# AUDITOR-LOGIC FINAL AUDIT REPORT
## ROWM Polymorphic Notebook — Logic Engine Security & Correctness Review

**Date:** 2026-07-27  
**Scope:** `/c/Users/jessi/Desktop/rowm-polymorphic-notebook/logic/` directory  
**Files Audited:** 10 Prolog modules (5 fact, 5 rule), test suite  
**Total Lines:** ~900 lines of logic code  

---

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Verdict: **NOT RELEASE READY**

The Prolog/Datalog authorization and release-readiness logic contains **2 CRITICAL security/correctness bugs** and **7 HIGH/MEDIUM issues** that create exploitable authorization bypasses and release-gate vulnerabilities.

### Counts by Severity
- **CRITICAL:** 2 findings (authorization bypass, expired capability enforcement)
- **HIGH:** 3 findings (tier_2 bypass, hardcoded proofs, unverified metadata)
- **MEDIUM:** 4 findings (recursion, caching, unreachable code, semantics)
- **LOW:** 1 finding (code quality)

### Key Risks
1. **Authorization gate is bypassable** — dispatch_permitted/5 can be circumvented by direct predicate queries
2. **Expired capabilities remain active** — get_time/1 hardcoded, boundary condition wrong
3. **Tier_2 agents can execute** — capability_satisfies/4 has no trust check
4. **Release gate incomplete** — proof list hardcoded, won't detect new obligations
5. **Notebook metadata unverified** — cell status not cryptographically linked to ledger

---

## CRITICAL FINDINGS (2)

### CRITICAL-1: Authorization Gate Bypassable via Direct Predicate Queries

**File:** `logic/rules/authorization.pl` (lines 44-51)

**The Issue:**
External code can bypass dispatch_permitted/5 by querying authorization predicates directly:

```prolog
?- capability_active('capa_001_loc_rust_exec', Result).  % Bypasses all checks
?- agent_authorized(loc, 'capa_001_loc_rust_exec', rust).  % Partial checks only
```

Dispatch_permitted enforces these checks:
- Agent trust level (tier_2 agents should be blocked)
- Runtime active status
- Permission scope

**Attack:** Query capability_active directly to bypass agent_authorized tier_2 check.

**Impact:** Any agent can execute by circumventing dispatch_permitted/5.

---

### CRITICAL-2: Expired Capabilities Remain Active (Timestamp Bug)

**File:** `logic/rules/authorization.pl` (lines 17-22, 55)

**The Issue:**

```prolog
get_time(1719432000).  % HARDCODED — not dynamic

capability_active(CapID, true) :-
    capability_issued(CapID, _, _, _, _, IssuedAt, ExpiresAt),
    \+ capability_revoked(CapID, _),
    get_time(Now),
    Timestamp is floor(Now),
    Timestamp =< ExpiresAt.  % Inclusive (WRONG)
```

Example from capabilities.pl:
```prolog
capability_issued('capa_006_phantom_rust_log', ..., 1719432000, 1719432000).
% IssuedAt = 1719432000, ExpiresAt = 1719432000 (same time)

capability_valid('capa_006_phantom_rust_log', false).  % Declared expired
```

**The Bug:**
- Comparison: 1719432000 =< 1719432000 → TRUE
- Capability flagged active despite ExpiresAt being NOW
- Contradictory facts: capability_active returns true, capability_valid asserts false

**Root Causes:**
1. get_time/1 hardcoded, not dynamic
2. Boundary uses =< instead of <
3. Contradictory facts create logic inconsistency

**Impact:** Expired capabilities cannot be enforced. System allows active use of expired credentials.

---

## HIGH SEVERITY FINDINGS (3)

### HIGH-1: Tier_2 Agents Can Execute via capability_satisfies Query

**File:** `logic/rules/authorization.pl` (lines 35-42)

**Issue:** capability_satisfies/4 has no agent trust level check. Tier_2 agents are blocked only in agent_authorized/3.

```prolog
% Tier_2 check in agent_authorized:
agent_authorized(AgentID, CapID, TargetRuntime) :-
    ...
    TrustLevel \= tier_2,  % ← ONLY HERE
    ...

% But capability_satisfies has NO agent check:
capability_satisfies(CapID, Permission, TargetRuntime, true) :-
    capability_issued(CapID, _, _, TargetRuntime, Permissions, _, _),
    member(Permission, Permissions),
    capability_active(CapID, true).  % No trust check
```

**Attack:**
```prolog
?- capability_satisfies('capa_006_phantom_rust_log', log, rust, Result).
% Returns true — phantom is tier_2 but no check performed
```

**Impact:** Observer agents can gain execution permissions.

---

### HIGH-2: release_ready Gate Has Hardcoded Proof List

**File:** `logic/rules/release.pl` (lines 45-49)

**Issue:** Proof verification is hardcoded to 4 specific proof IDs. No dynamic discovery of new proofs.

```prolog
all_proofs_satisfied(true) :-
    proof_satisfied('proof_borrow_step_sound', true),
    proof_satisfied('proof_cons_cell_model', true),
    proof_satisfied('proof_dispatch_safe', true),
    proof_satisfied('proof_receipt_chain_integrity', true).
```

If developer adds new proof obligation, release_ready won't check it.

**Scenario:**
```prolog
% New proof added:
proof_obligation('proof_new_invariant', 'Some theorem', 'lean4').

% But all_proofs_satisfied still checks only 4 proofs
?- release_ready(Result).
% Result = true  ← NEW PROOF NOT CHECKED
```

**Impact:** Release gate can be bypassed by new proof obligations.

---

### HIGH-3: Notebook Metadata Overrides Logic Without Ledger Verification

**File:** `logic/rules/release.pl` (lines 73-80)

**Issue:** Cell completion status checked against notebook_cells.pl facts (parsed from JSON) without cryptographic verification against receipt chain.

```prolog
all_cells_complete(true) :-
    \+ (cell_exists(CellID, _Type, _Kernel, _Visibility, _SourceHash, _OutputHash),
        \+ (cell_sealed(CellID, true) ; cell_metadata(CellID, _Class, _DepCount, passed))).
```

**Attack:**
```prolog
% Original:
cell_metadata('rust-bridge-test', test, 1, failed).

% Attacker modifies to:
cell_metadata('rust-bridge-test', test, 1, passed).

% Logic engine has no way to know:
?- release_ready(Result).
% Result = true  ← BYPASSES ACTUAL EXECUTION
```

**Root Cause:** Notebook metadata facts are not linked to immutable receipts.

**Impact:** Attacker can mark failing cells as passed, bypassing proof requirements.

---

## MEDIUM SEVERITY FINDINGS (4)

### MEDIUM-1: state_reachable Recursion Has No Cycle Detection

**File:** `logic/rules/transitions.pl` (lines 45-54)

**Issue:** Recursive rule lacks tabling, cycle detection, or depth limits.

```prolog
state_reachable(Stage, FromState, true) :-
    Stage \= receive,
    stage_prerequisite(Stage, PrevStage),
    state_reachable(PrevStage, FromState, true).  % RECURSION

state_reachable(_, _, false).
```

Current fact set is acyclic, but logic has no guards.

**Scenario:**
```prolog
% Buggy fact:
stage_prerequisite(dispatch, receive).  % Creates cycle

% Infinite loop:
?- state_reachable(dispatch, initial, Result).
% Hangs indefinitely
```

**Impact:** Logic engine can hang on state queries.

---

### MEDIUM-2: Revocation May Not Propagate (Caching)

**File:** `logic/rules/authorization.pl` (line 19)

**Issue:** Uses negation-as-failure which may be cached by Prolog. External code may cache capability_active results.

```prolog
capability_active(CapID, true) :-
    capability_issued(CapID, _, _, _, _, IssuedAt, ExpiresAt),
    \+ capability_revoked(CapID, _),  % Negation-as-failure
    ...
```

**Scenario:**
```prolog
% Cached at T1:
capability_active('cap_X', Result).  % Result = true

% Revocation at T2:
assert(capability_revoked('cap_X', 'reason')).

% Cached result still used at T3:
% Result = true  ← Revocation not reflected
```

**Impact:** Revoked capabilities can remain active in cached state.

---

### MEDIUM-3: receipt_sequence_valid Has Unreachable Dead Code

**File:** `logic/rules/provenance.pl` (lines 33-42)

**Issue:** First clause calls undefined predicate previous_receipt_id/1 (should be previous_receipt/2).

```prolog
receipt_sequence_valid(ReceiptID) :-
    ...
    (previous_receipt(ReceiptID, _) -> 
     receipt_sequence_valid(previous_receipt_id(ReceiptID)) ; true).
    % ↑ undefined predicate — always fails

% Falls back to simplified version:
receipt_sequence_valid(ReceiptID) :-
    receipt_issued(ReceiptID, _SeqNum, Agent, CapID, ...),
    agent_active(Agent, true),
    capability_valid(CapID, true).
```

**Impact:** Sequence validation logic is incomplete. Monotonic sequence number verification is skipped.

---

### MEDIUM-4: no_revoked_capabilities Semantics Undocumented

**File:** `logic/rules/release.pl` (lines 66-71)

**Issue:** Double negation-as-failure semantics are unclear and potentially misunderstood.

```prolog
no_revoked_capabilities(true) :-
    \+ (agent_active(Agent, true),
        capability_issued(_CapID, _Issuer, Agent, _Runtime, _Perms, _Issued, _Expires),
        capability_revoked(_CapID, _)).
```

**Semantic Gap:**
- **Checks:** "There does NOT exist an active agent with a revoked capability"
- **Name suggests:** "All capabilities are not revoked"
- These are different: inactive agents' revocations are ignored

**Impact:** Confusing semantics may lead to misuse.

---

## LOW SEVERITY FINDINGS (1)

### LOW-1: dispatch_permitted Overly Permissive Catch-All

**File:** `logic/rules/authorization.pl` (line 51)

**Issue:** Catch-all clause with all unbound variables creates infinite choice points.

```prolog
dispatch_permitted(_, _, _, _, false).  % All variables unbound
```

On backtracking with unbound variables, generates infinite choice points. Minor performance issue, not a correctness bug.

---

## RELEASE-READINESS BLOCKERS

### Blockers (Must Fix Before Release)

**CRITICAL Fixes:**
1. Enforce dispatch_permitted/5 as sole authorization entry point
2. Fix get_time/1 to be dynamic and use exclusive boundary (<)
3. Fix capability_active contradiction with capability_valid

**HIGH Priority Fixes:**
4. Replace hardcoded proof list with dynamic discovery (findall)
5. Add cryptographic verification of notebook metadata against receipts
6. Add tier_2 check to capability_satisfies

**MEDIUM Priority Fixes:**
7. Add cycle detection to state_reachable (tabling or explicit detection)
8. Fix dead code in receipt_sequence_valid
9. Document closed-world assumptions for negation-as-failure
10. Implement revocation propagation or cache invalidation

---

## SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE ISSUES

### Issue 1: No Forced Authorization Routing
Individual authorization predicates are exported as library functions with no enforcement that callers use dispatch_permitted/5.

**Fix:** Seal authorization as a module, export only dispatch_permitted and release_ready.

### Issue 2: Notebook Metadata Not Cryptographically Linked
Cell completion status (notebook_cells.pl) is separate from receipt chain (receipts.pl).

**Fix:** Add predicate to verify cell_metadata against receipt chain hashes.

### Issue 3: Hardcoded Lists Instead of Dynamic Discovery
Proof list, agent list, runtime list should be dynamically discovered.

**Fix:** Use findall to query all proof_obligation facts instead of hardcoding.

---

## TEST GAPS

**Missing Tests:**
- Direct capability_active query bypassing dispatch_permitted
- Tier_2 agent execution via capability_satisfies
- Revocation propagation
- Dynamic proof discovery
- Cycle detection in state transitions

**Current Test Issues:**
- test_queries.pl expects capability_active('capa_006_phantom_rust_log', false)
- But logic returns true due to timestamp bug
- **Test would pass incorrectly** without fixing the bug

---

## AUDIT SUMMARY

**Audit Tool:** AUDITOR-LOGIC  
**Date:** 2026-07-27  
**Modules Audited:** 10 (5 fact, 5 rule)  
**Lines Audited:** ~900  
**Issues Found:** 9 (2 CRITICAL, 3 HIGH, 4 MEDIUM, 1 LOW)  
**Release Verdict:** NOT READY

**Files Audited:**
- logic/facts/agents.pl
- logic/facts/capabilities.pl
- logic/facts/notebook_cells.pl
- logic/facts/receipts.pl
- logic/facts/runtimes.pl
- logic/rules/authorization.pl
- logic/rules/proofs.pl
- logic/rules/provenance.pl
- logic/rules/release.pl
- logic/rules/transitions.pl
- logic/queries/test_queries.pl