# Security Guide — Sentinel-AI This project is a hackathon/demo system that performs face recognition and biometric attribute search. Treat it as **sensitive infrastructure**, not a normal web app. The default configuration is intentionally convenient for a local demo. It is **not** safe to expose to a network as-is. --- ## 1. Deployment profiles | Profile | Auth | Rate limit | TLS | Suitable for | |---------|------|------------|-----|--------------| | Local demo (default) | Off (`SENTINEL_API_KEY` empty) | On, loopback only | No | Your own machine | | Shared / internal | Bearer token | On | Reverse proxy | Trusted team network | | Public | Bearer token + SSO/WAF | On (proxy + app) | Required | Not recommended | The local demo binds to `127.0.0.1` unless you deliberately use `--host 0.0.0.0`. If you bind to all interfaces, set `SENTINEL_API_KEY` first. --- ## 2. Secrets ### Where keys live - `E:\AI Infra\.env` and `E:\AI Infra\backend\.env` (gitignored; backend wins). - Provider console keys: `GEMINI_API_KEY` / `GOOGLE_API_KEY`, `GROQ_API_KEY`, `COHERE_API_KEY`. - The dashboard never receives provider keys. `VITE_API_KEY` is only an application access token and is visible in the browser bundle; never put a provider key there. ### Rotation The audit found plaintext keys in `.env` files. Because those files may have been copied or archived, **rotate all three keys** before sharing the folder: 1. **Gemini** — → revoke the old key, create a new one. 2. **Groq** — → delete, create a new key. 3. **Cohere** — → revoke, create a new key. Then update **both** `.env` files (or remove the duplicate and keep one), restart the backend, and verify `/health` plus one live alert. ```powershell # Check nothing secret is staged for sharing python scripts/check_secrets.py ``` Do not paste keys into chat, issues, screenshots, logs, or commits. If a key leaks, rotate it; deleting the file is not enough because the value may already be in history or a backup. --- ## 3. API access control Enable the built-in Bearer-token check: ```dotenv SENTINEL_API_KEY=change-me-to-a-long-random-demo-key RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE=60 RATE_LIMIT_BURST=20 ``` Every `/api/v1/*` request must then send either: ```http Authorization: Bearer ``` or: ```http X-API-Key: ``` `/health`, `/docs`, `/redoc`, and `/openapi.json` stay open for probes and documentation. `OPTIONS` preflight requests bypass auth so CORS works. Generate a key with: ```powershell # PowerShell -join ((48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Random -Count 48 | ForEach-Object { [char]$_ }) ``` The rate limiter is an in-process token bucket keyed by API key (authenticated) or client IP (anonymous). It is per-worker: if you run multiple uvicorn workers, enforce a shared limit at the reverse proxy as well. --- ## 4. TLS and reverse proxy Terminate TLS in front of uvicorn. A sample nginx configuration is in [`deploy/nginx.conf.example`](deploy/nginx.conf.example). Minimum requirements: - HTTPS only, HSTS enabled. - `client_max_body_size` slightly above `MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES` (default 10 MiB). - Forward `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Forwarded-Proto`. - Set `TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=1` only when the proxy is trusted and overwrites those headers. - Do not expose port 8000 directly when a proxy is in use. ```powershell # Backend behind nginx cd backend python -m uvicorn main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000 ``` --- ## 5. CORS `CORS_ORIGINS` is a comma-separated allow-list. The default includes the local Vite dev server on ports 8080/5173 and the preview server on 4173. Add your real frontend origin for a deployment. Avoid `CORS_ORIGINS=*`; it is incompatible with credentialed deployments and makes every site able to call the API. Allowed headers include `Content-Type`, `Authorization`, and `X-API-Key`. --- ## 6. Input handling - `/analyze-frame` rejects empty uploads (422), oversized uploads (413), and undecodable images (422). The size cap is `MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES`. - Uploaded bytes are decoded in memory and are not written to disk. - `/images/{id}` accepts only zero-padded six-digit `.jpg` names inside `CELEBA_IMAGES_DIR`; traversal attempts are rejected before filesystem access. - `/generate-person` returns sanitised errors and preserves meaningful HTTP status codes. It does not echo provider internals. - Error responses never include stack traces or absolute paths. Keep `MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES` aligned with the proxy limit, and keep the image directory outside any path served by the proxy. --- ## 7. Dependency isolation The project pins a tested environment in `requirements.lock` and targets Python 3.11. Use a virtual environment; do not install into a global interpreter that contains unrelated packages. ```powershell .\scripts\bootstrap.ps1 # CUDA 12.6 (verified environment) .\scripts\bootstrap.ps1 -Cpu # CPU-only ``` The bootstrap script creates `.venv`, installs the lock/requirements, runs the secret check, and warns about missing AdaFace assets. It never overwrites an existing `.env`. --- ## 8. Logging and incident response - The API logs provider failures (exception text) but not prompts containing biometric attributes at INFO level. - Access logs contain client IPs. Treat them as personal data; shorten retention. - If a key is exposed: revoke it at the provider, issue a replacement, restart the backend, and search logs/archives for the old value. - If a biometric image or report is exposed: follow the incident process in [PRIVACY.md](PRIVACY.md). --- ## 9. Pre-sharing checklist - [ ] Gemini, Groq, and Cohere keys rotated. - [ ] `.env` files contain the new keys and are gitignored. - [ ] `python scripts/check_secrets.py` exits 0. - [ ] `SENTINEL_API_KEY` set if the API is reachable by anyone else. - [ ] `CORS_ORIGINS` limited to the real frontend origin. - [ ] TLS/reverse proxy configured; port 8000 not public. - [ ] `Data/`, `backend/index_artifacts/`, and `backend/models_cache/` excluded from the shared archive. - [ ] Privacy notice and lawful basis reviewed for your jurisdiction.