Recorded Future’s Insikt Group has identified a large cluster of new operational infrastructure associated with use of the custom Windows and Linux backdoor KEYPLUG. We attribute this activity to a threat activity group tracked as RedGolf, which is highly likely to be a Chinese state-sponsored group. RedGolf closely overlaps with threat activity reported in open sources under the aliases APT41/BARIUM and has likely carried out state-sponsored espionage activity in parallel with financially motivated operations for personal gain from at least 2014 onward.


RedJuliett is a likely Chinese state-sponsored threat actor targeting government, academic, technology, and diplomatic organizations in Taiwan. They exploit vulnerabilities in network edge devices for initial access and use SQL injection and directory traversal exploits against web and SQL applications. The group operates from Fuzhou, China, and aims to support Beijing's intelligence collection on Taiwan's economic and diplomatic relations. RedJuliett has also expanded its operations to compromise organizations in other countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the United States.


RedKitten is a campaign targeting Iranian interests, particularly NGOs and individuals documenting human rights abuses, first observed in January 2026. The malware utilizes GitHub and Google Drive for configuration and payload retrieval, while employing Telegram for command and control. Although precise attribution is challenging, the activity exhibits TTPs associated with Iranian state-sponsored actors and linguistic indicators suggest a Farsi-speaking threat actor. RedKitten is characterized as an AI-accelerated campaign exploiting the humanitarian crisis surrounding Iran’s Dey 1404 protests.


In October 2022, Kaspersky identified an active infection of government, agriculture and transportation organizations located in the Donetsk, Lugansk, and Crimea regions. Although the initial vector of compromise is unclear, the details of the next stage imply the use of spear phishing or similar methods. The victims navigated to a URL pointing to a ZIP archive hosted on a malicious web server.


Throughout 2019, multiple companies in the Taiwan high-tech ecosystem were victims of an advanced persistent threat (APT) attack. Due to these APT attacks having similar behavior profiles (similar adversarial techniques, tactics, and procedures or TTP) with each other and previously documented cyberattacks, CyCraft assess with high confidence these new attacks were conducted by the same foreign threat actor. During their investigation, they dubbed this threat actor Chimera. “Chimera” stands for the synthesis of hacker tools that they’ve seen the group use, such as the skeleton key malware that contained code extracted from both Dumpert and Mimikatz — hence Chimera. Their operation — the entirety of the new attacks utilizing the Skeleton Key attack (described below) from late 2018 to late 2019, CyCraft have dubbed Operation Skeleton Key.


In 2021, PwC started tracking a series of intrusions under the moniker of Red Dev 17 that they assess were highly likely conducted by a China-based threat actor. Their analysis suggests Red Dev 17 has been active since at least 2017. Red Dev 17's observed targets are mainly in India, and include the Indian military, a multinational India-based technology company, and a state energy company. They assess that it is highly probable that the threat actor behind intrusions associated with Red Dev 17 is also responsible for the campaign known in open source as Operation NightScout. Red Dev 17 is a user of the 8.t document weaponisation framework (also known as RoyalRoad), and abuses benign utilities such as Logitech or Windows Defender binaries to sideload and execute Chinoxy or PoisonIvy variants on victim systems. They identified capability and infrastructure links between Red Dev 17 and the threat actor they call Red Hariasa (aka FunnyDream APT), as well as infrastructure overlaps with Red Wendigo (aka Icefog, RedFoxtrot), and with ShadowPad C2 servers. At this time, they do not have sufficient evidence to directly link Red Dev 17 to any of these threat actors. However, They assess with realistic probability that Red Dev 17 operates within a cluster of threat actors that share tools and infrastructure, as well as a strong targeting focus on Southeast Asia and Central Asia.


Since 2021, Red Menshen, a China based threat actor, which has been observed targeting telecommunications providers across the Middle East and Asia, as well as entities in the government, education, and logistics sectors using a custom backdoor referred as BPFDoor. This threat actor uses a variety of tools in its post-exploitation phase. This includes custom variants of the shared tool Mangzamel (including Golang variants), custom variants of Gh0st, and open source tools like Mimikatz and Metasploit to aid in its lateral movement across Windows systems. Also, They have been seen sending commands to BPFDoor victims via Virtual Privat Servers (VPSs) hosted at a well-known provider, and that these VPSs, in turn, are administered via compromised routers based in Taiwan, which the threat actor uses as VPN tunnels. Most Red Menshen activity that has been observed took place between Monday to Friday (with none observed on the weekends), with most communication taking place between 01:00 and 10:00 UTC.131 This pattern suggests a consistent 8 to 9-hour activity window for the threat actor, with realistic probability of it aligning to local working hours.


Red Nue, active since at least 2017, is known for its use of the multi-platform LootRAt backdoor, also known as ReverseWindow. LootRAT has variants for Windows and Macintosh (reported in open source as Demsty), as well as an Android variant known as SpyDealer. Red Nue has also used another Windows backdoor known as WinDealer since at least 2019, when it deployed it to targets as part of a watering hole campaign on a Chinese news website for the Chinese diaspora community. Parts of Asia feature heavily in Red Nue's victimology.


A group monitored as REF2924 by Elastic Security Labs is wielding novel data-stealing malware — an HTTP listener written in C# dubbed Naplistener by the researchers — in attacks against victims operating in southern and southeast Asia.According to a blog post by Elastic senior security research engineer Remco Sprooten, in that region of the world, network-based detection and prevention technologies are the de facto method for securing many environments.


Elastic's security team has published a report on REF5961, a cyber-espionage group they found on the network of a Foreign Affairs Ministry from a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Elastic says it found the group's tools next to the malware of another cyber-espionage group it tracks as REF2924. REF5961's arsenal includes malware such as EAGERBEE, RUDEBIRD, and DOWNTOWN.


REF7707 is a cyber campaign targeting government entities, particularly a foreign ministry in South America, utilizing malware families such as FinalDraft, GuidLoader, and PathLoader for persistence and lateral movement. The threat actor employs the Microsoft Graph API for C2 communication, blending malicious traffic with legitimate activity to evade detection. Despite their technical sophistication, REF7707 operators exhibited poor operational security, leading to the exposure of their infrastructure and malware. Their tactics enable the extraction of sensitive data, including passwords and Active Directory information, facilitating ongoing espionage activities.


Since the beginning of 2023, ResumeLooters have been able to compromise at least 65 websites. The group employs a variety of simple techniques, including SQL injection and XSS. The threat actor attempted to insert XSS scripts into all available forms, aiming to execute it on the administrators’ device to obtain admin credentials. While the group was able to execute the XSS script on some visitors’ devices with administrative access, allowing ResumeLooters to steal the HTML code of the pages the victims were visiting, Group-IB did not find any confirmation of admin credential thefts.


Returned Libra, also known as 8220 Mining Group, is a cloud threat actor group that has been active since at least 2017. Tools commonly employed during their operations are PwnRig or DBUsed which are customized variants of the XMRig Monero mining software. The Returned Libra mining group is believed to have originated from a GitHub fork of the Rocke group's software. Returned Libra has elevated its mining operations with the use of cloud service platform credential scrapping.


RevengeHotels is a targeted cybercrime campaign that has been active since 2015, primarily targeting hotels, hostels, and tourism companies. The threat actor uses remote access Trojan malware to infiltrate hotel front desks and steal credit card data from guests and travelers. The campaign has impacted hotels in multiple countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. The threat actor employs social engineering techniques and sells credentials from infected systems to other cybercriminals for remote access.


RGB-TEAM is a previously unknown Russian-speaking threat actor. They describe themselves as “a community of anonymous hacktivists fighting for freedom.” The group stated that it doesn’t have enemies in the U.S., Europe, “in the East, or in the West.”


According to Crowdstrike, RIDDLE SPIDER is the operator behind the avaddon ransomware


RipperSec is a pro-Palestinian, likely Malaysian hacktivist group created in June 2023, known for conducting DDoS attacks, data breaches, and defacements primarily targeting government and educational websites, as well as organizations perceived to support Israel. The group has claimed 196 DDoS attacks, with a significant portion directed at Israel, and utilizes a tool called MegaMedusa for their operations. RipperSec operates on Telegram, where it has amassed over 2,000 members, and collaborates with various like-minded hacktivist groups. Their attack strategy relies heavily on community involvement rather than sophisticated infrastructure.


According to new research by Kaspersky's GReAT team, the online criminal activities of the Roaming Mantis Group have continued to evolve since they were first discovered in April 2018. As part of their activities, this group hacks into exploitable routers and changes their DNS configuration. This allows the attackers to redirect the router user's traffic to malicious Android apps disguised as Facebook and Chrome or to Apple phishing pages that were used to steal Apple ID credentials.
Recently, Kaspersky has discovered that this group is testing a new monetization scheme by redirecting iOS users to pages that contain the Coinhive in-browser mining script rather than the normal Apple phishing page. When users are redirected to these pages, they will be shown a blank page in the browser, but their CPU utilization will jump to 90% or higher.


This threat actor initially came to our attention in April 2018, leveraging both Western and Chinese Git repositories to deliver malware to honeypot systems vulnerable to an Apache Struts vulnerability.
In late July, we became aware that the same actor was engaged in another similar campaign. Through our investigation into this new campaign, we were able to uncover more details about the actor.


Targets Saudi Arabia, Israel, US, Iran, high ranking defense officials, embassies of various target countries, notable Iran researchers, human rights activists, media and journalists, academic institutions and various scholars, including scientists in the fields of physics and nuclear sciences.


ROMCOM is an evolving and sophisticated threat actor group that has been using the malware tool ROMCOM for espionage and financially motivated attacks. They have targeted organizations in Ukraine and NATO countries, including military personnel, government agencies, and political leaders. The ROMCOM backdoor is capable of stealing sensitive information and deploying other malware, showcasing the group's adaptability and growing sophistication.


There are several groups actively and profitably targeting businesses in Russia. A trend that we have seen unfold before our eyes lately is these cybercriminals’ use of simple backdoors to gain a foothold in their targets’ networks. Once they have this access, a lot of the work is done manually, slowly getting to understand the network layout and deploying custom tools the criminals can use to steal funds from these entities. Some of the groups that best exemplify these trends are Buhtrap, Cobalt and Corkow.
The group discussed in this white paper is part of this new trend. We call this new group RTM; it uses custom malware, written in Delphi, that we cover in detail in later sections. The first trace of this tool in our telemetry data dates back to late 2015. The group also makes use of several different modules that they deploy where appropriate to their targets. They are interested in users of remote banking systems (RBS), mainly in Russia and neighboring countries.


RUBYCARP is a financially-motivated threat actor group likely based in Romania, with a history of at least 10 years of activity. They operate a botnet using public exploits and brute force attacks, communicating via public and private IRC networks. RUBYCARP targets vulnerabilities in frameworks like Laravel and WordPress, as well as conducting phishing operations to steal financial assets. They use a variety of tools, including the Perl Shellbot, for post-exploitation activities and have a diverse set of illicit income streams.


Ruby Sleet is a threat actor linked to North Korea's Ministry of State Security. Cerium has been involved in spear-phishing campaigns, compromising devices, and conducting cyberattacks alongside other North Korean threat actors. They have also targeted companies involved in COVID-19 research and vaccine development.


RuskiNet is a pro-Russian hacktivist collective associated with disruptive operations including DDoS attacks, website defacements, phishing, and data leaks against government, infrastructure, financial, and civil targets.


Ruthless Rabbit has been running investment scam campaigns since November 2022, primarily targeting users in Russia, Poland, Romania, and Kazakhstan. The actor utilizes RDGA patterns to create over 2,600 domains, hosted on multiple dedicated IPs, and employs a cloaking service for validation checks on user leads. Their campaigns have included themes such as Baltic Pipe financial scams and spoofing well-known platforms like WhatsApp and Google Finance. The most prevalent campaign theme involves a spoofed news article from "Channel One" promoting the "GazInvest" platform with promises of high returns.


Saad Tycoon is the operator and alleged developer of the Tycoon 2FA PhaaS, a phishing service that targets users for financial gain. The actor utilizes Bitcoin transactions to generate significant profits from the fraudulent service. The phishing infrastructure includes domain registration, server hosting, and possibly Cloudflare protection.


A group targeting UA state organizations using the GraphSteel and GrimPlant malware.


Beginning in January 2018 and persisting through the first half of the year, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed SALTY SPIDER, developer and operator of the long-running Sality botnet, distribute malware designed to target cryptocurrency users.


SAMBASPIDER is a threat actor associated to the Mispadu malware. On July 24, USDoD allegedly scraped and leaked a 100,000-line Indicator of Compromise list from CrowdStrike, revealing detailed threat intelligence data. The leak, posted on Breach Forums, includes critical insights into the Mispadu malware and SAMBASPIDER threat actor.


SandCat, on the other hand, is a group that was discovered more recently by Kaspersky. One of the Windows vulnerabilities patched by Microsoft in December had been exploited by both FruityArmor and SandCat in attacks targeting the Middle East and Africa.  SandCat has been using FinFisher/FinSpy spyware and CHAINSHOT, a piece of malware analyzed earlier this year by Palo Alto Networks. The group has also used the CVE-2018-8589 and CVE-2018-8611 Windows vulnerabilities in its attacks, both of which had a zero-day status when Microsoft released fixes.


First disclosed in 2023, the Sandman APT is likely associated with suspected China-based threat clusters known for using the KEYPLUG backdoor, specifically STORM-0866/Red Dev 40. Sandman is tracked as a distinct cluster, pending additional conclusive information. A notable characteristic is its use of the LuaDream backdoor. LuaDream is based on the Lua platform, a relatively rare occurrence in the cyberespionage domain, historically associated with APTs considered Western or Western-aligned.


This threat actor targets industrial control systems, using a tool called Black Energy, associated with electricity and power generation for espionage, denial of service, and data destruction purposes. Some believe that the threat actor is linked to the 2015 compromise of the Ukrainian electrical grid and a distributed denial of service prior to the Russian invasion of Georgia. Believed to be responsible for the 2008 DDoS attacks in Georgia and the 2015 Ukraine power grid outage


A Turkish hacking group, Sath-ı Müdafaa, is encouraging individuals to join its DDoS-for-Points platform that features points and prizes for carrying out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against a list of predetermined targets. Their DDoS tool also contains a backdoor to hack the hackers. So the overarching motivation and allegiance of the group is not entirely clear.


ScamClub is a threat actor involved in malvertising activities since 2018. They target the Mobile Web market segment, particularly on iOS devices, where security software is often lacking. ScamClub utilizes obfuscation techniques and real-time bidding integration with ad exchanges to push malicious JavaScript payloads, leading to forced redirects and various scams such as phishing and gift card scams.


Scarab APT was first spotted in 2015, but is believed to have been active since at least 2012, conducting surgical attacks against a small number of individuals across the world, including Russia and the United States. The backdoor deployed by Scarab in their campaigns is most commonly known as Scieron.


SCARLETEEL is a threat actor that primarily targets cloud environments, specifically AWS and Kubernetes. They have been observed stealing proprietary data and intellectual property, as well as conducting cryptomining operations. SCARLETEEL employs sophisticated tactics and tools to bypass security measures and gain unauthorized access to accounts, often exploiting vulnerabilities in containerized workloads and misconfigurations in AWS policies.


Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group’s motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, APT 2, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.
The attacks began over four years ago and their targeting pattern suggests that this adversary’s primary mission is to gather information about minority rights activists. We do not have evidence directly linking these attacks to a government source, but the information derived from these activities supports an assessment that a group or groups with motivations similar to the stated position of the Chinese government in relation to these targets is involved.
The attacks we attribute to Scarlet Mimic have primarily targeted Uyghur and Tibetan activists as well as those who are interested in their causes. Both the Tibetan community and the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim minority residing primarily in northwest China, have been targets of multiple sophisticated attacks in the past decade. Both also have history of strained relationships with the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), though we do not have evidence that links Scarlet Mimic attacks to the PRC.
Scarlet Mimic attacks have also been identified against government organizations in Russia and India, who are responsible for tracking activist and terrorist activities. While we do not know the precise target of each of the Scarlet Mimic attacks, many of them align to the patterns described above.


Scarred Manticore has been pursuing high-value targets for years, utilizing a variety of IIS-based backdoors to attack Windows servers. These include a variety of custom web shells, custom DLL backdoors, and driver-based implants.


When the first member of Scattered Canary, who, for the purposes of this report, we call
Alpha, began his operations, he was a lone wolf—working mostly Craigslist scams as he learned
the tricks of the trade from a mentor. However, within a few years, he had honed his craft
enough to expand into romance scams, where he met his first “employee,” Beta. Once they
had secured enough mules via their romance scams to launder their stolen money, they shifted
from targeting individuals to targeting enterprises, and the group’s BEC operation was born.


Scattered Spider, a highly active hacking group, has made headlines by targeting more than 130 organizations, with the number of victims steadily increasing.


ScreamedJungle is a threat actor that exploits vulnerabilities in outdated Magento e-commerce platforms to inject malicious JavaScript code, specifically Bablosoft JS, into compromised websites. This actor has harvested millions of browser fingerprints by leveraging vulnerabilities such as CVE-2024-34102 and CVE-2024-20720. ScreamedJungle utilizes PerfectCanvas technology to ensure pixel-perfect replication of legitimate user fingerprints. Group-IB analysts estimate that over 115 e-commerce sites have been impacted by this fingerprint theft campaign.


Scripted Sparrow is a prolific Business Email Compromise (BEC) collective that conducts highly targeted phishing campaigns, impersonating professional services firms to deceive finance teams into transferring funds. The group employs a disciplined approach, utilizing consistent language and familiar tones in their communications, while sending between 10,000 and 50,000 emails daily in small batches. They have developed a sophisticated understanding of corporate communication, crafting messages that mimic internal formats and urgency without raising suspicion. Scripted Sparrow relies on a network of US-based mule accounts, with 249 unique bank accounts identified across 42 financial institutions for cash-out operations.


Mentioned as operator of DanaBot in CrowdStrike's 2020 Report.


This blog post discusses the technical details of a state-sponsored attack manipulating DNS systems. While this incident is limited to targeting primarily national security organizations in the Middle East and North Africa, and we do not want to overstate the consequences of this specific campaign, we are concerned that the success of this operation will lead to actors more broadly attacking the global DNS system. DNS is a foundational technology supporting the Internet. Manipulating that system has the potential to undermine the trust users have on the internet. That trust and the stability of the DNS system as a whole drives the global economy. Responsible nations should avoid targeting this system, work together to establish an accepted global norm that this system and the organizations that control it are off-limits, and cooperate in pursuing those actors who act irresponsibly by targeting this system.


SEXi is a ransomware group that targets VMware ESXi servers, encrypting data and demanding ransom payments. They have been observed encrypting virtual machines and backups, causing significant disruptions to services. The group's name is a play on the word "ESXi," indicating a deliberate focus on these systems. SEXi has been linked to other ransomware variants based on the Babuk source code.


SHADOW-AETHER-015 is a highly adaptable cybercriminal group known for identity abuse and cloud compromise, primarily targeting identity and access management systems like Okta and Azure AD/Entra ID. They employ sophisticated social engineering techniques, including vishing and help-desk impersonation, to gain access to legitimate credentials. Their operations involve multi-pressure extortion tactics, such as data theft, ransomware, and employee intimidation, while leveraging MFA fatigue and token theft to bypass authentication controls. The group has been linked to the "0ktapus" phishing campaign and is most active in English-speaking countries, with a focus on sectors rich in sensitive data.


SHADOW-VOID-042 is a provisional intrusion set tracked by Trend Micro, active in October-November 2025, conducting spear-phishing campaigns against energy, defense, pharmaceutical, cybersecurity, and other sectors using lures like HR complaints, research surveys, and fake Trend Micro security updates urging browser fixes. Attacks employ multi-stage loaders: shellcode generates machine-specific IDs for C2 "get_module_hello" requests fetching encrypted Stage 2 (SystemProcessHost.exe) with scheduled tasks for persistence, followed by Stage 3 fetching additional payloads via API hashing and retries on hardcoded C2s. Infrastructure overlaps with Void Rabisu (ROMCOM/Storm-0978), but lacks confirmed ROMCOM deployment or Ukraine focus, warranting separate tracking.


ShadowSyndicate is a threat actor associated with various ransomware groups, using a consistent Secure Shell fingerprint across multiple servers. They have been linked to ransomware families such as Quantum, Nokoyawa, and ALPHV. ShadowSyndicate's infrastructure overlaps with that of Cl0p, suggesting potential connections between the two groups. Their activities indicate they may be a Ransomware-as-a-Service affiliate.


Shadows in the Cloud documents a complex ecosystem of cyber espionage that systematically compromised government, business, academic, and other computer network systems in India, the Offices of the Dalai Lama, the United Nations, and several other countries. The report also contains an analysis of data which were stolen from politically sensitive targets and recovered during the course of the investigation. These include documents from the Offices of the Dalai Lama and agencies of the Indian national security establishment. Data containing sensitive information on citizens of numerous third-party countries, as well as personal, financial, and business information, were also exfiltrated and recovered during the course of the investigation. The report analyzes the malware ecosystem employed by the Shadows’ attackers, which leveraged multiple redundant cloud computing systems, social networking platforms, and free web hosting services in order to maintain persistent control while operating core servers located in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Although the identity and motivation of the attackers remain unknown, the report is able to determine the location (Chengdu, PRC) as well as some of the associations of the attackers through circumstantial evidence. The investigation is the product of an eight month, collaborative activity between the Information Warfare Monitor (Citizen Lab and SecDev) and the Shadowserver Foundation. The investigation employed a fusion methodology, combining technical interrogation techniques, data analysis, and field research, to track and uncover the Shadow cyber espionage network.


ShadyPanda is a threat actor behind a 7-year campaign that has infected 4.3 million users through extensions masquerading as productivity tools while functioning as comprehensive spyware. Their tactics include data exfiltration, user surveillance, and systematic collection of corporate meeting intelligence from over 28 video conferencing platforms. Notably, the WeTab extension exemplifies their capabilities, collecting full browsing history and personal data, exfiltrating to 17 different domains. The actor employs steganography to hide malicious code within PNG files and maintains persistent access through shared infrastructure across their extensions.


ShaggyPanther is a threat actor that primarily targets government entities in Taiwan and Malaysia. They have been active since 2008 and utilize hidden encrypted payloads in registry keys. Their activities have been detected in various locations, including Indonesia and Syria.


Shahid Hemmat is an IRGC-CEC affiliated hacking group linked to cyberattacks targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, including the defense industry and international transportation sectors. The group has been implicated in the hack of a booster station at the Municipal Water Authority in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, which disrupted drinking water supply. Key figures within Shahid Hemmat include Manouchehr Akbari, Amir Hossein Hoseini, Mohammad Hossein Moradi, and Mohammad Reza Rafatnejad. The U.S. government is offering a $10 million reward for information on these individuals.


Shamoon Group is an Iran-linked threat actor associated with destructive Shamoon wiper operations targeting organizations in the Middle East, especially in the energy sector.


This group's activity was first observed in November 2013. It leverages a banking Trojan more commonly known as Shylock which aims to compromise online banking credentials and credentials related to Bitcoin wallets.


SharpPanda, an APT group originating from China, has seen a rise in its cyber-attack operations starting from at least 2018. The APT group utilizes spear-phishing techniques to obtain initial access, employing a combination of outdated Microsoft Office document vulnerabilities, novel evasion techniques, and highly potent backdoor malware.


ShinyHunters is a cybercriminal group of unknown origin that is motivated by financial gain. The group is known for its sophisticated attacks against a wide range of targets, including businesses, organizations, and government agencies. ShinyHunters typically uses phishing attacks and exploit kits to gain access to victim networks, where they deploy malware to steal sensitive data, such as names, addresses, phone numbers, Social Security numbers, and credit card information.


In September 2023, Cisco Talos identified a new malware family that it calls ‘HTTPSnoop’ being deployed against telecommunications providers in the Middle East. They also discovered a sister implant to 'HTTPSnoop,’ that they are naming ‘PipeSnoop,’ which can accept arbitrary shellcode from a named pipe and execute it on the infected endpoint. Based on these findings, the researchers assess with high confidence that both implants belong to a new intrusion set that it named ‘ShroudedSnooper.’


The SideCopy APT is a Pakistani threat actor that has been operating since at least 2019, mainly targeting South Asian countries and more specifically India and Afghanistan. Its name comes from its infection chain that tries to mimic that of the SideWinder APT. It has been reported that this actor has similarities with Transparent Tribe (APT36) and possibly is a subdivision of this actor. Cisco Talos and Seqrite have provided comprehensive reports on this actor’s activities.


SiegedSec, a hacktivist collective, emerged coincidentally just days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Under the leadership of the hacktivist known as “YourAnonWolf,” the group swiftly gained strength, announcing an increasing number of victims after its inception. The group humorously self-identifies as “gay furry hackers” and is renowned for its comical slogans and the use of vulgar language. SiegedSec has affiliations with other hacker groups like GhostSec and typically consists of members aged between 18 and 26.


FireEye recently looked deeper into the activity discussed in TrendMicro’s blog and dubbed the “Siesta” campaign. The tools, modus operandi, and infrastructure used in the campaign present two possibilities: either the Chinese cyber-espionage unit APT1 is perpetrating this activity, or another group is using the same tactics and tools as the legacy APT1.
The Siesta campaign reinforces the fact that analysts and network defenders should remain on the lookout for known, public indicators and for shared attributes that allow security experts to detect multiple actors with one signature.


a relatively new threat actor that’s been operating since mid-2016
Group-IB has exposed the attacks committed by Silence cybercriminal group. While the gang had previously targeted Russian banks, Group-IB experts also have discovered evidence of the group's activity in more than 25 countries worldwide. Group-IB has published its first detailed report on tactics and tools employed by Silence. Group-IB security analysts' hypothesis is that at least one of the gang members appears to be a former or current employee of a cyber security company. The confirmed damage from Silence activity is estimated at 800 000 USD.
Silence is a group of Russian-speaking hackers, based on their commands language, the location of infrastructure they used, and the geography of their targets (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Kazakhstan). Although phishing emails were also sent to bank employees in Central and Western Europe, Africa, and Asia). Furthermore, Silence used Russian words typed on an English keyboard layout for the commands of the employed backdoor. The hackers also used Russian-language web hosting services.


Andariel is a threat actor that primarily targets South Korean corporations and institutions. They are believed to collaborate with or operate as a subsidiary organization of the Lazarus threat group. WHOIS utilizes spear phishing attacks, watering hole attacks, and supply chain attacks for initial access. They have been known to exploit vulnerabilities and use malware such as Infostealer and TigerRAT.


Last Friday, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announced the indictment of nine Iranians who worked for an organization named the Mabna Institute. According to prosecutors, the defendants stole more than 31 terabytes of data from universities, companies, and government agencies around the world. The cost to the universities alone reportedly amounted to approximately $3.4 billion. The information stolen from these universities was used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or sold for profit inside Iran. PhishLabs has been tracking this same threat group since late-2017, designating them Silent Librarian. Since discovery, we have been working with the FBI, ISAC partners, and other international law enforcement agencies to help understand and mitigate these attacks.


SilitNetwork is a hacking group known for targeting high-profile entities, such as airlines, for various motives. They utilize sophisticated tactics to breach their targets, potentially including social engineering and exploiting software vulnerabilities. The group's attack on RwandAir highlighted the vulnerability of the aviation industry and the need for robust cybersecurity measures.


SILKFIN AGENCY has claimed responsibility for multiple significant data breaches, including the compromise of DimeCuba.com, which exposed over 1 million SMS records and more than 100,000 email records. They also targeted the Sri Lankan Department of Agrarian Development, allegedly compromising the personal and agricultural data of over 1.45 million farmers. Additionally, they claimed a breach of the Siam Cement Group's database. The breaches involved sensitive data such as NIC numbers and transaction details.


SilkSpecter is a Chinese financially motivated threat actor that orchestrates phishing campaigns targeting e-commerce shoppers, particularly during peak shopping seasons. They exploit legitimate payment processors like Stripe to exfiltrate Cardholder Data and Personally Identifiable Information through convincing fake e-commerce sites created using the oemapps SaaS platform. Their phishing infrastructure relies on Chinese-hosted CDN servers and utilizes deceptive elements such as the "trusttollsvg" icon and a "/homeapi/collect" endpoint to track victim interactions. Analysts have linked SilkSpecter to over 89 IP addresses and more than 4,000 domain names associated with phishing activities, predominantly using .top, .shop, .store, and .vip TLDs.


SilverFish is believed to be a Russian cyberespionage group that has been involved in various cyberattacks, including the use of the SolarWinds breach as an attack vector. SilverFish has been linked to the Wasted Locker ransomware and has displayed a high level of skill and organization in their cyber operations. There are also connections between SilverFish and the threat actor Evil Corp, suggesting a possible evolution or collaboration between the two groups.


As these tools rise and fall in popularity (and more importantly, as detection rates by antivirus vendors improve), SilverTerrier actors have consistently adopted new malware families and shifted to the latest packing tools available.


Sima is a group of suspected Iranian origin targeting Iranians in diaspora.
In February 2016, Iran-focused individuals received messages purporting to be from Human RightsWatch's (HRW) Emergencies Director, requesting that they read an article about Iran pressing Afghanr efugees to fight in Syria. While referencing a real report published by HRW, the links provided for the Director’s biography and article directed the recipient to malware hosted elsewhere. These spear-phishing attempts represent an evolution of Iranian actors based on their social engineering tactics and narrow targeting. Although the messages still had minor grammatical and stylistic errors that would be obvious to a native speaker, the actors demonstrated stronger English-language proficiency than past intrusion sets and a deeper investment in background research prior to the attempt. The actors appropriated a real identity that would be expected to professionally interact with the subject, then offered validation through links to their biography and social media, the former of which itself was malware as well. The bait documents contained a real article relevant to their interests and topic referenced, and the message attempted to address to how it aligned with their professional research or field of employment. The referenced documents sent were malware binaries posing as legitimate files using the common right-to-left filenames tactic in order to conceal the actual file extension. All of these techniques, while common pretexting mechanisms, are a refinement compared to a tendency amongst other groups to simply continually send different forms of generic malware or phishing, in the hopes that one would eventually be successful.


SingularityMD is a threat actor group that has targeted educational institutions in the US. They gained unauthorized access to their networks by exploiting weak security practices, such as using students' dates of birth as passwords. SingularityMD demanded a ransom in cryptocurrency and threatened to leak stolen information if not paid. They have demonstrated a willingness to follow through on their threats and have already leaked some data.


Sinobi is a financially motivated ransomware group that employs data theft and extortion as primary tactics, operating a public-facing leak portal to pressure victims during ransom negotiations. The group utilizes techniques such as phishing, credential compromise, and exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities for initial access, followed by data exfiltration using tools like RClone. Sinobi ransomware employs Curve-25519 and AES-128-CTR for file encryption, making recovery impossible without the attacker's private key. The group has been linked to significant breaches across various sectors, including automotive, legal, and nonprofit organizations.


SkidSec is a threat group that has engaged in operations targeting exposed printers in South Korea to disseminate North Korean propaganda, utilizing techniques such as printer exploitation and social engineering for evidence collection. The group has also experienced a leadership change following the loss of their leader, Govadmin, while continuing to mobilize their followers for various missions. They have humorously solicited financial support for their activities, framing it as a means to support their cause. Additionally, they have been noted for their potential to leak sensitive information from compromised devices.


While analysing an incident which involved a suspected keylogger, we identified a malicious library able to interact with a virtual file system, which is usually the sign of an advanced APT actor. This turned out to be a malicious loader internally named ‘Slingshot’, part of a new, and highly sophisticated attack platform that rivals Project Sauron and Regin in complexity.
While for most victims the infection vector for Slingshot remains unknown, we were able to find several cases where the attackers got access to MikroTik routers and placed a component downloaded by Winbox Loader, a management suite for MikroTik routers. In turn, this infected the administrator of the router.
We believe this cluster of activity started in at least 2012 and was still active at the time of this analysis (February 2018).


SlopAds is a sophisticated ad fraud and click fraud operation involving a collection of 224 apps, downloaded over 38 million times globally. The threat actors utilize steganography, hidden WebViews, and a mobile marketing attribution platform to execute their fraud schemes, which include generating fraudulent ad impressions and clicks. Their infrastructure comprises multiple C2 servers and over 300 related domains, indicating plans for expansion. The operation has been linked to 2.3 billion bid requests per day, with significant traffic originating from the United States, India, and Brazil.


SloppyLemming is an advanced actor that uses multiple cloud service providers to facilitate different aspects of their activities, such as credential harvesting, malware delivery and command and control (C2). This actor conducts extensive operations targeting Pakistani, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and China. Industries targeted include government, law enforcement, energy, telecommunications, and technology entitie


The Smishing Triad is a Chinese-speaking threat group known for targeting postal services and their customers globally through smishing campaigns. They leverage compromised Apple iMessage accounts to send fraudulent messages warning of undeliverable packages, aiming to collect personally identifying information and payment credentials. The group offers smishing kits for sale on platforms like Telegram, enabling other cybercriminals to launch independent attacks. "Smishing Triad" has expanded its operations to target UAE citizens, using geo-filtering to focus on victims in the Emirates.


Mentioned as operator of SmokeLoader in CrowdStrike's 2020 Report.


The campaign, called SmugX, overlaps with previously reported activity by Chinese APT actors RedDelta and Mustang Panda. Although those two correlate to some extent with Camaro Dragon, there is insufficient evidence to link the SmugX campaign to the Camaro Dragon group.

The campaign uses new delivery methods to deploy (most notably – HTML Smuggling) a new variant of PlugX, an implant commonly associated with a wide variety of Chinese threat actors. Although the payload itself remains similar to the one found in older PlugX variants, its delivery methods results in low detection rates, which until recently helped the campaign fly under the radar.


While investigating some of the smaller name servers that APT28/Sofacy routinely use to host their infrastructure, Cylance discovered another prolonged campaign that appeared to exclusively target Japanese companies and individuals that began around August 2016. The later registration style was eerily close to previously registered APT28 domains, however, the malware used in the attacks did not seem to line up at all. During the course of our investigation, JPCERT published this analysis of one of the group’s backdoors. Cylance tracks this threat group internally as ‘Snake Wine’.
The Snake Wine group has proven to be highly adaptable and has continued to adopt new tactics in order to establish footholds inside victim environments. The exclusive interest in Japanese government, education, and commerce will likely continue into the future as the group is just starting to build and utilize their existing current attack infrastructure.


SneakyChef is a threat actor known for using the SugarGh0st RAT to target government agencies, research institutions, and organizations worldwide. They have been active since at least August 2023, with a focus on leveraging old and new command and control domains. The group has been observed using lures in the form of scanned documents related to Ministries of Foreign Affairs and embassies. Talos Intelligence assesses with medium confidence that the operators are likely Chinese-speaking based on language preferences and specific targets.


In 2014, researchers at Kaspersky Lab discovered and reported on three zero-days that were being used in cyberattacks in the wild. Two of these zero-day vulnerabilities are associated with an advanced threat actor we call Animal Farm. Over the past few years, Animal Farm has targeted a wide range of global organizations. The group has been active since at least 2009 and there are signs that earlier malware versions  were developed as far back as 2007.


SOLAR SPIDER’s phishing campaigns deliver the JSOutProx RAT to financial institutions across Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia.


Solntsepek is a threat actor group with ties to the Russian military unit GRU. They have claimed responsibility for a cyberattack on Kyivstar, a Ukrainian mobile operator, and have been linked to previous attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Solntsepek has been associated with the Sandworm hacking group, known for their destructive cyberattacks, including the NotPetya worm. They have also engaged in hostile activities, such as revealing personal details of Ukrainian soldiers.


SongXY is a Chinese APT group that employs phishing tactics to initiate cyberespionage campaigns. They utilize the Royal Road RTF builder, exploiting the CVE-2018-0798 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. In one instance, they sent a document containing a link to an attacker-controlled server, which automatically triggered upon opening, allowing them to gather information about the target's system configuration.


Sowbug has been conducting highly targeted cyber attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia and appears to be heavily focused on foreign policy institutions and diplomatic targets. Sowbug has been seen mounting classic espionage attacks by stealing documents from the organizations it infiltrates.


Sp1d3r, a threat actor, has been involved in multiple data breaches targeting companies like Truist Bank, Cylance, and Advance Auto Parts. They have stolen and attempted to sell sensitive information, including customer and employee emails, account numbers, and source code. Sp1d3r has also claimed to have obtained data from a third-party platform and a cloud storage vendor. They have utilized hacking forums to sell the stolen data for significant sums of money.


SpaceBears is a ransomware group believed to be based in Moscow, Russia, that has taken credit for several high-profile cyberattacks while primarily operating as a Data Broker. They currently list eight organizations on their Data Leak Site, focusing on medium to small-sized targets. Their methods suggest a reliance on basic extortion strategies rather than sophisticated malware tactics, with no advanced techniques or indicators of ransomware detected.


ESET researchers have discovered a new undocumented modular backdoor, SideWalk, being used by an APT group they’ve named SparklingGoblin; this backdoor was used during one of SparklingGoblin’s recent campaigns that targeted a computer retail company based in the USA. This backdoor shares multiple similarities with another backdoor used by the group: CROSSWALK.


SPIKEDWINE is a threat actor targeting European officials with a new backdoor called WINELOADER. They use a bait PDF document posing as an invitation letter from the Ambassador of India to lure diplomats. The attack is characterized by advanced tactics, techniques, and procedures in the malware and command and control infrastructure. The motivation behind the attacks seems to be exploiting the geopolitical relations between India and European nations.


STAC5143 is a threat actor group tracked by Sophos, notable for its sophisticated use of Microsoft Office 365's legitimate services to conduct ransomware and data extortion campaigns. Unlike FIN7, which typically targets larger organizations through phishing and malicious Google Ads, STAC5143 focuses on smaller victims across diverse business sectors. Their operations begin with overwhelming targeted individuals with email bombing, followed by Microsoft Teams messages impersonating tech support to initiate a remote screen control session. Utilizing Microsoft's Quick Assist or direct Teams screen sharing, they deploy malware, including Java Archive (JAR) files and Python-based backdoors, from external SharePoint file stores. This cluster exploits legitimate services within the Microsoft Office 365 platform, using a Java-based proxy to execute PowerShell commands and download malicious payloads. While employing publicly available tools like RPivot, their obfuscation methods and the use of side-loaded DLLs for command and control, combined with the deployment of Black Basta ransomware in one instance, indicate a sophisticated and evolving threat actor adapting known techniques for their specific objectives.


Open-source reporting has claimed that the Hermes ransomware was developed by the North Korean group STARDUST CHOLLIMA (activities of which have been public reported as part of the “Lazarus Group”), because Hermes was executed on a host during the SWIFT compromise of FEIB in October 2017.


Stargazer Goblin is a threat actor group that operates the Stargazers Ghost Network on GitHub, distributing malware and malicious links through multiple accounts. They utilize compromised and created accounts to evade detection and quickly replace banned components to continue their operations. The group has been estimated to have earned approximately $100,000 from their malicious activities, offering a Distribution as a Service platform for other threat actors to distribute their malware. Stargazer Goblin has been involved in distributing various malware families, including Atlantida Stealer, Rhadamanthys, RisePro, Lumma Stealer, and RedLine.


Starry Addax is a threat actor targeting human rights activists associated with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic using a novel mobile malware called FlexStarling. They conduct phishing attacks to trick targets into installing malicious Android applications and serve credential-harvesting pages to Windows-based targets. Their infrastructure targets both Windows and Android users, with the campaign starting with spear-phishing emails containing requests to install specific mobile apps or related themes. The campaign is in its early stages, with potential for additional malware variants and infrastructure development.


This threat actor targets civil society groups and Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents.


The cyberattack campaign that Microsoft uncovered was launched by a China-linked hacking group called Storm-0062. According to the company, the group is launching cyberattacks by exploiting a vulnerability in the Data Center and Server editions of Confluence. Those are versions of the application that companies run on-premises.


Storm-0249 is an access broker active since 2021, known for distributing BazaLoader, IcedID, Bumblebee, and Emotet malware. The actor primarily employs phishing emails to deliver malware payloads, as evidenced by a campaign involving tax-themed emails that aimed to distribute BRc4 and Latrodectus malware. Storm-0249 has facilitated initial access for other threat actors, such as Storm-0501, by leveraging compromised credentials and exploiting known vulnerabilities in public-facing servers. Microsoft has detected malicious PDF attachments associated with Storm-0249's phishing campaigns.


The threat actor that Microsoft tracks as Storm-0324 is a financially motivated group known to gain initial access using email-based initial infection vectors and then hand off access to compromised networks to other threat actors. These handoffs frequently lead to ransomware deployment.


Storm-0381 is a threat actor identified by Microsoft as a Russian cybercrime group. They are known for their use of malvertising to deploy Magniber, a type of ransomware.


Storm-0473 (Tomiris) is a threat actor that has been active since at least 2019. They primarily target government and diplomatic entities in the Commonwealth of Independent States region, with occasional victims in other regions being foreign representations of CIS countries. Tomiris uses a wide variety of malware implants, including downloaders, backdoors, and file stealers, developed in different programming languages. They employ various attack vectors such as spear-phishing, DNS hijacking, and exploitation of vulnerabilities. There are potential ties between Tomiris and Turla, but they are considered separate threat actors with distinct targeting and tradecraft by Kaspersky.


Storm-0494 is a threat actor that facilitates Gootloader infections, which are then exploited by groups like Vice Society to deploy tools such as the Supper backdoor, AnyDesk, and MEGA. They utilize RDP for lateral movement and employ the WMI Provider Host to deploy the INC ransomware payload. Microsoft has identified their activities as part of a campaign targeting the U.S. health sector. Their operations are characterized by financially motivated tactics.


Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cybercriminal group that has been active since 2021, initially targeting US school districts with the Sabbath ransomware and later transitioning to a RaaS model deploying various ransomware strains, including Embargo. The group exploits weak credentials and over-privileged accounts to achieve lateral movement from on-premises environments to cloud infrastructures, establishing persistent backdoor access and deploying ransomware. They have utilized techniques such as credential theft, exploiting vulnerabilities in Zoho ManageEngine and Citrix NetScaler, and employing tools like Cobalt Strike and Rclone for lateral movement and data exfiltration. Storm-0501 has specifically targeted sectors such as government, manufacturing, transportation, and law enforcement in the United States.


Storm-0506 (DEV-0506) is a financially motivated cybercriminal group operating as a core affiliate within the Black Basta ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) ecosystem, having switched from deploying Conti ransomware around April 2022. This actor's operational model is distinguished by its strategic reliance on a dynamic network of initial access brokers, showcasing a division of labor common in RaaS operations. Throughout its history, Storm-0506 has leveraged access obtained through various brokers: initially Storm-0450/0464 via Qakbot infections (pre-September 2023), then expanding to include Storm-1674 delivering DarkGate, Pikabot, and IcedID (September 2023), and later employing Storm-1674's Microsoft Teams vishing campaigns (October 2024) and Storm-0569's SEO poisoning leading to BATLOADER and Cobalt Strike (December 2023). Following successful initial compromise, Storm-0506 employs a range of post-exploitation tools, including Cobalt Strike Beacon, SystemBC, and Brute Ratel C4 backdoors, and notably, often utilizes command-and-control (C2) infrastructure established by Storm-0365, indicating close collaboration or shared resources. This actor is characterized by hands-on-keyboard activity, culminating in the deployment of Black Basta ransomware. A resurgence in activity observed in October 2024, directly linked to Storm-1674's vishing, underscores the ongoing and adaptive threat that Storm-0506 represents within the ransomware landscape.


H0lyGh0st is a North Korean threat actor that has been active since June 2021. They are responsible for developing and deploying the H0lyGh0st ransomware, which targets small-to-medium businesses in various sectors. The group employs "double extortion" tactics, encrypting data and threatening to publish it if the ransom is not paid. There are connections between H0lyGh0st and the PLUTONIUM APT group, indicating a possible affiliation.


Storm-0539 is a financially motivated threat actor that has been active since at least 2021. They primarily target retail organizations for gift card fraud and theft. Their tactics include phishing via emails or SMS to distribute malicious links that redirect users to phishing pages designed to steal credentials and session tokens. Once access is gained, Storm-0539 registers a device for secondary authentication prompts, bypassing multi-factor authentication and gaining persistence in the environment. They also collect emails, contact lists, and network configurations for further attacks against the same organizations.


Storm-0558 is a China-based threat actor with espionage objectives. While there are some minimal overlaps with other Chinese groups such as Violet Typhoon (ZIRCONIUM, APT31), Microsoft maintain high confidence that Storm-0558 operates as its own distinct group


Storm-0826 is a financially motivated cybercriminal group operating as an affiliate within the Black Basta ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) ecosystem. This actor's primary known method of obtaining initial access is through handoffs from Storm-0464, a known distributor of the Qakbot malware


Nwgen is a group that focuses on data exfiltration and ransomware activities. They have been found to share techniques with other threat groups such as Karakurt, Lapsus$, and Yanluowang. Nwgen has been observed carrying out attacks and deploying ransomware, encrypting files and demanding a ransom of $150,000 in Monero cryptocurrency for the decryption software.


Cybercriminals have launched a phishing campaign targeting senior executives in U.S. firms, using the EvilProxy phishing toolkit for credential harvesting and account takeover attacks. This campaign, initiated in July 2023, primarily targets sectors such as banking, financial services, insurance, property management, real estate, and manufacturing. The attackers exploit an open redirection vulnerability on the job search platform "indeed.com," redirecting victims to malicious phishing pages impersonating Microsoft. EvilProxy functions as a reverse proxy, intercepting credentials, two-factor authentication codes, and session cookies to hijack accounts. The threat actors, known as Storm-0835 by Microsoft, have hundreds of customers who pay monthly fees for their services, making attribution difficult. The attacks involve sending phishing emails with deceptive links to Indeed, redirecting victims to EvilProxy pages for credential harvesting.


Storm-0867 is a threat actor that has been active since 2012 and has targeted various industries and regions. They employ sophisticated phishing campaigns, utilizing social engineering techniques and a phishing as a service platform called Caffeine. Their attacks involve intercepting and manipulating communication between users and legitimate services, allowing them to steal passwords, hijack sign-in sessions, bypass multifactor authentication, and modify authentication methods.


Storm-0940 is a Chinese threat actor active since at least 2021, known for gaining initial access through password spray and brute-force attacks, as well as exploiting network edge applications. Microsoft has observed Storm-0940 utilizing valid credentials obtained from CovertNetwork-1658's password spray operations, indicating a close operational relationship between the two. Once inside a victim environment, Storm-0940 has been seen leveraging compromised credentials for further malicious activities. Additionally, Storm-0940 has employed botnets, such as Quad7, to facilitate password spraying attacks.


Storm-1044 has been identified as part of a cyber campaign in collaboration with Twisted Spider. They employ a strategic approach, targeting specific endpoints using an initial access trojan called DanaBot. Once they gain access, Storm-1044 initiates lateral movement through Remote Desktop Protocol sign-in attempts, passing control to Twisted Spider. Twisted Spider then compromises the endpoints by introducing the CACTUS ransomware. Microsoft has detected ongoing malvertising attacks involving Storm-1044, leading to the deployment of CACTUS ransomware.


Storm-1084 is a threat actor that has been observed collaborating with the MuddyWater group. They have used the DarkBit persona to mask their involvement in targeted attacks. Storm-1084 has been linked to destructive actions, including the encryption of on-premise devices and deletion of cloud resources. They have been observed using tools such as Rport, Ligolo, and a customized PowerShell backdoor. The extent of their autonomy or collaboration with other Iranian threat actors is currently unclear.


Storm-1099 is a sophisticated Russia-affiliated influence actor that has been conducting pro-Russia influence operations targeting international supporters of Ukraine since Spring 2022. They are known for their website forgery operation called "Doppelganger" and have been actively spreading false information. They have been involved in pushing the claim that Hamas acquired Ukrainian weapons for an attack on Israel. Storm-1099 has also been implicated in amplifying images of graffiti in Paris, suggesting possible Russian involvement and aligning with Russia's Active Measures playbook.


DEV-1101 is a threat actor tracked by Microsoft who is responsible for developing and advertising phishing kits, specifically AiTM phishing kits. These kits are capable of bypassing multifactor authentication and are available for purchase or rent by other cybercriminals. DEV-1101 offers an open-source kit with various enhancements, such as mobile device management and CAPTCHA evasion. Their tool has been used in high-volume phishing campaigns by multiple actors, including DEV-0928, and is sold for $300 with VIP licenses available for $1,000.


Storm-1113 is a threat actor that acts both as an access broker focused on malware distribution through search advertisements and as an “as-a-service” entity providing malicious installers and landing page frameworks. In Storm-1113 malware distribution campaigns, users are directed to landing pages mimicking well-known software that host installers, often MSI files, that lead to the installation of malicious payloads. Storm-1113 is also the developer of EugenLoader, a commodity malware first observed around November 2022.


In early 2023, Microsoft In early 2023, observed a wave of activity from a Gaza-based group that we track as Storm-1133 targeting Israeli private sector energy, defense, and telecommunications organizations.


Storm-1152, a cybercriminal group, was recently taken down by Microsoft for illegally reselling Outlook accounts. They operated by creating approximately 750 million fraudulent Microsoft accounts and earned millions of dollars in illicit revenue. Storm-1152 also offered CAPTCHA-solving services and was connected to ransomware and extortion groups. Microsoft obtained a court order to seize their infrastructure and domains, disrupting their operations.


Storm-1167 is a threat actor tracked by Microsoft, known for their use of an AiTM phishing kit. They were responsible for launching an attack that led to Business Email Compromise activity.


Storm-1175 is a cybercriminal group known for deploying Medusa ransomware and exploiting public-facing applications for initial access. They have been observed exploiting a critical deserialization vulnerability in GoAnywhere MFT, tracked as CVE-2025-10035, which could lead to command injection and potential RCE. Microsoft Defender researchers identified exploitation activity aligned with TTPs attributed to Storm-1175, including the use of post-compromise techniques that involve creating a group named “ESX Admins” in the domain.


Storm-1283 is a threat actor that targeted Microsoft Azure cloud platform. They gained access to user accounts and created OAuth applications using stolen credentials, allowing them to control resources and deploy virtual machines for cryptomining. The targeted organizations incurred significant financial losses ranging from $10,000 to $1.5 million. Storm-1283 utilized compromised accounts and subscriptions to carry out their illicit activities.


Storm-1286 is a threat actor that engages in large-scale spamming activities, primarily targeting user accounts without multifactor authentication enabled. They employ password spraying attacks to compromise these accounts and utilize legacy authentication protocols like IMAP and SMTP. In the past, they have attempted to compromise admin accounts and create new LOB applications with high administrative permissions to spread spam. Despite previous actions taken by Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Storm-1286 continues to explore new methods to establish a high-scale spamming platform within victim organizations using non-privileged users.


Storm-1295 is a threat actor group that operates the Greatness phishing-as-a-service platform. They utilize synchronous relay servers to present targets with a replica of a sign-in page, resembling traditional phishing attacks. Their adversary-in-the-middle capability allows Storm-1295 to offer their services to other attackers. Active since mid-2022, Storm-1295 is tracked by Microsoft and is known for their involvement in the Greatness PhaaS platform.


CopyCop is a Russian covert influence network that has established over 300 fictional media websites targeting the US, France, Canada, and other countries, primarily to disseminate pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian narratives. The network employs TTPs such as deepfakes, fake interviews, and self-hosted LLMs for content generation, while also impersonating local media outlets and fact-checking organizations. Its operations are supported by the Moscow-based Center for Geopolitical Expertise and the GRU, aiming to undermine support for Ukraine and exacerbate political fragmentation in Western nations. CopyCop's influence content is amplified by a network of pro-Russian social media influencers and other Russian influence networks.


Storm-1567 is the threat actor behind the Ransomware-as-a-Service Akira. They attacked Swedish organizations in March 2023. This ransomware utilizes the ChaCha encryption algorithm, PowerShell, and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). Microsoft's Defender for Endpoint successfully blocked a large-scale hacking campaign carried out by Storm-1567, highlighting the effectiveness of their security solution.


Storm-1575 is a threat actor identified by Microsoft as being involved in phishing campaigns using the Dadsec platform. They utilize hundreds of Domain Generated Algorithm domains to host credential harvesting pages and target global organizations to steal Microsoft 365 credentials.


Storm-1674 is an access broker known for using tools based on the publicly available TeamsPhisher tool to distribute DarkGate malware. Storm-1674 campaigns have typically relied on phishing lures sent over Teams with malicious attachments, such as ZIP files containing a LNK file that ultimately drops DarkGate and Pikabot. In September 2023, Microsoft observed handoffs from Storm-1674 to ransomware operators that have led to Black Basta ransomware deployment.


Storm-1679 is a Russian disinformation group believed to be a spinoff of the Internet Research Agency, actively engaged in influence operations targeting the International Olympic Committee and the 2024 Olympic Games. The group has employed AI-generated content, including deepfake videos and fabricated narratives about violence, to discredit the IOC and instill fear among potential attendees. Their campaigns have been identified across multiple languages and platforms, utilizing techniques such as impersonation of media outlets and the creation of disinformation websites. Microsoft attributes significant disinformation activities related to the Olympics to Storm-1679, highlighting their focus on spreading falsehoods and promoting anti-Olympics messaging.


Storm-1747 is an intrusion set that develops and operates the Tycoon 2FA phishing kit, which has been active since at least mid-2023 and is known for its sophisticated obfuscation and exfiltration techniques. The kit has been sold and distributed under the PhaaS model, making it one of the most widespread phishing kits by early 2025.


UAT4356 is a state-sponsored threat actor that targeted government networks globally through a campaign named ArcaneDoor. They exploited two zero-day vulnerabilities in Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances to deploy custom malware implants called "Line Runner" and "Line Dancer." The actor demonstrated a deep understanding of Cisco systems, utilized anti-forensic measures, and took deliberate steps to evade detection. UAT4356's sophisticated attack chain allowed them to conduct malicious actions such as configuration modification, reconnaissance, network traffic capture/exfiltration, and potentially lateral movement on compromised devices.


Storm-1977 is a sophisticated threat actor that conducts password-spraying attacks targeting cloud tenants, particularly in the education sector, utilizing the AzureChecker.exe CLI tool as their primary infection vector. They have successfully compromised over 200 containers, repurposing them for cryptocurrency mining operations by leveraging guest accounts to create new resource groups within compromised subscriptions. Microsoft Threat Intelligence researchers have identified unique operational patterns that distinguish Storm-1977 from other cryptomining threat actors. The group exploits compromised accounts as a primary attack surface in their operations.


TAG-100 is a cyber-espionage APT that targets government and private sector organizations globally, exploiting vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices such as Citrix NetScaler and F5 BIG-IP for initial access. The group employs open-source tools like Pantegana and SparkRAT for persistence and post-exploitation activities, including credential theft and email data exfiltration. TAG-100 has compromised entities in at least ten countries, including two Asia-Pacific intergovernmental organizations, and focuses on sectors like education, finance, and local government. Their operations highlight the challenges of attribution due to the use of off-the-shelf tools and techniques that overlap with other state-sponsored groups.


Storm-2139 is a cybercrime group that exploited stolen API keys from compromised Azure OpenAI Service accounts to generate harmful content, including non-consensual intimate imagery, using the DALL-E model. The group utilized reverse proxy infrastructure and custom software to bypass guardrails in Microsoft’s GenAI services. Microsoft has filed a lawsuit against four individuals associated with Storm-2139, alleging they modified customer systems and resold access to these capabilities. The group systematically harvested authentication tokens from U.S.-based enterprises and is linked to a broader network of illicit AI tool development and distribution.


Storm-2372 is a suspected nation-state actor aligned with Russian interests, engaging in device code phishing campaigns targeting governments, NGOs, and various industries across Europe, North America, Africa, and the Middle East. The actor employs tactics that involve impersonating prominent individuals through third-party messaging services like WhatsApp and Signal to gain rapport before sending phishing invitations. These invitations lure users into completing device code authentication requests, granting Storm-2372 initial access to victim accounts and enabling Graph API data collection activities, including email harvesting. Microsoft has observed the actor utilizing keyword searches within compromised accounts to exfiltrate sensitive information.


Storm-2460 is a threat actor that has exploited elevation of privilege vulnerabilities to deploy PipeMagic malware and ransomware, enabling them to escalate access within compromised environments. They have been observed using the certutil utility to download malware from compromised legitimate third-party websites. Ransomware activity associated with Storm-2460 includes file encryption and the deployment of a ransom note named !_READ_ME_REXX2_!.txt. Microsoft recommends prioritizing security updates for elevation of privilege vulnerabilities to mitigate the impact of this actor's activities.


The group Microsoft tracks as Storm-2603 is assessed with medium confidence to be a China-based threat actor. Microsoft has not identified links between Storm-2603 and other known Chinese threat actors. Microsoft tracks this threat actor in association with attempts to steal MachineKeys via the on-premises SharePoint vulnerabilities. Although Microsoft has observed this threat actor deploying Warlock and Lockbit ransomware in the past, Microsoft is currently unable to confidently assess the threat actor’s objectives.  Additional actors may use these exploits to target unpatched on-premises SharePoint systems, further emphasizing the need for organizations to implement mitigations and security updates immediately.


Storm-2657 is a financially motivated threat actor targeting US-based organizations, particularly in higher education, to compromise employee accounts and redirect salary payments to attacker-controlled accounts. They employ tactics such as creating inbox rules to delete warning notifications from HR platforms like Workday and using phishing emails that impersonate legitimate university communications to gain access. The actor modifies employee salary payment configurations to facilitate financial theft. Mitigation efforts include implementing phishing-resistant MFA methods to secure user identities against such attacks.


Storm Cloud is a Chinese espionage threat actor known for targeting organizations across Asia, particularly Tibetan organizations and individuals. They use a variety of malware families, including GIMMICK and GOSLU, which are feature-rich and multi-platform. Storm Cloud leverages public cloud hosting services like Google Drive for command-and-control channels, making it difficult to detect their activities.


Stucx is a threat actor known for targeting Israeli systems, including SCADA systems and the Red Alert missile protection system. Stucx Team has also developed a mobile application called MyOPECS for coordinating attacks, which includes features like DDoS attacks and is expected to add more capabilities in the future. Additionally, they have been observed using VPNs and proxy software to conceal their activities and have a history of making threats against those who cooperate with Israel.


DEV-0665 is a threat actor associated with the HermeticWiper attacks. Their objective is to disrupt, degrade, and destroy specific resources within a targeted country.


Seqrite Labs APT-Team has recently uncovered a campaign which we have termed as Swan Vector, that has been targeting the nations across the East China sea such as Taiwan and Japan. The campaign is aimed at educational institutes and mechanical engineering industry with lures aiming to deliver fake resume of candidates which acts as a decoy.


Cisco Talos recently identified a large number of ongoing malware distribution campaigns linked to a threat actor we're calling "SWEED," including such notable malware as Formbook, Lokibot and Agent Tesla. Based on our research, SWEED — which has been operating since at least 2017 — primarily targets their victims with stealers and remote access trojans.
SWEED remains consistent across most of their campaigns in their use of spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments. While these campaigns have featured a myriad of different types of malicious documents, the actor primarily tries to infect its victims with a packed version of Agent Tesla — an information stealer that's been around since at least 2014. The version of Agent Tesla that SWEED is using differs slightly from what we've seen in the past in the way that it is packed, as well as how it infects the system. In this post, we'll run down each campaign we're able to connect to SWEED, and talk about some of the actor's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).


SYLHET GANG-SG is a hacktivist group that has targeted critical infrastructure and various entities, including the Central European University and the EU Parliament, often articulating their rationale for attacks. They have been involved in DDoS attacks against Western targets, including the personal website of UK Prime Minister Sunak and the Cyprus police. The group has also declared allegiance to the KillNet 2.0 hacker collective, focusing on threats against allies of Israel.


Proofpoint researchers detected campaigns from a relatively new actor, tracked internally as TA2101, targeting German companies and organizations to deliver and install backdoor malware. The actor initiated their campaigns impersonating the Bundeszentralamt fur Steuern, the German Federal Ministry of Finance, with lookalike domains, verbiage, and stolen branding in the emails. For their campaigns in Germany, the actor chose Cobalt Strike, a commercially licensed software tool that is generally used for penetration testing and emulates the type of backdoor framework used by Metasploit, a similar penetration testing tool. Proofpoint researchers have also observed this actor distributing Maze ransomware, employing similar social engineering techniques to those it uses for Cobalt Strike, while also targeting organizations in Italy and impersonating the Agenzia Delle Entrate, the Italian Revenue Agency. We have also recently observed the actor targeting organizations in the United States using the IcedID banking Trojan while impersonating the United States Postal Service (USPS).


TA2536, which has been active since at least 2015, is likely Nigerian based on its unique linguistic style, tactics and tools. It uses keyloggers such as HawkEye and distinctive stylometric features in typo-squatted domains that resemble legitimate names and the use of recurring names and substrings in email addresses.


Persistent cybercrime threat actor targeting aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense industries for years. This threat actor consistently uses remote access trojans (RATs) that can be used to remotely control compromised machines. This threat actor uses consistent themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel. The threat actor has used similar themes and targeting since 2017.


Since January 2020, Proofpoint researchers have tracked an actor abusing Microsoft Office 365 (O365) third-party application (3PA) access, with suspected activity dating back to August 2019. The actor, known as TA2552, uses well-crafted Spanish language lures that leverage a narrow range of themes and brands. The lures entice users to click a link in the message, taking them to the legitimate Microsoft third-party apps consent page. There they are prompted to grant a third-party application read-only user permissions to their O365 account via OAuth2 or other token-based authorization methods. TA2552 seeks access to specific account resources like the user’s contacts and mail. Requesting read-only permissions for such account resources could be used to conduct account reconnaissance, silently steal data, or to intercept password reset messages from other accounts such as those at financial institutions. While organizations with global presence have received messages from this group, they appear to choose recipients who are likely Spanish speakers.


In late March 2020, Proofpoint researchers began tracking a new actor with a penchant for using NanoCore and later AsyncRAT, popular commodity remote access trojans (RATs). Dubbed TA2719 by Proofpoint, the actor uses localized lures with colorful images that impersonate local banks, law enforcement, and shipping services. Proofpoint has observed this actor send low volume campaigns to recipients in Austria, Chile, Greece, Hungary, Italy, North Macedonia, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, United States, and Uruguay.


TA2722 is a highly active threat actor that targets various industries including Shipping/Logistics, Manufacturing, Business Services, Pharmaceutical, and Energy. They primarily focus on organizations in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. This threat actor impersonates Philippine government entities and uses themes related to the government to gain remote access to target computers. Their objectives include information gathering, installing follow-on malware, and engaging in business email compromise activities.


TA2723 is a financially-motivated, high-volume credential phishing threat actor known for spoofing Microsoft OneDrive, LinkedIn, and DocuSign. Proofpoint Threat Research has observed TA2723 conducting OAuth device code phishing campaigns, utilizing tools like Squarephish and Graphish to enhance their operations. The use of these tools allows TA2723 to mitigate the short-lived nature of device codes, facilitating larger campaigns. Successful attacks can lead to M365 account takeover, data exfiltration, and lateral movement.


TA2725 is a threat actor that has been tracked since March 2022. They primarily target organizations in Brazil and Mexico using Brazilian banking malware and phishing techniques. Recently, they have expanded their operations to also target victims in Spain and Mexico simultaneously. TA2725 typically uses GoDaddy virtual hosting for their URL redirector and hosts malicious files on legitimate cloud hosting providers like Amazon AWS, Google Cloud, or Microsoft Azure. They have been known to spoof legitimate companies, such as ÉSECÈ Group, to deceive their victims.


TA402 is an APT group that has been tracked by Proofpoint since  2020. They primarily target government entities in the Middle East and North Africa, with a focus on intelligence collection. TA402 is known for using sophisticated phishing campaigns and constantly updating their malware implants and delivery methods to evade detection. They have been observed using cloud services like Dropbox and Google Drive for hosting malicious payloads and command-and-control infrastructure.


TA406 is engaging in malware distribution, phishing, intelligence collection, and cryptocurrency theft, resulting in a wide range of criminal activities.


Early in August 2019, Proofpoint described what appeared to be state-sponsored activity targeting the US utilities sector with malware that we dubbed “Lookback”. Between August 21 and August 29, 2019, several spear phishing emails were identified targeting additional US companies in the utilities sector. The phishing emails originated from what appears to be an actor-controlled domain: globalenergycertification[.]net. This domain, like those used in previous campaigns, impersonated a licensing body related to the utilities sector. In this case, it masqueraded as the legitimate domain for Global Energy Certification (“GEC”). The emails include a GEC examination-themed body and a malicious Microsoft Word attachment that uses macros to install and run LookBack. (Note confusion between Malware, Campaign and ThreatActor)


Proofpoint researchers have identified a targeted APT campaign that utilized malicious RTF documents to deliver custom malware to unsuspecting victims. We dubbed this campaign “Operation LagTime IT” based on entities that were targeted and the distinctive domains registered to C&C IP infrastructure. Beginning in early 2019, these threat actors targeted a number of government agencies in East Asia overseeing government information technology, domestic affairs, foreign affairs, economic development, and political processes. We determined that the infection vector observed in this campaign was spear phishing, with emails originating from both free email accounts and compromised user accounts. Attackers relied on Microsoft Equation Editor exploit CVE-2018-0798 to deliver a custom malware that Proofpoint researchers have dubbed Cotx RAT. Additionally, this APT group utilizes Poison Ivy payloads that share overlapping command and control (C&C) infrastructure with the newly identified Cotx campaigns. Based on infrastructure overlaps, post-exploitation techniques, and historic TTPs utilized in this operation, Proofpoint analysts attribute this activity to the Chinese APT group tracked internally as TA428. Researchers believe that this activity has an operational and tactical resemblance to the Maudi Surveillance Operation which was previously reported in 2013.


TA444 is a North Korea state-sponsored threat actor that primarily focuses on financially motivated operations. They have been active since at least 2017 and have recently shifted their attention to targeting cryptocurrencies. TA444 employs various infection methods and has a diverse range of malware and backdoors at their disposal. They have been attributed to stealing hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of cryptocurrency and related assets.


TA453 has employed the use of compromised accounts, malware, and confrontational lures to go after targets with a range of backgrounds from medical researchers to realtors to travel agencies.


TA455 is an Iranian APT group targeting the aerospace industry through a campaign known as the “Iranian Dream Job Campaign,” utilizing deceptive job offers to lure victims. They employ spearphishing tactics with malicious ZIP files containing the executable “secur32[.]dll” and disguise their C2 communications within the traffic of reputable services like Cloudflare and GitHub. The group intentionally mimics the TTPs of the North Korean Lazarus group to mislead investigators and complicate attribution. Their multi-stage infection strategy enhances the likelihood of success while evading detection.


Since early 2022, Proofpoint researchers have observed a prolific threat actor, tracked as TA482, regularly engaging in credential harvesting campaigns that target the social media accounts of mostly US-based journalists and media organizations. This victimology, TA482’s use of services originating from Turkey to host its domains and infrastructure, as well as Turkey’s history of leveraging social media to spread pro-President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and pro-Justice and Development Party (Turkey’s ruling party) propaganda support Proofpoint’s assessment that TA482 is aligned with the Turkish state.


TA4903 is a financially motivated threat actor known for conducting credential phishing and business email compromise campaigns. They target organizations in the U.S. across various sectors, spoofing government entities and private businesses. The actor has been observed using techniques such as QR codes in phishing campaigns and spoofing supplier domains to prompt victims to provide banking information. TA4903's activities typically involve stealing corporate credentials to facilitate follow-on BEC activities.


TA499, also known as Vovan and Lexus, is a Russia-aligned threat actor that has aggressively engaged in email campaigns since at least 2021.  The threat actor’s campaigns attempt to convince high-profile North American and European government officials as well as CEOs of prominent companies and celebrities into participating in recorded phone calls or video chats.


TA505, the name given by Proofpoint, has been in the cybercrime business for at least four years. This is the group behind the infamous Dridex banking trojan and Locky ransomware, delivered through malicious email campaigns via Necurs botnet. Other malware associated with TA505 include Philadelphia and GlobeImposter ransomware families.


This actor typically distributes instances of the SmokeLoader intermediate downloader, which, in turn, downloads additional malware of the actor’s choice -- often banking Trojans. Figure 3 shows a lure document from a November campaign in which TA516 distributed fake resumes with malicious macros that, if enabled, launch a PowerShell script that downloads SmokeLoader. In this instance, we observed SmokeLoader downloading a Monero coinminer. Since the middle of 2017, TA516 has used similar macro-laden documents as well as malicious JavaScript hosted on Google Drive to distribute both Panda Banker and a coinminer executable via SmokeLoader, often in the same campaigns.


TA530, who we previously examined in relation to large-scale personalized phishing campaigns


TA547 is responsible for many other campaigns since at least November 2017. The other campaigns by the actor were often localized to countries such as Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Delivered malware included ZLoader (a.k.a. Terdot), Gootkit, Ursnif, Corebot, Panda Banker, Atmos, Mazar Bot, and Red Alert Android malware.


Since May 2018, Proofpoint researchers have observed email campaigns using a new downloader called sLoad. sLoad is a PowerShell downloader that most frequently delivers Ramnit banker and includes noteworthy reconnaissance features. The malware gathers information about the infected system including a list of running processes, the presence of Outlook, and the presence of Citrix-related files. sLoad can also take screenshots and check the DNS cache for specific domains (e.g., targeted banks), as well as load external binaries.
While initial versions of sLoad appeared in May 2018, we began tracking the campaigns from this actor (internally named TA554) since at least the beginning of 2017.


Beginning in May 2018, Proofpoint researchers observed a previously undocumented downloader dubbed AdvisorsBot appearing in malicious email campaigns. The campaigns appear to primarily target hotels, restaurants, and telecommunications, and are distributed by an actor we track as TA555. To date, we have observed AdvisorsBot used as a first-stage payload, loading a fingerprinting module that, as with Marap, is presumably used to identify targets of interest to further infect with additional modules or payloads. AdvisorsBot is under active development and we have also observed another version of the malware completely rewritten in PowerShell and .NET.


Since 2018, security researchers tracked a financially-motivated cybercrime actor, TA558, targeting hospitality, travel, and related industries located in Latin America and sometimes North America, and western Europe. The actor sends malicious emails written in Portuguese, Spanish, and sometimes English. The emails use reservation-themed lures with business-relevant themes such as hotel room bookings. The emails may contain malicious attachments or URLs aiming to distribute one of at least 15 different malware payloads.


One of the most active Qbot malware affiliates, Proofpoint has tracked the large cybercrime threat actor TA570 since 2018.


TA571 is a spam distributor actor known for delivering a variety of malware, including DarkGate, NetSupport RAT, and information stealers. They use phishing emails with macro-enabled attachments to spread malicious PDFs containing rogue OneDrive links. TA571 has been observed using unique filtering techniques with intermediary "gates" to target specific users and bypass automated sandboxing. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence that TA571 infections can lead to ransomware.


TA575 is a Dridex affiliate tracked by Proofpoint since late 2020. This group distributes malware such as Dridex, Qakbot, and WastedLocker via malicious URLs, Office attachments, and password-protected files. On average, TA575 distributes almost 4,000 messages per campaign impacting hundreds of organizations.


TA577 is a prolific cybercrime threat actor tracked by Proofpoint since mid-2020. This actor conducts broad targeting across various industries and geographies, and Proofpoint has observed TA577 deliver payloads including Qbot, IcedID, SystemBC, SmokeLoader, Ursnif, and Cobalt Strike.


TA578, a threat actor that Proofpoint researchers have been tracking since May of 2020. TA578 has previously been observed in email-based campaigns delivering Ursnif, IcedID, KPOT Stealer, Buer Loader, BazaLoader, and Cobalt Strike.


TA579, a threat actor that Proofpoint researchers have been tracking since August 2021. This actor frequently delivered BazaLoader and IcedID in past campaigns.


TA584 is a prominent initial access broker tracked by Proofpoint since November 2020, known for its high-volume campaigns targeting organizations globally. The actor employs various TTPs, including macro-enabled Excel documents, aggressive URL filtering, and geo-fenced landing pages, while frequently changing lures and delivery methods to evade detection. In 2025, TA584 expanded its geographic targeting to include Germany and Australia, while also introducing new malware such as Tsundere Bot alongside XWorm with the "P0WER" configuration. The actor's campaigns are characterized by rapid turnover and deliberate variability, making static indicators less effective for detection.


This attacker is an affiliate distributor of the The Trick, also known as Trickbot, and BazaLoader. (For more on how affiliates work, see the description of TA573).
TA800 has targeted a wide range of industries in North America, infecting victims with banking Trojans and malware loaders (malware designed to download other malware onto a compromised device). Malicious emails have often included recipients’ names, titles and employers along with phishing pages designed to look like the targeted company. Lures have included hard-to-resist subjects such as related to payment, meetings, termination, bonuses and complaints in the subject line or body of the email.


TA829 is a Russia-aligned threat actor that employs the RomCom RAT for intelligence-gathering and financially motivated cyberattacks, exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in Mozilla Firefox and Microsoft Windows. The group utilizes REM Proxy services hosted on compromised MikroTik routers to relay traffic and disguise its origin. In their operations, victims targeted by TA829 receive a strain known as SlipScreen, while their infrastructure and tactics show significant similarities to those of UNK_GreenSec. TA829's hybrid approach combines espionage with financial fraud, making it a notable player in the cyber threat landscape.


According to Proofpoint, TA866 is a newly identified threat actor that distributes malware via email utilizing both commodity and custom tools. While most of the activity observed occurred since October 2022, Proofpoint researchers identified multiple activity clusters since 2019 that overlap with TA866 activity. Most of the activity recently observed by Proofpoint suggests recent campaigns are financially motivated, however assessment of historic related activities suggests a possible, additional espionage objective.


TAG-112 is a Chinese state-sponsored APT that compromised Tibetan websites, including Tibet Post and Gyudmed Tantric University, to deliver Cobalt Strike malware. The group exploited vulnerabilities in the Joomla CMS to embed malicious JavaScript that spoofed a TLS certificate error, tricking users into downloading a compromised security certificate. TAG-112's infrastructure, concealed using Cloudflare, shows notable overlap with TAG-102, but it employs less sophisticated tactics, relying on Cobalt Strike rather than custom malware. The campaign reflects ongoing cyber-espionage efforts targeting Tibetan entities, likely for information collection and surveillance.


TAG-124 is a threat actor that employs a traffic distribution system to distribute malware, primarily using MintsLoader and targeting various sectors through phishing emails and compromised websites. The actor injects malicious JavaScript into WordPress sites, leading victims to fake Google Chrome update landing pages that facilitate malware downloads, often masquerading as legitimate updates. TAG-124 has been linked to multiple ransomware groups, including Rhysida and Interlock, and demonstrates high activity levels by regularly updating its infrastructure and refining its infection tactics, such as the ClickFix technique. Notable compromised sites include those associated with the Polish Centre for Testing and Certification and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).


TAG-140 is a threat actor group that primarily targets Indian government entities, employing cyber espionage tactics such as phishing and malware campaigns. They have deployed a new variant of the DRAT RAT, known as DRAT V2, which utilizes a ClickFix lure and executes a remote script via mshta.exe to establish persistence and facilitate data exfiltration. Their operations include the use of the BroaderAspect loader and a custom TCP-based C2 protocol, enabling a range of post-exploitation activities. TAG-140's activities reflect a pattern of iterative advancement in their malware arsenal and delivery techniques, complicating detection and attribution efforts.


TAG-28 is a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor that has been targeting Indian organizations, including media conglomerates and government agencies. They have been using the Winnti malware, which is commonly shared among Chinese state-sponsored groups. TAG-28's main objective is to gather intelligence on Indian targets, potentially for espionage purposes.


TAG-56 is a threat actor group that shares similarities with the APT42 group. They use tactics such as fake registration pages and spearphishing to target victims, often using encrypted chat platforms like WhatsApp or Telegram. TAG-56 is believed to be part of a broader campaign led by an Iran-nexus threat activity group. They have been observed using shared web hosts and recycled code, indicating a preference for acquiring purpose-built infrastructure rather than establishing their own.