President committed U.S. military forces to action in Yugoslavia without congressional authorization, Representative Tom Campbell used expedited procedures under the Resolution to force a debate and votes on U.S. military action in Yugoslavia, and later sought, unsuccessfully, through a federal court suit to enforce presidential compliance with the terms of the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution P.L. 93-148 was passed over the veto of President Nixon on November 7, 1973, to provide procedures for Congress and the President to participate in decisions to send U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities. Section 4(a)(1) requires the President to report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. When such a report is submitted, or is required to be submitted, Section 5(b) requires that the use of forces must be terminated within 60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes such use or extends the time period. Section 3 requires that the ""President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing"" U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. From 1975 through March 2017, Presidents have submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement, and in this case the military action was completed and U.S. armed forces had disengaged from the area of conflict when the report was made. The reports submitted by the President since enactment of the War Powers Resolution cover a range of military activities, from embassy evacuations to full-scale combat military operations, such as the Persian Gulf conflict, and the 2003 war with Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo, and the anti-terrorism actions in Afghanistan. In some instances, U.S. Armed Forces have been used in hostile situations without formal reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution. On one occasion, Congress exercised its authority to determine that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) became operative on August 29, 1983, through passage of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119). In 1991 and 2002, Congress authorized, by law, the use of military force against Iraq. In several instances none of the President, Congress, or the courts has been willing to initiate the procedures of or enforce the directives in the War Powers Resolution.",24,24 "The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA): A Legal Overview. In the wake of the 2016 election, concerns have been raised with respect to the legal regime governing foreign influence in domestic politics. The central law concerning the activities of the agents of foreign entities acting in the United States is the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA or Act). Enacted in 1938 to promote transparency with respect to foreign influence in the political process, FARA generally requires ""agents of foreign principals"" undertaking certain activities on behalf of foreign interests to register with and file regular reports with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). FARA also requires agents of foreign principals to file copies of informational materials that they distribute for a foreign principal and to maintain records of their activities on behalf of their principal. The Act contains several exemptions, including exemptions for news organizations, foreign officials, and agents who register under domestic lobbying disclosure laws. Failure to comply with FARA may subject agents to criminal and civil penalties. Although FARA has not been litigated extensively, courts have recognized a compelling governmental interest in requiring agents of foreign principals to register and disclose foreign influence in the domestic political process, resulting in a number of constitutional challenges being rejected over the decades since FARA's initial enactment. In 2016, the Office of the Inspector General at DOJ issued a report on DOJ's enforcement of FARA, finding that the department lacked a comprehensive strategy for enforcement. Among the criticisms highlighted in that report were the lack of enforcement actions brought by DOJ, as well as issues of vagueness in the terms and breadth of the statute. Some Members of Congress have introduced legislation to amend FARA following the Inspector General's report and other allegations that potential misconduct by foreign agents is not currently policed under the statute. For example, the Disclosing Foreign Influence Act (H.R. 4170, S. 2039) would repeal the FARA exemption that allows foreign agents to file under domestic lobbying regulations in lieu of the Act, would provide DOJ with authority to make civil investigative demands to investigate potential FARA violations, and would require DOJ to develop a comprehensive enforcement strategy for FARA, with review of its effects by the agency's Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office. The bills' sponsors have explained that the bills are intended to address ""ambiguous requirements for those lobbying on behalf of foreign governments,"" which ""has, over the years, led to a sharp drop in the number of registrations and the prospect of widespread abuses."" This report examines the nature and scope of the current regulatory scheme, including the scope of FARA's application to agents of foreign principals, what the statute requires of those covered under the Act, exemptions available under the statute, and methods of enforcement. The report concludes by discussing various legislative proposals to amend FARA in the 115th Congress.",78,76 "Crime Control: The Federal Response. Under the federal system in the United States, the states and localities traditionally have held the major responsibility for prevention and control of crime and maintenance of order. For most of the Republic's history, ""police powers"" in the broad sense were reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. Many still hold that view, but others see a string of court decisions in recent decades as providing the basis for a far more active federal role. Several bills are discussed in this report that address issues related to crime, juvenile justice, and school violence.",93,93 "Peru: Political Situation, Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations. Peru, a coca-producing country in the Andean region of South America, has had a turbulent political history. Despite its tumultuous past, Peru has recently taken steps to consolidate its democracy and pursue market-friendly economic policies. For the past seven years, Peru, a leading mineral exporter, has posted some of the fastest economic growth rates in Latin America. GDP growth reached 8% in 2007. In June 2006, former president Alan García (1985-1990) was elected president in a close race. After taking office, García embraced the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), which the two countries signed on April 12, 2006 and the Peruvian legislature ratified in June 2006. PTPA implementing legislation (H.R. 3688) passed the House on November 8, 2007, by a vote of 285 to 132, the Senate on December 4 by a vote of 77 to 18, and was signed by President Bush on December 14, (P.L. 110-138). In addition to trade matters, congressional interest in Peru focuses on human rights issues and counternarcotics cooperation. See CRS Report RL34108, U.S.-Peru Economic Relations and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement and CRS Report RS22521, Peru Trade Promotion Agreement: Labor Issues. This report will be updated periodically.",85,85 "Appropriations for FY2001: VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies (P.L. 106-377). Appropriations are one part of a complex federal budget process that includes budget resolutions, appropriations (regular, supplemental, and continuing) bills, rescissions, and budget reconciliation bills. This report is a guide to one of the 13 regular appropriations bills that Congress passes each year. It is designed to supplement the information provided by the House and Senate Subcommittees on VA, HUD and Independent Agencies Appropriations.",59,59